NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 32A; YEMEN (SAN'A'); COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100025-8
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
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CONFIDENTIAL
32A /GS /CP
Yemen (Sanla)
April 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
CONFIDENTIAL
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CENFRAl. SUIWEA (JIAI''I'I�RS
COUNTRY PROFILE Inte+;ratecl perspective of
the subject country Chronology Area brief
Summary nap
IIE SOCIETY Social stru6tire Populaliou
I ?mployntcnt Living conditions Social problems
I lvalth Religion 0 hdi -ation A listic cxpres-
sion Public inf(nnation.
GOVERNAIEN'I ANI) 1'0111"CS I"llitic�al evolu.
lion of thr state �Govcrnr�ru�nlul strength and s u!ility
Struclurc and function Political dynamics
National policies Threats to stability Tliv police
Intelligence and secrity Com,wrsibversion and
c�ouotcriusurc;cncy rupahilities
THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its
structure� agricull ire, fisheries, forestrv, fuels and
Dower, metals and minerals, manufactiring and con-
struction I)ornestic� trade I:conornic policy and
development Manpower International ec�ouonric
relations
'I'llANSM)HTATI()N ANI)
TlONS Appraisal of systems Strategic mobility
Iiighways Poris Civil air Airfields The
telecom system
:1III.ITARY GEOCHAPHY Topography and climate
Military geographic regions Strategic areas
Internal routes Approaches: land. sca, air
AICMEI) I ORCES The defeise establishinent
Joint activiVes *Ground forces Naval forces Air
forces ParaniiIit;ery
This general Survey supersedes lle one dated Junc
1970, copies of which should he destroyed.
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YEMEN (SAWAY)
Unfulfilled Revolution in a Medieval
Society 1
I'hr I.eg jc of Isolation The Tenacity of 'Trib-
alism Illiteracy, Suivrstition, and Oat liope
for the Fragile I?conomy N( Republic, Old
Problems Can the New Structure Survive? 0
The Search for Aid
Chronology 12
Area Brief 14
Summary Map follows 15
This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS
under the general superclision of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Social and Economic Statistics Administration, I)e-
partment of Commerce. Research was substantially
completed by fanuary 1973.
CON F I DENT 1A 1.
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.�,go
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Unfulfilled Revolution in a Medieval Society
IT
An extremely poor country with apparently limited
natural resources and isolated it) southwestern :Arabia
away from the main centers of Arab civilization,
Yemen' has rarely played all active role in the history
of the Middle East, Its greatest glary was achieved
during ancient times when, from roughly 12W B.C. to
the sixth century A.D., the various kingdon;s oc-
cupying the region were extensively involved in inter-
national commerce. Yemen's period of prosperity was
based on trade, most notably in frankineens? and
invrrh, and on an agriculture largely supported by an
elahorate, carefully tended irrigation system depend-
ent oil the great dam at Ma'rib, Overland caravan
routes to Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia �the
"incense trail originated in Yerrren, while ships
plying ill( Red Sea and the Indian Ocean used its
ports. 111 24 B.C, the Romans failed in their attempt to
subjugate the region. In the sixth and early seventh
centuries, however, first Ethiopian and then Persian
invaders succeeded in asserting hegemony over Yemen.
After the Ma'rib dam finally burst (sometime between
A.D. 542 and 570), rendering arid a large area of
'In antiquity the souther: edge of the Arabian Peninsula was the
Yemen, an area which now includes the Yernen Arab Republic
(Y.A.R.' and the western portion of the People's I)onocradc�
Republic of Yemen (P. 1). R.Y. 'Throughout this General Survey, the
word WITIC11 in discusoons of history desigoutes the entire area, but
in all other contexts it refers only (u the Y.A.R.
Historically, effective power in most c!' this part of the Arabian
Peninsula has rested with local tribes H chieftains. However, the
Imams, who reigned in what is now 'he Y.A.R. until 1962, had
considerable authority, sometimes exere.:ed under the suzerainty of
the Ottoman Turks. The present division of the arer. dates from IST)
when the British captured Aden, suhsequently established treaty
relationships with nearby tribal states, and in 1963 formed the
Federation of South Arabia, of which the P.D.R.Y. is the historical
descendant. "he Imams claimed that this territory was part of
Yemen, calling it "South Yemen" or "Occupied South Yemen.'
Now the antipathetic�Y.A.R. and P. D. R. Y. gay :mnlents have agreed
oil "unification." but actual merger i% unlikely.
hitherto fertile land, yerlielt settled into obscurity and
much of the country was reoccupied by Bedouin tribes.
(U
Yemen's adoption of Islam in the sew--nth century
did not reduce the country's political and intellectual
isolation from the rest of Arabia. in fact, by endowing
)'(.men with a comprehensive It-gal and social ardor
"ordained by God," Islam contributed greatly to the
deve!opntent of a closed sociopolitical system. Yemen
remained apart from the flourishing civilizations of
Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo and in any case was
too poor to support more than minimal cultural
standards. (U %GU)
Until the revolution of 1962, Yelinen was essentially
u medieval Islamic state, ur,tcsuched by the 20th
century and, in the view of foreign critics as :well as
domestic dissidents, backward and primitive. Its
theocratic rulers, the schismatic Imams who sought
refuge in Yemen late in the ninth century, had
gradually scaled off the region from outside influences
and from foreign visitors. This isolation was deliberate
Iv intensified by the imams of the 19th century,
Contact with the more progressive Aral) countries was
extremely limited; neither the Arab national
awakening nor the Muslim reform movements of the
late l9th century reached Yemen. Western technology,
except 'n the form of modern rifles, was hardly
appreciated. 'I'elephones, for examp,e, were riot in-
troduced until the late 1940'x, when a few were
installed for the Imam's personal use, and paper
money was riot issued until 1964. raved roads were
unknown before the 1960's. Even the use of radios was
severely restricted until the raid- 1950's, while modern
newspapers were developed only after the revolution.
Agriculture, the country's main industry, was based on
techniques developed in pre Islamic times. A fexw,
beginning in the 1930's, acquired some knowledge of
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the modern world through travel or Atidy :bn,ad, Imt
they were closely snatched for po,si1Ac sttbsrr,ive
inclinations. 61
Extenal forces, them, exerted or,l% a limited impact
uu Yenn�n's intenal developnetat. Sporadic occupa-
tion bs the Ottoman Turks bet%%evii 151- mid 1018
seerts to IMVC had altuost nu vffc�c�t on the country's
s060% Mid Politics. The absence of' Etiropc�an penetrne-
tion, except in the form of sm all trade missions,
p- ec�lude�d the nerd for modernization of arty kind, and
Tiirki,h iIIfluetice was too shallow to provide an
e ffc c tix model. ,11thcugh it initially had little impact
on Sar'a'.` Britain' conquest of Adett ill I8;1i) ul-
tintately was to prove of great significance to 1'vlllon. ,1
century later, Advil began to attract large mindwrs of
Yemeni laborers and merchants who were then a x
posed, however stiperfic�ially, to Western idea, and
rtu�lhods. These nlerl formed the nucleus of the
revolutionary movement the helped overthrow the
Imauuate in 1962. Moreover, Imam Ahmad Ifamid
al -Din (INS fit) miwittingl\ helped undermine Ili,
own position by accepting arms and tec�luiciatts from
:olllmtillst states frr use in the straggle against
"British impvrialisn'' in the "Oc�cupiecl South."
Yemen's entry into the "rtodern'' era may Ie dated
from 26 5vptetnber 1962, when a republican coi4p
d'etaI led bs (;ol. ';1bcl :Xllah al ',chug (l,I I
Imam Nitlltammad al -Radr. Mnnad's son, who had
reigned for only a week. The coup precipitated a
blood) civil war that was to last until 1970. lu order to
shore up his revolutionary n�gime, which almost
icrltnediatel' carne under attack frail the Iman's
Saudi- backed tribal forces, Colonel Sallal requested
the aid of E gyptian troops, who bore the brunt of the
fighting on the republican side uud whose nu ;nbers at
one point reached more than 60,000. :kltiotlgll the
situation was in fact quite complex, supporters and
opponents of Ole revolution tended to divide along
sectarian lines. The'' /.aydis, members of tic schismatic
Shia branch of Islam, generally supported their
religious leader, the Imam, while tilt Shah'is, orthodox
Sunni Muslims who c�ons.itrted a slight majority of Ifle
poptllatir,n, backed the republicans. Despitc the un-
popularit of Sallal, who was President of the Yclilen
Arab Republic (Y.A.R.) from 1962 until his ouster ill
November 1967, his adlnittistration of the country
resulted in teutdalnental political changes t1lA made it
return to the archaic practices of the 1,000 -year -old
Inuunaty virtually impossible. For a tinge, Yemen
became identified with ti(� "progressive' Arab states,
but contacts with the Arab world, except for E gypt.
remained limited. W)
�Fur diauritics un place tiamrti we thy� list of palm's on the aliron ul
the tinnumim Map aml the mall itself
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The Legacy of Isolation (u /ou)
(;cography no less that, I,,,licy ac�cc!U11ts for Yemen's
isolation and corriributes to its continuing insularity
and underdevelopn(nt. The country is not easily
approachable from any direction and is far frmrn an)"
other center of civilization except for Aden, to the
south. About t1w size of Illinois. Yernen is hemmed it)
on the by the lied Sea, With its hazardous coasts;
on the 1�ast by the vast desert expanse of the Empty
Quarter (Ruh' al- ilhah) on the north b% the arid
highlands :,f Asir in Su1:di Arabia; and on the south
and southeast by the rugged foothills and desolate
Ifadrama t plateau of Yemen (Adcn). The terrain
within the country is divides! into hvo main parts: the
Ti flit rna11, It hot and almost rainless coastal strip,
whose clintutc is oce of the most r on
earth and tilt' cooler, more dersc'I populated high
ph,leae, with Sae'a', the capital, in its center. The
sparsely settled eastern part of tf.c plateau slopes
gently down and shades into desert. Water is roost
Plectiful in the highlands, whicf catch the Indian
Occan monsoons; vegetation is generall sparse in
other areas. Whet the rains fail, massive f;unne
snrnetirnc's results.
The mountains, tilt' hight'st in Arabia, rise abruptlN
from th(� coastal plain to inure than 1209) feet near
S:.u1'a', ;:ud the}' huge profcundl divided the� country
'III(] its people, m;rry of whoa, rarely venture beyond
the confines of their natiyt. yallcy floor or hillside. In
contrast to the coastal dwelivrs, largely M -grot.s and
Afric�alls of ,ni%cd descent, the Volatile Arab
highlanders, whose mountain strongholds hove frc-
clucntly discoeraged military expeditions, have seldom
willingly sulrtitted to control by a c�cnh'al authority.
The few bedoeins inhabiting the eastern desert border
regions also have been reluctant to acknowledge t!u�
suzerainty of an governntc'rt. Undcr them. conditions,
the exercise of central authority has been extremely
difficult, even in nodern tines, and the rise ar d fall of
small principalities and tribal states hues been it
prominent characteristic of 1'cnu ni history.
Although the civil war between republicans and tilt.
royalist followers of the I,narn during the 1962 -70
period jolted the Ye,tte,is out of their medieval
lethargy, Yenu'n coutincc's to be an inward- looking
and primitive land, now preoccrrpiccl svitlt its rtriny
domestic problens and its unfinished sccial rcrol!Hon,
3
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/n,atn's Palace near San'a' Aertueen San'a' and A/ flu&,ydah

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shortage of mecl`r:,-,l personnel, the drought- induced
famines, not to s of the ravages of war, have
combined to meld a population that is generally
inclined to accept the misfortunes of life as ordained
by God. The typical villager is locked by ignorance
into a timeless world of spirits or demons, called jinns,
and of custom. Governed by superstition and fear, he is
skeptical of change but not unreceptive if its advan-
tages are clearly demonstrated.
A serious impediment to development is the
widespread habit of chewing qat, a mild narcotic
shrub grown on the Yemeni hillsides. Between 75%
4.- 4, 7
,k.
pe #or ,#fie r file to BONY (c)
r J, �L Y
y.. yy, L t r r. r
r
e
Antiquated social practices and a rigid social struc-
ture intermesh with the country's fragile economic
system to limit the prospects of development. There
seem to be few economic initiatives that can have
major impact in moving the country toward self
sustaining growth, and economic viability is many
decades away. At the equivalent of US$40 to US$50
per year, per capita income is one of the lowest in the
Arab world, and unemployment and underemploy-
ment are believed to be considerable. However, for the
moment at least, the government seems intent on
tackling the country's severe economic difficulties,
foreign aid is coming in, and the private sector is being
bolstered.
The national budget represents only rough estimates
of receipts and expenditures. The latter increased in
FY71 to over US$35 million, but the expansion has
been concentrated on defense and internal security.
Other uses of budgetary funds are indicated by a
remark of a former Prime Minister who likened the
6
and 90% of all adult males are said to be habitual
users; some estimates place experiditure-. for qat as
high as one -third of the cash income of the average
Yemeni. Urban Yemenis, in particular, like to spend
the afternoon chewing, smoking the water pipe, and
exchanging gossip. Some of these gatherings last well
into the evening, inducing a sense of euphoria in the
participants but making work nearly impossible.
Government efforts to eliminate the cultivation of the
bush, announced in May 1972, are likely to prove
ineffective, since qat is an important feature of Yemen
social life and a lucrative cash crop.
budget to "a fund for the relief of the unemployed, the
disabled, and the needy, as well as the source by which
the greedy ones get rich." Few people, however, get
rich in Yemen.
Although survey missions have located some
deposits of copper, coal, and oil, these natural
resources have not so far proved to be of commercial
significance. In this context, industrialization is vir-
tually out of the question. There are only about 8,000
industrial workers in Yemen, a quarter of whom are
employed in the two factories run by the state -owned
textile concern.
The repubhe's first economic priority, then, is
agriculture, accounting for about 90% of employment
and providing an estimated 709c of the gross domestic
product (GDP). Since ancient times, the Yemeni
farmer, despite his limited technical knowledge, has
ranked among the most skilled in the world. Almost
every hillside on which cultivation is possible is
elaborately terraced, and the irrigation systems are
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carefully maintained. A variety of clops are produced,
including millet, wheat, barley, corn, an assortment of
fruits, date palms, and coffee. Nevertheless, under
present ccndturns Yemeni agriculture can meet the
country's demand for food only in unusually good crop
years. 'l'he shortage of water is a prime reason for the
inability to increase production, although ground-
water reservoirs in the Tihamah could conceivably
be tapped. Moreover, the land is not as fert;le as it
once ryas; yields are fairly high oni% in relation to
those elsewhere in Arabia. Combined with the farrner's
ignorance of new griculturai techniques, these factors
suggest that. e�yen \xith c\tensive� foreign assistance,
Yemen's green revolution is years away.
Aside frorn the difficulty of expanding the national
product, the ability to augment revenues is severely
hampered by an ineffective system of taxation and the
public's traditional resistance to government authori-
ty. Instead of being taxed, Yemeni tribes expect to be
courted with handsome government subsidies.
Moreover, for the person who pays taxes, rates often
depend on his relationship with the tax collector.
Financial support for development projects must
come almost entirely from external sources. The
U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China have
been Yemen's major sources of aid, and West Germany
has replaced the United States as the main Western
contributor following the break in U.S. Yemeni
diplomatic ties in 1967. The improved relations with
Saudi ,Arabia since the end of the civil war have
stimulated inflows of foreign capital, and many
businessmen have fled the highly socialized Yemen
(Aden) �the P. D. R. Y. �to come to the Y.A.R. The
result has bee: a commercial surge in San'a' and Al
Hudaydah. Yemen's ability to earn foreign exchange is
limited, however, as it has an unfavorable balance of
trade with almost every country with which it deals.
Although imparts tripled during the 1964 -70 period,
exports dropped, largely because of drought ;;ears. The
stability of the rival, suc:, as it is, has been under-
pinned over the years by substantial remittances
(US833 million -350 million per y,ar) from thousands
of Yemeni emigrants working abroad.
Drawing well Mater
Unless the economic situation improves, it will be
extremely difficult to create modern political struc-
tures. Operating as a closed system, the Imamate Nvas
not required to satisfy economic demands, which were
muted in any case. Maldistribution of income was
hardly a problem in a country that boasted little in the
way of wealth. Even the despotic Imams were not men
of great wealth or given to Western luxuries. Main-
taining the political balance was a relatively simple
matter of playing off one faction againsi another and
keeping the tribes in line by bribery, cajolery, or
military force. So long as outside factors did not
intrude, this was a reasonably workable system.
Since the overthrow of the Imamate in 1962, the
basic conditions governing political life have not
changed substantially. Perhaps the main difference
between the oid and new regimes is that Yemenis are,
in theory, no longer subjects of the lmarn but citizens
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overworked high officials to delegate authority.
Moreover, the administrative machinery is corrupt
and, in the swords of a former Prime Minister,
characterized by "confusion, lack of discipline,
carelessness, and irresponsibility."
In the absence of a stabilizing officialdom, the
frequent changes in government (some 21 cabinets in
the 1962 -71 period) have had an immobilizing effect.
This situation mould be far more serious, however,
we re it not for the inertia of the rural areas and the
tradition of local government which enables villagers
and tribes to conduct their own affairs for prolonged
periods without interference or supervision from
San'a'. (The apparatus of modern government simply
does not operate outside Yemen's three main cities)
Furthermore, the Shar'a (Islamic law), still the coun-
try's only regular code of law, serves as a weighty
stabilizing factor. Recent events suggest not only a
consolidatior of revolutionary gains but also a
moderation of revolutionary excesses and a reassertion
of tradition. An accommodation with the royalists,
exclusive of the Imamic family, was achieved in May
1970.
Since then, the Yemeni leadership has been engaged
in a more or less systematic effort to restructure the
political process and enlarge the framework of public
participation. The Permanent Constitution, a rather
conservative document declaring Yemen to be an
Arab, Islamic state, was proclaimed in December
1970, and popular elections for the new parliament
were held in early 1971. In theory, this assembly, the
Consultative Council, is to represent all "national
tendencies of thought," but it is dominated by tribal
leaders, and the constitutional ban on parties severely
inhibits expression of public opinion, particularly by
leftwing elements.
The decidedly stronger of the two branches of
government is the executive, composed of a
Republican Council and a Council of N inisters. The
Republican Council, a three -man body aapointed by
the Consultative Council and presided over by the
President, is responsible for establishing and super-
vising national policy. The Council of Ministers,
headed by the Prime Minister, is responsible for
executing government police. A third executive
agency, an 11- member Supreme Council for Defense
of the St was reportedly established in September
1972, its membership to include the Chairman of the
Republican Council, ranking military officers, and
prominent tribal leaders.
It is impossible to de;ormine whether this new and
rather awkward constioitional structure will survive.
Yemen has had no experience with parliamentary
government, and lines of authority between the ex-
cutive and the parliament are not clear. drawn. All
may ultimately be overshadowed by the Supreme
"ouncil.
As elsewhere in the Middle East, intervention in
)olitics by the armed forces is always possible. In
triking contrast to the situation which existed under
he Imamate, the military has become an important
orce in the workings of government. Under the
nfluence of and with aid from the Egyptians and
soviets, the army made great gains after 1962. Some of
hose gains have now been lost, however; as the army
disturbed by the same tribal and religious divisions
Nch affect the rest of society, its operational and
rganizational capabilities are limited. In short, the
9
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Can the New Structure Survive? (c)

militarN N%ould be unlikely to gove�m the cmintrc am
more efficiently than the present civilian leadership
,ud mwndd be equally constrained b harsh economic
realities.
For many s ears, Yemeni political life s ill reflect the
character of its deep1% cmiservatire Muslim socich.
Modernization %%ill proceed unh fitfully, and ,.ipid
transformations in any sector are not tee i,e expected.
N1'c�re Marxist- oriented radical, of the Yenien iAdt-tl
stripe to assume Imwer, it is doubtful whether their
control could he imposed without stimulating the
rebellious instincts of' the "anti- Cminnunut tribes
and prejudicing the rappriwfn'rnent %%ith
Saudi Arabia. Whose friendsllip is impt tlr Yt-rneni
stabilit%. A radical pre,granl might also frighten ma\
the c(mmiercial interests urn v%li -w) the present g(wcrn
rnent has mule� to depend for support. On the other
hand, a more "right\\ ing" c(mrst- runs the risk of
:lienating educated %mIths anxious to put it l v; Id to
l crnen's back N artiness, as ell as important groups ill
the militar\ and civil ser %ic�t-s. Dissident group, ha\c
already elrnnu no. cd I'�esidcnt Irani ii> it rightist :ud
war?ted against 'react ionan, ii plots agaitlst
tilt- rexolulion.
Ihlr"riiun rnrirtll: ill C'hill'i
The Search for Aid (c)
In line with changing domestic policies, foreign
alignments also are beginning to shift. Yemen's
primary international concerns are related to a search
for foreign aid and the need to stabilize relations with
its neighbors. According to the Foreign Minister in
1911, Yemen's police is to remain friendly Frith all
countries, but in order of importance the Aral) states
rank first, the socialist countries secon:1, and the
Western powers last. With the partial exception of the
10
Arab countries, howe\er. Yemen has no natural
affinity with un\ state or blow. Its people have little
understanding of either democratic or Communist
political systems. During critical stages of the civil war,
the republicans leaned heavil on the Soviets, who
lime since shown considerable less interest in the
country, but acceptance of Soria aid was basically a
tactical consideration, as was the imams flirtation
with the Communist countries in the 1950�s. I3r the
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same token, Yemen's evening to the West beginning in
the late 1960's and culminating in the reestablishment
of diplomatic relations with the United States in July
1972, implies no moral comr. fitment to Western
patterns of development or politics, which are essen-
tially inapplicable in any event. It does underscore the
need for Western aid in the form of technology and
equipment and emrhasi..es the growth of a more
pragmatic government outlook that stands in sharp
contrast to past government policy, including that of
the period Egyptian domination.
Relations with other Arab nations have been
characterized by suspicions only slightly less deep than
those directed toward the non -Arab world. During the
civil war, the royalists and tribesmen generally viewed
the Egyptians as occupiers; ven many republicans
resented their heavy hand. Yemen has traditionally
viewed Saudi Arabia as an enemy, fighting and losing
a war with it in 1934 and, as recently as early 1970,
bombing border towns because of Saudi support of
Yemeni royalists. With the end of the civil war,
however, relations improved, and Saudi Arabia has
become an important source of aid.
After Yemen (Aden) formally the P.D.R.Y.�
gained independence from the United Kingdom
in 1967, relations with the south gre%, progressively
worse, reaching a low point in October 1972 when
Ader i dissidents, apparently encouraged by San'a',
seized Aden's Kamaran Island and captured some
Adeni soldiers. ;bon thereafter, how -ever, delega-
tions from San'a' and Aden, meeting in Ca;;: at
the behest of the Arab League, reached agreemc ia, on
the settlement of most difference.> and worked uut
a unification plan. The agreement according to which
the two Yei.iens are to become one by the end of 1973
was s?g,ned by the Y.A.R. and P.D.R.Y. presidents at a
summit conference in Tiipoli, Libya, on 28 November
1972, but it is questionable whether the two countries.
with divergent histories and political coloring, can ever
achieve a tr,;e .ae -ger.
Yemen's future will be determined by its ability to
secure and utilize development assistance and, more
importantly, by its success in accommodating the
imperatives of the modern world with its ancient
traditions. There is virtually no precedent for Yemen's
contemporary situation. Although the country is no
longer officially isolated, it is far rea Dved from the
mainstream of world affairs. While it is beginning to
educate its children, it has few employment oppor-
tunities for there beyond traditional pursuits.
Moreover, the country's prospects are overshadowed
by its tendency toward divisiveness. The nation has a
firm grounding in more than 3,000 years of history, but
Yernen's revolutionary brand of nationalism has failed
to bridge the gap between town and country, highland
and coast, north and south, Zaydi and Shafi'i, tribe
and nontribe. The revolution may have liberated the
people from the yoke of the Imams, but the people
have not yet decided where they are going or how they
will get there.
I1
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Chronology Wouj
628
Yemen is converted to Islam.
097
71 a Zaydi sect, which became the basis of 6e theocratic
Imamate, is introduced.
1517.96
First Ottoman occupation of Yemen.
1840 -1918
Second occupation by Ottoman Turks.
1911
Treaty of Da an, between the Turks and the Imam,
is signed, granting special rights to the Zaydi tribes.
1918
s
Yemen becomes independent, except for a coastal strip
retained by the United Kingdom until 1925.
1928
Yemen is recognized by the Soviet Union.
1934
Saudi Arabian -Yemen war is won by Arabia, which
waives any territorial claim.
1946
Yemen is recognized by the United States.
1947
Yemen is admitted to the United Nations.
1962
September
Imam Ahmad dies of natural causes and is succeeded by
Imam Badr on 19 September. Eight days later a coup,
led by Brig. Gen. 'Abd Allah al- Sallal and others, over-
throws the Imamate and proclaims the Yemen Arab Re-
public. Yemen is recognized by Egypt and the U.S.S.R.
before the end of the month. Civil war between the
republicans and the royalists begins.
December
The republican government is recognized by the United
Nations, and its representatives are seated in the U.N.
General Assembly.
1963
July
U.N. Yemen Observation Mission begins its operations,
which continue till September 1964.
A 12
1964
March
President Sallal tours European Communist capitals and
signs a 5 -year treaty of friendship with the U.S.S.R.
June
Sallal visits Communist 7hina, where he signs a treaty
of friendship.
October
Pence conference is held in Sudan under auspices of the
Arab states; a ceasefire is agreed to but not observed.
December
Serous opposition to Yemen's virtual occupation by
Egyptians surfaces when "Abd al- Rahman al -Iryani and
Muhammad Mahmud al- Zubayri resign from the govern-
ment.
1965
August
Egyptian P. rsident Nasir and Saudi Arabian King Faysal
agree on a ceasefire in Yemen and begin plans for a
peace conference.
November
First session of Yemeni peace conference held Y:t Harad
fails to reach agreement and never reconvenes,
1967
June
Yemen breaks relations with the United States over the
Arab Israeli war.
September
Egyptian troops and advisers begin to withdraw from
Yemen.
November
Pro Egyptian President Sallal is ousted. He is replaced by
a "Yemen first" regime under a three -member Repub-
lican Council headed by Iryani.
December
Egyptian withdrawal is completed.
1968
February
The royalist seige of San a' is lifted with the reopening
of the Al Hudaydah road.
August
Mutiny of predominantly Shafi "i shock troops is broken
by tribal forces.
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v
b
1969
MU& December s
Provisional National Council, which serves as a con- New rnnsti:ution is promulgated.
sultative quasi -legislature, meets, attended by tribal chiefs 197.1
and other notables. March-April
September-December
Saudi Arabia temporarily resumes aid to royalists who ody t3tive Council is elected, first elective legislative
eventually regain Sa`dah.
1970 1972
Mamh July October
Peace agreement between republicans and royalists finally Dissident forces from Yemen (nden) --the P.D.R.Y.� s
achieved at conference in Jidda. spark military engagements; San'a' takes Kamaran Island.
May November
The government adds ex- royalists to the Republican Coun- P.D.R.Y. and Y.A.R. Presidents meet in Tri
cil, cabinet, ails the National Council. poli, Libya,
and rati a greement to unify countries in 1973.
i
i
k
Sz
13
F

CONFIDENTIAL,
Area Brief Now
LAND
Size: About 75,000 sq. m� (parts of border with Saudi
Arabia and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen un-
defined)
Use: 20% agricultural, 1% forested, 79% desert, waste
or urban
Land boundaries: 950 mi.
WATER
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi.
Coastline: 325 mi.
PEOPLE
Population: 6,074,000 (mid -1972 est.); average annual
growth rate, about 2.9%
Ethnic divisions: 90% Arab, 10% Afro -Arab (mixca)
Religion: 100% Muslim
Language: Arabic
Literacy: 15% (est.)
Labor force: Almost entirely engaged in agriculture and
herding, about 8,000 in industry, 400,000 in commerce
and construction
GOVERNMENT
Legal name: Yemen Arab Republic
Type: Republic
Capital: San'a'
Political subdivisions: 8 provinces
Legal system: Based on Turkish law, Islamic law, and
local customary law; first constitution promulgated De-
1 nber 1970; has not accepted compulsory ICJ juris-
dic. _'on
Branches: President, Prime Minister, Republican Council,
Consultative Council
Government leader: President 'Abd al- Rahman al -Iryani
Communists: Few known
Member of: Arab League, FAO, ICAO, 1TU, U.N.,
UNESCO, UPU, WHO
14
ECONOMY
Agriculture: Sorghum and millet, qat (a mild narcotic),
cotton, coffee, fruits and vegetables; self sufficient in
food only in very good crop years
Major industries; Cotton textiles, leather goods, cement,
aluminum products
Electric power: 4,000 kw. capacity (1970); 14 million
kw. -hr. produced (1970), 2 kw. -hr. per capita
Exports: About $6 million (1970) �qat, coffee, hides,
rock salt
Imports: About $88 million 1970 manufactured con-
sumer goods, petroleum prod�cts, sugar grain, Flour and
other foodstuffs
Major trade partners: Trade with Aden 25% of total,
others include U.S.S.R., Japan, Saudi Arabia, Australia,
France
Monetary conversion rate: 1 Yemeni riyal =about US$0.20
as of late 1972
Fiscal year: 1 July -30 June
COD ri iCATIONS
Railroads: None
Highways: 2,160 mi.; 290 mi. bituminous; 270 mi.
crushed stone and gravel; 1,600 mi. earth roads and
motorable tracks
Ports: 3 major, 2 minor
Civil air: 8 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 24 usable; 5 with permanent- surface runways;
1 with runway over 12,000 ft., 6 with runways 8,000-
11,999 ft., 12 with runways 4,000 -7,999 ft.
Telecommunications: Systems among Mideast's worst;
consists of meager open -wire lines and low -power radio
communication stations; principal center, San a', secon-
dary centers Al Hudaydah and Ta'izz; 3,550 telephones;
25,000 radio receivers (approx.); 2 AM radio broadcast
stations
DEFENSE FORCES
About 1,470,000 males 15 -49 (July 1072 est.); 53% fit
for military service; about 31,000 in armed forces; ap-
proximately 50,000 reach military age (18) annually
CONFEDENITAL
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4
I
Places and features referred to in the General Survey (U /OU)
COORDINATES
o r o r,� o 1Yl o 1E
Abu as Su'Gd, Saudi Arabia 17 28 44 06 Kirsh, Yemen (Aden).................... 14 37 46 45
A4 Pal i' 1:3 42 44 43 Ma4iq Kamaran (channel) 15 20 42 38
Aden, Yemen (Aden) 12 46 45 01 M afbaq. 15 07 43 54
A n: nadi 14 48 42 57 M anakhah 15 07 43 44
AI 3ay4:i 13 58 45 36 M a' rib... 15 30 45 21
Ba;;t al Fagih :4 31 43 17 M aydi.. 16 18 42 48
Allludaydah 14 48 42 57 Mocha.. 13 19 43 15
Al Lub ayyah 15 4:3 42 42 Najran, Saudi Arabia (oasis) I7 30 44 10
Al Luhayyah (port) 15 42 42 42 Perim, Yemen (Aden) (island)............ 12 39 43 25
Ar Rahidah 1 3 20 44 17 Qa'tabah................... 13 51 44 42
Asir, Saudia Arabia (region). 19 00 42 00 Qizan, Saudi Arabia...................., 16 54 42 32
As Salif 15 18 42 41 Ramlat as Sah'atayn (dunes).............. 15 30 46 00
At Ta'if, Saudi Arabia 21 16 40 24 Rida'... 14 28 44 53
At Turbah 13 02 43 54 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.................... 24 38 46 43
Az Z aydiyah 15 14 43 04 Rub' al Khali (desert) 20 00 51 00
Bab el Mandeb (strait) 12 30 43 20 Sa' dah.. 16 57 43 44
Bahrain (island) 26 00 50 30 Salif, Ra's as (point) 15 19 42 40
Baijil I...... 15 04 43 17 San' a'... 15 23 44 12
Balaq 15 19 �15 23 Ta' izz... 13 38 44 02
Banial lIarith 15 38 44 10 Tiha mah area),................ 14 03 47 55
Bani al Ilarith (tribal area). 15 38 44 10 Uqdah, Saudi .Arabia.................... 14 07 43 05
Karat 13 35 44 39 Wadi Zabid (wadi)....................... 14 09 43 18
Da'a n 16 01 43 50 I Z abid 14 12 43 I8
D hamiir 14 46 44 23 %ahriin, Saudi Arabia.................... 17 40 43 30
Dhofar, Saudi Arabia (region) 17 00 54 10 Selected Airfields
fladhramaut (region) 15 0(1 50 00
liajjah 15 42 43 34 A] Bayda 14 06 45 26
l lara4 16 28 43 04 Al lludaydah New...................... 14 45 �12 59
I crib 14 57 45 30 I As Salif East 15 18 42 52
Ibb 13 58 44 12 I Qalat M arinaf 16 00 43 11
Jibl ah 13 56 �14 10 Ra wdah 15 28 44 13
Jidda (Juddah),Saudi Arabia 21 30 39 12 Sadah New 16 58 43 44
Ji� ayn 16 59 44 11 Sana South... 15 19 44 12
Kamaran, Yemen (Aden) (island). 15 21 42 34 Sukhne 14 48 43 26
K hawr Kathib (bay) 14 52 42 57 Tai New 13 41 44 08
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