NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 35; INDIA; ARMED FORCES

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WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by May 1973. Lr
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i.
This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by May 1973. Lr
'M
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CONTENTS
This chapter superrectes the Armed Forces cov-
erage in the Cenen4 Survey doted February 1970.
A. Defense establishment
1
1. Military history
2
2. Commar. d structure
4
B. joint activities
5
1. Military manpower
5
2. Strength trends
6
3. Training
7
4. Military budget
7
5. Economic support and logistics
7
6. Uniforms and insignia
8
C Army
14
I. Organization
14
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
15
3. Training
17
4. Logistics
18
5. Army aviation
19
SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEM
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P age
Page
i D. Navy
19
E. Air force
27
1. Organization
21
1. Organization
30
i 2. Strength, composition, and disposition
22
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
31
3. Training
23
3. Training
4. Logistics
31
33
4. Logistics
24
5. Naval air arm
26
F. Paramilitary forces
33
FIGURES
Page
Page
Fig. 1
Organization of the Ministry of
Fig. 14
OSA 1 class patrol boat (photo)
20
Defense (chart)
4
Fig. 15
Indian Naval Headquarters or-
Fig. 2
Camel- mounted infantrymen photo)
5
ganization chart)
21
Fig. 3
Personnel strengths table)
7
Fig. 16
INS Kalvari, F class submarine
Fig. 4
Annual military expenditures/
photo)
23
budget (table)
8
Fig. 17
INS Kamorta, PETYA class escort
Fig. 5
Officers' uniforms and insignia
photo)
23
(sketch)
9
Fig. 18
INS Bhatkal, inshore minesweeper
Fig. 6
Enlisted men's uniforms and in-
photo)
25
sigma (sketch)
11
Fig. 19
The aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant
Fig. 7
Organization of Army Headquar-
photo)
26
Fig. 8
ters chart)
Tampella mortar photo)
15
15
Fig. 20
Fig. 21
MiG -21FL (FisBBEV) photo)
Gvm EmNE (SA 2) surface to air
28
Fig. 9
T -55 medium tank photo)
16
missile photo)
28
Fig. 10
Vijayanta medium tank photo)
16
Fig. 22
HF -24 Marut jet photo)
29
Fig. 11
76 -mm mountain howitzer photo)
16
Fig. 23
Organization of the Indian Air
Fig. 12
SS -11 wire- guided missiles (photo)
16
Force Headquarters (chart)
30
Fig. 13
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INS Nilgiri (photo)
19
Fig. 24
HJT -16 Mk, II Kiran jet (photo)
32
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Armed Forces
A. Defense establishment
The major non Communist military power in Asia,
India has 1,257,000 men in its regular armed forces. Its
army is the third largest in the world, with a strength
of 1,092,000 (plus 28,000 integrated armed police),
which can be augmented by more than 260 battalions
of federal and state armed police totaling 347,000
men. Its navy, with 33,000 personnel and 110 ships, is
the smallest of the three services, while its air force,
with 104,000 men and 1,399 aircraft (745 jets), is the
second largest in non Communist Asia. Overall, the
armed forces are effective and have improved
markedly during the last decade. (S)
India's ground forces are capable of maintaining
internal security, could repeat their past successes
against Pakistan, and could probably repel a
conventional attack by the People's Republic of
China. The navy, although organized for coastal
patrol, escort, and antisubmarine warfare, would
probably be unable to defend the long Indian
coastline and sealanes of communications against a
substantial naval force. The air force would be able to
provide air defense and tactical and logistical support
of the ground forces against either Pakistan or China,
but sustained operations of more than a few months
would require extensive foreign supply of spare parts
and replacement aircraft. (S)
The huge manpower pool� estimated at 77 million
men fit for military service �would theoretically
permit a great expansion of the armed forces, but
illiteracy, limited training facilities, and logistic
problems would probably permit mobilization of only
a small part of this pool. Although India is committed
to a policy of attaining self- sufficiency in the
production of major items of military equipment and
has made progress in this direction, it will be some
years before it will be able to achieve complete
independence of foreign sources of supply and
attendant financial and political difficulties. (S)
In keeping with its policy o'l nonalignment, India
has rejected membership in regional military pacts, in
contrast to Pakistan which joined both the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). India also has
shown little interest in cooperative planning and
mutual defense of South Asia. However, it has signed
similarly worded treaties of "friendship" with the
Soviet Union (August 1971) and with Bangladesh
(March 1972) that essentially provide for mutual
consultations in event of an attack on either signatory
by a third power. Furthermore, India by agreement
exchanges military information with Nepal and
Bhutan and is responsible for the defense of Sikkim.
(S)
Many Indians believe that the willingness of both
the Soviet Union and some Western nations to supply
military hardwara confirms the wisdom of the policy
of nonalignment. Whatever gratitude the West,
especially the United States, earned for the
considerable military assistance rendered following the
Chinese attack in 1962 was subsequently negated by
the cutoff of military assistance during the September
1965 war with Pakistan and the inability of the United
States to prevent equipment it had supplied Pakistan
from being used against India. Under the terms of the
U.S. arms supply policy for South Asia adopted in
April 1967, the U.S. Military Assistance Program was
discontinued and replaced by a policy of permitting
sales of 1) nonlethal end items, 2) spare parts for
previously furnished end -items on a case -by -case basis,
and 3) ammunition for previously supplied end items,
also on a case -by -case basis. All military sales were
banned at the outbreak of the war between India and
Pakistan in December 1971. This ban, however, was
lifted in March 1973, at which time the United States
reverted to the 1967 policy. (U /OU)
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1. Military history
When the Indian subcontinent was partitioned in
August 1947 to form the nations of India and
Pakistan, the British controlled military forces of India
were divided proportionately between the two
countries. This division of personnel, units, materiel,
and facilities, coupled with the withdrawal of most of
the British officers and the reorganization and
relocation of units, reduced the effectiveness of the
forces remaining in India. After partition, efforts to
reorganize and expand the armed forces were
complicated b; governmental and civil adjustments
necessitated by partition and by the deployment of
forces to areas affected by the mass migrations and
large -scale communal rioting that followed the
formation of the two new countries. (C)
In late 1947 and in 1948 the new Indian Army and
Air Force engaged in a small -scale war with Pakistan
in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir area, an4 :or the
first time Indian officers commanded relatively large
forces in battle. Many of the army units involved on
both sides had seen service with the British in World
Wars I and II and belonged to regiments with long
records of fighting against dissident Pathan tribes in
what was then British India's North -West Frontier
Province. U.N. mediation brought about a cease -fire
in Kashmir in 1949, and a U.N. Military Observer
Group was set up to watch over the cease -fire line that
was established. This group was still functioning in
mid -1973. In the decade following the cease -fire in
Kashmir in 1949, the Indian Government regarded
Pakistan as the primary threat to its security. The
major portions of the armed forces of both countries
were kept deployed along the common boundaries,
and with the Indians the maintenance of military
superiority over Pakistan became a key objective of
national policy. In 1959, however, a shift in emphasis
began when Chinese and Indian troops clashed in
Ladakh' and at Longju in Arunachal Pradesh (north
of Assam). India reacted to this new threat by
expanding armed forces programs, improving
transportation and communications in the Sino-
Indian border area, and increasing domestic defense
production. Some progress was achieved in improving
the effectiveness of the armed forces during the next 3
years, but a number of serious weaknesses remained.
World War II -type materiel constituted the major
portion of weapons arid equipment on hand, and
India continued to depend largely on foreign sources
'For diacritics on place names see the list of name. on the apron
of the Summary `tap in the Country Profile chapter and the map
itself.
2
for complex items of military equipment. in addition,
progress in improving the transportation net in the
rugged Himalayan border area, including Bhutan,
was difficult and slow. Indian leaders continued,
though, to view Pakistan as the primary threat and,
therefore, gave lower priority to strengthening the
defense capabilities of those forces facing Tibet and
Sinkiang. (C)
These weaknesses quickly became apparent when
Chinese forces attacked in Ladakh and in Arunachal
Pradesh in October 1962. India appealed to the West
for modern weapons and equipment, and Indian
forces were hurriedly redeployed from the Pakistan
border to meet the Chinese threat. However, the forces
were committed piecemeal, tactical considerations
were subordinated to an unrealistic political policy,
leadership proved faulty, and the logistical system
proved inadequate. The Chinese readily seized much
of the territory that they had been claiming; then,
with winter coming on, they drew back and called on
the Indians to negotiate. Subsequent decisions by the
Indian Government resulted in a major increase in
Indian armed strength, and intensive efforts were
made to reorganize and reequip the armed forces. (C)
Limited hostilities between India and Pakistan
erupted in the spring of 1965 in the desolate Rann of
Kutch area over a longstanding border dispute. The
Pakistanis came off slightly better in the series of small
unit engagements; the Indian Army refrained from
engaging the Pakistan Army on a large scale because
of the difficult terrain and attendant problems.
Although the British Prime Minister arranged a cease-
fire and the dispute was submitted to international
arbitration, a second and more devastating conflict
with Pakistan opened on 1 September 1965, some 3
weeks after Pakistani infiltrators had crossed the
Kashmir cease -fire line with a mission to galvanize the
Muslims of the Vale of Kashmir into open revolt.
Retaliatory Indian attacks across the cease -fire line at
three points in nort!ern Kashmir were followed by a
large -scale Pakistani advance into the southern part of
the state. Its supply lines threatened, India made a
three pronged attack across the international border in
the Punjab area. Thereafter, the war became a battle
of attrition, with India launching attacks in numerous
sectors, thereby greatly extending Pakistan's lines of
defense. Pakistani forces were almost totally
committed while India was able to maintain
simultaneously both the initiative and a sizable
reserve, and, in addition, its defenses against China
remained essentially intact. Although a tintinuation
of the war might have been costly for India,
eventually the Indians Could have scorn down
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Pakistani defenses. Throughout the conflict, the
Chinese along India's northern border confined their
activities to the adoption of threatening military
postures and the issuance of ultimatums. (C)
The United Nations effected a cease fire on 22
September, and a second observer group, United
Nations India- Pakistan Observer Mission, was
established; its mission was separate and distinct from
that of the U.N. Military Observer Group that has
watched over the Kashmir cease -fire line since 1949.
In December 1965, Pakistan and India accepted a
recommendation by the Secretary General of the
United Nations that he provide a senior military
officer to assist in the withdrawal of military forces
from the areas of conflict. The U.N. representative's
mission was greatly facilitated by meetings in January
1966 between President Ayub of Pakistan and Indian
Prime Minister Shastri at Tashkent in the Soviet
Union. Withdrawal was accomplished in February
and early March 1966, all forces being returned to
locations within their respective international
boundaries and on the appropriate sides of the 1949
Kashmir cease -fire line. (C)
Open hostilities again occurred in December 1971.
Following Islamabad's suppression of its eastern
province's autonomy drive in March 1971, refugees
poured into India from East Pakistan and Bengali
freedom fighters escaped to India where, with New
Delhi's assistance, they established the independent
Republic of Bangladesh in Calcutta and set about
building a guerrilla force to continue the fight. After
months of increasing insurgency, New Delhi's armed
forces intervened in the East Pakistani fighting on 21
November in what was termed a "defensive" reaction.
Hostilities erupted in the west on 3 December when
Pakistani aircraft attacked Indian military airfields
under the guise of responding to Pakistani claimed
Indian ground attacks in West Pakistan. New Delhi
views this as the beginning of the war, while
Islamabad cites the Indian attacks in the east on 21
November as the start. Indian strategy called for a
defensive posture on its western border while its forces
subdued the Pakistani forces in the cast. Three corps
size thrusts, involv; at least seven divisions, were
launched simultaacously into the eastern province on
4 December. Indian heliborne and parachute assaults
circumvented Pakistani strongpoints in East Pakistan.
Indian forces surrounded Dacca on 13 December,
although Pakistani units continued to resist from
isolated cantonments and fortified strongpoints
throughout the province. Islamabad's forces
surrendered in Dacca on 16 December. Except for
naval attacks on Karachi harbor. the war in the west
was unspectacular. Army units blunted Pakistani
attacks across the Kashmir cease -fire line and made
several significant gains, especially in the Thar Desert.
A cease -fire, proposed by India, was accepted by
Pakistan on 17 December. China supported Pakistan
diplomatically throughout the war but made no
threatening military moves along India's northern
border. (S)
India has utilized its armed forces as instruments of
both internal and international policy. Army and air
force elements have been engaged in antiguerrilla
operations against dissident Nagas (1951 -71) and
Mizos (1966 -71) in northeastern India, and all three
services participated in the brief, successful operation
to seize Goa from the Portuguese in December 1961.
India furnished limited military medical support to
U.N. forces during the Korean war, and after the
cease -fire provided army personnel to supervise the
prisoner exchange and other aspects of the settlement.
Additionally, India has provided military personnel
for the International Control Commission in the
Indochina area since 1954. An Indian infantry
battalion formed part of the U.N. Emergency Force in
the Israel -Egypt border area from 1956 until
withdrawn in May 1967, just prior to the Arab Israeli
war. From November 1960 to March 1963, India
provided an infantry brigade for the U.N. effort in the
Congo. In addition, Indian military personnel have
provided training assistance in Bangladesh, Bhutan,
the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Nepal, Iraq, and
Nigeria. Spaces are allotted in Indian service schools
for military students from other countries, including
Egypt, Ethiopia. Nigeria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Burma,
Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and various other
Commonwealth countries, and the United States. (C)
Under the constitution, defense policy is a civil
rather than a military responsibility, and the armed
forces generally avoid involvement in politics, but on
occasion have been used to assist civilian agencies
during internal disorders. Military service carries
prestige, however, and defense expenditures constitute
a major item in the national budget. (C)
British tradition and influence in India's armed
forces linger on, especially in attitudes and in the fields
of staff procedures, organization, and tactical
doctrine. Soviet influence may grow, however, in light
of the fact that the U.S.S.R. has become the
predominant foreign source of heavy and /or
sophisticated military equipment since the 1965
hostilities with Pakistan and has strongly supported
the development of India's aircraft industry. (C)
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2. Command structure (S)
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The constitution vests supreme command of the
armed forces in the President of the Republic (Figure
1). In actuality, the cabinet, headed by the Prime
Minister, exercises this control with the advice and
assistance of the Cabinet Committee on Political
Affairs (CCPA). This committee is responsible for
formulating broad policy pertaining to national
defense, and the Prime Minister is its chairman. The
CCPA membership includes the Minister of Defense
and those other ministers whose offices are concerned
with matters related to defense.
The Minister of Defense is responsible for all
matters dealing with the defense establishment. He is
assisted by the Defense Secretary a civil servant who
controls and coordinates the activities of the ministry
through a Civil Secretariat. This Secretariat is divided
into a number of divisions, each concerned with the
matters of either a particular service or of an
interservice nature. These divisions are headed b,
various joint, Deputy, and Under Secretaries. The
Minister of Defense is also assisted by two other
elements of the ministry �the Defense Minister's
Committee and the Defense Minister's (Production
and Supply) Committee. Directed by the Minister of
Defense, the former is responsible for the country's
defense plan and all important matters concerning the
three services. The latter is under the supervision of the
Minister of Defense Production, who is not a cabinet
member; it is responsible for all matters pertaining to
research and development, defense production and
implementation of detailed plans for replacing
imports of military equipment with domestically
produced equipment.
Decisions of the CCPA and the Defense Ministers'
Committees are transmitted for action to the Chiefs of
Staffs Committee (CSC) or, if only one service is
concerned, to the chief of staff of that service. The
CSC, consisting of the heads of the three services, is
responsible for preparing strategic estimates and plans
and for advising the government on strategy and
service matters. In addition, the Chiefs of Staff
Committee makes recommendations to the CCPA on
all- service matters. Subcommittees of the CSC deal
with matters of a joint- service nature: planning,
operations, intelligence, training, and other ser-
vicewide matters. In addition to his advisory role as a
member of the CSC, the chief of staff of each service
in his command role is responsible for executing policy
decisions.
In addition to these officially constituted defense
committees, in time of hostilities or national crisis the
government may form ad hoc groups or expand
existing advisory groups. This was done in the fall of
1962, when a number of leading political, scientific,
and industrial figures as well as several senior retired'
military leaders were invited to join key cabinet
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President
Cabinet Committee
I
Prime Minister
on Political Affairs
Cabinet
I
Chiefs of Staff
Defense Minister's
De fense Secreta
Defense Minister's
Committee
Secretariat
Committee
(Production and Supply)
Com mittee
Minister of Defense
Production
interservice
Department Department
Air
Army
Navy Force
Divisions
of of
Defense Defense
Production Supplies
FIGURE
1. Organization
of the Ministry of Defense,
1973 (U /OU)
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representatives in a National Defense Council. This
council was charged with advising the government on
all matters relating to defense, especially in fields
related to public participation in national defense. In
the September 1965 conflict with Pakistan, the
Emergency Committee of the cabinet assumed the
functions of the CCPA, and in the December 1971
conflict, a committee of senior officials under the
chairmanship of the Cabinet `Secretary provided a
convenient forum for coordination between the
military and civilian sectors. Arrangements were also
worked out for effective coordination between defense
and foreign policies.
B. Joint activities
1. Military manpower (C)
As of 1 July 1973, India had 138,212,000 males in
the ages 15 to 49. It is estimated that 78,630,000, or
about 57 were physically fit for military service. The
average number of males expected to be reaching
military age (17) each yea in the period 1973 -77 is
estimated at 6,214,000. A breakdown by age groups
follows:
Total, 15 -49 138,212,000 78,630,000
Service in the armed forces is voluntary, and there is
no provision for conscription during wartime.
Enlistment is normally for 10 or 15 years. By law,
recruitment is open to all, without distinction as to
caste, creed, or race, and is governed by competitive
merit and physical fitness. In practice, however,
certain traditional "martial classes" (Sikhs, Rajputs,
Jats, and Marathas) still dominate the officer corps
and form the hard core of the enlisted ranks. Efforts
arc being made to recruit more widely in order to give
the services more of an all -India character. This
program appears to be progressing slowly, but the bulk
of military manpower is still from north India. Women
serve in each of the medical branches of the armed
forces under the same terms of enlistment as men. The
majority are assigned to the army as medical officers,
military nurses, and "Lady Health Visitors."
Because of the great manpower surplus available
and the general popularity of military service, the
armed forces can screen and recruit better -than-
average personnel by Indian criteria. The national
literacy rate is less than 30 however, and there is a
general lack of technical experience. Consequently,
recruits require extensive training, especially for jobs
which call for technical skills. Despite the low health
standards in India as a whole, the armed forces have
maintained a relatively high physical standard
through careful selection of recruits and adherence to
sound dietary and hygienic programs within the
services. As the national educational level improves
with the growing enforcement of compulsory
schooling for all children, the educational level of
recruits will rise.
Armed forces personnel are generally slender and
wiry and have outstanding endurance. Recruits
respond well to discipline and take readily to military
life. Regimental traditions (Figure 2) and the
economic security and prestige afforded by military
service influence many to remain on active duty until
retirement age, and this contributes significantly to
the professional competence of the armed forces.
Senior officers are generally capable (a junior
officers in World War II many had distinguished
combat records). The withdrawal of most of the British
officers at the time of partition and the gradual
departure of the remaining few during the 1950's
I
ley
FIGURE 2. The camel- mounted infantr- men of the Ganga
laisalmer Risala Battalion symbolize longstanding military
traditions. The unit is used for patrolling the desert
frontier with Pakistan. (U /OU)
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MAXIMUM
NUMBER FIT FOR
ACE
TOTAL MALES
MILITARY SERVICE
15 -19
29,259,000
18,435,000
20 -24
23,639,000
14,110,000
25 -29
28,828,000
12,225,000
30 -34
19,800,000
11,285,000
35 -39
17,228,000
9,335,000
40 -44
14,751,000
7,420,000
45 -49
12,707,000
5,820,000
Total, 15 -49 138,212,000 78,630,000
Service in the armed forces is voluntary, and there is
no provision for conscription during wartime.
Enlistment is normally for 10 or 15 years. By law,
recruitment is open to all, without distinction as to
caste, creed, or race, and is governed by competitive
merit and physical fitness. In practice, however,
certain traditional "martial classes" (Sikhs, Rajputs,
Jats, and Marathas) still dominate the officer corps
and form the hard core of the enlisted ranks. Efforts
arc being made to recruit more widely in order to give
the services more of an all -India character. This
program appears to be progressing slowly, but the bulk
of military manpower is still from north India. Women
serve in each of the medical branches of the armed
forces under the same terms of enlistment as men. The
majority are assigned to the army as medical officers,
military nurses, and "Lady Health Visitors."
Because of the great manpower surplus available
and the general popularity of military service, the
armed forces can screen and recruit better -than-
average personnel by Indian criteria. The national
literacy rate is less than 30 however, and there is a
general lack of technical experience. Consequently,
recruits require extensive training, especially for jobs
which call for technical skills. Despite the low health
standards in India as a whole, the armed forces have
maintained a relatively high physical standard
through careful selection of recruits and adherence to
sound dietary and hygienic programs within the
services. As the national educational level improves
with the growing enforcement of compulsory
schooling for all children, the educational level of
recruits will rise.
Armed forces personnel are generally slender and
wiry and have outstanding endurance. Recruits
respond well to discipline and take readily to military
life. Regimental traditions (Figure 2) and the
economic security and prestige afforded by military
service influence many to remain on active duty until
retirement age, and this contributes significantly to
the professional competence of the armed forces.
Senior officers are generally capable (a junior
officers in World War II many had distinguished
combat records). The withdrawal of most of the British
officers at the time of partition and the gradual
departure of the remaining few during the 1950's
I
ley
FIGURE 2. The camel- mounted infantr- men of the Ganga
laisalmer Risala Battalion symbolize longstanding military
traditions. The unit is used for patrolling the desert
frontier with Pakistan. (U /OU)
19
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resulted in the rapid promotion of Indian officers into
positions that in many cases they were unqualified by
experience to fill. Limitations on funds and training
facilities restricted the scope and number of training
exercises which could have provided needed practice
in handling larger units. This lack of experience was
demonstrated by the general ineptness of several senior
commanders in the fighting with the Chinese in 1962.
The rapid expansion of Indian military services,
particularly the army, in the period between the
Chinese and Pakistani border hostilities also caused a
shortage of qualified leaders. However, as a result of
the shortcomings made evident in these conflicts, the
general leveling -off of armed forces expansion, and
high -level command and staff experience gained in
1962 and 1965, leadership has improved at all levels.
Morale of the armed forces is good. Pay, allowances,
and various fringe benefits give the Indian serviceman
a higher standard of living and greater prestige than
the average civilian. Morale varies somewhat from
unit to unit, however, depending on leadership,
equipment, and local conditions, and isolated
instances of poor morale have been noted. Army units
stationed for long periods at high altitudes in the
Himalayas, for example, are prone to discipline and
morale problems. However, regular troop rotations
usually restore both morale and discipline. Addition-
ally, special allowances have been granted for those
stationed in especially undesirable locations.
Morale in the officer corps has been adversely
affected from time to time by political decisions which
appeared to be inimical to service interests. This was
particularly true in the early 1960's under Minister of
Defense V. K. Krishna Menon, who disregarded
established service practices and traditions and whose
policies led to the premature retirement of several of
the armed forces' most competent officers. The abrupt
dismissal of Menon in 1962 did much to restore officer
morale. Moreover, the government's reaction to the
hostilities with the Chinese in 1962, the successful
operations against the Pakistanis in 1965 and 1971,
and the receipt of first Western and then Soviet and
Eastern European arms aid, all tended to allay
concern over the status of Indian materiel and
stimulated morale throughout the armed forces.
The reserves for each of the services vary. The
Territorial Army, a civilian part -time reserve force
which has undergone considerable reduction and
reorganization as a result of its poor showing in the
1965 hostilities with Pakistan, is available for rapid
mobilization and would be assigned missions
comparable to those of regular units in time of
emergency. In peacetime, the Territorial Army can
6
relieve army units of static duty. Many of its
antiaircraft artillery regiments and infantry battalions
saw service in the December 1971 hostilities.
The reserve force of the Indian Navy has an
estimated strength of 3,200 men and is divided into
three basic elements: the Indian Naval Reserve,
comprising professional merchant marine officers; the
Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve, made up of other
periodically recruited officers keenly interested in
yachting; and the Flert Reserve of Sailors, manned by
ex- enlisted men transferred to the reserves on the
expiration of their regular service.
The reserves of the Indian Air Force consist of the
Regular Reserves, composed of men who have had
previous service in the Indian Air Force; the Air
Defense Reserves, composed of flying and technical
personnel associated with civil aviation; and the
Auxiliary Air Force, forming seven squadrons
composed of citizens who volunteer to receive air
training while following normal vocational pursuits.
In 1963, compulsory military training became
mandatory for all male students between- the ages of
13 and 26. These trainees were immediately absorbed
into the National Cadet Corps (NCC), which had
been established in 1948 as a voluntary ROTC -type
organization without actual service liability. Intended
to provide a reserve of potential officers for all anned
services (it has army, navy, and air force wings), the
NCC has not been a successful program. It is currently
plagued by a shortage of instructors and equipment,
particularly in technical units and the air force wing.
As of 1 January 1971 the corps was functioning at
about 3,000 colleges and 3,500 high schools; the
Senior Division had approximately 697,000 trainees,
and the Junior Division 673,000, the army wing of
each division being much the largest.
Terms of service, both active and reserve, range with
level of skill, the most skilled being required to serve
on active duty for the longest time. If the individual
serves the length of time of his obligatory reserve time
by extending his active duty service, lie is considered
to have fulfilled his reserve obligation.
2. Strength trends (S)
During the period 1948 -69 the total number of men
in the armed services quintupled; the army increased
over fourfold, the navy over fivefold, and the air force
nearly eightfold. Since then, there has been a general
leveling -off in the personnel strengths for all three
services (Figure 3). Emphasis is now being placed
upon improving quality rather than quantity.
NM
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FIGURE 3. Personnel strengths (S)
TOTAL
ARMED AIR
YEAR FORCES ARMY FORCE NAVY
1948.........
275,700
260,000
10,000
5,700
1952.........
421,700
400,000
12,700
9,000
1954.........
455,800
425,000
21,700
9,100
1956.........
413,100
380,000
22,100
11,000
1958.........
443,200
400,000
29,200
14,000
1960.........
459,800
410,000
33,300
16,500
1962.........
562,900
510,000
36,300
16,600
1964.........
926,400
864,000
45,500
16,900
1966.........
1,187,400
1,100,000
68,200
19,200
1969.........
1,228,900
1,120,000
77,000
31,900
1970.........
1,230,000
1,120,000
77,000
33,000
1971.........
1,233,200
1,120,000
78,200
35,000
1972.........
1,241,000
1,120,000
88,000
33,000
1973.........
1,257,000
*1,120,000
104,000
33,000
*Includes 28,000 armed police serving with the army.
3. Training (S)
Little of the training conducted in the armed forces
can be considered combined or joint training.
Concerted efforts have been made since the 1965
conflict with Pakistan to eliminate deficiencies in air
ground coordination. However, the December 1971
conflict with Pakistan again stressed the need for
additional combined arms training.
The National Defense College at New Delhi, the
Defense Services Staff College at Wellington (in the
far south), the National Defense Academy at
Kharakvasla and its feeder institution, the Rashtriya
Indian Military College at Debra Dun (in the far
north), are the major triservice academic institutions.
Additionally, technical schools such as the Armed
Forces Medical College at Pune (formerly Poona) and
the Ministry of Defense's School of Foreign Languages
at New Delhi serve the defense forces as a whole. Some
senior officers have received training in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.
Technical training is obtained from the foreign
suppliers of equipment.
4. Military budget (C)
The Ministry of Defense presents the proposed
defense budget to the Finance Minister for inclusion
in the central government budget, which is then
submitted tc.. ^arliament for approval. India's military
spending had been increasing at a relatively moderate
pace before the India- Pakistani war of December
1971. In FY1970/71 (1 April -31 March) defense
spending increased by 7% over FY1969/70 and was
budgeted to increase an additional 5% in FY1971/72
and reach US$1.66 billion. The conf.ontation with
Pakistan during April- November 1971 before the war
broke out did not substantially increase military
appropriations, but the hostilities the t erupted in
December 1971 resulted in military expenditures for
FY1971/72 increasing by about 20 compared to the
planned increase of 5 A supplementary expenditure
of about $223 million provided for the costs of extra
imports of equipment and added salaries and other
expenses generated by the war. The further sharp rise
of over 10% in defense spending in FY1972/73 reflects
the magnitude of the expansion in indigenous defense
production and the level of foreign arms procurement.
Actual military expenditures for FY1970/71 and
FY1971/72, and the approved military budgets for
FY1972/73 and FY1973/74 are shown in Figure 4.
5. Logistics
India has a rich reservoir of mineral, forest, and
power resources which provide a substantial base for
heavy industry. However, the economy is primarily
dependent upon agriculture, which accounts for
almost one -half of the GNP. The viability of the
economy is perennially challenged by a relentless
increase in population and shortages of transportation
facilities, electric power, industrial raw materials, and
managerial skills. (U /OU)
Since the early 1960's India has been committed to
the development of a domestic capacity to produce
military arms and equipment. India's economic
planners consider civil and military technology and
production as mutually supporting and believe that
domestic defense industries make positive contribu-
tions to the country's economic development. They
also feel that by becoming self sufficient in armament
production, India will be able to reduce its
disbursements of foreign exchange for needed military
materiel. India is producing a wide range of army
materiel, including all of its infantry weapons, light
artillery, and transport vehicles; most of the related
ammunition, engineering, and quartermaster items;
some types of field communication and radar
equipment; and several armored vehicles, including
the Vijayanta medium tank. The Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and the United
Kingdom are the major sources for larger caliber
artillery, armor, and related ammunition. All major
units of the Indian Navy fleet are foreign built.
However, domestic shipyards are building frigates,
inshore minesweepers, submarine chasers, and
auxiliaries. The country has a medium sized,
diversified aircraft industry. It is increasingly self
sufficient in the manufacture and assembly of its own
7
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FIGURE 4. Annual military expenditures /budget (C)
(In equivalent millions of U.S. dollars
EXPENDITURES BUDGET
FY 1970/71
Army 1,022
i Navy 126
Ai r Force 287
I,
Other military 142
Total 1,577
Percent of central government budget.... 20
Percent of GNP 3.0
*Converted at the rate of 7.5 rupees to US31.
*Approved budget.
*Includes capital expenditures for all three of the services, Ministry of Defense expensej, and
pensions.
8
f
r.
FY1971/72 FY1972/73 FY1973/74
1,253 1,318 1,249.2
150 171 114.1
371 390 432.1
109 197 337.9
1,883 .2,076 2,133.3
19 25 21
3.4 3.6 3.7
irectly responsible to this organization are the
irector General of Ordnance Factories, Director
eneral of Inspection, the Defense Research and
evelopment Organization, and the heads of several
utonomous undertakings such as Hindustan
eronautics, Ltd. (HAL), Bharat Electronics, Ltd.,
nd Praga Tools, Ltd. The Department of Defense
upplies is responsible for planning and implementing
ograms to develop the production in India of types
arms and military equipment that hitherto have
ad t-) be imported. This de artment is interested
articularly in the fields of electronics, vehicles, and
ipbuilding. Because of many difficulties, progress
as been, and will probably continue to be, slow. (S)
6. Uniforms and insignia (U`/0U)
Uniforms of the Indian Armed Forces are generally
milar in style, manner of wearing, color, and
aterial to those of the British Armed Forces. Since
e climate of India is mostly tropical or subtropical,
mmer uniforms are generally worn by army, navy,
d air force personnel the year round. These uniforms
ve a common styling and are olive drab for the
my, white for the navy, and tan for the air force. All
rvicemen of the Sikh religion, regardless of unit,
we the turban headdress �olive green in the army,
vy blue in the navy, and medium blue in the air
rce. White turbans are worn with dress uniforms.
The insignia system also has general similarities to
e British, but with some significant differences, such
the Indian national emblem (Asoka lions) in place
the British crown, and the use of a five pointed star
vice (pip) denoting grade of army personnel instead
the eight- pointed used by the British.
4
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I
i
jet aircraft, but it still must depend heavily on foreign
D
technical assistance for the major programs. Though it
D
has made progress, it is behind what the government
G
plans call for. Native design aircraft being produced
D
are the HF. -24 jet fighter and HJT -16 trainer. The
a
Soviet MiG -21 jet fighter, the British HS-
A
748 transport, and the French Sud- Aviation Alouette
a
III helicopter all are being produced under license,
S
i
most components being made in India. India has
pr
undertaken to produce under foreign license two
of
guided missiles, the SS -11 antitank guided missile
h
from France and the AA -2 A TOLL air -air missile
from the Soviet Union. (S)
p
The Soviet Union and India signed their first arms
sh
agreement in 1960. Since late 1965, the Soviet Union
h
has become India's chief foreign supplier of military
materiel. Prior to 1965, India had received military
assistance principally from the United Kingdom. For
the 1960 -72 period, military assistance from
si
Communist sources totaled approximately US$1.7
m
billion, with the Soviet Union supplying 92% of the
th
total Free world military assistance for the same'
su
period totaled $639.0 million, with the United
an
Kingdom and the United States supplying 51% and
ha
23% of the total, respectively. (C)
ar
The logistics system is coordinated at the Defense
se
Ministry level either directly by the minister or
w
through one of the various committees assisting him.
na
Logistics requirements, planning, and implementation
fo
are coordinated and directed by various agencies and
sections of the Ministry of Defense, depending on the
th
specific area of logistics being considered. The
as
Department of Defense Production deals with matteis
of
pertaining' to the manufacture of equipment and is
de
also responsible for research and development.
of
8
f
r.
FY1971/72 FY1972/73 FY1973/74
1,253 1,318 1,249.2
150 171 114.1
371 390 432.1
109 197 337.9
1,883 .2,076 2,133.3
19 25 21
3.4 3.6 3.7
irectly responsible to this organization are the
irector General of Ordnance Factories, Director
eneral of Inspection, the Defense Research and
evelopment Organization, and the heads of several
utonomous undertakings such as Hindustan
eronautics, Ltd. (HAL), Bharat Electronics, Ltd.,
nd Praga Tools, Ltd. The Department of Defense
upplies is responsible for planning and implementing
ograms to develop the production in India of types
arms and military equipment that hitherto have
ad t-) be imported. This de artment is interested
articularly in the fields of electronics, vehicles, and
ipbuilding. Because of many difficulties, progress
as been, and will probably continue to be, slow. (S)
6. Uniforms and insignia (U`/0U)
Uniforms of the Indian Armed Forces are generally
milar in style, manner of wearing, color, and
aterial to those of the British Armed Forces. Since
e climate of India is mostly tropical or subtropical,
mmer uniforms are generally worn by army, navy,
d air force personnel the year round. These uniforms
ve a common styling and are olive drab for the
my, white for the navy, and tan for the air force. All
rvicemen of the Sikh religion, regardless of unit,
we the turban headdress �olive green in the army,
vy blue in the navy, and medium blue in the air
rce. White turbans are worn with dress uniforms.
The insignia system also has general similarities to
e British, but with some significant differences, such
the Indian national emblem (Asoka lions) in place
the British crown, and the use of a five pointed star
vice (pip) denoting grade of army personnel instead
the eight- pointed used by the British.
4
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ar1f I@i. i1@1^ &5
r.
G ROUND FOR
FIELD MARSHAL GENERAL LIEUTENANT GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL
CAP INSIGNIA
GENERALS
BRIGADIER
COLONEL LIEUTENANT COLONEL MAJOR
CAP INSIGNIA
BRIGADIER
AND COLONEL
NOTE: 8�6
tl.t
'Tf P r n f �,9.11
r, YSr
1
o E E
Y.
w
FIELD UNIFORM f COLONEL
1 (,p b "A
NAVAL FORCES
..Y7, i F.
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII,
ADMIRAL VICE ADMIRAL REAR ADMIRAL COMMODORE
CAP INSIGNIA
CAPTAIN COMMANDER LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT SUBLIEUTENANT ACTING
COMMANDER SUB-LIEUTENANT
AIR FORCES
g g I
AIR CHIEF AIR MARSHAL AIR VICE MARSHAL AIR COMMODORE ':'rP INSIGNIA
MARSHAL AIR OFFICERS
1 9 9 Aft
GROUP CAPTAIN WING COMMANDER SQUADRON LEADER lw
SERVICE UNIFORM
4
i
V
i
k
I
t
t
i
11
f.
E'
G
CAP INScfON1A
OFFICERS
FIELD UNIFORM
FLIGHT LIEUTENANT FLYING OFFICER PILOT OFFICER
FIGURE 5. Officers' uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
F
9
,M
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r n n f rn r.arG ..n
I
Kam
JUNIOR COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
M 4 a a
SUBEDAR MAJOR/ SUBEDAR/ NAIB SUBEDAR NOlf. ^an d. n .o^
RISALDAR MAJOR RISALDAR �P ^a
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS In Armored Units
BATTALION BATTALION QUARTER- COMPANY
HAVILDAR MAJOR MASTER HAVILDAR HAVILDAR MAJOR
ga O, kA
FIELD UNIFORM
COMPANY QUARTER- HAVILDAR NAIK LANCE NAIK
MASTER HAVILDAR
NAVAL FORCES
(a 0G
CHIEF PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER LEADING SEAMAN
Is$
CAP INSIGNIA CAP INSIGNIA CAP INSIGNIA
CHIEF PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER OTHERS
SERVICE UNIFORM SERVICE UNIFORM
PETTY OFFICERS AIR FORCES SEAMEN
MASTER WARRANT OFFICER
WARRANT OFFICER
CAP INSIGNIA
FLIGHT SERGEANT SERGEANT CORPORAL LEADING
AIRCRAFTMAN
i FIELD UNIFORM
FIGURE 6. Junior commissioned officers', warrant officers', and enlisted men's uniforms
and insignia (U /OU)
Y
r
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rfn1 -1101 NFQ Iffro
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Y
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i
Peculiar to the Indian Army are the junior
commissioned officer (JCO) ranks. These were
established as a class by the British Indian Army
because its European officers were handicapped by
barriers of language and custom and, therefore, could
not exercise the necessary degree of control over the
ranks and establish close working relations with them.
The system was carried over into the Indian Army.
JCO's are invested with certain powers and privileges
of commissioned officers.
No graphic information is currently available on the
new naval ranks of master chief petty officer, class I
and class II, created in 1965 and on the new air force
rank of master warrant officer.
Summer field and service uniforms are shown in
Figures 5 and 6.
a. Uniforms
Army officers are issued three types of uniforms
field, service, and dress. Enlisted men are issued a
basic field- service uniform that is worn for all
occasions. The field and service uniforms are made of
olive drab wool material for winter and olive drab
cotton for summer wear. The officers dress uniforms
are made of tropical worsted or gabardine material.
The summer field uniform for officers consists of a
British style bush jacket, trcrosers, service cap or beret,
belt, and shoes or combat boors; a field shirt and pull-
over sweater may be worn in lien of the bush jacket.
The four pocket bush jacket is single breasted, has a
rolled collar, shoulderloops, and a belt of the same
material. This jacket is frequently worn with sleeves
rolled and may also be worn as a component of the
service uniform. In hot weather shorts with knee
length socks may be worn in lieu of long trousers. The
winter field uniform consists of a jacket, khaki shirt
and tie, trousers, leather or web belts, short canvas or
wrap leggings, combat boots or shoes, and beret or
service cap. The collar of the jacket is worn open. In
addition to the beret or service cap, a felt bush hat is
issued in some units.
Arm% enlisted men have summer and winter field
uniforms that are similar in design to those of officers,
except that the winter jacket is worn with the collar
buttoned and without shirt and tic. The bush jacket is
not worn. The usual headgear is a beret, but a helmet
or felt bush hat is issued in some units.
Army officers wear a service uniform consisting of a
coat, matching trousers, khaki shirt and tie, low
quarter shoes, and a service cap or beret. The four
pocket coat is single breasted, has a rolled collar,
shoulderloops, and belt of the same material. A Sam
Browne shoulder belt may be worn with the coat. The
service cap has an olive drab crown and visor, and a
brown leather ch'n strap. The summer service uniform
is similar to the winter uniform but of light weight
material. T he coat is not always worn and in hot
weather, shorts and knee length socks may be worn in
lieu of trousers. The dress uniform for icers is similar
in pattern to the service uniform except that it iS
tailored of tropical worsted or gabardine material. The
Sam Browne shoulder belt and service cap is worn with
this uniform.
The usual uniform for naval officers is the summer
service, which consists of a white bush jacket (similar
to that worn by array and air force officers) or un
open necked short sleeved white shirt with shoulder
boards, snatching trousers or shorts with white shoes
and knee- length stockings. The summer dress, worn on
more formal occasions, includes a white standing
collar, single breasted coat and matching trousers. The
traditional navy blue double breasted winter service
uniform is worn by naval officers when in cool
climates. Petty officer ranks wear summer and winter
service uniforms that are basically similar to those
worn by officers. They are also worn by leading
seamen in the supply, secretariat, and medical
branches, and by junior artificers (specialists). These
rates are identified by black horn buttons on the
uniform coat and red cap insignia. Petty officer ranks
and leading seamen are authorized a white summer
dress uniform that includes a white standing collar,
single breasted coat and matching trousers; winter
uniforms are similar to those of officers. The service
cap with a white cap cover is worn with officers and
petty officers uniforms.
Naval enlisted personnel in the lower ranks wear
standard white service and dress uniforms. The service
uniform includes white shorts, a square -cut, open
necked jumper with a blue border and short sleeves,
blue canvas belt, blue knee length stockings, and
black shoes. The dress uniform includes long white
trousers and white V- necked jumper with long sleeves
and square blue collar. A round, flat topped hat with
ribbon is worn with both uniforms.
Air force personnel wear uniforms that, except for
color and minor modifications, are similar in style to
those or Ole army. Summer uniforms arc tan colored
and winter uniforms a blue -gray, generally identified
as "RAF" blue. Headgear is Nue service or garrison
ca ps.
A
i
b. Insignia
The ranks of army officers and junior commissioned
officers are indicated by metallic or embroidered
devices displayed on shoulderloops. Embroidered
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insignia is worn by company havildar majors and
ahove, on the sleeves midway between the wrist and
elbow. All other ranks wear cloth chevrons on both
sleeves betw, -en the dhow and shoulder.
Naval officers wear insignia of rank either on
shoulderboards or sleeves. When displayed on
shoulderboards, insignia consists of gold stripes for
officers through the rank of conunodore. Flag rank
officers wear front one to three stars. Ilank stripes are
worn on the sleeves of the traditional navy Niue
uniform. Chief petty officer:+ have three gold buttons
in a horizontal row along th cuff of both sleeves of tilt'
jacket. Petty officers and leading seamen wear rating
badges on the left sleeve hetwecn the elbow and the
shoulder. From one to three bloc chevrons (Good
Conduct Badges) each representing 4 years of
satisfactory service are displayed below the rating
badges. Good Conduct Badges are also worn on the
left sleeve between the elbow and shoulder by
ordinary seamen.
The ranks of air force officers ;_re indicated by
varying numbers of blue cloth stripes displayed on
shouldcrboards of the summer field uniform or on
sleeves of the winter service uniform. Warrant officers'
rank insignia are embroidered and are displayed in the
same manner as those of officers. Other air force
JHTSPI i wear cloth chevrons on both sleeves lw1wecn
the elbow and the shoulder.
Distinctive cap devices are worn by officers of the
army with the rank of general through colonel. All
officers below the rank of colonel. the junior
commissioned officers, +lnd enlisted personnel wear
branch -of- service devices on headgear, except infantry
or cavalry personnel �tLey wear the budge of the
regiment to which they belong. The Indiatl ground
forces use both distinctive devices and colored berets
to indicate branch of service. Berets are dark green for
infantry personnel, black for cavalry and armor,
maroon for paratroopers and the President's
Bodyguard, and navy blue for al! other arms and
services. General officer: and colonris wear scarlet
bands on service caps and turban% and crimson c()Ilar
tabs.
Naval branch specialty badges are worn by seamen
on the right sleeve between the ellxrw and the shoulder
and by petty officers on their coat lapels.
Air force general officers wear a slightly different
cap insignia than that worn by other officers. Flying
hadges are worn over the left breast pocket.
C. Army
The Indian Array is charged with the mission of
territorial defense, internal security, and mkting in
14
civil emergency. It has more than doubled its strength
since 1962 as it result of rising; tension and of hostilities
on the country's borders. State Forces, formerly
maintained by the States of Assam and lananu and
Kashmir, and it nutnher of battalions of armed police
(normally under control of the various states) arc in
the regular army establishment on a semipermanent
basis. 'These forces arc used for both border security in
jannrnu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh and for
internal security (counterinsurgency in Nagaland,
Manipur, Mizoram, and Tripura). (C)
The principal strengths of the Indian Army include
a vast reservoir of available manpower, the excellent
fighting qualities, discipline, morale, and esprit de
corps of the individual soldier and a high state of
combat readiness. Principal weaknesses include
doctrinal rigidity, logistics, and the shortage of junior
officers Although Indian Army units performed well
during the December 1971 war with Pakistan, tactical
doctrine lacks flexibility. As an example, army schools
impart to commanders the guideline that every
brigade or higher level attack requires 2 days and 2
nights of reconnaissance. Although foreign aid and
military purchases have strengthened the army's
fighting capability, the diverse types and origins of
e(luinrnent still in the army's inventory pose
naintenance. technical training, and spare parts
procurement problems. India is, however, taking step%
to reduce dependence on foreign sources of supply and
alleviate logistical difficullies by developing a
domestic defense industry. Significant quantities of
military equipment made in India are appearing in
the hands of army troops. Finally, a lack of young
officers dictates the assignment of junior e orninis-
sioned officers (former nunconntnissionrd officers
appointed Dorn the ranks) as platoon leaders. Senior
army officers have a general Lick of conf; I sence in
these leaders. Consegnently, no unit smaller than u
mnnpany is ever deployed away from its parrot nnit in
;1 Imsition such as a eoinhat outpost or the hostile side
of a defended riverbank. (S)
1. Organization (U /OU)
Control of tilt army is vested in the Chic( of Army
Staff, who is ex officio a nlemfx�r of the (Chid% of Staff
Committee of the Ministry of Defrnsc. The %taff
organization of the army hradquarten in New Delhi
inclu(Ics the Ccncr ;ll Staff (.which includes the %'ice
Chief of Army Staff and Deputy Chief of Army Staff).
the Adjutant Ccncral, the Quarlernia %ter General. the
Master Ccncral of Ordnance, the Engineer -in- Chief.
and the Military Secretary (Figure 7). The %'ice Chief
of Army Staff sulx�rvises operational type directorate%.
i
tiM
1
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Irmomernc-
MINISTER OF
DEFENSE
CHIEF OF
AtMY STAFF
regitncnts of its artillery brigade are cquippvd with
lightweight mountain howitzers, and its vehicles are
snwllcr, predoininantly of I -ton rather than 3 -ton
capacity.
2. Strength, coinposition, and disposition' (S)
VICE CHIEF OF AD1UtAN1 GENERAL DEPOT' CHIEF Of
ARMY STAFF QUARTERMASTER ARMY STAFF
GENERAL
DIRECTORS OFD MASTER GENERAL DIRECTORS OF:
OF ORDNANCE
MILITARY OPERATIONS ENGINEER- IN-CHIfF STAFF DUTIES
MILITARY MILITARY SECRETARY WfAONS AND
INTELLIGENCE f0U11MENT
MILITARY TRAINING ARMORED CORPS
COMBAT ARTILLERY
DEVELOPMENT SIGNALS
INFANTRY
1E11WORIAL ARMY
DEFENSE SECURITY
CORPS
i
i
I
i
FIGURE 7. Organization of Army Headquarters,
1973 (U /OU)
while tilt Deputy Chief of Army Staff controls the
directorates of the various arms and services.
For arm' cYrrnrnand and administration. India is
divided into five territorial cuumands Northern,
Western. Central. Eastern. and Southern Commands:
their hvii(hi irters, respectively. are- in U(Illil r.
Simla, I.ucknow. Calcutta, and rune. Each of the
territorial commands is headed by a livolcnant general
cvho is responsible for loyal administration. lines of
communication. internal security, and troop units
within his arra. The territorial cominanek are
subdivided into tactical comtnan(Is (i.e.. I:orps) .11141
into administrative area and subarea commands: INoth
of these Iasi two crostil"tr hvadfloartrrs for static
"nits such as ordnance delPu4s and training
establishments. The tactical chain of cornrnaod naps
doss"%%ilfd fr the territorial command to corm,
division. brigadr. haltalion. and smaller units.
The basic units in the army are the infante
battalion, the artillery regiment, and the :armored
rrgiment (b ott. a these regiments are of *.S. Army
batlalion size). A coil" norrn.dl% If.,.. att .artillce
brigade and direr infantry -t%pr (li.isiron.: it is an
administrative a. %sell d% if I.Ectic:al ('nrnrn.and. The
arrnv has thrrr t%l)c. of divisions� :arrnorrd. infante,
and mountain. The armorrO division is comIx,vtl of
an :artillery brigade. an arnuam.l ITrigadr. anR) a
nacchanirrd inf.lntry brigade. The ;111.1114% division
srrmrdimr% has an organic .armored rroffirnt and
norltially all affillrf% brig."Ir... %tell a% three infantr
brigade... The "for stain division h.a. .1 similar
organinadion hill %%ith three escrplions �it u%iwll%
Iack the armored rrgintenl. one "r more of it% artillcr.
The Indian Army is estimated to have a strength of
1.092,M) men. there are 36,M) officers, 44,500
junior conttnissionccl officers, 861.500 enlisted tnen,
and 150,000 recruits. In addition, there are 30
integrated armed police battalions consisting of some
280X) men. The major combat units of the arrnv are
26 divisions (15 infantry, 10 mountain, and 1
artnored) and 36 independent or notidivisional
brigades (R infantry, .5 atinored, 1 -1 artillery, i air
defense, and 2 pit r:achtile). There are 7 corps
head(luarters.
Basic infantry weapons are the 7.62 -tom IshapNory
(Belgian FN) rifle, file 7.672 -inin Bren inachinegun, the
3.5 -inch rocket launcher, 2 -inch, tit -inm. and 120 -t11na
mortars (Figure 8). an(1 the 106 -min recoilless rifle.
Armored units are cquippe with the Sovicl designed
T -31 and T -55 tanks (Figure 9), the British Centurion,
or the Indian -built Vijayanha (Wicker) hanks (Figure
10). Mechanized units have either Czechoslovak
OT 612 (Topas). Czvchosloyak or folks OT 61 (5kot). nr
Soviet BTB -670 I'll armored )Personnel carrier. Artillery
"nits have a tnost diverse in%entory of ssrapons�
French 120 -111111 wortars, Yogoslav 76-mm mountain
howitzers (Figure 11). 1'.lh. 25- pounder g11n-
ho%%idzers, Soviet IM -111111 goes, l,.h. 105 -ra1a11 self
prolPellr d guns, So%irl 1:30 -mm guns, l'. h. 5.5 -inch
and 7.2 -inch gun howitzers. In addition, the army is
rrplipped s.ith SS I antitank guided missiles (Fig11rr
12).
frail the 11- tilitirs %%ilh China ire 1962, riffm
coinhat onils %%rrr oittionrd in norths.r�trrn India
4�1 rrgnlArle owdard Owmaimn. yr air rimer 4 Rnfflr
bEmmnry. I'nrrirn Gnrund Inrrrl_ aril III) \li /ifnny Inullirr.Frr
SNm"Wiry, 1��Ih I"INAwd M tlw Dr If"� %Crew.
F B. 120 -mm Tarnpolla mortar, designed and bvilt
In India (UiOU)
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FIGURE 9. T -55 medium tank, carried on a MAZ 537
tractor and low -boy trailer. The 39 -tan tank mounts a
100 -mm gun, one 7.62 -mm machinegun, and one .30
cal machinegun. The addition of a .30 cal machinegun
to the turret roof is an I idion modification. The tank has
a speed of 30 miles per hour and a cruising range of
310 miles. The MAZ 537 tractor has a towing capacity
of 90,000 pounds. (C)
Will in flit- Indian -held porlion of Jammu and
Kashnfir. dcplosed for defense wainsl Pakist;uf. I he
onlc ollicr significant concentration "as in the A\ salty
area. wlft-re alfelilion aas disided befsseen ssalchint;
file (:hinesr� border mid carrsit.s; on pacification
o1wralions against flit- flissidcnt \as a tribvs. Iicc.ntse
of the brief clash v itlf the Chinese in 1962. Indian
shah s is nilitars lflannins "as comeyoralcd primarily
oa Ihr Ihrraf f(on) Ihr� north. W illi Iht- Flinn of Krttch
inridrnl ssilh Ihr� RikHanis in the spring of P06.
Inoseser, frr>rfls syerc aKain conccnttalr :I a.nrfsl \Ccst
I'akishfn. .end fs Ibe sonclnsion of Ibis r lash. Ihr
In.Iians. as sell as Ilw Pakistanis. hall de(loscd laty
facli( f) formations in flit 1'onj.rb. aloe� !Ifc
FIGURE 10. Vijoyonto me diyrn tank, ptodviced vnder o
IKensing ogreetnEnt with VKkers ltd. (United Kingdom)
Once December 1965. The 37-ton torA mounts a I05 -mm
high.vQlocity gun, two .30 col n ochinegvns� and or* .50
cal rnochinegvn. It hot o speed of 35 n+:let pet hovt and
o ctwWnq range of 4 20 mites. IS)
inlemational fnmlier. Follossimt the September ssar
Mid the subserinenl 'I'asltkent Asucenu�nl, troops %sere�
ssithdrassn tocentral India. %%here flit-% remainrd mftil
Ibe gist- of the December 11971 .%ar ssith Pakistaf.
lthorft;l sonfe nods base been ssithdnfssn to
cai lonmt-nls in c entral and sonthenf India. the
Indian still donbiless c�ontinne to cif.%% I'akislan "ith
snslticion. 11ccokniiift; that India is .fill Ilfn�alened bs
bolli Pakistan and (:hina. flit- arms maintains si.fble
forces .%ith pritimrs nfissions orienlcd lossard each
front. s prmcn in 1965 amt acain in 1971. India has
the c:. to shift disision -sin� units oser f:real
In mid -1!I; i. fist disisions %sere stationed in J.ctntnn
Mid Kashmir to conntt-r the 1'akistam Ilia.. a mt one
ss a% stalionrd .11 1 I'll and orienh�rl lonard the (:hincsr
Irools ill 'I ilrrt Sit other disisions sett- stationed in
flip phitfs area of Ihr finial) for rtnllostncnt acainsl
Pakistani fours 0hotr�h snMftdinatr to Ill, Sottflirtr
(;onfrnanrl. flit I Ilh amt 12111 rlis wms. Ualionrd in
the stabs of (:nj. .f1 and 1lajaalh. sere also in
lnfsition flit (1#1411srrlrnf h life acsl To r+mntcr flit.
atinc'e llrr.t. ill addition to the dis isiol slationrd of
1011 t_rtanhnc the ahitttac)f to file \air of Kasffnlit.
I%%o "firs "f fllt,r dnisfocfs C.14 11 %sere lnanninc
FIGURE 12. Ftpnch.de SS. 1 1 ..ire.gvided rnist:fe,
mavnfed on a '/..ton trvch, The m4tite hot a range of
Iron+ 500 to 3.000 "fats. It .sent in ptodvct of
Hyderobod in 1971 vndpr Ncenw, froth the French
Socefe Nufronolp Imkilrwlle Akro�pafrolp and 1,040
et@ ottombled in 1972. (C)
L7
V.
t
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FIGURE 11. 70-mm mountain howitzers, designed and
built in India (U(OU)

�Jnno me rn c.
i
i
s
s
r
3
0
positions extending from within Sikkim to the eastern
;portion of Arunachal Pradesh. The remaining
divisions were located in pivotal positions from which
they could counterattack on either front or through
Nepal and Bhutan.
The reserve Territorial Army. (TA), which was
reduced and reorganized following its poor
performance against the Pakistanis in September 1965,
had a strength of about 43,700 men in early 1973. Its
company- and battalion -sized units are designed for
rapid mobilization in times of emergency and have
missions comparable to those of the regular forces. TA
units, especially its air defense regiments, reportedly
performed well during the December 1971 war with
Pakistan.
The army wing of the National Cadet Corps (NCC)
is a volunteer, military-type training organization
within the Indian school system. Its aim is to develop
leadership and character in the better qualified youth
and provide a pool of potential officer candidates for
the army. No actual service liabili'y is attached.
Centrally controlled by the Director General, National
Cadet Corps, New Delhi, and trained by regular army
personnel, the corps has its own distinctive uniform
and consists of Junior (high school level), Senior
(university level), and Girls Divisions. Strength of the
army wing's Senior Division as of February 1972 was
578,000, and that of its Junior Division, 525,000.
Training includes physical conditioning, drill,
mapreading, and other basic subjects. NCC units
frequently are used to supplement police units in
crowd control on special occasions and could readily
be used as fillers in regular service units in maximum
mobilization.
3. Training (S)
The army's training system has been strongly
influenced by British procedures and retains many of
the features o the old British Indian Army training
program. Overall, training is thorough and
conscientiously conducted but lacks originality and
flexibility. The infantry continues to use the British
regimental system under which each regimen'_ is a
repository of tradition. There are 25 infantry
regiments, including 7 Gurkha Rifles regiments, which
have training and administrative responsibilities but
no operational role. The other arms aria services of the
army have branch or "corps" centers wheic X11 officers
and enlisted men are trained. In addition, therms are a
number of specialist schools that teach technical,
scientific, and administrative skills. The principal
specialist schools, their locations, and types of training
are as follows:
SCHOOL
LOCATION
TYPE OF TRAINING
Combat Schools:
Courses for instructors
Training College
Armored Corps School
Ahmedna-
Armor training for of-
Faizabad
gar
ficers and enlisted
nance course for offi-
instructors
School of Artillery
Deolah
Technical and tactical
Faizabad
Various courses for of-
training for officers
Army /Air Transport
ficers and NCO's
and NCO's
Infantry School
Mhow
Infantry training for
courses for officers
officers and NCO's
Combat Support Schools:
and enlisted men
College of Military
Roorkee
Technical courses for
Engineering
officers, enlisted per-
struction for officers
sonnel, and civilians
Electrical and Me-
Secundera-
Technical and man
chanical Engineering
bad
agement courses for
School
School
officers and enlisted
cers and enlisted men
Institute of Defense
men
Army Intelligence
Pune
Intelligence courses
Corps School
for officers and en-
vilians
listed men
Schools of Signals
Mhow
Basic and advanced
technical courses for
officers and enlisted
men
Combat Service Support Schools:
Army Education Corps
Pachmarhi
Courses for instructors
Training College
ical Training
School of Mechanical
Faizabad
Driver and mainte-
Transport
nance course for offi-
listed instructors
Army School of Health
cers and enlisted men
Corps of Military Po-
Faizabad
Various courses for of-
lice School
Army /Air Transport
ficers and NCO's
Army Ordnance Corps
Jabalpur
Basic and advanced
School
courses for officers
and NCO's
High Altitude War-
and enlisted men
Remounts and Vet-
Meerut
Various courses for
erinary School
officers and enlisted
struction for officers
men
Army Service Corps
Bareilly
Technical courses for
School
Jungle Warfare
officers and enlisted
fare training for offi-
School
instructors
Specialized institutions:
Army School of Phys-
Pune
Physical and recrea-
ical Training
tional training courses
for officers and en-
listed instructors
Army School of Health
Lucknow
Health and sanitation
courses for officers
Army /Air Transport
Agra
Rigging and delivery
Support School
courses for officers
and NCO's
High Altitude War-
Culmarg
Cold weather and
fare School
mountaineering in-
struction for officers
and enlisted men
Counterinsurgency and
Dehra Dun
Unconventional war
Jungle Warfare
fare training for offi-
School
cers and enlisted men
Institute of Defense
Secundera-
Management courses
Management
bad
for officers and ci-
vilians
17
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The low educalional level of the average recruit
makes extended periods of training necessary.
Normally 36 weeks are required for basic training,
touch of which is devoted to literacy classes, basic
hygiene, and physical training.
The variety of languages used in India presents
another problem in training. The utn]y uses Ilindi, the
national language, hilt the objective of having all
cott]mands issned in flindi has not vet lice.] realized.
Regional languages mils( still lie employed in many
cases; however, tr(xps (earn basic amrnands in Ilindi.
F'irld training stresses operating in difficult tetrain
:Ind includes night training. Follow; g the fighting
with Pakistan in i965. battle indoctrination training
was intncloced into the armv entriculun] to accustom
Itoops to the noises and Shock of the battlefield. All
army units undergo simulated battle training.
Training ccmcepls are under conlinnal review to meet
the changing rrquiremenls brought alxint by new
developments and the inlnxh]ction of new� wra ffons
and rfluipment.
Until the Chinese attack in 1962, training had fern
cxttrrnev limited. This was (llte to if lack of emphasis
on training by the top command echelons and the
paucity of funds, in ;trrrclor;, facilities, and
equipment. The effect of this etcrr(lingl% ;erioo;
;i:cttaming wa; driven home patticulatk by the
ineploc-o. of many %eniot commander; in handling
large units in live field. In 1965 the fighting with
Pakistan again tr%raled setiont deficiencim in Indian
Army Icaderthip. In the rapid rtpatimon of the army
th at the 1%2 "inflict made necrtwn, the atrn% hold to
clan rnirate on training the individual mcrnit and
;mall units. Nforrc �rt, sofficirnl nnmbem of higher
c.mmanden had not Ixrn dri clottetl doting the 1962
65 prri(xl since find" were alloc-alra mainly In raiding
atul rg11ipping new nnild and not to encoded field
rirtci" The rmwill uat that in the field the Indian
Army fnnthl the 1965 war with Pakwan at it trrim of
Coonlonatrtl brigade action% talhet than as di%itional
of cotpt opetaliont. and, cart al i11.11. thine actions
wrrr charactcriml h% lack of coordination lrlwrrr/
snit% and lack of crnliticncr iwiwtrn commandcn
atxl intelligence officers. Perhaps Cot the Indian Atm%
live b c %I thing alxul the IWW5, fighting wad the good
field exprtienvr that it affnnfrd
A; it result of thew ctpctirmr. and a gcnctal
lr%clint off of the arm% ripantion program in the late
1960' the army ha" ixrn c.nrrnlraling 111cul
tltramlining, modernising. and npgrlding it% 111111. In
Sfarch 1(9 it hrid it% lattmi rterdw diner 1950
Uhilt hrldr(I inc%ulrcl a c"" hradquattrt; that had
I xr ll (onnr(I during Moil) h(ntililim. three inlanlry
1!i
divisions, and an armored division. Since then, joint
division and corps training exe*cises have been held
fairly regularly� usually every spring affording
valuable field experience in large-unit o(mratiom that
paid off well in the skillfully executed invasion of East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) by in atmy of three corps
in December 1971.
'The School system for army officers is adequate and
includes courses ranging from officer candidate to stuff
and war college levels. In addition, cellools such as the
Snow Warfare School, the Ifigh Allit nle Mono
taineering Schoo!, and the jungle Warfare School
provide special training in those fields. A few officers
are avo sent abroad such year for training in advanced
of SIX hrl(v, chiefly to the Soviet Union, the
United Stilt". and the United kingdom. PromiSing
senior officrrs arc sent to the imperial Defense 0wilege
in the United kingdom: the highest militan school in
the united Statrs attended I)v Indian officers is the
Army Command and General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth. Hansa;.
The rrserxe Territorial Army training program is
cxmdno nnder lido ;%stems, one four eO on nna)
area; and the other centered nimn nrhan commonitiet.
After completion of b:ltic� trctoil training. the
individual recri %r; 2 month; anmta) training nnder
the tural ;sober Training under the urban ;.Icm is
ponicird on wrrkend., and holiday; and (lilting
J11"11411 ramp of K to I I da%%. tid(mr prtdcnnr) attend
conrte at army .(honk Technical nnilt (;nch at
flailnad Enginerm etc) allend 30 -da% training
px�ri(xld annual%
4. Logislics (S)
The Qnattermattrt Gm etal and lite Gcnrt I
of (hdnancr hate primar% "tiomtibility (fit top letr)
kgitlic planning and proCincment of mal -tic) (tot the
arm%. 01fetalional drlailt air handlrd al Arm%
Ilradcpttaflrr" Ir%cl h% %anon% dirrrtotair+ within 'hc
gnattrtm,atict and ordnancr staff l,fanchr. These
ditectnrale" alto ate rrdlwntihle for dcbirt% of
rdtuipmcol to the irttitorial c.mrnandt. Sictagr and
i;atr are carded out primarily h% file Minandr (:ulna
howr%rt. file Army Sender (;()tpt. Corpt of F rigineett.
and Army Medical Corp; a14. handle cetlain
gw6ali/rd item� d( egnipmr,]t. 11(dpxadihility for
Irantlltntation and trlaln) denims i%%Ii%id(�l hetwrrn
life Army ,wr icr 0)rIn, which p.o%idc t and opcalm
all militan r(.1ll Iramlxtl, and a tifecial btanch of the
)(pt of Engiarrn that (urnithm technical prtvnnr)
for the c.altimclion, mainlenan(r, and operation of
nadt, railroad", 1110%, And inl.ln(i walrn%at.
a
`f.
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r
in addition to the various combat formations,
various head(loarters organizations subordinate to the
five territorial cotntnands are responsible for the
adnlinistration of the fixed installations, such as
ordnance depots and training centers. iit"(
organizations are known as Arra Commands or
Subarea Commands. For specialized nviontaan
operations in both Janunu and kashmir and
Arunachal 1'radesh, Comnnlnications 'lame Area and
Subarea Commands are responsible for [lie lines of
communications throughout this difficult terrain.
'i 'heir tasks include maintaining roads; maintaining
an(1 staffing staging arras, iccovrry points, and 1'01,
points; and the organizing and operating supply
CY ily(1:..
The logistics system has improved imitkedly over
the last drealde and is now- capable of snpp orting the
army. The December 1971 invasion of East Pakistan
co not have been nearly such a snecess as it was had
not the large -scale logistics planning and operations
been of a high order. Staff officers and commanders
learned the Icsuns of the fighting with the Chinese in
1962 and the Pakistanis in 196:5. These operations,
including the 1AW -toile rrdeplmment of an entire
division in i dwy %during the 196.1 conflict, provided a
aide range of va(ahle C.p e rience in soppl%ing units
in the firld. 0insideral'. improvement has oiled.
pmficoli rly in maintenance .opp ort and in supply
flo al m4aance dep of le%el and foraar(l. IIovryer.
the still onayoidablr nrrd h rely on forrign nrces for
imprrtant materiel, 1 "C iletertgencih of C(pllipincill.
and the inadrolnacio -N of life iran(portation net in file
"wire trmotr and thrratenrci areas ate maior burdrn%
than gill conlinne to hamprr the rilcctiyror.. of the
sy.trm for so-ilm to comr.
5. Army aviation (S)
The Indian Arn�y ,fir Arm is it .mall force of 11
11AL Ktith,ak NIK otilih "aircraft and 1.2W
firr% trod. including 2(16 army officrt pilot-.. Altloogh
Cipoipiticni is admini Ii%orI% (Y111lrnllr l In the .air
forcr. arm} asiati.n is oplr' r.Ition.i11% comtrollyd by
Arm} Ilra(I(poattCi�. 1'ni1 orgatlir.Ition con(i(h of 1 i
;fir 01rcfvalion Pont (A0P1 flig{lt�. which wire ac.ignecl
to Cithrt diyitiona) infanit's hric aidrt, indeprmlcol
attillCn brigi0m. of rnrp% artillery htigA(im. Thr
mi is to oppwif army unit. in artillery fire
.piting. lialivr,, and trconnai.�ancr. E%rn N ith life
i1.I11dical" of rid ,Ind Warcc alitct.111. the alit "arm 11.1. it
stotxl c j%J.ihly for perfotining it% mi. +ion. Mfni of the
airmy 410.11 m ha%r hero trained b% for air f,mr. 'i hry
atr compCfrnt, and their nwralc and Ioralty (Y0111p.1rr
1.011064% ailh That of air lord pCrs.anrl. 'i'ht; arr
totalled lie laren (lying l%%iKnnlCnt% and grmind
(ar(ille assignments. 'I'lle air force maintains the
Aircraft. Replacctnent of the utility aircraft with
helicopters is under consideration.
D. Navy
'i'hr Indian Navy is a coastal patrol, escort, and
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) force. 'i'he primary
missions are to hr prepared to conduct sea warfare in
the national defense or as directed by constitutional
anthority, to defend territorial waters, and to protect
constal shipping. The navy is endeavoring to fulfill
these missions anti at the satTIC tittle to assume a
greater presence in the Indian Ocean. Recause of
india's more pressing and itntnediate need for ground
and air defense, the nav: has historicalh' been the
smallest and most neglected of the three finned
SrfylCrs. 1-he acquisition of submarines, rscotts,
guided missile pallrol Itomts, and other ships and craft
froin the U.S.S.R. since 1966 have significantly I(I(Ie(I
to its offensive and defensive capabililies; additional
ac and cnstnlction of destroyer escorts
(Figure 13) in lodi in shipyards will Cnsurr the
continuation of the in(xlrrnization program. (U /0l')
FIGURE 13. INS Nilgiri, a 3,000 -ton, 30 -knot, helicopter-
equipped destroyer escort (DEH), is the lead ship of
six planned for Indigenous construction by the Indian
Navy. The Mozogon Dockyard at Bombay took almost
6 yevrs to complete it, but construction time should be
shover on the other five LEANDER doss DEH's. The
second keel was told in November 1968, and all are
scheduled to fain the fleet by 1978. Niigiri carries 17
officers and 250 men and Is 372 feet in length with a
41 -foot boom h car carry an ASW helicopter oft, two
4.5 -inch duol- pvrpo^ guns, two 40 -mm single mounts,
and one LIMBO 3- borrelled DC mortar. (U /OU)
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The navy is capable of accomplishing its missions
against Pakistan or any other North Indian Occan
navy, but would be unable to defend India's long
coastline and sea lines of communication against any
major naval power. Although Organized ptirnarily as a
defensive force, as indicated by its missions, the navy
has a modest offensive potential in its one aircraft
carrier, four F class submarines, two light cruisers, and
its destroyer /destroyer escort forge, coupled with its
eight OsA class guided missile patrol boats. However,
the employment of the ships as an attack carrier force
would be hampered by the small number and
obsviescence of tactical aircraft. Nevertheless, the
OSA (Figure 14) are unique in the North Indian
Ocean and provided a valuable contribution to the
Indian Navy's success in the December 1971 conflict
with Pakistan. (S)
The ASW capability of the Indian Navy is effective
only within confined operating are, The small
number of modern ASW ships and aircraft precludes
simultaneous patrol of all coastal waters. The
smallness of the minesweeping force is another serious
shortcoming in the navy's defensive potential. it is
generally conceded that in the face of a determined
enemy mining effort the Indian Navy would do well
just to keep the port of Bombay open. (S)
The principal strengths of the Indian Navy are: the
better- than average quality of its personnel its sound
organizational concepts that stern out of a long
apprenticeship under the British Royal Navy; its
ongoing program to upgrade the effectiveness of the
fleet with new ships and craft; and the slow but steady
expansion of shore facilities. Major weaknesses are: the
generally poor material condition of ships and craft;
the inadequate number of ships in relation to the long
coastline; the absence of modern tactical naval
aircraft; shortages of technically trained men in both
the operational aril maintenance fields; and a logistics
system that continues to be severely hampered by
having to depend on foreign procurement for most
naval ordnance, technical equipment, and spare parts.
(G')
The Indian Navy is a well- organized force,
patterned after and conditioned by the British Navy,
of which it was an adjunct up to 1947. British
influence, however, has diminished, particularly since
the mid- 1960's. Since the indo- Pakistani conflict of
1965, the Soviet Union has become an increasingly
important source of naval equipment and of technical
training and has replaced the United Kingdom as the
chief supplier. Recent reports indicate that the Indian
Government is dissatisfied with some of its Soviet
naval equipment, but not enough to stop further
rTi Ti
t t r r g4
,w
...w +-fit A
i
Y rat Q >r' r r
.k.
FIGURE 14. Eight of these OSA 1 class large guided patrol boats (PTFG's) have been provided to the Indian Navy
by the U.S.S.R. Mounting four STYX surface -to- surface missiles and having a maximum speed of 41 knots, those
boats were very effective in the December 1971 conflict. They are 1213 feet in length and displace 210 tons.
Noticeably absent from these units are the DRUM TILT radars which have not as yet been exported from the Soviet
Union. The DRUM TILT would enable the boats to carry out their own target acquisition prior to coming within
firing range of the STYX (approximately 25 miles). The Indian Navy presently uses Combat Air Patrol and the radar
from its larger units to conduct initial target acquisition. (C)
20
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L
l
purchases because the Soviets' financial arrangements
with the Indians are very liberal. ,he Soviets have
tried to impose the restriction that the ships it supplies
not be used in units which include Western supplied
vessels. This was probably a Soviet attempt to make
the Indian Navy more dependent upon the Soviets for
training. The Indian Navy has not yielded, however,
and since 1966 has been, in fact, mixing the Soviet
buile and Western -built ships and craft so that
personnel may be cross trained and learn to operate
together effectively. Though increasing dependence
on the Soviet Union has not yet materially affected the
strongly professional, patriotic, and generally pro
Western orientation of the service, continued
association may well develop greater sympathy for
Soviet points of view among naval personnel. There
are indications that attitudes toward Western
countries, and especially the United States, may be
cooling as a result of the actions of those countries
during the December 1971 Indo Pakistani conflict. On
the other hand, Soviet naval ambitions and growing
presence in the Indian Ocean, an area that India tends
to look on as its own naval area, may be leading
towards rivalry with the Soviet Navy. The overall state
of training is considered adequate, despite the fact
that there is a shortage of technical instructors and
modern training equipment. Morale of officers and
enlisted men is good, and pride in their growing fleet is
evident. The navy's successful operations against and
obvious superiority over the Pakistani Navy in
December 1971 heightened both. (C)
1. Organization (U /OU)
The Chief of Naval Staff, an admiral, is commander
of the navy; in the chain of command he comes under
the Minister of Defense. He is an ex officio member of
the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Ministry of
Defense and directs the overall activities of the naval
establishment through Naval Headquarters. His
principal assistant is the Vice Chief of Naval Staff, a
vice admiral. The Naval Secretary functions under the
Vice Chief of Naval Staff and has cognizance over
matters pertaining to the budget, naval regulations,
and shore establishments.
Naval Headquarters, in New Delhi, consists of five
branches staff, personnel, material, logistics, and a
composite branch under the Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff. The Vice Chief of Naval Staff also serves as
Chief of the Staff Branch and in this capacity is
responsible for plans, operations, communications,
intelligence, and hydrography (Figure 15). In March
1973, a plan to reorganize Naval Headquarters was
approved, but details are not yet available.
The Chief of Personnel is responsible for the
appointment of officers, for the recruiting of enlisted
men, for general service conditions, for training and
welfare of personnel, for maintaining discipline, and
for legal matters. The Chief of Material is responsible
for fleet maintenance, naval engineering, electrical
engineering, armament inspection, and heavy naval
equipment. He also coordinates scientific research and
development in the naval service and manages repair
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FIGURE 15. Indian Naval Headquarters Organization, 1973 (U/OU)

1
and dockyard facilities. The Chief of Logistics is
responsible for all supply matters, as well as civilian
personnel and civil engineering. The Assistant Chief of
Naval Staff is responsible for the naval air and
submarine arms, including their administration,
training, and operations.
The Chief of Naval Staff exercises operational and
administrative control over the forces afloat and the
shore establishment through three commands �the
Western Naval Command, the Eastern Naval
Command, and the Southern Naval Command. The
Flag Officer Commanding -in- Chief, Western Naval
Command FOCWNC), a vice admiral, controls all
shore establishments of the navy situated in and
around Bombay, as well as the ships based at Bombay
that are not part of the Western Fleet. Subordinate to
FOCWNC is the Flag Officer Commanding, Western
Fleet FOCWEF), a rear admiral, who commands
about half the principal surface combatants of the
Indian Navy in a fleet comparable to a small U.S.
Navy task group. The Flag Officer Commanding -in-
Chief, Eastern Naval Command FOCENC), a vice
admiral with headquarters at Vishakhapatnam, is
responsible for the bases at Calcutta, Madras, and the
Andaman Islands, as well as for those naval ships
based at Vishakhapatnam and Port Blair but not part
of the Eastern Fleet. Subordinate to FOCENC is the
Flag Officer Commanding, Eastern Fleet FOCENF),
a rear admiral, who commands the other half of the
principal combatants of the Indian Navy. The Flag
Officer Commanding -in- Chief, Southern Naval
Command FOCSNC), a rear admiral with his
headquarters at Cochin, controls shore establishments
and naval air stations at Cochin, Coimbatore,
Dabolim, and Marmagao, as well as ships and aircraft
at the stations. The Southern Naval Command was
formed in late 1970 by upgrading the former Southern
Naval Area.
Naval communications are basically controlled by
Indian Naval Headquarters, New Delhi. They are the
responsibility of the Director of Naval Signals, who is
directly under the Chief of the Staff Branch. In
general, communications organization and operations
follow the procedures that the Royal Navy used in
World War II. The Bombay Shore Broadcast is a
combined broadcast through which mosi traffic from
Indian Naval Headquarters is relayed. Between
Bombay, New Delhi, Cochin, and Vishakhapatnam
the navy has direct landline, closed circuit teletype
links. Naval Headquarters maintains a radio circuit
with Colombo, Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon),
operational only at night, and also has a
communication link with the British Admiralty in
London. Commercial telegraph and telephone lines
are used as backup.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition' (S)
Personnel strength of the navy is about 33,000,
about 3,300 of whom are officers. Almost all are in the
general service category, the only exceptions being the
1,500 aviation personnel. Some 40% serve afloat: of
those serving ashore, an estimated 20% are in a
training status. The navy has a small, active reserve
program that includes 3,200 men, about 100 of whom
are officers. As of April 1972, the Senior Division of the
naval wing of the National Cadet Corps, a quasi
ROTC type organization, had a strength of about
11,500 and the Junior Division 47,000. In 1967 an
extensive personnel expansion program was begun and
strength rose rapidly �from 19,200 in 1966 to almost
33,000 in 1969.
The ship inventory consists of 110 vessels. The
Western Fleet has 77 ships, the Eastern Fleet 24, and
the Southern Naval Command controls nine vessels.
By command, number, and type of vessels, the
inventory is as follows:
COMMAND NUMBER AND TYPE OF VESSEL
FOCWEF
1 ASW Support Af:craft Carrier
Western Fleet)
(CVS
2 Light Cruisers (CL)
2 Destroyers (DD)
8 Destroyer Escorts (7 DE, 1
DEH)
2 Patrol Craft Escorts PCE
3 Patrol Escorts (PF
8 Large Guided Missile Boats
(PTFG)
6 Motor Gunboats (PGM)
8 Minesweepers (4 MSC, 4
MSI)
10 Auxiliaries
27 Service
FOCENF
1 Destroyer (DD)
(Eastern Fleet)
3 Patrol Craft Escorts (PCE)
6 Motor Gunboats PGM
4 Submarines (SS)
1 Tank Landing Ship (LST
5 Auxiliaries
2 Motor Gunboats PGM
2 Medium Landing Ships (LSM
FOCSNC
3 Patrol Escorts (PF)
Southern
1 Motor Gunboat PGM
Command)
1 Auxiliary
4 Service
'For regularly updated information, refer to the Militant
Intelligence Summary, the Naval Forces Intelligence Study, and the i
Automated Naval Order of Battle (Ships). Naval aviation is treated '1
in the first two publications and also in the Air Forces Intelligence f
Study and the Free World Air Order of Battle. All of these references K
are published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
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A
FIGURE 16. INS Kalvari, Soviet
built F class submarine (C)
AIthough no ships are kno%% n to he in a reserve status.
the oldest of the light cruisers and three of the patrol
escorts, which are at Bombay, are assigned to lho f irst
Training Squadron and will probable deteriorate to
the point where they will no longer be considered
operational. By the end of 197 3 the fleet is to have
added four additional ex- Soviet I' class subniarfnes
Figure 16): five niorc PF.TYA class coastal escorts, of
Which two have already been delivewd (Figure 17):
another submarine rescue Vessel: aiid one more
domestically produced AS W helicopter destroyer
escort.
I'hc main operating bases and the principal
activities of the navy are in the ports of Bonibay on the
\yest coast, Cochin in the south, and Vishakhapatnani
on the cast coast. About two- thirds of the combatants.
auxiliaries, and service craft are based at Bombay,
where the major operating and repair base is located.
as well as headquarters for both the FOC\1'NC and
FOC\VFJ'. About a third of the navy's ships and craft
are bacd at Vishakhapatnam. In addition, nine small
craft are basal at Cochin. One of the light cruisers is
being refitted for duty as a midshipman training ship.
The destroyer escorts include the recently constructed
helicopter- equipped Leander class (Dh:l I The F class
submarines and the Os,x class large guided- missile
patrol boats are Soviet built.
FIGURE 17. INS Kamorta, the first
PETYA class coastal extort procured
from the Soviet Union (U /OU)
:3. Training (C)
'I'll( navv's training program is adequate in
practical subjects and operations hilt still lacks in
theoretical and technical competency becutise of'
shortages of funds, eg ii ipnucnt. .aid gnaIil'icd
instructors. Considerable progress has been made
toward self sufficiency ill training. P :xcepl for the
specialized training of a sinall number of personnel in
the United Kingdom, the United States. and the
Soviet Union, all officers and enlisted nice are trained
in India. Small numbers of sailors f'roni several Asian
and African Navies are also trained in Indian naval
schools.
Shipboard training is slrongl\ emphasized. In most
cases technical courses ashore arc followed by practical
training at sca. As a result, the afloat training program
is one of the best ill the ludian Ocean area. Ships
engage priniarily in individual and Ileet exercises and,
to a limited degree, in larger joint exercises with the
army anti air force. Sumner training exercises are
normally held each year in the Arabian Sea, and
occasionally naval exercises arc field \yith foreign ships
visiting India.
'The four principal training establishments arc:
I.N.S. (Indian N :ivaI Ship)I Venduritthy. the
'Folk-ing the British tradition. thr Indiam name 111vir naval
shun� eslablishnuvnts as if lh,.v wrry ships.
.3
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Combined Naval Training Establishment, at Cochin;
I.N.S. Circars, the Boys' Training Establishment, at
Vishakhapatnam; I.N.S. Shivaji, the Mechanical
Training Establishment, at Lonavale (80 miles
southeast of Bombay); and I.N.S. Valsura, the
Electrical Training Establishment, at Jamnagar (on
the Gulf of Kutch).
Boy -entry enlisted men, 17 years of age and under,
undergo a 1 -year basic training program at I.N.S.
Circars. The course serves the twofold purpose of
raising the educational level of the recruit to a
standard that will meet service requirements and of
giving him the elements of practical seamanship.
Upon completion, he is advanced to the rate of
ordinary seaman and proceeds to appropriate schools
for specialist training.
Direct -entry enlisted personnel receive 2 months of
basic training at I.N.S. Venduruthy and then are
assigned to one of eight specialty schools at the same
establishment. These specialty sc'.icols are as follows:
1) Basic and Divisional; 2) Diving; 3) Gunnery; 4)
Navigation and Direction; 5) Seamanship; 6) Signal;
7) Tactical; or 8) Torpedo and Antisubmarine. After
this training, sailors are assigned to ships of the fleet
for practical experience at sea. This training center
could train about 5,000 men at one time.
I.N.S. Shivaji trains mechanical engineers and
artificers, while I.N.S. Valsura provides training for
enlisted men of the Electrical Engineering Branch. In
addition, supply and secretariat personnel are trained
at I.N.S. Hamla, at Bombay, and petty officers at
I.N.S. Agrani, at Coimbatore. Enlisted members of the
Medical Branch receive their training at I.N.S. Asvini,
the central naval hospital, at Bombay. Plans to
consolidate the scattered naval training facilities
located in the Cochin area have not been carried out.
Three of the four major training establishments are
located away from that city. Until funds become
available, these facilities will probably remain in their
present locations.
The navy gets most of its officers through the cadet
entry training program, but a few are obtained
through direct appointment from civilian life or by
commissioning from the ranks. Cadet training is
conducted at the triservice National Defense Academy
at Kharakvasla, where prospective officers undergo a
3 -year course of instruction. Upon completion, they
receive 6 months training aboard the cadet training
ship, I.N.S. Tir, followed by an additional year of
technical training. Direct -entry officers begin naval
training at I.N.S. Venduruthy and from there go on to
the various technical schools. Advanced courses
qualifying naval officers for higher rank and
command are available at the National Defense
College and the Defense Services Staff College.
The active officer reserve program is small and fairly
new. Under the program, officers on the active list of
the Indian Naval Reserve and the Indian Naval
Volunteer Reserve are obligated to undergo an initial
training period of 2 months immediately on
commissioning in the reserve or as soon thereafter as
ordered. Subsequently, they are obligated to take at
least 1 month of training duty each year. The Indian
Naval Reserve is composed of professional officers,
while the Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve consists of
nonprofessionals who have a knowledge of the sea,
such as yachtsmen.
By law, when an enlisted man has served out his full
enlistment (10 years) and is discharged, he must join
the Fleet Reserve of Sailors. He is required to remain in
that reserve for a period of 10 years, during which he
must go on active duty 2 months each year. However,
this requirement is not much honored in practice.
There is little interest in fulfilling the obligation
because private industry restricts the leave of
employees; jobs are difficult to find in India, and most
men ignore the requirement for active duty rather
than request leave. Moreover, because enlisted men in
the regular navy tend to remain on active duty as long
as possible, most are too old to be of much use in the
reserve when they leave the regular establishment.
The naval wing of the National Cadet Corps was
established in the early 1950's to provide a pool of
potential officers and enlisted men for direct entry into
the regular navy. In actuality, however, the navy
considers the wing more a means of making the
country "navy conscious" than of providing a reserve
nucleus. The corps is organized into a Senior Division
for university and col'iege students and Junior Division
for lower school students. Cadets of the Senior
Division undergo a 3 -year course of training that may
be extended 1 year and includes cruises aboard naval
ships. Young men selected for commissioning in the
naval wing of the corps receive basic and technical
training at I.N.S. Venduruthy. They must then take a
month -long refresher training course every 3 years at
this same naval school.
4. Logistics (S)
The basic organization of the supply system is good;
however, it is encumbered by extensive paperwork.
Operating on the preposting method, 2 or 3 weeks are
often required for processing. The navy's procurement
system has been vastly improved by utilizing
interservice supply and logistics organizations for most
common -use items and has reduced its once heavy
j
x 24
i
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S
o, u
y
R J
I
dependence upon British sources for such items.
Commissary stores, clothing, common -use household
items, and maintenance and upkeep materials are
obtained from the Department of Defense Production
and Directorate General of Ordnance Factories under
the Ministry of Defense. Though many ship repair
parts are fabricated domestically, the navy must still
procure from abroad (the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union) such items as naval ordnance, technical
equipment, and those spare parts beyond the
capability of India to manufacture.
The navy is dependent upon foreign sources for
practically all major combatant ships, weapons
systems, fuel, and most of its reserve ammunition.
Until 1965 the navy depended almost totally on the
United Kingdom for ships, weapons, and equipment,
but in 1966 India turned to the Soviet Union for
submarines as well as for patrol and amphibious ships
and associated parts and ammunition. Stocks of fuel
and ammunition on hand are probably sufficient to
support a maximum combat effort for about a 2-
month period. Assuming that fuel is available,
cannibalizing equipment and using domestic industry
for fabricating ships parts and producim some
electronic and ordnance items, the nave could
probably continue to operate at least a small number
of its principal warships for an additional 2 to 4
months.
Except for a limited underway refueling capability,
the fleet is dependent upon shore bases. All major
repair, overhaul, and construction is done at Bombay,
the principal repair and logistic support center.
Limited capabilities exist at Cochin and at the east
coast ports of Vishakhapatnam and Calcutta. The
reliance upon a single naval base (Bombay) for major
repair and supply is a fundamental weakness of the
logistic system.
The Naval Dockyard at Bombay maintains" ready
issue" ordnance stores with backup from the nearby
Naval Ordnance Supply Depot. Other naval ordnance
depots are at Cochin and Vishakhapatnam. It is the
policy to stock each of these depots with ammunition
ranging from 6 -inch down to small arms. Each depot
also stores depth charges and torpedoes.
India is capable of building major combatant ships
but requires foreign technical guidance as well as
components. Such is the case with the British
supported destroyer escort construction program at
Mazagon Dockyard in Bombay. The first of six
destroyer escorts was launched in October 1968 (keel
laid in fall of 1966) and was commissioned into the
fleet in June 1972; only a few of its components were
built in India. The next two were fitting out at the end
of 1972. The ships' steel plate is being produced in
India, and the amount of equipment and technical
assistance that is being procured from the United
Kingdom is to diminish as a three -phase expansion
program at Mazagon Dockyard is completed. Plans
call for 80% of the components to be Indian -built by
1978.
The Hindustan Shipyard at Vishakhapatnam and
several private yards have built a number of small
naval ships, including two inshore minesweepers
(MSI) (Figure 18), three submarine chasers (PGM),
one survey ship (AGS), and one aviation fuel tanker
(YOG).
The government is actively endeavoring to build up
local shipbuilding yards and supporting industries.
Facilities for carrying out major overhauls and repairs
are located at Mazagon Docks, where there is a
graving dock capable of accommodating any ship in
the navy. These facilities are used almost exclusively
for the maintenance and repair of the more important
combatant ships. The basing of India's fleet of Soviet
built submarines in Vishakhapatnam stimulated
construction of additional support facilities in that
port and led to a significant upgrading of
maintenance and repair capabilities on the east coast.
T
T
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FIGURE 18. INS Bhotkal, an inshore
minesweeper built in India (U /OU)
4
J
25
w
dependence upon British sources for such items.
Commissary stores, clothing, common -use household
items, and maintenance and upkeep materials are
obtained from the Department of Defense Production
and Directorate General of Ordnance Factories under
the Ministry of Defense. Though many ship repair
parts are fabricated domestically, the navy must still
procure from abroad (the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union) such items as naval ordnance, technical
equipment, and those spare parts beyond the
capability of India to manufacture.
The navy is dependent upon foreign sources for
practically all major combatant ships, weapons
systems, fuel, and most of its reserve ammunition.
Until 1965 the navy depended almost totally on the
United Kingdom for ships, weapons, and equipment,
but in 1966 India turned to the Soviet Union for
submarines as well as for patrol and amphibious ships
and associated parts and ammunition. Stocks of fuel
and ammunition on hand are probably sufficient to
support a maximum combat effort for about a 2-
month period. Assuming that fuel is available,
cannibalizing equipment and using domestic industry
for fabricating ships parts and producim some
electronic and ordnance items, the nave could
probably continue to operate at least a small number
of its principal warships for an additional 2 to 4
months.
Except for a limited underway refueling capability,
the fleet is dependent upon shore bases. All major
repair, overhaul, and construction is done at Bombay,
the principal repair and logistic support center.
Limited capabilities exist at Cochin and at the east
coast ports of Vishakhapatnam and Calcutta. The
reliance upon a single naval base (Bombay) for major
repair and supply is a fundamental weakness of the
logistic system.
The Naval Dockyard at Bombay maintains" ready
issue" ordnance stores with backup from the nearby
Naval Ordnance Supply Depot. Other naval ordnance
depots are at Cochin and Vishakhapatnam. It is the
policy to stock each of these depots with ammunition
ranging from 6 -inch down to small arms. Each depot
also stores depth charges and torpedoes.
India is capable of building major combatant ships
but requires foreign technical guidance as well as
components. Such is the case with the British
supported destroyer escort construction program at
Mazagon Dockyard in Bombay. The first of six
destroyer escorts was launched in October 1968 (keel
laid in fall of 1966) and was commissioned into the
fleet in June 1972; only a few of its components were
built in India. The next two were fitting out at the end
of 1972. The ships' steel plate is being produced in
India, and the amount of equipment and technical
assistance that is being procured from the United
Kingdom is to diminish as a three -phase expansion
program at Mazagon Dockyard is completed. Plans
call for 80% of the components to be Indian -built by
1978.
The Hindustan Shipyard at Vishakhapatnam and
several private yards have built a number of small
naval ships, including two inshore minesweepers
(MSI) (Figure 18), three submarine chasers (PGM),
one survey ship (AGS), and one aviation fuel tanker
(YOG).
The government is actively endeavoring to build up
local shipbuilding yards and supporting industries.
Facilities for carrying out major overhauls and repairs
are located at Mazagon Docks, where there is a
graving dock capable of accommodating any ship in
the navy. These facilities are used almost exclusively
for the maintenance and repair of the more important
combatant ships. The basing of India's fleet of Soviet
built submarines in Vishakhapatnam stimulated
construction of additional support facilities in that
port and led to a significant upgrading of
maintenance and repair capabilities on the east coast.
T
T
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4 i
The main base at Vishakhapatnam is being expanded
to include a 1,200 -foot quay, a training center, a
torpedo storage facility, fuel storage, workshops, and
housing and recreational facilities. Soviet technicians
are assisting in this project, which began. in August
1968. The project was scheduled for completion in
1972, but because of complications caused by
continuing expansion of the navy and by finances
being drawn off for other purposes, such as the 1971
conflict with Pakistan, completion is not expected
before mid -1974. In the Andaman Islands, xpansion
is taking place primarily at Port Blair, where the Army
Corps of Engineers is constructing a 1,100 -foot
deepwater quay scheduled for completion in late
1976. On the west coast, the need for an intermediate
naval base between Bombay and Cochin will be met
with tine expansion of facilities at Marmagao.
Fleet. The air arm is administered b the Naval
y a al
Aviation Branch, which is headed by the Assistant
Chief of Naval Staff, Naval Headquarters. The I
aircraft inventory of 87 (U.K., French, U.S., and
domestic origin) is as follows:
Attack:
Jet: Sea Hawk
30
ASW carrier:
Turboprop:'Breguet 1050 Mize
11
ASW helicopter:
Turbine: Westland Sea King
6
Utility helicopter:
Turbine: Alouette III
15
Piston: TH -55A
4
Trainer and utility:
Jet: Vampire T -11
8
HJT -16 Mk II Kirari
7
Prop: HAL HT -2
2
Devon C -1
4
The air arm's effectiveness in the ASW role is good,
but capabilities are limited by the operational status of
the carrier I.N.S. Vikrant, too few, aircraft to permit
simultaneous patrol of all coastal waters, and the
deteriorating condition of the aging Alize aircraft. The
Sea Hawk jet attack aircraft provide a modest strike
capability. The at -sea capability is hampered by the
small number of aircraft that can be based aboard the
single carrier.
During the December 1971 war with Pakistan,
Indian Naval Air Arm interdiction efforts, using both
the Alize and Sea Hawk aircraft in conjunction with
the surface blockade, effectively isolated East Pakistan
(Bangladesh) from either resupply from, or escape to,
the sea. Repeated attacks on the Chittagong and Cox's
Bazaar areas caused extensive damage, and similar
efforts on the ports of Mangla and Chalna contributed
to their abandonment. Khulna naval facilities also
experienced heavy air attacks. Naval air is credited
with sinking several gunboats and barges and
damaging merchant ships. There are reports of the
Alize in an ASW role during this conflict, but details
5. Naval air arm (S)
The Indian Naval Air Arm (INAA) is small �about
1,500 men and 87 aircraft (45 jets). Its mission is to
protect surface forces against air and submarine attack
and to extend the striking power of the fleet. It is a
volunteer force and is not known to have a reserve. All
aircraft except one helicopter are assigned to
operational units.
The air arm maintains two squadrons aboard the
ASW support carrier I.N.S. Vikrant (Figure 19) �a
fighter- bomber strike squadron, equipped with
Armstrong Whitworth Sea Hawk jet aircraft, and an
ASW squadron, with Breguet 1050 Alize aircraft and
HAL HT -2 trainers. In addition, two helicopter
squadrons, with Sud Aviation Alouette III and British
Westland Sea Kings, are land -based at Goa. One
training squadron, with a variety of aircraft assigned,
is also based at Goa, and one helicopter training
squadron, with Alouette III and Hughes TH -55A, is
based at Cochin. The aircraft carrier, with its air
group, is homeported at Bombay and is usually
assigned to the Flag Officer Commanding, Western
,p
E
26
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are still lacking. Land -based Sea King helicopters were
deployed in an ASW role off Bombay, but there is no
indication as to their effectiveness.
Replacements are being sought for the aging Sea
Hawk and Alize aircraft, Among those being
considered are the British Hawker Siddeley Harriers,
joint French- British Sepecat Jaguar, and the U.S.
Douglas A -4 Sky Hawk and Grumman S -2 Tracker,
The navy is also inquiring into a replacement for the
aging and casualty -prone Wront.
Pilot candidates are procured both through the
triservice National Defense Academy and by direct
appointment from civilian life. Some general service
officers of the Indian Navy are selected to become air
observers. Enlisted personnel are recruited by the
Indian Navy and, upon completion of basic training,
are selected for aviation ratings or to become air
observers.
Cadet pilots for the naval air arm begin their
aviation academic training during their third year at
the National Defense Academy. This is followed by
basic flight training with the Indian Air Force and
several months of conversion training at the naval air
stations. Direct -entry candidates undergo a short
training period in naval subjects and then go on to join
their academy counterparts in basic flight training.
After completing a qualifying course, officer observers
are awarded their wings and appointed to a squadron
for an on- the -job probationary period of 6 months.
Enlisted personnel receive their basic training as
Indian Navy recruits and then go through technical
courses at I.N.S. Garuda, Cochin.
Most naval aviation training is conducted at I.N.S.
Garuda. In addition to pilot training, the air station
houses the Observer, Naval Airmen, and Naval Air
Technical Schools. Training in jet aircraft is
conducted at I.N.S. Hansa. Because of the critical
shortages of qualified instructors and equipment, the
schools are able to turn out technicians with only
minimum qualifications, and as a result these men
require supplemental training at air force schools. The
navy is striving to upgrade its air training program.
The Naval Aircraft Repair Organization (NARO) at
I.N.S. Garuda, a manufacturer of some aircraft parts,
is responsible for depot -level aircraft maintenance.
Maintenance practices, however, are inadequate and
must often be supervised by technical teams from
Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. An average of three
Alizes and six Sea Hawks are in overhaul status at all
times. Alize aircraft undergo modernization and
installation of aircraft service changes at about 1,200
hours, or 3 years of service.
E. Air force (S)
The Indian Air Force OAF) is the second largest of
the non Communist Asian and Coin monwealth air
forces. Its mission is to provide air defense and to
engage in tactical and strategic operations, as well as
to assist in civil emergencies. It can perform all of its
assigned missions. The 1965 war with Pakistan showed
that, in overall proficiency, the IAF was inferior to the
Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Since then, modernization
of equipment and improved training and techniques
have upgraded the Indian Air Force's capabilities.
Although a growing portion of the air force is
equipped with Soviet aircraft, the inventory still
includes a wide variety of different types, some 35 in
a11, a continuing detriment to the training logistics,
and maintenance programs. Night operations also
remain a problem; pilots do not like to fly at night,
and the IAF gives little priority to night training.
The air force is coequal with the army and the navy
under the Ministry of Defense. Its personnel remain
aloof from politics, are loyal to the constitutional
government, and enjoy the respect and support of the
population. Presently, there are no known dissident
elements in the air force.
Air force morale is excellent, security consciousness
is very good, and loyalty to service and country is
strong. Pay is good to excellent, depending upon rank,
and few officers or enlisted men voluntarily leave the
service. Privileges are extended to dependents of
deceased members, and other efforts are being made
to improve overall conditions in order to make service
life more attractive.
Because of India's numerical superiority and the
fact that the Pakistani Air Force did not fully commit
its assets, it is difficult to assess the performance of
either the Indian or the Pakistani Air Force in the
December 1971 war. The Indians achieved air
superiority over East Pakistan within a week but could
have done so more rapidly by extensively cratering the
runway at Dacca in the first day of fighting. Despite
the Indian Air Force's full alert status, Pakistani air
attacks in the west caught the Indians by surprise, and
the Indians launched few, if any, defensive reaction
sorties. Airfield strikes characterized the initial Indian
reaction to the 3 December attacks, closely followed
by a massive effort at the Karachi POL facilities and a
less intensive effort against Pakistani lines of
communication. Air -to -air combat operations were
relatively few, and the Indian Air Force's emphasis
was on interdiction and close air support operations.
The Indians lost 71 aircraft, mostly old British -built
Hawker Hunter F -56 and Soviet -built Su -7 (FITTER)
I
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FIGURE 20. MiG -21 (FISHBED) production facilities in India include the HAL
Nasik airframe plant, where final assembly takes place, as well as an
electronics plant at Hyderabad and an engine plant at Koraput. The MiG -21
FL was originally assembled from components imported from the Soviet Union,
but Indian capabilities have advanced and the aircraft is now produced
primarily from Indian- manufac�ured components. Production of a newer
variant, the MiG -21M (FISHBED J, export variant) which will offer increased
range and payload, is to begin in 1973. (S)
dily fighters, compared to �1:3 aircraft lost by ti
Pakistanis. Must aircraft lost on bath sides were shot
clown by ground fire.
'I'hc air defense ss :stem has it good capability against
;t conventional tnediom- to high- altilude attack by
either China (PRC) or Pakistan. The fighter element
comprises 16 squadrons. f light are equipped with
NI C -21 (Fisntu�:o) (Figure 20) aircraft and eight are
equipped with flawker Siddelev Gnat Mk. I (lay
fighters. The Mi( -21's provide a limited till- weather
interceptor capability. About half of these iircraft are
equipped with 23 -min guns and most are equipped
will) Soviet AA -2 ATOLL missiles and are used in either
the interceptor or ground support role, depen(ling on
priority. In the 1971 fighting th(�%� were used it ostl%- in
the killer role, but ill the former role they were
effective against Pakistani Lockheed F- 10-1's. In the
east the gun armo r Cnal subsonic day fighters proved
to be 111 effcc�tive -capon for low altitude, air -to -air
cotmbat against Pakistani North American F 86's.
'['he early %%arning /ground- comtrolle(I interception
([;W /CCI) system consists of 12 CCI and 72 EW sites
equipped with several types of radar, including Soyic�t
Bn; BEAI1 and U.S. AN FPS 89. Do. plo% ent is nloslly
oriente(I to the north and northwest. Contiguous
coverage is provided :long tl)e northern border and
along the western border to the Bonnhay area.
Coverage does not exist along the eastern border
except for the Madras and Calcutta areas. Against am
aircraft flying at 30,000 feet, the estimated nadir range
is 200 mantical miles. Effectiveness of the systerm is
limited by the number of available radars and the
masking effect of the IIi Ina Ilk yiis. All sites arc
connected by landlines to the Air Defense Direction
Centers at Allahabad. AinbaIli, 111(1 Shillong.
Landlimes were disrupted during the 1965 and 1971
28
Conflicts be interdiction. An effective buc�kop should
be provided by :r natiomyide microwave netsork nose
render c�onstruclion will) C-111a(liun and Ilungarimi
assist :utce and scheduled for completion in the n1i(I-
1970's. Although this network is designed primarily for
c�onnterciak use, the s%stetn should have the
capability to tie in during national einergemies. A
c�ontnlc�t for U.S. tropo /mic�rowave c�ontnunic�alions
equipment was not completed bec�anNe of the U.S.
etnfoargo on shipment of military equipment to in(lia,
but negotiations were sche(luled to begin in Jnly 197:3
on it new contract. So� iet SA -2 rnE;t.r
air missiles (SAM) (Figure 21) are used in defense of
significant ntilit :rry/industrial complexes. There are
five main c�otnplexes (wings), and they are tirade up of
a total of 19 sites (squadrons) �six operational sites arc
in the New Delhi area, tyo in the Bombay area, five in
the Chandigarh area, four in the Calcutta area, and
tyo in the Agra area. A site normally has six .missile
launchers, Will tyo missiles per launcher. Soviet
ENVXCI radars are collocated with the SAM
c�ornplexes, all :1 1'. \N Som; fire control radar is at each
site. A fr�w sites [illy(' the new Fs\ SONG I', end :jj1eimg
L
r
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FIGURE 21. GUIDELINE (SA -2) surface -to -air missile on
display in New Delhi (U /OU)

ii
c w3
the missile system's electronic counter countermeasure
(ECCM) and low altitude capability. More SAM sites
will he required to make the SAM system highly
"octive against it large -scale conventional attack by
ti. Chinese. The full extent of India's involvement
and success with SAM's in the war is unknown, but
the Pakistanis have admitted the loss of some Martin
B -57 Canberra bombers near Agra to SAM's. In the
Delhi area, missiles were deployed as point defenses
close to the two military airfields in the vkinity of the
city.
The Indian Army also has as many as 2.10 British
Tigeteat SAM's, but their disposition by unit and the
number of launchers are not know. All antiaircraft
artillery (AAA) units are subordinate to the Indian
Army. There are seven brigades with a number of
subordinate AAA regiments. The regiments are
equipped with either 1,60 or L70 Bofors 40 -mm guns.
The 1,70 guns are radar controlled, and the I.60's are
manually operated. During the war these weapons
proved to he the most effective air defense against low
level air ground attacks and strikes on airfields.
The air force has a minor strategic bombing
capability with its English Electric Canberra B(I) Mk.
58 light bombers. These aircraft have the range and
capability to homb all targets in Pakistan but do not
have sufficient range to attack deeper than forward
bases in south China. During the 1971 war they were,
however, used in a tactical role against Pakistani
airfields.
Fifteen fighter bomber squadrons (equipped with
the Soviet -built Su -7 (Frr the Indian -built IIF -24
Marut (Figure 22), the British -built hunter F -56, and
the French -built Mystere IVA day fighters) and three
Canberra B(I) Mk. 58 light bomber squadrons are
available for tactical operations. During the 1971 war,
the MiG -21, armed with an unknown bomb load, was
also used in a ground support role in East Pakistan and
the An -12 (Ccn) transports, armed with 500 -pound
bombs, were used in bombing raids on fuel and
ammunition dumps in the Chhanga Manga forest
area south of Lahore and along the cease -fire line in
Kashmir. Armed trainers such as the North American
T -6 were also used in a tactical role. The Indian Air
FIGURE 22. HF -s4 Marut, a let
fighter aircraft built in India (U /OU)
Force flew about 100 sorties per day in direct support
of the tinny and iln undetermined number against
shallow interdiction targets such as bridges, railroad
stations, supply points, assembly areas, etc. It earned
the army's praise for its good close support. This
effectiveness was largely because of the use of airborne
forward air controllers. The Indians also used an
airborne tactical communications intelligence
warning system to support their ground attack
aircraft, but there was no airborne command post. The
Canberra aircraft used on airfield strikes flew at
altitudes of 50 to 100 feet, thereby evading radar
detection. Other tactical aircraft performed ef-
fectively, but the Su -7 fighter /bomber did not fare
well against Pakistani fighters during attacks on West
Pakistan, provin., to he a heavy, fragile aircraft with
relatively poor maneuverability and poor capability
for absorbing damage.
The reconnaissance capability is modest. It reposes
chiefly in two squadrons, one of Canberra PB -57's and
the other of modified Lockheed C -121 Constellations.
A few of the Bunter F -56's are camera equipped,
giving them a tactical reconnaissance capability.
The transport capability is built around 13
squadrons of medium and light transports. There are
several types of aircraft such as th^ aging Douglas C-
-17's (Skytrain) and Fairchild C- 119G's (Packets), De
Ilavilland Canada DfIC -4's (Caribou), An -12's
(Cun), and about 80 Mi -4 (Ilou ND) transport
helicopters. Assuming an 80% serviceability, this farce
is estimated to be capable of lifting one of the army's
parachute brigades in one single lift under optimum
conditions. Logistic support would be inadequate to
sustain operatons on this scale. Pilots are well trained
and under visual conditions are effective in aerial
resupply. The Indians used helicopters and transport
aircraft to land troops and supplies during the war,
mostly in the eastern sector, but the extent of airlift
operations is not known. On several occasions,
bridgeheads were secured by heliborne assault, thus
speeding the army's advance. Gun -armed helicopters
lifted a battalion of troops during the capture of
Sylhet, and it was publicly announced that between
December 10 and December 13 helicopters had lifted
i
29
4!r:
t
,a
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JNTNL -1101 a&ff�
0
Over 50)U troops and 50 tons of supplies in the east.
On December 11 the Indians dropped a parachute
hattalion north of Dacca, using C -1 19's and AN -12's.
India will continue to strive for a modern "first
rate" air force. immediate requirements include
replacement of aging fighter /bombers and intercep-
tors; acquisition of heavy and medium transports
(including helicopters) for use as aerial observation
platform; and improvement of the command and
control environment. Thirty -three Soviet Mi -8 llln
helicopters were recently acquired, and the first
shipment of Soviet MiG- 21M's, the export model of
the Fisunr t) J, has arrive(]. Most of these new MiG's
will be given a primary mission of air defense, but
some may be used in an air -to- ground role to replace
aging }(linters, Mystcres, and De Ilavilland Vampires,
as well as the Sn -7's.
1. Organization
The Chief of Air Staff is commander of the air force.
in rank he is an air chief marshal, and in the chain of
command he comes under the Minister of Defense. lie
is, ex officio, the air force member of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee of the Ministry of Defense. The air
force consists of its headquarters in New Delhi, one
independent operational group, and five major
cotninands �three aerial, one training, and one
inaintenance. Air Force Headquarters is responsible
for control and organization of the air force and serves
principally a. an advisory in(] coordinating staff for
the Chief of the Air Staff. The Chief is assisted by four
principal staff officers �Vice Chief, Deputy Chief, Air
Officer in Charge of Administration, and Air Officer
in Charge of Maintenance. lie is responsible for the
functions that are implied in the titles shown in Figure
23. Ieadquarters is also responsible for the operation
of the Air Force Station at New Delhi, the Joint Air
Warfare School al Hyderabad, the institute of
Aviation Medicine, at Bangaloic, and for providing
air force representation in joint service activities.
The five commands tinder Air I leadquarters are the
Western, Eastern, and Central Air Commands, the
"('raining Command, and the Maintenance Com-
mand. The Eastern Air Command located at Shillong,
the Western Air Command at New Delhi, and the
Central Air Command at Allahabad are responsible
for air defense and close air support in their respective
areas of responsibility; the precise geographic
boundaries of these areas have not been disclosed. in
addition, the Central Air Command appears to have
functional command for both bombers and transports
for all of India. The No. I Independent Operational
Group has responsibility for air defense and close air
Minister of
Defense
I
Chief of
Air Staff
Vice Chief of Staff
I
Air Officer in
Charge of Administration
I
Air Officer in
Charge of Maintenance
I
I
Deputy Chief of Staff
I
Plans Programs
Officer Personnel
Plans Inspection
Operations
Standby Establishment
Enlisted Personnel
Systems
Inspection
Committee
Works
logistics Management
Flight Safety
Training
Medical Services
(Equipment)
Intelligence
Education
Accounts
Services
Meteorology
Staff Requirements
Personnel Services
Signals
j Financial Planning Judge Advecate General
Systems Evaluation (Air)
Protect Groups
FIGURE 23. Organization of the Indian Air Force Headquarters, 1973 (U/OU)
30
r 1
L_J
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I
support in the area roughly encompassing the states of
Gujarat and Rajasthan in the western part of the
country. The Training Command, at Bangalore,
controls most ground and flying training institutions.
It is responsible for hoth the flying and ground
training of officers and for the training of airmen in
various technical and nontechnical fields as well as for
training aviation personnel of both the army and
navy. The Maintenance Command at Nagpur
controls all units responsible for the repair and storage
of aircraft and those concerned with motor transport,
signal equipment, armament, ammunition, and
explosives.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
The air force has 104,000 men -7,980 officers
(including an estimated 2,600 pilots), 22,200 NCO's,
and 73,820 enlisted men. The aircraft inventory is
1,399 -755 jet, 370 propeller, 63 turboprop, and 211
helicopter. The breakdown by functional category and
type of propulsion is as follows:
Bomber:
Jet: Canberra B(I) btk 58
39
Day Fighter:
Jet: Hunter F -56
65
HAL HF -24 1lfarut
49
Su -7 (FrrrEn)
88
MUG -21 (FisHBED)
201
Gnat
176
Attack:
Jet: Vampire FB -52
20
Reconnaissance:
Jet: Canberra PR -57
8
Transport:
Jet: Tu -124 (Cooxpor)
3
Prop: C -119C Packet
54
L 1049 Super Constellation
8
DHC4 Caribou
14
I1-14 CRATE)
18
C47A Skytrain
80
Turboprop: An -12 (Cuu)
38
HS (Avro) 748
25
Helicopter:
Turbine: Mi -8 (Hip)
33
Sikorsky S -62B
1
Alouette III
80
Piston: M14 (Hou -m)
82
OH -13H Sioux
10
Sikorsky S-55
5
Trainer and utility:
Jet
106
Prop
196
'For regularly updated information, refer to the Military
Intelligence Summary, the Air Forces Intelligence Study, and the
Free World Air Order of Battle, all published by the Defense
Intelligence Agency. A brief summary of the Indian airfield system
and data on 29 selected airfields are provided in this General Survey
in the chapter on Transportation and Telecommunications.
Of the total inventory, 1,239 aircraft are distributed
among the following 64 operational units:
14 fighter /bomber squadrons
8 day fighter squadrons
9 fighter /interceptor squadrons
3 light bomber squadrons
1 strategic reconnaissance squadron
1 maritime reconnaissance squadron
13 transport squadrons
14 helicopter units
1 air headquarters communications (VIP) squadron
The balance of the aircraft in the inventory are
assigned to miscellaneous administrative or support
units, including a paratroop training unit and a
number of headquarters detachments of the various
major commands.
Except for three squadrons at Poona Airfield, most
of the air force is concentrated in the northern part of
the country. Fighters, bombers, transports, and
helicopters are fairly evenly distributed among the
various airfields in this region. More than half of the
flying units are based in the western portion of the
country. Prior to the hostilities with Pakistan in
December 1971, there was a wide dispersal of forces,
and aircraft were deployed to numerous forward
locations facing both the east and the west.
There arc three categories of reserve personnel. The
first, the Regular Reserve, includes those who have
retired or have been released from active duty in the
air force. The second is the Air Defense Reserve, which
includes individuals with technical or flying
backgrounds, e.g., Indian airline mechanics. The third
category is the Auxiliary Air Force (seven squadrons)
which resembles the organized reserve training units of
the U.S. Air Force. Citizens who volunteer for the
Auxiliary Air Force get aviation training, while they
continue to follow normal vocational pursuits. It is
also somewhat analogous to the U.S. Civil Air Patrol.
The air wing of the National Cadet Corps (NCC) is an
important source of potential air force officer
candidates. The NCC Senior Division air wing
strength is 9,800; the Junior Division, about 50,600.
No aircraft are assigned to the reserve. During the
December 1971 war, call -up notices to air force
reservists were issued to 9 officers and 2.35 airmen.
Airfields that are used on a regular basis by the air
force, such as Chandigarh, Agra, Ambala, Adampur,
and others, are generally capable of supporting
operations by Lockheed C- 130 -type aircraft. The three
international airfields, Bombay, Calcutta, and Delhi
arc capable of supporting Lockheed C -141 operations.
3. Training
The growth in the number of Indian air force
personnel since 1965, together with the acquisition of
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VI
da
more sophisticates) aircraft and of surface -to -air
missiles, has necessitated a parallel acceleration in all
phases of training. The training program has become
increasingly comprehensive and meets most normal
peacetime requirements. Much of the indigenous
training is in English; however, all commands are now
given in Ilindi. Students study the Russian language
in preparation for training in the U.S.S.R. The high
illiteracy rate and lack of mechanical background of
recruits, however, require that air force co arses begin
at a much more basic level than the comparable U.S.
Air Force courses. Facilities are austere, but the
training standards are high and discipline strict.
Training films from foreign countries are utilized, and
other innovations have been introduced. Soviet
technical specialists in India provide guidance in
specialized fields, and the air force sends students to
the Soviet Union for training on Soviet- provided
equipment. Typically, after the acquisition of a new
type of materiel the number of students sent to the
Soviet Union is quite large and then tapers off as the
IAF builds up its indigenous training program.
Students in the U.S.S.R. probably undergo training on
SA -2 missiles and perhaps the An -12's, Su -7's, and
iNiG -21's. IAF students also attend staff colleges in the
United Kingdom and Australia on an exchange basis.
In the past, large numbers of Indian Air Force students
airs trained in the United States tinder the U.S.
Military Assistance Program's (MA training
program. Recently, however, the Indian Government
has turned down all the MAP training offered. Egypt
and France have also conducted training programs for
Indian Air Force air and ground crews. The IAF itself
has trained personnel from Nigeria, Iraq, and Egypt.
Candidates for pilot training come primarily from
the National Defense Academy. A few enter from the
enlisted ranks and from the National Cadet Corps.
Pilot trainees initially receive 40 hours of flying
training :r the IIT -2 at the Elementary Flying School
32
FIGURE 24. HJT -16 Mk. II Kiran let
is produced at the HAL Bangalore
airframe plant. HAL had
encounted production problems with
the Kiran during the early stages
of the program but now has solved
them and is considering exporting
the aircraft. (5)
i
-:i
3
at Bidar. This is followed by an 85 -hour flying course
in the IIJT -16 Kiran (Figure 24) at the Air Force
Academy, Dundigal. Students arc then selected for
either the "Transport Pilot Course conducted at
Bangalore /Yelahanka (13 0 08'N., 77 �36'E.) or the
Fighter Training Course conducted at f lakirnpet.
Each of these schools offer a 125 -hour flying course.
The Fighter Course uses Vampires and the Transport
Course uses C -47's. IIS (Avro) 748's will be introduced
into the Transport Course. Attrition is about 30 in
the Elementary Flying School, but virtually negligible
in the advanced flying training programs. Pilot
trainees receive commission and pilot rating on
completion of either the Transport or Fighter Course.
The helicopter Training School at Tambanurn
provides the IAF with qualified instructor pilots The
IAF provides basic flying training for about 200
students per year, including students from the Indian
Navy and Army, and some foreign students. Plans
exist for the consolidation of all flying training at the
Air Force Academy, including navigation and signals
training, which is now conducted at iEyderabad.
About 15,000 nonflying enlisted personnel and
officers are trained and retrained annually in courses
varying in length from 20 to 72 weeks. The Air Force
Technical College at Jalahalli, with a peak enrollment
of 450 stadmts, provides training for aeronautical
engineering officers, in both electronics and mechanics
specialties. Other officers are trained at the Air Force
Admin;strative College. Both of these schools offer
advanced courses for senior officers. Advanced
professional schooling for officers is also conducted at
the Defense Services Staff College at Wellington, the
Joint Air Warfare School and the Institute of Defense
Management (both at Hyderabad), and the National
Defense College in New Delhi.
Airmen enter the air force by direct recruitment.
Recruits must have had I 1 years of school. Term of
enlisted service is 15 years. Basic military and
educational training takes between 8 and 12 months,
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depending on the specialty for which the individual is
trained. Subsequently, the recruit is assigned to u
squadron and receives on -the -job training until he
becomes fully qualified. This is followed by an
additional year of technical training with the Training
Command, after which the recruit is rated and again
returns to a squadron for 3 or 4 more years of on -the-
job training.
Principal training facilities of the Indian Air Force,
their locations (as of April 1973), and types of training
arc a, follows:
TECIMICAr. FACILITIES:
LOCATIO-I
TYPE Of TRAINn.0
FLYmc FACILITIES:
Signals School
Elementary Flying Training
Bidar
Basic flight train
School
School Administration
ing in HT -2
Air Force Academy
Dundigal
Intermediate
and Vampire T-
flight training in
Poona
Institute of Aviation Medi-
C47 and T -6
Helicopter Training School
Jodhpur
Training in OH-
Jodhpur
School
13H
Flying Instructors School
Tamoaram
Training in HT -2
Joint Air Warfare School
and HJT -16
Fighter Training Wing
Hakimpet
Jet fighter con-
version, Vampire
Transport Training Wing
Bangalore/
Training in C47
Yelahanka
Aircrew Examining Board
Hindan
Training in T -6G
and C -47A
TECIMICAr. FACILITIES:
Jalahalli
Air Force Navigation and Hyderabad
HS (Avro) 748
Signals School
Air Force Technical College Jalahalli
Nc, 1 Ground Training Sambre
School Administration
No. 2 Ground Training Tambaram
Training in HT -2
School Technical
and Vampire T-
55
Nos. 3, 5, and 6 Ground
Jalahalli
Training Schools Sig-
nals, Armament, and Ra-
dar, respectively
No. 7 Ground Training
Baroda
School Missiles
ADMINISTRATION AND MEDICAL FACILITIES:
Air Force Administrative
Coimbatore
College
Medical Training Center
Poona
Institute of Aviation Medi-
Bangalore
cine
Control and Reporting
Jodhpur
School
Air Force Intelligence
do
School
Joint Air Warfare School
Hyderabad
Not pertinent.
4. Logistics
of the Ministry of Defense. The Air Force
Maintenance Command at Nagpur is responsible for
the receipt, storage, and distribution of aircraft,
aircraft parts, and POL. Aviation fuels are supplied by
the government -owned Indian Oil Company under a
policy that calls for the maintenance of a 30- to 45 -day
supply at each air force base. It is planned to increase
this to a 90 -clay supply. In the event of a national
emergency, additional POL from domestic refineries
would be made available to the air force. Thus POL
products are not a limiting factor on air force
operations.
Storage points are classified as depot, base, and
bench stock. The stock control level at depots is 9
months; at bases, 2 months; and at bench stock, 1
month. Requisitions are classified as AOG (aircraft on
ground), priority, and ordinary. Processing time is
about 4 hours for AOG and several weeks for ordinary
requests. Although stock balance and consumption
data are transmitted to Air Force Headquarters on a
daily basis, this information reflects neither true
consumption rates nor facilities' direct redistribution
of items. In general, the supply system is cumbersome,
complicated, and could become hopelessly bogged
down in a wartime situation. A major factor
contributing to the logistics problems is the large
number of types of aircraft in the inventory Soviet,
British, French, U.S., Indian �and a supply system
that classifies spares in accordance with the
classification of the original supplier. This involves
duplicate listings and a variety of complicated cross
reference and coding systems.
Air Force maintenance concepts .ire similar to the
organizational, field, and depot -level maintenance
concepts of the U.S. Air Force; however, Hindustan
Aeronautics, Ltd. (HAL), performs depot -level
maintenance on all fighter aircraft and some trainers.
Depot -level maintenance on Soviet supplied aircraft is
performed with Soviet assistance at the airbase at
Chavdigarh, as well as at the HAL Nasik Airframe
Plant at Ozar Airfield (20 73 0 55'E.). About 50
Soviet technicians are assigned to the airframe plant.
The maintenance of air force equipment is
complicated by lack of trained personnel, shortages of
test equipment, insufficient spare parts, and lengthy
lead time in the procurement of spares for foreign
aircraft. The air force normally has an operationally
ready rate of 70 during the December 1971 war
this rate drooped to 60
F. Paramilitary forces (S)
Procurement of major items for the air force is India has a number of paramilitary organizations.
accomplished through the Defense Production Board Some of them �the armed state police battalions, the
33
N'A'
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Border Security Force and the Central Reserve
Police �could function as light infantry units,
supplementing the army during hostilities. Others
the Special Frontier Force, the Indo Tibetan Border
Police, and the Special Services Body �while
considered paramilitary, should be viewed as an
extension of the army because of their unconventional
warfare mission and seconded officers. In addition,
there are other security forces that are of little value in
an armed conflict because of their limited military
training and obsolete weapons. Personnel strength
trends in the armed state police, Border Security Force,
and the Central Reserve Police since 1960 has been as
follows:
1960 130,000
1962 130,000
1964 130,000
1966 214,000
1969 297,000
1970 337,0K
1971 337,000
1972 347,000
The armed state police battalions of each Indian
state have the mission of internal security and border
patrol. The battalions are normally used within their
own states, but they can be deployed to aid other
states or be brought under centralized control during
emergencies. Normally they are recruited, paid, and
controlled by their respective states. Of their estimated
242,000 men organized into 140 or 150 battalions,
28,000 (30 battalions) are on active duty with the
army performing light infantry type duties.
The Central Reserve Police (CRP) is a mobile,
armed gendarmerie. It serves as a strategic police force
in the Indian police system. Its chief mission is to
augment state police forces in their internal security
and border patrol missions. Normally it is under the
Ministry of Home Affairs, but frequently its units are
put under operational control of the army. Strength is
j about 51,000 men. The CRP is composed of 63
battalions -60 "duty" (infantry) battalions and three
signal battalions. Battalion commanders are either
i senior police officers or military officers seconded from
j the army. The men are armed with submachine guns,
rifles, and light machineguns. Following the attack by
the Chinese in 1962, many of these battalions were
assigned to the army, and others patrolled border
regions. At present, 30 battalions are under army
control, deployed along the Indo- Pakistani Cease -Fire
Line (CFL) in Kashmir, or in northeastern India.
The Border Security Force (BSF) is a border guard
organization and also under the Ministry of Home
Affairs. It was formed under the ministry in December
34
1965 to relieve the states of the responsibility for
patrolling the sensitive eastern and western borders
with Pakistan �a consequence of the fighting that
year between India and Pakistan. Still responsible for
patrolling the borders with Bangladesh and Pakistan,
the BSF carries out military as well as police functions.
In normal times, Indian Army units are stationed
within 5 miles of the Pakistani border, this area being
left to the Border Security Force. The BSF is armed as
light infantry. Its mission is to provide border security
along the frontiers, to collect intelligence on these
border areas, and to assist the state forces in
maintaining law and order. Strength is about 76,000
men. There are 75 to 80 battalions, a small air wing
with 4 C -47's (Dakota), and a small naval wing (2 tugs
and 3 patrol boats). Force Headquarters are in New
Delhi, Western Sector Headquarters at Jullundur,
Northern Sector Headquarters at Srinagar, and
Eastern Sector Headquarters at Calcutta. About half
of the battalions are under the Calcutta headquarters.
Units have served under the army combatting
insurgencies in Nagaland and in the Mizo Hills. In the
1971 war with Pakistan, the Border Security Force
ably supported army operations. In addition to units
assigned to the army for particular missions, a
battalion or two are put under army control for
advanced training every 2 months.
In reaction to the Chinese invasion of 1962, the
Indian Government assigned to the Intelligence
Bureau, an agency in the Home Ministry, the
responsibility for developing an unconventional
warfare capability that was to be put to use along the
northern borders, if needed. A three tiered, loosely
related structure was established that consists of a
Special Frontier Force (SFF), an Indo- Tibetan Border
Police force (ITBP), and a Special Services Body (SSB).
The Special Frontier Force is a small, highly trained
force for unconventional warfare operations along the
Tibetan border and in Tibet. Strength is about 8,000
men, including about 5,500 Tibetan refugees, a 1,200
man force from the Indian Army under a retired army
brigadier, and a 900 -man battalion of Gurkha
mercenaries from Nepal. The force's mission is to be
prepared to deploy by companies into forward
positions astride border communication lines as a
harassing and delaying force and to organize
resistance forces in the event of another Chinese
invasion. About 1,500 members of the SFF constitute
an airborne mobile force for contingency use against
the Chinese in Tibet or in sections of India should they
be overrun. The SFF units are normally based in
border positions in Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh, and
Arunachal Pradesh. Some units saw action on the
Kashmir cease -fire line in the 1971 war with Pakistan.
i
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The Indo- Tibetan Border Police is an organization
of conventional isnits composed of Indian trained and
Indian -led martial tribesmen of the Indo- Tibetan
border areas. The ITBP commander is an inspector
general of police. Strength is on the order of 8,000 men
and apparently there are about eight battalions.
During peacetime they are deployed with conven-
tional army units to carry out police and
counterinsurgency duties. In the event of another
Chinese invasion, the ITBP units would delay the
advance until their positions becames untenable, at
which time they would change to a guerrilla role in
areas that have been overrun.
The Special Services Body is a civilian /militia group
organized to maintain Indian contact and to identify
on a village level with individuals in the border areas.
During peacetime these personnel help combat
subversion, and, in the event of another invasion, they
are to provide a core of village resistance and to
cooperate with Indo- Tibetan Border Police guerrilla
units. At least seven Special Services Body battalions
SECRET
SECRET
have been raised and stationed in Assam, Manipur,
and Nagaland. These permanent formations impart
limited marksmanship training and some political
indoctrination to hill tribesmen.
Other security forces can also be used in various
roles during national emergencies, thus relieving
military and paramilitary units for combat. The
Defense Security Corps (DSC), the Central Industrial
Security Force (CISF), and the Railroad Protection
Force function chiefly as guard agencies, caring
respectively for government installations, state
operated industrial facilities, and railroad property. A
fourth organization, the Home Guards, composed of
about 526,000 citizen volunteers, assists the police at
the local level and performs civil defense services
during times of national emergency. Some platoon
size units even supplemented Border Security Force
units along the western border during the December
1971 war with Pakistan. These units are, for the most
part, well trained and contribute significantly to
internal security.
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