NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 13A; EAST GERMANY; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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C the National Intelligence Survey,
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
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c;
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121 i r
{gy p %I l
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the political coverage
in the General Survey dated February 1970.
A. Introduction 1
B. Structure and functioning of the government 2
1. Legislature
3
2. Executive
5
a. Council of State
6
b. Council of Ministers
6
3. judiciary
7
4. Local government
9
C. Political dynamics
9
I. The SED and its development
9
2. SED organization and membership
13
SEOW
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3. Party leadership
15
2. Affected groups
29
4. Collaborating parties and organizations
18
a. Industrial workers
29
a. Non-Communist front parties
18
b. Farm workers
29
b. Mass organizations
18
c. Intellectuals
29
Fig. 2
Party and government structure
(chart)
d. Youth
30
D. National policies
20
e. The churches
31
1. Domestic
20
F. Maintenance of internal security
31
2. Foreign
22
1. Police
31
a. Relations with the Soviet Union
b. Relations with other Eastern Euro-
22
2. Countersubversive and counterinsur-
34
pean countries
24
gency measures and capabilities
c. Relations with West Germany
25
G. East Berlin
34
d Relations with Berlin
26
e Relations with non-Communist world
27
H. Selected bi bliography
38
E. Threats to government stability 28 Chronology 39
1. Discontent and dissidence 28 Glossary 43
FIGURES
ii
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Fig. 1
Party and government leadership
Fig. 5
Party leaders (photos)
16
(ihart)
4
Fig. 6
Foreign Ministry building (photo)
23
Fig. 2
Party and government structure
(chart)
5
Fig. 7
East Berlin panorama (photo)
35
Fig. 3
Administrative subdivisions (map)
8
Fig. 8
East Berlin stores (photos)
36
Fig. 4
Central SED structure (chart)
14
Fig. 9
Control points in East Berlin (tnap)
37
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X
X
Es
Government and Politics
A. Introduction (U /OU)
The German Democratic Republic is a stepchild of
the Second World War, evolving over the past quarter
of a century from the status of a Soviet- occupied area
;end scorned satellite to a second German state that
commands the allegiance and support of a growing
number of its own citizens and has gained increased
recognition and prestige abroad. The revolution
imposed by the Communists during their long period
of control has restratified the society and abolished or
brought under Communist control all traditional
German institutions capable of commanding a
separate loyalty from East Germans or linking them
with their countrymen in the West. Using the Soviet
Union as their model, East Germany's Communist
leaders have established a political and social order
which has as its primary goals the perpetuation of one
party rule by the Communists and the establishment
of even closer links with the Soviet Union, the
principal guarantor of thc: GDR's durability and
stability.
The exercise of political power remains the exclusive
prerogative of the Communists who exert and
maintain control through the mechanism of the
Socialist Unity Party (SED) which was created in 1946
by the forced marriage of once bitter adversaries �the
Communists and the Social Democrats. As in the case
of the Soviet Communist Party, political power is
highly centralized within the top echelons of the
ruling SED, while responsibility for implementing
policy rests with the party apparatus and the various
governmental ministries and agencies. A facade of
multiparty democracy has been retained by allowing a
number of non Communist parties usually headed
by tractable officials �to remain in existence, but they
provide no genuine opposition and are allowed to
maintain separate organizations only because they
provide a convenient channel for organizing segments
of the population which would not join the SED.
At the time of its founding in 1949 the German
Democratic Republic faced an uncertain future
because of its public ?mage as a creation c the Soviet
Union which had plundered and ravaged large areas
of East Germany. Much of this hatred and contempt
was transferred to Walter Ulbricht' and other German
Communist leaders who were regarded as Soviet
stooges lacking both legitimacy and popular support.
Aware of its lack of broad support among East
Germans, the regime was also uneasy about the
firmness of the Soviet commitment to support the
development of a separate German state. There were
suspicions that Moscow might be prepared to sell out
East Germany in order to advance its own interests in
Europe.
The onset of the cold war, the West German
decision in 1952 to join the abortive European Defense
Community, and Bonn's accession to NATO in 1954
hardened the division of Germany and strengthened
the Soviet commitment to the development of a
separate German state under Communist control.
Moscow tried to shore up the East German regime by
conferring further prerogatives of statehood in order to
enable the rump state to compete more effectively
'Ulbricht, titular head of state, died of heart failure on 1 August
1973.
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with the Federal Republic. Membership in the
Warsaw Pact followed shortly, as did the Soviet
decision to grant "full sovereignty" to East Germany
while retaining the right to maintain troops there.
The greater prosperity and stability of West
Germany remained an obsessive attraction to the East
Germans particularly the trained and the edu-
cated �who continued to flee to the West in large
numbers. By the early 1960's it had become apparent
to the leadership that it could not consolidate control
over the political and economic system as long as some
of the nation's most valuable workers "voted with
their feet" and moved west. The erection of the Berlin
wall in August 1961 enabled the government to
establish firm control over the society and proceed
with overdue economic reforms, which within a
decade provided the population with the highest
standard of living in Eastern Europe. By the early
1970's East Germany had become the world's ninth
largest industrial power second to the Soviet Union
in the eastern bloc �with a concomitant growth in
prestige which gave added strength to its demands for
recognition as a sovereign state and a voice in
international councils.
Ironically, this period of growing accommodation at
home and increasing acceptance abroad coincided
with the political demise of the veteran Communist
leader, Walter Ulbricht, who had guided the destiny
of East Germany for 25 years. Despite his reputation as
a servant of Moscow, Ulbricht in his later years of rule
had incurred Soviet displeasure by appearing to
challenge the U.S.S.R.'s ideological supremacy and by
creating obstacles to Moscow's strategy of detente
with the West, particularly as it applied to West
Germany.
Ulbricht's resignation as party leader in May 1971
and the transfer of power to Erich Honecker was
accomplished smoothly, reflecting the government's
stability and the party's success in tightening its
control over practically all aspects of East German life.
As the SED's new First Secretary, Honecker typifies
the continuity and stability of a regime which has
been in power for more than two decades, and which
is increasingly confident abo;.it its popular support and
its right to govern. A lifelong Communist and heir
presumptive to Ulbricht for more than a decade,
Honecker is a methodical and energetic manager of
the party and the interlocking state organizations. He
has brought to the top leadership post a more realistic
view of economic planning, together with a
recognition that domestic political stability requires
the leadership to take steps to ir.iprove the morale of
the people. Thus, the regime has assigned highest
2
priority to raising the "material and cultural living
standards" of the East German population, although
it has not neglected to stress ideological discipline and
the SED's political control over the society.
After almost a quarter of a century of Communist
rule even the most intransigent non Communists in
the society have accepted the reality of the existence of
a separate East German state and come to terms with
the regime and its demands. The resulting process of
accommodation has led many East Germans to move
from hostility to passive acceptance, and finally
toward a degree of positive loyalty and a growing
sense of a separate East German national identity. It is
difficult to determine with any degree of precision
how far this process has gone, but it appears that most
East Germans now generally accept the GDR as a
separate state for the foreseeable future, approve of
some but not all aspects of its social and economic
systems, and have developed a sense of distinctiveness
from Germans in the Federal Republic.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (U /OU)
Since its founding under the aegis of Soviet
occupation authorities in the early postwar years, the
Socialist Unity Party (SED) has been the focal point of
political and social power. Although the constitution
does not define the role of the SED in the state
apparatus, in practice all political power is wielded by
the SED whose party hierarchy parallels the state
organization at all levels. To insure that state
organizations execute SED policy, the key posts in
both party and government are filled by the most
important and powerful party leaders. At the apex is
Erich Honecker, both First Secretary of the SED and
Chairman of the National Defense Council. Former
party leader Walter Ulbricht retains titular leadership
in the Council of State as its Chairman, and by this
position has remained East Germany's head of state.
Politburo member Willi Stoph is Chairman of the
Council of Ministers and thus the head of
government. SED control is insured down to the
lowest governmental level as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
The first constitution of the German Democratic
Republic, drafted in 1949 by a Soviet- sponsored
People's Congress (a legislative body chosen from a
Communist approved slate by 66% of the electorate),
formed the basis for the U. S. S. R.'s unilateral
transformation of the Soviet Zone into the East
German state on 7 October 1949. This document bore
a superficial resemblance to the Weimar Constitution
of 1919, but the East Germans strengthened the
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powers of the central government while paying lip
service to the Laender (states) as the foundations of
the state. It listed certain "guaranteed rights" of
citizens, but, as in other Communist constitutions,
these rights were qualified and subject to laws or
interpretations of laws put into effect from time to
time. Certain duties of citizens were stressed. Men and
women legally were equal. Although the constitution
appeared to establish a multiparty system of popular
representation and a parliamentary form of
government featuring legislative supremacy, in
practice the executive branch of the government
dominated. The executive, which was in turn
controlled by the SED through interlocking
directorates, made all major decisions and suspended
or withdrew democratic rights as desired by the party
leaders.
At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1967,
Ulbricht stated that the 1949 constitution no longer
reflected the political and social changes that had
occurred during the previous two decades. A
constitutional drafting committee was established in
December of that year and 2 months later a draft was
produced and made public. In an unprecedented
move, the draft constitution was submitted to a
nationwide referendum on 6 April 1968, and in
carefully controlled voting was approved by nearly
95% of those who voted. The relative haste with which
the new constitution was promulgated seemed due to
a desire to emphasize the sovereign nature of the
German Democratic Republic by distinguishing it
clearly from West Germany.
The new constitution was designed both to
incorporate into a basic framework the various
ch=anges adopted piecemeal by the regime since 1949
as well as to justify the coercive measures employed by
the state to channel and control expression. In
addition to codifying the numerous legislative and
social changes which had been instituted in East
Germany, the present constitution places particular
stress on the sovereign political character of the state,
and constitutionally anchors the SED in its leadership
role. All political power is nominally exercised by the
workers and peasants, led by the SED- dominated
National Front and its component parties and mass
organizations.
A whole series of rights contained in the old
constitution is retained in the new, including among
others the right to inherit "personal property to
inviolability of the home; "to social care in case of old
age and invalidity and the right "to profess a
religious creed and to carry out religious activities."
However, other rights guaranteed in the old
constitution have been qualified. Thus, free speech,
freedom of the press, the right to assemble peacefully,
and the right of association can only be exercised "in
accordance with the spirit and aims of this
constitution." Certain other rights have been defined
more narrowly or simply dropped from the new
constitution; thus, the individual is not entirely free in
his choice of work, and there is no provision which
allows workers to strike in order to seek redress of their
grievances. In short, the 1968 constitution is more
explicit in granting authority to the state and
subordinating the rights of the individual to the needs
of society.
I. Legislature
The legislature (Volkskammer or People's Chamber)
is one of the elite institutions of the German
Democratic Republic and is meant to mirror the social
structure of the population, to emphasize the direction
the regime wants its citizens to go, and to honor
worthy contributors to the building of socialism.
Unlike legislative bodies in the West, however, the
People's Chamber has little actual power and
functions as a rubberstamp, endorsing laws and
decrees already formulated by the party.
East Germany's first constitution in 1949
established a bicameral federal legislature consisting
of a People's Chamber and a chamber representing the
Laender. The constitutional revision of 1968, however,
replaced the two- chamber parliament with the
unicameral People's Chamber consisting of 500
deputies elected for 4 -year terms by citizens who have
reached 18 years of age.
Candidates for the People's Chamber are proposed
by election commissions organized by the SED
dominated National Front. The front is a loose
federation of nine officially sponsored groups
including five political parties (the SED and four
collaborating parties: the Christian Democratic
Union, the German Liberal Democratic Party, the
German National Democratic Party, and the German
Democratic Peasants Party) and four mass organiza-
tions (the Free German Trade Union Federation, the
Free German Youth, the Democratic Women's League
of Germany, and the German Cultural Association).
Only these nine organizations have seats in the
People's Chamber. In legislative elections the
[National Front apportions the seats among these
groups, designates the candidates who must be
approved by the SED, and then nominates them en
masse and places their names on the ballot. Because
the National Front is exclusively empowered by the
regime to put forth candidates, there is only a single-
3
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P A R T Y G O V E R N M E N T
Seerearies
9
Erich Honecker
(First Secretory)
Hermann Axon
Gerhard Grueneberg
Kurt Hager
Werner Lambert
Guenter Mittag
Albert Norden
Paul Verner
Werner larowinsky
Politburo
(23)
Erich Honecker
Walter Ulbricht
J Hermann Axon
I.
Friedrich Ebert
Gerhard Grueneberg
Kurt Hager
Werner Krolikowski
Werner Lambert
Guenter Mittag
Erich Mueckenberger
Alfred Neumann
Albert Norden
Horst Sindermann
Willi Stoph
Paul Verner
Herbert Warnke
CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Georg Ewald
Walter Halbritter
Werner larowinsky
Guenther Kleiber
Erich Mielke
Margarete Mueller
Harry Tisch
Council of Minister
(45)
Council of Sate
(24)
Erich Honecker
Walter Ulbricht
(Chairman)
People's Chamber
(SM)
Erich Honecker
Hermann Axon
Friedrich Ebert
Gerhard Grueneberg
Kurt Hager
Werner Krolikowski
Werner Lamberz
Guenter Mittag
Erich Mueckenberger
Alfred Neumann
Albert Norden
Horst Sindermann
Willi Stoph
Paul Verner
Herbert Warnke
Georg Ewald
Walter Halbritter
Werner larowinsky
Guenther Kleiber
Erich Mlelke
Margarete Mueller
Harry Tisch
Friedrich Ebert
Alfred Neumann
Horst Sindermann
Willi Stoph
(Chairman)
Willi Stoph
Paul Verner
Herbert Warnke
plus 18 other members
Georg Ewald
Walter Halbritter
Guenther Kleiber
Erich Mielke
FIGURE 1. Parry and go-ernment leadership (U /OU)
slate ballot. Prior to 1965, the voters could only
approve or disapprove the entire slate. That year the
ballot was expanded to include more candidates than
scats available and the voter was permitted to select
the "candidate of his choice" from a longer list of
National Front approved candidates. Furthermore, it
was decreed in 1965 that a third of the membership of
the People's Chamber must he replaced every 4 years.
Despite the fact that Fast Berlin has not been formally
incorporated into the German Democratic Republic,
the city is represented in the People's Chamber by 66
deputies. Their special status is partially maintained,
however, by the fact that they are elected by the East
Berlin Assembly and not directly by the people.
The regime's control of the Peoples Chamber
extends also to,the legislative process, which similarly
includes constitutional prerogatives that in practice
are not exercised. According to the 1968 constitution,
only the People's Chamber can adopt it constitution
and laws, and nobody may restrict this right. It may
-I
introduce legislation and pass on most legislative
matters, including those introduced by itself, the
executive branch, or local governments. It is further
empowered to decide on the constitutionality of laws,
to elect the members of the Council of State, the
Council of Ministers, the National Defense Council,
and the Supreme Court, and to appoint the Prosecutor
General. The People's Chamber approves the
conclusion or cancellation of state agreements and
determines the state. of defense of the German
Democratic Republic. In practice, however, the SED
makes all such decisions which, through the system of
interlocking diroctorates, are nsually proposed to the
People's Chamber by the Council of Ministers. Thus,
the "initiatives" of the People's Chamber become
mere ratifications, and the legislative body is used by
the SED primarily as a forum to promulgate the party
line.
In contrast to the marginal role assigned to the
Peoples Chamber by the SED under Walter Ulbricht,
0
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PARTY
STRUCTURE
NATIONAL
PARTY CONGRESS
or Conference
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
POLITBURO
DISTRICT D
DISTRICT D
District
SECRETARIAT
District
EXECUTIVE C
r-
Departments,
Party C
COMMITTEE
Commissions, and
Conference
Party
Bureaus
Control
tr ct
District D
Commission
Commission over all agencies
Direct control Elected body
BASIC PARTY ORGANIZATIONS w/
Nominal election Appeal
orappuiatment
GOVERNMENT
STRUCTURE
PEOPLE'S
CHAMBER
COUNCIL COUNCIL Supreme Prosecutor
OF STATE OF MINISTERS Court General
PRESIDIUM t
Ministries Cabinet
level
Agencies
controls
FIGURE 2. Party and government structure (U /OU)
there are signs that the Honecker regime may be
prepared to encourage the legislative body to assume a
more meaningful role in the governmental apparatus.
In his presentation to the Eighth Party Congress in
1971 Honecker called for" improvement" in the work
of the People's Assembly and an increase in its
authority. The present body has since begun to meet
more frequently than its predecessors, and in March
1972 the tradition of unanimity was broken for the
first time when 12 representati voted against a
controversial abortion bill. The results of the People's
Chamber election in November 1971 reflected the
great sociological changes which have occurred in the
last decade. The older generation of functionaries, for
the most part, were retired and their positions assumed
by a new generation of party activists. Of the 500
deputies, 75% are under age 50. The representatives
are also more highly educated; more than one -third
have received a university education and 105 have
attended specialized trade schools.
2. Executive
The executive branch consists of the Council of
State and the Council of Ministers, both of which are
constitutionally responsible to the People's Chamber.
In practice, the executive is clearly dominant and is
5
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DISTRICT
DISTRICT D
DISTRICT D
District
District
EXECUTIVE C
COUNCIL A
Assembly I
Party C
COMMITTEE
Conference
tr ct
District D
District
Control C
Court P
Prosecutor
Commission
LOCAL
County,
County C
COUNTY AND CITY C
COUNTY, CITY, C
City, or I
and City E
EXECUTIVE A
AND PRECINCT P
Precinct
rrence C
COUNCILS I
Conf r
I
County C
County C
County
and City C
Court P
Prosecutor
FIGURE 2. Party and government structure (U /OU)
there are signs that the Honecker regime may be
prepared to encourage the legislative body to assume a
more meaningful role in the governmental apparatus.
In his presentation to the Eighth Party Congress in
1971 Honecker called for" improvement" in the work
of the People's Assembly and an increase in its
authority. The present body has since begun to meet
more frequently than its predecessors, and in March
1972 the tradition of unanimity was broken for the
first time when 12 representati voted against a
controversial abortion bill. The results of the People's
Chamber election in November 1971 reflected the
great sociological changes which have occurred in the
last decade. The older generation of functionaries, for
the most part, were retired and their positions assumed
by a new generation of party activists. Of the 500
deputies, 75% are under age 50. The representatives
are also more highly educated; more than one -third
have received a university education and 105 have
attended specialized trade schools.
2. Executive
The executive branch consists of the Council of
State and the Council of Ministers, both of which are
constitutionally responsible to the People's Chamber.
In practice, the executive is clearly dominant and is
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itself controlled in all respects by the ruling party, the
SED.
i
a. Council of State
The Council of State was established by
constitutional amendment in 1960 to replace the
i office of the presidency after the death of Wilhelm
Pieck. Its constitutional status was meant to add to the
prestige of Walter Ulbricht who as "elected
i'
j chairman" is the chief of state. It also provides
sinecures for leading members of the collaborating
parties. According to the constitution, the Council of
State is elected by and responsible to the People's
Chamber; it is �?mposed of a chairman, six deputy
chairmen, 17 members, and a secretary, all of whom
serve 4 -year terms. In addition to exercising
ceremonial functions normally associated with the
office of the president in a Communist country, the
Council of State has specified executive duties and one
significant legislative function. The Chairman of the
Council of State proclaims the laws of the land, swears
in members of the government, and represents the
German Democratic Republic as h:;ad of state. The
full council ratifies or abrogates treaties, appoints and
recalls East German representatives abroad, receives
1. foreign diplomats, calls elections to the People's
Chamber, and convokes its first session after the
r elections. The constitution also empowers the council
to frame basic decisions on problems of defense and
security and to convoke meetings of the National
Defense Council, two additional prerogatives
normally associated with the executive branch of
government. In its legislative capacity, the council
since 1963 has acted for the People's Chamber
between its plenary sessions, thus replacing three
standing committees of the legislature which
originally had been charged with carrying out these
functions. The Council of State also has the
constitutional power to issue decisio which have the
effect of law and to issue binding interpretaiions of
laws.
In November 1971 Walter Ulbricht was reelected
Chairman of the Council of State despite widespread
speculation that he might also lose this post because of
his retirement as SED First Secretary 6 montas earlier.
Ulbricht's reelection was consistent with the theme of
continuity in leadership and did not signify that he
had retained a power base. In fact, the Council of
State appears to have lost status despite the presence
on the council of a growing number of high- ranking
SED leaders, including Erich Honecker. In October
1972 a law was promulgated which granted the
Council of Ministers substantial new governmental
powers, largely at the expense of the Council of State.
6
b. Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers (cabinet) organizes, on
behalf of the People's Chamber, the execution of the
political, economic, cultural, social, and military tasks
of the state. All members of the council serve for a
period of 4 years. In early 1973 the council, in addition
to Chairman (Premier) Willi Stoph, two first deputy
chairmen, and 10 deputy chairmen, consisted of 28
ministers with portfolios and four heads of special
agencies having ministerial rank, with the following
areas of responsibility:'
Ministries:
Agriculture, Forestry, and Foodstuffs Industry
Bezirk Administered Industry and Food Industry
Chemical Industry
Coal and Energy
Construction
Cultural Affairs
Education
Electrical Engineering and Electronics
Environmental Protection and Water Management
Finance
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Economic Relations
Glass and Ceramics
Health
Agencies:
State Planning Commission
Price Office
State Bank
Workers Peasants Inspectorate
Heavy Machine Construction and Installation
Constriction
Interior
Justice
Light Industry
Material Management
National Defense
Ore Mining, Metallurgy, and Potash
Posts and Telecommunications
Processing Machine Construction and Vehicle
Construction
Science and Technology
State Security
Trade and Supply
Transport
University and Technical School Matters
Formerly the chairman was chosen by the party
having the greatest stre:,gth in the People's Chamber,
but under the 1968 constitution the Council of
State recommends a candidate for the office of
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the
nominee is then dutifully approved by the legislature.
'For a current listing of key government officials consult Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
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This procedure was not followed in 1971 when
Honecker, as SED party leader, nominated Willi
Stoph for the post. The chairman is empowered to
select his ministers, whose appointments in turn are
passed on by the People's Chamber. The Council of
Ministers is subordinate to both the People's Chamber
and nominally to the Council of State, and carries out
its activities within the framework of the decrees and
decisions of the two superbodies. The Council of
Ministers is empowered to adopt ordinances as
necessary to accomplish its objectives and is
theoretically responsible and accountable directly to
the People's Chamber. The locus of power within the
Council of Ministers resides in its Presidium, an inner
cabinet composed in early 1973 of the chairman
(Minister President) and 13 ministers, 10 of whom are
deputy chairmen.
The regime has sought to solve its continuing
economic problems partly by naking a series of
changes in the organization and personnel of the
Cou�Acil of Ministers. Since the New Economic System
was formulated in 1963, these changes generally have
reflected a desire to bring younger men trained in
economics, technology, and management into
government work in order to improve the efficiency of
the bureaucracy. The introduction of the so- called
technocrats into the governmental and party
apparatus, however, has not diminished the party's
control over economic decisionmaking. Most of the
technocrats are themselves ideologically committed to
communism and agree that the party must play the
leading role in all spheres of life. In October 1972 the
People's Chamber passed a law which increased the
power of the council and redefined its relation to the
other state organs. The primary intent of the law was
to strengthen the central economic planning
structures. It clarified individual ministerial
responsibilities and provided for greater coordination
between central organs and local agencies. In an effort
to improve planning coordination between rrunistries,
the law emphasized their collective responsibilities
and ac.:ountability to parliament.
SED leaders, moreover, completely control the
Council of Ministers. Willi Stoph is Minister
President -Prime Minister; 12 of the 14 men who sit on
the Presidium are SED members, of whom six
including Stoph are also members or candidate
members of the Politburo. Furthermore, each of the
ministries and administrative units whose top officials
comprise the Council of Ministers has a counterpart in
the SED apparatus from whom he receives direction
and guidance.
3. judiciary
The imposition of a Communist regime in East
Germany brought about sweeping changes in the legal
system which had been inherited from the past. Like
the other elements of government, the judiciary is
completely dominated by the SUD.
After a territorial reorganization in 1952, a series of
laws restructured the judicial system and established
the framework for court procedure. District and
county courts were created to replace the old state
(Land) courts, but these new courts and the local
prosecutors' offices were subordinated to the Ministry
of Justice, later designated as the central body for the
administration of justice. The Supreme Court
continued to function ostensibly as a separate branch
of government, but it became for all practical purposes
an instrument of the executive branch. Civil and
criminal cases were treated within the same system,
with direct appeals from lower to higher courts.
Procedural law, changed to accord with the Soviet
model, was designed to further the regime's objectives
rather than to serve abstract concepts of justice.
In 1963 judicial reforms were introduced after IS
months of preparation and public "discussion." These
changes revamped the judicial system, bringing it still
more closely into line with that of the Soviet Union.
The new legislation reduced considerably the
authority of the Ministry of Justice, attacked
intermittently since 1956 as being too Stalinist, by
ending its control over the lower courts and
prosecutors' offices. The Supreme Court was assigned
general supervision over the administration of justice
in the lower courts, and the Prosecutor General's office
was given administrative control over the district and
county prosecutors' offices. Party control remained
intact, however, and both the Supreme Court and the
Prosecutor General, constitutionally responsible to the
People's Chamber under both the old and new
constitutions, continued in practice to be "guided" by
the SED leadership.
The regime also followed the Soviet model in
introducing arbitration commissions in residential
areas, collectivized farms, and private enterprises, and
by extending the use of conflict commissions to settle
disputes in factories. These commissions were formed
to relieve the regular courts of minor civil and criminal
cases by transferring them to nonprofessional units
more responsive to pressures by local SED
organizations. The 1963 changes also reflected the
strong influence of Soviet judicial practice in the
emphasis placed on the need to reeducate offenders.
7
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52
GER NY
Ji J/ 1 Spree
ssau. Cottbus
1 N C0TTBUS
f V i
tt Halle
f- -r'
H A L L S
r L Leipzig O
to LEIPZIG DR I SDEM1
ERFU RT S0�
i t
t' Dreade
Eisenach Erfurto 1
Y Ge a ^1 1
refeld5 c OKarl -Marx- l`
Stadt
O Suhl KARL -MARX- Tepllce�
lY S U H L STADT
T Plauen
HO
CZECHOSI
10 lxlww 748 tz to
/S POTSDAM r POLAND
r
1r Odcr- Ila K. nal
FED AL 1
til MAG0EBURG'
FRANIKFURT
`BERLIN I Kietz.
REPO PC
Kostrzm
f
-t
Frankfurt O
Hannover r m
-'1 }Brandenburg otsda
g Helmstedt Marienborn
1 12 NOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 19 t a
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
EAST GERMANY
DE NMARK
80RNHOLM
4
(Danmark)
Soviet Zone boundary
Bezirk boundary B A L T I C S E A
o BeArk administrative center
R
J
5assnitz
0 25 5 0 7 5 Mites
1
0 ^5 50 75 Kilometers tr SUnd C I J,
t0 War e Q V R ostock O S T O C K I POMERANIAN
BAY
54 .s� l -5a
Wismar
Schwerin
O NEUBRANDENBURIG
Hamburg J jjjJJJ Sic H W E R I N Neubrandenburg I Sz in
I I 1
chwanheide (St ela �Is
Sc�
Ludwigslust
r
.sf.JI y
IA
RABUE
FIGURE 3. Administrative subdivisions (U/OU)
S
a�
s
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.i-' Magdeburg I
I l
l 1
1
/S POTSDAM r POLAND
r
1r Odcr- Ila K. nal
FED AL 1
til MAG0EBURG'
FRANIKFURT
`BERLIN I Kietz.
REPO PC
Kostrzm
f
-t
Frankfurt O
Hannover r m
-'1 }Brandenburg otsda
g Helmstedt Marienborn
1 12 NOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 19 t a
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
EAST GERMANY
DE NMARK
80RNHOLM
4
(Danmark)
Soviet Zone boundary
Bezirk boundary B A L T I C S E A
o BeArk administrative center
R
J
5assnitz
0 25 5 0 7 5 Mites
1
0 ^5 50 75 Kilometers tr SUnd C I J,
t0 War e Q V R ostock O S T O C K I POMERANIAN
BAY
54 .s� l -5a
Wismar
Schwerin
O NEUBRANDENBURIG
Hamburg J jjjJJJ Sic H W E R I N Neubrandenburg I Sz in
I I 1
chwanheide (St ela �Is
Sc�
Ludwigslust
r
.sf.JI y
IA
RABUE
FIGURE 3. Administrative subdivisions (U/OU)
S
a�
s
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1 12 NOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 19 t a
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
EAST GERMANY
DE NMARK
80RNHOLM
4
(Danmark)
Soviet Zone boundary
Bezirk boundary B A L T I C S E A
o BeArk administrative center
R
J
5assnitz
0 25 5 0 7 5 Mites
1
0 ^5 50 75 Kilometers tr SUnd C I J,
t0 War e Q V R ostock O S T O C K I POMERANIAN
BAY
54 .s� l -5a
Wismar
Schwerin
O NEUBRANDENBURIG
Hamburg J jjjJJJ Sic H W E R I N Neubrandenburg I Sz in
I I 1
chwanheide (St ela �Is
Sc�
Ludwigslust
r
.sf.JI y
IA
RABUE
FIGURE 3. Administrative subdivisions (U/OU)
S
a�
s
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V
X
In January 1968 the People's Chamber adopted a
new penal code to replace the outmoded code which
hid formed the basis of civil law in both Germanies
since 1871. The new code, which was 5 years in the
drafting, is a "socialist" model in that it places great
emphasis on the political aspects of "socialist
legality," i.e., assuring the submission of the
individual to the state. The death penalty is prescribed
as maximum punishment for i 1 crimes, most of which
relate to political offenses. Several of These are newly
created in the code and include crimes against the
sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and
war crimes. In contrast to the harsh sentences meted
out for political offenses, the code prescribes more
lenient treatment of persons convicted of various
criminal and civil misdeeds. For example, the
punishment for petty theft, rape, slander, homosexual-
ity, and bigamy has been reduced or completely
eliminated. As in the case of its educational reforms,
the regime probably was eager to focus public
attention on certain relatively progressive provisions of
the new code as compared to West Germany's archaic
1871 code.
4. Local government
Theoretically, independent units of self government
are elected at the district, county, city, town, and
precinct level. Under the cop the local bodies
are empowered to make decisions and organize the
citizens to deal with the political, economic, social,
and cultural issues which arise at the various levels of
local government. In practice, however, each level of
local government is closely supervised and controlled
by the SED, almost to the same extent as the central
governmental bodies. In 1952 the regime reorganized
the subordinate units of government, replacing the
five historic states (Laender) with 14 districts (Bezirke)
whose boundaries are shown on Figure 3. These 14
districts are divided into 218 counties (Kreim), and
8,845 communities (Gemeinden). East Berlin, the
capital of the German Democratic Republic, functions
in practice�but not legally �as the 15th Bezirk.
At each level of local government, the elected
assembly selects an executive council, but local
autonomy is virtually nonexistent. The local
assemblies and their councils actually serve to impose
the SED leadership's wil' at various levels of local
government. In 1963 further changes were made at the
local level to provide still more control mechanisms for
the party. In the heavily populated urban areas 750
new residential subdivisions, corresponding to
precincts, were created, and committees were formed
within these subdivisions to "help improve life and
eliminate shortcon sings." Nominally controlled by the
National Front, these committees actually work under
the direction of closely knit party organizations guided
by the central party organization in East Berlin.
C. Political dynamics (U /OU)
1. The SED and its development
The history of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) is for
all practical purposes the history of the Ge -man
Democratic Republic. The SED has created a
governmental structure in which all elements of
political power are monopolized by the party.
Although this system is cloaked in the forms of
parliamentary democracy, au interlocking network of
party and government controls fires power in the
hands of the SED leadership, headed since May 1971
by Erich Honecker.
Walter Ulbricht and other C -rman Communists
who had been political exiles in the U.S.S.R. during
the Hitler period, returned to Germany with Soviet
twops in May 1945 to act as the political arm of the
Soviet occupation forces. At the outset, Soviet
occupation authorities disclaimed any intention of
imposing Soviet -style communism, and the German
Communists talked of favoring a parliamentary
democratic republic. In addition to the Communist
Party of Germany (KPD), three political parties �the
Christian Democratic Union, Liberal Democratic
Party, and the Social Democratic Party �were allowed
to organize.
Behind this facade of multiparty democracy. the
Soviet Military Administration manipulated or
coerced all parties into following policies compatible
with Soviet aims. In April 1946 the SED was created
by a forced merger of the r establisbed KPD, led by
Wilhelm Pieck and Ulbricht, and the old Social
Democratic Party (SPD), led by Otto Grotew
Despite the initial enthusiasm of many Socialists for a
unified party, the final merger was in large part the
result of coercive acts by the Soviet Military
Administration which was determined to develop East
German political life according to the Soviet example.
Grotewohl and Pieck were elected joint chairmen of
the new party, and Ulbricht became the srcretan-
general. From thr outset, elements which did not
acquiesce in C'.ommunist leadership were deprived of
the possibility of giving public expression to their
views because of the Communist control of
newspapers and other communications media. The
SED, conforming to Stalinist policy, proceeded slowly
in its attempt to "persuade" the people to choose
y l
J
a
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"socialism." Initially, the SED tried to Rain support
by stressing "democratic socialism" and German self
identity, i.e., the concept of a "German road to
socialism." The continuing failure to gain widespread
support from the people, however, together with the
breakdown of the uneasy cooperation between the
U.S.S.R. and its wartime allies, led Moscow and the
SED to harden their attitude and to abandon the
gradualist approach.
Until 1948 the SED was not a cadre party in the
Leninist sense, but u Socialist mass part) of 2 million
members. The expulsion of Yugoslavib from the
Comintern in 1948 provided the impetus for Ulbricht
and the other Fast German Communist leaders to
transform the SED into a tightly controlled and highly
disciplined organization modeled after the Soviet
Communist Party. Shortly after, Ulbricht declared the
SED "a party of a new type" �in other words, a
Leninist party �which was to be the "self- conscious
and organized vanguard of the working class." This
decision meant disavowal of the concept of a
"German road to socialism," recognition of the
leading role of the Soviet Commons Party, and
certain important organizational changci. Tie top
leadership was solidly packed w ith l,ll,richt's
adherents from the Moscow emigration and from lira)
Communist circles. The party membership at all level
was drastically purged, with prominent Social
Democrats and those with Western contacts the No to
go New party statutes were adopted which reflected
the latest Soviet Conmunist Party practims. and n ^w
reluirrment% for party mrmbcnhip. involving a
period of candidacy and intensive indoctrination.
were put into effect.
The years 1419 -53 reflected the high point of Fast
German "Suilinism With the ulbricht element
firmly in eontvol. the party committal itself to an
rconormic program of accelerated communisation and
imlintrialization. and took the initial strp% toward
farm cSnllrrfivisation and emulation of the S oviet
rxamplr as the oniv legitimate monirl for the party and
the government As popular rrwr_ awnt grrw 1 "Ibrio he
.again "irtrd to purges, culminating in the re rx.yal
from office it May 19.33 of the party's then wwrrd�
ranking man. Fran.- Dahlem. for "political
bdindne%% The purges. h~vrr. wrtr ntA a% brutal as
lixne shies oururrrd r1w%her� in F.aslrm Funopr,
and this may help 113 rxp6url the rrlatt,.r miking." 44
the post- Stalin rraciMr
Fvrnts in the U S H caused complictiliors in Vao
Germany. Stalin's death and rvk%rncv of mnfu.km
and competition among his surevwm were rrf6lyd
in conflicting dirmlivm cnncrming %laic ow's German
10
policy and East Germany's internal policy. Within the
SED leadership, Minister for State Security Wilhelm
Zaisser and putty ideol Rudolf Herrnstadt called
for a change in the party line and for the removal of
Ulbricht. Internal problems and Soviet pressure forced
the regime to retreat from the tough line it had
previously taken on such matters as workers'
production Am and the attitude toward the middle
classes and the churches. The attempt by certain labor
unions to resort to strikes as a means of improving their
standard of living led to the uprising of 17 June 1953.
Although the rioting had a profound psychological
impact in East Germany, only about 5% of the
industrial work force actually went on strike, and the
resulting clashes resulted in only 21 fatalities.
SED officials reacted "in a confused and bewildered
manner,' as Ulbricht later confessed. Party
organizations in major cities where SPD traditions
were strong joined the riolers in demands for
Ulbricht'% ouster. Even alter Soviet troops had restored
order, the party remained badly shaken.
Ulbricht with strong Soviet backing �lost little
time in moving to re labli%h his authority over the
patty and slate. J aiv%cr and Hrrmstadt were expelled
from the leadership, and later from the party. on
charges of forming a "party faction with defeatist
aims Othee prominent SFD figures were rrrwved
from their govrrnment positions, and worn wrrr tried
and impriwonel lot complicity in the uprising
Ulbricht also ousted "enrmy elements in the party.
possibly a% man as 20. 0411 functionaries and 7P010
rank -aril -file part members urn purged These
mrasu". hocked by the shots of Soviet ford'. wrrr
sufficient to present am serious challenge to
11hrichl's Iradrnhip for the next 3 wars
The wo- c-alled thaw in Srnirt larmn arxl cultural
policies in Itl -3.1,56 did tx,t inobxr Ihr Faro German
regime to make mraninitful rntxr%tinn% b, ids own
inlrllectoal communit. with llw tmull that man%
Fast German writrn awl artist.� inclawling SED
mrmhrr�- -Iwgwd that 111'tichl mighl I*- osrorr,
because of his idenlilicaliorr with the Stalinist pnlicim
condemned h,. Khrnhchry of the 21t1h lwnirl
01mmunisl Part% 01111tr" 11brichl ma"Ked to Iw,id
on to his pnutkm b% marx�u,.rong the SED 0 -nital
smmillrr Into %istr ssf c.mlArocr. while insliluling
a lest limilad measures to Iwortr the rimer sd its
Slalinisl past An in%"igwlksn of pest illr"Idirs was
lauraciaad. which tesu in .amrw11s lot is large
number of political priulnrn A sprcial SFD
commission. established to w%lru prsl purses.
trtrrmmen" the wh ilitatkm of Da hlrm And nt hrt
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5
Y
individuals, and many of them were given fairly
Important state offices.
During the Polish and Hungarian crises in the
autumn of 1956 East Germany remained relatively
calm. The arrest and subsequent conviction and
imprisonment for 10 years of Wolfgang Harich, a
young professor of Marxist philosophy at Humboldt
University in East Berlin and the most outsli oken of
the intellectual critics, served to discourage open
rebellion. less severe reprisals in the form of removal
from jobs, demotions, and reprimands were meted out
to other "deviationist" SED intellectuals. The fact
that dissident individuals could still escape to the Wcst
was also a reason for the lack of widespread active
resistance during this penal.
The next challenge to Ulbricht's party leadership
was far mote serious, as it was led by Karl Schirdewan.
Polithuro member and heir presumptive to l.:lbricht.
and by Fred Oelmner, the SED's chief ideologist. Both
men opposed Ulbricht' dmitr to increase the pace of
wxialira lion. mainly on Kroundi of economic
efficiency hot apparently alv heca(rsr they thought
that %och changes would impede German reunifica-
lion. Other high parts official,* backed the die
leader%, a% did Minister for State Security Etnst
%vollwrhrt.
The %houdown cache in Frhnlat% 191A when
Schitdrwan. (Tefs%ret. and N'ollwrlrt Awl their
followrn weir pnrgel. Schinlrwan anal Wollar'wr
"err am(nrd of "factional acti%itim. i e oplwr%ing
Ulbrich# The following seat. hour et. all etcrpt
Wollwrbet is%urd poiNic recantatiow of their rarfirt
prwitions and pledged their loyally In lllotichl Thi%
%a% to he the last of the %weeping peirgei of the
Politfnttrr. awl for the rwtl decade w so that iwnl% was
to be a lairds irliahlr imininwrll of thr purls
leadrrship
('IMichl pluna(d lotwanl with A prr.gram rsf
Actelrtatrd io47ialisaliotl. Atwl mrntraloalkm
furl the %mirl tiwnlel. And rTV w�mic rtpatnl M #in 11w
boot of a Se%rn Year Plan -411 ohrdientl%
ruhhrhtarnped. h% the l'ifrh Par% Camttmir held in
)rib IWA "ihr hash (Arm d +sr in
rAtls 19W. "it"i nwnri to test*W1 tri Wihint
memtwt% of tllr n*Mlr clans to r/wotr Niitlgrnl
rottttols. ,and. a ,*rAt lalrt. the 604" walign;twmI of
F.A %l (�rt11an ind"S1111 (o Mille ihr 47"181111
"Invalnrtahk to Nest (;#t n ecMwotook rrmnlot-
measrtr". bud to wfunp eesAwoaik (ithlrttl and ttlaos
nithts In the Nra Drs(tile thr pttNni%r nl ttlntr
purllrntr pllli47umi. oplt lhr hai%h vrcgHlt mmaufm
a�ndAtrd with thr hailrling of lily "a "All 641rd
the refugee exodus and prevented odic probable
collapse of the Ulbricht regime.
The Berlin wall, it conspicuous acknowledgement of
the serious problems facing the regime, was considered
by the East German leaden to be a necessary
prerequisite for the economic recovery of East
Germany and the strengthening of SF D con(rol.
Despite the wave of indignation which the building of
the wall evoked in the West, it enabled the regime to
halt the refugee flow, restore discipline, and to turn its
full attention to necessary changes in economic policy.
In 1962 Ulbricht began to abandon the "ideological"
approach to economics, dropping the Seven Year Plan
and quietly substituting more realistic annual Mans.
Al the same time he institute(] governmental
organizational and policy changes designed to provide
a more rational approach to East Germany'% basic
economic ptohlems. This rmphasi %on a more practical
approach to economic problems A a% reflected at the
Sixth Party C onKrrvt, held in January 196.3. where
younger, icchnicalh trained party functionaries were
raised into higher leadership positions.
The party'% preomupation with economic problem%
%a% (nrlher indicated In the decision of the Party
Congres,*. implemented in Februar} 1963. fry
terKanisr the party amirding to the "production
principle Imitating change% prrviomh initiated in
the Srniet Communist Part% In khnnhcNe.. the SF.D
(cnvohdaled it% e"rtrol mer the economy In creating
wpotatr party hurra(n for the acricslllrital And
indrntrial btancl o-% off the Mvirwms
Thu change% wrtr mimitrd in a mintani) of
the burr le%Pl SED ontaniration While {rasing %one
mrasutr of anlonom% to the A%wwiateon% rd Peoplr-
r/arwd ind(nttir% O NIl sl. The SED in18ihl (o im18tr it%
(control tnri the ecntwom% At the lrwrt Irsrli hs
trplaring the fotmrt dislod. Aiwl %c.unl% Irsrl
rte nti%r h18trails In (isr -men wwrtlarials 'thr nra
ww"IArials (lmaislel of A first Im? 'In Awl %r47trlAtir%
lot agrictltotr. iorliolm. agitAti(m. And itdr.aoRs
Three ovictural chAnar% wrtr acscrm"ni-ti in mAn�
caw h% prru nnrl thangm ahich ro%Aldrd the %F0 1r,
trptacr inelfrctisr lone /irhatiri with %"18ngrt Awl
rtwtr tr47hnicallt (swroprtrnt men
Dri(dtr 1 I1itichl :Iaim. thr ItAl %1r18e118tAl
lesetani>atMwl ratmA alnwssl At roam pri.hkms (o+
thr Pohl,* as it v%lsrd Ahhosrth murk liter And rflerrl
artr rrww In U�plrnlrnt the per.etih" rhangrs.
the SED I41rt quirt{% lollowrd the IrAd of
khtaclwllr% WTv* ot. aho twtan in lair 1%%4 10
AbOrAFM 111r Ir rdu47ttnn p4itltiph And in 1.1 1Ahlido
Ihr Irttilotial plinYi* A% Illy inirmirm CVWV t in
rhr patls's ottAnilwtion Thu SIF-D. hnartrt.
11
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r. -.v.. .r. wr� Jc.'.'," -J k wu w.. r tPw !f[Zl4J1YM1 1.
4
1
i
continued to emphasize the necessity of solving
economic problems, and Rave lower priority to brooder
political and ideological issues. Several high -level
party memben later criticized this development,
pointing out that ideological work had partially faded
into the background because of the preoccupation
with economic problems, and that party meetings had
often taken on the nature of "pr(Auction discussions."
The regime's overriding interest in ecxmomic theory
and development fluctuated, as various officials
expressed eoncem that the role of the party and
indoctrination in Marxism- Leninism were bring
neglected At the Seventh Congress of the SED in
April 1467 Ulbricht expounded his concept of "the
developer social system of socialism" which. as later
amplified, implied that socialism as it exisled in the
German Democratic Republic was a distinct and
independent social order and was not merely a
stepping shone to communism. Ile podwyc l the GDR
as a model to be follor:ed. this drempha%izing the
Sovirf example avid riperience. F uribermorr. Ulbrichi
b egan incrra%inghv to sfrrsa national themes, and at
times appeared to he drooling went altenliovo to the
interests of intetnalional c.mmoni%m as defined h%
the 5mirf Communist Part%.
Ulbricht fascination with science and atxlrac:
economic thetn wrtr not tha"I by all. houmrr In
April 19fi9. whit (:mchcnlovak dmclopmenl% �till
bring shatpl% debated and idekgicai factionalism at
an alltime higfu within the Commooisl world_
Polithuoo member H o rieclter fold the IIN plenum cif
the (:cotta) Committee that part% discipline was at
important at rtymomic dr%rkvmrnl ile castigaled
supixwfrn of thr Iherw%' !i r that
capitalism and rnmmuni%rn wrtr coming moor :vrxfl
move to trwmhle each other. at wrll as trformrn and
tr%itiirtish. aril hinted that his trmatks wet, totrtxkd
as much for drMvett tYwnompii'm at (tw knomn
nm %rtkkt such as Cr fxwknakia and mini.+nia
Fmplatit coot permililan irainin t Icst thn�rgh
inicittifird programs ttxwm trd in the socirh for
Sport and Trchnolfv% RAT). the F ree (.rtman lmilh
401). avid Ermt thaeltrunn Pwwxrn. al�mt with
incirawd part% indowidnalkwt, rntrwigIr d with thr
ginrrnvternl t inrv`ratint c.wxrm net kIrssk�tkal
dr%ial At hotrvr And a hti.ad
Lrading pail% kltwliigist Kurt ilagry tuppnrtrd
Ilcwiftltrt In strr�aiteg thr tmprwtancr n) pl.annivit and
Ihr parh_t tale in ditimlint klenlitg% and culheral
dr%rkj>.xtt%
nrKaniralion decidm that the camlidate (I#" nol rt
hw-v all the netr�wn Iuali(icatiom to he an SF I)
mcnilx�t. it nui% woh +nK hit candidavh prrirxl (tor
an thrr ear The dir it,ion of the ImOv p.rh
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r
A
organization finally to approve or disapprove the
candidate's application or to prolong the candidacy
period are confirmed by the next highest party
organization.
In addition to its large party organization, the SED
leadership has immediately under its control the
Workers Militia (Kampfgruppen), a paramilitary
adjunct estimated to number around 350,000 persons,
armed and trained by the People's Police. The
Workers Militia was formed in 1953 following the
uprising in June, and its primary task is the protection
c -f the state owned enterprises against acts which
would disrupt proxluction or endanger public order.
Thev are, therefore, particularly concerned with civil
disturbances, and they cooperate with police units in
the prevention and suppression of strikes, riots, and
other disorders. In addition to being trained in the use
of small arms and riot control, the Workers Militia
participates in full field exercises employing
machineguns, mortars. antitank gams, and armored
scou cars. Training has become more rigorous since
1967. and during the (:zechcnlovakia crisis in 1%. h
some units reportedly were given orientation lectures
because of the possibility that they might sec action in
the soccupxation of (.l. ^choslovakia.
Part% control of the Workers Militia remains in tl
hands of the SED securih leaders from the higho st
levels in the (ventral Committee to local securih
secretaries and through them to the immediate level cif
commanden of the basic groups of 1(X) meta. T hese
basic groups are called Hunder(srhaften. a term used
by ancient Germanic tribes as early as the first centun
to describe the hundred hest warriors in a "immunih.
The Workers Militia is the largest organization in fast
German, with the etception of the ?egular military
forces. to which weap!ns are made available.
Although the capabilih of the Workers Militia has
been questioned in the exist. recent emphasis on
training and indoctrination ma% have improved its
of Ie�1i %enM%
3. Party leadenhip
until Ma% 1971 Walter Ulbricht (Figure 5)
occupied the summit of the SED organization and
fvmished the driving force for the party and for East
Germam. a. u wluole
Boom in I.eiprig in IW3 of socialist parents.
ull,richt joined the SPD in 1912 and helped found the
German communist Party after World War I
t'Ibricht quickly demonstrated the quatitim of
Iho;oughnns and pretWence that have since led many
biographers to describe him as the perfect bureaucrat.
tie was self assured, if somewhat unimaginative, but
burdened with the pedantic mannerisms of an old
fashioned schoolteacher. Ulbricht was a hard worker,
did not drink or smoke, and prided himself on physical
fitness. As the SED First Secretary after 1953, he was
directly responsible for adopting and overseeing the
execution of regime policies.
On several occasions prior to 1961 Ulbricht's
authority was challenged from within the party, and
there were widespread public hopes that he might be
purged in the wake of de- Stalinization moves in the
U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries.
Ulbricht, however, was able on every occasion to
counter all challenges and dash the hopes of the
populace by convincing the Soviet leaders that his
demotion or replacement would weaken the regime
nand raise a threat to continued Soviet control of Fast
Germany. For almost a decade after the erection of the
Berlin wall in 1961. Ulhricht's authority was virtually
unchallenged and he proceeded with great vigor to
consolidate. Communist rule in East Germany.
Although he slowed his pace somewhat, delegating
more power to other members of the Politburo and
attempting to assume the role of an elder statesman
who was alorve day -to -day events, them w�.as little
doubt that Ulbricht remained in control of the SED
and of Fast Germany.
Even while Ulbricht remained envYnced as part%
leader. it group of able younger men had begun the
climb to top positions in the party. Despite their
differing views on the problems facing the regime, this
younger group had risen through the party ranks
under Ulbricht's tutelage and they were all apparently
convinced of the necessity of continued East German
dependence on the Soviet Union. There were reporh
and speculation that SED leaden were divided. with
the "hard" faction or "dogmatish" allegedly led by
Erich lionecker (Figure 5). and the "xft" f +;ction or
"technocrats" Ind by Premier Willi Stoph (Filtorr .i).
There was no firm evidence to substantiate such
repxrts, however. particularly when the leadership
dertumstrated that it was capable of closing ranks and
presenting it united fnrnt when other potentially
divisive i%sa.es anise
Since taking the reins of txwrr. llonecker has
pnven to be at capable and acceptalale %txxr%%ir to
Ulbricht Despite the laatirr's long years of dedicated
wrvicr. there were apparently few tears shed at his
demotion. Initial Western press speculation pnstalated
that Ilonmker was tow colo,rl and too) %tomialized in
cadre and securih af fairs to he able to sucYrs
handle the "implicated economic problems which
had been the focus of criticism since the 14111 plenum
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in December 1970. It was predicted that a triumvirate,
possibly consisting of Stoph, Honecker, and Guenter
Mittag would be formed. Honecker has, however,
established himself as primus inter pares.
Erich Honecker was born in 1912 in the Saar. At the
age of 10 he was enrolled by his father in the
Communist children's movement, and later trans-
ferred to the youth movemew where he rose quickly to
high -level positions. After spending 10 years (1935 -45)
in Nazi prisons, he returned to the Soviet occupation
zone where he was given the very important job of
organizing the Free German Youth (FDJ). Honeeker's
success in building the FDJ led to candidate
membership in the Politburo in 1950. llr. was
promoted to full membership in 1958 and became the
secretary responsible for security and cadre affairs.
Long before the actual transfer of power,
Honecker's position as Ulbricht's heir designate had
been unquestioned. His experience and connections in
the FDJ, the party bureaucracy, and the security
apparatus assured him the support of these key
.elements. Even more important, howe Honecker
was acceptable to Moscow because of his unswerving
loyalty to the Soviet Communist Party, his seeming
immunity to nationalist tendencies, and the likeli-
hood that he would he prepared to subordinate SED
intcrest -r those of Moscow if a situation were to
arise in which a choice had to be made.
The Honecker style of leadership combines a strict
adherence to ideologicp) principles with a willingness
to find pragmatic soluutions to diffucuit social and
economic problems. Though his strength lies in
organizational and cadre -vork, he opposes a
beavyhanded bureaucratic approach to salving
problems. At the Eighth Party Congress he criticized
tendencies which had developel under Ulbricht
including ohstinacy, bureaucratism, paper- pushing.
and the penchant for taking too optimistic a view of
developments. Honecker is deeply devoted to the
SED, but he wants it to be a party which does not rely
on punitive administrative measures to command
loyalty
Several trends have become evident since Honecker
took office. On the one hand there has been the
Nttempt M strengthen political cor*trols of the SED
over Fast German society. This included KivinK
increased weight to political attitude, over
performance rreards. and assigning an increasingly
important role to the cabinet -level Worken and
Farmers Inspectorate (ABI) which has the responsibil�
ity to implement party resolutions affecting the
economy and society. Simultaneously, the SED has
also taken steps to raise the morale of the people by
lrlM Ilan -Mar
fine Secreurr (1951)�
wariw Lawb.ra
N1*10- 40%71
4
trrllll lagU
wale. urwkht
A16M Nwdm
PnA hewer
Sammy (lM)
FIGURE S. Party Lt>adsrs MOU)
16
rZil
M
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we
Hermann Axon
International Affairs (1965)�
4440
L A
echenberger
lfo
lei
Horst Slndermann
Herbert Werwke
i
Friedrich Ebert Gerhard Grueneberg Kurt Hager
Agriculture (1958)` Culture. Science. and
Ideology (1951)
Werner Krolikowski
JOINED CENTRAL
BORN PARTY COMMITTEE CANDIDATE TO POLITBURO
�FULL POLITBURO MEMBERS:
HONECKER (First Secretary)
1693
ULERICHT (Chairman)
18991 AXEN
EBERT
r� GRUENEBERG
HAGER
KROLIKOWSKI
LAMBERZ
MITTAG
MUECKENSERGER
NEUMANN
NORDEN
SINDERMANN
STOPH
VERNER
WAANKE
CANDIDATE MEMBERS
EWALD
r HALBRITTER
JAROWINSKY
KLEIBER
MIELKE
T MUELLER
TISCH
1 1 1 1 l l 1 1
1100 1910 1120 1110 1110 1150 1W 1170
Geotg Ewald
t
Margaete Mwller
11)
1
fA
Harry TI�ch
Supply (1911)' 'Arta of r iW'ry end Free of e00- m"'tnt M Se.eMeetet
I C- r d000%
Walter Halbrltter Werner Gwnther Klelber Erich Mielbe
Foe" Trade P4
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ECtN'ryyr' ^?h *l. m:, ar� 't}w T:� p., r, wn; a� t! r+ xr. n?msaCr" EM? l` t" B:` 7fi'tlus"F!4'ry'R9YS!s1?ProTI r y "4r'"S'J' dux, l, 3?! a yl!rP; :,vR
V
i
I
improving living standards and increasing outlays for
social welfare.
4. Collaborating parties and organizations
In addition to the SED there are four other political
parties, all of which are virtual adjuncts of the SED
and are permitted to exist only because they lend
democratic coloration to the regime. The collaborat-
ing parties, along with four of the more important
ltass organizations and the SED, are organized
collectively as the National Front. The collaborating
parties serve the SED chiefly by organizing those
sectors of the population which the SED would have
difficulty in reaching �the surviving remnants of the
bourgeoisie and small farmers�and by providing
channels through which the East German line can be
propagated among West German parties representing
similar interest groups. An indication of the extent to
which the collaborating parties are captives of the
SED is provided by their decision in the spring of 1972
to le -id the drive to nationalize industries which
remained in private hands. These parties also provide
personnel for East German missions to foreign
countries, especially nonaligned countries, where the
presence of such "non- Communist" functionaries is
inte-ded to strengthen East Germany's claim to be a
democratic republic. Leading officials of the
collaborating parties are often assigned to head
various friendship societies and are given representa-
tive positions in the government�especially in the
Council of State �in an effort to stress the rnultipariv
nature of the rt gime.
a. Non Communist front parties
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), formed in
I 1945, originally represented the same Christiar-
oriented, middle class elements which organized the
CDU in the Western occupation zones. The CDU
soon ran into difficulty, however, because of its
opposition to the SED a -il conflicts with the Soviet
Military Administration, as a result of -vhich
prominent pane leaders were forced to step down. The
CDU had lost as independent character by 1948, and
since then it h is functioned as an auxiliary of the SED.
Ai its sixth ;tarty congr s, held in 1952, the CDU
reorganized itself on the SED pattern, creating a
political committee (cor:espording to the SED's
Central Committee) and a presidium (Politburo).
Gerald Goettiag, long the most powerful figure in the
CDU, became the formal head of the party when he
succeeded August Bach as chairman of the CDU aft -r
the latter's death i.. Match 1966 Goetting had >:arlier
been rewarded for faithful service to the SED by being
placed on the Council of State. Although the CDU is
organized on a district and local level and publishes
several newspapers, thereby giving the impression that
it is a thriving organization, its membership has
steadily dwindled from a high of approximately
217,000 in 1947 to t ^ss than 80,000 in 1968, at which
level it appears to have stabilized.
Tlw German Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) was
formed in 1945 to represent middle class East Germans
who had a "liberal creed and democratic political
convictions." The party accepted the need to work
with all anti Fascist parties, but its espousal of private
property and a free economy soon placed it in conflict
with SED and Soviet authorities. In the face of
constant pressure and harassment, the LDPD
leadership slowly retreated from its original program
and by 1952 it agreed to participate in "the building
of socialism" in East Germany. In 1957 the LDPD
accepted the leadership of the SED, thereby
confirming its position as a mere adjunct of that part;.
The LDPD is led by Dr. Manfred Gerlach and is
estimated to have a membership of about 75,000.
The German National Democratic Party (NDPD),
headed by Dr. Heinrich Homann, was formed in May
1918 to extend the SED's influence over former low
level Nazis who had "broken with their past" and
professional soldiers, to whom the party appealed by
ern r hasizing the r ationalistic aspects of East German
policy. Like the w.her collaborating parties, the NDPD
has attempted to contact similar elements in West
Germany, apparently with only minor success. Unlike
t're other non -SED parties, however, the NDPD has
increased in membership, growing from 1.,000
members in 1949 to approximately 120,000 in early
1W9, where it has stabilized.
The German Democratic Peasants Party (DBD) was
created by the SED in 1948 to win over the farmers
and farm workers to the party's brand of socialism.
Once nominally representative of farmer., with small
holdings who had profited from the SF:D's early land
reforms, the DBD surrendered all pretense to being
independent when it supported the regimis decision
to collectivize agriculture in 196(1. The party is le I by
Ernst Goldenhaum and Paul Scholz and has
appruaimately 80,000 members. Of the four
collaborating parties. the DBD is perhaps the least
influential.
It. Mass organizations
Like the four political partir-,, the so- called muss
organizations have been .ta`lished w appeal to
genuine or alleged group interests, and they operate
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k''?'� 9r:'!,'^ f3.�?, S' F, rl.'' fm' fA .wE+vrt::,rq'!'Mrd!r+xFr ra5! s. GC^ S?^ q' tfl'*�. Ffrrw. r� m,.,+� wc' N!!! YC" P:^ rt?!! rtn*?'.' N"-^ Y'! r.., r: t*�" 1K-: i:!+ rM' ft' iA4": vc:*+G.'Ff�M.!`,,!Cr'4tW`f'"y x. �f A0. '+'nrp ��;?STHA7�h.'1PIK.''
under direct SED guidance. The four major
organizations are the Free German Trade Union
Federation (FDGB), the Free German Youth (FDJ),
the Democratic Women's Leagu,, of Germany (DFD),
and the German Cultural Association (DKB). From
the regime's point of view, the organizations provide a
convenient channel for transmitting party directives to
the rank and file and mobilizing the people to achieve
variolis objectives set by the regime. At the same time
because these mass organizations are represented in
the national and local legislatures through the
National Front single -list elections tickets, they afford
a supplementary means of directing popular interest
into regime- approved channels. From the viewpoint of
the ordinary citizen, membership in the organizations
is attractive only because certain privileges can be
obtained. Marry persons wishing to rise economically
or politically find that participation in one or more of
the organizations is a prerequisite.
The FDGB, organized in 1945 and affiliated since
1949 with the Communist controlled World Federa-
tion of Trade Unions, is the organization which
nominally represents all East German workers. In
contrast to the role of trade union federations in the
West, the FDGB does not represent the interests of the
workers but instead functions as an agent of the
regime, cooperating with m in the
nationalized industries and with the state administra-
tions in Setting up and enforcing production quotas
and in maintaining control over workers. The FDGB
also -administers the social insurance program and
operates rest homes.
The federation and its member unions are organized
on a territorial basis, with executive bodies at national,
district, county, and local levels. The highest body of
the FDGB is its congress, which meets every 4 years to
elect a chairman (SED Politburo member Herbert
Warnke in 1972) and a presidium to lead the
organization. In 1972 the FDGB claimed 7.2 million
members (or about 88% of the total work force), but
many persons have joined the organization merely to
avoid losing jobs, privileges, or certain benefits.
The FDJ and its junior affiliate, the Ernst
Thaelmann Pioneers, whic;i includes the Young
Pioneers, were among the first organizations permitted
by the S(,viet authorities in 1945 -46. Patterned after
the Soviet youth organization, the FDJ exercises
important functions in the educational and political
indoctrination of East German children and youths.
Its chief function is to prepare future cadres for the
SED. The FDJ maintains an extensive program of
activities and facilities, including sports events,
premilitary training, trips and expeditions, parades
and rallies, recreational centers, and vacation camps.
An affiliate of Communist -front World Federation of
Democratic Youth, the FDJ accepts members 14 to 26
years of age; most of these members were previously
enrolled in the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers, which is
open to children 6 to 14 years of age. The FDJ
organization is patterned after that of the SED, with
bodies at the local and district level receiving direction
from the nation. I leaders. A congress meets every 4
years to elect a central council, a bureau, and a
secretariat to conduct FDJ affairs until the next
congress. The FDJ claimed 1.7 million members in
May 1972, while the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers had
some 1.8 million.
Despite strenuous recruitment campaigns and the
preference given to FDJ members for the most
desirable jobs and for admission to the universities, the
FDJ has not attracted East German youth to the
extent desired by the SED. Only about 60% of the 14-
to 26 -year age group are members. Various concessions
granted by the regime to youth and efforts to enliven
the g:nerally monotonous FDJ meetings and
publications have not been productive.
The Democratic Women's League of Germany
(DFD) was founded in August 1948 with the goal of
drawing women into more active participation in the
economic life of the nation. Despite intensive
membership campaigns, the majority of women have
not joined its ranks. Total membership has remained
constant at 1.3 million.
The German Cultural Association (DKB) was
created in 1945 by the Soviet military authorities and
was ittusted with the task of unifying all members of
the intelligentsia. Since the early 19.50's the creative
artists, musicians and writers, have had their own
autonomous organizations, but the association, with
its 185,000 members, plays a peripheral role by
sponsoring lectures, discussions, poetry readings,
concerts, and exhibitions.
Other large organizations include the Society for
German- Soviet Friendship (GDSF) and the German
Gymnastics and Sports Association (DTSB). Each
organization is patently designed to propagandize and
control a specific cross section of the population. A
more specialized role is played by the Society for Sport
and Technology (CST), which was organized in 1952
under the Ministry for National Defense to provide
guidance and facilities for premilitary training and
sports activities which are useful in military service.
The society offers marksmanship, driver training,
telecommunications operation, parachuting, and
other related activities.
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E
t
4
4
The National Front, in addition to representing the
parties and mass organizations, purports to represent
the population as a whole and functions as the vehicle
for presenting candidates for office at all levels of
government. The National Front is organized on a
residential basis; each apartment house or group of
houses (in rural areas, even the smallest hamlet) elects
a delegation to the National Front Committee for a
specified locality or region. From these local
committees a hierarchical structure ascends to the
central controlling body called the National
Committee of the National Front. The entire
organization propagates the official line whenever the
regime wishes to make the "popular will" apparent on
questions of national significance� particularly in
connection with elections.
D. National policies (U /OU)
In the early postwar years the Soviet occupation
forces laid down the policy guidelines and the Socialist
Unity Party (SED) acted, for the most part, as an
executory agent. Soviet officials determined the
breadth and scope of the reforms social, educational,
agricultural, and industrial �which overturned the
existing system and provided the framework for the
development of a new social and political structure. In
their day -to -day decisions, however, the Soviet
occupation authorities appeared to be pursuing
contradictory policies, wavering between harsh
exploitation of German resources through confiscation
and reparations and attempts to set up a viable
governmental structure. The resentment and
alienation resulting from these policies came to be
focused on the SED.
Disregarding popular opposition, the Soviet
occupation authorities and East German leaders
introduced sweeping reforms which paved the way for
the development of a Communist society modeled
after the Soviet Union. An indigenous elite gradually
emerged and Soviet control became less direct. East
German ideology still proclaims that the Soviet Union
is the model for socialist development, and the SED
leadership has shown itself sensitive to Soviet policy
and practice. Both Walter Ulbricht and Erich
Honecker have held the position that the GDR can
find its place in the sun only by close cooperation with
the Soviet Union. Today the leadership commands the
loyalty of a large, dedicated bureaucracy and
technical intelligensia, which increasingly identify
their own interests with those of the regime and
rec -gnize the stake they have in advancing the
20
legitimacy of the East German state by contributing to
the successful implementation of government
programs.
1. Domestic
The primary goals of the domestic policies pursued
by the regime are to assure the perpetuation of SED
control of the society and to continue the process of
transforming East Germany into a viable state
separate and distinct from the Federal Republic of
Germany. Until recently, the major barriers to
achievement of these goals have been t!ie problem of
legitimacy �the GDR was born of foreign occupation
rather than domestic revolution �and the lingering
desire of citizens of both Germanies for reunification
of their divided nation. Prior to 1961 the East German
citizenry had a choice as to whether they wished to be
a part of the new society that the Communist regime
was molding in the part of Germany under its control,
or move to West Germany which had received general
recognition as the only legitimate German state. The
escape route through Berlin provided the means by
which the East Germans were able to "vote with their
feet," as a result of which a steady stream of the
nation's most highly trained citizens technicians and
professional people, including engineers, scientists,
and phys,cians �fled to the Federal Republic of
Germany.
The readily available escape route allowed the
remainder of the population to take a "wait- and -see"
attitude toward the SED. In fact, the general state of
relations between the regime and the people was
measured by the flow wf refugees to West Berlin. The
construction of the wall on 13 August 1961 had the
immediate effect of stopping the exodus of technically
skilled manpo Ner, but there were also longer range
consequences. For the first time since the creation of
the state, the regime had control over its own borders,
a development that gave the entire party and
governmental apparatus a measure of confidence that
had previously been lacking. In addition, it was now
clear to the people that they had no choice but to
remain, and that in order to improve their own
material well -being they would have to come to terms
with the regime and its demands.
In its initial period of development the German
Democratic Republic, like other Communist states,
placed great emphasis on completing large show
projects, particularly in heavy industry, with ie result
that consumer goods industries suffered and the
creation of a broad economic infrastructure was
neglected. While viewing economic growth as a goal
in itself, the regime has also attached great importance
I
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v
C
G)
to economic achievement as a measurement of the
state's ability to compete with West Germany and of
the regime's legitimacy to rule. In 1963 the Ulbricht
regime adopted a sweeping program of reforms, the
goal of which was to encourage efficiency by giving
greater play to such factors as profitability, realistic
price -cost relationships, material incentives, and
increased initiatives and responsibility at the
managerial level.
Ulbricht, who was considered a hard -line dogmatist
on many questions, was instrumental in bringing in
young, technically trained experts to responsible party
and governmental positions. Practical economic
problems came to dominate party meetings and
Ulbricht personally sponsored the development of
theoretical economics and encouraged the develop-
ment of a computer industry. In fact, Ulbricht's fall
may be partially traced to his economic theories which
tended to look to the 1980's rather than coming to
grips with the immediate problems facing the regime.
The Polish riots of December 1970 were seen by some
East German leaders as an example of what could
happen when concrete daily needs were ignored in
favor of long term goals.
Since May 1971, when Honecker replaced Ulbricht,
the SED has tried to strengthen domestic stability and
improve the morale of the people by devoting more
resources to the long- neglected consumer goods
industries. In addition, Honecker announced at the
fifth Central Committee plenum in April 1972 that
the regime intended to expand the existing social
welfare programs in order to provide additional care
and services for the people.
It cannot be assumed that the promise of a greater
volume of consumer goods and various services will
automatically be translated into greater acceptance of
the regime by the population. The comprehensive
social welfare system, for example, reorganized and
further developed by the regime, provides the people
with a greater degree of security, particularly with
respect to the health care field. These benefits have
won the regime few converts, however, perhaps in
large part because they are not innovations for
Germans who have a long tradition of comprehensive
social and health insurance programs that go back to
the Bismarckian era in the late 19th century.
The SED leadership has at times been willing to
attempt to win popular support by easing restrictions
on travel and cultural activities. These concessions in
the past have not always led to positive results from
the regime's point of view, and such gestures as
allowing greater freedom of expression to writers and
artists, agreeing to pensioners' visits to West Germany,
negotiating the Berlin pass agreements, and
encouraging contacts with the non Communist world
were regarded as counterproductive by the leadership.
After a rash of youth riots in 1965, the SED leaders
again tightened controls and were reluctant to
experiment further with "liberalization."
As the Dubcek reforms swept neighboring
Czechoslovakia in 1968, the East German regime
placed even more. emphasis on strengthening the
SED's commitment to orthodox Marxism- Leninism.
The regime began to pay more attention to
paramilitary training of students and intensified the
indoctrination of youth groups in the party and mass
organizations. During the first weeks following the
Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in the fall
of 1968, most military anci paramilitary units in East
Germany were either activated or placed on alert.
Popular support for the East Lerman role in the
suppression of the Czechoslovak experiment was far
from general, and the regime sought to neutralize pro
Dubeek sentiment at home by involving as many
citizens as possible in military activity. There was
evidence that antiregime sentiment was prevalent
among intellectuals, and there were scattered reports
of wavering among military personnel, government
workers, and even party members. The dissent that did
surface was not widespread or well organized, and the
regime quickly and quietly suppressed the sporadic
student demonstrations which occurred in a number of
cities.
Soon after assuming power, the Honecker
a
leadership took tentative steps to relax some of the
more onerous restrictions on cultural expression. At the
Eighth Party Congress in June 1971 Honecker
exhorted the artists' unions to conduct "frank,
businesslike and creative discussions." Later that year
at a Central Committee plenum, Honecker declared
that there should be no taboos in art or literature either
with regard to content or style, but he went on to warn
against "feeding on the modernism of a :world which is
alien and even hostile to us." During 1972, the
Honecker regime appeared to be in the process of
determining the guidelines for its cultural policies, but
it was far from certain that the first tentative steps
t
taken by the regime represented a real change in
policy rather than being merely tactical concessions.
q
The Honecker, leadership, like its predecessor,
attaches great importance to indoctrination of the
population as a means of winning popular support
and approval. The SED controls all media of mass
communications, and party officials responsible for
propaganda and ideology together with other top
levels formulate the main lines of doctrinal policy.
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t
These policies are reflected in all the relevant media
and are given further dissemination by political,
educational, social, recreational, and professional
organizations.
Although the points of emphasis in the propaganda
disseminated by the regime vary from day to day to
reflect the current party line, ti. general thrust of East
German propaganda has remained consistent
throughout the years. The major themes relate to the
achievements of the regime and Communist nations
;Isewhere in the struggle to assure peace, progress, and
prosperity for all people.
The art of winning support through persuasion has
taken on new importance under Honecker who has
stated that "the art of leadership is the art of
persuasion." The party has been prodded to get to
know the workers and to speak their language. Several
themes have been repeatedly emphasized, particularly
the central role of the Five Year plans and the
obligation of each citizen to participate in
strengthening socialism. By attempting to show
citizens that they have an opportunity for "true"
participation in the governmental process, as opposed
to the "sham" participation found in the West, the
regime is waging a battle for the loyalty of East
Germans. The old slogan, "Plane mit, arbeite mit,
regiere mit" (plan with us, work with us, govern with
us), expresses the Marxist Leninist view that the
dictatorship of the proletariat brings real democracy
for the first time in human history to the great
majority of the population.
The degree of success enjoyed by the regime in its
drive to establish the legitimacy of the SED as the
nation's leading force is difficult to determine. There
undoubtedly is discontent and there are some who
reject the concept of an East German state with the
SED as its ruler, but these numbers are declining.
Since the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 there has
been a slow, rather subtle, process of enforced
reconciliation between the population and the regime
which seems fairly well advanced. As long as the
regime is able to continue to register impressive gains
in economic growth and in satisfying popular
demands for goods and services, growing numbers of
East Germans are likely to identify their own Werests
with those of the regime, thereby hawuening the
division of Germany and establishing the legitimacy of
the GDR.
Although the regime proclaims the primary mission
of its well- organized and well- equipped armed forces
to be the defense of East German territory against
foreign enemies, an equally important task is their
supporting role in maintaining internal security and
22
r
order. The primary duty of the Frontier Command
troops, for example, is to prevent escapes from East
Germany into West Germany and West Berlin.
Civilian authority over the military, exercised by
regime leaders, is virtually complete. There is no
conflict between military and civilian leaders, and
there is no indication that the East German military is
prepared to assume a role that would challenge the
primacy of the party's civilian leadership.
2. Foreign
The major foreign policy objective of East Germany
is to secure international acceptance and formal
recognition as a sovereign state. A corollary of this
policy is the intensification of the drive initiated
under Ulbricht �for systematic differentiation
(Abgrenxung) of the two Germanies on the basis of
their social and political orders and' their alleged
contributions to peace and stability in Europe. The
regime has established contacts and relations with a
growing number of states since the fall of 1972.
Evidence of increased acceptance and recognition
abroad will strengthen the position of the East
German leaders with their own people by dispelling
the notion of the transitory nature of the GDR and
placing the final seal on the existence of two separate
German states (Figure 6).
East Germany's dependence on the Soviet Union as
the guarantor of its continued existence as a national
state and the integration of its armed forces into the
Warsaw Pact combined command are effective
deterrents to the formulation and implementation of a
defense policy inimical to the interest of Moscow and
the nations of Eastern Europe. In the event of war,
strategy would be dictated by Soviet leaders, and the
employment' of the armed forces would be in
accordance with Soviet plans.
a. Relations with the Soviet Union
East Germany's international relations continue to
be circumscribed by the fact that it must frequently
subordinate its own interests to those of the U.S.S.R.
The East German Soviet tie has gradually changed,
however, from the vassal- master relationship of the
Stalinist period to one in which East Germany has
become more like a junior partner in a joint venture.
By the early sixties the East Germans had begun to
assert their own interests more vigorously; they were
gradually allowed to determine their own internal
affairs and were given some latitude in managing
relations with West Germany and the nonaligned
nations. But Moscow has retained the decisive voice
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46
,i
ti
-r
on issues affecting rel ations with the Western powers,
partict!I �rly West Berlin, and has restrained the East
Germans from undertaking actions which might
directly challenge the position of the three Western
Allies in the divided city. Continuing Soviet control is
guaranteed by the 20 Soviet divisions stationed in East
Germany.
Although Soviet and East German interests have
generally coincided, there is evidence of some
differences between the two regimes and a certain
amount of friction in their relationship. The Soviet
failure to sign it separate peace treaty with the GDR in
the early 1960's and Khrushchev's cautious flirtation
with West Germany in 1964 particularly irked
Ulbricht.
More serious problems arose after 1968 when
Moscow's interest in pursuing detente with the West
coincided with West German Chancellor Willy
Brandt's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Ulbricht
felt that Brandt's eastern policy (Ostpolitik) neglected
East German interests, and he attempted to h alt or at
least redirect Soviet and East European initiatives
toward West Germany. Ulbricht continued to
maintain that an improvement in relations between
the two Germanies required the Bonn government to
recognize the German Democratic Republic, even
though it had been evident for some time that the
Soviet position on this question had become more
flexible. Ulbricht's unwillingness to eni'er into any
agreement which might downgrade East German
claims to the western half of the city also created
difficulties in Four -Power negotiations on it regulation
of the status of Berlin. From the Soviet point of view,
Ulbricht �in his prime, a master of maneuver for
political gain �had become so inflexible that he could
riot adjust to the change in the international climate
and the consequent shift in Soviet policy objectives.
Although Erich Honecker had a reputation as a
hard -line dogmatist, he went it long way toward
meeting Soviet demands. This was not accomplished
without some Soviet I,rodding but, in general,
Honecker has been prepared to acknowledge the
regime's dependence on Moscow both politically and
economically. Honecker has been responsive to Soviet
interests in the area of foreign policy, as was evident in
the spring of 1972 when he unilaterally took several
steps which aided the passage by the West German
Bundestag of the Soviet Federal Republic treaty
renouncing the use of force. The leadership has echoed
nearly every nuance or shift in Soviet attitudes on a
variety of issues, ranging from the need for it European
Security Conference to the possibility of eventual
agreement e troop reductions in Europe by the
United States and the U.S.S.R. East Germany also
continues to lend its wholehearted support to M OSCOW
on such issues as. Romanian nationalism, the
occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the Sino- Soviet
dispute. The regime has also championed the Moscow
line on issues concerning the so- called third world
nations, including staunch support for the Arabs in
their dispute with Israel.
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FIGURE 6. New Foreign Minis'ry building, East Berlin (U /OU)
23
Y
A.
Tz
S�rY. LL. ..n': Y.. 4.....:, xu:L- �:y.' N a+. ...c ...w r.
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FIGURE 6. New Foreign Minis'ry building, East Berlin (U /OU)

It. Relations reith other Eoxtern European
countries
Recognized as a sovereign state by all the
Communist countries of Eastern Europe, East
Gennanv strives to obtain from its" fraternal socialist"
allies a binding commitment to support all East
German political objcctiv In particular, East
Germany relics on the other Eastern European
countries to support the regime's drive to gain
membership in various international organizations
and to encourage other nations to establish official
relations. Tit,- Communist nations of Eastern Europe
have been willing up to a point to support the GDR in
attaining these objectives because they clearly regard
the existence of a separate East German state to be
essential to their own security arrangements. Relations
with these countries were strained at times, however,
because of such issues as West Germany's Ottpolitik,
which the East German regime tried to block and
which the other Communist nations regaeded
favorably. Another irritant has been the receptivity of
thew nations to Bonn's drive to expand trade relations
with Eastern Euronc, along with the succesr, of the
West Germans in negotiating agreements for
exchanging trade missions with Poland, Hungary,
Romania, Czechmiovakia, and Bulgaria. From the
East German point of view, a particularly galling
aspect of these agreements has been the implicit
recognition by the Communist nations of Bonn's claim
that West Berlin is a part of the Federal Republic.
Bonn was unable or unwilling to follow up its early
successes immediately, but in earl 1967 the new West
German Government again sought improvements in
West German relations with Eastern Europe. Its efforts
met with some success when Romania established
diplomatic relations with Bonn, and Prague and
Budapest agreed to rec^ive Bonn's emissaries. This led
to feverish East German diplomatic efforts in early
1961 to convince the Warsaw Pact states that they
should not improve their relations with the Federal
Republic until Bonn gave up its claim to be the uIe
representative of Germany and recognized the
German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state.
This diphmatic activity was highlighted by a series
of visits by Ulbricht to various Warsaw Pact states and
the signiag of mutual assistance treaties with Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. From the
East German viewpoint, these, treaties provided
reassurance that East German interests would not he
completely ignored even if other Eastern European
countries eventually established diplomatic relations
with Bonn.
24
R% 1110-1%8, relations between Pankow and other
capitals in Eastern Europe had worsened. Bonn's
0,11polnik was proving to be attractive to other bloc
countries in addition to Romania, and the East
German regime feared eventual isolation if West
German initiatives succeeded. The prospect of a
liberal, Western oriented Czechoslovakia toned the
most serious and immediate threat. As it result, the
Ulbricht regime launched a vitriolic attack on the
Dubcck leadership with the purpose of raising cdouLt�.
about the ideological loyalties of the government in
Prague and reversing the trend toward liberalization in
Eastern Europe. East Germany's criticism of Dubeek
was often more vehement than that of the Soviets, and
on 20 August. when Soviet-led Warsaw Pact foxes
invaded Czechoslovakia, it was made to appear in
East Germany that Ulbricht's policies had been
vindicated.
During 1969 -70 the Ulbricht regime pursued an
active but defensive foreign policy in its attempt to
coordinate and restrict East European approaches to
Ronn. The East Germans succeeded in dclaving moves
toward detente between Bonn and the Communist
world, but the regime suffered a sharp setback in
August 1970 when the Soviet Union signed a
nonaggression treaty with the Federal Republic. The
agreement was a particularly bitter pill for the Fast
German Government to swallow because it violated a
key axiom of GDR policy �that the Communist
nations would refrain from taking steps toward
normalizing relations with West Germany is long as
the Bonn government continued its policy of not
recognizing East Germane. Comulka had also)
dropped this as an issue in the talks between Bonn and
Warsaw.
The more flexible policies of the Honecker
leadership toward West Germany have eaw d tensions
with fast Germany's allies, especially "Oland and
Czechoslovakia. Honecker visited his closest
Communist neighbors in the fall of 1971. and at the
fourth Central Committee plenum the following
December he declared that a "new historical phase in
the Irothrrlp relations" was being introduced. One
concrete result we- the conclusion of special
agreements in January 1972 allowing visa -free Iravcl
between these countries. The East German regime also
remains a staunch supporter of economic and
technological cooperation among the Communist
nation. through the Council on Economic Mutual
A- tance which is headquartered in Moscow.
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c. Melallona with West Gemwny
In one sense, Fast Germanv serves a% a mere
instrument of Soviet policy toward the Federal
Republic of Germany, the West Berlin authontim, and
the Western Allies. The range of Soviet interests I% %o
great and the issues are so sensitive that the Soviets
have not permitted the East Getmans to develop a
truly independent policy towanl the West. Their
interests broadly coincide, h,owevrr, and the U.S.S.R.
recently has tended to allow the East Germans a
longer tether on foreign policy issues than it did
formerly.
The G, man Democratic Republic's claim to It- a
vrvereign state dictated it basically hostile attitude
toward West Germany. Nonetheless, the Cast
Germans paid lip -service to the idea of an East -West
Groman confederation, which would include the
.wparate 'ctritory of West Berlin a% a first step
toward reestablishing Germany unity. Ulbricht
reaffirmed this paition in his 1967 New Year's
message. adding the caveat that unification is
imixnsible until West Germany u::democs a "radical
democratic revoltition." Ulbricht alvo reiterated
%evrral of East Germany's longstanding demand% it
calling for agreemenh which would lead to
confederation. The East (;romans atgned that the two
German states should establish normal diplomatic
relations: recognize existing nationa" frontier in
Europe; renounce control of or participation in the
control of nuclear weap ons, and declare their readiness
to participate in a nuclear -free none in Europe. rrsprct
the independence of West Berlin. and establish a
commission to examine how the Potsdam agreement
had torn implemented in East and West German.
Although they denounced the West German
Government a% ieing unrepresentative and revanchist.
the East Germans constantly utilized varioits
stratagems to induce Bonn to enter into talk% at a ievrl
which could loc used to bolster the GDR's claims to
sovereignty. The West German% refrained fnm official
negotiations. limiting their contacts with the Ertl
German to technical discussions among repre-
sentatives from %uch agencies a% the Trusteeship Olficr
for Interzonal Trade, which handle% economic and
traffic matters. Neverthelew there were intcrmini%-
terial contacts on technical matters %uch a%
communication and tranport. Both %ides also found
it advantageous to use private citizen%. particularly
church leaden. In conduct nonofficial negotiations
which occasiorially led In government sanctioned
agreements, a% in the case of the prisoner exchange
agreement in 1%4. In 19Ffi the two Germania s
appeared about to initiate a high -level %to: ulcer
rtchange between the West Getman Social
Democrats, headed by Willy Brandt, and leading
member- of the SED. The East Germans, however,
became increasingl% apprehensive al�nt the course of
the talks and hacked out, allegelh over B no's
reloctance to rescind a law tinder which East Getman
leaden could be %object to arrest in West Gertnan In
the negotiations for the proposed speaker exchange,
prowl %icon was made for temporary %n %pension of this
law, Iut the Ea%t Getman gime was fearful of
%pontaneous tmpulat demonstral,ions as well as longer
range political effects if the popular Brandt and other
well -known West German leaden appeared in East
Germany. These fears were c nfirmel when Brandt
and Stoph met in F:tfnrt in 1970, where Brandt
received a tumoltiNu: welcome
In the clo Ling months of the Ulbricht regime, the
theme of unit% of the German nation of the
de%irahility of %ome form (of Grrman cmnfederation
lorgan to receive less emphasis and wa% finall% dropped
cntiret%. It was replaced by a polic% calling for it
Complete differentiation between the Iwo states
AIRrenzunR �which has been given added cmpha%i%
by the Nonecker regime. Under this iwxlicy. relation%
briwc. it the two Getmanim are to Ix� like those
between an-; two sovereign and independent states.
Fast Getman leaden losid1v and unetuivocall rcr-.t
Chancellor Brandy% contention that the two
Germanics represent two states within one nation and
that a special relationship exit% between them.
llonecker and his ideologists instead insist that West
German can no longer ignore the nrw %ocialist vcicty
which has been created in East German. since it
rrprrwnt% an irreversible development in the histon of
the German people.
De%pitc the AbgrrnzunR campaign. lionecket has
taken a numlort of %irp% to case relatiom brt Arcn East
and West Germany. Under the umbrella of the Four-
Power Berlin Agrrcment concluxlel in Srptrmbrt
1971, the East and West Germans negotiated an
agreement nn transit traffic to West Berlin. in addition
to Iwn agreements on rxchangr of territory. in Berlin
and travel for West Belinen to East Brr ion and to Flo %t
German. In eariv 1972 the East German Government
initiatrd a General Traffic Treah with the Federal
Republic and look several steps which made the
passage of Bonn'% treaties with Moscow and Warsaw
easier.
On 13 June 1972. the East and West German
rcpt- enlatives opened preliminary talks on the
normalization of relations through conclusion of a
treaty which would establish certain xvicral principles
governing relations, while leaving specific (xoint%to he
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agreed on in zulrsequent negotiations. It became
evident at a fairly early stage in the talks that ba %ic
disagreements had arisen because of Bonn'% insistence
that a measure of recognition be granted to the
gist -nee of "the German nation," and the desire of
the West Germans for reaffirmation of Four -Poaet
right in Germany a% a whole. The GDR categorically
rejected "the German nation" concept and preferred
to downplay Allied rights in all of Germany.
Aftet much tough bargaining the two governments
initialed a general political treaty in early "ovember
1972 and signed it a month later. The treaty contiincd
only an indirect reference to the "national question."
It called for Iotthet ag.rments on -o operation in such
fields as commerce, scic-ice and technology, transport,
health, and %p ort. The two sides agreed on the
inviolability of borders, to refrain from the use or
threat of force, to respect each others independence
and autonomy, and to eschangr permanent
representatives.
d. Relatimm tdth Berlin
For almost two decades after the end of the Second
World War the Berlin issue was the focus of
rontrovenv and tension in Fast -West relations.
Despite the establishment in 1419 of the German
Democratic Repoblic with its capital in Fast Berlin,
the Sovict Union retained tight control over prohlems
concerning Berlin because of it own awareness of the
potential for conflict that misted in the tug of war over
the rights of the occupying powers in the city. By the
early %ixlie% the Soviets began to allow the Fast
German regime greater freedom of maneuver on zone
issues affecting Berlin. apparently in response to
pressures by the Ulhricht regime. The regime hoped a
more active Berlin policy would enable Fast Germany
to carve out for itself a more important role in
determining the future of both Fast and West Berlin.
During most of the mid- and late- %hlir% the Fast
Gcrmars� undoubtedly at Soviet behrst �werr
careful to avoitl serious thmah In Allied right in Wc%t
Berlin and concentrated instead on disrupting West
German tics with the city. Following the student
rioting in West Berlin in April M. S. which was
triggered by the attempted assassination of firebrand
leftist leader Rudi Dutschke, the Fast Germans
arbitrarily furred travel through East Germany to
members of West Germany's rightwing National
i Democratic Party, as well as to high ranking Bonn
officials. This was followed in the summer by the
imposition of passport and visa requirements for West
German travelers. and vow and personal identity card
requirements for We%t Berliners visiticig or transiting
26
Fast Germany. The Soviets supported Fast Getman
actions of this kind a% long a% they did not run counter
to Soviet policy and did not involve the risk of a
cnfmntation with the Western Allies.
The Ulhricht regime apparently had considerable
frrdr,m of action in its dealings with die West Berlin
city administration (Sent, particularly in negotiating
the several pass ag- cements which were concluded
from M3, to M6. In their relations with the West
Berlin authorities, the Fast Germans were interested
mainly in encouraging the Senat to recognize the
MR, at Iraqi on a de/acto basis. Although differences
occasionally developed between West Berlin and Bonn
author: irs ever the proper response� to harassment of
access to the city, the Fast German: genetaliy failed in
their efforts to create dissension between the city
government and Bonn.
In Jme 1912 the foreign ministers of the United
Kingdom. France, ar.d the Soviet Union, and the U.S.
Secretary of State sncccssfully concluded nearby 2
years of negotiations by signing the Four -Power treaty
on Berlin. In the agreement the Soviet Union formally
agreed �for the first time since the partitioning of
Germany �to share respensihility for the copeditious
handling of traffic and communications into and out
of West Berlin. In practical terms. the U.S.S.R.'s
assumption of this respon%ihility was a blow to the
Fast German regime which had been delegated
control over the access route~ by the Soviets in 19aa.
The Soviet Union's decision to negotiate the
agreement underscored Mcscow*% interest in reaching
detente with the West and in pavi.ig the way for the
ratification by the Aundestag of the Srrvict -Writ
German treaty of August 1970 renouncing the trx of
force. The Wmirm Allies had specified to the Soviet
Union that ratification by the Bonn parliament was
dependent upon an agreement on Berlin.
In the agreement the Sirrvict Union recognized the
original rights of the three We item powrn to maintain
their presence in West Berlin. which it had often
denial. Moscow also atsrpir d a wide range of
political, economic. and social ties between Bonn and
West Berlin. thus retreating from its earlier position
that West Berlin was an "independent political
entity." In addition, the Federal Repuhlic was
authorized to reprewnt West Berlin's interests abroad.
cocept in those matten affecting the security or %talus
of the city.
The %tiemsful conclusion of the Soviet -West
German treaty and the Four Posner treaty on Berlin
opened the dkior to talks between Fast and West
Germany which led to three agrrrmrnt% affrcting
Wrst Berlin and iGs tiro to the West. One agreement
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i
l
eased the movement of people and goods. between the
Federal Republic end West Berlin, and two others
between the GDR and the West Berlin city
government liberalized the rules for travrl by West
Berliners between West Berlin and Fast Germanv and
prepared the way for the elimination of enclaves
within Berlin itself through territorial exchanges.
On balance, the treaties and agreements of 1970 -i2
required decisive shifts in the regime's posture on the
all- important question of its relations ith the Federal
Republic and West Berlin. Perhaps because of a
pragmatic reassessment of East German interests, or
because of Soviet pressure �or a combination of
froth �the Honecker regime was forced to �:treat from
to number of long -held pcaition%. in particular that
West Berlin was part of East Germany, and that East
Germany controlled access rout(.. to the city.
e. Relations with the non-Communist world
Since 1969 the GDR has made significant progress
toward achieving international recognition and the
prmpcc !s are g(xxf that in the next several yeah this
pattern will continue. General recognition has long
been the goal of the East Germans. They have wanted
it Froth as a manifestation of the regime's legitimacy
and as an entree to Western markets and technology.
Because of its pivotal position in the East -West power
struggle, however, Fast Germany accepted the need to
sclxordinate its aspirations to those of the Sovirt
Union, and relations with the West were held in
abeyance. It fell to Erich Nonecker, a% the Soviet
interest in detente grew. M oversee a dramatic-
turnabout in Pankow'% attitude toward the West.
The signing of the inter German political treaty on
21 December ISi2 opened the door to Fast German's
acceptance in the West. Most Wcoern powers.
including France and the United Kingdom, have
recogni>.cd Pankow, and the remainder air very likely
to follow suit. Fast Germany has fakra its seat in
several international forums, such as the Conferener
on Security and Ccooperation in Europe, and can hook
forward to full U.N. membership by fall IW3.
As the CDR prepares for full diplomatic relations
with the West, it mint make a number of delicate
measuremen!s. The speed with whin it moves will
depend in part on the disposition of the regime'%
slender diplomatic resources. It most balance the
benefits it finds in Wesirm markets and in its new
feeling of legitimacy against some real difficulties. It
must take cirr not to get out in front of the Soviets,
and above all it mint weigh the impact of closer
contact with the West on the East Cermun people and
on its own ability to build a Socialist Germanic state
that is the true equal of West Germany.
Some of the nation's most talented individuals are
employed in the foreign service. Many of them are
tireless in their efforts to enhance East Germany's
position in the countries to which they are posted. In
Burma. for example, the East Gewan consulate
negotiates government -to- government ,rade and aid
agreements and cultural exchanges. East German
consular officen have regular access to the Burmese
Foreign Ministry and are allowed to disseminate
information and propaganda on the same scale as an
embassy.
For nearly two decades East Germany struggled to
gain diplomatic recognition from non (;communist
countries, and it finally achieved a breakthrough in
May 1969 when Iran agreed to exchange diplomatic
missions. Recognition from several other diddle
Eastern, African, and Asian coumtrics followed in
quick succession. The most important of these was the
United Aral) Republic (Egypt), which recognized
Pankow in July.
Fast Germany maintains a high level of official
reprr%entation in Egypt. with an embassy in Cairo+ and
it consulate in Alexandria. Communist support of the
Araln against Israel and the increased Soviet military
presence in the Mediterranean probably contributed
to the decision by Egypt to recogaize East Germany.
Furthcrmc.re. Bonn's reluctance to take retaliator
measures, other chow to withdraw its amhassadon�
when Cambodia and Southern Yemen had earlier
recognized Fast Germany may have encouraged the
Egyptians to act. Cairo was also) %0I aware that the
West German Government was divided at that time
on the question of invoking the so- called Ilallstein
Doctrine under which Bcnn refused to maintain
diplomatic recta "_ions with countries recognizing East
Germany. and neither of the governing parties wished
to make it -in issue in an election vrar.
East Grrm.ny'% successful wooing of Iriq came 4
yean after the Aral) nations had severed rrlation with
West Germany over the latter'% recognition of Israel in
1965. Although West Germany continued to conduct
extensive economic relations with a number of Arub
states, its ties with Iraq had not been significant.
Indeed. Iraq had little to hoe and, from an economic
point of view, much to gain by yielding to the strong
Fast German pre.scure for recognition. Syria and
Sudan, which recognized the GDR in June 1969, were
similar cases in point.
Foust Germany has also %uffered some sharp setback.%
in its drive to establish diplomatic relations with non
Communist countries. In 1971 the Central African
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Republic suspended its relations with the GDR, and
this was followed shortly by a himbian request that
the Fast Germans close their trade mission in Lusaka.
Relations with the Sudan soled. and the reestablish
merit of relations between Boon and Cairn in 1972 was
viewed critically by East German leaders. Many Asian
and African states conttnvaed to turn it deaf car to Fast
German requests to upgrade relations.
In its initial forays into Western diplomacy, Pankow
has tried to project the image of it responsible and
constructive participant. The Fast German media
have expressed satisfaction that Fast Germany is being
accepted as an "equal anb sovereign" state while
voicing regret that acceptance had not come earlier. In
their new chairs at international conferences, East
German diplomats have generally (N- ncenirated or. the
issues at hand and have avoided polemics and
chauvinistic challenges to their West German
colleagues. While looking westward, the East German
Government is by no means relinquishing its role a,
loyal supporter of bloc policies. Both as observers at
the United Nations and in the preparatory Conference
on Security and Coop, ration in Europe, Fast German
representatives have staunchly �if quietly supported
Soviet initiatives.
E. Threats to government stability (U /OU)
1. Discontent and dissidence
The erection of the Berlin wall in August 1961 not
only halted the crippling exodus of trained manpower
from the German Democratic Republic, but it also set
in motion a slow and subtle process whereby the East
Germans' previous hostility toward the reginnc
changed first to passive acceptance and then in a
growing number to positive loyalty and a wn+w of a
separate Fast German national identity. Throughout
the fifties, the will to resist by segments of the
population had been undermined by the regime's
coercive tactics, the threat of Soviet intervention to
crush any uprising, the flight of potential resistance
leaders to the West, and a sense of abandonment by
the West which had remained aloof during the Fast
Berlin riots in 1953 and the erection of the wall in
1961.
The passing of the years and the maturation of a
generation hom under Communist rule is a major
factor in the accommodation of the population to the
demands of the regime; more than 30% of all Fast
Germans were ixnm after the war and more than 506
have no active memory of any other system. This
demographic trend is reinforced by ideological
4
indoctrination, increased rc oomic security and well-
being, and the considerable pride of the citizenry in
the accomplishments wrought by their own labor in
the absence of any substantial foreign assist nee. As
the regime has developed a greater sense of self
confidence, the controls based on force and
intimidation which were instituted in the fifties have
been replaced boy more institutionalized restraints
staessing persuasion and reward.
The long term process of accommodation and
adaptation by the citizenry does not automatically
exclude manifestations of dissatisfaction or low -key
resistance to the regime and it, policies. A major
irritant in the past has been the regime's insistence on
the mouthing of slogans and propaganda as evidence
of loyalty. Even prior to Ulbricht's departure,
however, the regime had begin to deemphasize these
frequently superficial demonstrations of allegiance to
the regime and to attach greater importance to
professional comtetence.
The Berlin wall and the development of
sophisticated devices to discourage escape across the
border have reduced the refugee flow to a mere trickle,
but occasionally individuals, and even families, are
lucky or resonurceful enough to carry out escape plans
successfully. Those deeply dissatisfied persons appear
to be as distinct minority, however, and in all
probability a growing number of Fast Germans would
not he prepared to leave their present pos4ions,
homes, and the manner of life to -.vh;ch they have
become accustomed for the uncertainty of beginning
:anew in West Germany. There also appears to be
growing optimism over the prospects of improving life
at horse, and a determination among many to remain
and strive for this goal.
A main source of discontent in the past was the
failure of the regime's economic policies to effect a
rapid improvement 3n living standards. These
problems were heightened by Ulbricht's unrealistic
^corunmir plans and his concentration on the
development and expansion of heavy industry to the
detriment of the c nstrr:acr goods sectors. Under
Floneeker the regime has tried to increase domestic
political stability by taking steps to improve the
morale of the people. A package of new social
measures was introduced in 1972 which aimed at
improving health and welfare facilities, and the
regime- has also promised a greater volume of goods
and variety of sources over the next 5 years.
The government has moved to deal with
longstanding ccnmplaints directed at the stringent
controls over travel and the restrictive cultural policies.
Although it is now relatively easy for East German
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X
citizens to travel in Eastern Europe and millions have
taken advantage of this opportunity. there is little
likelihood that the tight controls on travel to the West
will be relaxed in the near future. The regime has
made tentative moves to allow writers and artists more
freedom of expression, but there appears to have been
no fundamental change in the policy of closely
monitoring the activities and output of the cultural
elite.
2. Affected groups
a. Industrial workers
Discontent among industrial workers, arising from
specific economic grievances, is a source of deep
concern to the East German leadership. The lesson
le. rned in 19x3, when an uprising was triggered by
construction workers in East Berlin who resented an
increase in work norms and who nitiated a
spontaneous strike, has not been forgotten. Under
present circumstances, however, workers are unlikely
to take to the streets, because there is no desire to risk
sacrificing whatever has already been achieved and
because of the certainty of reprisals. The regime has a
pervasive and efficient security system which has
usually been able to discern and deal with workers'
grievances beiore they became widespread. In
addition, the government has been known to grant
limited concessions or has otherwise taken steps to
eliminate sources of major grievances. In April 1966.
for instance, the regime attempted to eliminate one
chronic source of complaint by revising the workweek
schedule so that all workers would have a 5 -day
workweek every other week, thereby reducing the
average workweek from 48 to 45 hours. In September
1961 a general 5-day workweek was introduced and,
after some initial difficulties stemming from
complaints by shoppers who found that their favorite
stores were closed on Saturday along with factories
and other enterprises, seemed to be working
reasonably well.
The decision of the regime to increase production of
consumer goods and expand social benefits is intended
to raise the living standards of industrial workers and
to show that the leadership is concerned about their
problems. Despite these measures, various complaints
have cropped up periodically, including charges of
inept management and unkept wage promises, rumors
of price rises, and demands for more democratic
procedures. The workers on occasion have tried to
highlight their grievances by resorting to brief strikes,
gathering petitions, engaging in slowdowns, and
passively resisting exhortations for more production.
While not a threat to the regime in themselves, these
grievances are taken seriously by the leadership. The
Polish riots of December 1970 are a vivid retnimler of
what happens when the government and pariv lose
touch with the workers.
b. Fawn raorkers
The redistribution of land under the 1946 land
reform resulted in some dilution of the traditionally
conservative attitudes of the rural population, since
many of the new farmers had either Social Democratic
or Communist backgrounds. However, the eollectivi-
zation campaign culminating in th all -out drive of
1%0� resulted in the flight to the West of thousands
of farmers and farm workers, including many who had
been in fuv:r of the social and ec,nomic reforms
instituted during the postwar period. Since 1963 the
regime has been able to overeorne resistance to
collectivization to some extent by sharply raising farm
incomes. This policy has improved lanor productivity
and reduced passive resistance, but it has riot solved
the problem of persuading youth to choose a career in
agriculture.
c. Intellectuals
Intellectuals and iersoas in the professimis express
their disaffection in more subtle ways, although their
opposition to the regime's determination to imix-se
limits on the freedom of the individual is at least as
strongly; felt as that of the workers and farmers.
Freedom to think, write, publish, and work without
political interference has not fit in with SED attempts
to restructure East German society along Communist
lines. Many of East Germany's more prominent
writers, artists, and professional men fled to West
Germany, leaving few who might crve as rallying
points in opposition to the regime Many of the
members of the intellectual community who have
chosen to remain are committed Gommunists, though
they may question specific policies of the regime.
Ilowever, both groups of intellectuals �the Marxists
as well as the more refractory non Communists �have
been reluctant to challenge the authorities head on.
Rather than engaging in outright criticism or an
exchange of polemics with the regime, many
intellectuals employ satire and innuendo to express
their dissatisfaction.
On the rare occasions when intellectuals have taken
a firm stand against regime policies, retribution has
been swift. Prof. Wolfgang llarich, a journalist and
professor of Marxist philosophy at Humboldt
University, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment
in 19-37 (only 7 were actually served) for writing
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articles criticizing the regime at the time of the Polish
and Hungarian revolts. Prof. Robert Havemann,
another Humboldt faculty member, was dismissed
fron� his post and dropped from the SED in 1964 for
advocating freedom of inquiry. In 1956 Havemann
further antagonized SED officials by advocating a
democratic re irganization within the SED Welf and
by having his suggestions published in a leading West
German weekly. Again the reaction was immediate;
H: vemann was dismissed from his job on the staff of
the East German Academy of Sciences and expelled
from the academy. The regime further forbade
academy members from maintaining any contact
whotever with the "dissident" professor. During the
tense days just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968, Havemann was quoted in the West German
press as advocating Dabcek -style reforms for East
Germany. There was no evidence that Havemann was
Personally involved in the rash of pro Czechoslovak
demonstrations throughout East Germany that
followed the occupation, but his two teenage sons
were arrested for taking part in rallies.
The regime generally has sought to control its
writers by using tactics less harsh than those employed
against Harich and Havemann. These include
financial inducements, petty harassments, chicanery,
and the denial of a forum for dissenting views. Writers
who have been particularly offensive from the
regime's viewpoint notably playwright Peter flacks
and balladeer Wolf Biermann �have been publicly
censured. Others have been compelled to engage in
self- criticism.
Under Honecker's leadership, the SED approach
toward the intelligentsia has altered, reflecting in part
personnel changes in the cultural sector of the SED
Central Committee. The regime has clamped down on
the nonideologically oriented technocrats who are now
required to receive more intense political indoctrina-
tion. Those who refuse to cooperate are threatened
with professional isolation and economic deprivation.
The guidelines for the artistic intelligentsia have been
relaxed somewhat to allow more room for creative
expression. The works of some artists, authors, and
film producers previously withheld from the public
have appeared. At the fourth Central Committee
plenum in September 1971, Honecker said that there
should be no taboos in either style or content of artistic
works, but there is no indication that the SED is
prepared to loosen its grip on the cultural field. At a
time when East Germans are being exposed to new
ideas through travel abroad and through contacts with
visiting foreigners, the regime is trying to make sure
that it can rely on the intellectuals for support.
30
d. Youth
In the eyes of the regime, the youth represent one of
the most difficult and defiant elements in East
German society. The party's intensive cradle -to-
college indoctrination, while shaping some young
people into obedient Comm. unists, sparks rebellious-
ness in many others. Prior to erection of the Berlin wall
in 19-A, nearly 50% of the refugee flow to the West
was comprised of young people in search of greater
personal freedom and better jobs, and children
accompanying parents.
In its efforts to control East German youth, the
regime has alternated between a policy of cajoling and
threatening, neither of which has produced entirely
Positive results. Dissatisfied with the results of its
earlier policy of close regimentation, the regime
relaxed its pressure in the early sixties and drafted a
youth communique which allowed young people more
time free of governmental and party supervision. This
new policy, however, enabled young people to use
their new -found leisure time to adopt fads and styles
popular in Western Europe. Regime sponsored
activities were ignored, as youth sought to imitate the
Pop culture of the West, with its rock music a,.d
distinctive d �ess. Incidents of "antiregime" activity
occurred sporadically throughout East Germany, and
frequently party youth leaders even found it difficult
to control meetings of the official youth organization,
the Free German Youth.
The period of relaxation was quickly terminated
after seriour. rioting broke out in Leipzig in October
hA5 when police attempted to prevent students from
singing songs proscribed by the regime. Following a
crackdown on rowdyism, the regime introduced a new
Family Code aimed at strengthening moral
responsibility and reminding parents of their
obligation to supervise the conduct of their children.
Now forced to stay in East Germany, young men
and women and teenagers remain a source of great
concern to the party leadership, because they are the
most vociferous critics of the regime and of life in
general within East Germany. "Hooligans" have
disturbed the smooth operation of factories and farms.
Teenage students have upset the educational
machinery by asking searching political questions, by
emulating their counterparts in Western Europe, and
even, on occasion, by staging demonstrations against
the regime's policies. Probably the most serious
incidents of this type occurred in the weeks
immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia
when sporadic pro- Dubeek demonstrations took place
in cities throughout East Germany. Although these
demonstrations were easily contained by the regime,
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.l
they took on added significance because of the large
number of st,ulcnt demonstrators whose parents were
members if the party and government elite. The
confidence of the regime in the effectiveness of its
political indoetrinatiop program was understandably
shaken, and it number of high- ranking party and
government officials whose children were involved
were either fired or demoted. Despite vigorous efforts
by the SED to instill political "reliability" in the ranks
of the Young Pioneers and the Free German Youth,
many of their members have retreated to a position of
passive participation in the activities of these
organizations, while a number of others have become
sophisticated critics of the government and its imlicies.
The disside,t, movement among young East
Germans was fragmented after the crisis in
Czechoslovakia subsided and now consists of
numerous small, normally massive, loosely organized
and ideologically differentiated groups. They meet to
discuss politics and to exchange dissident literature
and only occasionally display their opposition to the
regime overtly, since such actions often result in the
arrest of the participants. The authorities monitor the
dissidence closely and attempt to keep it under strict
control, but they have not been able to eliminate it.
The young dissidents oplxise the regime on grounds
that it is not representative of the population. They
favor greater personal freedom and are particularly
critical of the regime's restrictive cultural policies and
of the inefficiency of its overcentralired bureaucracy.
e. The churches
The Evangelical and Roman Catholic churches
have been the only nongovernmental institutions
permitted by the regime to maintain independent
contacts with West Germany. However, strict
governmental control of the domestic and foreign
activities of the churches, particularly contacts with
West Germany, severely limits their effectiveness.
The contacts of the Evangelical Church with its
sister church in the Federal Republic were further
restricted in 1969 when a regime- sponsored plan was
adopted providing for the formation of a sep arate East
German church and the subsequent severing of
organizational ties with the Evangelical Church in
West Germany. All eight established territorial
churches (Landeskirchen) of the Evangelical Church
in East Germany yielded to pressure by the regime and
agreed to establish a separate organization called the
League of Evangelical Churches (BEK), but the
constitution of the new organization continues to stress
the all- German aspect of Protestantism in both East
Germany and the Federal Republic. Despite regime
pressures, church leaders have refused to delete thes
references from the BEK's constitution.
The Roman Catholic Church, like the Evangelical
Church, is it potential rallying point for opposition but
church authorities have gone out of their way to avoid
it confrontation with the regime in order to prevent
additional restrictions and harassment. On what it
considers vital issues, however, the Catholic Church
has tended to be more outspoken than the Evangelical
Church and more adamant in its stand. In order to
protect its own members and clergy in East Germany,
the Catholic Church generally avoids focusing
international attention on the internal last German
situation unless a specific issue is considered worth the
risks involved.
Both the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches
arc extremely circumspect in voicing opinion on
secular matters. Even during the tense period of the
Czechoslovak crisis, the reaction of religious leaders
%vas muted. By accepting restrictions on their
traditional rights and freedoms in secular matters and
by demonstrating their willingness to "render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar's" religious leaders
hope to ensure the continued existence of the
churches. Although some Protestant churchmen have
lent their support to the regime, for the most part the
churches have tried to resist Communist indoctrina-
tion of the faithful and other ideological pressures.
Despite the conciliatory gestures of the Evangelical
and Catholic churches, the SED continues to regard
organized religion as a competitor for the loyalties of
the people and a potential source of dissidence which
the state is compelled to neutralize, if not undermine
and destroy, regardless of past agreements. Under
Honecker there has been a renewed attempt to isolate
believers from the rest of society and to diminish the
role of the churches. Thus, in March 1971, the regime
moved to restrict even further the activities of the
clergy by requiring the churches to report all
"nonreligious' functions to the police, a requirement
that is being fought by the Evangelical and Catholic
leaders. In addition, new requirements for admission
to the universities discriminate against youths who are
avowed Christians.
F. Maintenance of internal security (S)
1. Police
The primary mission of the police forces is to ferret
out and control domestic opposition to the regime.
Combating ordinary crime and protecting the rights
and safety of the population are secondary functions
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of the law enforcement system. A shaft in emphasis is
likely to occur, however, as the regime becomes more
confident about its legitimacy and suceptance by :a
majority of the citizenry; in addition, as the economy
becomes more consumer oriented and the acquisition
of goods and propert becomes the objective of
growing numbers of citizens, there is likely to be a
rising incidence of crimes which Communist regimes
have always insisted flourish only in capitalist
societies, such as robbery, theft, and burglary. In late
1971 the attorney general claimed that crimes against
property accounted for more than 50% of all criminal
offenses.
All police and security organizations, as well as the
courts, are under the direct control of the SED. The
inner circle of SED leaden charged with formulating
security and penal policy are members of the Central
Committee Security Commission, headed by Paul
Verner. Actual day -to -clay policy and administrative
decisions are worked out by the Central Committee
Security Department.
On the governmental level, the Ministry of Interior
is the organization primarily responsible for
controlling the population and combating crime. The
ministry has at its disposal, directly or through its 15
district headquarters, not only regular civil police but
also the Alert Nice. which are militarized security
units trained for riot control, and personnel of the
Civil Air Defense Commando It reportedly controls
about 100,000 full -time armed police and security
personnel. The higher echelons are composed for the
most part of trusted SED members, and there is a
significant number of SED members and sympathizers
in the lower ranks.
Directly subordinate to the ministry is the Main
Administration of German People's Police HVDVP),
which exercises day- to-day control over the major
police functions and operations. The IIVDVP has at
its disposal several operational civil police organiza-
tions totaling some 89,000 personnel, including:
Regular Police
Water Police
Traffic Police
Factory Guards
Prison Guards
Criminal Police
Transport Police
The HVDVP also exerts control, through district
SED headquarters, over the approximately 11,000
heavi armed Alert Police. Several of the operational
police organizations, notably the Criminal Police,
coordinate their operations with the Ministry for State
Security.
The Ministry of Interior also directs the Main
Department for Passports and Registration, which acts
as a central file for inforrnaticn on East German
citizens. Through coordination between the record
offices of the Ministries of interior and State Security
supplemented by local police files, a careful record is
kept on nearly every aspect of the life of an individual
citizen. In the case of SED members, this information
is supplemented by local and SED Central Committee
cadre records.
Various other organizations exercise supplemental
police and internal security functions. These include
the SED controlled Workers Militia with 3:50,000
members available for duty during civil disturbances,
and the army's Frontier Command, which has 4'),5(X)
men engaged in border control. (A full description of
the duties of these forces is found in the discussion of
their parent organizations.) The secret police
organization, the State Security Service (SSD), which
is subordinate to the Ministry for State Security, has
responsibility for certain aspects of domestic security
and counterintelligence (counterespionage and
co untersubversion). It includes a 3,500 -man Security
Guard Regiment. In all, the active members of both
police and security forces (uniformed and plain-
clothes) probably total about SW000 �or about 3% of
the population. To supplement the large police and
security forces, the regime has also attempted to
organize an extensive network of informers,
particularly in regions bordering on West Germany.
Although so-ne people, usually SED or F DJ members,
willingly act as police informers, most recruits for this
task must be coerced into service.
The police maintain a complex and extensive
system of checks and controls over the population. In
addition to the usual regulation of firearms and
ammunition, fire and healtl..iazirds, and dangerous
chemicals :end drugs, the police have established
controls over individuals, their associations, and their
movements. Each citizen over 14 years of age, for
instance, must carry a personal identity card
(Personalausweis) which bears his picture; a copy of
this picture is kept on record by thu police. Every
employed person is required to carry a work and
insurance certificate which contains a complete record
of his employment history. The police also maintain
surveillance of population movements through a
general registration system which requires every person
to notify the police of any change of residence,
including temporary visits exceeding 3 days. Both the
population registers and the identity card system are
administered by the regular police. Neither uses
fingerprints for purposes of identification. To identify
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V
suspected lawbreakers, however, the Criminal Police
use the Bertillon system, which includes a 10- finger
procedure of fingerprinting. They keep complete files
on all suspects and convicts.
Travel both within and outside the country has
increased, especially since the introduction of visa -free
regulations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the
increased travel of West Berliners to East Berlin and to
the rest of East Germany. East German officials have
expressed some concern over these increased flows, but
there are no indications that security considerations
would lead to curtailment of this travel. The
government has, however, imposed currency
restrictions for Polish citizens to prevent them from
buying out East German consumer goods. The regime
controls the travel of foreigners; special permission is
required to enter certain areas, including the frontier
zones and the uranium mining area in the Erzgebirge.
Some administrative measures have been taken to
curtail contacts with West Germans. Special passes are
required to enter some factories. Police permission is
also necessary for meetings and public collection of
funds, and clubs and social organizations are required
to have licenses issued by the police. Radio and TV
receivers must be licensed by postal authorities.
Contacts with the West are closely regulated.
Letters and printed material originating in West
Germany or West Berlin, and to a lesser extent in other
Western countries, are censored or excluded. The
number, size, and content of parcels received by
individuals are monitored and subject to control. The
regime discourages viewing and listening to television
and radio broadcasts from the Federal Republic and
Western Europe, but controls have been largely
ineffective. Attempts at jamming radiobroadeasts
have generally been ineffective, except for the
occasional difficulties created for broadcasts by the
U.S. Government managed Radio in the American
Sector (RIAS) from West Berlin.
The police system, with the backing of the East
German military forces, appears capable of dealing
with any popular disturbance short of a spontaneous
uprising of nationwide proportions. Buttressing the
system of pervasive police controls is the legal system
which is modeled closely after that of the Soviet
Union, and functions as an instrument to perpetuate
Communist rule. The maintenance of an impartial,
comprehensive syst .m of criminal and civil
jurisprudence has been of less concern. Accordingly,
the legal system reflects little either of the traditional
German or the present -day West German system.
By Western standards, the penal code is harsh and
arbitrary, clearly weighted in favor of the prosecution,
normally the state authority. The severe principles
operative in the state's early years were summarized by
the Minister of Justice:
The announcement of sentence is the goal of the
criminal proceeding. It must in this connection be
emphasized once again with all clarity that the task of
defending our state against all threats and disturbances
of our order continues to be the crucial task. Therefo!e,
we must understand that we dare not show either soft-
ness or weakness in relation to the enemies of our order,
and that hard sentemos are also correct sentences.
By 1963, however, the regime shifted ground
slightly in order to reflect changes which had been
introduced in the Soviet Union the year before. A new
decree stressed reliance inn persuasion and education in
judicial proceedings, and increased collective
responsibility for apprehending, prosecuting, and
reforming offenders. A new penal code was adopted in
January 1968, and while considered a judicial model
in Eastern Europe, it continues to emphasize the
political aspects of justice in a Socialist state.
The new code is primarily designed to reinforce the
unchallenged authority of the state and is tailored to
meet the security needs of the regime. Under the code,
many criminal offenses carry relatively light sentences
as compared with penalties meted out by West
German courts for similar crimes. On the other hand,
crimes against the state, regardless of how trivial, are
subject to harsh judicial decisions, some carrying the
death sentence. Execution is by firing squad.
The Prison Administration, subordinate to the
Ministry of Interior's HVDVP, controls several
hundred prisons, ranging from county jails to large
penitentiaries and labor camps. In addition, the
Ministry for State Security controls two security
prisons, at Bautzen and Waldheim, where mpjnr
political prisoners are incarcerated. Nearly all prisons,
as well as the labor camps, employ the inmates as
laborers; in some cases the prisoners are used in outside
work detachments as well as within th prison itself.
Information on the exact size of the prison
population is not available, but it has been estimated
that as many as 6,000 persons may be in custody for
political offenses. Since 1964 East Germany has
concluded several "ransom" agreements, whereby it
has released approximately 3,600 political prisoners in
return for payment by the Federal Republic of
DM10,000 per prisoner. In October 1972 Honecker
proclaimed a broad amnesty for several thousand
persons convicted of minor crimes. This number
included some West Germans. The amnesty was
intended to demonstrate the internal stability of the
GDR and to aid West German Chancellor Brandt's
reelection campaign.
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2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities
The regime still lacks the total suppc t of East
Germans, but the discontent which exists is mainly of
the grumbling variety and is unlikely to lead to large
scale demonstrations or riots. This can be attributed
not only to the well- discipL ned police and intelligence
forces, but also to policy decisions made by the top
SED leadership aimed at preventing minor problems
from developing into serious disputes. Public
demonstrations of dissatisfaction are quickly and
easily controlled by security personnel who have
demonstrated their loyalty by carrying out even the
most odious tasks, such as firing on citizens trying to
escape over the Berlin wall.
The SED bureaucracy controls and aids the police
forces in fulfilling their security functions. The party
leadership in East Berlin is regularly informed about
the state of public opinion and often quietly
intervenes in situations which have the potential for
leading to civil unrest if left unresolved. It is not
unusual for SED leader Erich Honecker to concern
himself with minor contentious problems.
The agreements reached by the two Germanies in
mid -1972 to facilitate visits of West Germans to the
GDR aroused fears of a large influx of West Germans,
and certain categories of governmental officials were
refused permission to receive Western relatives. There
have been no indications, however, that the visits are
creating security_ problems for the government.
In the event of civil disturbances which the East
German security forces could not handle, the regime
could count on the intervention of the 300,000 Soviet
troops stationed in the country. If these troops were to
be withdrawn at some future date, East Germany's
own security forces would be prepared to assume full
responsibility for internal security.
The internal security system has broken down only
once and that occurred in 1953, the year of Stalin's
death. At that time about 300,000 workers (5% of the
work force) went on strike in protest against increased
work norms. The demonstrations turned into full
fledged riots directed L Linst the government and
were finally brought under control by Soviet troops.
The uprising did not provide a severe test for the
security forces, ho�ever, because of the reluctance of
the SED leadership and Soviet military commanders
to order the use of extreme measures against the
rioters. By underestimating the seriousness of the
situation and failing to appreciate the depth and
magnitude of the workers' disaffection, East German
and Soviet authorities apparently avoided more
serious bloodshed. However, by the time order had
been restored, 21 of the rioters had lo- their lives.
Despite widespread discontent during the remain-
der of the decade, there was no repetition of the 1953
disorders. The building of the Berlin wall in 1961
made the job of the security forces easier by
facilitating control of border traffic. There were small
scale student riots in the midsixties as well as open
criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
but the security forces had no difficulty containing
these overt expressions of dissatisfaction.
After almost a quarter of a century, most East
Germans have come to terms with the Communist
regime and accept the reality of Communist rule for
the foreseeable future. The trend toward accommoda-
tion between the ruled and the rulers which has been
on the ascendancy in recent years, has given the
regime increased confidence in its legitimacy and
strengthened the faction in the party which favors
securing the cooperation of the people by tactics of
persuasion and reward instead of relying on the
discredited policies of coercion and arbitrary rule.
G. East Berlin (U /OU)
East Berlin, described by the Communists as "the
democratic sector of Berlin," is the capital of East
Germany. In practice, it is treated by the Communists
as the 15th district (Bexirk) of East Germany, although
it has not been formally incorporated into the German
Democratic Republic. Because of the symbolic
character and historical associations of Berlin, the East
German regime has sought to develop its half into a
more attractive city than other East German
population centers (Figures 7 and 8). It still has not
achieved the vast rebuilding and broadly based
prosperity so evident in West Berlin.
The evolution of Communist control in the Soviet
Sector of Berlin has followed a more complex course
than that in East Germany because Berlin as a whole
was originally governed separately under Four -Power
authority and did not form part of the Soviet
Occupation Zone under the basic quadripartite
agreements. Before the establishment of a Four -Power
Kommandatura in July 1945, the Soviet authorities
already had licensed various political parties to
operate throughout the city, at the same time
installing Communists in key positions in Berlin's
administrative system. But when the Soviet authorities
moved to expand their control after the formation of
the Kommandatura, the further development of
citywide political activity virtually ceased. The
attempt to merge the Communist Party of Germany
s

IIffi is t- WE @I NF& lffro
FIGURE 7. East Berlin panorama
(top) and part of the restored
4
Unter den Linden (bottom). The
extensive reconstruction and face
lifting of recent years has been
impressive and has greatly im-
proved the outward appearance
of the city. (U/OU)
14
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4
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(Kill)) and the Snc�ial Demnenilic Yams (SNI)i failed
onlright in (Vest lierliu: both orguaizutiotis were
eventttafly liiculkwd by the Kontrnundaletra to operate
ill all parts of the city, and tit- SM) continued as a
srpurilc org:uiiurtiom in F. u, i3crliti until 1961. 111
fast Ce'rtilatty the Sill) disappean�d as a wixtrale
cttlity ill 19.16.
With the breakdown of Dour -Nusv. rcuhuborilion in
19.18. two svpikmte Iretlitie:d syslettts evolved. A dials
meeting organized by the (:o11lnuutisls on 30
\oyrmher 19-M irMalltKf a new governmvnl in East
licrlin. Sitter fled time� 111r� Soviet Sector has ill practice
alx�relrcl :is nn in(vV! al part of flit- East Cerinan
political acfministr.itive systrni.'I'hc sc�Irarate clurtctcr
Of East 1$Tlirt syas eiNtn:dize�d by the ervelion of the
Rerun wall which rnforeed a drislic� curlailmetil on
Ile 111,1', meat of lx�mple Ixtercrn tl, Suvicl Sector
and the time Allied svelars; in )Vest Rcrlin. Actual I a%I
German .�ou(rol liver Earl Berlin w�as acarU�d rs-eil
36
FIGURE 8. The East German regime
provides a relative obundonce of
consumer goods end food t the
shops of East berlln. Shown is a
clothing shop on the Rathoussirosse
(fop) and a food market an
Leninplatz (below). (UJOU)
more forceftdh in August 1962 cslem am 1 {ast German
KorniliandeNuro n�placed flit- Soviet city votttmaod 111
cOMM%rttlitm of agreerrtents that only mililars
lxrsm inel of the� four Powers could he permitted in
lk-rhit. substantial E nst Getman military forces u11w
operate in Ile city. A ft-%% rernuattts of I our- l'owt-r
stalir estst, however, motahly the right of Wc%tern
ritililary patrols to visit I:ost Berlin' wilhoal voillrol
h% liasi German aulhorities. "fliese palroh, 311d :ill
11lher fon�iga nalimiAs. enter East Merlin mill throngl
ClivAlmint Charlie, 1111 Cif the seyerol ,�rolling points
'�lick esist between h:ast and West Berlin lt'igum 511
As a result of the agri signed betty ce�n flit \Vest
Ift�rlin Senrtl aucl flit bast German Coscrnnx�nt on 20
Dect�11ibe�r 19; 1. file number of crossing points for
\Vest Berliners aas imcmasetj to l3.
�flit� gersrrnnu�nt of Easl Rerlin consisls of a eit
exutncil l \4etgixdrettl of Ili member.. beaded h) u I ord
\1ay11r (Olre�rh tie rgernteister). Only two nu�n hire,
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