NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 50B; NIGERIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100004-1
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
508 /GS /GP
Nigeria
February 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of th, NIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per
ishability can be updated on an indiWidual basis. These chapters� Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, TransportatiCn and Telecommunicntions, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provide the pt- imary Ni3 coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
pond sacurity organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, productior if these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and
includes classification c date of issue; it thus facilitutes the ordering of
NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document UJOClins information affecting the national defense of the United Statles, within the
meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED BY 58 -0001. EXEMPT FROM WNERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
SB (1), (2), (3). DECLAS' ?IED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
3
y k
1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorizatio
of the Director of Central Int- Aigence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub
stantiaUg completed by NovemL -r 1972.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

NIGERIA
CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated De-
cember 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.
A. Summary and background 1
Background of military rule; assessment of political
stability.
B. Structure and functioning of the g;.t=eniment 2
1. Federal government 2
a. Cowon and Dodan Barracks advisers 2
Unlimited powers of military government;
Gowon's style of rule; role of advisers.
SECRET No FOREIGN DIssEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

Page
b. Supreme Military Council 3
Membership; significance and limitations.
c. Federal Executive Council 4
Sine civilian body at federal level; functioning and influence of ministries.
d. Quasi government bodies 5
National Oil Corporation; others.
2. State government
5
a. Federal �state relations
5
Division of responsibilities during civilian era and under FMG; state boundary
question; revenue sharing compromise.
b. Political power within the states
6
Formal and informal lines of authority.
3. Local government
6
a. Indirect rule precedent
6
Colonial government patters; effaztiveness in various regions.
b. Local democracy
7
Degree of popular participation and democratic procedures.
c. FMG reforms
8
Pattern of reforms; role of funds and persona changes in the north, west,
and east; success of reforms to date.
4. Judicial system
10
a. Impact of FMG politics
10
Organization of judiciary; greater regime control; special robbery tribunals.
b. State -level judiciary
10
Organization and reform.
5. Civil service
11
a. Governing role
11
Structure and administration; increased importance of higher civil service;
staff proliferation.
b. Recurrent problems
12
Nigerianization, salaries, and corruption; government attempts to solve these
problems.
C. Political dynamics
12
Political activity banned since 1966 coups
1. Tribal politics
12
Importance of largest ethnic groups; areas in which each predominates; attempts
by minority tribes to escape big -tribe domination; resentment against the Yoruba.
2. Political parties
14
Parties' tribal bases; historical review of party maneuvering during civilian era;
continuing activity today, despite ban; O'uafemi Awolowo.
3. Elections
15
No elections since 1965; pre -FMG electoral laws; speculation as to future
elections.
4. Ethnic separatism 15
a. 1966 military coups 15
Background of Iron4i and Gowon coups.
b Civil war 16
Secession and reintegration.
c. State minorities 16
Calls for creation of more states; FMG stand.
ii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

D. National policies 20
I. Domestic
Page
5. Military government
17
a. Gowon's personal style
17
Indecision and drift; police and militaints.
military complaints.
21
b. Alternative leaders
17
1'f "'iculty in finding acceptable successor; potential coup leaders.
c. CiviJan participation
18
'Limited role of FEC; expanding participation of senior civil service.
6. Ideology and interest groups
18
a. Role of ideology
18
Impotence of ideological groups; expediency more appealing than ideology.
b. Labor unions and leftist groups
18
Role of Communist and government backed uuions; Soviet influence.
23
c. Student politics
19
Student groups fragmented, disorganized.
d. The press
19
Effect of government control; press attacks.
e. Business and the professions
20
Influence of lawyers and businessmen on the government.
f. Farmers and other traditional interests
20
Regional direction of such interests.
D. National policies 20
I. Domestic
20
Main goals: national unity and economic development; Gowon's nine -point
scheme.
a. Economic goals
21
Progress of National Development Plan; airing of economic grievances; oil
exploitation.
b. Administrative goals
21
Reorganization of the army; settlement of state boundary hassles; elimination
of corruption; 1973 census.
c. Political goals
22
Drafting of new constitution; return to civilian rule.
2. Foreign
22
a. Relations with other states
23
Black Africa; Western Europe; United States; Communist countries; effect
of civil war on international ties.
b. Domestic implications of foreign policy
Public satisfaction and consequent enhancement of Gowon's stature.
E. Threats to government stability 25
1. Discontent and dissidence 25
Limited potential of disenchanted groups.
a. Economic complaints 26
Unemployment and underemployment; rising cost of living.
b. 'ersonality conflicts 26
Tribal and nontribal animosities among military leaders.
2. Subversion 26
Effectiveness of FMG control; Gowon's efforts to retain army loyalty; activities
of quasi Communist political party; Soviet involvement.
iff
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

Page
F. Mahztenanee of internal security
I. Police 27
Structure and operations of Nigeria Police Force and re6ted organizations; image
and reliability; morale and loyalty factors.
2. Intelligence and security services 29
Organization and activities of police Special Branch and Army Inte!L�'gence Corps;
other military and civilian services.
G. Seleded bibliography
Chronology 31
FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1
Structure of the Federal Military Government chart)
I.... 2
Fig. 2
General Yakubu Gowon photo
3
Fig. 3
Structure of state and local government chart)
7
Fig. 4
Supreme Court building photo)
11
Fig. 5
Dominant hibes in state governments table)
13
Fig. 6
General Gowon and President Kenyatta photo)
23
Fig. 7
Major General David Ejoor photo)
27
Fig. 8
Police laboratory photo
29
Fig. 9
Police re^eiving riot- control training photo)
29
iv
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

Government and Politics
A. Summary and background (S)
Nigeria, under military rule since 1966, is governed
by Gen. Yakubu Gowon, youthful Commander in
Chief of the nation's 264,000 -man armed forces.
Gowon rules by decree with the support and advice of
an unofficial group of predominantly military leaders.
The military government is not ideologically minded,
and most questions of policy are taken up as they arise,
with decisions reached more or less informally. The
routine functioning of the government is in the hands
of the increasingly powerful senior civil service.
0vilian politicians, who play little role in governing,
are left to find consolation in the promise of the
Federal Military Government (FMG) to return the
country to civilian rule by 1976 and in the prestige of
their status as commissioners in the FMG. The current
military regime, although authoritarian, nevertheless
allows a relatively open society -Nigeria is decidedly
not a police state. Although the Gowon regime
ostensibly follows a nonaligned foreign policy, it has
held to an essentially pro-Western, if anticolonialist,
posture.
The sequence of political events in Nigeria since
independence 1960 has continued to reflect two
vastly different heritages: the sizable indigenous,
traditional, political and social entities; and the
cultural, commercial, and political legacy of over half
a century of British colonial rule. The two traditions
were wedded when the British practice of indirect rule
solidified imperial domination through the support of
indigenous rulers. Indirect rule was implemented with
less success among Nigeria's eastern Ibo and western
Yoruba than among the northern Hausa- Fulani,
where it tended to reinforce the traditional social and
religious hierarchy. Under a British written federal
constitution, the former Northern Region dominated
postrndependence electoral politics and controlled the
central government until the first 1966 coup, which
transferred effective power to military figures from the
former Eastern Region. A second coup by northerners
later in 1966 resulted in the ascendanc of Middle Belt
milita� leaders from minority tribes, who continue to
control Nigeria, and led indirectly to secession by the
East and civil w-r.
The "Republic of Biafra," headed by the Ibo
military governor of the Eastern Region, declared its
independence in May 1967. Two months later the
Nigerian federal forces invaded the east, and by
August 1968 they had occupied the non,bo areas that
had been controlled by the secessionists, but the Ibo
heartland proved to be impenetrable until the end of
1969. A vigorous federal drive launched at that time
against the exhausted Ibos led to the surrender of
Biafra in January 1970. During their 2 1 /2 years of
independence, the secessionists proved to be
resourceful as soldiers and civilian administrators and
were able to keep most essential public services
operating throughout the war.
Since the end of the civil war in early 1970, the
Gowon government has enjoyed unquestioned
strength and general stability, although both rest on
an inherently insecure complex of military- political
relationships. The strength of the regime is based on
the army's huge size, experience, and firm control. The
army leadership is plagued by seemingly endemic
personality, career, and regional interest conflicts, but
in spite of a succession of coup rumors, the FMG has
faced no real challenges to its authority and holds the
allegiance of the vast bulk of the army and p�clice.
A moratorium on politics continues under FMG
decrees banning all tribal organizati ,ns and political
parties and forbidding s!,ikes or labor disturbances by
the unions. The public and the former politicians
accepted these collective deprivations in the name of
national unity during the civil war, and since the end
of the war the country has enjoyed a petroleum -based
economic boom that has served to undercut the appeal
of any antigovernment moves. In time, however, the
enthusiasm and the speed of economic recovery will
slow, quarrels over the distribution of development
funds will begin in earnest, and the economically
neglected will again turn their attention to politics.
Part of the public may then come to feel that the
FMG's ban on political and union activity is
oppressive and no longer justifiable in terms of
national uni v.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

The Gowon regime is beset by an inability or a
calculated unwillingness to make decisions on difficult
issues. For example, the FMG pursues a war of rhetoric
against corruption but has avoided taking steps to
eliminate it for fear of offending powerful persons and
interests. Additionally. Gowon has diverted public and
press attention from persistent domestic problems
through his extensive travel abroad and personal
involvement in international diplomatic missions. As a
result, he has maintained the loyalty of everyone, but
his indecisiveness and frequent absences from the
country have led to frustration among the senior
officials who have the responsibility for running the
country. Disaffected individuals are found in the
army, the civil service, the police, and among the
politicians, but there is no evidence that these
individuals are fundamentally disloyal.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (S)
The Federal Republic of Nigeria has been ruled by
decree since January 1966, when a small group of
military officers ousted the civilian government which
had _)een in power since independence and suspended
the complex system of federal and regional executives
and parliaments which had been provided for in the
independence constitution of 1960 and the republican
constitution of 196.`3. In May 1966 the military
K: replaced the federal system wito a unitan
one, but these office., were themselves ousted 2
months later by another military coup whose leaders
reinstated th? federation. In April 1968 the four
regions that had made up the federation were replaced
by a 12 -state system, which the F vernment has since
indicated will not be altered before 1974.
The FMG has announced that it will return Nigeria
to civilian rule by 1976, provided that by this time it
has carried out a program of reforms outlined during
the country's celebration of its 10th anniversary of
independence in 1970. In the interim, the government
will continue to be run by the military with the aid of
some civil servant politicians are virtually excluded.
Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Head of the FMG, announces
v, decrees, which are formulated by him
with a small group of advisers and confirmed by the
military hierarchy. The institutions used for carrying
out these processes in 1972 are shown in Figure 1. On
many crucial matters the government appears hesitant
to make firm decisions, but it has reached a workable
solution to the major problem of revenue distribution,
has introduced structural reforms in local government,
2
r 1 Mead of the Fed
I E erd t" Whory Govern em (FMG)
L__._J
Supreme Whary Coundl (SMC)
Chalrntan: Mead of" FMG
Metebars: Senior Mllitory and
PolioA Officiak; State Governors
sa.d..rcl i...-t� C I FeC
Chakmw: Mood of the FMG
m�'beu 4, cwdinn
fS Mmltwy and Polbe
Frdr- o Civil Srr�,
Nrad- S --10,y r,, FMG
P,rrnanrrr S,�o rfn�n�e f
.-arh M,nntry
AN hoer of tttt WN, A40my ekesesds in Wee.
hferetal btu Of momf C �han elements m led
FIGURE 1. Structure of the Federal Military
Government (U /OU)
and is working to complete the staffing of the state
courts and civil services.
I. Federal gov- rmment
a. Gowon and Dodan Barracks advisers
All executive and legislative power is vested in the
FMG. laws are made aid implemented through
decrees signed by the Head of the FMG, General
Gowon (Figure 2), who is also Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces, Chairman of the Supreme Military
Council (SMC), and Chairman of the Federal
Executive Council (FEC). The absolute supremacy of
the military government %--as publicly asserted in a
May 1970 decree and an accompanying statement
which abolished judicial review of governmental
decisions and affirmed that the authority of the
military derived from the "bloody revolution" which
gave it "unlimited powers to rule this country." In
practice, the power of the FMG is largely that of
General Gowon personally, whose strength is based
first on his ability to retain the allegiance of the
military leadership through compromise and
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

devoted entirely to military problems. Since the war,
this group has been meeting progressively less
frequently �in fact, it did not meet at all for several
months in 1972 �but there is no evidence that its
political importance has eroded. Gowon co. tinues to
chair the meetings and push for consensus among the
group, but he depends on its members to argue the
merits of various policy options and substantive
proposals. This process is thought to involve relatively
candid discussion, open disagreement, and only loose
adherence to a prepared agenda. Neither Gowan nor
the military participants at the Dodan Barracks
sessions appear eager to bring civilians into the group
on a permanent basis. Senior civil servants frequently
are invited to attend when the discussion centers on
matters in which they have special expertise, but the
civilian commissioners are present only rarely.
FIGURE 2. General Yakubu Gowen, plead of the
Federal Military Government (U /OU)
consensus, and second on his unique and neutral
background as a Hausa speaking Christian from a
small Middle Belt tribe. Gowon came to power
through a process of negotiation within the army
which was obviously not foreseen by the constitution.
There are no kno%vn provisions for the transfer of
executive authority, but were he to be replaced for any
reason, power almost certainly would continue to be
held by senior military officers.
Gowon does not reach decisions in isolation but is
influenced in policymaking by a relatively institution-
alized group of top military and police: advisers. Those
regularly attending the meetings of this group. which
are held at Supreme Headquarters, located at Dodan
Barracks in Lagos, include the Inspector General of
Police and his deputy, plus several high ranking
military figures stationed in Lagos. These men
sometimes are joined by colleagues from the field who
happen to be in town. The military professionalism of
the regular participants is illustrated by the fact that
the) are typically older, higher ranking, and more
exclusively militarily educated than the majority of
members of the larger and more formally constituted
SMC. Significantly, over half of those attending the
evening meetings at Supreme Headquarters are
members of minority tribes.
During the civil war the Dodan Barracks meetings
were held three times a week, with some sessions
b. Supreme Military Council
The SMC was created following the first military
coup in 1966. After 6 years of gradual evolution, its
membership has come to include: the Head of the
FMG; the governors of the 12 states; the heads of the
army, navy, and air force; the Chief of Staff of
Supreme Headquarters; the Commandant of the
Nigerian Defense Academy; the Naval Officer in
Command, Lagos Command; former army chief of
staff Major General Katsina; and the two top police
officials. Almost all members of the SMC who are
based in Lagos �i.c., not military governors �are also
among the regulars at the Dodan Barracks meetings;
hence proposals formally approved by the SMC have
in large part already been debated by the same persons
acting in their unofficial capacity as advisers to
Gowon. The effect of having the military governors in
the SMC is to make it a larger, younger, better
educated, and more northern oriented group than that
which meets at Dodan Barracks. Most important, the
SMC is relatively heterogeneous, in that each
governor's personal background reflects that of the
state to which he is posted; it is homogeneous in that
all members except one (the administrator of East
Central State) are from the military or police.
At its inception, the SMC was by decree wholly
subservient to the head of the FMG, having no
independent prerogatives. In early 1967, hoping to
forestall the secession of the Ibo- controlled former
Eastern Region, Gowon theoretically vested in the
SMC all legislative and executive powers over
important matters by providing that decisions of the
FMG could be reached only with the concurrence of
all governors. Tirat tactic failed, partly because the
terms of the decree were too am ,iguous to satisfy the
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200100004 -1

eastern leaders, and shortly before the secession
Gowon again assumed almost complete control of the
government. The SMC continued to fu ction,
however, and met at more or less monthly intervals to
consider war policy and to confirm FMG decrees.
Since the civil war the SMC has met less often,
partly because a majority of its members are dispersed
throughout a very large country. The SMC does not
initiate policy and offers only a limited check on the
use or potential abuse of executive power.
Nonetheless, the SMC performs a variety of significant
functions: it provides a Formally constituted body to
confer legitimacy on the decrees of the FMG; its
membership provides the link between the federal and
state levels of government; it provides positions for
those military and police officials most likely to
threaten Gowon`s positit,ii, thereby enabling him to
control them better; and it provides an effective
mechanism for retaining military supremacy over
potentially rival civilian political groups. On the last
count the SMC has been especially adamant, at one
point in 1968 insisting that the Head of the FMG hold
final legislative power, thus allowing no independent
action by the predominantly civilian FEC.
c. Federal Executive Council
Like the SMC, the FEC was created in early 1966,
but it existed only on paper until 1967, when Gowon
appointed civilian commissioners to head all but three
ministries.' The FEC has a firm civilian majority
which is somewhat older and more highly educ.;ted
than either the SMC or the Dodan Barracks group.
Gowon originally was careful to appoint at least one
person from every state to the FEC. More recently he
has attempted to make the FEC representative of
articulate interest groups as well; for example, in
October 1971 he appointed two commissioners from
the academic world. Although the FEC is the single
civilian body at the federal level, it does not follow
that its membership is unified or antimilitary; indeed,
after the resignation of its vice chaiaman, Yoruba
leader Obafemi Awolowo, in 1971 the FEC has been
notable for its lack of cohesiveness and leadership.
Prior to January 1968 the FEC theoretically
possessed the power to legislate on its own initiative.
This potential was never used or tested to the fullest,
however; with the reemergence of Chief Awolowo as a
figure of consequence in Nigerian politics, the SMC
curtailed the power of the FEC by rendering its
'For a current listing of key government officials, consult Chiefs
of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published
monthly by the Dir,: torate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
4
actions immediately subject to Gowon's veto, and thus
indirectly subject to control by the FMG as a whole.
Nevertheless, although subordinate to the SMC, the
FEC retains considerable influence, because it meets
regularly on a weekly basis, gives greater consideration
to the details of running the government, lends
civilian respectability to the FMG, provides civilian
leaders with access to the government at the highest
levels, and is ordinarily the first of the two official
governing bodies to receive and comment on Dodan
Barracks proposals. Additionally, the agenda of the
SMC in its infrequent meetings tends to be drawn
from the more important items faced by the FEC.
The FEC performs some of the functions of a
cabinet, giving special attention to foreign affairs and
to monetary and fiscal matters. In 1971 it pla a
significant role in setting civil service salaries. The
government's action in determining the levels of such
remuneration sheds some light on the role of the FEC
in relation to other segments of the governing
apparatus: policy was in effect suggested by the civil
service, reviewed by the and only finally
submitted to the SMC for determination. Despite its
clearly second- echelon role and its rather ambiguous
legal position, the FEC, with its able commissioners, is
thought to have considerable inflnence on Genera]
Gowon. Because of its regular Wednesday meetings it
is continually in the public eye, and it could provide a
forum for Gowon to create and develop a nonmilitary
image for an ultimate transition to civilian rule.
The functioning of the ministries is only
theoretically in the hands of their largely civilian
commissioners. With changes made in late 1971, the
civilian leadership took on a somewhat more capable
and technocratic cast, but as a group the
commissioners still remained weak by comparison
with their pre -1966 counterparts. On a day -to -day
basis the commissioners' ostensible subordinates, the
permanent secretaries, retain the greatest responsibil-
ity and de facto policymaking authority. The highest
positions in the civil service were reshuffled at the end
of 1970, and although a few new men were brought in,
the real success of the changes was the transfer of some
of the best career civil servants to the country's most
important min: tries.
Permanent secretaries served as the heads of
ministries from the time of the January 1966 coup
until Gowon appointed civilian commissioners in June
1967. Since then, however, permanent secretaries have
continued to deal directly with the FMG and Gowon
on a daily basis and through their frequent attendance
at the Dodan Barracks meetings, bypassing the
commissioners and in so doing creating a measure of ill
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

will. Thus in all areas the importance and power of the
permanent secretaries, traditionally based on their
technical expertise, have been steadil augmented by
much of the decisionmaking authority w had
been held b ministers in the previous civilian
government.
Civil servants have attempted to take upon
themselves the task of working directly with the FMG
to implement the 4 -year development plan announced
in October 1970. Their direct access to Gowon and the
latter's preference for contacts of this type suggest that
civil servants will continue to occupy strong positions
relative to their nominal political superiors and to the
military. This role is resented because, as a practical
matter, civil service strength particularly at lower
levels �still means Yoruba strength, even though the
post -civil war predominance of westerners is becoming
increasingly balanced by Ibo reintegration. At the
decisionmaking level (permanent secretary and
deputy permanent secretary), however, the civil
service is generally representative of the country's
many ethnic groups, with the exception of the Ibo.
d. Quasi government bodies
At the federal level there are a number of statutory
corporations which collectively are of some
importance in the administration of the government
and the economy. In the past, the most significant
have been the Nigerian Rai4ay Corporation, the
Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, and the Ports
Authority. Most of the country's public corporations
are notoriously corrupt and inefficient by Western
standards, but the FMG is regulating them in the
same casual manner as did the former civilian
executives and parliamentary committe -s.
One potentially significant new body is the
Nigerian National Oil Corpor ition (NNOC), whose
board of directors held its first meeting in September
1971. Creation of the NNOC was authorized by the
FMG as a means of coordinating and controlling
increasingly sizable Nigerian interests in all phases of
petroleum exploitation. Although still in an embryonic
state, the NNOC is recruiting extensively at very high
salaries in anticipation of rapid expansion and has
begun exporting limited amounts of crude oil through
contractual agreements. The creation of the NNOC
exemplifies the complexity of the interrelationships of
governing bodies and personalities at the federal
level �the chairman of its Board of Directors is also
the Permanent Secretary for Mines and Power and a
frequent adviser at Dodan Barracks evening meetings.
2. State government
a. Federal -state relations
Nigeria's 12 -state federal structure is the product of
a long series of constitutional and extraconstitutional
maneuvers designed to achieve a balance of power
between the central government and the country's
diverse regional interests. At independence in 1960,
Nigeria cunsisted of three regions with a central
government so weak that prestigious politicians almost
without exception preferred regional to federal posts.
In 1963 a fourth region was created as a political
expedient, but interregional conflict continued until
the old federation collapsed following the 1966
military coups. The January revolt resulted in such an
increase in political instability that the new national
leader, General Ironsi, decreed the creation of a
unitary state after 4 months in office �an ill- advised
move that led to his assassination and the institution
of the Gowon government, which reintroduced the
federal system. The regic,ns were replaced by 12 states
in May 1967, but in reality the state system did not
begin to function until April 1968, and even at that
date two of the 12 states were non by governments "in
exile" owing to the civil war.
Pending a long- promised constitutional review, the
12 states theoretically possess the same powers granted
each of the 3revious regions by the independence
constitution. That document listed the powers
belonging exclusively to the federal government and
those to be exercised concurrently with the regional
government.;; residual power lay with the regions. The
federal government had r elusive power over such
matters as defense, foiei,;n affairs, interregional and
foreign trade, and commerce. The federal and regional
governments held concurrent power over labor affairs,
public order, industrial development, and public
works; in cases of conflict in power, federal authority
prevailed. Regions held exclusive power in such fields
as education, health, and agriculture.
With the coming of the military government, the
exclusive and concurrent lists were maintained, but it
was established quitQ early that the regional governors
could legislate on matters on the concurrent list only
with the prior permission of the FMG. Decree I of
1966 claimed for the F,*AG the authority to make laws
w, respect to any matter whatsoever." In practice,
a substantial duplication of ministries at the two levels
of government has occurred, with the federal
government impinging on much of what was
previously thought to be regional or state prerogative,
expecially in the field of education. As a result, there
have been relatively discreet but pointed protests by
state -level officials objecting to the "federal
centralization of power."
The federal -state relationship was never really clear
in practice under the civilian government and has
become much less so since the advent of military rule.
In terms of real power there is no question that the
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

hand of the central government has been strength-
ened, if only because the individual states have neither
the political power nor the economic resources of the
former regions. The dilution of stag power has not
been uniform, however; Mid Western State is simply
the region renamed, and Western State, although it
two provinces to Lagos, is substantially
unchanged from the previous region.
Disparities among the states have led many
separatists, primarily from among minorities in North
Eastern, Western, Kwara, and South Eastern States, to
call for the creation of still more ethnically based
units. To discourage such sentiments, the FMG has
indicated that the present state structure is the 'oasis of
the 1970 -74 development plan and that no rr, -.)re states
will be creai ed before completion of the plat,. The way
the FMC has handled the states issue exemplified by
the dormant States Boundaries Delimitation
Commission suggests that the government is hoping
that the current boundaries will somehow become
permanent before the promised transition to civilian
rule.
The real crux of the federalism issue in Nigeria has
always been the distribution of revenues between the
center and the states. No single factor has so
influenced the viability of the states or regions as the
money available to them, for the majority are not
economically self- sufficient. Complicating the basic
problem of how much money the federal government
is willing to give up is the even gicxter problem of how
to distribute available funds among the several states
with different needs and resources. Kwara, for
example, is desperately poor compared to its neighbor,
Mid Western; the former has neither mineral nor
a, .cultural products to export, while the latter has
both. The pre -1966 civilian government was always
northern dominated; hence more funds tended to flow
north, with the rationale that the principle of need
should predominate over the state -of- origin theory.
In its typically pragmatic manner, the military
government acted in March 1970 to effect a
compromise of the revenue question by dividing the
distributable funds half according to population and
half equally among the states. Additionally, the FMG
decreased the federal share of petroleum revenues by
two thirds. The 1970 decree served to distribute funds
more evenly among the states, with relatively wealthy
East- Central, Western, and Mid Western receiving
less vis -a -vis their poorer neighbors.
On a short -term basis the financial strength of the
states has been bolstered; the fact that almost 70% of
the states' budgets comes from the federal treasury has
allowed even the poorest state to expand both
6
recurrept and capital expenditures with a manageable
deficit. In the long run, however, the FMG stands to
henefit from the current revenue distribution system,
since the important and ever growing corporate profits
tax goes into the central coffer. These revenue changes
indicate that the federal government is willing to use
as it sees fit its undisputed power to redistribute
wealth. The exercise of fiscal and budgetary power
within Nigeria points to continued strength for the
FMG; the states will continue to be its clients.
b. Political power within the states
The East- Central State (the heart of former Biafra)
is governed by a civilian administrator; all others have
military governors. In every case, the state executive
officer owes his job and his allegiance to the FMG
rather than to any presumed local constituency. This
in turn extends the influence of the FMG thro
the states' governing apparatus, since governors have
the pc.wer to appoint their civilian commissioners and
to dictate promotions and transfers in the s;a!e civil
service. Figure 3 outlines the formal and informal
relationships connecting the governor and the various
state and local governmental institutions. Despite
occasional rumors that transfers of governors are
planned, the FMG has allowed almost all of the
governors to retain their posts, even though a few are
extremely corrupt and incompetent. Some have
proved to be little more than messenger boys of the
FMG, but this helps guarantee their political !ife.
In nearly every case, the military and the state civil
service have together imposed their will or tate policy
and programs, relegating the civilian commissioners to
a distinctly secondary position. Like many of the
governors, most of the political commissioners are
weak and previously unknown figures who are
dependent on the FMG for their power base. Thus,
with the commissioners weak and the governors of
uneven quality and administrative skill, the civil
servants have assumed much of the initiative in
running the state governments� despite the fact that
the civil service has been both qualitatively and
quantitatively diluted with the proliferation of
governments to be staffed.
3. Local government
a. Indirect rule precedent
The British system of indirect rule over colonial
dependencies was widely applied in Nigeria,
particularly in the Northern Region. It was found to
be an effective and economical method of providing
local administration for large numbers of geo-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

Military Governor*
1
1
Executive Counci,
Chairman: Governor-4
Members: Commissoners I
I
Civil Service
Secretary to the
Military Government
Permanent Secretaries
for each Ministry 1
1
I
I 1
I
1
1
Local Government
Administrative Areas Traditional
Local
Authorities
Farmd lino of w 4 m*
Informal Jbns of authority
Military ekments in blue.
Civilian elements in red.
*AN powrnors arc military or oolice except in the
apse of East Control State (former Xof -a),
W" is povened by a civilian aolmbwsirotor.
FIGURE 3. Structure of state and local
go% rnment (U /OU)
graphically dispersed and politically unsophisticated
peoples. The governmental administrative structure,
originally established by colonial governor Lord
Lugard, consisted ultimately of regions divided into
provinces and of provinces split into districts. Effective
power at the provincial level was in the hands of the
provincial secretary and at the district level in the
hands of the district officer, both of whom were highly
trained, university- educated civil servants.
The district officer (both before and after
Nigerianization) was responsible for a large area and
often for tens of thousands of people. As a result, the
average citizen had no dealings with the civil service
arm of the government, but instead relied for
assistance and justice on the native authority (later
called local authority), the traditional structure
headed by a chief or emir which was the embodiment
of all judicial and fiscal power at the local level. The
point of contact between the two systems was the
relationship of the district officer with the heads of the
native authorities, who were legally bound to follow
his direction in significant matters. To facilitate this
program, the British created both native authority
councils and 'heads in many areas where none existed
traditionally. One result of British support for the
traditional leadership was the augmentation of the
powers of that leadership to include authority over
modern education and public works.
A key to the success of the indirect rule system was
the ability of the native authority to govern
effectively. The capability of the individual unit, in
turn, was determined largely by its size, revenue, aad
population. There were vast differences among
authorities, both before and after independence. For
example, the native administration of Kano had a
1965 budget of US$6,575,000, employed more than
5,000 persons, and contained 800,000 taxpayers; in
contrast, the local authorities of southern Nigeria
spent as little as $5,000 and employed only a small
office staff. In short, the system of local government
existing up to 1965 was marked by vast disparities in
effectiveness and importance.
The importance of local government in Nigeria has
varied greatly between the north and the south. In the
north, indirect rule was perfectly suited to the Hausa,
Fulani, and Kanuri social systems and therefore was
correspondingly efficient. In the south the trad.tirtrial
social structure was not amenable to incorporation
into the indirect rule system, with the result that local
government was much less important and efficient.
Local governments have always had responsibility
for primary education, health servkes, administrative
duties, the local judiciary, and the police. In the north
far more attention and money are given to agriculture
forestry, and the police while in the urban areas
greater expenditures are devoted to public welfare.
These relative priorities are continuing although the
FMG has tended to assume steadily greater
administrative and financial responsibilities at the
expense of local autonomy, particularly in matters
involving the police, the court systems, and primary
education.
b. Local democracy
Efforts at local government reform and reorganiza-
tion have had only limited success in cultivating
popular participation and democratic procedures.
Power in the far north remains to a large degree in the
hands of local emirs and chiefs. Legal provisions for
democratic involvement notwithstanding, few, if any,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

persons or institutions carry on any drogra.ms contrary
to the wishes of the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir ui
Katsina, or the S!hehu of Bornu. Tradidonal social and
religious loyalties are simply too effective as
determinants of human behavior, wh. ver a
government or governor may decree.
Nonetheless, basic changes had be -sun to occur prior
to the military government's efforts at local reform.
Some of those basic changes were of a potentially
democratic nature and provided starting points for the
most recent reforms. Beginning in 1963, for example,
all native authorities were compelled to include a
proportion of elected members; by the tin:; of the first
military coup, a few authorities were wholly elected
and well over half had elected majorities. Progress
proceeded at different rates within the north,
naturally, and was fastest in those parts of the
northern provinces almost half the area �which
were outside the traditional emirate system.
Elective local councils were introduced most
enthusiastically in southern Nigeria, with the Western
Region leading the way during the early 1960's.
Paradoxically, however, the democratic reforms which
were designed to strengthen local government proved
to contribute to its downfall. A combination of
financial difficulties, corruption, and political intrigue
had rendered the councils useless for administering to
local needs, and by late 1%%5 not a single elected
council functioned in either the Western or the Mid
Western Region. In the north, where the local
authorities were least democratic, local government
continued to be fairly efficient, while in the west,
increased democracy was not accompanied by greater
viability or participation by the bulk of the
population. When the FMG took over, therefore, local
govemment everywhere was either undemocratic or
hopelessly inefficient.
e. FMC reforms
Basic reform in local government was encouraged
by the FMG during the 1968 -70 period, but the
military government did not seriously threaten the
existence of the traditional rulers or governing
practices. The federal government has clearly adopted
the strategy of backing up the state governors in their
efforts at reorganization, but it has made every effort
to avoid antagonizing the traditional leadership. The
most fundamental changes have occurred in the north,
primarily because it is there that traditional authority
has been most engrained, but also because the 1966
coup eliminated a number of northern personalities
and institutions that had blocked earlier efforts at
8
reform. Progressive northern elements are now more
free to initiate changes under the present military
government, which is much less, subservient to
traditional northern interests.
Benue- Plateau in June 1968 became the first stale to
announce basic reforms, and by late 1972 all 12 states
had taken some steps toward local government reform.
Each state has been left to implement reforms as it sees
fit, however �which in practice has meant as the
governor desires and is able to implement. For Nigeria
as a whole, the consequence of this method has been a
lack of uniformity of institutions and terminology.
Nonetheless, the typical pattern which is emerging is
one in which each state is separated into divisions,
divisions into administrative or development areas,
and areas into districts and villages. In most cases the
state and the administrative area appear to be the
most important units; the other levels frequently exist
only on paper. Sometimes they have been announced
Fy a governor and then, in effect, forgotten
Considered in terms of the former system, an
administrative area often corresponds to a former
district, emirate, or local authority. Immense variation
occurs, however, as whet a large emirate such as Kano
is involved. Kano emirate has been organized into five
administrative areas, whereas the other three emirates
in former Kano Province constitute one area each,
giving the new Kano State a total of eight
administrative units. The state appointed head of the
administrative areas is often known in popular
parlance as the D.O. (District Officer), but in fact the
new areas often are smaller than the former districts,
theoretically allowing their officials to become mare
acquainted with the development needs of the local
population.
Most states have announced an intention to replace
the traditional local authority, headed by a chief or
emir, with an elected area council whose members are
or will be appointed by the governor pending the end
of military government. In fact, however, no state has
abolished the former structure, although some have
suspended it and reappointed substantially the same
persons under the new framework. In many case the
area councils are obliged to report to the emirs'
councils, which retain real power locally. Particularly
in the rural areas, the emirs' continued possession of
the power of taxation would challenge the success of
the parallel administrative councils, were it not that
they are provided staff and financial support from the
state government, which in turn receives the bulk of its
money from Lagos. The major impediment to reform,
despite these cooperative arrangements, is the dearth
of trained manpower to staff the proliferating levels of
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

state and local government. To some extent this
problem is being alleviated by hiring southerners to
staff northern bureaucracies, but this strategy is now
being followed less frequently than prior to 1966.
Many northerners have both anti- Yoruba and anti -lbo
feelings, and nearly all are eager to reserve jobs for
their fellow Hausa Fulani.
Success in making local administrative reform work
seems to depend partly on the availability of funds
and personnel, and partly on the personalities of the
persons involved in pushing it. The effectiveness of
reform in Kano has differed from that in North
Central, for example, largely because the governors'
personalities differ. In Kano a modem enlightened
governor, supported by an emir with similar views, has
helped to get reform off to a rapid start. In North
Central a weak governor has been unable to overcome
the traditional resistance to change of the Emir of
Katsina.
Amon; the northern states, Kwara and Benue
Plateau were the first to announce reforms, but thev
have not in fact progressed any faster than has Kano,
or even North Central. The North- Western and
North Eastern States have been distinguished by a
lack of change and by the success which the
traditional rulers have had in controlling such limited
reform as has been enacted. In North- Western State,
for example, the Sultan of Sokoto was able to insure
that the new administrative divisions correspond
almost exactly to the old emirate divisions. Moreover,
when the new units were finally implemented in mid
1971, their heads were obliged to rely on the local
authorities for much of their staff and service.
Similarly, in North- Eastern State an original proposal
for 14 areas which would report to the state was
changed to allow for 31 areas reporting to the local
authorities; the largest authority, Bornu, had its
council changed only thro-igh the addition of a few
appointed members.
Considering the impediments to local government
reform in northern Nigeria, some considerable gains
have been achieved since the advent of military rule.
Among the first moves was the federalization of courts
and prisons at the time of the creation of new staies in
1968. Later steps toward reduction of the power of the
local authorities have included almost complete
absorption of the Native Authority Police into the
Nigeria Police Force, elimination of the absolute
control of the emir over his council, enforced
contribution to the state treasuries of part of the taxes
collected by the emir, and, most important,
assumption of administrative power at the lowest
levels by evil servants directly trained, paid, and
controlled by the state. When adequately financed
and staffed, this direct involvement of the civil service
in tF a affairs of the village will mean the demise of the
indirect rule system and will ultimately reduce the
emir's position to that of a rsligious and social leader.
In political terms, the a stathts over the long run
will become that of a figurchead or constitutional
monarch.
Loca! government reform has taken a somewhat
different twist in western Nigeria, where the size of the
groups paying allegiance to traditional rulers is much
smaller than is the case in the north. Prior to the most
recent round of reforms, the position of the chief, or
oba, had already been reduced to basically parochial
matters, with the role of the govenment (district
officer and staff) the leading one even at the local
level. The southern regions of Nigeria did not
experience indirect rule in the literal form in which it
was applied in the north. As a result of this different
historical heritage, the reform goal in the west has
often been to create larger, more useful onuncils rather
than to dilute the power of traditional councils.
Accordingly, the Western State governor in 1972
proposed that the "hodgepodge" of 114 cou icils be
reduced to 40 which would be given sufficient
authority to make them viable. According to the
proposal, the new district councils would be en'-rely
elected but the !ocal oba would preside over their
meetings, thus providing contact between the
traditional and modern systems of authority. It was
also suggested that the Western State government pay
a salary to the more important obas, thus completing
the process of making traditional authority dependent
on the state military government.
In the eastern states local government reform has
proceeded unevenly but generally slowly. In the whole
of the east, the divisional officer or his equivalent
exercises authority at very low levels, leaving little
room for either traditional authority or modern
councils to maneuver. When East Central State began
to establish community and urban councils in late
1970, it was the divisional officer who oversaw the
election or selection of their members. Significantly for
one of the most advanced areas of the country, the
community councils are being created to represent
collections of villages coterminous with existing
traditional social and political units; each includes
from 1,000 to 50,000 persons. The community councils
are to be represented in divisional councils, which will
in turn report to the state government. Until the whole
structure is established, however, the function of the
community council is merely to advise the divisional
officer on local development needs, thus underscoring
9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

the councils' secondary status. The councils have
modest powers of taxation, but they have little
executive authority.
It. all states, the trend in local government reform is
toward the assumption of more and more political and
administrative power by the state bureaucracy.
Corresponding to this change is the inevitable
diminution of the power of the. t--Ational leadership,
whether it is aid by the state and to assume
figurehead status (as in the west), allowed to advise at
the lowest local level (as in the east), or gradually
contained by a parallel state civil service (as in the
north). The new format has been easiest to introduce
in the south, and almost impossible to introduce in the
ultraconservative far worth. The FMG is careful not to
offend established interests in its program of local
government reforms and, therefore, has had only
limited succcs, but it seems determined to see the
project through.
4. Judicial system
a. Impact of FMG politics
The FMG has not changed the basic strr of the
Jujiciary, although FMG control ever it is
substantially more direct and regular than was that of
the previous ci%ilian regime. The highest court of
appeal continues to be the Federal Supreme Court in
Lagos (Figure 4), consisting of a chief justice and five
other justices; all are appointed and removed by the
head or the FMG. Gowon has not hesitated to use his
powers of appointm_nt, as in 1971 when he waived by
decree the previous constitutional age limit to allow
additional service by the chief justice. The extent of
executive primacy over the federal judiciary %%as
brought to light in 1970, following a decision by the
court that both as FMG decree and a Western State
edict were unconstitutional. Within a month of the
verdict, '.he SMC issued a decree stating that any
decision purporting to overturn an enactment of the
FMG would be "null and void and of no effect
whatsoever."
The existing distribution of It -gal authority is such
that the 1963 constitution applies in all areas not
covered by FMG decrees. The scope of the
constitution has peen increasingly cir- umscribed,
however, as the military government has taken steps to
limit the independence of the press, the legal
profession, and citizens in general. A state of
emergency was declared in 1966, and comments made
by Go%:on at the end of 1971 indicated that it would
remain in force indefinitely. In practice the FMG has
not interfered to any unusual degree with the freedom
Irl
of private individuals; the only special courts which it
had created by 1972 were the special state -level
tribunals to try cases of armed or forcible robbery, and
that action had public support. In early 1972 the
government appeared to he considering establishing
similar courts to combat the problem of corruption.
The special roblwry tribunals were originally
composed of one representative each from the
judiciary, military, and police services and were
headed initially by state m�igistrates. By late 1971 the
legal community had convinced the FMG that such
tribunals were compromising basic rights, in that
conviction carried the deaf!. penalty and appeal
possible only to tl.: governor. A subseo,.er t decree
eliminated mandatory capital punislhmet, certain
cases and provided that High Court judges must sit on
all tribunals to upgrade their judicial status and the
general quality of their proceedings. The success of the
legal community in gaining modification of the
robbery tribunals I.ss not been paralleled in other
areas, however, even though prestigious figures such as
the president of the Nilerian Bar Association have
publicly criticized the government for limiting basic
freedoms and for issuing decrees protecting itself from
suits initiated by private citizens. In November 1971
the press gave cxmsiderable attention to a government
action creating a committee to revise Nigerian laws,
but as of mid -1972 it appeared likely that the
committee would merely update the existing code to
reflect decrees already promulgated; it was not
expected to limit in any way the growing judicial
prerogatives of the FMG. Despite the FMG's
rpanded influence on political matters, it has not
acted to interfere with the standards of :he judiciary,
which h-s v. reputation for fairness and impartiality.
V
State -level judiciary
Apart from its establishment of the special tribunals,
the military government has done little to alter the
state -level judiciary. The Head of the FMG appoints
the state High Court justices, but other appointments
are left either to the northern chief justice or to the
state Public Servi ,e Commissions. There have been
more instances of government or press interference
with the state courts than with the federal, but the
judges involved have exhibited striking audacity and
success in defending their independence, particularly
against the influence of the state governors.
The several levels of lower courts are variously
named among the different states, but a typical
arrangement is that of South- Eastern State: High
Court, Senior Magistrates Courts, Magistrates Courts,
Customary Courts of Appeal, Customary Courts, and
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

High Court and are administered and supervised by
the Commissioner for Area Courts. These changes,
plus the possibil ity of appeal to the state High Courts,
have substantisly improved the impartiality of justice
and partial]% reduced the high amount of corruption
previously found at the local level.
Wi the rural areas) Justices of the Peace. The
significant exception to this pattern is Western State
Nigeria's largest �where there also i; a Court of
Appeal which is senior ever, to the High Court.
In the six northern states of Nigeria the modern,
British oriented legal code is applied by the District
Courts (with civil jurisdiction) and by the Magistrates
Courts (with criminal jurisdiction): their decisions are
subject to appeal to the state High Courts. The
modern court system was long accompanied, however,
by a hierarchy ')f traditional Native Authority Courts,
culminating in the Sharia Court, which is empowered
to decide questions of Islamic law. The Native
Authority Courts provided judicial processes in even
the most remote areas, but they were (by European
standards) arbitrary and corrupt. Through the
issuance of identical edicts in April 1968 the northern
stag governors created, by consolidation, roughly 400
Area Courts to supplant nearly twice as many Native
Authority Courts. These Area Courts handle 95% of all
litigation and handle both civil and criminal cases
under modern law.
The establishment of the Area Courts has
represented fundamental and genuine reform. as it has
placed the administration of justice at the local level
under the authority of the state bureaucracy and :ias
weakened or removed forn, -r links 1vith the traditional
leadership. Owing to an cute lack of legally trained
personnel, the Area Courts are often staffed by the
same persons who were formerly employed by the
Native Authority Courts, but the most aged and
corrupt officeholders have been eliminated and a
portion of the others have been given at least a
minimum of legal training. Most important, however,
is the fact that the Area Courts and their personnel are
under the ultimate direction of the Chief Justice of the
5. Civil service
a. Governing role
Reflecting its British heiitage, the Nigerian civil
service possesses a carefully systematic formal and
legal structure. Its organization includes a Public
Service Commission, a complicated grading system,
extensive personnel regulations, competitive entrance
examinations and a functioning pension system. The
internal management of the civil service and its
administration of the country are theoretically
independent of political influence, subject only to the
policy directives of the commissioners heading each
ministry. Despite this heritag.-, recent years have
transformed the ideal arrangement into one where the
FMC has assumed rather direct control over the
federal civil service, and the state governors have
ass greater control over the state services.
Accordingly. the federal Public Service Commission
has lost to the FMC much of its control over
appointments, discipline, promotions, and firings, and
the state commissions, where they exist, are infericr
replicas of their former regional counterparts. In
August 1972 the FMG established a Public Service
Reviev. Commission with comprehensive powers to
"examine the organization, structure, and manage-
ment of the public services" and to recommend
reforms within 24 months.
The comparative inexperience of the military
leade!s with the process of governing, coupled with
their effective suppression of politicians, has created a
situation where the higher civil service is conisiderably
more important than it was under civilian rule. The
resulting tendency of civil servants to deal directly
with the F'MG has inevitably `politicized" their work
an extent previously unknown and has had the
Jfect of creating considerable civil service sunport for
the continuation of military rule, particularly among
the few highest ranking heads of the bureaucracy who
are confidants of Cowon himself. Fortunately, Gowon
seems to be relying on the most able career officers. In
late 1970, for example, he reshuffled all but five of the
permanent secretaries, putting the three who often
attend Dodan Barracks meetings and who drafted his
widely noted 1970 anniversary speech in the most
crucial substantive positions.
it
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1
FIGURE 4. Supreme Court building %1U /0U)

The single structural alteration of the civil service by
the FMG was embodied in a 1971 decision to establish
a police council independent of the Public Service
Commission �a move designed to improve the morale
of an underpaid police force frustrated by the
problems of coexistence with a pervasive and more
favored army.
Th, military government has elso been obliged to
become more involved in civil service affairs as a result
of the administrative disruptiom stemming from the
civil war and the shartage of trained personnel at the
state government level. Prior to the civil war in 1967
the federal public service included nearly 69,000
employees and had an annual rate of growth of 14
A much more rapid growth following the war was
partly a result of a policy decision in September 1971
to recruit federal employees with the express aim of
seconding them to the states. This represented direct
federal involvemert and a degree of interserviec
mobility never before seen in Nigeria, but it seemed to
be the only method of overcoming the low pay, lack of
tenure, and antirural mentality on the part of civil
servants that had inhibited the states' efforts to recruit
for their civil service positions. State and federal
employees combined were believed to number almost
200,000 in late 1972.
b. Recurrent problems
A number of problems relating to the public service
continue to plague the government, among them the
perennial issues of Nigerianization, salary levels, and
corruption. Efforts at Africanizing the service were
begun early, but in late 1972 expatriates were still
holding some of the most prestigious positions in a few
states, largely as a result of their educational and
technical qualifications in financial matters.
Ironically, the FMG is contemplating hiring even
larger numbers of foreigners for lesser positions as a
result of its failure to induce Nigerians resident abroad
to return home and its inability to persuade other
trained Nigerians to take rural posts.
The salary question is part of a package of
admini problems which have arisen primarily
because of a lack of systematic consultation among the
several federal, regional, state, and local governments
in the past on wage and staff policies. An April 1971
decree sought to clarify procedures for transfers from
one service to another and to provide uniform pension
benefits. The issue of greatest concern to government
workers, wages, was largely taken care of by a decision
in October 1971 to allow the 10% to 30% increases
which had been recommended by a government
appointed commission for public sector employees.
12
Despite mild protests on spocific issues, there has been
no serious labor unrest; the civil service and the police
have a history of reliability and allegiance.
The most persistent problems facing the civil service
are those of corruption and incompetence. In 1972 the
government was considering establishing corruption
tribunals to insure prompt punishment for dishonest
practices, but there is little chance that even the
strictest measures will eliminate such pervasive
behavior. Widespread corruption has had the effect of
deterring foreign companies from following through
with investment plans and has served to further reduce
the generally low level of efficiency domestically.
Bureaucratic efficiency has also been inhibited by
ethnic bias and by the military government's
indecisiveness on certain basic matters. The leadership
vacuum and a general reluctance to assume
responsibility have accelerated the already disruptive
practice of passing aii rt ^cisic,ns to the highest levels for
resolution. Nev by African standards the civil
service as a whole functions tolerably well, and
Gowor.'s fairly extensive personnel changes of late
1970 were cause for hope for the future.
C. Political dynam;cs (S)
Politica', activity has been banned in Nigeria since
the January 1966 military coi which overthrew the
constitutional government and substituted rule by
decree. The government has outlawed political
p::rties, but the former politicians continue to meet
quiedl and to plan strategy in anticipation of the
return to civilian rule, targeted by the military for
1976. General Gowon has listed nine goals which must
be met prior to the return to civilian government, but
the FMG has taken few tangible steps to realize any of
them. In late 1972 power remained firmly in military
hands, with the civil service exercising considerable
influence in governing the country. The FMG has
eliminated many of the civilian era problems of ethnic
separatism and minority frustrations, but in so doing it
has prevented popular civilian leaders and interest
groups from participating in government.
1. Tribal politics
The country's regional and ethnic diversity was the
major factor responsible fo the vast and violent
political changes that characterized Nigeria's first
decade of independence. During the first half of the
1960's this diversity was reflected in the power
machinations of the largest tribal linguistic groups,
pitting the interests of the Hausa Fulani, the Ibo, and
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

the Yoruba against one another. The latter half of the
decade witnessed the emergence of the power of small
tribes in espousing their interests vis-a-vis 'hose of the
larger groups previously in power. The personification
of this historic transformation is Gowon himself;
whether this small -tribe, Middle Belt, military figure
will allow a return to civilian rule and to elective
politics dominated by big tribes is the major question
of the 1970's.
The importance of the few largest ethnic groups in
Nigerian politics is illustrated in Figure 5. which shows
the states in which each major tribe is dominant: the
four largest tribal groups together constitute nearly
two thirds of the national population. Of particular
significance are the Hausa and Fulani, which have
been virtually identical since the earlv 19th c.vntury
conquest of the indigenous Hausa by the nomadic
Fulani in a Muslim military religious caoipaign.
Fulani expansionism was checked at the far northeast
by the Kanuri, in the south by the Yoruba, and in the
southeast by the terrain and social structure of
lboland. Within these limits, however, the Hausa
Fulani amalgam covered most of what later became
the Northern Region, comprising roughly half of
Nigeria's population and constituting the largest
political force in the country. Similarly, because thev
were the largest single tribal groups in their respective
areas, the Yoruba controlled the Western Region and
the Ibo the Eastern Region at independence. The
subsequent creation of the Mid Western Region also
reflected tribal predominance, in essence giving the
sizable Edo group a political home.
FIGURE 5. Dorrinant tribes in state governments (C)
The 1966 a,ups resulted I I I r.3rt from the inability of
the large tribes to coexist, the benefits of those
upheavals were enjoyed primarily by the smaller
trines, wh.ch found new power in t1he highest national
leadership and thrtugh the creation of the 12 -state
structure. The dissolution of the regions had the effect
of freeing the smaller groups from the pervasive
regional power of thr big tribes. In the former
Northern Region, for example, the gov -nment of
North Eastern State has been established in the
Kanuri area; Kwara State is governed by the Yoruba;
and Benue Plateau is controlled by a Tiv -Woma
coalition. Only three states remain securely in the
hands of the Hausa Fulani: Kano, North- Western,
and North (ventral. Similarly, in the former Eastern
Region Aere it took a civil war to settle This and
related issues �the Ibo are now reduced to control over
the East Central State; South Eastern State is
controlled by the Ibibio -Efik, and Rivers State by the
Ijaw. The latter group, particularly, continues to be
very anti -Ibo; their zeal to remain autonomous
permeates all other political issues for them and leads
them to support the FMG with atypical ewhusiasm.
The institution of the state system was felt least in the
Western and Mid Western Regions, which with
ielatively minimal changes were transformed into
states of the samA names.
The state- oriented distribution of political power
has effectively limited overt Hausa Fulani dominance
of Nigerian politics, and the civil war ended a period
of ibo ascendancy in the civil service end commerce.
Ironically, these changes did not end large -tribe
influence but in so�ne ways contributed to a new
phenomenon, the Yoruba problem. The Yoruba are
invariably described as "inveterate political
maneuverers and have in fact augmented this
reputation through the actions of their colorful
military figures, their continuing partisan activity,
their predominance in the federal judiciary, their
active participation in the FEC, and their popular
demonstrations in the Western State and in Lagos, the
federal capital and a Yoruba city. Most important,
Yoruba predominance is felt in politically significant
ways� Yoruba speaking stude -its win a strikingly
disproportionate number of federal scholarships, and
Yoruba occupy lower and middle civil service jobs at
the federal level and in the growing services of the
northern states. These gains, when accompanied by
the widely noted aggressiveness of the Yoruba
personality, have led in the northern states to an anti
Yoruba feeling which in many areas is stronger than
the previous anti -Ibo sentiment. Tribal prejudices
show no sign of diminishing and constitute both
13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1
PFRCENTAGE
OF
STATES OF POLITICAL
TRIBE
POPULATION
DOMINANCE.
Hausa- Fulani....
28
North Western, North
Central, Kano.
Ibo
17
East- Central.
Yoruba.........
17
Lagos, Kwara, Western.
Kanuri..........
4
North Eastern.
Ibibio -Efik
3
South- Eastern.
Tiv
3
Benue Plateau.
Edo
2
Mid Western.
Ijaw
1
Rivers.
The 1966 a,ups resulted I I I r.3rt from the inability of
the large tribes to coexist, the benefits of those
upheavals were enjoyed primarily by the smaller
trines, wh.ch found new power in t1he highest national
leadership and thrtugh the creation of the 12 -state
structure. The dissolution of the regions had the effect
of freeing the smaller groups from the pervasive
regional power of thr big tribes. In the former
Northern Region, for example, the gov -nment of
North Eastern State has been established in the
Kanuri area; Kwara State is governed by the Yoruba;
and Benue Plateau is controlled by a Tiv -Woma
coalition. Only three states remain securely in the
hands of the Hausa Fulani: Kano, North- Western,
and North (ventral. Similarly, in the former Eastern
Region Aere it took a civil war to settle This and
related issues �the Ibo are now reduced to control over
the East Central State; South Eastern State is
controlled by the Ibibio -Efik, and Rivers State by the
Ijaw. The latter group, particularly, continues to be
very anti -Ibo; their zeal to remain autonomous
permeates all other political issues for them and leads
them to support the FMG with atypical ewhusiasm.
The institution of the state system was felt least in the
Western and Mid Western Regions, which with
ielatively minimal changes were transformed into
states of the samA names.
The state- oriented distribution of political power
has effectively limited overt Hausa Fulani dominance
of Nigerian politics, and the civil war ended a period
of ibo ascendancy in the civil service end commerce.
Ironically, these changes did not end large -tribe
influence but in so�ne ways contributed to a new
phenomenon, the Yoruba problem. The Yoruba are
invariably described as "inveterate political
maneuverers and have in fact augmented this
reputation through the actions of their colorful
military figures, their continuing partisan activity,
their predominance in the federal judiciary, their
active participation in the FEC, and their popular
demonstrations in the Western State and in Lagos, the
federal capital and a Yoruba city. Most important,
Yoruba predominance is felt in politically significant
ways� Yoruba speaking stude -its win a strikingly
disproportionate number of federal scholarships, and
Yoruba occupy lower and middle civil service jobs at
the federal level and in the growing services of the
northern states. These gains, when accompanied by
the widely noted aggressiveness of the Yoruba
personality, have led in the northern states to an anti
Yoruba feeling which in many areas is stronger than
the previous anti -Ibo sentiment. Tribal prejudices
show no sign of diminishing and constitute both
13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

psychological and political limits within which any
future return to civilian government must be carried
out.
An important element in the Yoruba problem is the
fact that the predominant Yoruba state, Western, is by
far the most populous in Nigeria. This has led to calls
for giving the state's minorities greater autonomy or
for splitting the state into two or even three entities.
The carving up of Western State app>mred likely for a
time, if only to assuage the fears of non Yoruba that
the state was going to dominate federal politics, but
the r MG announcement that no new states will be
created until at least 1974 has had the effect of cutting
off debate. Ironically, the Yoruba themselves disagree
on the pros and cons of dividing Western State, with
views on the issue corresponding almost exactly to
former party allegiances.
2. Political parties
Before political parties were banned, party
allegiance in Nigeria corresponded almost universally
to tribal background. Basically, the Northern Peoples
Congress (NFI�) was the political arm of the
traditional Hausa- Fulani leadership in the north; the
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC)
represented the Ibo of the east; and the Action Group
(AG) re iresented the Yoruba of the west. The
liabilities of being in opposition against an NPC
NCNC coalition led in 1962 to a split in the AG in
which the progressive, southern Yoruba parent party
lost members to the more conservative Muslim,
northern Yoruba Nigerian National Democratic Party
(NNDP).
In addition to these four large -tribe political groups
there were smaller, less important parties based
primarily on minority -tribe sympathies but sec-
ondarily on ideological positions. Among the smaller
groups were the Northern Elements Progressive Union
and the United Middle Belt Congress. In the 1964
federal elections these two small parties joined the AG
and NCNC in an electoral coalition to oppose an
NPC -NNDP combination.
The patterns of electoral alliances formed by the
major parties during Nigeria's early years underscored
the fact that the paramount goal of the politicians was
to advance personal and tribal interests by linking
their followers to a winning team. Thus eastern,
western, and Middle Belt figures all allied themselves
at various times and in varying circumstances with the
politically powerful NPC. Political opportunism and
not ideology provided the basis for these arrange-
ments, as is exhibited in the fact that the leftist
14
elements in the N( :N(: made it Nigeria's most
ideologically comscious party, yet it combined with the
1- cryatiye NPC to form the first pc)stindependence
govt rnment. Among the major parties, only the
Yoruba AG was never part of a federal government.
Although political parties remain illegal in late
1972, maneuvering and negotiation in anticipation of
the return of civilian rule continue to take place
among former party leaders, who are drawing on long
established followings and organizations. The leaders
of the FMG are mindful of their self imposed
responsibility to create a permanent alternative to
regional self- centeredness: they are cultivating
replacements for traditional loyalties; they are hoping
that the current state bowndaries will become
permanent; and they are insisting that future political
parties be nationally oriented rather than based on
parochial tribal or regional interests. They have not,
however, eliminated regional forces or aspirations.
But despite the FMG's preferences, subterranean
partisan activity continues Such activity increased at
the end of the civil war in January 1970, but it
dropped off sharply when Gowon announced in
October of that year that civilian rule would likely be
6 years in the future. A late 1971 announcement that a
census will be held in 1973 has led some observers to
expect elections and a return to civilian rule shortly
thereafter. If such expectations spread, an increase in
partv activity will undoubtedly follow.
In the interim, organizational efforts seem most
advanced among the perennially political Yoruba,
somewhat less vigorous among northern and Middle
Belt groups, and least in evidence among the
caster rers. In the latter case politics has obviously
been deemed secondary to postwar economic
reconstruction, and in any event the relatively
thorough replacement of discredited political leaders
has left an organizational and leadership vacuum. In
other regions the bulk of the political maneuvering
continues to be by politicians active in the decade rip
to 1966.
The best known civilian politician during flee period
of military rule has been Chief Obafemi Awolowo,
founder and leader of the AG who served as vice
chairman of the FEC until. his resignation in 1971.
Both durir,g and after his participation in government,
Awolowo has sought to expand AG influence and
organization, with the result that it is the single part,
enjoying both a meaningful structure and a coherent
Policy. Even the AG remains little more than Awolowo
and his Western State apparatus, but limited success
has been achieved in eliciting support from key figures
in all 12 states, with potential electoral support limited
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

to the non -Hausa north and elements in Mid Western,
Rivers, Lagos, and Soath- Eastern States. In 1970
Awolowo considered forming a truly national party,
but Gowon's speech that October caused him to
deflect his ambitions in the direction of simply
polishing his contacts with like- minded leaders in
other states while concentrating on organizing in
Western State.
The importance of Awolowo and of Western State is
reflected in the strategies and policies of the NNDP
and NCNC. The two established a tentative alliance
in 1970, based largely on an anti Awolowo platform,
but that combin"�ion was dealt a severe blow by the
announcement of the prolongation of military rule.
The resulting lack of rationale for unified action not
only ruined the two -party alliance but by late 1971
had reduced the NNDP to a number of factions of
indefinite leadership. The party retained a following
among opponents of Awolowo in Western State, but it
appeared unlikely that prospective leaders in the north
would again try to cultivate an alliance with the
NNDP.
To an even greater extent than the NNDP, the
NCNC suffers a severe leadership problem and has
almost no organization in its home area, East Central
State. In late 1971 the NCNC leadership was inclined
to concentrate on organizing in Western State; it had
no plans to move into its traditional strongholds in the
mid western and eastern areas.
Political activity continues in the northern states,
although in a less obvious manner than in the west.
The northern states' Interim Common Services Agency
provides an opportunity for meetings of the northern
military governors, but the organization's subservience
to the FMG insures that it has no independent
political future. Unofficial associations of former
leaders do exist, but these are comparatively
amorphous groups having little modern political
organization behind them. Despite the current lack of
party structure, however, traditional iovalties remain
strong in the north, will continue so regardless of the
success of the local government reforms, and will he
drawn on when parties are reestablished.
The history of Nigerian political parties and recent
efforts at reorganization confirm that the creation of
parties with larger than regional bases is at the same
time the greatest problem and the most essential
requisite for a successful return to civilian rule. The
national parties which emerge are almost certain to be
combinations of merely renamed regional parties.
Western State is presently the unofficial testing ground
for the strength of the former leaders' organizational
skills, but the disposition of the north will determine
which party is ultimately successful.
3. Elections
Elections at the federal le -el were last held in 1964,
and at the regional level in 1965. Early in 1966,
following, the first military coup, parliament was
abolished, and the states which replaced the regions
have appointed rather than elected leadership. By
1971 there was some evidence that local 4nd largely
informal elections were being held in the creation of
local government bodies in East Central State, but
that process was decidedly embryonic and atypical.
The FMG announcement that a census would be held
in November 1973 caused speculation that general
elections would come as early as 1974, but there is no
evidence that the FMG has in fact decided on a date
or planned any electoral machinery.
The electoral yaws which existed prior to the
military takeover allowed for universal suffrage except
in the Muslim Northern Region, where voting was a
male prerogative. Throughout the country, voter
registration and participation were very high by
democratic standards �both were about 80 Despite
the progressive laws and widespread participation,
however, elections were tarnished by government
corruption and voter resentment at both the federal
and the regional level: official manipulation, party
boycotts, strong -arm tactics, voter intimidation,
public disorders, registration irregularities, and voting
frauds, with no effective remedies for them. The
impact that such abuses had on the results of the 1964
and 1965 elections is still open to debate; what is not
debatable is that the FMG must take considerable
pains to provide legal of fair elections
before public confi(ici m- -an be restored and the
results can become genuirvely representative.
With political parties still officially banned, there is
no basis on which to project future election results, but
it can be s;ifely assumed that the key factor in popular
voting behavior will continue to be tribal loyalty. In
the past this phenomenon has led to major -tribe
control of the government; in 1959 the NPC was the
senior partner hi a successful coalition including the
NCNC, and in 1964 it was joined by the NNDP.
Given the military government's insistence on
preserving the state system, however, the small -tribe
electorate is likely to play a substantially more
important role in determining the composition of the
next government.
4. Ethnic separatism
a. 1966 military coups
Although the irregularities of 1964 and 1965 did
much to erode popular trust in the electoral process,
15
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

they did more to undermine support for the northern
dominated federal government. This erosion led
ultimately to the militar, coups of 1966 and the
eastern secession of 1967.
Relations between the north and the east first
became seriously strained when the NPC turned to the
NNDP as a coalition partner in 1964. The federal
government's role in installing the NNDP in control of
the Western Region in the 1965 regional election
alienated the AG, which was the popular preference,
and also brought the NCNC to realize that it had no
hope of regaining national political power through the
constitutional process, which was becoming grossly
fraudulent.
In January 1966 a group of young, idealistic, and
predominantly Ibo army officers overthrew the
northern regime, in the process assassinating a number
of the top political and military leaders from the north
and west. The commander of the army, Major General
Aguiyi Ironsi, an Ibo. took control and organized a
southern -based military regime that relied essentially
on Ibo persor:nel in the federal military and civil
service. Encouraged by advisers who an
opportunity to create a strong central government
under Ibo leadership, Ironsi began by decree to erode
the autonomy of the regions, finally issuing a directive
unifying the regional and federal civil services and
abolishing the federal structure. Northern dissatisfac-
tion with Ironsi and fear of Ibo domination led in mid
1966 to the murder of Ironsi as part of a second coup
in which Gowon came to power. Shortly after that
coup, thousands of Ibo resident in the Northern
Region were slaughtered.
b. Civil war
The military governor of the Eastern Region,
Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, who had been appointed
by Ironsi, consistently refused to acknowledge the
legitimacy of Gowon's regime and attended only one
meeting of the SMC �the one which was held in
Ghana in early 1967 to settle outstanding constitu-
tional issues. Gowon made limited concessions in an
effort to keep the east in the federation, including his
proposal to make the SMC a collegial body requiring
the governors' unanimous approval on crucial issues.
According to Ojukwu as well as most independent
observers, Gowon later reneged on some points which
had been settled, but even if he had acted in good
faith Gowon could not have consented to the degree of
financial, military, and political autonomy ultimateiy
demanded by the east. In May 1967 the Eastern
Region Consultative Assembly gave Ojukwu a
mandate to secede at any "early practicable date."
16
Faced with whin he judged insubordination, Gowon
issued decrees abolishing the regions and reorganizin
Nigeria into 12 states, putting the Ibo into a single,
landlocked state, and creating individual states for the
larger eastern minorities. Ojukwu thereupon
announced secession.
The new republic, Biafra, existed from May 1967
until January 1970, at various times controlling East
Central, South Eastern, Rivers, Mid Western, and a
small oortion of Western states. Mobilizing a very
large army, the FMG conducted a war of ItLrition
which finplly reduced Biafra to a small Ibo enclave
and surrender. During its 2'h -year life the secessionist
state was run by a government with an organizational
format very much like that of Nigeria itself. Most
public services were kept functioning. The govern-
ment was to some degree representative of all eastern
ethnic groups, although the non -Ibo exhibited much
less enthusiasm for the separatist cause than did the
Ibo and were among the first to be "liberated" by
advancing FMG armies. Ironically, the surrender
document was signed by a Biafran military leader,
Philip Effiong, who was a member of a tribe (the Efik)
which had strong anti -Ibo feelings.
Although human suffering inside Biafra was great
during the war, it was not so extreme as the astute
Biafran propagandists suggested, and elite groups
emerged relatively unscathed. More important, fears
that the FMG was engaged in a genocidal war proved
completely unfounded, and the federal government
immediately set upon a course of reconstruction for
the east. Federal aid to East Central State was so
extensive, in fact, that by late 1971 northerners were
complaining of the comparative neglect of their areas.
Within a year and a half of the end of the war it %k as
estimated that as many as 50,000 Ibo had left the east
to take up residence in the north; although this figure
represented only a fraction of the 350,000 who had
fled the 1966 purges, it reflected substantial Ibo trust
in the FMG. Reintegrotion and the reclamation of
property proved to be nuch more difficult in Rivers
State, but considerable progress was evident there too
by the end of 1971. Nevertheless, the political and
commercial role of the Ibo community remains much
diminished from its prewar level.
e. State minorities
The civil war demonstrated that military separatism
has no future, but it did not settle the perennial
problem of minority politics. In North Eastern State,
for example, the Kanuri are free from the previous
Hausa Fulani domination, but they in turn must deal
with the 50% of the state's population who are from
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1
25X1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1
25X1

advance planning, for electoral pandemonium, and
for regional factionalism.
In early 1971 the police Special Branch uncovered
evidence of Soviet subversion in the NTUC, and as a
result several of the union's leaders were detained for
more than a year. By the end of 1971 the organization
was in desperate financial straits, as it was denied
access to its bank account without the authorization of
its leaders, and the Soviet Embassy had supplied no
funds for over 6 months.
The NTUC poses no security threat to the military
government and lacks widespread popular support,
but with its affiliated unions it can make the
;mplementation of government policies very difficult,
such as in 1971, when it led the opposition to the
FMC's wage policy. The leadership of the 'NTUC
overlaps that of two other radical organizations, the
Nigerian Committee of the Afro -Asian Peoples
Solidarity Organization and the Nigerian- Soviet
Friendship and Cultural Association (NSFCA).
Particularly in the latter case, identical leadership
constitutes a ecmnection of the radical groups to the
political establishment; for example, in East- Central
State a commissioner chaired an organizational
meeting of the NSFCA, most of whose members were
from the NTUC. The consistent supporters of both the
labor and friendship organizations are students
seeking scholarships, unemployed workers, market
women, and others motivated by personal advantage.
Few have ideological motivations.
c. Student politics
Dissident students create the same kind of
difficulties for the FMG as do the labor unions �i.e.,
they are a hindrance to the implementation of specific
policies but are not a basic threat to the stability of the
regime. Whatever the validity of their complaints, the
students' ability to confront the government is
inhibited by the fact that their organizations are
fragmented in the same way as are those of their labor
counterparts. The largest student group, the National
Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS), held a
convention in 1970 which was so disorganized that it
dissolved before it could elect officers for the following
year. The national NUNS organization was reunited
in late 1971, but it failed to take any concerted action
on public issues. Leadership posts in the NUNS and
similar groups are sought chiefly because they lead to
opportunities for foreign travel, budget manipulation,
and political publicity for the individuals involved,
not because the organizations themselves are
politically .significant.
Demonstrations by youth groups have concentrated
on such issues as university admissions quotas and
stipend levels rather than on national or international
political topics. The relative lack of student
enthusiasm for the anti- British demonstrations
following the announcement of the terms of the
Rhodesian settlement provided further evidence of this
preoccupation with specifically student concerns.
Early in 1971 students and unions were simul-
taneously protesting to the government on separate
issues, and the FMG feared that the two would unite
to form a serious threat. Although concerted action
was not taken in this case, mutual sympathies and the
potential fcr future joint action were clearly
demonstrated. Student and labor groups do pose a
serious long -term problem for the government; the two
groups share economic grievances and a much less
tribally based organizational framework than do the
.raditional political parties.
d. The press
Among established nongovernmental groups and
institutions, the press is one of the more effective in
influencing public policy. Top FMG officials appear
to value the usefulness of the press in disseminating
information to the people and are in turn responsive to
questions on public issues brought up by the more
prestigious newspapers. Neither of Nigeria's two major
dailies is owned by the central government �both are
independent to an extent unique in Africa. Unofficial
censorship provided effective if unsystematic
guidelines of government control during the civil w4r,
but since that time the press has sought to expand its
freedom to criticize the government. Newspapers in
the eastern states have riot recovered from the effects
the civil war had on their circulation and prestige;
therefore they are relatively parochial and not very
effective nationally. The northern states' newspaper,
the New Nigerian, was founded in 1966 but already
has a wide circulation and comparatively professional
standards. It vigorously boosts northern interests, and
occ4sionally criticizes the FMG when those interests
seem threatened. The prodding most sensitive to the
military government has come from the press in
Western and Lagos states, where in early 1971 editors
from three different newspapers were detained brieflv
on Go\von instructions for writing editorials critical
of the government.
Uncertainty about the FMG's limits on press
freedom created such a furor that Gowon met
personally with newspaper figures later in 1971, and in
October of that year the government sought to define
its policy of "orientation without censorship" at a
19
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

meeting of the state information commissioners.
Proposals have been made to create a national news
agency, a press code of conduct, a press council to
insure observance of the code, and a national
broadcasting authority. The press almost unanimously
condemned the government's proposals, with the
result that none has been implemented. It remains
clear, however, that the FMG and Gowon are irritated
with growing press attacks on the army and the
military government and that continued regulation in
some form is a virtual certainty.
e. Business and the professions
Two groups which have some influence with the
FMG are the legal profession and the leaders of
private and public corporations. P.eflccting the
struggle which still exists in the top echelons of
Nigerian business between expatriates and Africans,
such executives and their organizations usually do not
present a united front to the government. Despite this
limitation, legal and illegal contacts are common
between government figures and individual busi-
nessmen at both the federal and state levels, and
organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce show
signs of life in many of the larger cities. The national
president of the Nigerian Association of Chambers of
Commerce in 1972 waE the country's most widely
known African businessman and a man who has
consistently and publicly decried government
interference in the economy.
Lawyers are much better organized and more
explicitly political than are businessmen; the president
of the Nigerian Bar Association. R.O.A. Akinjide, for
example, is a leading NNDP politician, a public critic
of the FMG, and a potential civilian leader. The legal
profession has been especially critical of the lack of
due process alleged to exist in the special robbery
tribunals, and in 1971 lawyers conducted a one -day
strike to protest a summary execution. Lawyers' groups
are likely to increase their influence, and will do so
even more quickly if civilian rule becomes a reality.
Other professional groups, notably doctors and
teachers, have their respective organizations which are
very vocal and are sometimes influential when policy
questions relating to their specialties arise.
f. Farmers and other traditional interests
Farmers are predictably less well organized than are
urban wage earners. Only the cocoa producers are a
political force, and this predominantly Yonrba,
Western State group is important because of the
delicacy of its relationship with the marketing boards,
the police. and government budgetary policy. Rural
20
workers' interests are primarily economic; the
perennial task of the FMG is to overcome a depressed
world market and to keep prices at acceptable levels
that will forestall demonstrations, minimize the
problems of noncooperation and smuggling, and
prevent political grievances and movements from
springing up. In other agricultural fields �e.g.,
peanuts, cotton, and rubber� neither landowners nor
workers are organized in a manner which would make
them important in national politics.
Traditional organizations are increasingly losing
their importance as forces in federal politics, although
some, particularly in the north, retain regional
influence. One genuinely traditionalist group is the
Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI), a Muslim organization
receiving moral and political support from the
northern emirs and financial support from the Middle
East. The JNI is dedicated primarily to spreading
Islam through the schools and religious institutions,
but secondarily to building a base for future political
activity. Established by the former Sardauna of
Sokoto, a powerful northern ruler who was killed in
the first 1966 coup, the JNI will continue to be an
influence on northern political leaders, particularly
after the promised return to civilian rule. Another
northern organization whose membership includes
many traditional leaders is the Barewa Old Boys
Association, a group of roughly 2,000 graduates c the
north's most prestigious secondary school, Barewa
College. With political parties outlawed, the
association's public activities concern alumni related
matters, but its influential members are in a position
to raise a powerful voice for traditional northern
interests in the future.
Traditional and modern ethnic interests are als,
made known to the FMG from time to time through
nongovernmental representatives of tribal groups.
Self appointed and unofficial as these leaders are, they
still area numerous and influential and are sometimes
referred to as tribal caucuses. The importance of these
caucuses is difficult to judge, but they do serve to
espouse the interests of the tribes which are minorities
within their states as well as to bypass certain
governors who are not members of tLe state traditional
or commercial elite.
D. National policies (S)
1. Domestic
Nigeria's domestic policies since independence have
been geared toward the pursuit of two main goals:
national unity and economic development. The
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

outbreak of the civil war underscored the country's
failure to achieve the former, and the pursuit of the
war prevented progress in the latter by disrupting all
nonessential programs and expenditures from 1967 to
1970. Since the hostilities, absolute power has been in
the hands of Gowon and his close advisers, none of
whom is accustomed to thinking or acting in
systematic, policy- oriented terms. On the occasion of
Nigeria's 10th anniversary celebration in Octobeo
1970, however, Gowon finally Gook the bull by the
horns in proposing nine tangible steps as prerequisites
to the return to civilian rule by 1976. Comprising his
nine aims were two essentially economic goals (the
institution of a national development and reconstruc-
tion plan, and the implementation of a permanent
forrr ula for revenue distribution among the states and
the central government); four administrative or
organization:,l goals (the reorganization and
redeplovmLnt of the army, the resolution of state
boundary problems, the elimination of corruption,
and the holding of a national census); and three
wholly political goals (the writing of a nc%i
constitution, the creation of national and nontribal
political parties, and the holding of free elections).
These nine points have formed the backbone of the
government's domestic policy since they were
formulated in 1970. In most public appearances since
that time Gowon has sought to demonstrate that the
FMG is making progress toward achieving this
program. In reality, the military government has taken
some steps to implement Gowon's economic policies,
but except for scheduling a census in 1973, it has
avoided facing problems with political implications.
a. Economic goals
Gowon's Second National Development Plan (1970-
74) was a general, albeit uneven, success during its first
years. By 1972, Nigeria's rapidly increasing oil
revenues had balanced the federal budget, provided
adequate foreign exchange for increased imports, and
eased the burden posed by continued high military
expenditures. Most important, N'igeria in 1971
achieved an estimated 12% growth rate. B% mid -1972
the government had succeeded in retarding general
inflation, but it way i(+ s successful in 0,
attempts to check rising foou prices. In spite i
substantial FMG efforts and successes, politically
significant economic -based grievances remain:
unemployment is a problem; many development
projects are stalled owing to administrative
bottlenecks; and expenditure priorities favor elite
groups and the military. Development expenditures to
date have concentrated on rehabilitation of the worst
of the war- afflicted areas, but in other parts of the
country the masses of the population feel ignored and
are generally cynical about the government's alleged
improvements in such fields as transport and
communications.
Progress by the FMG in implementing its declared
policy on other economic matters has beer. slow.
Gowon called in October 1970 for the formulation of a
permanent plan for revenue distribution to replace the
interim plan announced by the FMG the previous
March, but by 1972 no steps had been taken to devise
a new system. 'Because all states receive a larger
allocation of nonpetroleum revenue under the inter ;m
plan, however, and because the FMG provides budget
and reconstruction assistance to the states, manv of
them appear reconciled to the interim plan as a
workable compromise.
The most politically successful of Gowon's
economic policies �one not explicit in his nine -point
program �is that of Nigerianization. The FMG is
trying to secure full employment for Nigerians and to
place effective control of all major industries in
Nigerian hands. A decree issued in 1972 will prohibit
foreign investment in retail trade, service industries,
and simple manufacturing after 1974. Larger and
more heavily capitalized industries continue to he
open to foreign ownership, but only through
partnership arrangements with Nigerian nationals.
The FMG has acquired varying degrees of
participation in the existing oil concessions, and it is
expanding the role of the Nigerian National Oil
Company (NNOC) in all phases of petroleum
production and marketing. Nigeria is taking an
increasingly assertive stand in the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries and in its own
negotiations with the major oil- producing companies.
The trend toward economic nationalism accelerated
rapidly in 1971 and 1972.
b. Administrative goals
In 1970 Gowon indicated that a reorganization of
the army was necessary to keep the troops efficient,
L,val, and happy �his prescription for political
stability. Occasional gnlmblings from wrni,oc officers
notwit' the h MG has the loyalty i)t the
army k ,uttressed b% foreign trainitax ind
new equipment to placate the officers and by
relatively good pay and popillar prestige for nlisted
men. This policy of keeping the military content,
however, has drawn ht?,. A) mi the national t (14+ouny,
which must maintain an armv (if mc,ghly 260,000
men. The hope expressed at the end of the civil war
21
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

that the armv would be a force in economic
reconstruction has failed to materialize, soldiers have
played a minimal role in civic action projects.
Perfunctory training programs are limited primarily to
the lower ranks, although an extensive athletic
program helps occupy the troops. Fortunately, the
underoccupied army has rarely antagonized the
civilian population and is quite well disciplined. In
fact, demobilization would crease more social
problems than it would solve.
Overall, Gowon's relations with the army are good,
his policies are effective, and the public is cooperative,
although civilian politicians complain about the size
of the defense budget. Gowon has moved slowly and
with extreme care in reorganizing and redeploying the
army. However, in 1972, the anticipated transfer of
:he headquarters of three divisions of the army to
permanent locations in Kaduna, Ibadan, and Jos, plus
Gowon's appointment of a new chief of staff,
appeared to be paving the way for more rapid change.
Although the FMG has stuck to its policy of not
creating new states before 1974, active developments
on the states issue have included a willingness to
consult on border disputes and a forceful dedication to
the principle of unlimited mobility of people from
state to state. In his 1972 New Year's message Gowon
observed that growing reconciliation among Nigerians
and their movement across state borders had
culminated in greater mutual understanding. The
government's policy of stimulating unity among the
various elements of the population appears to be
working and to be welcome to the public.
On the issue of corruption the government has
waged its war primarily through propaganda in the
newspapers. In early 1972, however, the FMG
approved an anticorruption decree which would
enable the government to take firm action against
dishonest civil servants and their contacts in the
private sector.
The most tangible step toward the implementation
of Gowon's administrative goals came in his
announcement that a census will be held in November
1973. Gowon reassured the country that the census
would be a purely technical operation, but the
Political implications were obvious to everyone, as the
1963 census had created insuperable problems among
the regions. If the census is carried out as promised, it
will be the first publicly obvious accomplishment of
the r,tiuc-point program and will be wceivvtl ly lbr
public and the press as hard evidence that Gowon is
prepared to take on other political problems.
c. Polilit al goals
Concerning political issues, the schedule announced
by the regime in 1970 provides that within 6 years the
22
FMG will have drafted a new constitution, permitted
the creation of national and nontribal political pasties,
and provided for free elections. By 1972 no steps had
been taken toward implementing any of these goals,
with the government having adopted the practice of
periodically renewing the ban on political activity and
minimizing the political aspects of various economic
and administrative problems. The public has been
sympathetic to the FMG's apolitical approach, in
recognition of the seriousness of the country's postwar
economic and administrative problems. The public's
superficial di interest in partisan politics may
disappear as the civil war psychology fades and as
1976 draws nearer, however, and its support for the
FMG may begin to disappear as well unless tangible
progress is discernible.
Gowon probably announced his nine -point program
in good faith, but the following years have revealed
that he is reluctant to make the hard decisions and to
take the unpopular steps necessary to implement it. In
his major public addresses he has established a pattern
of rhetoric which has not been complemented by a
substantive program. His tendency toward personal
and governmental inaction is most pronounced when
political issues are involved, but it can be seen also in
the economic field. In fiscal, monetary, and budgetary
matters, where careful planning and integrated
administration are required, the FMG has a poor
record. Reflecting the government's lack of concerted
behavior, newspapers in 1972 began to refer to a "loss
of faith in public organs" and to a "gap 6rlween
public pronouncements of rnen in authow, ;,ud
action required to make pronouncements mean-
ingful."
2. Foreign
Nigeria's civilian government pursued a theore
cally nonaligned foreign policy. In reality the largely
European- educated civil servants and the traditionally
oriented politicians were led by their own conservative
backgrounds, by Nigeria's colonial heritage, and by a
pervasive preoccupation with domestic affairs to
construct by default a basically pro Western but
almost isolationist policy. General Gowon is similarly
Hell disposed toward the West and is suspicious of the
motives of Communist sta es, but he has created an
international posture which is more genuinely
nonaligned than was that of his predecessors.
Moreover, the exigencies of the civil ,ir and Gowon'
personal taste for foreign travel h�` utributed to an
ir: reasingly independent, no' al, and assertive
foreign policy, in keeping wit, geria's size and
relative importance among black o irican states. The
result of this contimning evolution has 1%een to enhance
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

the F1!G�s standing in Africa. weaken its tie to the
United Kingdom, and put relations \with the
superpowers on a pragmatic, issue oriented basis
almost devoid of ideology.
a. Relations with other states
Nigeria's relations with other black African states
have usual]\ been good, but in some instances they
were marred for a time by recognition of or support for
the rebels on the part of several African governments
during Nigeria's civil war. Niger and Chad �among
Nigeria *s immediate neighbors offered strong
support for the federal position, and relations with
them have been excellent. Dahomey briefly assisted
international relief operations helping the rebels, but it
reversed its position when Nigeria showed its
displeasure by closing the border between the two
countries. Relations with Dahomey have improved
steadily since the war. Cameroon supported the FMG
during the civil war, but border and fishing disputes
have kept relations with Nigeria on a relatively formal
level. Further afield. Nigeria's relations with Ivor\-
Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia have nearly returned to
normal in spite of those nations recognition of former
Biafra. Rapprochement with Gabon proved to he more
elusive, but a substantial step was achieved in the
successful negotiations leading to the return in 1971 of
the Nigerian children evacuated during the civil war.
By the middle of 1972 Gowon had met with Gabon
President Bongo, and steps were being taken to
regularize relations between the two states. The FMG
FIGURE 6. General Gowon meeting President Jomo
Kenyatta in Kenya, May 1971 (U /OU)
also has 1:eriodic�ally had diffic�ultN protecting its
nationals working in and oc'c'asionally expelled from
such states as Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and Zaire,
but in general terms Nigeria has ye�r% extensive,
apidl\ expanding, and consistentl\ cooperative
diph natic� relations with its fellow African states
(Figure 6).
One of Gowon *s top foreign polic% priorities is to
stimulate coordinated economic development and
regional unite in west Africa, and in pursuing this goal
he has met Nvith the leaders of nearly ever\-
neighboring c�ountr\ since 1970. Both his visits and the
public statements resulting frorn them have often been
superficial and platitudinous, vet the vi ;its have
achieved tangible successes in agreements on projects
to improve transportation and c'ommunic'ations
systems. AnV limitation to further cooperation will be
caused b\ the duplication of the economics involved
rather than by a,lack of political congeniality. In his
bilateral endeavors Gowon has stressed that Nigeria
has no territorial ambitions and that it respects the
sovereignty of its smaller neighbors �he is mindful
that Nigeria's strong e'c'onomy, siir, and military
capability make the countrN potentially intimidating
and that its policies run the danger of being resented
bv less favored neighbors.
I'he most public'ize'd developments in Nigeria's
African police have been its acceptance of the
usefulness of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and its shift to a hard line on the question of
European disengagement from colonial rule. During
its civilian era Nigeria was lukewarm toward the
OAU, and the country's limited role in that body was
far overshadowed by the rhetoric of the Traders of
Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania. Partly in appreciation
for an OAU resolution supporting the FMG during the
civil war, however, Nigeria recently has participated
more actively in the OAL' and in its Defense
Commission. In June 1971, Gowon spectacularly used
.n OAU summit meeting to call for the "liberation of
at least one colonial territory in the next 3 years." The
head of the FMG has contributed limited military and
unlimited moral support to the African Party for the
Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde
and to Guinea itself in their anti Portuguese
campaign, and has invited represc 1 tives of Angolan,
Rhodesian, and South-West Afri nsurgent groups
to visit the FMG in Lagos. Gowon support for these
revolutionary movements, a marked departure from
past Nigerian practice, is designed to bolster Nigeria's
position as leader of the progressive African states, as
well ss ultimately to assist the challenge to white
governments. The FMG has declined opportunities to
23
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

contract formal military alliances, but it has left no
doubt that Nigeria seeks preeminence as black Africa's
acknowledged economic, military, and political
leader.
Nigeria's closest international ties continue to be
with the United Kingdom. The basically good
relations which were built up during the colonial era
and the years of independence were strained t
the onset of the Biafran secession when the E
hesitancy to support and supply the FMG irritated the
military government and set it off in search of new
friends. Relations between the 'two states later
improved substantially, however. and Britain
continues to be Nigeria's most important single
partner in the fields of defense, foreign trade, private
investment, and technical assistance. Nevertheless,
Nigeria's political relations with Britain are still
somewhat restrained, primarily because of their
differing stands on a number of international issues
differences which stem largely from Gowon's
campaign to promote his progressive image in Africa.
Nigeria was the first Commonwealth member to
withdraw from the study group on Indian Ocean
security in response to the British decision to sell arms
to South Africa, for example, and the FMG attempted
to take th- lead in protesting the terms of the
Rhodesian settlement. On all such issues, however,
Gowon has been careful not to permanently impede
cooperation with London.
The civil servants in the military government
appreciate the need for good relations with the United
Kingdom, but they are noticeably more anti- British
than are the army leaders. Civil servants' attitudes are
important in light of Gowon's practice of leaving more
policymaking authority to the Ministry of External
Affairs than did the previous civilian government.
Trade with the European Communities (EC) as a
whole surpasses trade with the United Kingdom.
Nigeria's exports are especially heavy to France and
the Netherlands (petroleum), and it imports heavily
from West Germany. In political terms, Nigeria's
relations with -Al of the major European countries are
good, although ties with the French continue to be
delicate because of the latter's active support for
Biafra.
Gowon has extended his personal involvement in
international politics beyond Africa. He was a
principal figure in the 1971 OAU "Wise Men" mission
to explore the possibilities for peace in the Middle
East, and he offered advice to both sides during the
1971 India Pakistan war. By early 1972 Nigeria had
some level of diplomatic relations with 72 countries.
Additionally, Nigeria has become more involved in a
24
variety of internation it forums, including the United
Nations and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries. Although Nigeria is a signatory to most
major international conventions, it does not have anv
significant military or political agreements with any
country.
The U.S. Government's official policy of
noninvolvement ir, the Nigerian civil war, its very low
key support for the federal cause, and the widespread
pro Biafran sympathies of the U.S. public offended
the FMG and brought relations between the United
States and Nigeria to a low point. Since the end of the
war the atmosphere has improved, although this
process has Leen inhibited because the foreign policies
of the two governments do not have much in common.
Differences on such questions as the Middle East and
the Law of the Seas have provided temporary
frictions; in the long run the United States' chief
problem is to avoid being identified with the United
Kingdom, South Africa, and Portugal on the issue of
colonialism in southern Afa( -a.
In economic terms the United States is heavily
involved in Nigeria: U.S. private investment totals
$i300 million, virtua;ly all in petroleum; the United
States has been among Nigeria's primary sources of
economic assistance, with total economic aid of
approximately $41.7 million in 1971; and the United
States is Nigeria's third largest foreign market and its
second most important source of imports. Nigeria
continues to offer opportunities for U.S. foreign
investment, but such investment is increasingly
subject to restrictions, such as requiring Nigerian
public and private participation. The United States
has no cultural agreement with Nigeria but has had a
limited exchange program. Nearly 2,000 Nigerian
students study in U.S. universities annuall and the
total American official and nonofficial presence
includes almost 5,000 persons.
Nigeria's relations with the Soviet Union have
varied inversely with Lagos' relations with the West.
When potential Western arms suppliers balked at the
outbreak of the civil war, the U.S.S.R. stepped in to fill
the gap. Although Nigeria was paying cash for nearly
all the arms deliveries, the Russians were building up a
reservoir of political goodwill 'rhe FMG appreciated
the Soviets' unequivocally f; gable stand during the
war but has since remained keptical of Communist
motives, with the result that relations have cooled
since 1970. The Soviet Embassy in Lagos incurred
Gowon's displeasure through its funding and support
of a variety of leftist organizations and publications,
and from early 1971 to early 1972 Gowon detained
three especially important Nigerian labor leaders for
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

collaboration with the Soviets. Soviet funding and
other quasi- subversive activities were then apparently
reduced, leaving Soviet Embassy personnel to lament
in private their lack of progress in Nigeria. A trade
agr -ement between the two countries was signed in
October 1971 in Moscow, but trade and aid continued
to be minimal during the early 1970's. Cultural
cYnta_ts were also minimal, although more than 1,000
Nigerian studeni, were stud', ing in the U.S.S.R. in
1971. The U.S.S.R. is planning to expand its
participation in Nigeria's petroleum industry and its
projected iron and steel industry.
In 1972 Nigeria had diplomatic relations with all
Eastern European Communist countries except East
Germany and Albania. Moreover, in its effort to
appear nonaligned the FMIG has srg:.cd trade
agreements with each of the Communist states, but
collectively such trade including that with
Moscow amounts to only 5% of Nigeria's total.
Cooperation with Eastern Europe was at its height
during the civil war, when Czechosiovakia and
Bulgaria supplied varying amounts of arms. By 1972
Communist military aid to Nigeria had become
negligible, development aid was minimal, and Gowon
was confidentially expressing disappointment over the
meager results of the previously signed trade
agreements. All of the Eastern European states with
which Nigeria has diplomatic relations maiatin small
diplomatic missions in Lagos. No cultural or exchange
agreements have been negotiated since 1970, but
several Communist countries do host small numbers of
Nigerian students.
The single recent noteworthy development in
Nigeria's generally routine relationships with
Communist countries was its regularization in 197 of
ties wit!i the People's Republic of China. Nigeria had
long recognized and dealt with both Chinas without
opening diplomatic relations with either, but in
practice the FMG tended more and more to take a
pro Peking stance internationally. Formal diplomatic
relations were established with the People's Republic
in February 1971, but it was not until the end of that
year that the Nigerian Government announced its
selection of an ambassador. The obvious Chinese
determination to establish a sizable presence in Largos
has received a warm welcome; Nigerian press coverage
of the Chinese has been fairly extensive and uniformly
favorable. Nigerian- Chinese friendship and commer-
cial societies have appeared throughout Nigeria,
partly at the expense of the membership of existing
pro- Soviet groups. In their initial statements the
Chinese expressed an interest in expanding trade, aid,
and cultural contacts, and they have consistently
avoided associating with potentially subversive groups
and individuals. In November 1972, the FMG signed
a trade pact as well as an econom :c and technical
cooperation agreement with Peking.
b. Domestic implications of foreign policy
The Nigerian public �to the extent that it is
politically conscious �is undoubtedly proud of
Gowon's growing stature as a statesman and of
Nigeria's increasingly progressive image in Africa. The
head of the FMG has received good press coverage
through his meetings with other heads of state both at
home and abroad, distracting Nigerians from their
more persistent domestic problems and therefore
relieving pressure on the military government.
Civilian and mih.ary leaders, however, frequently
grumble that Gowon deprives hims Af of sufficient
time to consider domestic problems. To defuse this
oppositiop, Gowon has sought to include top military
leaders, especiall; the state governors, in all his foreign
trips, ostensibly to give them experience and exposure,
but this tactic has not been completely successful. In
short, Gowon's preoccupation with foreign policy has
yielded very good results, but at some cost
domestically.
E. Threats to government stability (S)
1. Discontent and dissidence
Almost no active discontent is apparent among
social and political groups that have any organizatirn
or ability to challenge the government. Moreover,
such limited o Sideuce as exists among the politically
conscious elite is riot amenable to conversion into
subversive or mass violence. The old guard politicians,
the newly emerging leftist leaders in the state
governments, the unions, and the intellectual and
academic groups are all sympathetic to the F MG's
increasingly "progressive" foreign policies. These
groups are individually disenchanted with several
specific domestic policies, but they are neither
uniformly antigovernment nor in agreement among
themselves; hence they are politically disorganized
and largely quiescent. The secession issue which
threatened the government's stability and the
country's unity is now dead. Biafran leader Ojukwu is
in the Ivory Coast and for practical purposes out of the
picture entirely; more important, there is no
discernible separatist sentiment remaining in the east.
Tribalism persists in the form of occasional calls for
autonomy by the state minorities and as an irritant
within the army, but it appears to be strictly a latent
25
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1
25X1

from the Soviet Embassy of up to $140,000. Since the
FMG ban on political parties, SWAFP has pursued its
activities through the NTUC, the Nigerian- Soviet
Friendship and Cultural Society, and the Nigerian
Committee of the Afro -Asian Peoples Solidarity
Organization.
Both the Nigerian Youth Council and SWAFP were
formed '.)y J. Q. Otegbeye, Nigeria's leading
Communist until his resignation as secretary general of
SWAFP in August 1970. Otegbe} .'s resignation was
symptomatic of the declining fortw.�!s of the Nigerian
Communist movement, which has lost udberents since
political parties were outlawed in 1966. Estimates of
SWAFP's membership have ranged from 1,000 to
5,000 since the rnid- 1 .960's; the smaller figure is
probably accurate for 1972 strength.
The several leftist political, labor, cultural, and
friendship organizations are not in fact distinct
entities, as an overlapping leadership serves all. In
general, that leadership has not been impressive or
concerted; most of the top figures have been inclined
toward financial mismanagement and political
opportunism. None of the leftist groups has been able
to recruit widely, and the members have tended to he
as self centered, opportunistic, and nonideological as
the leaders. The numerous but ephemeral pro
Chinese, Cuban, and East European groups have been
no more successful than their pro Soviet counterparts
and similarly constitute no threat to the FMC.
The leaders of Nigeria's former non Communist
parties continue to be frustrated at their exclusion
from the political arena and from the spoils of office,
but there is no evidence that any of them has
subversive aims or capabilities.
The U.S.S.R. has remained determined to control
and strengthen the NTUC. The NTUC took over
publication of the weekly Communist newspaper
Advance in 1968, formally affiliated with the Soviet
dominated World Federation of Trade Unions in
1969, and received sizable cash support from the
Soviet Embassy as the front group for the banned
SWAFP. In early 1971, labor disturbances and the
documented collaboration of NTUC leaders with the
Soviets led Gowon to detain the union's top leaders. In
response to this blow, and reflecting the impotence of
the leaderless movement, Soviet funding for the
NTUC dropped to virtually nothing by mid -1971, and
the organization's activities were sharply curtailed.
Despite these setbacks, the NTUC: in early 1972
organized a highly professional 3 -day strike of one of
its minor labor union affiliates. Although economi-
cally inconsequential, this strike appeared to signal the
reemergence of NTUC activity and was considered
evidence that a new and possibly more aggressive
leadership was emerging.
Soviet actions in Nigeria make it apparent that
Moscow's strategy is to maintain the goodwill created
by the U.S.S.R.'s pro -FMG stand during the civil war,
to strengthen the NTUC, and to bolster the cultural
and friendship organizations through an expansion of
contacts with students and other young, progressive
groups. The Soviet Embassy provides financial and
organizational aid to newly formed Friendship Societe
branches, and it is attempting to create and back a
unified, socialist- minded, pro Soviet political
movement which could assert itself after a return to
civilian politics. This long -term plan has been dictated
by Gowon's security measures, which have foreclosed
I opportunities for active subversion. Even this subtle
strategy, appears unlikely to result in an
expansion of Soviet influence.
F. Maintenance of internal security (S)
1. Mice
The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) has provided an
element of continuity and stability in the national
27
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1
FIGURE 7. Major General David Ejoor, Army Chief
of Staff (U /OU)

political system since independence. The 32,000 -man
NPF (plans have been made to expand the force to
40,000) is legally a centralized institution, but in
practice the Forcr. Headquarters in Lagos must coexist
with 12 somewhat autonomous state commands. Thus
the NPF has provided an example of the way in which
authority and responsibil ?ty can be shared between the
central government and the 12 state governments in
Nigeria's federal system. Within most states the NPF
continues to reflect its colonial heritage through its
organizational levels: province, division, district, and
local station. On paper, if not always in fact, each of
the levels in the state organization consists of five
departments: administration, operations, supply and
works, criminal investigation, and domestic intelli-
gence.
The NPF, through its state commands, has fully
incorporated the former Local Government Police of
Western, State and has substantially completed its
integration of the former Native Authority Police of
the northern states. Some of the aged or uneducated
police in the north have been dismissed, and others
have been retrained and redeployed, despite the
opposition of most traditional rulers and a few state
governors. This FMG sponsored process has created a
better trained national force with fewer factional
tendencies and parochial loyalties.
Outside the main structure of the NPF there exists a
variety of autonomous organizations performing
specialized security functions. The Police Mobile
Force, for example, receives special training in riot
control and serves as n elite strike force under the
direct control of the police Inspector General (IG). The
army's Federal Guard was created by General Gowon
as a personal bodyguard of roughly 1,500 men
responsible only to him. It is probably the best and
most trustworthy security organization. During the
civil war a number of localities established Home
Guard units, composed of volunteers who get
something resembling military training and serve part
time as auxiliaries to the police and the army. Finally,
there are the supernumerary constables, who guard
government buildings, and the police forces of the
Railways Corporation and the Ports Authority. The
latter two groups are virtually independent police
forces protecting only their own property, but their
personnel are seconded from the NPF and are
ultimately controlled by the IG. With the exception of
the Police Mobile Force and the army's Federal
Guard, these groups do not have the prestige of the
basic NPF, nor is their morale as high.
The command structure of the NPF centers on the
IG, who receives his orders directly from the Head of
28
the FMG and controls the tactical disposition and the
operational use of the police. In consultation with the
military governors of the states, the IG appoints the 12
state commissioners of police. Each state commissioner
reports to the IG, but he is also subject to the authori ty
of his governor and is a member of the governor's
cabinet. The IG has the final authority to resolve
disputes arising from conflicting orders, and in
practice he exercises fairly close, direct control over his
subordinates in the states. In 1972 the IG was Kam
Selem, a Hausa speaking Shuwa from the North
Eastern State. In addition to being Inspector General,
Selc*m was a member of the F EC by virtue of his being
Commissioner for Internal Affairs, a member of the
SMC, and an intimate of Gowon at the Dodan
Barracks evening meetings. Although the practical
ability and personal inclination of the IG to control
the day -to -day functioning of the state and
subordinate commands are limited, he remains a
figure of paramount importance in national politics.
He enjoys strength in his own right and as an associate
of Gowon in all governing bodies.
The operational methods and responsibilities of the
NPF have changed substantially since 1966. Prior to
that time the police operated in the British tradition:
they were unarmed and confined themselves to the
maintenance of civil order. With the two military
coups in 1966 and the outbreak of the lengthy civil
war in 1967, however, the police took on additional
responsibilities. As a result they continue to possess
special emergency powers by FMG decree, carry
weapons for a wide variety of purposes, exercise
greater prerogatives in searching and questioning
suspects, and perform a number of quasi military
duties. Although the FMG has neither rescinded its
emergency decrees nor made any effort to curtail the
power of the police, the NPF is not omnipresent or
pervasive, apparently does not abuse its expanded
legal privileges, and continues to respect individual
liberties.
The NPF was substantially weakened by the large
scale loss of Ibo policemen to the east in the 1966 crisis
and by the added burdens forced on it by the civil war.
In spite of the subsequent rapid expansion with less
thorough training, however, the NPF remains well
trained, well organized, and well equipped by African
standards. The full range of police services is often not
available in the rural areas, but in the urban
jurisdictions the police are able to draw on the
technical and specialist resources characteristic of a
large, modern police force, including photographic,
fingerprinting, recording, and detective services
(Figure 8). Motor traffic divisions exist in all larger
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1
25X1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1
25X1

C
Chronology (U /OU)
1553
1 First English ships reach Bight of Benin.
17th century
t Nigeria becomes a center of west African slave trade.
1849
First British consul appointed for Bights of Biafra and Benin.
1861
Lagos is annexed as British colony.
1886
Royal Niger Company is granted royal charter.
1912
Frederick Lugard named governor of Nigeria.
1914
Lagos colony and interior protectcrates amalgamated as Colony
and Protectorate of Nigeria.
First Legislative Council established.
1923
First elected members join Legislative Council.
1947
Houses of Assembly created for each province.
1954
Federation of Nigeria created.
1958
Oil production begins.
1959
December
First direct elections for House of Representatives are contested
by the Northern P- ople's Congress (NPC), the National Conven-
tion of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG).
1960
October
Nigeria becomes independent under NPC -NCNC coalition
government.
1962
First National Development Plan adopted.
,.4-
1963
August
Mid Western Region formed :gut of eastern part of Western
Region.
1984
February
Government announces controversial results of 1963 census.
SECRET
SECRET
December
Parliamentary elections held; boycvrtted in Eastern Region.
1965
March
Government formed including representatives of all regions and
all major parties except AG.
October
Western Region parliamentary elections held, followed by
violence over election irregularities.
1966
January
Army coup led by Ibo; parliament is dissolved and Federal
Military Government is established; political parties are abol-
ished.
July
In military coup against Ibo leadership, minority tribesmen gain
power.
1967
January
Federal military leaders meet in Ghana in an effort to agree on
powers of federal and regional military leaders.
May
Federal government decrees 12 states will replace former four
regions; state of emergency declared.
Eastern Region secedes as Republic of Biafra.
July
Federal forces invade Biafra and civil war begins.
1968
July
France rnnounces support for Ibo "right to self determination."
1970
January
Civil war ends with Biafrau surrender.
October
General Gowon reveals "nine -point program and sets 1976 as
target date for return to civilian rule.
November
Second National Development Plan announced.
1971
July
Nigeria joins Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
October
General Gowon appoints reconstituted Federal Executive Coun-
ci I.
NO FOREIGN DISSEhI
31
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEAoI
SECRET
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA� RDP01- 00707R000200100004 -1