NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 19; HUNGARY; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 37
• Content Type: REPORTS

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d
I

5
s s yH i
M ir
r_
Magyar arise, the homeland callsat a
t
Now or never, the hour falls!
Will we be slave or free? W
To this what will your answer be?
We swear, we swear that we will
i
no longer be slaves!,
From the Nemzeti Do/ (National Song)
by Sandor Petofi (1848). Used as a
y cr
rallyin in the revolts of
Y g rT E iy i ,N \F1
1848 and 1956.
Jz
r y k i. 1 Fv t,r
hi r I V s
V
r
s v_ lr c Wiarkx
,y,Sl l t Jty tp. 10.' i &'Sx�
x .r` 1 44 i I ttl 4 nn
I t It t 2, r .r 17 x X n4.
The Hungarian, na;ionvvvoultl`hate \perished long
ago if its political Naomi had'nor succeeded
1
ii t t r It is very' characteri
in preserving stic.
that by giving up. the battle itha m fact
consolidated its position and its o pgftunitesr
p
has been a es of d n and an
in Europe. seri people
uninterrupted rtteditation on its artual
x
r I
possibilities C
3
1
8 Mihaly Babits 1939
On -the ,Hun arar Character,
d is e
a V
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Revolution or Evolution?
A Hungarian Dilemma
With almost cyclical regularity hardheaded
realists and romantic nationalist firebrands have
alternately dominated historical events in Hungary.
Through centuries of foreign subjugation the Hun-
garians have proved to be reluctant and rebellious
subjects, and a general pattern of repression-revolt-
reform- repression has characterized their national
experience. The decade of the 1960's was a period
of orderly reform, and the Communist regime in
Budapest rode a tide of political stability into the
early 1970's. Whether this situation lasts or declines
into more repression and turmoil will depend
largely on how well the leadership adjusts to new
challenges and whether it can continue to deliver
on its promises of a better life through g- and
pragmatic reforms. (U /OU
Throughout history, the Hungarians have been
the victims but also the intimate beneficiaries of
their circumstances. Originating in northeastern
Europe and during their prehistory subject to con-
siderable Turkic influence, Magyar tribes settled in
the Danube River basin toward the end of the
ninth century. As a small non -Indo- European
people surrounded by hostile Slavic nations who
were in turn at odds with their Germanic neighbors,
the Hungarians became pawns in nearly all of the
military and diplomatic struggles that have dis-
rupted central Europe. The Turks, Habsburgs,
Nazis, and finally the Soviets established themselves,
in turn, as Hungary's "protectors" and sponsored
Hungarian political leaders who would give them
loyal service. (U /OU
But Hungary's misfortunes were also a source of
inner strength. They helped hone a special brand
of nationalism and developed over the centuries a
determination either to seek compromise with su-
perior power for the sake of national existence, or
at times to take up arms �even though facing cer-
tain defeat �for the sake of national identity. The
Magyar people, despite repeated invasions and
attempts at ethnic assimilation, have maintained
their national identity and a high degree of cultural
and ethnic integrity. In the end, the foreign powers
that have; successively denied Hungary's elusive
dream of true national independence have had to
rely on military force to maintain their hegemony.
(U /OU)
On the scale of Hungary itself, the Magyar record
of military defeats and futile revolts is a bleak
one. But on the larger European scale, the Magyar
willingness to rise united against a stronger over-
lord has helped to shape the rel4.Jons between one
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or another dominant central European power and
the weaker nations in the area that it sought to
subjugate. For the Soviets in 1956 as for the
Habsburgs in 1c 38 the use of military force to
crush Hungarian revolts has had this effect. The
1848 revolt against the Austrians was crushed with
critical assistance from Russia, but it so boldly
dramatized Austrian misrule that the ensuing period
of reforms led directly to the Great Compromise
of 1867. It gave Hungary nominal equality with
Austria in the Empire and almost total autonomy
in domestic politics. The 1956 revolt against the
Soviets similarly dramatized the evils of Stalinist
imperialism in Eastern Europe. It set off a series
of changes in the Soviets' relations with its satellites
in Eastern Europe which in the early 1970's has
still not run full course. (U /OU)
The impact of 1956 on the Hungarian Soviet
relationship has been massive. Efforts to recreate
Hungary in the image of a small Soviet republic,
following the same political formulas Moscow
uses to rule its citizens, have ceased. Since early
in the 1960's, Janos Kadar, the party leader im-
posed on Hungary by the Soviet Red Army in the
wake of the revolt, has charted an evoluticaary
course. While remaining true to the fundamentals
of Marxist Leninist ideology and strengthening the
"socialist" character of Hungary, he has recognized
and met to some extent the demands of his nation
for a more humane, more Hungarian, form of
communism. (U /OU
The range of these compromises is wide. The
reform of the economic structure, the more `liberal"
cultural policies, the muted role of the secret police,
and the wider array of consumer goods available
to Hungarians represent some of Kadar's more
visible improvements. They are appreciated by the
vast majority of Hungarians, whose attitude of quiet
compliance has helped Kadar achieve since the
early 1960's a record of stability unequaled in
Easter Europe. Kadar has gone even further,
promising gradual political reforms, a few of which
he has already introduced m watered -down form.
(U /OU)
Continued peaceful evolution will, however, de-
pend on Kadar's ability to establish for his regime
a more solid basis of support among the population.
His acceptance clearly is conditional. The Hun-
garians know that the price Moscow 1 is demanded
of Kadar for permission to plot domestic reforms
is to keep the domestic situation on an even keel
and to give loyal support to Moscow's foreign policy
2
positions. And they also suspect that the Kremlin
leaders may someday decide that the reforms are
unacceptable. They doubt that when that time
comes Kadar would, or could, effectively fend off
Soviet demands for tighter orthodoxy in Hungary.
(U /OU)
Kadar, like other Hungarian leaders before him,
has not found a means of controlling nationalism
and transforming it into a creative force. He and
his lieutenants have opted instead for a sterile
policy of dampening almost all nationalist expres-
sion. This hypercaution is unpopular with Hun-
garians of all political persuasions, including signifi-
cant numbers of Communist party members. Young
people especially are materialistic and are be-
ginning to show signs of disaffection with the com-
promises their parents have had to make to secure
any semblance of a decent standard of living.
Nationalism bordering on chauvinism is a tradi-
tional alternative for Hungarians in the absence of
other guiding spiritual ideals ideals that com-
munism, despite its philosophical pretensions, has
not been able to instill. (U /OU
One of the main factors that has helped Kadar
keep down Magyar nationalism since 1956 has been
the older generation's sense of "no alternatives."
They realize that Hungary's options are frozen by
the political and military balance in postwar Eu-
rope. For them, especially, the Soviets' use of mili-
tary power against the Dubcek reformers of Czech-
oslovakia in 1968 reinforced the memories of what
Moscow did to Hungary in 1956. (U /OU)
The Hungarians, with their small numbers and
shortsighted antipathy toward most of their neigh-
bors, may well be doomed to continuing to ex-
change one foreign "protector" for another and to
engage in bloody demonstrations of their patriotism
as the only safeguard against national extinction.
But there are some among them who are deter-
mined to find a new solution to this dilemma. One
such vision rests on the creation of a "Danubian
confederation," a `Tong alliance of all the states
in the area based on mutual guarantees of inde-
pendence within a larger entity. Whether this con-
cept �based at least in part on nostalgia for the
Austro- Hungarian Empire �is realistic even over
the longer term may be doubtful, but it is a con-
cept that Hungarians hope their neighbors will not
lightly dismiss. It is, moreover, a tenacious dream,
and, at the very least, a hopeful sign that the Hun-
garian people have not resigned themselves to the
grim prospect of unending strife and cyclical blood-
letting in defense of their homeland. (U /OU)
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The Hungarians: Their Habitat and History (U90U)
Hungary ;.s endowed with a great natural re-
source, the vitality of the people. Sorely beset
over the years, Hungarians have endured, and so
has the nation. Not even the wet blanket of Soviet
imposed Communist rule has been able to dampen
completely their fiery spirit. Eastern in origin and
Western in outlook, they are inclined to consider
themselves unique and even a trifle "superior." In
short, they take pride in being Hungarian.
Ethnically, they are related to the Finns. Both
trace their ancestry to the nomadic Finno -Ugric
peoples who migrated from a region between the
Volga and the Urals. About 93% of the 10.4 million
Hungarians are classified as Magyar, with a scatter-
ing of Germans, Slovaks, Romanians, Serbo- Croats,
and Gypsies (still partially untamed) constituting
the remainder. Most of the Magyars, however, are
actually of mixed blood through intermarriage
which has gone on for centuries. Just as every Hun-
garian "has a cousin in the United States," every
Hungarian has a German or Slavic grandparent.
Another 4.6 million people of Hungarian ancestry
dwell outside the homeland: nearly 2 million in
Romania, nearly 700,000 in Czechoslovakia, half a
million in Yugoslavia, and not quite 200,000 in the
U.S.S.R. In the prideful tradition of this region,
the Hungarian people harbor grudges over alleged
"injustices" visited on its people by neighboring
governments.
Hungary proper is a homogenous nation chiefly
because Hungarians act as one people. The Magyars
have assimilated large numbers of their one -time
conquerors Slays, Austro Germans, and Roma-
nians �and in the process have obliterated any sort
of textbocok claim to racial purity. They are largely
indistinguishable physically from other Europeans,
although some Hungarians do possess the flattish
concave nose of their Mongol ancestors or exhibit
characteristics acquired through intermixture with
the Turks.
What sets apart the Hungarian more immedi-
ately is his language, which is unrelated to any
of the main European languages and is similar only
to Finnish and Estonian. Linguistic isolation has
contributed to a cultural tradition unusually free
of foreign influences. During the centuries of Hun-
gary's subjugation, national leaders have repeat-
edly evoked the popular yearning for freedom in
the mother tongue, thus bringing forth a marriage
between the word and the soul of the people. This
insistence on use of Hungarian is one of the reasons
Hungary exists as a separate nation today.
As the representative of an old and proud society,
the Hungarian has uevelopcd a civilized and honest
approach to life. He is not afraid to express his
mood of the moment, whether it be rapturous joy
or deep despair. He possesses the imagination and
sensitivity of a poet, the intellig.:nee and volubility
of a lawyer. Renowned as a wit, he is an unsur-
passed teller of jokes, which frequently turn out
to be wry commentaries on life. As a host he dis-
plays courteous and gracious ways. With acquaint-
ances he will be polite; with family (of which he
is the ruler) and close friends, affectionate; with
foes, argumentative or sullen. All in all, he is both
hard:ieaded and romantic.
The Hungarian experience is perhaps bast sym-
bolized 'n the person of the peasant who has
engaged in a never ending struggle with wind,
weather, rapacious landlords, and alien masters. Al-
though somewhat lost sight of in the inevitable
rush to urbanization, the country folk still represent
3
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the historical Hungary. Small villages abound, with
their unpaved roads, baroque churches, bullock
carts, flocks of geese, and nesting storks. Scattered,
low -lying abodes are frequently no more than white-
washed mud -brick cottages �a tradition in con-
struction dating back to the Turkish occupation
when their destruction was frequent and wide-
spread. And like their distinctive dwellings, the
peasants themselves evoke the past in their holiday
dress and observance of ancient religious customs.
Isolated from the sea, Hungary is situated in a
broad basin of south central Europe that has been
traversed and contested by disparate peoples over
the centuries. Once dominant over the entire area,
Hungary now shares the basin with Romania and
Yugoslavia which, along with Austria, Czechoslo-
vakia, and the U.S.S.R., comprise a girdle of alien
cultures. Comparable in area to Portugal or the
state of Indiana, present -day Hungary extends only
280 miles from east to west and 122 miles from
north to south. Cultural isolation and compactness
of shape tend to reinforce Hungary's identity and
integrity as a political entity. Location astride major
east -west land routes has compensated in some
measure for the limitation of size and has permitted
extensive external ties that have enabled Hungary
to progress beyond the limits of its own natural
resources.
The Danube River, more than any other physical
feature, unifies the country. It provides access to
the industrial and commercial heart of Europe and
to the ports of the Black Sea. It is the core of the
natural drainage system, and as it meanders across
the land it evokes the free flowing spirit of a rest-
less people. Balaton, Europe's largest warm water
inland sea, is a mini Riviera for Hungary.
Hungarians still require the ego massage they
give themselves, for in various ways their small
nation is the "poor boy of the neighborhood."
Among the states bordering Hungary, it outranks
only Austria in size and population. Since losing
707o of its territory following World War I, it has
lacked naturally defensible borders. And, in con-
trast to neighboring states, it features a relatively
level terrain. Approximately 60% of the area con-
sists of flat to rolling, practically treeless plains.
A narrow chain of low mountains and hills extends
a^ *oss the northern part of the country, and a
small, low mountain mass occurs in the southwest.
Less than a third of the country is over 1,000 feet
above sea level. The highest elevation, 3,300 feet at
Kekes,l occurs in, the Matra mountains northeast
of Budapest.
Climatic conditions in Hungary, like the moods
of its people, vary considerably. Hungary is sub-
jected to the mild oceanic climate of the northwest,
the Mediterranean climate of the south, and the
continental climate of the east. On average, winter
is dismal cloudy and cold �but the unpleasant-
ness of that time is compensated by long, warm
summers when, in the heat of midday, a mirage
For diacritics on place names see the list of names on
the oron of the Summary Map and the map itself.
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may dance along the dusty horizon. An erratic pat-
tern of precipitation during the growing season
is a constant national concern, but the construction
of irrigation works has provided some relief dur-
ing extremely dry spells.
Blessed with an abundance of fertile soil,
Hungary was for some time the breadbasket of
central Europe. Despite the inroads of industrial-
ization, the cultivation of grains and vegetables
continues to be a major venture. To the world out-
side, Hungary would not be Hungary without its
speciality crops: the apricots of Kecskemet, the
paprika peppers of Szeged, and the wine grapes of
Tokaj. Hungary is also celebrated as a land of
cowboys (gulyas; and horseherders (csikos) This
Wild West aspect of the national existence remains
in view on the grazing land of the Hortabagy
Steppe east of the river Tisza, the nation's other
great natural water route.
If rural life represents the traditional Hungary,
then it is in the capital city of Budapest that
"Hungary universal �a mixture of yesterday and
today �is to found. The successor to the old
Roman town of Aquincum, Budapest has lived the
1,000- plus -year history of the nation. It has been
ravaged repeatedly, and its remaining historical
treasures bear the marks of national suffering. Its
vitality, however, remains intact. Long called "the
pearl of the Danube" because of its beautiful lo-
cation, Budapest has always had a lively charm that
has even transcended the grayness of spirit that nor-
mally shrouds a Communist capital. Budapest, the
largest city in Eastern Europe, has grown to
a population of 2 million in post -World War II
times, -largely as a result of the regime's push
toward industrialization. It is, in sum, the political,
military, industrial, cultural, intellectual, and trans-
portation hub of the nation, as well as the shrine of
the Hungarian spirit.
That spirit has weathered many storms, for
Hungary i3 an old society. It has known times of
glory and has its pantheon of heroes. Among them
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of their own independence. When the Turks were
finally expelled in the late 17th century, they left
behind a country devastated, depopulated, and
quite unable to resist the dynastic ambitions of the
Habsburgs, who reigned until the end of World
War I despite flareups of Magyar nationalism, in-
cluding the 1848 revolt, and extended periods of
passive resistance.
In 1919, the nation briefly fell under the dictator-
ship of indigenous Communists led by Bela Kun.
His attempts to force drastic sicial reforms a la
Lenin gave communism a bad name. In 1920,
stability of a sort came to Hungary with the advent
of the heavily paternalistic, semifeudalistic regency
of Admiral Miklos Horthy. Successive cabinets
played on such themes as irredentism, anticom-
munism, and Hungarian nationalism; they grappled
with a laggard economy and slowly steered the
country into the orbit of newly arisen Nazi
Germany. In 1940, lured by the promise of re-
covering historic Hungarian lands, Budapest allied
itself formally with Berlin. Four years later ad-
vancing Soviet troops occupied the Hungarian
capital.
As in other East European states after the war,
Hungary was permitted a multiparty, quasi -demo-
cratic government for a short time. Soviet over
lordship guaranteed that the Communists were to
be the dominant factor. By the use of what party
chief Matyas Rakosi called "salami tactics" the
Communists sliced away at those institutions alien
to their cause. In 1947, leaders of the "bourgeois"
parties were bounded into submission or exile. In
1948, the Social Democrats were done in by a popu-
lar front merger, and the collectivization of agricul-
ture and industry commenced. In 1949, Cardinal
Prince Primate Mindszenty was given life im-
prisonment, ex- Interior Minister Laszlo Rajk �an
example of an indigenous Communist �was given
death, and the nation was given a Soviet -style con-
stitution and a new name, the Hungarian People's
Republic.
Secret police terror reigned, and adulation of
Rakosi was required. The new party boss, the son
of a poultry butcher, became the most brutal of
the early satellite leaders. Touting himself as
"Stalin's greatest Hungarian pupil," he tried to
transform the nation into a Soviet Union in minia-
ture. There were 150,000 political prisoners, and at
least 2,000 others had been executed by the time
of Stalin's death in 1953. Out of favor with the new
Soviet leadership, Rakosi then found himself edged
aside by more humane elements who sought to
abate the terrible tensions that gripped Hungarian
society, only to become victims of the ensuing ex-
plosion.
The seeds of the Hungarian revolt had ger-
minated long prior to 1956. Hungarians were
singularly unreceptive to a political system lacking
a national foundation, particularly one that em-
bodied an atheistic and alien dogma and was im-
posed by the Russians. More immediately, the pop-
ulace was angered by the denial of individual
liberty and alienated by the absence of material
well- being. As a result, workers turned apathetic,
the peasantry grew restless, and intellectuals be-
came aroused. With an irievitability born of popu-
lar desperation, violence erupted in late October.
Under the uncertain leadership of Imre Nagy Hun-
garian aspirations for a liberal socialist neutralist
regime emerged �and within a fortnight were
crushed under the tread of Soviet tanks. The revolt
was over, but after this latest assertion of age -old
Hungarian nationalism, life on the Danube could
never be the same. The winds of domestic reform
were sharpening and would have to be heeded, at
some cost to Budapest's conformity to Soviet ways.
The task fell to Janos Kadar, a purported friend
of the revolution, but, as it turned out, more of a
political opportunist, to find a course between the
rocks and shoals of rampant nationalism on the one
hand and Stalin style communism on the other. At
first it seemed that little had changed, as the regime
restored order in the approved Communist fashion.
Finally, in December 1961, Kadar set the stage for
a time of domestic relaxation and popular reconcili-
ation by declaring that if the Rakosi era motto had
been "Those who are not with us are against us,"
then his should be "Those who are not against us
are with us."
Still wary of its sullen citizenry, the government
inched forward on two fronts: broadening the
political system to give the individual a sense of
participation, and liberalizing the economic system
to permit the individual to share in the fruits of his
labor. At the same time it compensated Moscow
with almost slavish support of Soviet foreign policy.
The regime was shaken by the Soviet move against
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, seeing in it a
possible indictment of its own reform pri. gram.
With appropriate pauses, ho,vever, for soul -s -arch-
ing reevaluations, Kadar groped forward tov and a
position capatible with the popular mood and the
demands of limited national sovereignty.
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iong the banks of the Danube in Budapest
stands a monumental structure suitable for the
suzerains of a great empire. Built in turn -of -the
century neo- Gothic style, this house of government
is reminiscent in outward appearance to the parlia-
ment on the Thames. There the resemblance ends,
for the Hungarian building houses bodies that in
themselves enjoy little real power but rather are
servile attendants of the ruling Communist party.
Political theorists might wish to know that Parlia-
ment, a unicameral assembly elected every 4 years,
is by constitutional writ the highest organ of state
authority and as such is empowered to make laws,
determine the national budget and economic plans,
create or abolish ministries and define the scope of
their activities, declare war, conclude peace, and
grant amnesties. Political realists understand that,
despite talk of "unleashing" the legislature, it re-
mains a captive beast barely capable of clearing its
own throat. A Presidential Council, also supplied
with an impressive list of powers, supervises the
day -to -day operations of the government when Par-
liament is not in session, which is all but 12 to lk
0
days a year. A Council of ;;finisters, in practice the
dominant government body, is in effect a puppet
cabinet whose members largely move to the tune
played by counterpart officials of the party.
As is readily apparent, the power of the Com-
munist party is absolute; its glory, however, is
negligible. Even the most dedicated follower is hard
put to make the story of Hungarian communism
creditable. The Hungarian Communist Party was
founded in November 1918, tasted power briefly
in the Bela Kun dictatorship (March -July 1919),
and then lapsed during the interwar era into a
largely underground organization with limited sup-
port among industrial workers, the urban Jewish
middle class, and intellectuals. Overmatched
against strong conservative, Christian, and na-
tionalist traditions as well as the police, the party
receded into passivity by the time of World War
II. Following the "liberation" by Soviet armies
a "glorious" event by Communist accounts but a
national disaster according to most others, the popu-
lace was required to tolerate the Communists but
showed little love for them. A friend of the Rus-
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sians was considered an enemy of '3ungary, and
even a nominal Jew, as were many party leaders,
was an obje: of distrust. In the national ballot of
1945 Hungary's first and last free election �the
Communists received only 177o of the vote, and in
the semirigged ballot of 1947 they upped their
share to only 229o. Rakosi and company, however,
had a simple solution to the problem of popular
disaffection: a one -party system abetted by a cam-
paign of terror against party enemies. The result
was to add a large dollop of fear to the reservoir
of public contempt for the Communists. When the
explosion occurred in 1956, the Hungarian Workers
Party, as the Communist organization was then
called, virtually fell apart.
Since the Rakosi days, the reconstituted Hun-
garian Socialist Workers Party HSWP as it is
now called, has come a long way. Led by First
Secretary Janos Kadar for over a decade and a
half, the party has learned that it must react favor-
ably to the concerns of the people and seek to
enlist their support. At the same time it realizes
that it must on occasion �as in the unpopular 1968
invasion of Czechoslovakia� submerge Hungary's
national self interest to the concerns of Moscow
and thus risk the charge that its rule is just the
most recent version of foreign domination. Both
paths have had their pitfalls, but by and large the
cautious Kadar has steered a safe course around
them in the process of rebuilding the party's au-
thority.
Public policy aside, the HSWP organizationally
is a fairly typical Communist party. About one
Hungarian in 16 belongs �a ratio approximately
equal to that in the U.S.S.R. and Poland, but be-
low that for the Communist parties of East Ger-
many, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Its 700,000
members constitute a motley group: fervent young
idealists; superannuated conservative functionaries;
cynical opportunists; and largely apolitical estab-
lishmentarians, among others. All are expected to
react in disciplined fashion to the next higher
echelon in the party command, and ultimately to the
dictates of the 13 -man party Politburo. This prin-
ciple of party unity frequently fails in practice, but
at least strenur as intraparty debate lends credence
to the part claim that the "cult of the personal-
ity" has been banished in favor of "collective leader-
ship."
Kadar is beyond question "number one" in the
political hierarchy. Rumors circulate from time to
time that he has lost favor with the Soviets or is in
increasingly bad health as a result of his imprison-
ment during the Rakosi bloodbaths. There is no
indication that he has lost control, but conserva-
tive elements opposed to his liberal ways do exist.
The Kadar style, if indeed such a spartan and
largely colorless personality can be said to have
style, is that of the team player. Poorly educated
but gifted with good political instincts, Kadar has
surrounded himself with a group of talented, fairly
young advisers who generally share his point of
view. The working levels of the party, conversely,
are heavily seeded with hacks. If Kadar's policies
fail in implementation, it is more likely due to the
immobility or incompetence of this petty official-
dom than to the intrigues of highly placed rivals.
The Kadar regime has publicly committed itself
to reform in the name of "broadening socialist
democracy." If such a formulation seems vague,
it is no accident, for the regime is loathe to elabo-
rate on the concept. It appears, nevertheless, that
Kadar and the party are in debt to the departed
and discredited Imre Nagy, who postulated that
a workable Hungarian government should take into
consideration the views of the nonparty masses.
Inherent in this thesis is the admission that the
party, to its own detriment, has dictated national
policy to a muzzled and largely indifferent popu-
lace. Also inherent is the hope that by allowing
persons other than the party faithful to have
some say, the party will broaden its base of popular
support. At this point, a difficult question arses
as to whether an authoritarian body can afford
to enhance significantly the rights of others without
weakening and ultimately destroying itself. And,
if such doubts exist, are Communist leaders in other
capitals, particularly Moscow, willing to tolerate
"dangerous experimentation" in their midst?
Having weighed the delicate issue with great
deliberation, Kadar has chosen to move ahead with
inchworm precision and wariness. A first try at open-
ing new lines of communication has come via the
regime's "national reconciliation policy." Under it, all
who are loyal to the homeland and not outwardly
opposed to the party are welcome to participate
in the state system. Talent that oherwise would
have gone to waste is now available and frequently
serves as a welcome alternative to the lame, old
party warhorses at the lower and middle echelons
of government and industry. Elsewhere the party
has encouraged its mass organizations patriotic
fronts, youth groups, women's organizations, and
the like �':o concern themselves less with enforcing
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ideological purity (a fairly hopeless task in any
case) and more with the airing of grievances in
open debate. best the organizations shy away from
this new responsibility, as frequently has been the
case, the party has undertaken private opinion polls
to uncover popular discontents. At the local gov-
ernment level, district councils have been granted
a measure of autonomy over budgetary and devel-
opmental planning. At the national level, electoral
reforms have even allowed candidates "not hostile
to the socialist system" to run against party-ap-
proved men. In 1971 at least five "spontaneous"
candidates won parliamentary seats �an encourag-
ing number, though hardly enough to boost the
regime's avowed hopes of upgrading the national
legislature qualitatively.
Through the use of these pluralistic techniques
the HSWP has become a somewhat more benign
and less pervasive influence. While loosening its
hold, however, it has shown no inclination to
abandon the single -party ideal or its dominance in
practice. A new constitution, in preparation since
1969, presumably could lead to further liberaliza-
tion, but the delay in its issuance may indicate
that the party for now would prefer to mark time.
Should Kadar go many more steps forward polit-
ically, he always risks striking that great vein of
nationalistic sentiment that lies so near the surface.
And the consequent unleashing of anti- Soviet and
irredentist emotions could easily result in an era
of Warsaw Pact enforced repression.
The Economy, the NEM, and the Consumer (G)
Hungary, by exercise of its national pride, has
overcome poverty but has failed to become a rich
nation. As a result of Turkish conquest and Habs-
burg oppression, Hungary remained backward long
after other European countries had been fully de-
veloped. Well into the 20th century, for example,
remnants of semifeudal practice still persisted in
its predominantly agricultural society. Ravaged by
the retreating Germans toward the end of World
War II and then despoiled by Soviet occupiers a
point carefully omitted from Communist histories),
Hvingary in 1945 lay prostrate �its industry in
ashes, its farms untended, its population decimated
and starving, and its currency virtually worthless.
At this dire pass, the country fell into the hands
of Marxian Socialist planners and their Moscow
mentors. Their philosophy seemed to be that blood
could be extracted from a stone.
10
Hungary, as with the other "people's democra-
cies," was obligated by the Soviet Union at the
start to push industrialization to the limit, without
regard to its resources. Particularly trying was the
effort to build from scratch �at a terrible cost to
the laborer and consumer �a base of heavy indus-
try. Lacking the necessary experience, Hungarians
committed egregious planning, management, and
production mistakes. In the process, the nation be-
came a veritable sweatshop. Workers initially bore
the br.rden, but then lapsed into apathy on finding
little reward in terms of the ordinary comforts of
life. At times during this era Hungary was hard
put to compete even with its eastern neighbors. In
sum, it received a heavy dose of Stalinist -style in-
dustrial socialism, and nearly choked in the process.
Virtually the same methods were applied to agri-
culture, with virtually the same results. Enforced
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collectivization proceeded spasmodically as former
landholders showed a grand indifference to working
their plots in the name of the state. Many fled
the soil or were impressed by the state to work in
factories. Food was in short supply, and the cities
overcrowded. In 1961 the government could an-
nounce that practically all cultivable land belonged
to the "public sector," but what it failed to announce
was that the campaign of "peaceful persuasion"
that brought this result left many with broken
heads.
By the 1960's the government's commitment to
a succession of multiyear plans had still produced
little more than a subsistence economy. Farmers
largely were sitting on their hands, while in in-
dustry matters were not much better. It was clear
that the government had to do something to get the
country moving. The answer came in January 1968
in the form of the New Economic Mechanism
(NEM), an innovative scheme that provided for
the injection into the system of certain thinly dis-
guised and somewhat modified capitalistic features.
They included a sort of supply and demand market,
managerial and trade union responsibility for plan-
ning and production, worker incentive offers, and
a profit reinvestment program. In effect, Kadar
was conceding that his central economic planners
had botched the operation and that local expertise
and initiative were needed. The NEM, however,
should not be regarded as a shift toward capitalism.
Kadar was careful to insure the continued Socialist
character of the economy.
As with other Kadar projects, the NEM did not
represent a sudden plunge into the unknown.
Rather, Bud ipest had carefully prepared this new
departure over a 3 -year period. It studied Yugoslav
and Czechoslovak precedents and conducted con-
trolled experiments. Only then did it proceed within
the limits of the possible. At the start the regime
decreed that the program could not result in eco-
nomic dislocations or increased dependency on the
West, nor could it involve any serious break with
orthodox views on the socialist planned economy.
Thus, the reform retained planning as the key over-
all guiding force and relied heavily on economic
controls to manipulate the market forces inserted in
the system.
Except for a few strategic target areas, however,
enterprises were freed from ..entrally imposed out-
put and quality norms. It was up to them to decide
what and how much to produce given expected de-
mands, price regulations, and constraints on imports.
The rewards for profitability were higher salaries
and wages for ma*iag:;rs and workers. Moreover,
profitable firms were given the means to finance
plant expansion and modernization. Though mildly
revolutionary in terms of standard Communist
economics, the reform was not expected to produce
startling results immediately. In fact, progress was
slow at first, but at least economic shocks were held
to a minimum. More important, the reform en-
dowed the economy with a new rationale, proved
agreeable to a public tir:siing for a better life,
boosted the reputation of the party for clear think-
ing, and, overall, helped supply the regime with a
broader base of legitimacy.
By the advent of 1971 the NEM had begun to
show signs of success. Industrial productivity rose
nearly 10% in 1970, a marked improvement com-
pared with previous years. Trade with the West
increased significantly, and consumer goods were
in far larger supply. But just when the regime was
starting to congratulate itself, setbacks occurred
and were severe enough to demonstrate that the
NEM was no panacea. The warning sign came in
duplicate: runaway investment totals and a record
trade deficit. After considerable delay, during
which the Soviets made unpleasant noises about
the direction the Hungarian economy was taking,
the regime took corrective measures. By so doing,
it seemed to concede that a larger measure of cen-
tral direction than envisioned under the NEM
was necessary for economic equilibrium in Hun-
gary.
In the longer view, Hungarian economists also
have had to concede their inability to overcome
either Mother Nature or human nature. Mineral
resources are limited, leaving the country highly
dependent on foreign sources chiefly the Soviet
Union and allies �for such basics as iron ore and
energy producing materials. A small population
means both a chronic labor shortage and a con-
tinuing search for foreign markets to supplement
the small domestic market. Coming late to the in-
dustrial scene, Hungary suffers a dire shortage of
expert managers and skilled workers, and piracy
of good administrators and artisans is common.
Under the NEM, some crafty types in important
places have enriched themselves, in part by sic
cumbing to the old national habit of accepting a
little under -the -table money. Workers have com-
plained about getting a smaller share of the profit
pie than do plant managers. Party loyal bureau-
11
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..n...;
r iFh"
r 111
crats and entrenched trade union chiefs have tried
to block any takeover of their powers by young,
ambitious technocrats. And, in this worker peasant
state, the peasant has complained so bitterly of
unequal treatment that the government has had
12
to increase farm wages, farm investments, and farm
community amenities. In turn, the peasants have
demonstrated their order of priorities to the regime
by producing about as much on their small private
plots as is produced on all the state farms combined.
Though many are the complaints, the average
Hungarian might admit to himself that he had
never had it so good. He lives better today than
at any time within the lifetime of the oldest living
person, whether he appreciates it or not. He is bet-
ter dressed and better fed than 10 years ago, has
sufficient money for an occasional luxury item, and
may spend his leisure time at a vacation resort. If
be is one of the favored few who has profited
heavily from the NEM, he may have developed a
taste for "the finer things in life," including a private
house and an automobile. These benefits of "goulash
communism," as it is derisively called by anti-
Kadarists, are largely attributable to a conscious
effort on the part of Kadar to enlist the consumer
as a prop for his regime.
After long years of deprivation, the Hungarian
finds that his government has brought him a con-
siderable array of goods at prices he can afford.
And, now that his possessive instinct has been
aroused he may demand more than can be offered
by a regime caught in the spiral of rising expecta-
tions. Adequate housing, for example, is perenially
in short supply, and the automobile remains a status
symbol in a land where motorcycles outnumber cars
three to one. With 2.5 million radios and 1.8 million
TV sets available as opposed to 800,000 telephones,
Hungarians find it easier to receive than transmit
the spoken word. In a nation of hearty eaters, pro-
tein -rich foods are still in short supply. And finally,
the (mrative waters of the health spa still take up
some of the slack left by inadequate state sponsored
medical facilities.
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The Regime and the People (S)
The seeds of liberalism planted by Janos Kadar
have yet to yield a crop of popular allegiance.
About the best that can be said in belialf of the
regime is that the populace appears to be progres-
sively less antagonistic toward it. Outright support,
however, remains negligible. Rather, the citizenry
by and large seems ideologically neutral and politi-
cally passive. Pessimism to the point of fatalism is a
characteristic of Hungarian They have learned to
accept what comes a.nd to avoid that which will
bring only pain. The failure of the 1956 revolt led.
to the final realization that Hungary was enmeshed
in the East -West power balance and that as a result
the Magyars, once again, could not choose their
own path of development. Still, they have resisted
the regime's efforts to build a collectivist mentality
and impose a Marxist- Leninist belief system. If
anything, individu,:listic behavior has become more
pronounced. Minor protests are mounted on oc-
casion, but they are easily squelched by a govern-
ment inclined to be more lenient than its predeces-
sors. Moreover, active dissidence is isolated in
character, usually emanating from small bands of
romantic idealists at home and professional anti
regime refugees abroad. Neither element poses
much real danger to a system powerful in itself,
assured of Soviet backing, and relieved of the
threat of Western intervention.
Reasonably secure in the present and relatively
confident of the future, the regime has sought
reconciliation with its largely submissive citizenry.
It has posted notice that fealty to the party is no
longer required for a citizen to live in peace.
Variant life styles are tolerated if they do not
represent open conflict with the principles of the
13
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state. While the nonconformist may expect Jess in
the way of favors from the system, he otherwise is
likely to be left alone. To conformists, the regime
holds out the lure of membership in its new elite of
professionals, intellectuals, technocrats, and man-
agers. Many accept, but their loyalty is largely
superficial and opportunistic. To the common man,
the regime poses as a partner in the appreciation
of things Hungarian. It has joined the effort to
preserve ancient folkways; rehabilitated national
monuments such as the royal palace in Buda; and
promoted excellence in such sports as fencing,
soccer, water polo, swimming, boxing, and wres-
tling. Still, most Hungarians see the regime heavily
mortgaged to the Soviet will rather than committed
to Hungarian fortunes, and Kadar, try as he may,
cannot wash that stain from the record.
In a variety of ways �by themselves unspectacu-
lar, but in total significant �the people have made
manifest a lack of "oneness" with the system. At
bottom, Hungarians collectively have declined to
meet the official standard of a burgeoning nation of
uncommon character. The birth rate and growth
rate of the population are lower in Hungary than in
any other state in the Communist bloc. The suicide
rate is the highest and the divorce rate the thud
highest in the world. In practical terms, this erosion
of the human spirit portends an increasingly aged
population and a stagnating labor force. More im-
mediately, other indications of individual alienation
suggest that a social crisis of considerable dimen-
sions may be brewing. Alcoholism is widespread,
and prostitution flourishes. Psychiatric disorders ap-
pear to be growing, and a minor drug culture may
be forming. Crime is on the rise, and special appeals
to help curb it have met with public apathy.
Juvenile delinquency and youth offenses are partic-
ularly mortifying to a regime that bases its future
on a younger generation indoctrinated in the puri-
tanical morality of state socialism.
If anything, Hungarian youth seems more dis-
spirited than the older population. The regime has
bestowed unique favors on the young in terms of
better educational opportunities, better health care,
better recreation areas, and improved social facili-
ties. Such heartily despised features of educa-
tion as compulsory technical and Russian lan-
guage training may soon be alleviated by a con-
templated "NEM of the classroom" that would pro-
vide greater local autonomy at the universities,
wider latitude for the individual in choosing a pro
fession, and increased opportunity for academics
14
to indulge in self expression. Still, youth continues
to view itself as a submerges underprivileged, and
somewhat forlorn minority in a small -time Com-
munist state. The failure of any appreciable num-
bers of the under -35 generation to advance to
leading positions in the system is accepted as a
sign that the ingrained paternalism of Hungary's
past still holds. Apathy is the result, as even the
low level of political commitment found in neigh-
boring C ummunist countries is not met here.
Compared with youth, Hungary's writer- intel-
lectual caste represents a potentially far more sub-
versive element in the eyes of the regime. Histori-
cally, men of the arts and letters have raised the
torch of freedom during Hungary's many dark
hours. Whether poet or politician or both in the
same person, they have transcended the barriers to
understanding and evoked the essence of Magyar
nationalism as rooted in the common man. Espe-
cially have they idealized Hungary as an outpost of
Christian- Western civilization holding against the
alien hordes of the east. This conception, while it
borders on national conceit, nonetheless is easily
understood both as it applies to Constantinople in
the past or to Moscow today.
It is small wonder, then, that the Communist
regime from it inception sought to strap its most
creative people into the intellectual straitjacket
of "socialist realism." After long periods of greater
or lesser repression, Kadar finally chose as part of
his liberalization program in the early 1960's to
relax the death grip on dissident cultural expression.
Since then, bureaucrats and intellectuals have ob-
served an uneasy truce, with the former largely
abandoning overt censorship and the latter ven-
turing only very tentatively into the no -man's land
of antiregime criticism. Occasiunal skirmishes still
occur at the frontier of misunderstanding, however,
and it is clear that the amount of trust felt on both
sides could be measured by the thimbleful. Mean-
while, a pall still hovers over intellectual output,
and it seems evident that outright genius, as ex-
emplified by recent musical greats Bela Bartok and
Zoltan Kodaly, is unlikely to blossom in the Philis-
tine setting of Kadarland.
A third factor which has left the Communists'
governing equation somewhat unbalanced is the
church. Christianity came to Hungary shortly after
its founding as a state, and over the centuries
entered into the lifeblood of the nation. The domi-
nant Catholic Church representing two- thirds of
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the Hungarians as opposed to one -fourth for the
Protestants) had become a spiritual and secular
power long prior to this century. Unwilling to sac-
rifice this privileged position, it faced an inevitable
clash with the new creed of communism. Attacking
hard and fast from the beginning, the regime na-
tionalized the church-run school system, expropri-
ated church lands, abolished religious orders, jailed
recalcitrant clergy, and took overall charge through
a State Office for Church Affairs. Faced with a
merciless foe, the church slowly and stubbornly
gave way. For its part, the regime came to realize
that it could not win total victory, and from the
early 1960's it began to abate its harassments and
strike bargains with the church. Today, a modus
vivendi obtains, uncomfortable though it may be.
The church abstains politically. The state allows
the church a modest subsidy. Ostensibly there is a
reconciliation, chiefly in favor of the state. Yet,
state authorities remain wary of an institution that
continues to have such a powerful emotional hold
on the people �one that they themselves cannot
hope to emulate.
Kadar, it would appear, has neutralized and
pacified those individuals and institutions ho the to
his cause. Presumably he has little to fear. Yet, the
trauma of the anti- Communist, anti Soviet uprising
of 1956 lives on in the minds of those now in con-
trol. Never ones to take matters of state security on
faith, they remain constantly watchful of their
enemies, whether they be rightist emigrees in
Vienna or former Rakosists in Budapest itself. The
government has even drafted plans to deal with a
future uprising �the possibility of which seems slim
to all excopt those ruling Communists who might
be its victims.
Lest government opponents, latent or real, be-
come overly optimistic about their chances, govern-
ment authorities continue to exercise internal con-
trol through an information and security network.
The print and broadcast media, both regime -con-
trolled, largely echo the party line (though far
more subtly than in the past) and serve as channels
of instruction to the populace. Censorship has been
relaxed and independent views are at times permit-
ted to circulate, particularly in the periodicals of the
cognoscenti. In like manner, parades, mass rallies,
party indoctrination sessions, and poster campaigns
have been deemphasized in order to avoid propa-
ganda overkill with resulting suspension of belief.
Nevertheless, the regime's message remains strong
and clearcut. It glorifies the Soviet Union, the
socialist system, the party, and the national eco-
nomic goals. There is no doubt as to who is in the
saddle in Budapest.
As with almost any government, the Kadar group
seeks to stop trouble before it starts. Police in-
formants and opinion polls are devices used to
listen in on public sentiment. Mass organizations,
as noted earlier, are encouraged to voice complaints
and help defuse touchy situations. In the event
that sterner measures are called for, the govern-
ment comes well armed, chiefly in the person of
the internal security police originally the AVO
and now referred to as the AVH. In early days the
AVO was essentially an elite intraparty group,
largely Moscow- directed, that enjoyed virtually ab-
solute authority over the nation's vital organs. Its
tactics were crude but effective: swift arrest, forced
confession, summary verdict, and lengthy imprison
ment�or, perhaps more humanely, immediate ex-
ecution. In short, the Hungarian authorities who
closed out a 16th century peasant rebellion by fry-
ing its leader on a metal throne and forcing his fol-
lowers to eat the flesh had little on the sadists of
the AVO. Since 1962 the regime has curbed the
powers of the AVH and purged it of its worst
elements, but some of its reputation for cruelty lives
on. Regular legal procedures are now observed. But
the statutes against antistate activity are broadly
worded, and the regime is not averse to tightening
the screws if need be.
Should a national emergency occur, the armed
forces would come in .o play. In view of lingering
doubts about their oyalty and effectiveness, this
prospect is a fairly cheerless one for the govern-
ment. In terms of manpower, the regular armed
forces are the smallest in the bloc, numbering only
about 97,500. And, in terms of gross national
product, Hungary spends less on defense (47o in
1971) than any other East European nation. Eco-
nomic and social needs take priority, but, more
important, the crisis of confidence in the military
establishment resulting from its failure to respond
during the 1956 revolt has not been completely
overcome. Since then it has been rebuilt, politically
purified, and reindoctrinated with the message of
loyalty to the state. The armed forces returned to
participation in Warsaw Pact exercises in 1966 and
in small numbers joined the intervention in
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Neither action, however,
has been taken as a final judgment on their capabil-
ity or reliability.
15
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Foreign Policy: A Function of Reality (S)
For years there was doubt that Communist Hun-
gary had a foreign policy. In the cold war era it
led a largely parochial existence as a Soviet satel-
lite, and only in late 1955 was it finally accepted
for membership in the United Nations. Recently a
native Hungarian wit has allowed that there now
is a foreign policy, but that it is mainly a screen
behind which party leaders attend to their favorite
occupation, the cultivation of the economy and
the tranquilization of the country at large. This
observation, while generally true, masks the more
specific truth �that Hungary, as it focuses in-
wardly on all- important domestic reforms, must at
the same time work skillfully for the best possible
relations with its Communist neighbors. Kadar's
liberalization steps tend to disturb other East Euro-
pean governors, who profess to see in them the
seeds of Western capitalistic subversion. Thus far,
Kadar's caution in prosecuting reform has staved
off truly damaging criticism. More important, his
hearty approval of most aspects of Soviet policy
has served to insure that Hungary will continue
to be accepted as a fully paid -up member of the
"socialist commonwealth of nations."
Generally, Hungarian Communists find it easy
to conform to Soviet world views. In many situations
they already agree on the basis of a common ide-
ology, while in others they feel the issue is so
remote as to be of little concern. Occasionally, how-
ever, national self interest intrudes, and then Hun-
garian leaders pursue their own special cause to
the extent they believe Moscow will permit. In the
balls of the United Nations Hungary regularly
echoes Soviet positions. In particular, it mirrors
the Soviet view on Vietnam, the Middle East, and
the "struggle" of third world nations for unity and
independence. Budapest backs Moscow against
Peking, but, along with other East European capi-
tals, frequently urges restraint. The Kadar regime
hews closely to the Russian line on the large ques-
M.
tion of European security and cooperation, although
here, given a choice, the Hungarians would seek
to accomplish more. They have also shown interest
in participating in the International Monetary Fund,
but they have held off pending a Soviet move. In
bolder action, Hungary has proposed, aspite Soviet
displeasure, that CEMA Moscow's would -be com-
mon market for East Europe) be converted into an
integrated system along the lines of the European
Economic Community.
The basic logic of Budapest's position, as Kadar
has acknowledged, is that Hungarians "cannot
change geography." Hungary lies in the Soviet
sphere of influence. It is an economic and military
dependency of Moscow. And the U.S.S.R. is capable
of strong, swift intervention at any time. By reason
of this stark reality, Hungary's options are limited.
Specifically, the Soviets have an important, per-
haps even decisive, voice in Hungary's economic
course. The U.S.S.R., for example, supplies three
fourths of Hungary's iron ore and more than half
of its lumber, coal, and oil. CEMA accounts for
+ughly two- thirds of Hungarian foreign trade, and
half of this total is attributable to the U.S.S.R.
Additional leverage is supplied by the 50,000 -man
military force the Soviets have "temporarily sta-
tioned" in Hungary, presumably at cost to the host
nation.
In recent years, the Soviets have chosen to follow
a "compromise" policy toward Hungary� neither
heavyhanded intervention nor hands off. They
know the location of the pressure points on `he
Hungarians corpus, and they are not afraid to
squeeze them when necessary. The Soviets appear
to have some sense of confidence in Kadar, on the
grounds that he has managed rather well in diffi-
cult circumstances since 1956. On the other hand,
Soviet suspicions of Hungarian domestic reform
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are strong, as was shown in February 1972 when
Kadar was hastily called onto the Kremlin carpet
to further justify the NEM.
With regard to the other nearby Communist
states, Hungary strikes an amicable but less sub-
servient pose. Its attitude is colored by the memory
of the Trianon settlement following World War I.
Hungarians have neither forgotten nor forgiven
their losses, particularly the forfeiture (to Romania)
of picturesque Transilvania, the historic bastion of
Hungarian independence. On this account, the man
in the street is disposed to grieve for his "op-
pressed" Magyar brothers so long departed from
Hungary itself.
On an official level, needless to say, Hungarians
pay regular tribute to the largely symbolic treaties
of friendship with each of the Communist neigh-
bors, as well as to CEMA and the Warsaw Pact.
But they also stress Hungary's primary responsi-
bility for its own affairs. With the interventionist-
minded and militantly conservative East German
regime, Hungary at most has "correct" relations.
The Hungarian minority in Transilvania and Bucha-
rest's maverick foreign policy are strong irritants
in the Hungarian- Romanian juncture, but attempts
in recent years at a better understanding appear
to have borne some fruit. Foland under Gierek and
Czechoslovakia under Husak are less well regarded
than formerly, but allowance has been made for
an improvement here too.
The regime's attitude toward Western nations is
now cautiously positive �a far cry from the time
when the "capitalist- imperialists" were the scape-
goats for everything from a small incident to the
1956 revolt itself. In the interest of retrieving Hun-
gary 's image shattered when the 1956 revolt was
crushed �and expanding his government's area of
maneuverability, Kadar extended his liberalization
program westward. Cultural and scientific agree-
ments have been negotiated. High -level official
visits have been promoted. The frontier with neutral
Austria has been partially disarmed. Western litera-
ture has been made available. And the famous
Hungarian hospitality has been offered to increas-
ing numbers of Western tourists. Ensuing good will
aids in Hungary's deeper efforts to exploit Western
technology and vie for sales in Western markets,
both vital facets of the NEM.
17
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On taking office in 1956, the Kadar regime faced
the herculean task of restoring a nation torn asunder
by revolt. It proceeded slowly and a bit uncer-
tainly to build a Hungary that would first conform
to the requirements of the U.S.S.R: s security and
dogma and then be capable of meeting popular
needs. Progress at times was almost imperceptible,
but finally there has emerged a new political
entity�one that can claim to be the most stable
and liberal in Eastern Europe.
At present, the Hungarian people are largely
docile �a tribute of sorts to Kadar and his group.
The NEM has offered the promise of a better ma-
terial life. Intellectual horizons have been broad-
ened a bit by a tolerance for greater freedom of
expression. Increased visiting privileges to the
West have alleviated the sense of physical confine-
ment. Overall, tentative understanding between
the party and the people has been established. Still,
Kadar and his cohorts remain wary lest a misstep
topple the delicate structure they have so carefully
raised. In particular they are concerned, as ever,
about a recrudescence of Magyar nationalism that
might well trigger a Soviet move destructive of what
has been accomplished thus far.
To a large extent the prospects for Hungary are
intertwined with the personal fate of Kadar. Sixty
years old as of 1972, he may on account of health
have few years left. His rule has been highly per-
sonalized and a degree intuitive. No heir apparent
exists, nor is there the promise of one who can
match Kadar's example. In the event of Kadar's
weakening or demise, proregime and antiregime
forces may well be prepared to battle for control
of his legacy to the Hungarian people.
Even now, footdragging on some of Kadar's
policies is more the rule than the exception. Sup-
18
port for the NEM in particular has shallow roots
and may have been shaken further by late -hour
economic reverses. And the success of NEM de-
pends ultimately on political reform, which still
must find its way around the doctrine of party
supremacy. Then, too, it is evident that not all of
Kadar's problems lie within his domestic line of
sight. Hungary's "separate road to socialism" arouses
deep years among neo- Stalinist element, elsewhere
in Eastern Europe. The Soviets themselves, while
praising Hungarian reforms in general terms, have
also warned Kadar to go slow on several occasions.
Kadar probably is in no immediate danger, but in
dealings with Moscow he has little room for mis-
calculation.
Whatever the fate of Kadar and his program,
Hungary over the longer term seems destined to
remain a pawn of big -power politics. As a small
nation, it can do little to improve its role in Europe
cr on the international stage. At best it must p ay
that the currents of change will permit a wider open-
ing to Western influence and a consequent weaken-
ing of Soviet domination. Given these trends, a
Hungarian government would have a freer hand for
the development of the nation on the basis of its
own rather than alien requirements.
Such an outcome is not considered a likely pros-
pect by most Hungarians, however. On the basis
of experience they are reasonably certain that the
Soviets are not about to relax their grip on Eastern
Europe. And so, the Hungarians must continue to
accept foreign domination a:. they have so often in
the past, uncomfortably and unwillingly, yet with
a fortitude that seems to guarantee their con-
tinuance as a nation.
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19
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Chronology (U/OU)
895-96
Prince Arpad leads Magyar conquest of Hungary.
1000
King (Saint) Stephen is converted to Christianity.
1241 -50
Tatars invade.
1458 -90
Reign of Matyas Corvinus: Hungarian Renaissance is
at its apex and domination of the area is at its widest
geographically.
1526
August
Turks defeat Hungarians at Mohacs; Turkish conquest
of Hungary ensues.
Late 17th century
Combined efforts of Austrians and Hungarians drive Turks
from Hungary. Habsburg domination of Hungary begins.
1703 -11
"War of Independence the first effort to evict the
Habsburg-, fails.
1848
March to
1849
August
National revolt against Habsburgs almost succeeds. Hun-
garian armies are crushed by the intervention of the
Russian Imperial Army.
1867
Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy �the "Great Compro-
mise' �is formed.
1914
July
Hungary enters World War I as an ally of Austria and
Germany.
1918
November
Hungarian Communist Party is founded.
1919
March -July
Hungarian Socialist Republic, a short-lived Communist
dictatorship led by Bela Kun, is established.
1920
March
Admiral Miklos Horthy is elected Regent of Hungary.
June
Hungarian Peace Treaty, also known as the Trianon
settlement, is signed at Versailles; Hungary cedes three
fourths of its territory and over one -third of its popu-
lation to neighboring states.
1940
November
Hungary signs Axis Pact.
1941
June
Hungary declares war on U.S.S.R.
1944
March
Germany occupies Hungary.
October
Regent Horthy is arrested by Germans.
December
Provisional government is established in Debrecen under
Soviet auspices.
1945
January
Armistice agreement is signed in Moscow.
April
Hungary is liberated from Nazi rule.
November
Only free election in Hungarian history is held; Small-
holders get absolute majority; Communists receive 17%
of vote.
1946
February
Republic is proclaimed; Ferenc Nagy of Smallholders
Party becomes Premier.
20
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I A I ,nn rNIL ff
1947
February
Hungarian Peace Treaty is signed in Paris; Hungary
returns all territories acquired since 1939.
May -June
Hungarian Communists take over the government.
1949
January
Hungary joins U.S.S.R. and other East European states
in forming the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA).
February
Cardinal Mindszenty (who had been arrested 26 Decem-
ber 1948) is sentenced to life imprisonment.
September
Former Interior Minister Laszlo Rajk is tried on charges
of plotting with Tito against the Hungarian Government;
Rajk is sentenced to death.
1952
August
Matyas Rakosi becomes Premier.
1953
July
Imre Nagy sy Rakosi as Premier and outlines New
Course to National Assembly.
November
Rakosi becomes First Secretary of Party Central Com-
mittee.
1954
October
Janos Kadar -'s released from prison and made party
secretary of Budapest's 13th district.
1955
April
Imre Nagy is removed as Premier and expellcd from
Party Central Committee following 9 March condemna-
tion for "rightist deviation Andras Hegedus becomes
Premier.
1955
May
Warsaw Pact is signed by Hungary.
December
Hungary is admitted to the United Nations as part of
a package deal.
1956
February
Bela Kun is rehabilitated.
March
Laszlo ".ijk is rehabilitated.
July
Matyas Rakosi is relieved as Party First Secretary and
replaced by Erno Gero.
October
Revolt breaks out; Imre Nagy replaces Hegedus as
Premier.
Gero rep .:ces Kadar as Party First Secretary; coalition
government is formed with Nagy remaining as Premier;
Soviet troops intervene but later withdraw from Buda-
pest; Cardinal Mindszenty is released.
November
Hungary proclaims neutrality and withdraws unilaterally
from Warsaw Pact.
Soviets again resort to massive armed intervention; Nagy
and associates take refuge in Yugoslav Embassy; Kadar
government is formed; Cardinal Mindszenty takes refuge
in U.S. Legation.
Nagy and colleagues leave Yugoslav Embassy under safe
conduct, but ar-- immediately arrested by Soviet troops.
December
United Nations adopts resolution condemning Soviet in-
tervention in Hungary.
1957
February
Party and government is reorganized; Kadar consolidates
party power by adding 3 new members to Politburo, 2
to Secretariat, 21 to Central Committee.
September
U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution condemning
Soviet intervention in 1956; it appoints special repre-
sentative to seek Iungarian compliance with earlier
resolutions.
November
Government abolishes Workers Councils which had been
established during the revolt.
1958
January
Kadar is replaced as Premier by Ferenc Munnich but
remains Party First Secretary.
June
Ministry of Justice announces that former Premier Imre
Nagy and several of his close associates have been
executed.
December
Party Centrai Committee decides to speed up collectiviza-
tion.
1959
November December
Seventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party, the first since May 1954, meets in Budapest; Cen-
tral Committee is enlarged from 53 to 71 members,
Politburo from 11 to 12; Kadar is reelected Party First
Secretary.
21
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1960
January
In government reshuffle, Gyula Kallai is made First
Deputy Premier.
March
Amnesty for certain categories of political prisoners is
announced, including some imprisoned in 1956.
1961
February
Collectivization drive is completed; party announces that
more than 90% of arable land is "within the socialist
sector."
June
Travel restrictions on diplomats are rescinded mutually
by Hungary and the United States.
September
Government undergoes major reorganization; Kadar as-
sumes premiership, while retaining party leadership; two
new deputy premiers are appointed.
1962
February
Six deputy ministers and 12 high executive officials are
relieved; regime fills posts with more technically pro-
ficient party members.
April
Warsaw Pact maneuvers held in Hungary, with Hun-
garian troops participating for the first time.
August
As part of de- Stalinization campaign, Central Committee
expels Matyas Rakosi, Emo Gero, and 23 others from
party.
October
Politburo member and party secretary Gyorgy Mamsan
is dropped from all party posts.
November
Eighth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party is held in Budapest. Major party and government
reshuffle is announced; Kadar reaffirms Hungary's posi-
tion within Soviet camp and attacks Albanian regime
and those who support it.
December
United Nations votes to abolish post of "special repre-
sentative for Hungary."
1963
March
Kadar announces dismissal of two government ministers
who served under Rakosi, shifts others to different posts;
amnesty is declared, affecting 2,000 to 3,000 prisoners;
nearly all political prisoners from 1956 are released.
May
Negotiations are undertaken between Hungary and the
Vatican; five Catholic bishops are released from house
arrest.
22
June
Hungarian delegation is fully accredited at the United
Nations, for first time since 1956.
September
Kadar and Tito confer; meeting marks improvement in
Hungarian- Yugoslav relations.
November
Trade agreement is signed with West Germany; Hungary
accepts the 'Berlin clause."
1964
April
Kadar publicly identifies himself with Khrushchev's
policies during the latter's visit to Hungary, attacks
Chinese Communists.
September
Hungary and the Vatican sign accord, the first such
agreement between the Vatican and a Communist state;
five new bishops are named.
October
Kadar publicly praises Khrushchev, who was ousted as
Soviet Premier on 15 October; he assures Hungarians
that there would be no repercussions in Hungary.
Austrian F ureign Minister visits Budapest (the first
visit of a Western European foreign minister to Hungary
since the end of World War II); Austro Hungarian rela-
tions improve.
November
United States and Hungary begin negotiations to settle
outstanding bilateral issues.
1965
February
Kadar tells Parliament that Soviet troops will remain
in Hungary until West accepts "Soviet proposals for
power disengagements" in Europe.
May
United States participates in the Budapest International
Trade Fair for the first time.
June
Major party and government changes are announced;
Kallai succeeds Kadar as Premier; party hardliners are
downgraded; Kadar lieutenants are promoted.
November
Kallai addresses Parliament for the first time as Premier;
education reforms are announced by Minister of Culture
Pal Ilku.
Party Central Committee approves "guiding principles'
of the economic reform.
December
Permanent representative of the National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam arrives in Budapest.
Details of 1966 economic plan are announced (approved
by Central Committee on 8 December); some wages and
pension allowances are increased; prices of various con-
sumer goods are left to be increased during the first 6
months of 1966. The announcement of price increases
generates widespreai popular discontent.
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1966
April
Kadar speech at the Soviet 23d Party Congress endorses
Soviet policies, blasts Chine -e and Albanians.
May
Party Central Committee approves resolution on eco-
nomic reforms to be implemented between 1968 and
1970; Party Secretary Nyers announces that political re-
forms will be considered by Ninth Party Congress in
November.
November- December
Ninth Congress of Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
is held in Budapest; Central Committee powers are in-
creased; Central Auditing Committee and candidate
membership in the party and Central Committee are
abolished.
1967
April
Government changes are announced; Jeno Fock replaces
Gyula Kallai as Premier as economic experts move into
top government positions.
May
Regime organizes destructive anti- Vietnam demonstrations
at U.S. Embassy in Budapest.
July
Hungary hosts Communist summit discussions of support
for Arabs.
September
Hungarian Soviet treaty of mutual aid and friendship
is renewed.
November
U.S. Ambassador presents credentials in Budapest, com-
pleting U.S. side of 1966 agreement to upgrade diplo-
matic representative to the ambassadorial level.
1968
January
Hungary's economic reform (New Economic Mechanism)
is inaugurated.
February
Hungary hosts preparatory session for the World Com-
munist Conference.
March
Premier Jeno Fock pays state visit to France.
April
Party daily announces support for Czechoslovakia s de-
Stalinization campaign.
June
Debate in Secretariat over continued support of Czech-
oslovaks is settled in favor of continued support.
July
Kadar argues for moderate course at Warsaw meeting
of hardline regimes alarmed at developments in Czech-
oslovakia. Kadar signs joint letter to Dubcek regime
warning of excesses.
August
Kadar meets Dubcek on 18 August in last -ditch attempt
to counsel gradualism and is rebuffed. Kadar joins hard-
liners in sending troops into Czechoslovakia on 20 August.
September
Hungarian leaders publicly reassert their intention to
continue gradual domestic reforms in Hungary.
Hungarian ambassador to United States arrives in
Washington.
1969
March
Joint party- government meeting extends Kadar's gradual
reform policies.
Writers Union Congress marks rapprochement between
Kadar regime and liberal authors who join regime or-
ganization.
19'10
January
Minister of Interior Andras Benkei calls for reforms
limiting powers of secret police.
November
Tenth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
is held in Budapest. Kadar wins low -keyed endorsement
of domestic reforms and silences critics who disturbed
preparations for the congress with complaints about effects
of internal liberalization. Brezhnev attends congress and
gives Kadar a general �but vague endorsement.
1971
February
Matyas Rakosi, Stalinist party boss of the 1950's, dies
in exile in the U.S.S.R.
May
National elections are held. As first test of new elec-
tion reform, elections prove to be generally disappoint-
ing in extending limits of popular choice and participa-
tion.
July
Hungary joins in Warsaw Pact polemics against Romania,
Yugoslavia, and Albania for their ties with China. Hun-
garian- Romanian rapprochement is temporarily halted as
a result.
September
Cardinal Mindszenty leaves refuge in U.S. Embassy,
Budapest, for residence in Vienna.
1972
February
Economic and political differences with Soviet Union
surface. Kadar and Fock go to Moscow in February
and March to smooth over problems.
2.3
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Area Brief
LAND (U /OU)
Size: 35,900 sq. mi.
Use: 60% arable, 14% other agricultural, 16% forested,
10% other
Land boundaries? 1,395 mi.
PEOPLE (U /OU)
Population: 10,405,000, average annual growth rate 0.3
(current); density 289 persons per square mile
Ethnic divisions: 93.4% Magyar, 2.5% German, 2.4%
Gypsy, 0.7% Jew, 1% other
Religion: 68% Roman Catholic, 20% Calvinist, 5%
Lutheran, 7.5% atheist and other
Language: 93.2% Magyar, 1.8% other
Literacy: 98%
Labor force: 5.0 million (1 January 1971); 26% agricul-
ture, 44% industry and building, 30% other nonagricul-
tural; females account for 41% of industrial work force
Males: 2,659,000, of whom 2,140,000 considered fit for
military service. About 90,000 reach military age 18)
annually
GOVERNMENT (U /OU)
Legal name: Hungarian People's Republic
Type: Communist state
Capital: Budapest
Political subdivisions: 19 megyes (counties), 5 autono-
mous cities in county status, 113 jaras (districts)
Legal system: Based on Communist legal theory, with
both civil law system (civil code of 1960) and common
law elements; constitution adopted 1949; Supreme Court
renders decisions of principle that sometimes have the
effect of declaring legislative acts unconstitutional; legal
education at Lorand Eotvos Tudomanyegyetem School of
Law in Budapest and 2 other schools of law; has not
accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Branches: Executive Presidential Council (elected by
Parliament); legislative Parliament (elected by direct
suffrage); judicial� Supreme Court (elected by Parliament)
Government leaders: Jeno Fock, Chairman, Council of
Ministers; Pal Losonczi, President, Presidential Council
Suffrage: Universal over age 18
Elections: Every 4 years; national and local elections are
held separately, two years apart
Political parties and leaders: Hungarian Socialist (Com-
munist) Workers Party (sole party); Janos Kadar is First
Secretary of Central Committee
GOVERNMENT (U /OU) (Continued)
Voting strength (1971 election): 7,260,856 (98 for
Communist- approved candidates; 76,725 (1.4 invalid
and negative votes; total eligible electorate about 7.3
million
Communists: About 693,000 party members (June 1971)
Member of: CEMA, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, ITU,
UNESCO U.N., UPU, Warsaw Pact, WHO
ECONOMY (S)
GNP: $16.7 billion in 1971 (at 1970 prices), $1,610 per
capita; 1971 growth rate 4.6%
Agriculture: Normally self- sufficient; main crops �corn,
wheat, potatoes, sugar beets, wine grapes; caloric intake
3,140 calories per day per capita (1970)
Major industries: Mining, metallurgy, engineering indus-
tries, processed foods, textiles, chemicals (especially
pharmaceuticals)
Shortages: Metallic ores (except bauxite), copper, high
grade coal, forest products
Crude steel: 3.11 million metric tons produced (1971),
300 kg. per capita
Electric power: 3,150,000 kw. capacity (1971); 15 billion
kw. -hr. produced (1971), 1,450 kw.-hr. per capita
Exports: $2,500 million (f.o.b., 1971); 26% machinery,
23% industrial consumer goods, 27% raw materials and
semimanufactures, 24% food and raw materials for the
food industry (distribution for 1971)
Imports: $2,990 million (1971); 26% machinery, 9% in-
dustrial consumer goods, 54% raw materials and semi
manufactures, 11% food and raw materials for the food
industry (distribution for 1971)
Major trade partners: $5,490 million (1971); 67% with
Communist countries, 35% with non Communist countries
Aid: U.S.S.R. �$338 million extended (1956 -64), $10 mil-
lion extended in 1967 and $167 million extended in 1968;
to less developed non Communist countries� $435.3 mil-
lion (1954 -71)
Monetary conversion rate: 10.81 forints =US$1 (arbitrary
commercial); 27.63 forints =US$1 (p_oncommercial)
Fiscal year: Same as calendar year; economic data re-
ported for calendar years
COMMUNICATIONS (S)
Railroads: 5,908 route mi.; 5,098 mi. standard gage,
788 mi. narrow gage (mostly 2 22 mi. broad gage
(5'0 688 mi. double track, 581 mi. electrified; all but
96 miles government owned (1970)
24
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SECRET
COMMUNICATIONS (S) (Continued)
Highways: 18,360 mi.; 11,048 mi. paved, 6,558 mi.
crushed stone or gravel, 754 mi. earth (1970)
Pipelines: Crude oil, 500 mi.; refined products, 180 mi.;
natural gas, over 1,200 mi.
Inland waterways: 1,320 mi. (1972)
Freight carried: Rail -129.8 million short tons (1971),
14.0 billion short ton /mi. (1971); highway -492.0 million
short tons, 4.7 million short ton /mi. (1971); waterway
15.4 million short tons, 1.9 billion short ton /mi. includes
international transit traffic (1971)
River ports: 2 principal (Budapest, Dunaujvaros); no mari-
time ports; outlets are Rostock, East Germany, and ports
in Poland (1972)
Civil air: 21 major transport aircraft (1972)
Merchant marine: 18 cargo ships (1,000 CRT or over)
totaling 33,061 GRT, 45,038 DWT
Airfields: 61 total; 13 with permanent surface runways;
17 with runways 8,000- 11,999 ft., 20 with runways 4,000-
7,999 ft.
Telecommunications: Services meet most government and
industrial requirements, but local public telephone serv-
ice is inadequate; radio and TV broadcasts can be re-
ceived throughout most of the country; 11 AM, 4 FM
stations, more than 2.5 million receivers; 1 major and
10 relay TV stations, 1.9 million TV receivers; 873,194
telephones (99.4% automatic)
DEFENSE FORCES (S)
Personnel: (estimated) Ground forces 90,000, naval forces
1,900, air force 6,000, frontier guard 20,000, interior
troops 15,000; Soviet ground force troops in Hungary as
of 1 October 1972, 50,000
Personnel in reserve (not on active duty): (estimated)
Ground tortes 690,000, naval forces 2,800, air force 40;
(estimated) pilot reserves, additional 60 -70 pilots and 110
other aircrews from civil aviation
SECRET
DEFENSE FORCES (S) (Continued)
Major ground units: 6 divisions (4 motorized rifle, 2 tank),
1 SCUD (SS -1) tactical missile brigade, 4 regiments (3
artillery, 1 antiaircraft artillery), 1 airborne battalion
Ships: 19 river patrol types, 42 minesweepers, 2 landing
craft, 2 auxiliaries, 58 service craft
Aircraft (operationaI): 163 (137 jet); 137 jet fighters, 2
turboprop transports, 7 prop transports, 19 turbine heli-
copters, 5 piston helicopters
Missiles: 14 SA -2 SAM sites (84 launchers); 3 SAM regi-
ments (13 SA -2 SAM battalions); National SA -2 force
capability is increased by the presence of 2 operational
SA -2 sites and 6 operational SA -3 sites which are sub-
ordinate to Soviet Southern Group of Forces (stationed
in) Hungary. Deployment of SA -4 (6 SA4 battalions) is
now in progress for defense of Soviet forces
Supply: Produces small arms, ammunition, explosives,
light artillery, naval ships and craft, an armored recon-
naissance vehicle, some trucks, chemical warfare defensive
materiel and small quantities of agents, some types of
electronic equipment; dependent upon Communist coun-
tries, primarily the U.S.S.R., for other military equipment
including radar and missiles
Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December
1972, 9.72 billion forints; about 4.5% of total budget
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (S)
III Main Group Directorate (Intelligence and Security
Services); Ministry of Interior (commonly referred to
as the AVH); 1 Group Directorate of the III Main Group
Directorate (Foreign Intelligence Service); II Group Di-
rectorate of the III Main Group Directorate (Counter
Espionage Service); VKF /II (or General Staff /II Vezer-
kari Fonokseg), Military Intelligence Service
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
W
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.AkPPMC)NfaE3 FC3M MaL-aAk:Sa: 2009/06/16:
COMIDINATES
Places and Features Referred to in this General Survey (U/OU)
COORDINATES
o 'N.
1�.
Ahaliget (rr sia)
41) 09
I 8
Adony
47 07
is 52
Ady (see of Budapest)
47 33
18 56
Ajka
47 06
17 34
AIgy5
46 20
20 13
Airmlisftizitii
47 43
is 16
Alps (mix)
16 25
10 00
Apafa (rr sta)
47 35
21 40
ApafAja
47 35
21 40
Arad, Romania
46 11
21 10
Asz6d
47 :39
19 30
Bab6csa
46 02
17 22
BAoIna
48 37
17 59
Baia Nlare, Romania
47 40
23 35
Baja
46 11
18 58
Balcony (mix)
47 15
17 50
Balaton (take)
46 �0
17 45
R.I.tembmilAr
16 47
17 40
Places and Features Referred to in this General Survey (U/OU)
COORDINATES
COORDINATES
I
'E.
Gyongy6soroszi
47 .10
19 54
Gy5r
47 41
17 38
Gyula
46 39
21 17
llsjd6szot)o.%z]6
47 27
21 24
Halimba
47 02
17 32
Hamburg, W. Germany
53 33
10 00
Saftirikovo, Czechoslovakia
47 40
19 41
Ilatvan
47 55
17 10
Hegyeshalom
47 56
18
-1 07
Neves
47 36
48 30
20 17
21
llidasn6wti
19 17
II0dmvz6v6sArhcIy
46 25
20
Hortabfigy (region)
47 35
21 05
Inota (see of Varpalola)
17 12
18 11
lszkaszentgy6rgY
47 14
IS 1
Sib
46 57
17 25
lzmail,
45 21
28 50
Habheg (-0
47 03
1 7 39
Kalush, U.S.S.R
40 01
.7.1 22
COORDINATES
Hi
International b
magya bounds
QQ National capita
1 Megye center
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3
0 I.V.
'E.
RAkhegy
47 17
18 111
Rilkosszentmilhiily (.cc of Budapest)
47 32
19 10
116ts6g
47 56
1 08
Rijeka, Yugoslavia
45 21
14 24
Hoszke
46 11
20 03
RudahAnya
48 23
20 38
Saftirikovo, Czechoslovakia
48 25
20 20
Aahy, Czechoslovakia
48 04
58
Saj6 stns
47 56
18
-1 07
Salg6tarjiin
48 07
19 41)
Sic ri
47 13
19 17
Siirmell6k
46 43
17 10
Silrviir
47 M,
10
Sitrviz (canal)
.16 21
IS 46
,assnitz, E. Germany
54 31
13 39
Sib
46 22
IS 48
Sib (canalized x1rin)
46 20
18 53
SiMok
46 54
18 03
Hi
International b
magya bounds
QQ National capita
1 Megye center
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3

^RRMC)VEE3 FOR F2ELEASE= 2009106/16: CIA- ME3RO1 00707M0002001 1 0037 -3
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18
Summary Map
ncy For Official Use Only
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3