NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 13A; EAST GERMANY; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1
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SECRET
i3A /GS /CP
East Germany
August 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
C
SECRET
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NX
WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret

MUUZT61Tl :II1761ZAZ01 1I1I:7bI:l[: wo]F_ l 1S1iftll rl :itI1I1Y41I11I11111KISI
{:LAI� RA1. SL ifs EA CHAPTERS
O t I III I'M )1 i I I Integrated perspective of
the subject country F Chronology Area Brief
Summary Map
I i 11. %O C I I 'I 1 Social structure Population
Labor Health hiving conditions Social
problems Religion Education Public in-
formation Artistic expression
(,O I�ii\N.F I A \1) POI.1T1Us Political evo
lution of the state Governmental strength and
stability 0 Structure and function Political
dynamics National policies Threats to sta-
bility The police intelligence and security
Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capa-
bilities
I'11I� 1�.( ()\()111 Appraisal of the economy Its
structure� agriculture, fisheries forestry fuels and
power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and
construction Domestic trade heonomic policy
and development International economic re-'a-
tions
0
I R 1 \ti1'OIt1 1I(}\ 1 \1)
TE.I.FC ONI\It'\IC A'lION Appraisal of syst ^ms
Strategic mobility Railroads Highways
Inland waterways Pipelines Ports Merchant
mas:ne Civil air Airfields The telecom
system
\I1I.IT -1111 C YOC RA1'1I1' Topography and cli-
mate Military geographic regions Strategic
areas Internal routes Approaches: land, sea, air
114 \I ED F ORCE S The defense establishment
Joint activities Cround forces Naval
forces Air forces Paramilitary
SCIENCE Level of scientific advancement
Organization, planning, and financing of re-
search Scientific education, manpower, and
facilities Major research fields
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East
G W-1
I&A EJUMAN
A Place in the San t
Linking the Old with the New
Institution of the New Society
Lifestyle: Politicul and Economic
The Regime and the People
Big Brother and Orhvrs
Two Germanies or Oise?
Chronology I8
Area Brief 2
Summary Map follows 23
This Country Profile uws prepared for the NIS by
the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was
substantially completed by May 1973.
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A Place in the Sun (c)
For years the Leipzig Industrial Fair has symbolized
East Germany's striving for international stature.
some fumbling by Bonn in the Middle East broke the
ice. Iraq established formal ties with East Germany,
and then a number of other Afro -Asian states followed
suit. When West Germany's Government, led by
Chancellor Willy Brandt, concluded the reconciliation
treaty with East Germany in late 1972, broad inter-
national diplomatic acknowledgement of East Ger-
many began to follow in due course. (U /OU)
In its campaign for international acceptance, East
Germany has held one major trump card: it is an in-
tegral part of the German Problem, a major source of
cols' war tensions which stood as a massive stumbling
block to the realization of an enduring peace in
Europe. It would be exceedingly difficult, if not im-
possible, to resolve the problem without Western
acceptance of East Germany. Over the years East Ger-
many and its Soviet sponsor have reinforced that point
by various means, including the instigation of periodic
crises over control of the movement of goods and per-
sons across the autobahn between West Germany and
West Berlin. The aura of East -West confrontation
there was finally cleared away by the laboriously
negotiated Berlin Agreement of 1971, which
guaranteed access to isolated West Berlin. In subse-
quent accords West Germany formally conceded the
existence of an East German state, albeit as a part of
one German nation. East German political theorists
make no such proviso; they claim a completely
sovereign existence for their country, a claim which has
been unwavering under the late Walter Ulbricht and
his successor Erich Honecker. (U /OU)
Well before the East German regime gained non
Communist acceptance abroad it began to win the
grudging respect, if not the support, of the native pop-
ulation Along the way, the regime was favored by an
assortment of traditions that allowed for a measure of
popular approval. By and large, the populace found
nothing strange in a prideful nationalism, a strong
socialist movement, a highly developed social welfare
system, a Prussianized view of state dominance and
citizen conformity, and a certain scorn for those Ger-
mans living to the west or south. The authorities need-
ed only to exploit this endowment. (C)
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With the conclusion in late 1972 of the General
Relations Treaty between the two German states, the
Federal Republic of Germany gave its blessing to hav-
ing its friends and allies proceed at their own pace to
establish relations with the German Democratic
Republic. The dam burst, and a literal wave of new
diplomatic relationships engulfed the East Germans.
This, coupled with its simultaneous entry into the
world of international organizations, has brought the
CDR the acceptance which it vainly sought since its
founding. (U /OU)
The demise of Nazi Germany left the Third Reich
dismembered. Some of its eastern area was transferred
to Polish or Soviet rule. The old capital city of Berlin
was separated into Sectors under Four -Power ad-
ministration. The remaining German territory was
divided into zones of occupation �later merged, in the
West, to create the Federal Republic of Germany. The
4`
Soviets countered by declaring East Germany a
separate state. To Bonn and its allies the move was a
hypocritical attempt to provide a facade for continued
manipulation of East Germany by Moscow. (U /OU)
At that time, in the wake of World War II, East Ger-
man assertions of separate statehood and sovereign
status clearly lacked credibility. The Germany of re-
cent memory had been a large, independent.
prosperous, and powerful nation. The new East Ger-
many, by contrast, was a mere fragment of that
territory, economically deprived and dependent on
Moscow's mailed fist for its political muscle. After more
than two decades, the expenditure of mountainous ef-
fort, and continued Soviet backing, East Germany still
stands �and now stands much stronger. (U /OU)
The international acceptance East Germany has
gained has not come easily. For 20 years West Ger-
many, with the aid of the Western Allies and by
weight of its own political dynamics and surging
economic strength, kept its eastern neighbor isolated
r�
from the non Communist world. East Germany tried
with dogged determination to win favors where it
could �by exchanging trade missions with emerging
African states, for example �but its successes were few.
Finally, in April 1969, East Berlin's persistence and
For years the Leipzig Industrial Fair has symbolized
East Germany's striving for international stature.
some fumbling by Bonn in the Middle East broke the
ice. Iraq established formal ties with East Germany,
and then a number of other Afro -Asian states followed
suit. When West Germany's Government, led by
Chancellor Willy Brandt, concluded the reconciliation
treaty with East Germany in late 1972, broad inter-
national diplomatic acknowledgement of East Ger-
many began to follow in due course. (U /OU)
In its campaign for international acceptance, East
Germany has held one major trump card: it is an in-
tegral part of the German Problem, a major source of
cols' war tensions which stood as a massive stumbling
block to the realization of an enduring peace in
Europe. It would be exceedingly difficult, if not im-
possible, to resolve the problem without Western
acceptance of East Germany. Over the years East Ger-
many and its Soviet sponsor have reinforced that point
by various means, including the instigation of periodic
crises over control of the movement of goods and per-
sons across the autobahn between West Germany and
West Berlin. The aura of East -West confrontation
there was finally cleared away by the laboriously
negotiated Berlin Agreement of 1971, which
guaranteed access to isolated West Berlin. In subse-
quent accords West Germany formally conceded the
existence of an East German state, albeit as a part of
one German nation. East German political theorists
make no such proviso; they claim a completely
sovereign existence for their country, a claim which has
been unwavering under the late Walter Ulbricht and
his successor Erich Honecker. (U /OU)
Well before the East German regime gained non
Communist acceptance abroad it began to win the
grudging respect, if not the support, of the native pop-
ulation Along the way, the regime was favored by an
assortment of traditions that allowed for a measure of
popular approval. By and large, the populace found
nothing strange in a prideful nationalism, a strong
socialist movement, a highly developed social welfare
system, a Prussianized view of state dominance and
citizen conformity, and a certain scorn for those Ger-
mans living to the west or south. The authorities need-
ed only to exploit this endowment. (C)
t'
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The regime has also attempted to create its own
tradition. The new rulers first argued their claim to
govern on the basis of historical determinism. Accord-
ing to Marxist Leninist doctrine, a socialist worker's
state was destined to replace the capitalist system on
German soil. It was asserted that this progression had
already been sanctified by Soviet success, which
Walter Ulbricht, a one time "associate" of Lenin, was
best able to interpret. (U /OU)
While this may have satisfied true believers in the
Communist faith, it failed to generate mass loyalty.
Therefore a more pragmatic line was introduced and
emphasized: the contention that the East German
system works, purportedly in ways even superior to
those of rival West Germany. (U /OU)
The government in East Berlin boasts in particular
of high standards in such fields as education, welfare,
health care, and in the dramatic arts. It impresses on
the young that East Germany is a "land of oppor-
tunity" where aptitude and drive �not to mention
political conformity �are likely to bring rapid ad-
vancement. It asks the general public to take pride in
an "economic miracle" that has made East Germany
the ninth ranked world industrial power and provided
it with the highest standard of living in the Soviet
camp. It sports the trappings of a full fledged nation,
including an army to patrol its borders and a civil air-
line and merchant fleet to show its flag abroad. The
regime also has working in its favor, of course, the fact
that it has endured �far longer, in fact, than did either
the Weimar Republic or the Third Reich. (U /OU)
The overall extent to which the rulers of the new
"worker- peasant state" have won popular support is
difficult to estimate. The regime has its warm
adherents (doubtless a minority) and its outright op-
ponents (probably an even smaller minority). There
remains the bulk of the citizenry, among whom an un-
emotional conformity seems to be the rule. Life
evidently goes forward in a familiar pattern for most
East Germans, who are concerned with things other
than politics. Privately they may find the regime doc-
trinaire, niggling, and clumsy; publicly they may drop
a critical remark. Yet, resistance appears futile. The
regime's capacity for coercion and willingness to use it,
the Soviets' determination to maintain a firm grip on
Eastern Europe (as exemplified in East Germany itself
in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in
1968), and the West's caution about intervening
directly in the East are factors that would stifle the
hopes of any would -be resistance leader. (C)
i
1
Linking the Old with the New (c)
On the whole, the history of East Germany has been
short and inglorious. Deriving from that sector of Ger-
many assigned Soviet occupation forces by World War
II agreements, East Germany grew up in the Russian
image as a well regimented state in which human
beings conformed to the wishes of the Communist par-
ty. Incorporated formally in 1949 as the German
Democratic Republic, East Germany under the
much -hated Walter Ulbricht remained an inter-
national pariah for much of the cold war era.
Unilateral grants of sovereignty by Moscow were effec-
tively countered by Bonn's efforts to isolate the regime.
Internally, there was a short -lived popular uprising in
1953, and in succeeding years many East Germans
"voted with their feet �as President John F. Kennedy
put it �until the construction of the Berlin wall in
August 1961 closed the last escape route.
In the decade following the erection of the infamous
wall, East Germany inched forward in economic and
political stature, winning a grudging respect from the
populace and a modicum of international acceptance.
In May 1971, Ulbricht �who had come to place his
wisdom above that of the Soviet masters retired" as
party leader and long -time party stalwart Erich
Honecker was installed in his stead. During the early
months of Honecker's efficient but colorless rule, he
endorsed the Four -Power negotiations then in progress
on the status of Berlin, thus paving the way for the in-
ter- German General Relations Treaty establishing the
GDR as a member of the international community.
Despite humble beginnings and a deprived up-
i,ringing, East Germany had reached maturity.
East Germany's rulers, as if fearful that their hold is
more tenuous than it appears to be, have been expert
at invoking past spirits and building new illusions in
their own behalf. A regime specialty is to push the East
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Berlin's ancient Maiden's Bridge;
SED Central Committee offices are at left
and apartments on the right, with the
State Council and Foreign Ministry
buildings in the rear.
German story back in time so as to make current GDR is validated.
happenings seem the natural outcome of prior events. In tangible ways East Germany also links itself with
History is reinterpreted; in East German texts the older times. It uses the black, red, and gold flag of
"class struggle" is rampant, and "heroes of the Weimar, but with the hammer and compass state sym-
people" are many. Ultimately the "triumph of the bol affixerl. Its rail system is still called the Deutsche
proletariat" is assured, and thus the legitimacy of the Reichsbahn. Statues of the Prussian generals
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Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bluecher, and Yorck are
again in place on broad, tree -lined Unter den Linden,
the Fifth Avenue of prewar Berlin. Goethe, despite his
aristocratic tendencies, is made to seem a democratic
progressive and thus a progenitor of the East German
ethos. The greatest prize of all is Berlin, long promoted
as "the capital of the German Democratic Republic.
For years, East German autborities intimated that it
was only a matter of time before they took over the en-
tire city, but with the General Relations Treaty they
finally admitted the right of West Germany to repre-
sent West Berlin. Nevertheless, they seek whatever ad-
vantage they can derive from the fact that their capita!
is the city �part of it, at least �that throughout Ger-
many's history as a nation -state was its political and
cultural heart and soul.
Germany, centrally located as it is, has served as the
crossroads of Europe. Historically it has been a
battleground and an arena of conflicting cultures.
Primarily Western- oriented, it also has displayed a
fascination with the East. It has preyed upon its
neighbors and in turn has been a prey. That Germany
should now exist in two parts is not extraordinary.
More often than not it has existed in a state of dis-
unity.
The territory which became East Germany is
situated principally on the central North European
Plain and is dominated by Berlin, a focus of land and
inland waterway transportation routes. Generally
scenic though not spectacularly so, the country ranges
in nortb -south perspective from flat to gently rolling
terrain. Only in the south and southwest is there high
S ground with elevations up to 3,300 feet. A rail
i network, so extensive as to be likened to a national
trolley, constitutes the backbone of the transportation
system. Good highways, lengthy canals, and midern
oil and gas pipelines help speed traffic. The two great
navigable rivers, the Elbe and the Oder, lead respec-
tively to the ports of Hamburg, West Germany and
Szczecin, Poland. Cool to cold winters, mild summers,
prevalent cloudiness, and frequent precipitation con-
stitute the weather pattern. Generally variable within
i fairly narrow limits, the weather at times turns suf-
ficiently capricious to disrupt crop growing, an
endeavor k.lready beset by soils low in fertility. The
subsurface endowment primarily brown coal,
potash, sulfur, fluorspar, natural gas, and uranium �is
insufficient to maintain an advanced industrial socie-
ty, and East Germany must look largely to Soviet
suppliers to meet its energy and raw material re-
quirements.
Looking outward, East Germany finds its setting to
be equally bleak. To the west stands a powerful Ger-
man rival. To the south lies a potentially unstable
Czechoslovakia, and to the east a proud, nationalistic
Poland comes between East Germany and its patron,
the U.S.S.R. As the westernmost of the European
Communist states, East Germany has developed a
"front line" mentality. Party functionaries have
visualized themselves as members of an outpost
holding back the tide of "Western imperialism." On a
broader front, regime leaders have at times displayed
suspicions of all their neighbors and performed as if
East Germany were virtually beleaguered. In a sense it
is. East Germany is smaller in area than any adjoining
state and surpasses only Czechoslovakia in population.
In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that
East German authorities suffer some sense of inse-
curity.
Within a compact area of almost 42,000 square
miles there exists a population of slightly over 17
million, a figure that has remained virtually static
since the building of the Berlin wall. The people are a
Nordic- Slavic blend, and thus exhibit the tall, blond,
blue -eyed and short, brunet, brown -eyed
characteristics of both groups. East German society is
homogeneous, however, being sc 99% Germanic in
makeup and outlook. Only a tiny Slavic minority, the
Sorbs, form an exception. Even they are highly in-
tegrated into the Germanic lifestyle, despite the
government's attempts to portray them as a treasured
minority.
The regime has largely destratified the old Germanic
society, eliminating the former ruling class and bring-
ing the middle class under control by economic stric-
tures. The working class in theory dominates the
system, but in practice Communist authorities
somewhat distrustful of worker loyalties �speak for
it. Thus, a party managerial elite constitutes the
true dominant class.
The old Teutonic family portrait of the iron willed
father, domestic servant mother, and submissive
children has also been drastically altered. Women
have been granted equal rights with men, and are no
longer kitchen bound. Nurseries, schools, and youth
groups are heavily responsible for child- rearing by
"approved methods." Originally unpopular, such
policies have been increasingly accepted by a populace
which with the passage of years has perceived that it
had little choice but to come to terms with the regime.
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The regime, during its two -plus decades of existence,
has busied itself domestically with reshaping old Ger-
man institutions into a new socialist establishment. It
has been fortunate in that some of its reforms have
proven popular and thereby established a rapport
between ruler and ruled. It has also dispensed
medicine bitter enough to antagonize its citizenry.
a r. k Throughout, the guiding principle has continued to be R
Institution of t h e Ne d Soci the exaltation of the interest of the state. The populace
has had to adjust accordingly.
The determination of the government to have its
way was most strikingly demonstrated in the spring of
1960 when it unleased a massive campaign to com-
y
y
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plete the collectivization of agriculture, Many farmers
resisted as best they could, only to be overwhelmed in
a matter of weeks by party organizers fanatically
devoted to the dictates of political doctrine and
socialist agricultural science. Defeat bred apathy
among the peasantry, which in turn contributed to a
downturn in agricultural production. Typically, the
regime persevered and through the application of
threats and incentives inspired East German farmers to
outproduce their counterparts in neighboring East
European countries. In human terms, the happy, smil-
ing peasantry portrayed by the regime is doubtless a
great distortion, but still the original bitterness seems
to have dissipated and the collectivized farmer ap-
parently finds life tolerable.
By contrast with the equivocal result in the
agricultural sector, educational reform has definitely
bolstered the regime. By and large, the changes under-
taken have proven acceptable, and the credit goes to
the government. The old European class system, which
permits the advancement of only a small elite, has
largely been scrapped, and a mass schooling system
has been substituted. The formerly submerged levels of
society may now achieve according to their ability,
and their political reliability. Principal emphasis is
placed on vocational training and on socialist indoc-
trination, which is pervasive. Practical work programs
in the factory or on the farm are emphasized as an
educational adjunct even for those hoping to enter the
professions. This factor of socialist learning is equaled
in unpopularity by one other: as in other areas, also in
education and science there persists the strong odor of
Soviet dominance and exploitation. Russian is given
first prior;ty in the study of foreign languages.
Research projects are frequently oriented toward
Soviet needs. Soviet dogma, as it extends into the
physical and natural sciences, is stressed. In the
classroom, life in the West is presented in an extremely
restricted and highly colored format, thus reinforcing
the mental isolation of the student. He may opt not to
believe what the teacher imparts, but still he will be
able to acquire precious little ground on which to build
a counterbelief.
In the instance of at least one institution, the
military, the regime has sought popular acceptance by
retaining rather than abandoning "the best of the old
tradition." The Volksarmee presents with its
goose- stepping troopers, neat formations, rumbling
tanks, and heavy Germanic marches a remarkable
resemblance to the forces of former times. Aspects of
6
socialist modernity also creep in, however, including:
the shaping of an officer corps representative of the
party and the proletariat, the lowering of caste barriers
between officers and men, and the reordering of Ger-
man military history to highlight "revolutionary
episodes."
East Germany nurtures its army as a prominent sym-
bol of the integrity of the state. Totaling almost 120,-
000 men, the East German armed force exceeds in
numbers only those of Hungary and Albania in
Eastern Europe. However, relative to population it has
almost as many men in uniform as West Germany.
The army is clearly subordinate to the civilian officials
c.f the state and is virtually incapable of exercising
political influence. In. addition, there is doubt about its
combat reliability. Ultimately the question that has
hung over the Volksarmee is the same as that which
has haunted its West German counterpart: "Would
German fight German The proposition may seem
highly theoretical, but still it exists. And, in the East
German case, any answer other than a strong af-
firmative bespeaks doubt about the endurance of
the state.
Alert to this frailty, the regime continually
seeks �with some success �to bolster the morale of the
army. Plaudits are showered on it by the government,
and extensive favorable coverage is g in the media.
Military parades are held with considerable frequency
in East Berlin even though they violate tl: a terms of
Four -Power Agreements on the status of the city. In
addition the armed forces increasingly have been per-
mitted to play a more prominent role in Warsaw Pact
exercises, though hardly one that challenges the reality
of Soviet dominance in Pact affairs. The Volksarmee
itself is molded along the lines of the Soviet forces, is
supplied chiefly with Soviet equipment, and, quite
naturally, is subject to considerable Soviet influence in
its day -to -day operations. The approximately
333,000 -man Soviet component euphemistically
known as "the friends maintains a low public
profile in East Germany, but by its presence helps in-
sure the life of the regime.
From 1945 onward, the Protestant Evangelical
Church has represented the longest lived holdout
against the dominance of the state. The church initial-
ly sought to operate on the basis of one Germany, in
principle a denial of East Germany's right to exist. The
church was also identified with the old society,
whereas to many pastors the new secular authorities
were the representatives of "godless Marxism." In
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former times the church had had a say in the running
of the state. Now the state encroached on the church.
In the name of "socialist morality" (i.e., whatever
fosters socialism is moral), Walter Ulbricht proclaimed
the "Ten Commandments of Socialism." The state
pressed its own forms for baptism, confirmation, and
marriage, and discouraged religious education.
Recalcitrant clergymen were browbeaten, or even
jailed.
Presently, after years of feuding, church and state
have learned to coexist, although not always comfort-
ably. The regime continues to grant small subsidies as
in pre -1945 days, tolerates religious training, and per-
mits pastors to speak out against state sponsored
atheism but not against the socialist state itself. For its
part, the church has forsworn open political opposition
and, under extreme pressure, broken ties with the
church in West Germany. Viewing these
developments, some observers have seen the regime
trying for a genuine modus vivendi, but the situation
appears to be more a case of the state, by cat -and-
mouse tactics, turning the church into a cooperative
subject.
Overall, the regime has been more watchful of its in-
tellectuals than its churchmen. Religious expression
inay be dismissed as anachronistic and irrelevant;
cultural expression is officially regarded as a modern
day tool for upholding and exemplifying the state.
From time to time, as in the early Honecker days, the
regime deems it wise to relax its hold, but normally in-
tellectual dissent is rooted out far more quickly in in-
secure East Germany than in other, better established
East European states.
The regime has failed rather woefully in enlisting
the full cooperation of its most innovative people. It
has permitted them to travel abroad, provided them
with social clubs, showered them with honors, and
made them financially secure. Yet, it has not seen fit to
supply the degree of freedom that even avowed Marx-
ists demand. Some of the most able of German Marx-
ists� Bertolt Brecht and Arnold Zweig, for ex-
ample �chose to reside in East Germany following
World War II, and by their presence lent prestige to
the regime. The situation soured, however, as many of
the great talents rebelled or dried up, and few
replacements were found in the younger generation.
To some extent the collective excellence of orchestral
and theatrical ensembles has filled the void, but in-
dividual genius remains a dear commodity in a land of
group conformity.
Lifestyle: Political and Economic (c)
As a political entity, East Germany is the product of
interlocking wills: that of German Communists to
fulfill their destiny as set down by the patron saints
Marx and Engels and that of the Soviet Union to build
for itself the broadest possible buffer zone in central
Europe. The event that historically was supposed to
bring forth a German Communist state �a violent
class revolution �never materialized. This omission
constitutes a serious departure from orthodoxy for a
highly doctrinaire regime. A successful revolution,
however, was never an immediate prospect for strug-
gling members of the radical left, who ultimately found
in Russian expansionisia their instrument for victory.
The Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the
direct antecedent of the East German ruling party, was
founded at the end of World War I following a split of
the Socialist Party. True to Lenin's vision, it sought by
all available means to promote an upheaval on Ger-
man soil as the precondition for revolution everywhere.
At the time of Hitler's accession to power in 1933, the
KPD had 300,000 members, a total second only to the
Soviet party in the Comintern. Over the next 12 years
Nazi persecution and party factional strife thinned the
ranks and hardened the survivors in their determina-
tion to build a new German state following World War
II.
Communist rule in the Soviet Zone of Germanv
commenced on 30 April 1945 when the "Ulbricht
group" arrived from Moscow. Operating under Soviet
aegis, it offered the semblance of a democratic system.
As the cold war came on and the time for mollifying
the Wcst passed, a new reality appeared: an
authoritarian state patterned on the Soviet model and
subservient to it. All power was lodged in the Socialist
Unity Party (SED), the party formed by the forced
merger in April 1946 of the Social Democratic Party
7
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i
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into the KPI).
From the beginning, the SED was largely the tool of
Waiter Ulbricht, and he endowed the party with his
principies: rigid organization, strict discipline, doc-
trinal orthodoxy, and loyuity to Moscow. Any devia-
tion from these norms was a privilege reserved for
Ulbricht himself. Having faced many perils since his
youthful days as a KPD functionary� including the
menace of Stalin's displeasure during his Moscow
years (193 845)--he had become practiced at political
survival. He set Lle public example as the well in.
funned, painstaking, and puritanical leader who work-
ed almost ceaselessly for the new state. In private- he
manipulated the party machinery ruthlessly to his own
advantage. Overall, he lilted to be considered the
father of his country, but his inability to rise above the
image of a petty tyrant more often made him an object
of ridicule.
Under Ulbricht, the party, by its own accounts,
guided the state from one triumph to another in a
quest fur excellence. At its founding in 1949 the self
styled German Democratic Republic was declared to
be a peoples denrocmcy at an intermediate stage, aim-
ing to become a genuine socialist state. By 1952 the
groundwork was being laid for a socialist order, and as
of 1958 the groundwork had been completed. In 1968
a new constitution hailed the achievement of the
socialist state and assumed its continuing perfectiun.
Thoughout, important anniversaries were --as they
continue to be� celebrated by the party with
overflowing self praise for its achievements in building
"the first German peace state."
Su outpourings over the years doubtless have con
stitutiJ an attempt on the part of regime leaders to in-
spire confidence in the durability of the party and the
system that it has wrought. The doctrinaire dullness of
the exaggerated claims and constant sloganeering,
however, has served more as a reminder of the nature
of the leadership itself. it fia:< been the burden of the
party to have produced few tan men of the type who
inspire popular trust. What has been produced has
been a coterie of grey -faced bureaucrats, solemn of
mien, and joyless of mood, who operate in the old :;er-
man paternalistic tradition of "papa knows best." As
the chosen keepers and interpreters of Marxist truth,
they exhibit an elitist mentality and a consegttent dis
trust for popular feeling. On occasion they pose as true
democrats and friend: 4 the people, but conformity is
what they demand and expect to receive from those
below.
The success of political regimentation as practiced
by tier SED has rested to a considerable .1egree on a
commonalty of view and a uniformity of purpose
among the top members of the party. Ulbricht was for
years the personification of the unity of the Socialist
Unity Pary. Fealty to the mast( was the price of
political success. There were thuse who plotted his
demise as party leader, but so firm was his grip and so
favorable the fates that even the workers' uprising of
17 June 1933 failed to dislodge him. Eventually he was
eased out, but even then the changeover to Erich
Honecker in 1971 .vas carried through smoothly. Like
Ulbricht, Honecker is experienced and artful, the sort
of man not likely to be taken by suprise by his foes.
As is usually the ease with Communist governments,
the East German regime has outfitted itself with
Western -style democratic finery. One of its showier
items is a multiparty system which allows four ad-
ditional parties representing Christian, Liberal,
agrarian, and reformed Nazi elements membership
in parliament. These parties ptirport to be counterparts
of similar groups in West Germany, but in reality they
are largely paper organizations. Each, of course, is
regime controlled and lacks any stature of its own. In
similar fashion, so- called mass organizations such as
the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB)
and the Free German Youth (.I:DJ) operate under
direct SED guidance and serve both as listening posts
for popular opin and as conduits for regime edicts.
Finally, the regime groups together the political parties
and the more important mass organizations into a
semisaered body known as the National Front, which
claims to represent the views of the populatic.. as a
whole.
In East Cennany the indbipensable political element
is solidarity. An election iq a referendum for or against
the system. Candidates are hand chosen, and their
speeches are carefully tailored. Subsequent discussion
is so arranged as virt.tally to be scripted. The campaign
audience is well aware that only its approval is desired.
Social and psychological pressure is applied to
guarantee a massive turnout since a nonvoter is con-
sidered a dissenter. Regularly, 98% to 99% of titre elec-
torate do their duty and overwhelmingly "confirm"
the regime.
The shorn forms of democratic practice in East Ger-
many are complemented by err,; ty vessels of
parliamentarism. The republican institutions
Wpulated in the Constitution serve largely as stage
props around which the SED directs the human
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scenario. Unreal in the Wvstt-rn c�oniext. thi% w1krine
nevertheless represents socialist reality
A readieIg of the East German Constitution gives tilt-
impression that the };nveriirr+.t�rtt constitutes a funs-
tioning parliaincritary s�stent. relrlcte irtt shred
powers and responsiitilities. Twin nndtinientber vx-
ecuti�c heiciies exist: the {..until of St11te, 'kill] Iwven
approximating those� of a cercrncttial president; will.
the Council of N- finistcrs, largely an administrative
force. Both purlxirte dly operate ail the collegial psin i-
ple. In Fact. both carry out orders presented In the
SE'D I'Mitharo, tie tightly krtit body of st�lect part%
authorities vho decide Policy in tie name of the
vurkinx class." Parliament is midoved with
nuiltitudinous dirties. inilist of which have 1wen
dclegattil to the executive, 1110 i1 prttct M has been
relegated to the role of a rolthe�rstarnp. In :uw cast�, the�
(ask of the elceted It-gidator is not to repre-wnt the Itt�a-
Ple to tilt� state� hilt tit( state to tht- people. pnshittt; the
reginiv's nie�ssage and soothing those� trotthled In it
East Gerrttart's eCanoltic� Iz'lartnerc hate ;aced. ;ill([
its a c�onsiderahli� tlet;ree inct a treater challengf. than
111.0 Paced tin tilt- political leader~ We�ighti-d
down b% the ravages rif car and the dic-ta0t�% of
soei:iiisnt, Ihc Ila�e nonethele�+ hitilt a qeu
rtatioti:ilizcd et�onom%. Fed Soviet aplx�titec. etcl
provided a floe of roods to the local cmi 'I hew
accoinplishrueuts �h
and large superior to thww of
the other Eust Eurnpe:itt e i�nked a
weasure of :iclutir�.ition ill the ll'est and its nttn�h :tc
ut".111ing elst� have provided In those leaning toward
Ilu� E:.ist Gt-rown cause a rati01.11le for .tecept:utce
In the itoint -lute poshar \cars, East t ;crania io
Iwwt by severe handicaps irnncated traitsportatitm
DI
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The "People's Chamber' is the Communist parrs rubber stamp parliament.

ti
systems, a paucity of raw materials, a lack of heavy in-
dustry, and an inadequate agricultural base. Heavy
reparations, including the dismantling and shipping of
entire industrial enterprises to the U.S.S.R., completed
the gloomy picture. While the West German economy,
given the impetus of the Marshall Plan, took off and
soared, the East German economy for years remained
grounded. The factors were many, and certainly not
the least of them was the dire labor shortage caused by
the flight of 2.3 million persons prior to the building of
the Berlin wall. Whereas in the West the wall signified
the division of Germany, for the GDR it meant the
start of a new economic life. With escape no longer a
possibility, the people had no choice but to serve East
Germany. The result was what the East Germans
choose to call their very own Wirtschaftswunder
(economic miracle). It clearly is a source of pride, even
to those East Germans unsympathetic to the regime.
The manner in which the regime directed the
10
buildup of the economy was indicative or its ambition
to give East Cermany a claim to a sovereign existence.
Prior to 1945 this sector of Germany had been
somewhat sparsely industrialized �its chief production
being in light industry: chemicals, optics, and preci-
sion instruments. The regime proceeded with a
vengeance to build a broad industrial base in the in-
terest of virtual self sufficiency.
Unfortunately for the East Germans, their economic
aspirations frequently remained just that, as Soviet
needs took priority over their own. By Moscow's lights,
East Germany's role was to be that of a servant of the
Soviet economy. It would be a machineshop turning
out high quality products for the U.S.S.R. and would
provide a ready market, at inflated prices, for Soviet
raw materials. The East Germans over the years have
swallowed hard and accepted Soviet demands, but not
without acts of protest, the most sDectacular of which
was the suicide in December 1965 of Erich Apel, head
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of the State Planning Commission.
Apel's death illustrated a basic fact of East German
life, i.e., that politics dominates economics and that
party chiefs are ascendant over technocrats. Those who
would push the economy ahead in a rational fashion,
even resorting to capitalistic devices, have won a
modicum of freedom, particularly under Honecker,
but the dead hand of party doctrine still lies heavily on
their plans. It is as if the authorities would rather per-
mit economic lag than commit political heresy. Thus
East Germany, advanced though it is by East Euro-
pean standards, has proceeded under severe hand-
icaps. Its industry for years was cut off from impor-
tant scientific and technological advances, and its
markets were restricted by reason of its isolation from
the West. It continues to exist in the straitjacket of a
centralized command economy. Finally, it seems fre-
quently to be stretched to the limit of its resources and
thus susceptible to grievous damage from the errors of
man or the wHms of nature. Acts of God are imper-
missible in socialist planning, but nonetheless wet
summers have ruined crop harvests, and harsh winters
have produced power shortages dire eneugh to disrupt
industry and douse city lights.
Breakdowns are embarrassing, especially in that
they serve as a reminder of grimmer days for the
average man. The late 1940's and much of the 19M's
were times of deprivation. In the 1960's the populace
experienced a steadily increasing standard of liv-
ing, and now, by Communist criteria, a consumer-
oriented society has arrived. Television sets and to a
lesser degree refrigerators and washers are generally
available, though frequently not at a price the average
family can easily afford. Private cars are still luxury,
and housing remains in meager supply despite the best
efforts of the regime. Food shortages are largely a thing
of the past, with the quality and variety of the
offerings both unproved. Some advances also have
been made in supplying high quality clothing, shoes.
and furniture.
As consumers, the Fast Germans are _.ot unlike their
cousins in the West. They yearn increasingly for luxury
items� exotic food, stylish apparel, or even a car, and
work long hours and stint themselves in various ways
to gain their goals. They inwardly rage at authority if
the pmdiict is not available, or, if obtained, it proves
unsatisfactory. The regime is well aware that its
reputation is on the line in the nationalized market
place, and under Honecker in particular it hai made
adjustments to fill the wants of the people.
The Regime and the People (c)
In an era of increasing detente, the regime continues
to prefer that its people live in semi isolation behind
heavily barricaded borders. With few exceptions, only
those certified as politically reliable or economically
expendable are allowed to travel to the West. Those
rash enough to attempt flight across a boundary or
over the Berlin wall are still deemed guilty of a crime
against the state and may be shot by border guards.
Within its political compound, the state constantly ex-
tracts pledges of loyalty from the populace and dis-
penses a rigorous brand of justice. To a large extent,
Western influences are still shut out. Intellectuals are
exhorted to be good servants of the state, mirroring
East German society in their works and combating
,lien ideologies. The People's Army, the state security
forces, and the considerable encampment of Soviet
troops are frequently lauded a a bulwark against the
enemy to the west. Trends towards liberalization
elsewhere in Eastern Europe frequently have elicited
public condemnation from a regime intent on warding
off any infection iii its body politic. Even the Soviet
Union has been open to criticism, at least during the
!alter years of Ulbricht, though seldom under the
g enerall loyal Honecker, who has also seen fit to relax
domestic strictures ever so %lightly.
As compared with earlier yeah, Fast German society
in the 1970's is caught in some -thing less than an iron
vise. On ncrasion. the authorities even relent suf-
ficiently to allow a modicum of free expression. Such
leniency selves to alleviate a buildup of tension..
However, the %ituation is rarely permitted to get out of
hand, and, if signs of di%%Pnt appear, the clamp-t are
likely to be reapplied. Since most potential
tmublemaken apparently either have had their spirits
crushed or have long since fled the country, public of-
ficiate� encouraged by the lead of Honecker �have
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assumed more of an air of trust of the populace.
Most inhabitants of East' Germany on a day -to -day
basis have faced the reality of their existence and have
learned to give the cooperation required of them.
,Many slip into rationalizations to the'effect that life in
East Germany is mare secure, less hectic, and therefore
"nicei than in West Germany. Those who are a part
of the regime or who owe their success to it doubtless
constitute a growing band of state loyalists.
12
There remains, however, an air of negativism among
East Germans, which frequently is more pronounced
than that found elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Fven
allowing for the traditional German tendency to face
life grimly, many observers have commented on the
absence of enthusiasm and spontaneity. There appears
to be a "we versus them' mental set among the pop-
ulace vis -a -vis the authorities. At times individuals are
surprisingly outspoken on such matters as the inability
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to visit West Germany or the unavailability of certain
items at the neighborhood store. Sallies against "the
system" at this level are genera!!, tolerated, but out-
right attacks on the political leadership are taboo and
invite stern retribution.
Other evidences that "a correct socialist attitude"
has not been fully implanted are readily available.
Rock music and long hair, for example, frequently
have been portrayed as tools of capitalistic subversion,
although as of 1973 these "youthful aberrations" were
tolerated. High party officials continue to inveigh
against juvenile delinquency, or "hooliganism" as
they call it. in addition, the regime has acknowledged
alcoholism as a considerable problem. The high in-
cidence of divorce and eRtramarital relations also
suggests that a systematized existence does not
necessarily bring the high standards of morality
preached by the regime.
By and large, however, antiregime and antisocial
behavior is a relatively minor concern in a state in
which regimentation bas become a way of life. Per-
sonal documentation is constantly required, and police
checks are common. Job mobility is severely restricted,
and variant behavior is viewed with suspicion. What
regular authorities fail to detect, police informers may
ferret out. Political offenses, though considerably less
frequent than in earl 't er days, usually result in harsher
punishment than standard crimes, and, one accused,
the individual's chances for acquittal are slim. Then
too, a personal existenee.as such is sharply dimini_shvA
by reason of the fact that an individual is merged into
a series of collectives --for work, play, and political
and s(: ial activity. Within that context, he is expected
to conform in realization of the socialist dictum that
cooperation with one's "comrades" and obedience to
the rules of the team are the highest goals.
Centralized direction by the regime of the nation's
intellectual and cultural life provides another means
for the perpetuation of mass subservience to the state.
Radio, television, and the press bear witness to the
gre�tness of the nation -and the wisdom of the party
with a constancy, volume, and uniformity seemingly
guaranteed to promote boredom. Motion pictures and
theatrical productions frequently supply only a slightly
less rigorous political indoctrination. Unhappily for
the regime, Western influences such as radio and TV
brondeasts are available in sufficient quantity to
provide a standard of comparison for those Fast Ger-
mans who care to take advantage of them, On
balance, however, the regime's domestic propaganda
is the major factor. Pervasive and thus largely un-
avoidable, it must eventually seep into the individual's
being.
Doubtless the most powerful instrument of control is
the ruling Socialist Unity Party itself. About 1.9
million East Germans are Communist party members,
but some only nominally so. In addition, the party
directs a 35.000 -man Workers Militia, a paramilitary
force, adw ittedly of unknown effectiveness, charged
with putting down civil unrest. Basic party
organizations are established in factories, collective
farms, production cooperatives, police units, state and
economi_- administrations, scientific and educational
institutions, residential areas, and any other place a
small group may congregate. At this level, trained
functionaries propagate the regime's message to the ex-
tent that their sometimes limited skill and their
auditors' frequently limited Interest allow.
When propaganda and political agitation fail, the
government may still enforce its will on the populace
by resort to the police, the courts, and the prisons.
De- Stalinization and liberalization as practiced
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, however, have also taken
root in East Germany, albeit somewhat tentatively,
and in the process the government's use of terror tHdics
has abated. Memories of state oppsessioa persist,
however, and they serve to discourage overt dissidence.
Even then it is important to note that bloodlust was
more a Soviet than an -East German aberration and
that Ulbricht disposed of opponents in less brutal
fashion than Stalin. Generaily, the regime in recent
years has preferred to cow rather than crush its op-
ponents. A domesticated critic is living proof of the
regime's ability to triumph. Purges would only invite
comparisons to events of the Hitler era.
The maintenance of public order an a day to-day
basis falls.to.ttie Peoples Police and the.State
Service (SSD), both responsible 'to national and not
local authority. The SSD, operating .covertly, has been
the feared instrument of political control, although to-
day to a considerably lmwr extent than formerly. Sum-
mary punishment is n-a longer a feature of the East
German system. Arrests, indictments, and trials are
conducted according to established procedures. Ac-
quittals; reversals of sentences, and pardons are now
conceivable. By constitutional writ the Fast GermamIs
entitled to many of the same rights and privileges as
the citizen of a Western democracy. In practice the in-
dividual is, Judged according to the degm.- that his
behavior detracts, from the well -being of the state.
13
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Big Brother and Others (c)
in the successful quest foe status, East Germany has
had the decisive backing of the Soviet Union. For
Moscow, East Germany represents the Soviets forward
most military political position in Europe. It is an im-
portant industrial partner, and above all else its con-
tinued existence obviates "the German threat." Soviet
troops stationed in East Germany provide a guarantee
of the endurance of the regime. The U.S.S.R. takes
about 40% of East German exports and is the chief
supplier of essential raw materials. Ry its ac-
complishments, e.g., space flights, it radiates an aura
of socialist success in which East Germany may bask.
For its part, East Germany has a record of compliance
that compares favorably with that of any other East
European state.
The evident harmony of the Moscow -East Berlin
relationship has been punctuated by some discordant
notes over the years. In the postwar era, the Soviets
plundered their sector of Germany, hesitated before
approving the creation of the GDR, domineered over it
for years. failed to deliver Berlin to it or to sign a
separate peace treaty with it despite frequent promises.
In the early days, the proud Nordics had little choice
but to accept humiliation by their Slavic mentors.
As East Germany became stronger and hence less
dependent, the leadership undertook a new course. It
frntueptly finessed Moscow's demands, openly pledg-
ing loyalty to the Soviets and then quietly proceeding
the German way. In the post- Khnuhchev era. the
Ulbricht regime, perhaps exaggerating its importance
to th- bloc. went a step further. It ceased giving the
Sovi4 full credit for all socialist advances and with
evident delight pronounced some of its own accom-
plishments superior. As the elder statesman of blom
leaden. Ulbricht increasingly advised Moscow on
proper courses of action, particularly on Berlin where
14
East German interests were involved. Finally a more
pliable leader was found in the person of Erich
Honecker. From this episode it became clear that on
crucial issues Moscow's desires still prevailed over
Pankow's, to the detriment of the image of full East
German sovereignty. In domestic affairs the regime
clearly enjoys the dominant role, but overall it remains
only a junior partner in Soviet sponsored ventures.
Friendship among peoples" is one of East Ger-
many's most heavily stressed precepts. Yet even in
Eastern Europe East Germans often are resented, since
they are viewed more as Germans than as socialist
brethren. Alluding to past Teutonic depredations,
many East Europeans are inclined to believe that Ger-
mans, East or West, simply "cannot overcome their
national character." As inheritors of a Western cast of
mind and a Protestant morality, East Germans are also
considered to be "different." For their part, many in
East Germany would agree that they themselves are
"different," and also "better."
The regime has lived in mortal fear that incipient
liberalism in the established East European nations
may spread into East Germany and pro.iuce infec-
tions, perhaps even convulsions among the populace.
Broadly, it was for this reason that East Germany was a
prime mover in the bloc's invasion of Czechoslovakia
in August 1968. Once again the world was treated to
the spectacle of Germans marching into
Czechoslovakia.
Despite underlying tensions and occasional flash-
points, the Fast Germans remain generally cc}
operative allies in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA.
Within this context, Pankow looked to the other allied
capitals to back its claims to sovereignty and boost its
campaign for recognition. Their frequent failure to do
so vigorously increased the regime's sense of insecurity,
and at times induced among East German leaders con-
cern that their Eastern neighbors would succumb to
the wiles of West Germany, strike a deal with Bonn.
and thus leave Fast Germany in an isolated and
weakrne d condition.
A new confidence born of acceptance has partially
displaced such oncerns. and has imbued the regime
with a sense of belonging. Still, old fears die hard
among the East German faithful, and they remain
vigilant against any infidelity on the part of Fast
Europeans.
On the basis of experience, the Fast Germans have
never been quite able to trust the Soviets. In 1952
Stalin proposed a draft treaty offering reunification of
f
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a. 9
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Germany conditional un it� neutralization and disar- at thi..tage -were only a remote� Ixp..ibilit% Equally
nlament. and Khrmlic�hev .portly Ix�fore his. downfall remote i% the chalice that the Sin iet. would .00n allow
in 1964 %%as dropping hints. to Bolin of a Exn +ible dial. Ea.t Germany. should it %%kh� to make ttS own drrl. In
For the time being. however� the Soviet commitment the final view. the lot of F'a.t G-nnan% depends
to 1�:1. German. aplx ar. firm A revcr%ion by Mo.cnw 011 hoe %.ell it. V ith Slroiet backing, call nn�ct the
to a strategy of a united, n: utralized Germam world challenge of German"
15
d
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l
E
Two Germanies or One? (c)
It has not been easy for East Germany to live next
door tco the dramatic prosperity which burst forth in
West Germany's capitalistic pluralistic society.
Pankow on the one hand belittles Bonn's economic
slsmess and on the other promises to outstrip it by way
of Marxian socialism. Extending its effort to the break-
ing point has brought some results, but has not dis-
pelled the sense of frustration and inferior.ty of com-
ing off second best in almost any observable com-
parison with West Germany, which to 'iegin with
has two and a half times the territory and nearly four
times the population of East Germany.
In marching to its own dremmet, the GDR has
written off the idea of German reunification �a notion
it had occasionally extolled for propaganda purposes
and which is still held up in West Germany as an arti-
cle of faith. In one of his more accurate descriptions of
the German situation, Walter Ulbricht told his Com-
munist Party Congress in April 1967: "Two separate
German states 1-ave been created, and they have pur-
sued completely different paths of development. To
unify them would be tantamount to combining fire
and water. I: is unrealistic to talk about unification
now." On balance, it appears that the former East
German ruler c as a point. Time and circumstance
have lossened tanohar and fraternal ties. Regionalism
has taken hold, rind each state has been welded into
military and economic pacts inimical one to the other.
Each is prideful in its accomplishments and separate
identity. Each sees itself as the true fatherland, reserv-
ing for itself the best of the Germanic past, and places
the onus of unrighteousness on the other. Neither
appears disposed in the near future to modify its style
sufficiently to accommodate the other.
Present -day relations between the two Germanies
are heavily influenced by a residue of distrust. For
16
years West Germany treated East Germany as a
political and social outcast, an "untouchable" on the
international scene. Bonn claimed the right to sole
representation for Germany as a whole. Bonn
spokesmen dismissed East Germany as "the Soviet oc-
cupied zone," "Middle Germany," and "the so- called
German Democratic Republic." Only in the fall of
1969 did newly inaugurated Chancellor Brandt
acknowledge the existence of "two German states,"
albeit in "one German nation �a formula unaccept-
able to a Pankow regime intent on winning accept-
ance of a sovereign East Germany. By contrast with
Bonn's attitude of disdain, East German spokemen
over the years verbally assaulted the Federal Republic
with very special rage, some of it bordering on the
obscene. More recently, the Brandt policy of recon-
ciliation with the East has undercut Pankow's
propaganda effort and the war of words abated in the
early 197G's.
A sign of the mood of insecurity that still grips East
Germany is the uncertainty with which relations with
West Germany are conducted. On the one hand, the
GDR in recent years has pressed a policy of
separateness (Abgrenzurig) in order to show in every
small way the existence of two entirely different Ger-
manies. It continues to regard West Germany as a
menace to its existence, the governing SPD as a
betrayer of socialism, and popular Chanceller Willy
Brandt as a seducer of its people. On the other hand,
East German leaders realize they must deal with West
Germany in good faith, in order to solidify their political
ga,..s and to open new avenues to Western markets
and technology. Seeking a solution to its dilemma,
the CDR has agreed, somewhat grudgingly and with
specific limitations, to permit those East -West German
personal contacts spelled out in the General Relations
Treaty. Simultaneously, the GDR has continued to
bargain toughly on the official level with Bonn in
behalf of East German interests. In mall ways, such as
the release of political prisoners, East Germany has
made concessions to domestic and West German
public opinion, bu c it remains doubtful that Pankow is
ready to risk a full normalizaticip of relations with the
powerful magnet that is West Germany.
Looking ahead, observers of East Germany have
mused for years as to what comes next. Many
predicted that Ulbricht's passing from power would be
a major turning point. As it turned out, observable
changes have thus far been minimal. Erich Honecker
has slightly relaxed domestic controls and allowed his
r1
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3x
pi
4
s
n
ail
people a slightly larger measure of "the good lift,"
both in terms of consumer gomis and social welfare
benefits. At the same time, lie has opted for a
somem-hat greater degree of ceotralLmd control of the
economy. In external affairs, lie differs again by
degree: conforming more fully to Soviet wishes, acting
friencifier ,oward other Warsaw fact states, and
generally avoiding throwing his weight around in East
European affairs. In party matters, he procceds
cautiously, in the process slowly replacing incumbents
with his own risen. As a lifelong bureaucrat and
longtime heir apparent, he seems to Have learned his
lessons well.
Unlike Honecker and the bureaucrats now in office,
there Is no certainty that the younger generation,
which will inherit the system, will conform to es-
tablished practice. Self- confident and pragmatic, the
new risen seers willing to accept the concept of
socialism nominally, but then operate according to the
dictates of reason. An infusion of more youthful, less
rigid personnel into positions of Iwwer conceivably
could eventually tip the balance in favor of a society
miff ieientiv h1wralized and an econoniv sufficientiv
Westerniml to permit an accommodation with West
Germany. Stic a result is hardiv foreordained.
however. The firobability remains that the liberals of
today will be the conservatives of tomorrow; and. by
the time they assume power. they will be prepared to
march in lock step along the Ulbricht- Honecker
course.
On balance, the bast German regime has reason to
believe that developments in the ricar term may be
favorable to its interests. In effect, it has built its own
house. To u considerable degree, it has gained aecep-
lance at home and ubroud. Overall, it feels t hat time is
on its side, 1larticularly as expectations of a return to
17
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German national unitv diminish further among East
and West Germans and separation becomes more a
i reality.
Nonetheless, East Germany still has problems. At
home, the regime must deal with the spiral of rising ex-
pectations, and it is problematical whether it can
fulfill the demands of the populace both for a better
life and increased contact with the outside world.
I Abroad, East Germany must be careful in several
respects �to maintain the proper attitude of loyalty to
the Soviet Union; to avoid the weighty embrace of
West Germany; to exploit Western economies without
falling prey to their ideologies; to keep the friendship
t of third world countries without paying an exorbitant
price in terms of aid; and above all, to do these var'.ous
things with slender diplomatic resources and little ac-
crued experience in tb international arena.
In the long run, Pankow also will not be able to
rest worryfree. Hopes for reunification, as opposed
o ex ,iectations, are unlikely to die out completely.
Building on hope, Chancellor Brandt and his suc-
cessors may be expected to pursue practical inter
German ties as the br for some form of political
union. In an era of detente, circumstances con-
ceivably may arise which would break down the
carefully erected barriers and make union the more
possible. On c, larger scale, West and East Europe
may over time interact in a movement toward one
Europe in which logic decrees that there will be
ono Getmany. Thus, there is no guarantee in per-
petuity that there will he an East Germany. At
present, Pankow can only insist that such must be
the case.
No matter what path the regime itself would take, it
must in plotting its course accept two conditions as
facts of life. The GDR will continue to be subordinate
to the Soviet Union whose own national interests will
define the broader aspects of Fast Germany's
relationships abroad. Also, the West German Govern-
ment has not abandoned the concept of reuni .cation.
Rather, it has switched to playing a Fong -term game on
this ;paramount issue. Bonn has challenged East Ger-
many to a competitive coexistence in the confident
belief ,'hat ultimately its Western lifestyle and the
spirit of German nationhood will win out. At present, it
has acceded to East Germany's international recogni-
tion in an effort to lure the Communist regime into the
arena. East Germany has accepted the challenge and
novv is fated to emerge from isolation into a world of
change, with con.setluenem as vet unknown.
Is
Chronology (u/ou)
1945
April
First group of German Communist emigrees, headed by
Walter Ulbricht, returns from Moscow to take charge of civil
affairs under Soviet auspices.
May
German Iligh Command signs unconditional surrender.
Jane
Allied Control Council composed of United Kingdom, France,
Urited States, and U.S.S.R. takes over government of
Germany.
Jaly� Aagoat
Tripartite (United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.)
Potsdam Conference confirms division of Germany into four
zones of occupation, while Berlin is divided into sectors
occupied by four Allied powers. Germany not to be parti-
tioned but to be treated as single economic unit with certain
central administrative departmeuta following a common
policy to be determined by Allied Control Council.
1946
April
Socialist Unity Party (SED) founded in Soviet Zone through
forced merger of German Communist Party and Social
Democratic Party.
October
Elections held for parliaments in fiv Laender created in
Soviet Zone, and coalition governmews (SED, CDU, LDPD)
formed. Number of central admit.istrative departments
created, directly respt,nsible tc Sevtet occupation authorities.
1947
January
U.S. and British zones fused into the Bizone to cope with
economic problems worsened by Soviet lack of cooperation.
(French zone joined in October 1948.)
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December
SED convenes People's Congress in East Berlin; by appor-
tionment of seats SED and front parties dominate.
1948
January
Power and composition of Economic Council of Bizone
changed to create nucleus of a future German government.
March
Soviet representative walks out of Allied Control Council,
thus ending last vestige of joint control.
April
Soviet authorities gradually extend restrictions on read and
rail traffic to Berlin.
June
Soviet representative leaves Allied Kommandatura, executive
body for Berlin. Total blockade imposed on 2.5 million
inhabitants of West Berlin by Soviet and East German
authorities, requiring airlift by U.S. and British to supply
city.
Summer
U S.S.R. begins to build up militarized police force in East
Germany, in violation of Potsdam Agreement.
1949
May
Blockade of West Berlin ends. People's Congress adopts East
German Constitution. Federal Republic comes into existence
in West Germany with publication of its constitution.
September
East German regime joins Soviet sponsored Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance.
October
German Democratic Republic proclaimed and its government
recognized by Soviet Union and Soviet dominated govern-
ments; Soviet Military Administration dissolved and admin-
istrative functions transferred to East German regime; East
German representation at quadripartite functions retained by
Soviet Control Commission.
1950
July
East Germany and Poland sign treaty at Goerlitz recognizing
Oder -Neime line as their frontier.
October
General elections held in East Germany establishes primacy
of SED. To enhance illusion of East Germ.:. autonomy,
Soviet Control Commission replaced by a Soviet High
Commissioner with rank of ambassador.
1952
May
Poliee guarded no man's land 3 miles wide created along
entire western frontier excluding only Berlin.
July
East Germany administrative divisions reorganized; tradi-
tional Laender abolished; 14 districts (Bezirko), similar to
Soviet oblast, established. Collectivization of agriculture j
begins.
October
Judicial system revised in accordance with Soviet system.
1953
June
Uprising in East Berlin over harsh labor policies spreads
throughout East Germany; repressed by Soviet forces.
1954
January
Reparations to Soviet Union cease; ownership of joint East
German Soviet companies, except for uranium complex in
the Erzgebirge, returned to East Germans.
1955
January
Soviet Union ends state of war with Germany.
May
East Germany joins Warsaw Pact ae provisional member;
receives full membership following year.
September
Soviet Union declares East German regime sovereign; East
Germany given control over border security and communica-
tions between West harlin and West Germany, with U.S.S.R.
reser �ing jurisdiction only over movement of Allied personnel
and freight.
December
West Germany formally implements policy of isolating East
German; diplomatically by proclaiming Hall -,tein Doctrine,
i.e., West Germany will end diplomatic relations with any
country except the U.S.S.R. establishing diplomatic ties
with East Germany.
1556
January
East Germany formally establishes armed forces.
1957
March
U.S.S.-L. and East Germany sign agreement on stationing of
Soviet troops in East Germany.
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October
Yugoslavia recognizes East Germany; first nonbloc state to
do so.
1958
February
Purge begins of leading Communist functionaries who oppose
pace of Ulbricht's economic policies; party and government
reorganized.
November
East and West Germany formalize commercial relations by
signing Interzonal Trade Agreement, which for years serves
as principal official link between them.
1959
May� August
Big Four foreign ministers meet at Geneva in futile attempt
to work out formula for German unification; East and West
represented as "advisers."
1960
April
Government undertakes drive to complet^ gricultural
collectivization.
September
Upon death of Wilhelm Pieck, office of president abolished;
Council of State created as replacement with SED chief
Ulbricht elected chairman.
1961
July� August
East German refugees to West Berlin and West Germany
reach highest number since 1953: 33,415 in July and 47,433
in August.
August
Escapes virtually stopped by erection of Berlin wall and by
strengthening of defenses on East -West German demarcation
line.
1962
January
Universal military training law passed.
August
Would -be defector Peter Fechter shot and allowed to bleed to
death at the Berlin wall in h.dhly publicized instance of East
German brutality.
1963
June
Ulbricht proposes and later (February 1964) spells out New
Economic System which places emphasis on such factors as
profitability, realistic price -cost relationships, greater outlays
for remarck, material incentives for workers, and increased
managerial responsibility.
20
August
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by East Germany.
December
West Berlin and East German authorities conclude first
Berlin Pass Agreement whereby West Berlin citizens visit
relatives in East Berlin.
1964
June
Soviet -East German Treaty of Friendship and Mutual
Assistance signed.
September
Premier Otto Grotewohl dies and is succeeded by Willi Stoph.
1965
April
Soviet and East German military forces harass West German
civilian and Allied military traffic to West Berlin in retalia-
tion for West German Bundestag meeting in West Berlin.
September
Ulbricht leads high -level delegation to Moscow to receive
support for GDR claims to international recognition of its
sovereign status; marks beginning of more intensive Soviet
GDR bilaterial relations.
October
Youth n'ctc occur in Leipzig and other East German cities.
December
SED leaders criticize youth and cultural policies at 11th
plenum of the SED Central Committee; subsequent return to
hardline cultural policy produces many incidents between
regime and intellectuals during 1966.
Erich Ape], head of the State Planning Commission, commits
suicide in spectacular act of protest against Soviet economic
demands on East Germany.
1966
March
In bw for international recognition, East Germany applies for
U.N. membership through Polisn offices.
1967
February
Nationality Law enacted by People's Chamber establishes for
first time concept of "citizens of GDR" as distinct from
"German nationality."
Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers discuss bilateral relations
with Wpst Germany; East Germans, Poles against; Czechs,
Bulgariais, Hungarians favor.
March� September
GDR seeks to shore up opposition to Bonn; signs 20 -year
bilateral treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia (March),
Hungary (May), and Bulgaria (September).
41
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June
East Germany publicly sides with Arabs in Arab Israeli war.
September
West German efforts to broaden and improve contact
founders on East German precondition of recognition for
GDR.
1168
April
New constitution replacing outmoded 1949 document adopted
in East Germany's first popular referendum.
March �Jane
East Germany bans travel to and from West Berlin by mem-
bers of NPD, West Germany's ultrarightist party. In April,
ban broadened to include senior officials of West German
Government. In June, People's Chamber announces passport
and visa requirements for all West Germans and West
Berliners.
August
Occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, in-
cluding East German troops, followed by crackdown at home
on liberals sympathetic to Dubeek government.
1969
March
West German presidential election held in West Berlin;
arouses ire of East German and Soviet Governments but no
incidents result.
April
Recognition of East Germany by Iraq, first non Communist
country to do so, opens door to recognition by number of
other Afro -Asian states.
September
Advent of West German Government led by Social Demo-
cratic Party's Willy Brandt renews efforts to normalize
relations with Soviet Union, GDR, and other Communist
neighbors.
Soviets reply positively to notes from Allied partners seeking
cooperation in reducing Berlin tensions.
October
Delegations from 84 countries attend 20th anniversary
celebrations in East Germany; divergences between East
Germany and its allies over policy toward West Germany
dominate speeches by most Eastern European leaders.
December
U.S.S.R. begins talks with West Germany on renunciation of
threat or use of force in any conflict.
1970
March and May
Prime Minister Stoph and West German Chancellor Brandt
meet in Erfurt and Kassel but fail to agree on basis for
improving relations.
March
First Four -Power talks in 11 years discuss Berlin problems.
August
Soviet Union and West Germany sign trerAy renouncing use
of force and accepting all postwar European boundaries.
Four -Power rights in Berlin and Germany not affected.
(West Germany signs same agreement with Poland in
December.)
December
Ulbricht criticized for economic planning failures at 14th
Central Committee plenum.
1971
May
Erich Honecker replaces Ulbricht as SED First Secretary.
June
Honecker's opening speech at Eighth Party Congress ratifying
his accession indicates he would settle for less than full
diplomatic recognition by West Germany; wishes success to
Four -Power negotiations on Berlin.
September
Four -Power Agreement on Berlin initialed (signed in June
1972). Berlin remains under quadripartite authority with
reduced political ties to West Germany, Soviet Union
guarantees unimpeded access to West Berlin through East
Germany. East -West German negotiations begin on supple-
mentary agreements.
October
Major ideological speech to social scientists explicitly rejects
Ulbricht's favorite themes.
1972
April
General Traffic Agreement reached with Bonn in April
(signed in May); covers transport of goods, travel of West
Germans to East Germany virtually unrestricted, only
emergency travel allowed to East Germans.
Fifth Central Committee plenum adopts package of social
legislation, granting additional benefits in pensions, rent and
family assistance allotments.
June
Four -Power Agreement on Berlin is signed; discussions begin
Fth Federal Republic on general treaty.
October
Government reorganization places greater power in hands of
ministers at expense of advisory commissions, according to
Honecker's dictates.
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Agreement reached on general German treaty designed to end
25 years of cold war hostility; states pledge to refrain from
use of force, respect common border, recognize sovereignty
of each state in internal and external affairs; left open
question of reunification.
East Germany becomes member of UNESCO and is granted
observer status at U.N.
victory.
1973
January
East and West Germany accorded equal representation at
Helsinki preparatory talks for Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Regime hails reelection of Brandt coalition in West German
Area Brief
LAND (UIOU)
Size: 41,800 sq. mi.
Use: 43% arable, 15,E meadows and pasture, 27% forests,
15% other
Land boundaries: 1,433 mi.
PEOPLE (UIOU)
Population: 17,050,000 (including East Berlin), average
annual growth rate 0% (current)
Ethnic divisions: 99.7% German, 0.3% Slavic and other
Religion: 59% Protestant, 8% Roman Catholic, 33% un-
affiliated or other; less than 5% of Protestants and about
25% of Roman Catholics actively participate
22
By end of January, 67 states had established diplomatic
relations with East Germany, 34 since 7 December 1972.
Language: German, small Sorb (West Slavic) minority
Literacy: 99%
Labor force: 8.2 million; 36.9% industry; 5.2% handicrafts;
8% construction; 12.5% agriculture; 7.2% transport and
communications; 10.9% commerce; 19.3% services and others
Organized labor: 88% of total labor force
GOVERNMENT (UIOU)
Legal name: German Democratic Republic
Type: Communist state
Capital: East Berlin (not officially recognized by U.S., U.K.,
and France, which together with the U.S.S.R. have special
rights and responsibilities in Berlin)
Political subdivisions: (Excluding East Berlin) 14 districts
(Bezirke), 218 counties (Kreise), 8,845 communities
(Gemeinden)
Legal system: Civil law system modified by Communist
legal theory; new constitution adopted 1968 by approx. 95
of the voters in national "referendum court system parallels
administrative divisions; no judicial review of legislative
acts; legal education at Universities of Berlin, Leipzig, Halle
and Jena; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction; more
stringent penal code adopted 1968
Branches: Legislative Volkskammer (elected directly);
executive Chairman of Council of State, Chairman of
Council of Ministers, Cabinet (elected by Volkskammer);
judiciary� Supreme Court; entire structure dominated by
Socialist Unity (Communist) Party
Government leaders: Chairman, Council of State, Walter
Ulbricht (Head of State); Chairman, Council of Ministers,
Willi Stoph (Head of Government)
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Suffrage: All citizens age 18 and over
Elections: National and local alternating every 2 years; pre-
pared by an electoral commission of the National Front;
ballot supposed to be secret and voters permitted to strike
names off ballot; more candidates than offices available;
parliamentary elections held 14 November 1971; local
elections, 22 March 1970
Political parties and leaders: Socialist Unity (Communist)
Party (BED), headed by First Secretary Erich Honeeker,
dominates the regime; 4 token parties (Christian Democratic
Union, National Democratic Party, Liberal Democratic
Party, and Democratic Peasants Party) and an amalgam of
special interest organizations participate with the BED in
National Front
Voting strength: 1971 parliamentary elections: 98.33% voted
the regime slate; 1970 local elections: 99.85% voted the
regime slate
Communists: 1.9 million party members
Other special interest group9: Free German Youth, Free
German Trade Union Federation, Democratic Women's
Federation of Germany, German Cultural Federation (all
Communist dominated)
Member of: CEMA, IPU, Warsaw Pact, UNESCO
ECONOMY (UIOU)
GNP: $45.1 billion (1972, at 1971 prices); per capita $2,650
Agriculture: Food deficit area; main crops potatoes, rye,
wheat, barley, oats, and industrial crops
Major industries: Metal fabrication, chemicals, light indus-
try, brown coal, uranium, and shipbuilding
Electric power: Installed capacity 14.3 million kw.; produc-
tion 72.8 billion kw.-hr. (1972), 4,270 kw.-hr. per capita
Exports: $7,635 million (1972) at 1972 monetary conversion
rate; metal products, basic materials, light industrial and
agricultural products
Imports: $7,248 million (1972) at 1972 monetary conversion
rate; metal products, basic materials, light industrial, agri-
cultural and forestry producta
Major trading partners: 75% of export trade zsnd 70% of
import trade with Communist areas (1971), U.S.S.R. 38%
of total trade, West Germany 10.2%
Fiscal year: Same as calendar year
Monetary conversion rate: DME2.8 =US$1 (early 1973);
DME3.15 US$1 (1972)
COMMUNICATIONS (S)
Railroads: 9,109 route miles; 8,762 miles standard gage, 347
miles meter and narrow gages; 7,379 miles single track, 1,730
miles double- and multiple- track; 843 miles electrified;
government owned
Highways: 28,500 miles classified routes, mostly paved:
7,750 miles classified state or national highways including
950 miles of limited- access autobahns, 20,750 miles classified
district roads. Additionally, 25,600 ?Hiles unclassified, natural
surface minor roads
SECRET
d
Inland waterways: 1,640 miles navigable, 1,040 miles of
which are principal
Pipelines: About 650 .piles, mostly for crude products;
estimated 116 miles of ne.v lines under construction
Ports: 5 major (Rostock, Wismar, Stralsund, Sassnitz,
Peenemuende), 12 minor
Merchant marine: 138 ships (1,000 g.r.t. and over) totaling
1,043,247 g.r.t. and 1,392,260 d.w.t.; major part of fleet
consists of 91 dry cargo, 12 bulk cargo, and 10 tankers
Civil air: 28-30 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 146 total; 54 with permanent- surface runways; 49
with runways 8,000 11,999 ft.; 42 with runways 4,000-
7,999 ft.
Telecommunications: Domestic and international facilities
modern and adequate; good coverage provided by radio
broadcast stations (AM and FM), 6 million receivers; 12
regional and 7 local TV stations, 4.5 million TV receivers;
2,165,000 telephones (fully automatic)
DEFENSE FORCES (S)
Military manpower: Males 15 -49, 3,876,000; 3,110,000 fit for
military service; about 132,000 reach military age (18)
annually
Personnel: (Estimated) ground forces 90,000, naval forces
17,500, air force 12,000, front.ir groups 49,500, alert police
11,000, security guard 3,500
Personnel in reserve (not on active duty): (Estimated) ground
forces 700,000, naval forces 22,800, air force 4,400
Major ground units: 6 divisions (4 motorized rifle, 2 tank),
1 SCUD (88-1) tactical missile brigade, 4 regiments (2
artillery, 2 antiaircraft artillery), 1 airborne battalion, 2
antitank battalions
Ships: 2 destroyer escorts, 141 coastal patrol types R9 river/
roadstead patrol types, 57 minesweepers, 28 amphibious
types, 54 auxiliaries, 91 service craft
Aircraft (operational): 399 including 329 jet (320 jet fighters
and 9 turbofan transports), 3 turboprop transports, 11 prop
transports, 14 turbine helicopters, 35 piston helicopters
Missiles: 20 SA -2 SAM sites (120 launchers)*
Supply: Dependent on Communist countries mainly tee
U.S.S.R. except for light infantry weapons, small arms am-
munition, explosives, chemical warfare, defensive materiel,
signal equipment, transport vehicles, some CW /BW warfs e
agents, and most naval ships
Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1973, 8.3
billion DME; about 9.2% of total budget
*National SA -2 force capability is increased by presence of 27
operational SA -2 sites and 23 operational SA -3 sites which are
subordinate to Soviet Group of Forces (stationed in) East
Germany; deployment of SA-4 (23 BA-4 battalions) continues
in defense of Soviet forces. Deployment of SA-6 has commenced,
and elements of a:, least 2 regiments are believed to be present.
23
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Places and features referred to In this General Survey (u/ou)
Adlershof (see. of East Berlin)
Altenburg
Aue....................................
Babelliberg
Bad Elster
Bad dersfeld, West Germany
Bad Schandau
Bansin.................................
Barh6ft................................
Barth..................................
Bautzen................................
Bergen.................................
Berlin..................................
Biesenthal..............................
Bitterfeld
Blankenheiin
B6hlen.................................
Boizenburg.............................
Bonn, West Germany
Boxberg................................
Brandenburg
Brandenburg (region)
Braunschweig, West Germany............
Breege.................................
Briesen.................................
Bracken (peak)
Buch (see. of East Berlin)
Bug...................................
Calvdrde...............................
Gilpin.................................
Cottbus............
Crossen................................
Diinholm (island)
Danube (stream)
Darsser Ort (cape)
Dequede...............................
Dessau
Dresden................................
EastBerlin
Eberswalde
Eggersdorf
Eilenburg
Eisenach
EisenhUttenstacit
Eialeben
Elbe (stream)
El be- Havel- Kanal (canal)
Erfurt.................................
Erzgebirge (mts)
Espenhain
Fichtel-Berg (mt)
Forst..................................
Frankfurt
Freiberg
Fulda, West Germany
Gedser, Denmark
Gehl&dorf
Gera...................................
Gerstungen.............................
Glowe..................................
Gdrlitz......
Greifswald
Gross In8elsberg (mi)
Gfildendorf
Halle..................................
Halle-Neustadt (sec. of Halle)
Hamburg, West Germany
Harz( is)
Havel (stream)
Havel-Kanal (canal)
Heinersdorf
COORDINAT9A 11 1 COORD04ATEM
#N.
'E.
0 'V.
01:.
52 27
13 32
Naumburg
1 51 09
11 49
60 59
12 27
Neisse (stream)
52 04
14 46
50 35
12 42
Neubrandenburg
53 34
13 16
52 24
13 06
Neustrelitz
53 22
13 05
50 17
12 11
Niederfinow
52 50
13 56
50 52
Q 41
Niemegk
52 05
12 42
50 55
14 09
Oberhof
50 43
10 44
53 58
14 08
Oder (stream)
53 32
14 34
54 26
13 02
Oder- Havel- Kanal (canal)
52 52
14 02
54 22
12 44
Oder-Spree-Kanal (canal)
52 23
13 41
51 11
14 'A
Oranienburg
52 45
13 14
54 25
13 26
Osnabrijck, West Germany
52 16
9 03
52 31
13 24
Opthafen (part)
52 27
13 2f,
52 46
13 38
Ostseebad Wustrow
54 21
12 24
51 37
12 19
Paderborn, West Germany.
51 43
N 46
51 31
11 25
Pankow (sec. of East Berlin)
52 34
13 24
51 12
12 23
Parow
54 21
13 05
53 23
10 43
Patz
52 14
13 39
50 44
7 06
Peenemijnde
54 08
13 '7
51 24
14 34
Petkun
51 59
13 21
52 25
12 33
Piesteritz
51 52
12 36
53 00
14 00
Plauen
50 30
12 ON
52 16
10 32
Pomerania (region)
53 40
15 00
54 37
13 21
Potsdam
52 24
13 04
52 03
13 43
Prague, Czechoslovakia.
50 05
14 28
51 48
10 37
Radeberg
51 07
13 55
52 39
13 30
Rheinsb4,-rg
53 06
12 53
54 37
13 13
Riems island
54 11
13 22
52 24
11 18
Riesa
51 IN
13 19
53 31
13 26
Rossendorf
51 03
13 M
51 46
14 20
Rosslau
$1 53
12 15
50 46
12 29
Rostock
54 05
12 09
54 19
13 07
Rothenser
52 11
11 40
45 20
29 40
Ruderitz
50 25
12 01
54 29
12 31
Rfigen (island)
1 54 25
13 24
52 50
11 41
Rummelsburg
52 30
13 31
51 50
12 15
Saale (stream)
51 57
11 55
51 03
13 45
Saalfeld
50 39
11 22
52 30
13 33
SRAII)w
52 12
13 23
52 50
13 50
Savir. West Germany r(gior
49 15
7 00
52 32
13 49
Sangerhausen I
51 28
11 IN
51 28
12 37
Sassnitz
54 31
13 39
50 59
10 19
Kiihlungsborn...........................
54 09
11 43
52 09
14 39
Saxony (region)
if 00
IZ 00
51 32
11 33
Schkopau
51 24
11 59
53 So
9 00
Schimebeck
52 01
11 .15
52 24
12 23
Schwarzeripfont....
44 If
12 Is
00 59
11 02
8 c h warse p
51 32
14 21
50 30
13 10
Echwedenschante (site)
54 33
13 09
51 11
12 28
Schwedt
53 04
14 IN
50 26
12 57
Schwerin
52 *2
13 53
51 44
14 38
Seefeld
52 37
13 �41
52 21
14 33
Seelingstadf,
50 47
12 15
50 55
13 22
Seiffen
50 39
13 27
50 33
9 40
8enftenberg
51 31
14 01
54 15
11 57
Silesia, Poland and Czechoslovakia (region)
51 00
is 00
54 06
1. 06
Sonneberg
50 21
11 10
50 52
12 03
Stendal
32 36
11 51
50 58
10 04
Stralsund
54 18
13 06
54 34
13 29
Strausberg
52 35
13 53
51 10
15 00
Stubbenkammer
54 35
13 40
54 06
13 23
Sfidluffen (port)
52 31
13 12
50 52
10 28
Suhl
50 38
10 42
52 19
14 32
Szczecin (Stettin). Poland
53 25
14 35
51 30
12 00
Tarnewitz
53 58
11 14
51 29
11 56
Tautenburg
51 00
11 43
53 33
10 00
Teplice, Czechoslovakia
50 38
13 SO
51 45
10 30
Thfiringer Wald (mia)
50 40
10 so
52 53
11 58
Thuringia (region)
1
51 00
11 00
52 36
13 12
Torgau
51 34
13 00
53 06
14 12
Trattendorf
51 32
14 23
51 33
11 30
Trelleborg, Sweden 55 22
13 10
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1

1
a 14
11117't6"
East Berlin
52 30
to 33
Eberswalde
52 80
13 80
Eggersdorf
82 32
13 49
Eilenburg
81 28
12 37
Eisenach
50 59
10 19
Eisen hOttenstadt
52 09
14 39
Eisleben
at a2
11 33
Elbe (sirea m)
53 50
9 Do
Elbe Havel Kanal (canal)
52 24
12 23
Erfurt
so 59
11 02
Erzgebirge (min)
50 30
13 10
F. speahain
51 11
12 28
Fichtel -Berg (ml)
50 26
12 57
Forst
51 44
14 38
Frankfurt
52 21
14 33
Freiberg
50 55
13 22
Fulda, Went Germany
50 33
9 40
Gedser, De.-mark
54 35
11 57
Gehlsdorf
1,4 06
12 P6
Gera
50 52
12 05
Gerstungen
50 58
10 04
Glowe
54 34
13 29
Gorlitt
51 10
15 00
Greifswald
54 06
13 23
Gross inselsberg (ml)
50 52
10 28
Guldendor t
52 19
14 32
Halle
51 30
12 00
Iialle- Neustadt (sec. of Halle)
51 29
11 56
liambcrg, West Germany
53 33
10 00
Harz mix
51 45
10 30
Havel stream
52 53
11 58
Havel -Kenal (canal)
52 36
13 12
Heinersdorf
53 06
1: 12
Helbra
51 33
11 30
Helmstedt, West Germany
52 14
11 Ob
Hennigsdorf
52 38
13 12
Hettatedt
51 39
11 30
Hildesheim, West Germany
52 (19
9 58
Hof, West Germany
50 19
11 55
Hohenwarte
IYJ 36
11 29
Hoyerswerds
31 26
14 15
Ilmenau
50 41
10 54
Jens
50 56
11 ;tS
Juliusruh
54 37
13 22
Kamenz
51 16
14 06
Karl Marx- Stadt
So 5(1
12 85
Kassel, West Germany
at 19
9 30
Kolkwitz
51 45
14 15
Konigttein
SO 58
14 M
Konigs Wusterhsusen
52 17
13 37
Kdpeniek (see. of Bast Berlin)
32 27
13 34
Kostrtyn, Poland
52 35
14 39
K uhlungsborn
54 09
11 43
Lauta
at 28
14 04
Leipzig
51 18
12 20
Leuns
51 19
12 01
Lichtenberg (see. of Gera;.
30 Ii0
12 09
Lindenberg
52 12
14 08
Linow
53 23
13 57
Lippendorf
51 11
12 23
Lohme
54 35
13 37
Lubbenau
al 52
13 S8
Lubmin
34 07
13 36
Lud wigslust
53 19
11 30
Lutzkendorf
81 18
it SI
Magdeburg
52 10
11 40
Marienborn
82 12
11 07
Marienehe (sec. of Rostock)
84 07
12 05
Markenbath
50 32
12 52
Markgrsfenheide
54 it
12 10
Marlow
51 09
12 35
Marquardt
32 27
12 58
Mecklenburg (region)
53 30
12 W
Meiningen
30 33
10 25
Meissen
at 09
13 29
Meneburg
al 22
12 00
Mittellsod Kanal (canal)
32 16
11 41
Moxa
30 39
It 38
Muldenstein
31 40
12 20
Nauen
52 36
12 33
Saslow, 80 39
11 22
Saar, m
Wept Uerany (repinn)
82 12
13 23
Saniterhausen
49 18
7 00
8assnitz
81 28
11 18
K tihlungsborn
84 31
13 39
Saxony
84 09
11 43
region 81 00
13 00
8chkopau 81 24
It 89
Schiineb eck
52 01
11 45
Schwarteupfost
54 11
12 to
Schwarte Pumpe
51 32
14 21
Schwedenschanse (Rife)
54 33
13 09
f;chwedt
53 04
14 IN
Schwerin
52 12
13 53
Seefeld
52 37
13 41
SeelingstAdt
60 47
12 15
Seiffen
50 39
13 27
Senftenberg
51 31
14 01
Silesia, Poland and Czechoslovakia
(region) 51 00
18 00
3onneberg
50 21
11 10
S tendal
52 36
11 51
Stralsund
54 IA
13 06
Strausberg
52 35
13 53
Stubbenka mmer
54 35
13 40
Siidhafen (port)
52 31
13 12
Suhl
50 36
10 42
Szczecin (Stettin), Paiand
53 25
14 35
Tarnewitz
53 58
it 14
Tautenburg
51 oo
it 43
Teplice, Czechoslovakia
!i0 38
13 50
Thuringer Wald (mix)
50 40
10 50
Thuringia (region'
51 (o
11 00
Torgau
51 34
13 00
Tmttendorf
51 32
14 23
Trelleborg, Sweden
55 22
13 10
Tremsdorf
.',2 16
13 07
Unstrut stream)
51 10
11 48
U nterwellenborn
50 39
11 26
Vetschau
51 47
14 04
Vitte
54 34
13 06
Vockerode
51 51
12 21
Wahnsdorf
51 07
13 t0
Waldheim
52 35
13 03
Warnemiinde
54 10
12 05
Weimar
50 59
H 19
Werra sirerm
51 26
9 39
West Berlin
52 30
13 20
Westhafek .(port)
52 32
13 20
Westatsaken
52 30
13 08
Wieck.......
54 06
13 27
Wilhelm- Pieck-Stadt G uben
51 57
14 43
Wismar
53 54
11 28
Wittenberg
51 52
12 39
Wilte nlr rxr
53 00
11 45
Wolit "t
54 03
13 46
Wroclaw (Breslau). Poland
51 06
17 02
Wunxdorf
52 10
13 28
Wurzburg, Went Germany
49 48
9 56
Zehlendorf
52 47
13 23
Zebrensdorf
52 10
13 30
Zeitz
51 63
12 09
Zeft- Mehlis
50 35
M 39
Zeuthen
52 22
13 37
Z
52 17
11 41
Zoeeen
52 13
13 27
Zschornewitz
51 43
12 24
Zwickau
.W 44
12 30
Selected airfields
Alt Lonnewitz
51 33
13 13
Brieaen
52 02
13 45
Dresden
51 08
13 46
Drewilz
51 53
14 32
Gross Dollo
53 02
13 32
Kothen
SI 43
11 58
Oranienburg
S2 44
13 13
Peenem a nde
54 10
13 47
Prsxhen
51 40
14 38
Schonefeld
32 23
13 31
We lzow
51 35
14 08
W eraeuchen
52 38
13 46
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1
East Germany
International boundary k' Ur t Bazlik center t Airfield
Soviet Zone boundai Railroad 4 Major port
Bezirk boundary Autobahn
National capital Other road
A Soviet control Point for Allied traffic
A East German Intomnol border crossing point
Populotod prates
1.000.0" IQ 7,200A00 0 20.000 1) 100.000
100,000 to 1.000.000 Und., 20,000
Spot ol&rflonz in (�r
SC614 �1.430A00
0 1 so ty
Statue uue
0 1s 5 T8
Naumanetn
.11
1.0
1.0nebutil-
F e die r a
b I ir,
14
7,7
FTIMMe" 21 =1% WITIPT11
Vith

i 1
1
1
aItIC
1
1
East Berlin
Land Use and Industi
LAND USE
S Urban
Forest or park
Open area (primarily
field or meadow)
INDUSTRY
Cncse ar�d seg-unts mdcale
relatire rmporlanC
M
Q Basic materiels
Metallurgy, power, chemicals and Iert
rubber. bulldmg .001,6.001,61t Metal working
Neary machinery, transparlat� sgu,l
menl, ehipbudd'% elscarrul egrupmei
Pierian and optical equipment
Light industry
O
Tertles, clolhrnq, wood, paper, glass
Food mduatry
Stadtbezuk boundary
See
54
Pomeranian
Bay
Od
w
poll and
57
Basic Resources
and Process
RESOURCES
lC.f Natural gas
i Brown cod
llm Bituminous c
Potash
Copper
MAJOR PIPELINE
Oil
f Natural gas
PROCESSING
Iron and wee
Copper
A Od, gas, coal
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1

oirn I@Iv a 1111 tea& ten
id Indussr
ark
(primarily
sallow)
r
Is indicate
M
clie -Cate :nd fart
falling mSte, ials
franapi 1141,0- eguil
1. alaelrical equlpmei
lea) puipmant
wood, paper, glass
isources
Coss[
MCES
oral gas
wn coal
tninous cc
Nh
iper
MVEUNE
Ural gets
ISSING
and steel
leer
ves. coal
Land Use
Industrial Cen
Grclu and segments md�
'slat.: unttartanee
Q Basic
Most intensive agricult
(primarily wheat, sugt
and corn)
Mimed intensive and e11
0
agriculture (including
and potatoes)
LJ
Mixed e11lerimver agricui
pasture, and forest
Permanent pastt -re
Forest
Industrial Cen
Grclu and segments md�
'slat.: unttartanee
Q Basic
materials
Mmmq, mNfllurgy. D0' tAem
Calf and fer:duvs, rubber, build
mg inaterols
0
Metal working
Heavy maohmry, transporttwn equip.
men). sh,pbuddng, electrical equipment.
predawn smi cDUCall equromenl
O Light
industry
Toxides. clothing, wood. paper.
glass, C:rs�s
Food industry
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1
53
p ol a n d
m
Basic Resources
and Processing
RESOURCES
Natural gas
J
Brown pe1
JUDI num na a Ca i
pa ;ash
Ca PPar
"OR PIPELINE
Od
Naiur al gaa
PROCESSING
iron and ale.
4a
Copp"(
!Y' Od San caa+
Populati
ienu; w I%tktg
so lop m I
Prraws pt sown WR
chosIova6
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1
rces
d
Industrial Centers
C>�L1.a .nq 1.qlfni. +IC+cli.
Iiblln. I+poriln[.
BI.iC RIOT @rillq
14iry, aftli6u ql, pp.,er, c+.s++
Klla .nd Ilrsavua, rblw a+ra-
MQ mJ4n111.
M@!ql worAmp
k.l r7 m.ck+l1+). Ir.n.rpgr(pfWn fqu.p
nlenL MPt-UMs. Ckcl-al .gvipmfnl
cd
4_1.1 11@ iq.lpl j
O Llyht mdo"
T.difa, cbtpry. >.aqa, p.p.r.
ql..a. Nr.wK.
Food mduttry
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1