NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 58; MOZAMBIQUE; ARMED FORCES

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X11;101;4 1=14 =F-im= '41I11:1L1I11li[wo] /ed: 111 111111I1111
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I YI-11 Ji I Nll

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Page
C. Army 4
1. Organization 5
Strength, composition, end disposition 0
3 Training 6
4. Logistics 7
D. Navy 8
I. Organization 8
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 9
3. Training and logistics 9
4 Marines 10
E Air force 10
1. Organization 11
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 12
3. Training 12
4. Logistics 12
Fig. 1
Strength trends (table)
Fig. 2
Defense budgets (table)
Fig. 3
Medical corpsman (photo)
Fig. 4
Destroyed trucks (photo)
Fig. S
Road construction equipment (photo)
Fig.` 6
Coastal escorts (photos)
Fig. 7
T -6, close- support aircraft (photo)
Fig. 8
G-91, used in reconnaissance role
FRELIMO (photo)
(photo)
F. Paramilitary forces
1. Public Security Police
2. Fiscal Guard
3. Protection militia
4. Special Groups and- Special Parachutist
G roups
5. Port and Railroad Police
B.OPVDCM
G. FRELIMO guerrilla forces
I. Organization
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
3. Training
4. Logistics
FIGURES
Page
4 Fig. 9
4 Fig. 10
5
8 Fig. 11
9 Fig. 12
1 0 Fig. 13
Fig. 14
11
page
13
,i3
13
14
14
14
14
14
15
15
17
17
Page
1lehborne operation (photo)
11
FRELIMO members at a subordi-
nate base (photo)
15
FRELIMO strength trends (table)
16
FRELIMO militia (photo)
16
Training platoon in Tanzania (photo)
17
Dual purpose machinegun used by
FRELIMO (photo)
18

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V
Arm ed Forces
A. Defense establishrxtent
Portuguese armed forces stationed. in Mozambique
consist of 43,000 army troops, 3,500 naval personnel
(including 800 naval riflemen, or "marines").and I8
ships and patrol Craft, and 3,300 air force personnel
(including SIN paratmopers),and 105 aircraft (11 jets),
Personnel are well trained in counterinsurgency
operations, but there are shortage, of pilots and air
force technicians; morale is generally good, but there
is some disgruntlement among middle officer ranks of
the army because of repeated tours in Africa. Much of
the equipment is obsolete, and there are shortages of
numerous Items, including artillery, engineer and
communications equipment, navigational aids,
transport aircraft, helicopters, and spare parts for
maintenance and overhaul. Available resources have
been effectively adapted, however, and are adequate
for the present level of insurgency. (S)
Approximately 7,000 -8,000 armed, foreign
supported, and foreign -based insurgents oppose the
Portuguese an active fronts in the three northern
districts: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Tete. Guerrilla
attacks and harassment have intensified during the
past year, particularly in Tete District, where the main
objective is disruption of the Cabora Bassa
hydroelectric project, u few incidents possibly
probing attempts aimed at supply lines to Tete and
communication lines to Rhodesia �also have occurred
south- of Tete in Beim, and Vila Very districts. The
Portuguese are capable of continuing to protect
construction of the hydroelectric project, which is
currently on- schedule. The Portuguese control all
population centers and maintain all lines of
communication; they are capable of controlling the
situation and continuing to maintain their position in
Mozambique, although they cannot eliminate the
externally supported insurgency. (S)
The armed forces are assisted in the maintenance of
local security by approximately 41,600 personnel :irk,
the various paramilitary farces, as follows: 4,000 in the
Special Groups (including '800 in the Special
Parachutist Groups); 21,400 Public Secuty Police
(PSP), which includes 6,100 In the PSP- proper�w-of
whom 60D are from the metropole --and 15,300 in the
intervention militia; 700 in the Fiscal Guard '(also
called Customs Guard); about 15,000 in the protection
militia, which protects the villages and agricultural
workers in the fields near the villages; and 500 in the
Port and Railroad Police.- An unknown number of
armed personnel in self- defense units of the Provincial
Organization of Volunteers for the Civil Defense, of
Mozambique (OPVDCM) provide protection for
public and private institutions, including various
commercial firms and oth:.r vulnerable institutions. A
special force of 10 groups of 60 men each, largely
former guerrillas, is being organized for use in Tete
Di.%tdct under the control of the Directorate General of
Security; the name of the new force has not been
announced. (S)
Portuguese counterinsurgency techniques include
the use cf a limited fortified village system, which has
been developed extensively in Cabo Delgado and
Niumn districts and is progressing steadily in Tete
District, The program of resettling rural Mozambicans
in villages for protection by local militia units also
denies sanctuary and support to the insurgents. The
army's modest civic action program, which provides
food, education, medicine, employment, and other
assistance to the rural population, has been helpful In
holding the allegiance of the Mozambicans, but
resources are lacking for expansion of the army's
nonmilitary activities. (C)
1. Military history (S)
Portugal's hegemony in Mozambique has been
under attack since September 1964, when the
Mozambique Liberation Pront(F'REL1MO) launched
attacks from Tanzania on settleratenis and military
outposts in Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts. The
Portuguese confined F'REL IMO activity generally to
these districts for almost 4 years, although a few
guerrilla attacks occurred in MmbeAat and Tete
districts during that period. The principal tactic used
in containing the insurgency wins a system of fortfied
'For diacritics on place names sm listbf wmes nn thr. apron
of the Summary Map in the Country Profile map
itself.
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villages, most of which were Ituated near roads to
permit rapid assistance from the Portuguese forces
Several hundred thousand persons from the border
areas affected by the insurgency were moved into the
villages, called aldeamentos; protection militia and
self defense units were organized, trained, and armed
to protect the villagers from subversion and guerrilla
attacks. Early in 1968 the insurgents began operations
in Tete District and also stepped up the use of road
and antipersonnel mines and increased the number of
ambushes and mortar attacks against the fortified
villages and army outposts in Cabo Delgado and
Niassa. In June 1970 the Portuguese initiated an
offensive in these districts to seize and hold guerrilla
base camps and to cut infiltration and supply routes,
particularly in Cabo Delgado. In May 1971 the
offensive into Cabo Delgado and Niassa was resumed,
and a minor offensive was undertaken in Tetc in an
attempt to offset any gains the insurgents might have
made during the rainy season. Tete District has been
widely affected since the wet season months of 1971,
with an increasing number of incidents south of the
Zambezi River. The Cabora Basso hydroelectric
project is well protected, however, and construction is
proceedirg on schedule. The fortified village program
is progressing slowly in Tete District, but several
thousand persons have been moved into areas not
affected by the insurgency, and self defense units are
being organized and trained to protect the villages.
During the late summer of 1972, ambush attacks
occurred south of Tete District at points near Vila
Couveia and Macossa in Vila Peru District in central
Mozambique, indicating possible probing attempts
aimed at Portuguese supply lines to Tete and the lines
of communication from Beira to Rhodesia. Guerrilla
activity continues in Cabo Delgado and Niassa,
although not on an intense scale, and some troops may
have been moved from these districts to augment
forces in Tete. Many parts of the northern half of
Mozambique have not been affected at all by the
insurgency; only scattered incidents have occurred in
the central region, and the south is. completely
unaffected. The insurgents are based in Tanzania and
Zambia and transit Malawi between the two nations.
They receive a steady flow of support from a variety of
sources, but the bulk of their military aid is from
China and the U.S.S.R. Thestrength of thePortugucse
armed forces in Mozambique has been more than
doubled since the insurgency began, but the
additional personnel include an increasing number of
Mozambicans.
FRELIMO's collaboration with Rhodesian national
ists �the Zimbabwe African National Union
l7ANHI and the 7imhnhwe Afrirron Pennle.'c tlninn
(ZAPU) �in the border areas with Tete District has led
to small -scale antigucrrilla operations across the
border into Mozambique by Rhodesian troops. Some
Rhodesian equipment, including helicopters, has been
lent to the Portuguese for short periods, but most of
Rhodesia's support consists of information and
intelligence provided in its close liaison with
Portuguese military and police officials. The
Portuguese also coordinate items of mutual
intelligence interest with South African oUicials. Some
supplies are purchased from South Africa for use in
Mozambique; these consist chiefly of medical
supplies, canned foods, vehicles, and possibly some
radios for the army and small quantities of small arms,
ammunition, and communications equipment for the
police. Assistance from Rhodesia and South Africa has
been extremely limited, however. chiefly because
Portugal does not seeks aid.
2. Command structure (C)
The Commr nder in Chief of the Portuguese Armed
Forces in Mozambique, currently an army general, is
responsible to the Minister of National Defense and
Army through the Chief of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces in Lisbon; he is subordinate in all
matters of policy and civil administration to the
Governor General (a civilian), who is the highest
authority in the state. The Commander in Chief may
be from the army, navy, or air force. He is appointed
by the M9nistLr of National Defense and Army, with
the approval of the service to which he belongs and
the concurrence of the Superior Council of National
Defense, which includes [lie Minister of Overseas. The
headquarters of the Commander in Chief, organized
as a unified command with representation from the
three services, is located in Nampula rather than
Lourenco Marques, capital of the state. The
headquarters consists of a Chief of Staff, a Director of
Operations, and five small staff bureaus or sections
that are generally comparable in functions to most of
the U.S. joint staff system, as follows: Personnel
(equates to U.S. J -1), Intelligence U -2), Operations (J-
3), Logistics (J -9), and Psychological Warfare
(includes civil affairs and public information). The
Director of Operations is a special adviser to the
Commander in Chief on various priority projects and
activities of a limited duration; his responsibilities are
neat ?in conflict with those of the Operations Section of
the staff. Personnel and logistics functions are only
coordinated and monitored by the joint staff, each
scrrice having primary responsibility for hand'hing
those matters. The Commander in Chief maintains
effertive lint on with the C:nvemnr Cr- -nrrnt in

I
s
Lourenco Marques and personally coordinates
important matters, such as policy, but delegates
responsibilit� for routine liaison functions to the
commander of the army's Southern Territorial
Command, which is headquartered in Lourenco
Marques. The Commander in Chief has been directed
by governmental decree to cooperate vith fhe General
Command of Security, which was created by a
Ministry of Overseas decree in August 1972 under
control of the Governor General toassure coordination
of operations by the various security forces. The degree
of participation by the Commander in Chief is not
known. He controls all units assigned to an
intervention role, including being responsible for
direct operational command as well as commitment of
these units to an operational area or to a spe^ al
operation. intervention units include the commando
companies, air force paratroop battalions, the special
marine detachments, the special groups, and the
special parachutists groups; selected army infantry
units may be assigned to the intervention forces as
required.
Mozambique comprises a military region or
command for each of the three armed services. The
armed forces commander also serves as tha
commander of the army's military region. The other
service commanders are responsible to the Com-
mander in Chief for intelligence and for all joint
operations. For matters of personnel, logistics, and
training, the service commanders are responsible to
their service chiefs of staff in Lisbon.
B. Joint activities
1. Military manpower (S)
As of 1 July 1973, Mozambique had about
2 117,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49. Of this
number, approximately 480 were physically fit for
military service. Their distribution by 5 -year age
groups was as follows:
TorrAr. MA IS-Vis
A'UMDER NMIDER FIT FOR
ACE
OF MALES
111ILMAriY -SE21 CE
15-13
518,004
280
20 -29
431,000
220,000
25.29
277,Q00
135,000
ToW, 15 -09
?.30,004
2,117,000
1,024,004
1 The number of males reaching military age (20) will
i r average 90,000 during the 5 -year period 1973 -77.
Portuguese laws of military service apply to
Mozambique. The military obligation begins on I
January of the year in which male citizens become 18,
but in time of peace active compulsory military service
does not begin until the men are 21. At age 20, each
man is required to report to the draft authorities for
medical examination, but classification may be made
earlier, depending on defense needs. The. conscription
term is 2 years, but the law authorizes exceptions to be
made according to the needs of each of the armed
forces. The overseas tour for conscripts from the
metropole is 2 years, although it can be extended if
required. The overseas tour is in addition to the active
duty time served tip to the time of embarkation, and
most conscripis from metropolitan Portugal spend
about 3 years in active military service. Mozambique
born conscripts normally serve 3 years; the annual
conscript class is usually called up in two increments.
No figures on the total number of Mozambique -bom
personnel in the armed forces are available, but it is
believed that only a negligible number serve in the
navy and air force. Approximately 15,000 (35%) of the
army's total strength are Mozambique -bom, and it is
estimated that between 13,500 14,250 of these are
black. in addition to the Mozambicans serving in the
army, about 30,300 serve in the militia- 15,300 in the
intervention militia, which carries out antiguerrilIa
operations under Public Security Police control, and
15,000 in the protection militia, which protects the
villages and surrounding agricultural areas. Also,
4,000 Mozambicans are in the special groups and
special parachutist groups, which assist the army in
combat operations. Plans reportedly call for increasing
the strength of these groups to 10,000 men, possibly by
the end of 1973. Except for a few officers, all of the
personnel in the militia, special groups, and special
parachutist groups are black.
Morale in the Portuguese armed forces is believed to
be generally good. The average Portuguese conscript
accepts his military obligation willingly and adapts
well to military service. The black troops have
performed well in combat operations with the
Portuguese, and there are no known problems of
loyalty, although it is possible that there have been a
few defections. Leadership is generally competent,
and officers of all ranks appear to be firm in their
conviction that the Portuguese position must be
maintained in Mozambique_ They believe that
departure of the Portuguese would cause chaos and
stress tl:e importance of the military role in the
socioeconomic program to develop higher educational
and economic levels for the Africans. Repeated tours
in Africa have caused some disgruntlement in the
officer corps, particularly in the army, which bears the
3
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brunt of the war. The average rotation of duty
assignments runs 2 years in Africa anus. 1 year in the
metropole. Continued separation from their families
has had an adverse effect on morale, and it is believed
that Portugal has moved the families of some of t)%c
career officers to Mozambique for the length of thetf
tours. Dc.spite personal hardships, however, the
officers are patriotic Portuguese and are loyal to
Portugal.
FIGURE 2. Annual defense budgets (C)
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
2. Strength trends (S)
Army strength has increased by 9,000 since 1067.
The spread of insurgent activity to Tete District in
1968 resulted in a small rise, but the largest increase
occurred in 1970 in connection with the Portuguese
offensive to cut FRELIMO infiltration and supply
routes in Cabo Delgado District, particularly on the
Mueda plateau, A slight increase occurred in 1971,
probably because of the induction of more
Mozambique -born conscripts, although it is possible
that a small number of additional troops were sent
from the metropole as a result of intensified insurgent
activity in Tete District. Navy strength has increased
by about 1,700 personnel since 1967. The number of
personnel in the air force, after being reduced by 1,200
in 1969, was increased by 900 in 1970 to its present
strength of 3,500. Air force strength fluctuation is
believed to be caused by temporary deployments.
i Strengths for the period 1967 -72 are shown as of 1
October of each year in Figure 1.
I Training (U /DU)
No joint field training is cos ducted in Mozam-
bique, but integration of the three services in the
unified command provides experience in joint military
operations. The Portuguese Army conducts training
for conscripts and for officer and NCO candidates;
qualified individuals may attend schools in the
metropole,
4. Military budget (C)
Annual military budget proposals are prepared by
the state govemment in Mozambique and are
FIGURE 1. Strength treads (S)
1968 1969 I970 1971 1972
Derense budget........... 29.4 31.6 32.7 34.9 37.7
Defense budget percent of
total nallenal budget.... 13.7 13.5 1..5 11.0 10.9
Defense budget as a percent
of estirnuted GDP....... 2.S 2.6 2.5 no nf;
na Data not Avallable.
approved by the Ministry of Overseas in Lisbon. In
addition, the Portuguese metropolitan military budget
includes funds for the overseas military forces
stationed primarily in Angola. Mozambique, and
Portuguese Guinea. Since 1968, annual overseas
military budgets have averaged US$139 million, but
the amount al)ocated to each overseas state or
province is not available. Based upon personnel
strength data, Mozambique probably receives less
than one -third of the total appropriation. Defense
budgets, funded by the state government of
Mozambique, for the years 1968 through 1972 are
shown in Figure 2.
S. Logistics (C)
The Logistics Section on the staff of the armed
forces Commander in Chief coordinates and moniWrs
logistical functions for the armed forces in
Mozambique, but each service has responsibility for
its own logistical support. A branch of the Military
Support Organization, a military production facility
controlled by the Secretary of State for Army in
Lisbon, is in Lourenco Marques to facilitate
procurement of subsistence, medical, and POL
supplies from local sources and the Republic of South
Africa; some vehicles and possibly a few radios
purchased from South Africa are believed to be in use
by the army in Mozambique. Storage, distribution,
and maintenance facilities in Mozambique are
adequate for all classes of supplies. The air force
distributes emergency items and performs medical
evacuation for the armed forces, it transports troops
for the army in an emergency situation and on a
routine basis as space is available. Civilian air taxi
services are used to deliver supplies and evacuate
casualties when necessary.
AIR
YZAA
ARMY
NAVY
roRCic
TOrAL
C. A*ny
I967.........
34,000
1,800
4,300
40,100
1908...........
36,000
1,SDO
4,300
49,100
The primary mission of the Portuguese Army in
1909...........
30,000
I
3,140
41,000
Mozambique is to protect the territorial integrity of
1970...........
41,000
1,990
3,500
48,400
the state and maintain intemal security. The army has
1971...........
33,004
43,000
3,500
3,540
50,000
had the major role in internal defense operations since
1972...........
3,500
3,508
50,000
armed Insurgency against the Portuguese began in
4
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t
r
196.1. It has been unable to eradicate the insurgency
because it cannot deprive the insurgents of their
rternal support and foreign sanctuaries. Although not
able to prevent the spread of guerrilla activity south of
the Zambezi River, the Portuguese control :ill
population centers and have been able to maintain all
lines of communication. The arm' r e50la r ees i n
Morunb [lue are limited because of requirements in
Portugal's Other two Afric insurgencies, but it is
capa of c to f for the Port u guese
presence in Nlo7a ntbiclue. Repeated tours in Africa
have caused some disgruntlement a mong the middle
officer group, but this is not believed to be a limitation
on the army's capabilities. 'rhe officers are patriotic,
and all appear to )told the cortvictioar that Portugal has
a i %oral obligation to remain in X-11ozimbiq there is
tic, evidence of any lack of willingness to serve because
Of personal hardships. Almost all of the younger
officers in lire army have experience to counterinsur-
gency situations, and probably 98% of the tot officer
corps have served in one or more of the African states
during the past t 1 years. maoy have served two or
more tours. Army units in i4lozambique are
adegnately but not well equipped for the present level
of insurgency. The standard weapon of the infantry
the primary combat arm �is the Portuguese-pmduced
7.62 -rum 63 rifle. Only a negligible amount of field
artillery, consisting of obsolete World War 11 British
items, is available, and air defense artillery is lacking.
'There are no tanks, only a few armored cars, and a
shortage of signal and engineer equipment. Repair
facilities are severely strained to maintain efficient
vehicles because of the high .accident rate, and there
are shortages of spare parts for all items of cclt%ipmcrtt.
the army salvages all parts that earl possibly be used
from wornout or danhag:.-d equipment, ipent, particularly
vehicles. (S)
A considerable portion of the urmy's time is spent in
conducting a modest civic action program to assist in
the government's overall socioeconomic program to
raise the standard of living of the Africans. Although
handicapped by inadequate resources, the anny
provides food, medical services, employment,
education. and other assistance to the local African
population. hundreds of Africans have been trained
as skilled mechanics and technicians in the army's
maintenance facilities and military hospitals. Unit
medical officers maintain clinics to provide medical
treatment for the local population (F :gure 3), and
sonic teach basic hygiene classes for the Africans. The
army has operated schools, with classes conducted by
bolh African and white CO's during their off -duty
hours. 'Training in the metropole has been realistically
directed toward preparing the Portuguese soldier for
dealing with the Africans on a person -to- person basi,.
[clack Mozambicans serve in the army as well as in the
vartom paramilitary forces which assist in maintaining
internal security. Tire black soldiers have perforined
well in conihat operations alongside soldiers front the
metmpole and speciA in dependent operations;
there have keen no known incidents of disloyally.
although there inay have been a few defections (S)
1. Organization (C)
Mocambique comprises one of the military regions
of the Portuguese Array. The army commander in
Mozambique is also the Commander in Chief of the
awned forces. He has delegated control of all
nonoperational activities of the urnhy to his deputy;
the latter is responsible for personnel, recruiting; and
conscription, implementation of the training program,
and c of all logistical facilities. Tire aTMV
regional headquarters isin Nanhpula, with lite unified
command headquarters, and most of the army staff
officers serve in a dual role --fo, the military region
and for lite joint staff. Directives for control of
nonoperational matters are transmitted by the Chief
:7
;T. ..q. e- ;3.9'S... :S...,. ;.:G.s c... G:.... 1
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FIGURE 3. Salta �ton inedica� corpsman vaccinating
children in resettlement village MOM

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of Staff of the Army in Lisbon; operational orders are
transmitted from Lisbon. by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces
The Military Region of Mozambique is divided into
two operational zones (the Northern Intervention
Zone (ZIN) and the Tete Military Zone) and Uvo
territorial commands (the Central and Southern). The
ZIN is subdivided into four operational sectors: A, B,
C, and D, with headquarters in Vila Cabral, Porto
Amelia, Nampula, and Quelimane, 'respectively.
Sector commanders report directly to the joint
headquarters in Nampula. The ZIN encompasses Cite
districts of Nhisce.. Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, and
Zambezia. The fete Military Zone, with headquarters
in the township of Tete, includes only the Tete
District, which was reduced in size in August 1972 by
the transfer of Mungari Circunscricao (a rural
administrative subdivision of the district) to Beira
District. The military commander of the zone is also
the governor of Tote District. For more effective
control of counterinsurgency operations, which have
intensified over the past 2 years, the zone is subdivided
into three operational sectors: F, G, and H, with
headquarters in the towns of Tete, Fingoe, and
F'urancungo.
Most of the training and logistical facilities of the
Military Region of Mozambique are located within
the two territorial commands, which have no
subdivisions. The commander of the Southern
Territorial Command, which has headquarters in
Lourenco Marquee, serves as liaison for the
Commander in Chief with the Covemor General of
the state. Inhambane, Gaza, and Lourenco Marques
districts are included in this command. The Central
Territorial Command, with l in Beira,
contains Vila Pery and Beira districts, which were
created in August 1972 from the District of Manica
and Sofala.
2. Strength, composition, and disposi;:;on" (S)
Portuguese Army strength in Mozambique is about
43,000 officers and enlisted men. The number of
conscripts is not known, but they probably comprise
approximately 95% of the total. It is estimated that
35% of the army consists of Mozambique -barn
personnel, of whom all but about 5% are believed to
be black. The majority of the paramilitary forces,
which supplement the army in performance of its
mission in Mozambique, are black. There are 39
rFor current, detailed information, see the Grd�r of Battle
Sumraary, Foreign Ground Forces (Portugal), and Military
Intelligence Summary (Portugal), both published by the Defenw
Intelligence Agency.
6
battalions or battalion equivalents, most of which are
infantry. Several units have designations of other
combat arms, such as artillery or cavalry, but they
operate as infantry; Cite designation has been derived
from the traditional arm of the unit which operated
the center in Portugal where the battalion was formed
and trained. Battalions have no standard size but vary
according to the operational needs of the sector in
which they are assigned. Combat units in Mozam-
bique are divided into two categories: quudricula and
intervention. Quaddculu is a term applied to the
combat units which are assigned specific boundaries
within a sector in which they conduct operations over
a long per_od of time. While in this role, ;nits
normally are not assigned to an intervention mission.
Intervention is the term applied to those combat units
which are used for special assignments and are
controlled directly by the Commander in Chief. The
army's commando battalion and selected infantry
companies possibly I2 �are intervention units. Of
the tots! units in Mozambique, it is estimated that 26
battalions arc gaadrtcula. Combat support units
consist of four battalions (one .artillery, two engineer,
one signal), four cavalry (armored cars) troops
(companies), and three military police companies. The
:artillery battalion, headquartered in Beira, furnishes
three batteries (probably four pieces in each battery)
of World War II British -made 25- pounder (88 -111m
equivalent) gun howitzers for northern Mozam-
bique �two batteries in Niassa and one in Cabo
Delgado; a few additional artillery pieces are at the
training center in Beira, and a battery in Lourenco
Marques is believed to have 40 -mm air defense
artillery (probably six pieces). The cavalry units are
located in Lourenco Marques, Beira, Nampula, and
Mueda; they are equipped with pre -World War II
British -made armored cats and possibly a few French
Panhards which are used for patrol purposes and in
parades. Service support unit: ronsist of four
battalions (one each of quartermaster, transportation,
ordnance, and signal) plus an unknown number of
medical detachments. The major concentrations are in
the northern districts� Niassa, Cabo Delgado, and
Tete �but a small number of units and most of the
training centers are in central and southern
Mozambique.
3. Training (C)
Men who were conscripted in metropolitan Portugal
have completed 9 weeks of basic training, plus
advanced and unit training, before they arrive in
Mozambique. The length of the advanced training
period varies from 7 weeks (for infantry) to 49 weeks
U
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for some specialties (such as medical). The final stage
of training takes place in the unit that is to be
deployed overseas. The length of time spent in unit
training depends on the urgency of operational needs
but is usually about 12 weeks. Almost every
Portuguese conscript serves overseas, either in Africa or
the F& East. The normal overseas tour is 2 years; this
service is in addition to the active duty time served up
to the date of embarkation. The term can be extended
as required; however, the average conscript drns aui
serve more than 3 years. Most of the conscripts from
Portugal remain in the unit to which they were
assigned in tl;te metropole, although a few, such as
specialists and commandos, may be assigned to locally
trained units. The men who have received commando
training in the metropole undergo 4 weeks of
additional training at the Commando Training Center
at Montepuez. At present, however, the majority of
the personnel in commando units are Mozambicans.
Metropolitan units arriving in Mozambique process
through one of the replacement centers, where they
receive weapons and field equipment. There are
replacement centers in Lourenco Marques and
Nampula, and it is likely that a facility has been
established In Beira to receive some of the troops
moved to Mozambique by air. Units usually serve 12
to 20 months in a sector of active insurgency; the
remainder of the normal 2 -year tour is spent in a quiet
area.
Conscripts barn in Mozambique normally serve a 3-
year term, including a minimum of 16 weeks in one of
the training centers. Mozambicans normally do not
serve outside the state, but qualified personnel may
attend schools in metropolitan Portugal. The basic
training phase in a training center lasts 9 weeks,
during which physical conditioning and basic military
skills are stressed. The second cycle cc asists of 7 weeks
for those being assigned to infantry units; 9 weeks are
required for specialties, such as typing, bugling, and
use of machineguns. The length of time spent in
training for qualification in other specialties, such as
medical aides, is not known. The principal training
center is at Boane, with a capacity for training 6,000
men per year. Other training centers are located at
Vila Pery, Namialo, Beira. Nampula, Montepuez, and
Lourenco Marques. The facilities at Boane include the
Driver Training Center and the School of Military
Application, which conducts courses for reserve
(mflfdar;0) officer and NCO candidates. The 11-
week course for offic r candidates begins in August of
a A mflreranu officer or NCO equates roughly to a U.S. reserve
officer. or NCO on extended active duty. The word m0fefono
translates as "militia;' which is not need in order to avoid confusion
with the local self-defense forces.
each year_ The NCO candidate course also lasts I
weeks and begins each January. Locally trained
officers and NCO's szrve as instructors at all of the
training centers, as well as in combat and othcrduties.
The training center at Montepucx trains only
commandos and is the home station of the commando
battalion in Moxambiclue. Driver training is also
conducted at the center in Lourenco Marques, and the
only artiller '.nnining provided locally is at the center
i n Bei ra.
4. Logiisti -s (C)
The army's logistical system in Cite Military Region
of Mozambique provides adequate support for the
troops conducting, counterinsurgency operations, but
its effectiveness is hampered by a lack of spare parts
and of north -south rail links, the vulnerability of the
cast -west rail lines, and an inadequate road system.
Logistical support operations are severe] ha4cap-
ped by mud during the wet season, and the unpaved
roads are also extremely vulnerable to guerrlllu mining
activity at all times.
The chief of the 4th Bureau (logistics) nn Cite army
commander's staff has nverall responsibility for
coordinatio� Iogistical support requirements, which
are prepared by the chiefs of the quartermaster,
medical, engineer, signal, and ordnance services, also
on the army commander's staff ['hc =-hief of the 4th
Bureau handles procurement, provides truck
transportation, and arranges for distribution of
supplies. The service chiefs control storage of supplies
and their issue to the troops. A branch of the Military
Support Organization, controlled by the Secretary of
State for Army in Lisbon, is located in Lourenco
Marques to facilitate procurement of items such as
uniforms, footwear, food supplies, and, to some extent,
POL. The Military Support Organization buys POL
products from commercial organizations, which
haudle the distribution. Most supplies are obtained
from the metropole and are received in Mozambique
at one of four ports� Lourenco Marques, Beira,
Nacala, and Porto Arnelia. innumerable complica-
tions have arisen on the few occasion., that
northbound shipments have been inadvertently
offloaded in a southern port, or vice versa. A few
items, including canned fruit and vegetables and some
medical supplies, are obtained from South Africa.
During most of the past year, the majority of the
troops have been moved by air between the metropole
and Mozambique. The transport capability of the air
force has not been sufficient to move battalion -size
units cohesively, however, and the army is considering
the return to the use of ships for routine rotation
7
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Within Movarttbique, must supplies are mover) by
trucks (commercial and military), as well as by rail
and ships; emergency items art delivered by military
or commercial aircraft. Routine troop riunMnuats
within tlae regiun are handled chiefly by military
trucks, but both military and commercial aircraft arc
used eu available, particularly in vniergencies; so ne
troops are probably moved by rail and ships.
Maintenance is adequate but slow. A nci
maintenance facility in Nampula. which became
operational in the summer of 1972, handles major
repair and rebuild requirements; prior to its opening
most of the vcliicles and engines needing major repairs
or complete rebuilding had to be sent to Lisbon. A
vehicle repair facility in Mueda performs soine tnajor
repairs, but its capacity is extremely small.
Commercial facilities in Beira are used forsonic major
repairs. Military maintenance facilities make extensive
use of cannihali7. ation to obtain spare parts, repairing
or rebuilding every salvageable item. Vehicle
maintenance problems arc numerous because of poor
drivers, rough roads, and an increasing number of
accidents caused by mines laid by the guerrillas
(Figure 4), Units perform as much of their own
Maintenance as possible; repairs hcyond their
capability are handled by direct support ordnance
maintenance detachment�', which also are responsible
for forwarding items requiring maintenance in fixed
installations. Battlefield casualties are evacuated to
the nearest medical aid station and may be moved
successively to the higher echelon aid stations, the
nearest military or civilian ho and to one of the
three major military hospitals �in Nampula. Beira,
and Lourenco Marques, T'he .air force performs
medical evacuation for the army, but civilian air taxis
are also chartered to evacnate casualties, particularly
at night, and to deliver medical supplies to isolated
units. Critiealty vounded patients are flown to tlic
metropole, acce:rtpanied by paratroop nurses.
Units in :Mozambique are lightly equipped, but
stocks of weapons, equipment, and ammunition are
generally adequate to support requirements it the
present level of insurgency and could probably
support a slight increase. The Must comtnari squall
arms used are Pork uguese- rrt;: III factured 7.62 -mini, C.:3
automatic rifles and 1 9 -mm subinachincguns (1111'
is derived from the name of the ractorv� F'irbrica
Militar fie Breco de Praha �in Lisbon). Artillery is
obsolete and consists of all insignificant quantity of
British World %'ar II 25- pounder (till -man) gun
howitzers and a few antiaircraft naacliinZ guns.
Cavalry units in Loun'net Marques, Beira, and
Namipula have a few arinored cars that are used for
p- Wok they arc chiefly pre -World War I1 British
models, although a few arc French Panhards that tray
have been procured from South Africa, Some vehicles,
principally Y+ -ton trucks have been obtained by
Portugal from South Africa, and it is likely that a few
are in use in ,titoz uabique. 'rhe principal light truck is
[lie I Yi -tot, German Mercedes UNIMOG wilich is
assembled in Portugal. Tic standard heavy truck is the
French Berliet, also assembled in Portugal.
Cormmuraications equipment is in short supply, but a
small number of radios may have beeti purchased
from South Africa. Engineer equipment consists
chiefly of simple machinery for construction and
repair of roads (Figure 5). bridges, and landing strips.
D. Navy (S)
The primary mission of the Portuguese naval forces
stationed in tiMaianibique is to safeguard the 1,5$5
rriile coastline along tlic Indian Occan, defend ihe�
ports, and patrol the coastal atud itnland v :iten :n s,
including; Lake Nyasa. A secondary mission is to
protect coastal shit, ping. '['he navy genendly performs
its missions effectively.
1. Organization
\Mozambique c rnprises ;a naval command of
Portugal, Its cornrnarmicr, a rear admiral or
coninudore, is subordinate to the Commander in
(thief of kite Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique
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FIGURE 5. Engineers constructing o military rood (U /OU)
FIGURE 4. Trucks destroyed by guerrilla rifnes (C)

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eg
3
FIGURE 6. Coastal escorts, the
Jacinto Candido (F476) and the
General Pereira d'1:ca (F477) (U /DU)
for operational matters and to naval headquarters in
Lisbon for administrative matters. The naval
commander is assisted by a de puty, a chief of staff,
and a small staff. The Moiaimbique Naval Command,
with headquarters in Nampula, is subdivided into 10
maritime defens commands: Vila de Antonio fines,
Mozambique, Nacala, Porto Amelia. L.onreneo
Marques, Beira, Inhambane, Quelitnane, Vila do
Chinde, and lake Nyasa. with headquarters at
Augusto Cardoso (formed) Metangnin). Tile m, itary
communication network operated by the navy is
linked directly with Lisbon and has five major radio
stations located at Loureneo Marques. Porto Amelia,
Beira, Nacala, and Augusto Cardoso, as well as 25
minor stations at sites throughout the state.
2. Strength, comp3sition, and disposition'
Portuguese Navy strength in Mozambique is
approximately 3,500 officers and enlisted men,
including some 800 naval riflemen. Virtually all
personnel are believed to he metropolitan Portuguese.
Tor current. detaileet information. see the Automated Naval
Order of itatrle (5hilh). Volume 1 ,Vacal Forces Intelligence Si tidy
(Portugal), and ,Military Intelligence Summary (Portugal), all
published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
�sl'
The rtttmber of ships assigned to Mozambique
varies accor to requirements. lit late 197 2, ship
strength included two coastal escorts (PCE) (Figure G1,
six patrol boats. (i'B), one miseellutteous auxiliary
(AG), one surveying ship (AGS), one titility land ing;
craft (LCU), four mechanized landing craft (LCM),
and three vehicle. personnel landing craft (i,CVP).
The PCE's are based at Lourenco Marques and are
used for coastal putrid and transport of personnel and
equiprivent. Two of the 1 and the L!:U, based at
L ourCTIC0 M- ,trrit=es.iimtfctrtoAmelia, respectively. are
also used in patrol antl'transpurt roles- both along the
coast and on inland w