NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 32A; YEMEN (SAN'A'); ARMED FORCES

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100024-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
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• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 24
• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
32A/GS/AF
semen (anlaj
April 1.973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
No FOREIGN D /SSEA9
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YEMEN (SANW)
CONTENTS
This General Surcey .supersedes the one dated
June 1970, copies of which should be destroyed.
A. Defense establishment 1
Summary of stricture, strengths, weaknesses, and
capabilities. Soviet influence and presence.
1. Military history 2
Creation and growth of armeel forces; Egyp-
tian troops in the Y.A.R.; foreign aid; dissident
tribesmen, border incidents.
2. Defense organization 3
Chain of command and Armed Forces Su-
preme Command.
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3. Military manpower 4
Estimated male population by age group and
number physically fit; recruitment and morale.
4. Strength trends 5
Armed forces persr onnel strength.
5. Training 5
Summary of foreign training, military educa-
tional programs under consideration, and joint
service trainh,g.
6. Military budget.... 5
Estimate of military budget for 1968 -71.
7. Logistics 5
Foreign suppliers of military equipment and
total dependence on Soviet an-] W--rsaw Pact
countries.
B. Army 6
Mission and capabilities; so in the army,
and tribal conflicts.
1. Organization 7
Armed Forces Supreme Command, chain of
cammand, and control of combat units; ad-
ministrative provinces and corresponding mili-
tary commandr
2. Strengths, composition, and disposition 8
Personnel strength; major breakdown of
armed forces; area of troop concentration;
arms and equipment,
3. Training 9
Soviet military advisers assign to various
military schools and army units; number of
personnel undergoing training in the U.S.S.R.
and Saudi Arabia; types of military schools.
4. Logistics 9
Deptndenoe on foreign sources; types and
amours: of mili' pry equipment received frcm
foreign countries; control of equipment and
weapons.
Page
C. Navy 10
1. Organization 10
Command structure and headquarters organi-
zation.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
Ship and personnel strengths.
3. Training
Soviet and Egyptian advisers; training in the
U.S.S.R.
4. Logistics
Limited repair facilities.
D. Air force
Capabilities, mission, and dependence on the
U.S.S.R. for aircraft and spare parts; status of
aircraft.
1. Organization
Command structure and headquarters organi-
zation.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
Personnel and aircraft strengths; squadron
based assignments; personnel problems.
3. Training
Domestic and foreign training by Soviet and
Syrian personnel.
4. Logistics
Depenue�c.e upon foreign sources; denial of
spare parts by Soviets; major supply depot and
bulk fuel storage area.
E. Paramilitary forces
1. Ministry of Interior security forces
Strengths and functions of the Central Se-
curity Force and the Office oi; General Se-
curity.
2. Zaydi tribal forces
Brief discussion of tribes; estimated strengths;
arms and equipment.
FIGURES
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10
10
11
11
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12
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Fig. 1 Tribesmen carrying supplies
Fig. 4
Army organization chart)
7
(photo)
3 Fig, 5
Paratroopers (photo)
8
Fig. 2 Defense organization (clout)
4 Fig. 6
Naval force personnel (photo)
10
Fig. 3 Tribal soldiers (;photo)
6 Fig, 7
Armored carrier photo)
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Armed Forces
A. Defense establishment
1'he� armed force~ of div vine n :1rab liepublic�
c�ensist of ;ill army of about 30.0W. ;u
embryonic naval force� of about 250 Wren ;urd five
,peraatinnal small craft, and ati air force of abcrit ;(H)
then and 27 aircraft. Parunilitary force~, under the
klinistry of Interior, consist of the Central Security
Force and the Office of General Security 'These
c- ornbined forces total about 4,3(H) mete, In addition,
there a re the Gavdi tribal forces >vho have a
pit rtnailitary calub ;lii� scilh streugtis rarer
exceeding a f v %v 11) tisuncl. {Sl
The arnied forces art charged with maintaining
internal sec�urit\ and defending the country against
foreign aggression. The awned forces of Yemen' are
marginall\ capahle of maintaining iutenal sivitrit\,
bolt th(-\- would be unable to offer significant
resistance to the forc of ;a major power or to conduct
successful offensive operations against nc�ighhoring
countries. The arnwd forces have been unable to
protect Yenten's southern border from forts by
Kllrt.). known as Yenen (Aden)�forces. (S)
The train external challenge facing the military
e- stablishinent is the threat from the� radical
Government. Most iailitary leaders ,could like to
e.�omrnit their forces, it: rorijrtnctiem with anti -Aden
tribal forces and dissident groups, against the Aaeui
regirne. Past attempts along these lines indicate such
ventures are not likely to be satc�cessful. civilian
offickls are divided oil the subivo.- with 1'resident
Irani strongly opposing an) such trove. (S)
I.uck of 'greater combat effectiveness is due
primarily to obsolete e(luiptnent, which hay beet
further degraded through iriadecluute rn ;rintenance,
lack of spare parts, and the ;absence of 7111 effective
traimtig program. The armed forces have been
'The word Yenien refers to the Yemen Arab Repnblic(Y.A.It. or
Yettten (San'a'), not to be cvtifused with the Pee,ple's t)ernoc�ratic
Republic of Yenu +n (P. 1). It. Y.), or Yernen (Aden).
c�omph�tel\ depe�nderil on Warsam fact countries,
prin,aril-, the V.S.S li.. for military aid and advisf�rs.
Tlv- Soriets, whe� also srtplxrt Ilse c�ornln�ting Yernen
(:%deta l armed forces, an� apparentic %ioithholdiiig meet
mihtar% dehkeries and spun� parts, wfiile providing
greater support to the Adeni regime�. Yenea's
rapt rochement kith Saudi .1rabia in
1970. increased cooperation svilh Westerii countries
sa_ as 11'e Gcrntauv. and the remunplion of
telatiois with Ilse foiled Slate. ill Iul% 1972 have
midorebtedls c�ontrilmwd to the decrease in Soviet
logistic support. Still farther animoNity has retinlled
froth Allowing anti- Yvinen (Ade dis:ielenl organi /a-
lions it) c�oraduct insurgent operations from Yemeni
territon. Current and near -lean military aid from
Sa+tdi Arabia, Egvpl, and Libya \sill not be sufficient
to replace the S(;%iel assistance if iI is temi iiiated. (S)
Although the mvrsizcd standing arm% cat, rely on
ni nbers to maitI;ain internal security, except along
the southem border aith Aclen. any major offee.ice
operations would be sv%vrely wAric�ted becaatse of IFie
lack of spare parts, esln�cial1% in the� armored units.
The oaval force las no c�omhat capabilih and rarer
conducts even short-range patrols. In the past, the ;air
force has ofv mot tstraIcd its c� ;a Ili biIi, y to bomb
slaIinnary (argots and provide limited supporl to
ground nnils; however, bec�auu� of its complete
reliance o il iioviet ecluipinent, it too is Plagued b litc
shortage of spare parts. The V.S.S.K. has supplied
earl\ warning and gromid control intercept radar to
Yvin �n, hot no effective air defense system cxists.:1ir
&.4vuse capability is limited to irtnv antiaircraft units
and tribal forces faniIiar wit It light anliaireraft
w eapons that were employed during ill( republic�an-
ro\:ilist civil war of (1;c 1960%. (S)
No formal military alliances are known to exist;
however, Yemen has concluded technical and military
assistance agreements with the U.S.S.H., litilgari;a,
Yugoslavia, Pcople 114-public of C11ina, Czecho-
slovakia. Bast German\, and E,gypt. From the
beginning of the mpublicatt regime in September 1962
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Initi) 1%7 F p lit exerci.ed ;�onsiderlble iufltrence
eser lc�IJU�JIi g( ve�Jnrru� It, 11 affair.. (n resIifIII e the
IItsgIcf (111 nl%allst allentpl to osertbroa the
republican goyertimet -l. file I� :ppliaus w�nl lei leutcn
it 11 e%pedttiortar% fon�e. %%hic�II reached a maxlrnIIIII of
about 60,M).
1. Military hkton
Follimirtg indepelldl-nc�e front flu� Turks ill ISMS,
Yvmvn's nidinu�ntar% aritwd forc rsoived into ticcir
present strucloire undo�: gtticdance, training. and arnis
pro%ith-d by a %im0% of foreign immer%. inchiditlg file
1'nited kingdom. Turks�%. S%% (den. l :gspt. I. ill%;:,
Syria, :n�choslovakia. and the I S.S. 11 ?1')
The army is cseutiall% art mitgrow111 of the tribal
levies that functioned as little more flan it paL1.e
guard for the linarti 111) to the revolution of Septendwr
1962. Ill that revolution ;1 gro(11) (If %as Ili arms
o fficers. livaded b% :ol. :V;d .111ah .d- S:ill:cl.. %%ere
able to obtain extensive foreign %lipp uotabli from
Egypt, and oyerthre%% lbe reginu�of Imam liadr. From
that date the royalists foilghl ;tg.1insl the rep il; WMI
forces. B% 1961 the w1mblicall arnn, stipplertertted In
recruiting, %%as formed into five nonsho dard 1rig:�.dv%
under Soviet and I� :pptian ltitelagl-. I)espiteexl: ns1%e
I :9 ptiaII aid, the royalist forces remained in c:ntrol of
the highlan(fs %%bile Ihe w1mblic:uls nutiut ;tined a hold
on the coastal lowlands. (i' 101'
11'bert the Jurie 196T Arab- Israch ,svr begun. file
Fgypti:ut% %yithdre%% %onto troops ate;i equipment from
Yo In Augmf 19(17, at the kloartomn Cmiferetice.
Sandi Arabia agreed to ce .1se its assistance to the.
royalists ill rettirn for F,ppl's promise to recall its
forces from Ycrnvu. As the last Epfilial: troops were
(Aac�11aIvd in I)ecernber 1967, the rny:disls again
seized the initiative, c�aplitring most of the northerii
eastern� and ceiitral parts of the country. I)nring die
first 2 months of 1966, the royakk laid Beige (o San';,
the c�apitid, IIII foiled to cuptim it. The reasons for
failure were primarik I%;ofolel. 1leif.11 the 1�:g }�pti:ut
troops no longer in Yemen� mam of the rmalists lost
much of their tea! for fighting. Others questioned Ihe
benefits in restoring the Inlatll:ll(� il spite of Irnani
11adr's promises of reforim, In 1970. Saudi Arabia
recognized the 1.;1. H. and terminated all aicl to the
royalists. (1j01')
The army was further built 111) under the 911id;uuCe
(if former Prime Minister U. Gen. Ilasan ul- 'Amri,
who Again becalm' the Prime Minister fora short time
in 1971. Ile was forced to resign after Its% than 2 weeks
in office after he murdewd a Yemeni c�iyiiian in a
private quarrel. Since late 1971, the armed forces hove�
br en "MI" the Colitrul of till .'0immuuler is (160 of
1114� arntrel Fomes. (;ol. 11J11:ontu