NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 19; HUNGARY; ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110036-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: REPORTS

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Page
3. Military manpower 3
Breakdown by 5-'year age groups of males of
military age; number of fit males coming of
military age each year; reserve system; com-
pulsory military service.
4. Strength trends
Increases and decreases in overall and service
personnel strengths since World War H.
5. Training
Summary of training system and Soviet in-
fluence; joint and combined training, includ-
ing participation in Warsaw Pact maneuvers.
6. Economic support and military budget
a. Economic support
Domestic production of limited range of
military items; heavy dependence on im-
ports, particularly from U.S.S.R.
b. Military budget
Preparation of military budget; budget fig-
ures for 1967 -72.
7. Logistics
Organization of the logistics system; responsi-
bilities of the Rear Service Directorate and
branch commands for the procurement, stor-
age, and issue of supplies.
R
Page
3. Training 12
Basic training and technical instruction for
enlisted men; officer training; joint and com-
bined exercises.
4. Logistics 13
River craft construction and repair facilities.
5 D. Air and air defense forces
13
Composition, missions, and capabilities.
1. Organization
13
Air defense part of Warsaw Pact system co-
b ordinated by Soviets; air defense zones and
6 sectors; Hungarian and Soviet radar defenses;
control of fighter aviation.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
13
Personnel strength, aircraft, and deployment
7 of fighter regiments; Soviet Air Force in Hun-
gary; SAM forces, including Soviet manned
sites; aircraft control and warning radar sites.
7 3. Trainuig
15
a. Air force
15
Pilot recruitment and training, including
training in U.S.S.R.; operational training
exercises.
B. Ground forces 8
Mission; reorganization and development of
ground forces under Soviet control.
1. Organization
Control of the ground forces; Soviet pattern
of divisional and lower unit organization; gen-
eral appraisal of equipment.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
Personnel strength; reserves; deployment of
forces; Soviet ground forces in Hungary.
3. 'Training
Appraisal of individual and small-unit train-
ing; training program for conscripts; major
schools for officers and enlisted men; training
program for reservists.
4. Logistics
Procurement, storage, and issue responsi-
bilities; supply procedures.
N.
b. Surface -to -air missile forces 15
Training based on Soviet doctrine and
methods; training and firing exercises in
U.S.S.R.
4. Logistics 15
a. Air force 15
9 Patterned after Soviet system; Soviet
Union source of aircraft, engines, and
spare parts; aircraft maintenance facilities;
9 appraisal of logistics system.
b. Surface -to -air missile forces 16
Dependence on U.S.S.R. for missiles,
equipment, and special parts.
10 E. Militarized security forces 16
Brief description of organization and training;
emphasis on political reliability in selection and
on political indoctrination in training of personnel.
C. Naval forces 11
Mission, wartime and peacetime functions, eapa- 1. Frontier Guard 16
bilities of Military River Flotilla. Personnel strength, responsibilities, and or-
ganization; training of enlisted men and of-
1. Organization 11 ficers� weapons
Chain of command; principal elements of the and transportation.
44th Indepf3ndent brigade and their responsi- 2. Internal Security Troops 16
bilities. Personnel strength, mission, duties, organiza-
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 12 tion, training, weapons.
Personnei strength and deployment; inventory
of operational and reserve vessels. Glossary 19
ri
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FIGURES
iii
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Page
Fig. 1
Organization of Hungarian armed
8
Fig. 6
forces (chart)
4
Fig. 2
Armed forces personnel strengths
9
Fig. 8
(table)
6
Fig. 3
Hungarian manufactured version of
10
Fig. 9
the Soviet AKM automatic rifle
(photo)
7
Fig. 4
Annual military budgets table)
7
iii
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Page
Fig. 5
Scup A missile and crew photo)
8
Fig. 6
FROG -5 missile system (photo'
8
Fig. 7
SNAPPER antitank missiles photo)
9
Fig. 8
Communications troops in training
(photo)
10
Fig. 9
Typical SA -2 surface -to -air missile
site (photo)
14
Fig. 10
Typical SA -3 surface -to -air missile
site photo)
15
iii
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Armed Forces
A. General
The armed forces of Hungary consist of ground,
naval, and air and air defense elements known col-
lectively as the Hungarian People's Army (MN).
They constitute a single, highly unified military
force controlled by the Minister of Defense. Total
personnel strength is 97,400. Of these, 90,000 are
in the ground element including 4,600 assigned to
the air defense element of the air and air defense
forces), 1,400 in the naval element, and 6,000 in
the air element of the air and air defense forces.
Major combat elements include six ground force
divisions and three field artillery and one antiair-
craft artillery regiments; one missile (Scup) bri-
gade; a naval river) flotilla with 123 craft; and
three air force fighter regiments, one transport
squadron, and one helicopter squadron, with a
total of 163 aircraft. (S)
The armed forces are supplemented by approxi-
n ately 35,000 militarized security troops, subor-
di sate to the Ministry of Interior. These include
20,900 in the Frontier Guard and 15,000 in the
Internal Security Troops (BKH commonly known
as the Interior Troops. Included arbitrarily under
the Frontier Guard are about 100 personnel and 25
craft in quasi -naval elements and various police
organizations. (S)
The Hungarian Peor' 's Army is one of the
smallest and least effective armed forces of the
active Vlarsaw Pact members. The rebuilding of
these Hungarian forces following their near dis-
solution after the 1956 revolt was completed by
1967. Minor changes in organizational structure
may be expected from time to time without signifi-
cantly affecting capability. Although the forces are
not capable of conducting sustained independent
action on a large scale, they could perform defen-
sive and limited offensive operations as part of a
Soviet commanded Warsaw Pact campaign. In
other than a territorial defense -ole, however, the
reliability of Hungarian troops is qu6stionable. (S)
All armed forces components have L �en devel-
oped with extensive support and direction by the
U.S.S.R. A degree of Soviet control continues to be
exercised through the unified command of the
Warsaw Pact in Moscow, the small Soviet military
mission in Budapest, and the Soviet advisers to the
Hungarian militarized security forces. In addition,
the Soviet Union keeps about 50,000 men in Hun-
gary �four line divisions and six air regiments �on
the basis of a bilateral status -of- forces agreement
signed in May 1967. (S)
1. Historical (C)
Hungarian troops, true to their historic tradition,
performed well in World War I as part of the
Austro Hungarian Empire's military forces. With
the breakup of the dual monarchy, the military
history of modern Hungary began. The Treaty of
Trianon, imposed by the Allies in 1919, reduced
Hungary by more than two- thirds of its territory
and about 60% of its population. In addition, terms
of the treaty restricted the armed forces to a
maximum of 35,000 men, called for an extended
term of enlisted service, and prohibited heavy
artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft. These
limitations resulted in an emphasis on quality that
ultimately developed a well- trained nucleus for
future expansion.
Having lost so heavily as a consequence of World
War I, Hungary became a leading advocate of re-
vision of the peace settlement, in particular, it
sought to terminate the military and territorial pro-
visions of the Trianon Treaty. With the deteriora-
tion of the international situation in the mid- 1930's
and the emergence of a strong, ambitious Nazi
Germany also eager to revise the peace settlement,
Hungary became increasingly vocal in its de-
mands. Hungary supporter) Hitler during the
Sudeten crisis of 1938 and joined in the dismember-
ing of Czechoslovakia. With strong German sup-
port, the strength of the military forces was raised
to approximately 150,000 men in 1939 -40.
Hungary signed the Axis Pact in November 1940
and ultimately entered World War II on the side
of the Axis. At the outset, Hungary supplied Ger-
many with food, raw materials, and c `lei t ,_oducts
and was promised aid in restoring the pre Trianon
borders. Some former territories lost to Czecho:io-
vakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia under the Trianon
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Treaty were in fact returned to Hungarian control.
In June 1941 Hungary declared war on the Soviet
Union and Hungarian troops joined in the invasion.
Hungary's armed forces reached a peak wartime
strength of more than 375,000 men, and at times, as
many as 250,000 served on the Eastern Front. The
climax of Hungarian participation in the Russian
campaign came in January 1943 near Voronezh on
the Don river. Here a force of II line divisions was
overwhelmed and virtually destroyed by Soviet
forces in an action preliminary to the epic Battle of
Stalingrad. As a resvlt of this disaster, as well as of
domestic developments, the Hungarian military
units from that time onward were used almost en-
tirely in the rear areas for line -of- communications
security and occupation duties. In March 1944 the
Germans occupied Hungary, an occupation that
lasted until .April 1945.
In spite A the country's ancient antipathy for
Slavdom and Russia and its animosity toward com-
munism, Hungary was forcibly drawn into the
Soviet world following World War II. Because of
the basically German orientation of the armed
forces, they were allowed to deteriorate rapidly
after the war. Only a small cadre remained after the
establishment of a democratically constituted pro-
visional government, which included a new Defense
Ministry and provided for a new military organiza-
tion. Nearly all vestiges of the wartime force were
rooted out, and the military was infiltrated by the
Communists. The Communists assumed power in
1947, and long -time Communist Gen. Mihaly Farkas
was appointed Minister of Defense. With Soviet
supervision and support the ground forces were
expanded beyond the 65,000 -man limit set in the
World War II peace treaty, the air force was ex-
panded beyond its 5,000 -man limitation, and a mili-
tarily controlled river guard was reestablished. A
large Soviet military mission, which at one time
may have numbered 5,000 men, was established to
supervise the redevelopment of the armed forces
and insure their conformity to Soviet principles and
concepts.
Sovietization of the armed forces progressed
steadily. Experienced officers and noncommissioned
officers whose political reliability was doubted by
the Comaunists were replaced with younger, more
reliable men, many of whom were schooled in the
U.S.S.R. Organization was along Soviet lines and
shipments of up -to -date Soviet equipment kept pace
with progress in training and organization.
The strength of the armed forces and militarized
security forces had been expanded to over 220,000
2
by 1952. This rapid growth reflected the Com-
munist regime's and the Soviet) determination to
build a relatively large force as a politically stabi-
lizing factor in Hungary and in response to various
external developments. These included the ouster
of neighboring Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, the
formation of NATO, the rearmament of the West,
and finally the Korean war.
By the early 1950's the armed forces were well
organized, well equipped, and well trained. They
were capable of carrying on effective combined
arms operations on a substantial scale. The efficient
reserve and mobilization system would have per-
mitted rapid expansion especially of the ground
forces �in the event of war.
In May 1955, Hungary joined the Warsaw Pact,
a collective security organization created by the
U.S.S.R. as a political response to the rearming and
admission into NATO of West Germany. In Novem-
ber 1956 Hungary unilaterally withdrew from the
Warsaw Pact, but this action was canceled after
the Soviets had crushed the revolt and the Kadar
government had been installed.
The aimed forces initially played no significant
part in the sudden popular uprising that began in
Hungary on 23 October 1956. Only a few organized
units went over to the rebellion. The militarized
security forces collapsed, however, and efforts made
to bring troops into Budapest to quell the rioting
there were largely unsuccessful; the mechanized
division that was moved into Budapest was quickly
withdrawn. Senior officers, although pro Soviet,
hesitated to order military action against their own
people. Lacking guidance from the top, the officers
and noncommissioned officers at the lower levels
would not, or coin not, take effective action. In
addition, it was doubted that the rank and file of
troops would fire on their own unarmed country
men. By the sa token, except for a few scattered
elements, the armed forces did not resist the Soviet
mechanized forces that swiftly .noved in and oc-
cupied strategic points throughout the country.
Following the uprising, Hungary was left with
little in the way of an organized military force. In
addition to wholesale desertions, one entire con-
script class was released on schedule in November
1956 and no effort was made until the following
sprint; to induct the next eligible class. Total
strength dropped to about 26,000 men. In January
1957, deserters were given the opportunity to avoid
aenalty i` they returned to duty immediately; by the
end of the month strength had risen to perhaps
40,000 or 50,000 men.
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Loyalty oaths were administered to officers who
desired to remain in service, and conscription of a
new age class was initiated in April 1957. Recon-
stitution of the militarized security forces was as-
signed high priority, and their strength was rapidly
raised to the prerevolt level. Total ground and air
forces strength rose gradually during the ensuing
years, reaLhUng an estimated level of 105,000 men
in 1960. Units were reorganized along Soviet lines
to give greater tactical flexibility and potential ef-
fectiveness. Equipment which had been collected as
a precautionary measure from Hungarian military
units and stored under Soviet and Hungarian mili-
tary control during and following the revolt was
gradually reissued.
Slow but steady progress has been made in equip-
ping and training the armed forces, with emphasis
given to developing the proficiency of the individ-
ual soldier and the smaller units. Accelerated by
the Berlin crisis in the autumn of 1961, a substantial
increase in military spending was made, the intro-
duction of new major items of modern equipment
was begun, and an extensive propaganda campaign
was launched to glorify the armed forces as able
and active members of the Warsaw Pact fords.
In August 1968, elements of the Hungarian
People's Army participated in the invasion of
Czechoslovakia. The token farce deployed to
Czechoslovakia is estimated not to have exceeded
6,000 men.
2. Defense organization (S)
Under the guidance of the Hungarian Socialist
Workers Party (HSWP) and the Council of Min-
isters, the Minister of Defense controls and directs
all elements of the armed forces. The overall struc-
ture of the Hungarian high command follows the
Communist pattern� relatively simple, rigid, and
highly centralized. A small Soviet mission remains
in Hungary to advise and monitor the higher
echelons of the Hungarian military e.;tablishment.
The Minister of Defense is a member of the Party
Central Committee and takes part in formulating
national policy. He is commander in chief of the
Hungarian People's Army and exercises control
with the assistance of a first deputy minister, a
deputy minister who is the Chief of the General
Staff, a general staff, a number of directorates, and
branch commands Figure 1). All components of
the ministry except the branch commands are
unified and serve the armed forces as a whole,
although the high command is dominated by of-
ficers of the ground forces. The incumbent Minister
of Defense is a Communist party functionary with
limited military experience.
There are three groupings of operational units
under the Ministry of Defense. The largest, the
tactical ground units, includes the six line divisions
and one missile (Scan) brigade, as well as numer-
ous separate smaller units of line, combat support,
and service types controlled by the 5th Army
headquarters at Szekesfehervar 1 and an uniden-
tified corps (headquarters at Cegled). All air units,
as well as those ground forces units of surface -to -air
missile SAM) and air control and warning
(ACW) type assigned to home air defense, are con-
trolled by the National Air Defense Command. The
Military River Flotilla, the third operational com-
ponent, is Hungary's navy, equipped manly with
small river craft.
The 5th Army and the unidentified corps sup-
ply logistic and administrative support to all tactical
ground units, relieving the general staff of this
burden acquired following the abolition of the pre
revolt territorial administrative districts.
The Ministry of Defense is also in charge of civil
defense. Through a National Headquarters for Civil
Defense (PVOP it controls, coordinates, and ad-
ministers all civil defense activity.
3. Military manpower (C)
There were approximately 2,659,000 Hungarian
males of military age (15 to 49 years inclusive) in
January 1973. Of these, an estimated 2,140,000
were considered fit for military service. The number
of fit males coming of military age (18) each year
is expected to be about 90,000 in the next few years.
A breakdown by 5 -year age groups of the estimated
available military manpower follows:
Hungary's highly efficient reserve and mobiliza-
tion system follows the same pattern as that of other
For diacritics on place names see the list of names at
end of the chapter.
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TOTAL
MAXIMUM
NUMBER
NUMBER FIT IOR
AGE
OF MALES
MILITARY SERVICE
15-19
473,000
430,000
20 -24
432,000
380,000
25 -29
378,000
330,000
30 -34
350,000
290,000
35 -39
325,000
250,000
4044
352,000
245,000
45 -49
349,000
215,000
Total, 1549
2,659,000
2,140,000
Hungary's highly efficient reserve and mobiliza-
tion system follows the same pattern as that of other
For diacritics on place names see the list of names at
end of the chapter.
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COUNCIL
I
OF
I
MINISTERS
Deputy Minister
Frontier
Chief
M of Defense
Guard
Minister
o f
o f
of
First Deputy Minister
Interior
interior
I
Troops
Physical Training
1
I
I
I
I I
Deputy Minister
Chief
Chief
Chief
Chief of Combat Chief of
Chie of Genera Staf
o f
o f
of
and Rear Services D
Political
Personnel
Technical
Physical Training
Directorates and Sections:
Main Directorate
('lain Directorate
Direccora:e
Directorate Directorates:
Operations
Food Administration
Intelligence
Quartermaster
Organization and
r
Motor Transport and Fuel
Mobili.ation
Military Installations
Communications
Chief
Chief
Chief
Medical
Chief
Topographic
of
of
of
of
Cryptographic
Military Justice
Administration
Finance
Secretariat
Document Control
Direc:erate
Directorate
Directorate
Rail Transport
Chief
Chief
Chief
Chief
of
of
of
of
Artillery
Engineer
Chemical Defense
Armor Command
Command
II
Command
Command
Commander
Commander
Commander Commander
National
Air Defense Command
Sth Army
Unidentified Corps Military
River Flotilla
I
Antiaircraft Artillery
Tactical
Tactical
Military Independent
Surface -to
qtr Units
-Air Missile
Ground Units
Ground Units
River Flotilla Brigade
and
Aircraft Control
and Warning Units
FIGURE 1. Organization of Hungarian armed forces (S)
Warsaw Pact nations. A detailed mobilization plan
is maintained for the rapid mustering, assignment,
and movement of all persons liable for wartime
service males 18 through 65) Reservists fre-
quently participate in field exercises or maneuvers
of the unit to which they would be assigned if
mobilized. All males are considered members of
the reserves until age 50 enlisted men) or age 60
(officers). The reserves consist of the ready reserve
personnel who have served on active duty) and
the second -line reserve untrained personnel who
have never served on active duty). In each
category, the length and frequency of training and
the order in which reservists wo )bilized are
L
ased on age and previous m;' uning. About
693,000 trained reservists u forces 690,000,
naval forces 2,800. force pilots) who
have serv u forces since their
"Sovieti N are available for callup.
From the point of view of physical and emotional
qualities and adaptability to military life, Hun-
garians generally make good soldiers. In the past
their performance has been characterized by a spirit
of individualism, national pride, and resourceful-
ness, although today these qualities probably are
tempered by a generally apathetic attitude toward
the Communist regime.
Under the provisions of the National Service Act
of 1960, as amended in 1964, Hungarian males are
liable for 3 years of active service in the armed
forces, including the militarized security forces.
Most serve only 2 years, but some men in the river
flotilla, the air force, the Interior Troops, and
certain ground forces specialists serve longer. Each'
male is liable for service as a conscript or reservist
from the year of his 18th birthday to the year of
his 50th birthday. Commissioned reserve officers
4
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are subject to military service until age 60. The Id
policy of inducting most of the men in the year of
the,e 20th birthday has been changed, and now
most men are inducted during the year of their
18th birthday. Before the induction age was
lowered to 18, an individual's liability to conscrip-
tion ceased at age 24, but that, too, has been
lowered (to age 23). Some members of each con-
script class are screened out for political reasons
or are deferred on such personal grounds as having
dependents, studying in certain fields, farming, or
working in essential industries. These men, as well
as those found temporarily unfit, are reexamined
annually until the age of 23. Of the nearly 50,000
men inducted each year, about 35,000 go into the
ground forces, 1,300 into the air and naval forces,
and 12,500 into the militarized security forces.
Men may volunteer for military service as early
as the year of their 17th birthday. Conscripts and
volunteers may extend their terms of service if
they can meet stringent military, political, moral,
and physical requirements.
Great efforts are made to increase the prestige
and improve the morale of the armed forces. The
value of Hungarian membership in the Warsaw
Pact is stressed repeatedly in the press, and even
routine activities of armed forces units and indi-
vidual soldiers are given relatively extensive cover-
age in news media. Inductees are honored by elabo-
rate ceremonies, and their families are encouraged
to participate in the oath- taking formalities.
Political reliability is one of the chief criteria for
officer selection. Almost all selectees are members
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party or the
Communist Youth League (KISz), or have other-
wise demonstrated loyalty to the regime. They are
recruited primarily from the working class and the
peasantry.
Officers and career noncommissioned officers
seem to accept military service willingly in return
for an assured career in a time honored profession.
The typical conscript accepts his compulsory serv-
ice without protest and as part of a Hungarian
tradition, and he may later look back upon it
with pride. His active duty, however, is not per-
formed with particular enthusiasm. Low pay aiii
generally poor living conditions of enlisted men,
NCO's, and junior officers, as well as a genera-
tion gap between senior and junior officers, sug-
gest the likelihood of dissatisfaction in the armed
forces.
4. Strength trends (S)
Armed forces strengths have varied little since
early 1960, indicating that the Hungarian People's
Army has achieved its desired poctrevolt force
level. In the autumns of both 1961 and 1962 sig-
nificant but temporary increases occurred in re-
sponse to the Berlin and Cuban crises, respectively.
On both occasions, conscripts due to be released
from active service were retained, normal conscript
inductions were held, and some reserves were
called up. Total strength probably increased by
about 30,000 men on each occasion. Reserves and
held -over conscripts were released when tensions
abated, and no permanent strength increase re-
sulted. During the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 an
estimated 5,000 reservists were called up and
assigned to existing units to improve combat readi-
ness. Most of these reservists were released in No-
vember 1968.
The estimate of the strength of the ground forces
was revised downward in late 1967 from 100,000 to
90,000, a result of a lowering of manning levels in
the six divisions and support units. The estimated
strength of the armed forces for selected years is
shown in Figure 2.
5. Training (S)
Training is based on tht Soviet system. The
Combat and Physical Training Directorate of the
Ministry of Defense is responsible for the annual
training programs, the organization and conduct
of all military competitive contests, and the coordi-
nation of the curriculums and training activities in
the various military schools. With the Operations
Directorate of the General Staff and the branch
commands, it plans the overall armed forces train-
ing program.
There is some training of politically reliable
officers and enlisted men in the Soviet Union.
There is cross service training in Hungary as well
for example, naval personnel are trained in the
ground forces engineering school at Szentes and
in the air force officers school at Szolnok. To com-
pensate for the phasing out of the United Officers
School in September 1967 the existing specialized
service schools were upgraded to 4 -year institu-
tions, equal in legal and formal status to civilian
institutic ns of higher learping.
Both jumt and combined training exercises are
held. Hungarian units first took part in Warsaw
Pact maneuvers in the spring of 1962; the maneu-
6 1
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FIGli'r 2. Armed forces personnel strengths (S)
vers were held in Hungary that year. Starting in
1965 the armed forces intensified both joint and
combined training; they are no longer considered
deficient in the command and staff capability re-
quired for these operations. In 1965, major joint
training exercises involving all line divisions and a
combined exercise involving major Hungarian units
and elements of the Soviet Southern Group of
Forces were conducted. Again in 1966 and 1967
Hungarian forces participated in joint and com-
bined exercises. Most notable of these was the
"Vltava" exercise during September 1966, a major
combined, air /ground training operation in Czecho-
slovakia involving Soviet, East German, Czecho-
slovak, and Hungarian forces. This was the first
time that Hungarian forces had taken part in large
scale exercises outside their national boundaries,
and their inclusion in these maneuvers indicates
increasing Soviet confidence in Hungarian military
capabilities. In June 1968 Hungarian ground forces
participated in the "Sumava" exercise, again in
Czechoslovakia, 2 months before the invasion of
that 'country. In October 1970, they engaged in
"Brothers -in- Arms," an exercise held in East Ger-
many. During 1971, Hungarian ground forces par-
ticipated in three major combined exercises in
Hungary, one with Czechoslovak and Soviet forces
and two with '-oviet forces only.
6. Economic support and military budget
a. Econc lic support
Hungary's economy is moderately well devel-
oped, but it supplies the armed forces with only
a narrow range of conventional military materiel.
Manufacturing is concentrated on the production
of heavy industrial goods, and is greatly dependent
upon imports or raw materials and some types of
machinery. (C)
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MILITARIZED
GROUND
Alit
NAVAL
SECURITY
FORCES
FORCE
FORCES
TOTAL
FORCED
World war 11 (peak)........
350,000
24,000
3,000
377,000
1900 (July)
38,500
2,500
500
41,500
5,000
1051 (July)
100,000
3,000
800
103,800
12,500
1952 (July)
175,000
10,000
1,000
186,000
35,000
1953 (July)
175,000
10,000
1,200
186,200
37,500
1954 (J it Iy)
150,000
10,000
1,500
161,500
38,000
1955 (July)
150,000
10,000
2,000
162,000
38,060
1956 (Sep.)
150,000
13,500
2,500
166,OGO
38,000
(Dec.)
25,000
1,000
500
26,500
20,000
1957 (July)
50,000
5,500
500
56,000
30,000
1958 July
80,000
5,500
800
86,300
35,000
1959 'July)
90,000
4,00()
1,000
95,000
35,000
1960 (July)
100,000
3,800
1,200
105,000
35,000
1961 (July)
100,00()
3,600
1,500
105,100
35,000
1962 (July)
100,0()0
5,000
1,500
106,500
35,000
1963 (Jul,-)
100,000
5,000
1,500
106,500
35,000
196.1 (July)
100,000
5,000
1,500
106,500
35,000
1965 (July)
100,00()
5,000
1,500
106,500
35,000
1966 (.fan.)
100,000
5,000
1,500
106,500
35,000
1967 (July)
100,000
5,000
1,500
10,500
35,000
1968 (Julv)
90,000
6,000
1,400
47,400
35,000
1969 (Jan.).
90,000
6,000
1,400
97,400
35,000
1970 (July)
90,000
6,000
1,400
97,400
35,000
1971 Jan
90,000
6,000
1,400
97,400
35,000
1972 (Jan.)
90,000
6,000
1,400
97,400
35,000
Not pertinent.
*Figures from 1952 through September 1956
include 20,000 men in
the Internal
Security Troops
(Interior Troops), the remainder
being in the
Frontier Guard. The reduction
between September and
December 1956 was the result of the revolt, and the strength of 20,000
repres..lts an
estimate of the
total strength of both elements.
The figures from
July 1957 through January 1972 include
20,000 in
the Frontier Guard, the remainder being in the Interior 'Troops. One hundred of the
35,000 men in
the security forces are assigned
to the rive:
section of the
Frontier Guard.
vers were held in Hungary that year. Starting in
1965 the armed forces intensified both joint and
combined training; they are no longer considered
deficient in the command and staff capability re-
quired for these operations. In 1965, major joint
training exercises involving all line divisions and a
combined exercise involving major Hungarian units
and elements of the Soviet Southern Group of
Forces were conducted. Again in 1966 and 1967
Hungarian forces participated in joint and com-
bined exercises. Most notable of these was the
"Vltava" exercise during September 1966, a major
combined, air /ground training operation in Czecho-
slovakia involving Soviet, East German, Czecho-
slovak, and Hungarian forces. This was the first
time that Hungarian forces had taken part in large
scale exercises outside their national boundaries,
and their inclusion in these maneuvers indicates
increasing Soviet confidence in Hungarian military
capabilities. In June 1968 Hungarian ground forces
participated in the "Sumava" exercise, again in
Czechoslovakia, 2 months before the invasion of
that 'country. In October 1970, they engaged in
"Brothers -in- Arms," an exercise held in East Ger-
many. During 1971, Hungarian ground forces par-
ticipated in three major combined exercises in
Hungary, one with Czechoslovak and Soviet forces
and two with '-oviet forces only.
6. Economic support and military budget
a. Econc lic support
Hungary's economy is moderately well devel-
oped, but it supplies the armed forces with only
a narrow range of conventional military materiel.
Manufacturing is concentrated on the production
of heavy industrial goods, and is greatly dependent
upon imports or raw materials and some types of
machinery. (C)
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Current production of ground forces materiel in-
cludes amphibious armored reconnaissance vehicles,
57 -mm antiaircraft guns, small arms Figure 3), am-
muntion, explosives, signal equipment, transport
vehicles, and quartermaster equipment. Naval con-
struction is limited to small river patrol craft.
Hungary has no significant aircraft industry, and
most of the country's aircraft have been purchased
from the U.S.S.R. Missile systems have been sup-
plied by the Soviet Union. Hungary is also depend-
ent on imports primarily from the U.S.S.R. but
also from Eastern European Communist coun-
tries �for artillery, armored combat vehicles, and
many of the more complex items of military equip-
ment. During the period 1955 -71 Hun .ry received
from Communist countries military A estimated
in value at US$650 million. The bulk of this aid
came from the Soviet Union. (S)
FIGURE 4. Annual military budgets (C)
l,. Military budget (S)
The military budget is prepared annually by
the Ministry of Defense in collaboration with the
Ministry of Finance and the Party Central Com-
mittee. This budget is then presented to the
Council of Ministers for int--gration into the overall
national budget. After approval by the Council of
Ministers, the total national budget is submitted
to Parliament iur formal enactment. Parliament
has the constitutional authority to change all
budget proposals, but in practice it functions as
a rubber stamp, endorsing all proposed legislation
submitted by the Council of Ministers. As is the
case i.n other Communist countries, the announced
figures do not include all expenditures for military
purposes, and some military costs, particularly
those for military research and development, are
charged to other budget accounts. Research and
development, however, are believed to account for
a relatively small portion of total military expendi-
tures in Hungary. Defense budgets for fiscal years
1967 through 1972 appear in Figure 4.
7. Logistics (C)
The Rear Services Directorate Figure 1) is re-
sponsible for the procurement, storage, and issue
of common -use items such as rations, clothing,
petroleum products) for all of the armed forces.
Technical services of the respective branch com-
mands, working in coordination witiA the rear serv-
ices system, are responsible for the procurement,
stGr?ge, arz'a issue of items peculiar to the individual
branches of service.
The Rear Services Directorate and the individual
branch commands maintain central and regional
supply depots frr the storage and distribution of
their respective supplies. Most of the central depots
are in or near Budapest. Regional supply depots
are maintained throughout the country and are con-
trolled by the Ministry of Defense through the
Chief of the Rear Services Directorate. The line
divisions and other major units, in turn, maintain
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FIGURE 3. Hungarian- manufactured ver-
sion of the Soviet AKM automatic rifle
equipped with a night- vision device (U /OU)
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Ministry of Defense budget (millions of forinls)
5,437
6,400
8,029
8,898
9,440
9,715
Defense as percent of total national budget
5.2
4.6
5.1
5.1
1
4.5
Defer se as percent of estimated GNP
2.4
.4.0
3.6
8.8
4.0
1
VOTE -The official rate of exchange of 10.81 forints=
USt1.00 is artificial. Converting the sums
to U.S.
dollars on this basis
would be unrealistic and deceptive.
7
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FIGURE 3. Hungarian- manufactured ver-
sion of the Soviet AKM automatic rifle
equipped with a night- vision device (U /OU)

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their own depots and supply points for their sub-
ordinate units.
B. Ground forces
The mission of the Hungarian ground forces is
to defend the national territory, in wartime these
forces would be emplo as part of the Warsaw
Pact forces, The Hungarian ground forces are
small� amn;ig the smallest of those of the active
Warsaw Pact scales. In 1960 the Soviets decided to
allow Hungary to develop a small national field
army, and in 1961 the tempo of development picked
up. Over the next 2 years new types of equipment
were brought into the inventory, the forces began
reorganizing along Soviet lines, military spending
substantially increased, and the Kadar regime
launched an intensive campaign to raise the pres-
tige of the iniiitary. Soviet control exerted through
the Warsaw Pact and Soviet advisers assigned to
the various directorates and commands of the Hun-
garian Ministry of Defense developed a ground
force modeled after Soviet ground forces in or-
ganization, training, and equipment. It is estimated
that today the Hungarian ground forces could
make a limited military contribution to the War-
saw Pact during wartime. (C)
1. Organization (C)
Major units of the ground forces are controlled
by the Minister of Defense through the 5th Army
Headquarters, in Szekesfehervar about 35 miles
southwest of Budapest), and the unidentified corps
headquarters at Cegled. During peacetime, all four
operationally ready divisions three motorized rifle
and one tank) are subordinate to the 5th Army
Headquarters, and the remaining two divisions
one motorized rifle and one tank), both under
strength, are believed to be subordinate to the un-
identified corps headquarters. Wartime subordina-
tion may differ. Unlike other Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, Hungary does not have military territorial
subdivisions. Divisional and lower unit organiza-
tion generally follows th,: Soviet pattern, though
the Hungarian line divisions are smaller than those
of the Soviet ground forces. Armored and motorized
divisions represent recent concepts of Soviet tactical
organization and are advanced well beyond those
of the prerevolt period. There are still some equip-
ment deficiencies, especially in armored person-
nel carriers, when measured against wartime tables
of equipment. G� adually, however, the Hungarians
Q
are receiving some modern Soviet equipment.
Limited quantities of Scvo tactical surface -to-
surface missiles Figure 5), necessary for a wartime
field army, are on hand, and free- rocket -over-
ground FROG) battalions are integral to several
line divisions Figure 6) and are authorized in
the wartime tables of organization and equip-
ment of both the motorized rifle and the tank
divisions.
The motorized rifle division �the basic tactical
unit, with an authorized wartime strength of about
9,300 men �is designed to provide the heavy fire-
power, tactical flexibility, and maneuverability
needed in both modern conventional warfare and
nuclear vArfare. This Soviet type of streamlined
combat division, smaller than the former infantry
division. is made up of the basic three motorized
rifle regiments, one tank regiment, and eleven
supporting units (communications, engineer, antiair-
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FIGURE 5. SCUD A missile and crew on
maneuvers (U /OU)
FIGURE 6. FROG -5 missile system (C)

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craft, FROG, maintenance, reconnaissance, rocket
launcher, motor transport, and medical battalions
and chemical. defense and traffic control com-
panies).
The Soviet -type tank division, with an authorized
wartime strength of about 7,200, consists of three
tank regiments, one motorized rifle regiment, one
artillery regiment, and eleven supporting units
similar to those of the motorized rifle division.
2. Strength, compasition, and disposition 2 (C)
Including 4,600 ground force personnel assigned
to the air defense element of the air an l air
defense forces, the present strength of the ground
forces is estimated at 90,000 officers and enlisted
men. Of these, 20,000 officers and 5,000 noncom-
missioned officers make up the regular cadre. The
remainder are conscripts, most of whom serve on
active duty for 2 years. An estimated 5,000 men
of each conscript -age class are selected for an addi-
tional year of extended service; these are mostly
technicians and personnel who have received tech-
nical schooling during their first 2 years of .service.
There are an estimated 690,000 reserves who have
served on active duty with the ground forces since
1950 -51, and, of these, 234,000 have completed
active duty in the immediately previous 5 years.
In addition to the four motorized rifle divisions,
two tank divisions, and the ScvD (SS -1) tactical
missile brigade, which has an authorized wartime
strength of 1,000 men, there are sufficient separate
line and support units to form an operational field
For detailed current information see Order of Battle
Summary, Foreign Ground Forces and Military Intelligence
Summary, both published by the Defense Intelligence
Agency.
army. These units include three artillery regiments
of 545 men each, one antiaircraft regiment of 700
men, and an airborne battalion of 400 men. Com-
bat units are generally disposed throughout the
country, with the exception of the northwestern
part, which is garrisoned primarily by troops of
the Soviet Southern Group of Forces. The opera-
tionally ready Hungarian divisions are, however,
located in western Hungary and oriented toward
the Austria and Yugoslavia borders. Major combat
vehicles and weapons of the motorized rifle and
tank divisions include medium and amphibious
tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles, SNAPPER
anElan c missiles Figure 7), 82- and 120 -mm
mortars, and 57 -mm antitank and antiaircraft guns.
The Soviet ground forces in Hungary consist
of approximately 35,000 ground troops organized
into four line divisions two tank and h? u motorized
rifle) and smaller support and service elements.
These forces, as well as the six Soviet air regi-
ments in Hungary, are controlled by Soviet Head-
quarters, Southern group of Forces, Budapest.
3. Training (S)
Individual and small -unit training is thorough
and realistic, with emphasis on combat under spe-
cial conditions such as at night; across water bar-
riers; under chemical, biological, and nuclear at-
tack; and with nuclear weapons support. Ground
force training is gradually incr� -sing in frequency
and level.
The training program for 2 -year conscripts con-
sists of three 8 -month training cycles. During the
first cycle, the conscript receives basic advanced
individual training. The second and third 8 -month
cycles are devoted to unit training, exercises, and
maneuvers. The three 8 -month cycles are employed
FIGURE 7. AT -1 SNAPPER antitank
missiles ready for firing (C)
9
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so that at any given time two- thirds of the total
conscript force will have received some training.
Small -scale and unit field exercises are part of
the normal training process throughout the year
Figure 8). Large -scale field maneuvers and
exercises normally are held in late summer or
early autumn. Each year one of the two firing
battalions of the Scup brigade plus essential sup-
port elements are sent to the U.S.S.R. for training
and live firing of SCUD missiles.
The military school system is organized on the
basis of interbranch schools in which instruction
is given at all levels enlisted specialist, noncom-
missioned officer, officer candidate, and command
and staff. The Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, in
Budapest, trains captains and majors of the basic
arms for combined -arms operations. Separate
schools for the various arms and services have
been established, among them an infantry school
and chemical school, both at Szentendre, an armor
10
school at Retsag, a signal school at Budapest, an
engineer school at Szentes, and a radar school and
an artillery school, both at unknown locations. Both
officers and enlisted men attend. Regiments also
maintain noncommissioned officer schools that train
promising recruits as NCO's, technicians, and spe-
cialists. Promising field grade officers who are con
sidered politically reliable are sent to Soviet mili-
tary schools and academies.
Reservists are called to active duty periodically.
Younger reservists and some specialists are called
to active duty yearly, normally for periods ranging
from 2 weeks to 1 month. Reservists train with units
to which they would be assigned in wartime. Re-
serve officers and extended service NCO's may be
called up for training once every 3 years for periods
of 1 to 4 months. Conscripts can be called every
3 years for 1 to 3 months. From time to time large
scale mobilization exercises are held. Such an exer-
cise was held in March 1968; in it individual re-
servists were put into regular ground forces units,
while reserve units conducted their own training
under the supervision of regular officers and NCO's.
Civilian trucks were used by the reservists through-
out the exercise. Assignment to units is based on
individual qualifications and proficiency. Generally
speaking, the reserves are sufficiently trained to be
able to perform effectively in their mobilization
positions.
4. Logistics (C)
The procurement, storage, issue, and mainte-
nance of supplies and equipment in common use
throughout the armed forces are the responsibility
of the armed forces Chief of the Rear Services Di-
rectorate and his representatives at lower com-
mand echelons down to regiments and separate
units. Supply depots are maintained throughout
the country to facilitate the issue of rations, fuel,
clothing, medical supplies and other general issue
items. Requisitions are usually initiated by the
lower units and are routed through to the divi-
sion, which places the requirement on the depot.
Procurement, storage, and issue of specialized
equipment peculiar to any one branch of service
are handled by technical and supply elements
within that branch, with close coordination between
the branch and the rear services apparatus. Branch
technical representatives are assigned at division
level and the command level of separate units to
assist the unit rear services officers. Branch supplies
are requisitioned through separate channels, but in
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FIGURE 8. Communications troops in training. Ultra-
high frequency antenna is used with COIN GRASS
radio relay system. (C)

i
most cases depots for specialized branch items are
located near those of the rear services for general
supplies.
Peacetime maintenance is adequate, and suffi-
cient basic weapons and equipment are available
to bring the existing units up to full strength; it
is estimated that the six existing divisions could
be brought to full strength within 24 hours, the
four ready divisions could be deployed in 1 day,
the understrength tank division could be deployed
in 3 to 5 days, and the understrength motorized
rifle division would require a week or longer to
prepare for deployment. Other than light infantry,
the mobilization of additional divisions, however,
would depend on Soviet ability or willingness to
provide large quantities of additional equipment
such as tanks, artillery, and armored personnel
carriers.
C. Naval forces
The Military River FIotilla exists primarily to
support ground forces operations. Its mission is
twofold �to deny use of Hungarian waterways to
the enemy and to facilitate exploitation of those
waterways by ih.c H- ,ngarian ground forces. Spe-
cific wartime functions would be to lay defensive
minefields, sweep enemy mines, support river
crossing operations, and protect the flanks of
ground forces elements moving along the rivers
of the country. In peacetime the force patrols the
riverine borders and assists in maintaining law and
order on inland waterways. A strategic require-
ment exists for forces to fulfill these missions on
the Danube, the Tisza, and Balaton lake. Available
forces, including reserve ships, are adequate to
support the ground forces in river crossing opera-
tions and to conduct harassment attacks against
enemy crossings. However, the flotilla would ;-;e
unable to fulfill its mission on all three waterways
simultaneously. Except on the Danube, the mine
laying capability is inadequate. The mine counter-
measures capability is also limited; even the Danube
could not be kept open if it were subject to a large
scale attack with the more sophisticated mines. (S)
1. Organization (S)
The Commander of the Military River Flotilla
is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense.
The commander exercises administrative and op-
erational control over all naval forces in Hungary.
His principal assistants at headquarters are the po-
litical officer. the chief of staff, and the technical
deputy. It is the responsibility of the political offi-
cer to assure the loyalty of all personnel to the
Communist regime and to assist in morale and
welfare activities. The chief of staff oversees op-
erational planning, training, communications, and
general administration at the headquarters level.
Supply, equipment maintenance, and a variety of
other support activities are the responsibility of
the technical deputy. Each of these assistants has
a number of subordinates to handle specific aspects
of the staff functions.
Originally, the operational elements of the flo-
tilla were subdivided into a number of brigades and
operated on both the Danube and Tisza rivers.
After the 1956 revolt, the operational elements were
organized into the 44th Independent Brigade and
activity was limited to the Danube; however, re-
cently there have been indications of naval activity
on the Tisza, at Szentes and Mindszent, and on
Balaton lake. The Commander of the Military River
Flotilla serves concurrently as Commander of the
44th Independent Brigade, both elements having
headquarters at Ujpest. He also acts as Chief of
the River Guard Department, a small planning staff
within the Ministry of Defense which exercises
overall supervision of all militarized river forces.
The 44th Independent Brigade comprises three
principal elements �the Mine Planter Sweeper De-
tachment, Assault Detachment, and Support Sub
detachment. The Mine Planter- Sweeper Detach-
ment has 100 frogmen sappers) and specializes
in mine clearance. The Assault Detachment, which
includes 100 demolition specialists and 180 en-
gineer ratings for bridge construction, supports
the ground forces by securing their flanks during
operations along the Danube, by conducting river
crossing operations, and by providing fire support.
The Support Subdetachment operates approxi-
mately one -third of the service craft of the flotilla.
A naval ship brigade, by definition, has no ap-
preciable support facilities shor Hence, it must
be assumed that most support functions are subor-
dinate to the flotilla Base Battalion. The battalion
would furnish logistical support ashore through the
depc;ts and undertake repair and maintenance of
ships at flotilla workshops at Ujpest. it also operates
half of the flotilla service craft.
The Ujpest Reserve Depot, also probably subor-
rlinnte to the Rggr. Battalion, prepares mobilization
plans and maintains reserve ships. During winter
months, this depot also provides maintenance for
a large percentage of regular flotilla units. Another
11
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subordinate element is the Dunafoldvar Flotilla
Mine Depot, located some 50 miles south of
Budapest.
The Training Battalion, also probably subor-
dinate to the flotilla, operates combat ships not
assigned to or being used by the 44th Brigade.
Normal strength is 18 minesweeping boats, but
this battalion may also make use of reserve ships
for the training of reservists in summer months.
2. Strength, composition and disposition 3 (S)
Personnel strength of the Military River Flotilla
is estimated at about 1,400; some 140 are officers
and the balance, enlisted men. About 800 serve
afloat, 400 are in staff and support capacities, and
200 are undergoing various types of training at
any given time. All are stationed at Ujpest except
about 100 support per.:nnnel at the Dunafoldvar
Flotilla IMine Depot and 100 staff personnel at
the Ministry of Defense and at various ground
forces schools. During the summer a small per-
centage of afloat and support personnel may be
found at Baja and on Balaton lake, A small person-
nel contingent also may be located on the Tisza
and at Szentendre on the Danube. Approximately
half of the trainees would be at Ujpest under the
Training Battalion and the rest at ground forces
schools or in training in the U.S.S.R.
Most vessels are of postwar construction, espe-
cially designed for river operations, and in generally
good material condition.. The inventory of opera-
tional vessels of the Military River Flotilla is as
follows:
Combatants:
River gunboats
4
River patrol boats I...........
15
Minesweeping boats
42
Utility landing craft
2
Auxiliaries:
3
Barracks ships
2
Service craft:
Launches
43
Open barges
4
Covered lighter
1
Floating crane
1
Ammunition lighters
3
Fuel oil barges
2
Floating workshop
1
Small harbor tugs
3
Total
123
For detailed current information see Strength and Dis-
position of Foreign Navies and Military Intelligence Sum-
mary, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
12
In addition to these vessels, there are 53 in
reserve two small river monitors (BMRL 16
river gunboats (PR), eight minesweeping coats
(MSB and 27 river patrol boats. Nine of the
river gunboats, six of the minesweeping boats,
and all 27 river patrol boats have been built since
World War II. The condition of and maintenance
procedures and schedules for these vessels are
not known. All reserve vessels are probably kept
at Ujpest.
Of the operational vessels, the Mine Planter
Sweeper Detachment operates 24 of the mine-
sweeping boats, and the Training Battalion, the
remaining 18. The Assault Detachment uses four
river gunboats, 15 river patrol boats, two utility
landing craft, 20 launches, three mobile bridge
sections, and two small harbor tugs. The Support
Subdetachment operates two fuel oil barges, 13
launches, three ammunition lighters, a floating
crane, and a small harbor tug. The Base Battalion
utilizes 10 launches and other auxiliary and serv-
ice craft.
3. Training (C)
Preinduction training is provided by the Hun-
garian Sport Federation in conjunction with the
Communist Youth League. Conscripts enter naval
service as recruits and receive basic training, in-
cluding shipboard time, in the Training Battalion
at Ujpest. Recruit training includes 2 months of
basic instruction and 4 months of specialty train-
ing. Recruit training ends with 1 week of pro-
ficiency examinations to select outstanding per-
sonnel. Those selected are given 3 weeks of junior
NCO instruction. All enlisted personnel between
the ages of 17 and 23 who have completed ele-
mentary school may apply for admission to one
of several NCO schools. Technical training for
enlisted men is given by the naval department
of the ground forces NCO engineering school
at Szentes.
Professional officers are trained in ground and
air forces schools. Reserve officers usually are
graduates of civilian universities. Political officers
presumably are trained at the Petofic Political
Academy, and there is evidence that navigation
officers receive instruction at the Cyorgy Kilian
Air Force Officers School at Szolnok. Some flotilla
officers have had advanced training in Soviet
naval schools.
Training for both officer and enlisted personnel
concentrates on political indoctrination. The op-
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erational aspects of training emphasize river com-
bat operations, including amphibious landings,
river crossings, and.. bridge construction, Special
attention is also given to defense against nuclear
and chemical attack. joint operational exercises
are conducted with other Hungarian forces and
combined exercises with other Warsaw Pact forces.
The naval reserve component numbers about
2,800. Officers are subject to recall up to age 60,
enlisted men to age 50. Every 3 years reserves
can be recalled for up to 90 days for training,
including refresher courses in their specialties.
4. Logistics (C)
Logistic support for the Military River Flotilla
is coordinated at the Ministry of Defense level.
Supplies and equipment are obtained from cen-
tral military warehouses. Hungary has adequate
facilities for the construction and repair of river
craft, but much of the navigational equipment
and certain engine parts, including bearings,
shafts, and superchargers, are imported. Repairs
are carried out mainly at the MAHART Repair
Yard at Ujpest and at the Military River Flotilla
Base facilities. In addition, the shipyards in Buda-
pest, Vac, and Balatonfured are utilized on occa-
sion for the overhaul and maintenance of naval
units. The Military River Flotilla maintains a few
support facilities of its own, including workshops
and a supply depot at Ujpest and the Flotilla
Mine Depot at Dunafoldvar. Protracted defen-
sive or offensive operations undertaken by the
flotilla would require large -scale support from
the U.S.S.R.
D. Air and air defense forces (S)
The Hungarian air and air defense forces under
the National Air Defense Command (OLP) are
a composite, integrated force of air, antiaircraft
artillery, surface -to -air missile, and radar units.
They are charged with the missions of destroying,
nullifying, or reducing the effectiveness of attack
by aircraft or cruise missiles after they become
airborne and of providing close air support to the
Hungarian ground forces.
The Hungarian National Air Force is consid-
erably smaller than those elements of the Soviet
Air Forces stationed in Hungary. It is essentially
an air defense force, though there is limited train-
ing in ground support. It is equipped primarily
with fighter /interceptor jet aircraft, all Soviet
built.
1. Organization
For air defense Hungary is a single, centrally
controlled district within the overall Warsaw Pact
system that is coordinated by the Moscow head-
quarters of the Soviet PVO Strany Air Defense
of the Country), the operational command that
coordinates Soviet air defense. Air situation re-
ports are exchanged between the OLP, the So-
viet Air Forces, Hungary, of the Soviet Southern
Group of Forces, Budapest, and the other Eastern
European Communist air and air defense com-
mands. All of these are in direct communication
with the Soviet PVO Strany and the Warsaw
Pact Headquarters.
The Hungarian air defense district is divided
into two air defense zones, Eastern and Western,
with headquarters at Miskolc and Veszprem, re-
spectively. These headquarters control all air de-
fense elements within their respective zones. The
two zones are each further subdivided in two
air defense sectors organized for air surveil-
lance. The radar defenses include two relatively in-
dependent systems �the Hungarian National Air
Defense System and the Soviet system that sup-
ports the Soviet Southern Group of Forces. Both
have independent headquarters in Budapest.
The commander of OLP exercises administra-
tive and operational control over fighter aviation
units of air defense. A Soviet military mission is
also attached tv the OLP command; it probably
includes political representatives. Directly sub-
ordinate to the OLP commander are the follow-
ing sections: air traffic, estimates, liaison, logistical
services, officer personnel, operations, technical
aviation, and technical information. Soviet ad-
visers are believed to be primarily concerned with
logistics, operations, and training.
2. Strength, composition, arri disposition 4
The air force portion of the air and air defense
force has a personnel strength of about 6,000, in-
cluding about 250 pilots, and consists of three
fighter regiments, a transport squadron, and a heli-
copter squadron. The regiments are based at
For detailed current information see European Com-
munist Aircraft Order of Battle and Military Intelligence
Summary, both published by the Defense Intelligence
Agency. For additional information on airfields see the
Transportation and Telecommunications chapter of this
General Survey.
13
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Keeskemet, Papa, and Taszar, and both squad-
rons are based at Veszprem.
Although equipped by the Soviet Union largely
with supersonic fighters, :he Hungarian air force
component would contribute little to the Warsaw
Pact air and air defense efforts. As indicated
below, the total inventory of fighter aircraft is only
137, about one fourth of the fighters are older
versions (FARMER and FF,ESCo), and, of the newer
high performance aircraft (FISHBED), less than
one -half are all- weather versions (FISHBED D, F).
FIGHTER TYPE NUMBER
P'ARNtER B, E (hiiG -19) 10
FISHBED C, E MiG -21) 57
FISHBED D, F MiG -21) 46
FBEsco A, B, C (MUG-17) 12
FREsco D (MiC -17) 12
total 137
The remaining aircraft consist of two turboprop
(COKE) and seven piston -type (CAB and CRATE)
transports and 17 medium helicopters HOUND
and Hip).
Pilot reserves are estimated to number only
about 40. There are some 60 to 70 transport pilots
and 110 other crewmen employed by MALEV
Magyar Legikozlekedesi Vallalat), the national
airline, which serves as an air force reserve pool
and would provide personnel if required.
The Soviet Air Forces, Hungary (SAFH an
element of Soviet Tactical Aviation correspond-
ing to a tactical air army, consist of six regiments
with a total personnel strength of about 12,000.
The regiments have a total of 228 combat air-
craft -148 fighters, 64 light bombers, and 16 re-
connaissance aircraft �and are based at Buda
pest /Tokol, Debrecen, Kiskurlachaza, Kunmada-
ras, and Sarmellek airfields.
The Hungarian air defense surface -to -air mis-
sile SAM) forces are an integral part of the
unified Warsaw Pact defense force and, altho
their primary mission is to defend national ter-
ritory, they serve as well to defend the pact area
against air attack from the west and south. As of
1 January 1972, the Hungarian SAM forces were
organized into three SAM regiments, consisting
of 13 SA -2 battalions in all. Nine battalions are
deployed as a "vital area defense" of Budapest,
the remaining four provide air defense for Miskolc.
The Hungarians also maintain one SAM training
site. Two Soviet SA -2 battalions and six Soviet
SA -4 battalions, all probably subordinate to the
14
Soviet Southern Group of Forces, are deployed
as a westward extension of the Budapest defense.
Figure 9 shows a typical SA -2 site layout.
Antiaircraft artillery units provide for the air
defense of the ground forces troops and installa-
tions. Soviet SA -3 SAM battalions were introduced
into Hungary, possibly in 1967, and are currently
deployed at six sites, each of which provides for
low altitude defense of a Soviet airfield. Figure
10 shows a ypical layout of an SA -3 site.
There are about 40 aircraft control and warn-
ing ACW) radar sites scattered throughout the
country but primarily in the west, the direction
from which attack is considered most likely. These
include both early warning (EW) and ground con-
trol interception (GCI) sites. About half of these
installations are manned by the Soviets and sup-
port the Soviet ACW network in Hungary. All
ACW sites are equipped with the better Soviet
radar equipment, including TALL KING (long
range early warning) which is deployed along the
west and southern borders as a screen against
FIGURE 9. Typical SA -2 surface -to -air missile site.
Upper right inset: SA -2 missile on a transporter. Lower
left inset: FAN SONG, a tracking and guidance
radar. (S)
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FIGURE 10. Typical SA -3 surface -to -air missile site.
Upper right inset: two SA -3 missiles on transporter.
Lower left inset: LOW BLOW radar, associated with
the SA -3. (S)
approaches from Austria and Yugoslavia. SIDE NET,
the best Soviet heightfinder radar, is deployed at
most GCI sites.
3. Training
a. Airforce
Pilots for the Hungarian Air Force are recruited
mainly from the paramilitary organization Hun-
garian National Defense Federation (MHSz).
Although this organization is voluntary and part
time, its contribution to the military is substantial.
In addition to the premilitary training given the
Hungarian youth, the MHSz also holds refresher
courses for reserve officers.
Suitable students are selected for military train-
ing at 17 and begin with a 6 -week preparatory
flying course at Bekescsaba airfield in the south-
east. Only about 30 out of every 1,000 students
are selected for this course. After the preparatory
flying course, the air force candidates spend another
year in the MHSz while completing school. They
are then given an air force examination to determine
if they are mature enough to handle jet aircraft.
The first year of flight training takes place at
Szolnok in the Czechoslovak -built MAYA (L-29)
and possibly the Soviet -built MIDGET (U- MiG -15
The next 3 years are spent at the Krasnodar Flight
School Center in t> U.S.S.R., where training con-
tinues in the U- MiG -15, L -29, and FxEsco (MiG -17).
Upon completion of the training in the U.S.S.R.,
the student returns to Szolnok for 2 years of training
in the FAGOT MiG -15 MONGOL (U- MiG -21), and
FISHBED MiG -21) At the end of the 6 -year flight
training period, which includes studies in politics,
the Russian language, and a number of technical
subjects, the graduate is assigned to an operational
unit. Pilot flight time is low by U.S. s"
Operational training exercises are held throughout
the year, sometimes involving Soviet and other
Warsaw Pact forces.
b. Surface -to -air missile forces
Surface -to -air missile training is based on Soviet
doctrine and training methods. There is a SAM
training school located near Budapest. Selected
graduates attend Soviet technical schools for ad-
vanced training, and SAM units travel to the
U.S.S.R. on a scheduled basis for live- firing exer-
cises. SAM units maintain proficiency through on-
site training in Hungary and participation in joint
air defense exercises.
4. Logistics
a. Air force
The Hungarian Air Force logistics system is pat-
terned after that used by the Soviet Air Force. The
Chief of Rear Services is responsible for air base
support services and the procurement and issue
of aviation technical supplies. Through the deputy
commanders for rear services of the air regiments,
he supervises the housekeeping and supply tasks
necessary to support sustained flight operations.
Hungary has a well developed industrial base and
produces most of the common -use items required
by the air iorce, but it is dependent on the Soviet
Union for aircraft, engines, spare parts, and other
aviation technical supplies.
Flight line maintenance, periodic inspections, anal
all but major repairs of combat aircraft are accom-
plished at airfields by the regimental maintenance
organizations. Major repair work and overhauls
of aircraft are performed at the Budapest /Tokol
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Aircraft Repair Base. Aircraft engines have re-
portedly been sent to the aircraft engine repair
plant in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, for overhaul.
The Hungarian Air Force logistics system ade-
quately supports the flight- combat training pro-
grams and other scheduled flying operations in
peacetime. The quantities of aviation technical
supplies held in Hungarian air depots are probably
only adequate to support wartime combat opera-
tions for a short period of time. The Hungarian
Air Force would consequently be incapable of sup-
porting sustained combat `lying operations without
Soviet assistance.
6. Surface -to -air missile forces
SAM missiles, equipment, and special parts are
imported from the Soviet Union. General purpose
equipment is probably manufactured domestically.
There are five Hungarian SAM support facilities
two at Budapest and one each at Dunafoldvar,
Miskolc, and Nyiregyhaza) and five Soviet SAM
support facilites (at Debrecen, Mor, Papa, Szekes-
fehervar, and Veszprem).
E. Militarized security forces
Paramilitary forces consist of the Frontier Guard
(HO) and the Internal Security Troops BKH
also known as the Interior Troops �both of which
are normally under some form of joint subordina-
tion to the Ministries of Interior and Defense. These
forces are organized into military -type formations
and are equipped primarily with light infantry
weapons. Training consists mainly of basic infantry
fundamentals plus instruction in the particular se-
curity functions of the respective force. In the as-
signing of personnel to the security forces, political
reliability figures strongly. Political indoctrination
is given special and continual emphasis. In war-
time, units of the Frontier Guard and the Interior
Troops could be assigned to ground field com-
mands. (C)
1. Frontier Guard (C)
The Frontier Guard has an estimated strength
of 20,000 men. Officer personnel are provided by
the Ministry of Interior and all are staff officers
of the III Main Group Directorate AVH the
secret or political police. Recruits are obtained
f.oin the annual military draft for tours of duty
of 24 months. Rank designations and uniforms are
identical with those of the ground and naval forces
16
except for a distinctive green Frontier Guard
insignia.
The Frontier Guard is responsible for guarding
the conntry's borders. To prevent illegal border
crossings and insure the security of lines of com-
munication in the border zone, about 19 battalions
are deployed in 11 district commands along the
frontiers, with the stronger units along the Austria
and Yugoslavia borders. A rive: section comprised
of about 100 men and 25 ports security boats op-
erates principally along the 85 -mile section of the
Danube bordering Czechoslovakia. Additional units
consist of an independent battalion at Gyor and
several independent engineering battalions in the
interior. All are subordinate to the guard head-
quarters in Budapest.
Recruits receive approximately 3 months of basic
training in infantry and frontier security. Mortar
training is given to a few men �only the district
reseri forces have mortars. District commands
have their own noncommissioned officer training
school, and most do their own recruit training. Per-
manent training establishments include the Frontier
Guard Signal School, Adyliget; the Equestrian
School, Kiskunhalas; and the Dog handlers Train-
ing School, Dunakeszi.
The guard is equipped with rifles, submachine
guns, light and heavy machineguns, handgrenades,
mortars, and antitank weapons. Transportation con-
sists of patrol boats, helicopters, trucks, staff cars,
buses, motorcycles with sidecars, and horses. Fron-
tier Guard engineer units are equipped to remove
and plant mines and to maintain border obstacles.
2. Internal Security Troops (S)
The Hungarian Internal Security Troops BKH
commonly called the Interior Troops, constitute
the regime's most loyal and reliable troop force.
The force was established by the Communists soon
after they first took power in Hungary. Personnel
strength is about 15,000, including both career and
conscript personnel. The conscripts serve 24 -month
tours of active service. Commissioned officers are
provided from the secret police AVH) Rank
designations and uniforms are identical to those
of the ground forces.
The primary ,nission of the Interior Troops is
to guard the regime. They are responsible for the
protection of the economic, political, and social
order of the state. Specific duties include guarding
sensitive installations and lines of communication,
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traffic control, detection and apprehension of
foreign agents and dissident citizens, riot control,
and supporting other military and civil police and
the AVH.
The Interior Troops are organized into district
type commands with units of company to regi-
mental size stationed at strategic locations within
the districts. Two regiments comprised of from
1,000 to 1,500 men each, 13 battalions of 900 men
each, and a 500 -man headquarters unit have been
identified to date.
Recruits receive months of basic training in
weapons, small unit tactics, and special security
procedures. Political indoctrination and training
are given special emphasis. Field training of troops
has been noted in the past in conjunction with
ground forces exercises.
The troops are armed primarily with light in-
fantry weapons. Regimental weapons companies
have antitank guns, heavy machineguns, and mor-
tars. One of the regiments is reportedly equipped
with water cannon similar to those used in East
Berlin.
17
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GLOSSARY (U /O i7
ABBREVIA'r'
FOREIGN
ENGLISH
AVH
Allamvedelmi Hatosag
State Security Authority
BKH
Bebo Karhatalom
Internal Security Troops Interior
Troops)
HO
Hatarorseg
Frontier Guard
HSWP
Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
KISz
Kommunista 1 f jusaM Szovetseg
Communist Youth League
MAHART
Magyar Hajozasi Reszvenytarsasag
Hungarian Shipp.?ng Joint Stock
Company
AALEV
Magyar Legikozlekedesi Vallalat
Hungarian Airlines
MHSz
Magyar Honvedelmi Szoveiseg
Hungarian National Defense Fed-
eration
MN
Magyar Nephadsereg
Hungarian Pccple's Army
OLP
Orszagos Legvedelmi Parancsnoksag
National Air Defense Command
PVOP
Polgari Vedelem Orszagos Parancsnok-
National Headquarters for Civil
saga
Defense
PVO Strany
Protivo Vozdushnaya Oborona Strany
Air Defense of the Country
(Russian)
SAFH
Soviet Air Forces, Hungary
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Places and Features Referred to iri this Chapter (U /OU)
SELECTED MILITARY AIRFIELDS
Budapest /Tokol 47 21 18 59
Debrecen 47 29 21 37
Kiskunlachaza .17 11 19 05
K un m adaras 47 23 20 47
Papa 47 22 17 30
Sarmellek 46 41 17 10
S E:C R E: I'
SEC1;E-r
19
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COORDINATES
W.
'E.
Adyliget (sec of Budapest)
47 33
18 56
Baja
46 11
18 58
Balaton (l ake)
46 50
17 45
Balatonfiired
46 57
17 53
Budapest
47 30
19 05
Cegled
47 10
19 48
Danube stream)
45 20
29 40
Debrecen
47 32
?1 38
Dunafoldvar
46 48
l8 56
Dunakeszi
47 38
19 08
Esztergo m
47 48
18 45
Gy6 r
47 41
17 38
Keeskemet
46 54
19 42
Kiskunha las
46 26
19 30
Mindszent
46 32
20 12
Miskolc
48 Of',
20 47
Mor
47 23
18 12
N yi regyhaza
47 57
21 43
Papa
47 20
17 28
Plovdiv, Bulgaria
42 09
24 45
Retsag
47 56
19 08
Szekesfehery ar
47 12
18 25
Szentendre
47 40
19 05
Szentes
46 39
20 16
Szolnok
47 11
20 12
Taszar
46 22
17 55
Tisza (stream)
47 30
20 40
Cjpest
47 34
19 05
Vac
47 47
19 08
Veszpre m
47 06
17 55
Voronezh, U.S.S.R
51 38
39 12
SELECTED MILITARY AIRFIELDS
Budapest /Tokol 47 21 18 59
Debrecen 47 29 21 37
Kiskunlachaza .17 11 19 05
K un m adaras 47 23 20 47
Papa 47 22 17 30
Sarmellek 46 41 17 10
S E:C R E: I'
SEC1;E-r
19
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