NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 26; SOVIET UNION; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090032-1
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Page
C. Structure and functioning of the government 25
1. Constitution 25
2. Central government 26
3. Lower governmental structure 29
4. Judicial system 30
5. Electoral procedures 31
D. National policies
31
I. Domestic
32
2. Foreign
35
a. General
35
b. Soviet policy toward the West and
Fig. 9
Japan..........................
36
C. The Soviets and the Communist
Growth of the Soviet Communist
world..........................
38
d. Soviet policy toward the less
7
developed world
40
e. International organizations
44
Page
E. Threats to government stability 44
1. Discontent and dissidence 44
2. Subversion 46
F. Maintenance of internal security 46
1. Police 46
2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
methods and capabilities 47
G. Selected bibliography 47
1. Political history� general works 47
2. Party and government 47
3. Foreign policy 49
4. Judicial system 50
5. Propaganda and security 50
Chronology 52
Glossary 57
FIGURES
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Page
Fig. 1
The interlocking directorate chart)
2
Fig. 2
Party echelons and the government
15
Fig. 9
(chart)
6
Fig. 3
Growth of the Soviet Communist
27
Fig. 10
Party chart)
7
Fig. 4
Growth of the central party organs
38
Fig. 12
(chart)
9
Fig. 5
Central party machine chart)
9
Fig. 6
Republic, regional, and local party
42
Fig. 14
structure chart)
10
Fig. 7
Evolution of the Party Politburo
58
(chart)
13
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Page
Fig. 8
Policy responsibiiities of Soviet
leaders (chart)
15
Fig. 9
Representation and structure of
Supreme Soviet chart)
27
Fig. 10
Council of Ministers chart)
28
Fig. 11
1972 Moscow Summit photo)
38
Fig. 12
Brezhnev and Kosygin with
Czechoslovak leaders photo)
41
Fig. 13
Crechko in Egypt photo)
42
Fig. 14
Administrative divisions
(map) follows
58
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Government and Politics
A. Introduction (U /OU)
The present Soviet state is the lineal descendant of
the Russian socialist regime established by V. I. Lenin
in 1917, and it still retains many points of similarity
with that governmental system. The police terror and
total repression of the Stalinist era, however, left their
mark, as did the revelations and reforms of the
Khrushchev years. Moreover, the trar.- of
the U.S.S.R. from an agricultural into an industrial
state, as well as the continuing impact of the
worldwide scientific technological revolution, has had
a profound effect upon the attitudes of the Soviet
leaders and the range of policy options they see open
to them. The visionary content has eroded from the
national policies of the Soviet state �a process which
may be said to have been begun by Lenin himself
and been replaced by the more pragmatic values and
goals of Great Power politics.
In theory, the U.S.S.R. is a federation of 15 equal
republics, with political power exercised by the freely
elected representatives of the laboring masses. In
practice, it is a tightly centralized single -party
dictatorship. The ruling Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) exercises a virtual monopoly of
political power. It directs the organs of government
through its control of nominations and appointments
to positions within the machinery of state. It
commands the instruments of state power �the armed
forces, the security police, and the civil police
through an intricate system of controls and checks.
Purportedly independent institutions �the soviets
(councils), the courts, trade unions, youth organiza-
tions, L nd the whole gamut of cultural and social
associations� respond to its command. Public
expression of opposition to the party's leadership and
policies is effectively prohibited by its total
domination of the news and communications media.
The Soviet state's federal structure is a fiction. Not
only the central party and state machinery, but the
organs of the local party and state organizations in
republican capitals and regional centers are
subordinate to the central party organs. Local officials
can be posted and removed at the behest of Moscow,
and quite independently of the desires of the local
state and party apparatus.
The result is a concentration of decisionmaking
power in the hands of a numerically tiny elite. The 16
full members of the Politburo of the party's Central
Committee stand at the apex of the Soviet state in
control of key posts of both party and government
(Figure 1). The authority of the party leaders over the
roughly quarter of a billion citizens of the Soviet
Union is unfettered by either legal limitations or
formal institutional checks and balances. It is subject
only to the limitations imposed by the necessity of
reaching and maintaining a consensus among
themselves and of satisfying the interests of the lesser
party oligarchs who command the regional and local
machinery of the parry.
Even though undefined and uncertain, these
informal bureaucratic limitations have become
increasingly significant in recent years. Since the
ouster of Khrushchev in 1961, the pattern of Soviet
politics has tended to gravitate in the direction of
bureaucratic systematization. This has been evident in
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the relative stability of the Politburo itself. Despite the
inevitable shifts in its internal balances, changes have
been minimal. 'The forced "retirement" of Petr Shelest
and Gennady Voronov in April 1973 were the first
such dismissals among full members of the Politburo
since 1966, when Anastas Mikoyan was permitted to
go into honorable retirement. The same trend has been
evident in the Central Committee, where the rate of
turnover has dropped sharply since the Khrushchev
ye; t rs.
Indeed, one of the foremost motives for the
overthrow of the late First Secretary was the general
resentment felt within party ranks for his overhearing
style of rule. Khrushchev had reacted to mounting
difficultics on the domestic scene and on the foreign
political front by relying increasingly on dictatorial
methods in his relationships with his pears in the party
leadership and in his treatment of lesser luminaries
within the party apparahas. In the end, his alienation
of the professional party bureau rats who sat in the
Central Committee and of his colleagues in the
Politburo proved politically fatal.
Khrushchev's successors have sought to avoid his
mistakes, and there hits been no return to the style of
rule which he favored. The collective leadership which
his successors proclaimed has in the main been
maintained in fact as well as in theory. Efforts have
been made to avoid any undue concentration of
authority in the hands of any single individual.
General Secretary Brezhnev, although increasingly
preeminent among his colleagues, has shown neither
the power nor the inclination to ride roughshod over
them as did Khrushchev in his time.
Both change and continuity are evident in the
policy goals which the present Soviet leaders have set
themselves. In their relations with the outside world,
the Soviet leaders see their country as having achieved
for the first time true political and military parity with
the United States. 'Their new confidence hits made
them both more willing and more able to deal through
negotiation with Washington and other capitals on
the basis of more traditional concepts of national
interest. Moscow's increasingly sophisticated ap-
proach to relations with the outside world is
undoubtedly influenced by its enduring quarrel with
China, which hits both faced it with it new and major
enemy and demonstrated the inadequacy of a shared
ideology as it basis for a lasting alliance. Despite the
innovations, however, the basic cornerstones of Soviet
foreign policy remain. These include the maximiza-
tion of Moscow's power and influence in relation to its
rivals, the maintenance of a buffer zone of dependent
Communist states in Eastern Europe, and the
shielding of the Soviet population from the influence
of Western individualist culture and thought.
At home, the Soviet leaders have made serious
attempts to come to grips with the nagging problems
of the economy. Agriculture has been allotted an
increased slice of the investment life, and some
attention has been turned to satisfying the long
neglected needs of the Soviet consumer. Neither effort
has enjoyed any sweeping success. Agriculture remains
the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy, and consumer
goods production continues to lag.
At the heart of the problem is the reluctance of the
Soviet rulers to depart from the shibboleths of Marxist
Leninist economics. They have shied away from evert
modest efforts to reform the organization of
agriculture, which is still based upon the model of
collectivization imposed by Stalin in the hate 1920's
and 1930's. t'he needs pf the consumer goods industry
have al%vays been subordinated to those of heavy
industry �with its direct correlation to military
power �and this relationship has not yet been
fundamentally altered, despite the growing tendency
of Brezhnev and some other leaders to heed the desires
of the Soviet consumer.
Neither have tle Soviet leaders shown any
inclination to adopt liberalizing reforms in the
political and social sphere or rase the restrictions on
freedom of expression. In fact, since 196 -1 there has
been a tendency toward it tightening of controls which
had been eased by Khrushchev. Trial, exile, and police
persecution have silenced many of the leading
members of it small dissident movement. However,
this retrograde tendency has stopped well short of it
return to the completely arbitrary and willful police
methods of the Stalin era, and it feeble voice of dissent
is heard from time to time.
The Soviet leaders fall hack on ideology to justify
the party's monopoly of political power. The urge to
"modernize" socialism which is evident in many of
the leadership's approaches to foreign and domestic
policy problems has no parallel in their attitudes
toward the fundamental relationships between the
party and the mass of the population. Mere the
Leninist formulas of proletarian dictatorship and the
identification of party policies with the "real" interests
of the working class survive virtually intact.
3
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In spite of inevitable grumbling and dissatisfaction
with material conditions among the masses, there is no
evidence of any broad -based opposition to the existing
regime. The vocal dissident movement which cam�
into the open in the mid- 1960's is still confined almost
entirely to the representatives of the cultural and
scientific elites and to some ethnic minorities, notably
the Jews. There is no sign that the views expressed by
these groups enjoy any broad popular support. In
short, the regime apparently can rely c-i the passive
support, born of fearand inertia, of the majority of the
population.
The willingness of the population to accept
uncomplainingly a harsh dictatorial rule has deep
historical roots. Foremost among these is the complete
absence of any native tradition of democracy, or even
of any limitation upon the power of the state. The
autocratic rule of the tsars survived virtually
unchanged into the 20th century. The experiment
with democratic forms which followed the February
Revolution of 1917 was both brief and ineffectual.
The Bolshevik coup of October brought it to an end,
and the remnants of democratic fre; dorns were
extirpated during the Civil War of 1918 -20. This was
followed by the turmoil of collectivization, the
Stalinist purges, World War II, and German
occupation. By the time Stalin died in 1953, the Soviet
people had suffered a cumulative ordeal unparalleled
in modern times, with scant opportunity for
developing even the most basic concepts of individual
rights.
Moreover, Russian willingness to tolerate both
tsarist and Communist despotism has been con-
ditioned by the traditional concept of strong,
cer.t- alized rule as it guarantee against both internal
anarchy and foreign danger. This view, engendered by
the Russian national experience, remains strong in the
U.S.S.R. today. In addition, most Soviet citizens share
the pride of their rulers in the Soviet Union's status as
one of the two most powerful nations on earth.
The patriotism, willingness to sacrifice, and pride of
achievement of the Russian people provide the
necessary basis of support for the present regime and
constitute significant elements of national strength. At
the same time, popular impulses for self- expression
and social justice which have surfaced from time to
time in the past and again seem incipient continue to
be feared by the Communist leaders as a potential
weakness in the fabric of the state.
4
B. Political dynamics
1. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) (U /OU)
a. The framework of power
The political forces that direedy affect the internal
balance of power have been dominated by the
Communist Partv virtually since the Bolsheviks seized
power in 1917. All other surviving parties were forcibly
suppressed in 1921 -22. Even during Stalin's reign of
terror in the 1930's and late 1940's, when the security
police played the dominant role, the party not only
survived but continued to exercise many of its political
functions. It provided the Stalin dictatorship with an
appearance of legitimacy and continuity with Lenin's
revolutionary state, as well as an instrument and
ideological pretext for national expansionism.
During the early post Stalin years of collective rule,
the party leadership focused on the threat represented
by the physical power and high degree of organization
of the security police and the armed forces, and took
steps to reassert party control over these elements. In
19,53, Minister of Internal Affairs L. P. Beriva was
executed as a "traitor" on charges of attempting to
seize power and to place the .police above party and
government; and in 1957, Minister of Defense G. K.
Zhukov was removed from his party and military
posts, apparently for trying to free the armed forces
from party interference. Since the removal of Beriva
and Zhukov from power, the security police and the
military have been effectively removed from direct
involvement in the formulation of policy and have
been placed under closer party supervision. Although
they and other institutions still have considerable
influence, none is capable of exercising independent
political power outside the party.
The Communist Party has thus been the key to the
maintenance of the Soviet system. Although the Soviet
constitution simply alludes to the "leading" role of the
party (Article 126), the party is in practice responsible
for the formulation of all state policies and has
ultimate control over their execution. Because of this,
politics in the Soviet Union is largely political
maneuvering among individuals high in the party's
hierarchy. Public opinion scarcely exists as a political
force and plays only a peripheral role at hest.
Organized political groupings either within or outside
the party are forbidden, and even informal
factionalism is sharply circumscribed in practice.
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While presuming to be a "voluntary association"
standing outside and above the formal institutions of
government, the Communist Party actually deter-
mines the organizational and personnel structure of
the government and controls and directs its activity.
This it does primarily through the assignment of party
personnel to all important governmental posts. This
relationship exists at all administrative levels and
extends to all other vital institutions. The interlocking
personnel appointments at the highest party and
government 'revels are shown in Figure 1; Figure 2
shows the organizational relationship between the
several echelons of the party and governni mt
structure.
The pervasive involvement of the Communist Party
in all Soviet institutions gives great power and
authority to its leaders, both collectively and
individually. Ultimately, the hard policy choices are
made by the men at the top of the party. The most
likely arena of meaningful political struggle is
therefore within the party rather than between the
party and special interest groups such as the military,
the managerial elite, or industrial laborers, although
these special interest groups may precipitate intraparty
political struggles.
Nevertheless, the fragmentation of power inherent
in the collegial nature of the post- Kh rushchev
leadership allows even greater room for po's:ical
maneuvering among the individual party leaders, who
tend to identify with and advocate the ve red interests
of institutions falling within their areas of competence.
Tlicv use their influence to win favorable policy and
budgetary decisions and to gain the appointment of
proteges to key positions, especially within the party
staff which has a powerful voice ir_ personnel policies.
Individual party leaders have been generally able to
resolve most differences among themselves without
engaging in a protracted and self destructive power
struggle, but they continue to strive for greater
influence in policymaking and improved personal
status and position.
h. Membership
The membership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union totals approximate!v 15 million. This is
slightly more than 9% of the Soviet population old
enough to join (18 and over). Figure 3, which shows
the growth of the party since 1918, also indicates the
close relationship that exists between the leadership's
domestic and foreign policies and the growth of the
party. Following the violent fluctuations in
membership caused by the zigzag political course of
the early postrevolutionary years and of the Stalin era,
the party's membership has followed a more consistent
and stable pattern of growth conforming to the more
settled pattern of Soviet politics.
Party membership, according to the rules adopted
in 1961, is open to all citizens of the U.S.S.R. age 18
and over who have demonstrated a devotion to the
Communist cause. Young persons under the age of 20
may enter the party only through the Komsomol
(Communist Youth League). Before gaining member-
ship, however, an applicant must negotiate a lengthy
and complex bureaucratic process. He must be
noininated by three party members of at least 3 years'
standing who have known him for at least a year. The
nomination must then be approved by the
membership of the primary party organization the
prospective member wishes to join, and endorsed by
the next link in the party chain of command, the
district or city committee. The applicant must serve a
probationary period of 1 year as a candidate member;
at that time the primary party organization and
district or city committee again have the option of
rejecting his application. After becoming a full
member of the party �with the right of electing and
being elected to party posts �the individual must
remain active in party affairs and gay regular dues in
order to retain his membership.
The party's ethnic composition approximates that
of the population as a whole, more than three- fourths
of the total membership being Russian and
Ukrainian respectively 61.2% and 15.9% in 1971.
Information on the social composition of the party is
misleading, because Soviet statistics do not register the
present social status of party members, but rather their
status at the time they joined the party. The members
of the "intelligentsia" (generally white- collar
workers), however, are believed to constitute a large,
albeit declining, majority. Especially since 1958, the
party has stressed the preferential admission of
industrial workers and farm workers engaged directly
in production. These two groups together constituted
more than 65% of the new party candidates admitted
during 1966 -70. As the ratio of the urban to the rural
population increased in those years, so did the
proportion of industrial workers in the party, and in
1973 this group accounted for 57.3% of all new party
candidates.
On the average, CPSU members of the present
generation are slightly older and better educated but
have had a briefer tenure in the party than those of
J
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FIGURE 2. Party echelons and the Soviet Government, 1973 (U/OU)

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prev:- us decades. The proportion of party members
with a secondary or higher education had risen from
nearly 34% in 1952 to more than -1 2'/(' in 1961, and to
over 56% in 1971. In January 1967, 19.556 of the
members were over -10 years of age, while in 1946 64%
were under the age. of 36 clue largely to the mass
recruitment of party members (luring World War II.
The ratio of members with more than 10 years'
tenure, rising from 34% of the total membership in
October 19-32 to 60% in October 1961, dropped to
-11.7% by January 1967 as a result of it vigorous
recruitment campaign pressed during 1938 -65. Since
then the stress has once again been placed on more
selective recruitment procedures, and the proportion
of veteran party members of more than 10 years'
standing has once again risen to 56.2 A sizable and
rapidly increasing proportion of party members have
had no connection with the party during the Stalin era
and hence have little sense of personal involvement in
the excesses of that period. It should he noted,
however, that the members of the present inner circle
of the Politburo belong to the oldest generation of
party members, i.e., those whose entry into the party
dates back to the 1920's and 1930's and to the height
a
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FIGURE 3. Growth of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1918 -72 (U /OU)

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of the Stalinist terror. The youngest members of the
Politburo are of the World War I1 generation of party
members.
Although there are able people in the party,
particularly at th.; top of the hierarchy, it does not
attract a membership uniform in caliber. Partv
membership is a key element to personal advancement
in Soviet society, and this circumstance guarantees
that the party is faced with the continual problem of
ridding itself of inactive, opportunistic, or corrupt
members. Party discipline is generally strict, both in
the interest of enforcing standards upon the members
and to impose political uniformity and prevent
factionalism. It is normal for several tens of thousands
of party members to be expelled annually for misdeeds
or slackness. An exchange of party membership cards,
the first since 1954, began in 1973 and is scheduled to
continue through 1974. The process involves a
thorough scrutiny of party membership rolls, but it is
not expected to develop to the proportions of a
wholesale purge.
Although they are identified with regime policies
and generally regarded as members of a privileged
class, party members have not incurred widespread
dislike as individuals simply on the ground of their
membership in the CPSU. Most Soviet people
recognize that party status is a useful and, at higher
levels, a necessary means of advancement. Mem-
bership at the lower levels does not necessarily imply
total support of the regime or of its ideology, and some
young persons may even join the party in the hope of
effecting reforms from within.
Closely tied to the party are the Communist youth
organizations: the All -Union Leninist Communist
Union of Youth, generally referred to as the Komsomol
or Communist Youth League (ages 14 -28), and the
Pioneers (ages 10 -15). Their combined membership in
May 1970 was over 44 million, about 27 million of
whom were in the Komsomol. The Oc,obrists, LSildren
ages 7 through 9, are not formally organized, but their
planned activity is a preparatory stage for entry into
the Pioneers. Communist youth, like members of the
party, are subject to intense ideologcal indoctrination.
On the whole, however, their role is an auxiliary one
and their discipline riot so strict.
c. Organization
The basic unit of the party is the primary
organization (Figure 2), which is formed in factories,
governmental agencies and institutions, farms, and
8
units of the armed forces. Although the party statutes
provide for the election of party officials, all officials
require the approval of, and are often designated by,
higher party authority. Each organization is
answerable to the next higher unit in the hierarchy of
party organizations. Party leaders make some attempts
to encourage the initiative of rank -and -file members
and the use of "criticism and self criticism," but the
most important function of party activity is the
faithful execution of orders from above. Thus, in
practice the party's guiding princ;g�c of "democratic
centralism" essentially means that power flows
downward from the top leadership and not upward
from the membership.
The All -Union Party Congress is nominally at the
top of the party structure. It is convoked by a Central
Commit' e plenum and the decision published in a
decree. The plenum also establishes the "norms of
representation," which specify the ratio between party
members and delegates to be selected to the Congress.
At the 24th Congress, in 1971, for example, the ratio
was one delegate for each 2,90 members, and a total
of 4,740 voting delegates were selected. The delegates
to the All -Union Party Congress are formally elected
at republic party congresses which precede the All-
Union Congress. The delegates to the republic party
congresses, in turn, are elected at the lower level
provincial (oblast or kray) conferences by other
delegates selected at lower echelons of the party's
chain of command. The entire process of elections is
thus hierarchical and purports to spring from the grass
roots; in practice, it is entirely controlled by central
party organs.
The All -Union Party Congress merely ratifies
policies fixed by the Central Committee's Politburo
(during 1952 -66 called the Presidium). During Stalin's
regime the congress was convened at irregular and
increasingly lengthy intervals. After Stalin's death in
1953 the party leaders generally came closer to
meeting the statutory requirement of holding a
congress at least every 4 years. The 24th Congress in
1971 adopted a rule change to lengthen the interval
between congresses from 4 to 5 years, formalizing the
precedent which had developed.
The Central Committee and the Central Auditing
Commission are next in the theoretical hierarchy.
Those elected as voting members of the Central
Committee include all members of the Politburo and
Secretariat, the leaders of the largest regional party
organizations, the top ranking officials of the
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executive and legislative branches of the government,
and a scattering of leaders from other important mass
organizations. It also includes a few representationally
decorative members, Bach as old party veterans, and
rank and -file workers and peasants. Figure 4 indicates
the growth over the years in the size of the Central
Committee.
In principle, the Central Committee is responsible
for administering the affairs of the party between
party congresses. In practice, these functions are
carried out by officials of the central party
bureaucracy �the Central Committee depa.tments
(oldely) �which are in turn supervised by the
members of the Secretariat and ultimately are
responsive to the Politburo, the party's most powerful
body (Figure 5). The Central Committee was reduced
to meaninglessness during the latter part of the Stalin
era, when it was convened only three times in 10 years.
Khrushchev called the Central Committee together far
more frequently; from 19.% to 1964 the Central
NOTE: Includes members and andidate members of the
Central Committee and members of the Central
Auditing Commission, oil or whom participate in
Central Committee plenums.
FIGURE 4. Growth of the central party organs (U /OU)
Committee averaged three sessions a year, each session
averaging a little over 3 days in length. However,
Khrushchev used the device of "expanded" sessions to
which hundreds of nonmembers were invited, in order
to ensure that it would function as a docile
propaganda sounding board.
General Secretary Brezhnev has given the
committee new prestige by restricting participation in
the sessions to its members, although its sessions have
been shorter and slightly less frequent than under
Khrushchev. According to the party statutes, the
Central Committee is supposed to meet at least twice a
year to discuss and act on the most important issues
facing the party and the state. During the 8 -year
period between Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964
and the end of 1972, 26 such plenary meetings were
held. They took up such questions as changes in the
composition of the party leadership. foreign policy,
9
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FIGURE 5. Central party machine (!S /OU)
477
TOTAL
439
Central
Auditing
395
Commission
318
ISS
Candidate
Members
273
165
;ISS.
122
a
3 '0
Z
Members
e v
V
V
Q
1952 1956
1959
1961
1966 1971
19th 20th
21st
22d
23d 24th
�CONGRESS
Central
Committee
NOTE: Includes members and andidate members of the
Central Committee and members of the Central
Auditing Commission, oil or whom participate in
Central Committee plenums.
FIGURE 4. Growth of the central party organs (U /OU)
Committee averaged three sessions a year, each session
averaging a little over 3 days in length. However,
Khrushchev used the device of "expanded" sessions to
which hundreds of nonmembers were invited, in order
to ensure that it would function as a docile
propaganda sounding board.
General Secretary Brezhnev has given the
committee new prestige by restricting participation in
the sessions to its members, although its sessions have
been shorter and slightly less frequent than under
Khrushchev. According to the party statutes, the
Central Committee is supposed to meet at least twice a
year to discuss and act on the most important issues
facing the party and the state. During the 8 -year
period between Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964
and the end of 1972, 26 such plenary meetings were
held. They took up such questions as changes in the
composition of the party leadership. foreign policy,
9
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FIGURE 5. Central party machine (!S /OU)

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economic plans, agricultural programs, and industrial
reorganizations. Many of the plenums involved little
more than formal approval by the Central Committee
of policies already established by the Politburo. At
least some of the sessions, however, have led to real
debate on the questions under discussion. The October
1964 plenum, of course, produced the decision to oust
Khrushchev. The June 1967 plenum, after the Arab
I� aeli war, brought a challenge, albeit a futile one, to
Brezhnev's leadership. Even though the Central
Committee's authority over day -to -day affairs is
insignificant, it does serve as a potential court of last
resort in case of a power struggle within the leadership.
The chief policymaking unit of the party is the
Politburo of the Central Committee. It is made up of
16 full members and seven candidate (nonvoting)
members. The party's chief executive body is the 10-
member Secretariat. Its main functions are the
selection of personnel for all significant party and state
posts and supervision over the implementation of
party decisions. The Party Control Committee is the
least important of the Central Committee's auxiliary
bodies. It is charged with the enforcement of party
discipline and morality, and is responsible for bringing
violators to account.
Party controls over central executive agencies of the
state are exercised through departments (otdely) of the
Central Committee, which actually functions as the
staff (apparal) of the Secretariat. Each secretarv,
including Ceneral Secretary Brezhnev and the others
having Politburo status, oversees the work of one or
more departments. Within the bounds set by top
leaders, these departments work out !hc details of
public policy.
In general terms, the professional party staff
performs the following functions:
Disseminates, explains, and interprets party and state
policy decisions.
Implements party policies.
Checks on and insures the implementation of state
policy by governmental and other organs.
Mobilizes economic and social pressures for the imple-
mentation of party and state Policy.
Allocates the manpower and resources of the party.
Collects and evaluates information and prepares reports,
memorandums, and staff studies for the Secretariat
and Politburo.
Calls the attention of the Secretariat and Politburo to
problems and prepares, suggests, and recommends
plans for their solution.
Similar staffs with comparable functions are
organized under the secretariats of the republic party
central committees in all but the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic (Figure 6). The
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FIGURE 6. Republic, regional, and lower party structure
(U /OU)

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R.S.F.S.R. traditionally has been within the purview
of the all -union party staff in Moscow. Prior to 1966, a
Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R. existed under the Central
Committee to perform these staff functions through
departments similar to those on the national level;
with the bureau's abolition by the 23rd Party Congress
in April 1966, the R.S.F.S.R. staff wasassimilated into
the central party departments.
Below the republic level, party control is exercised
by provincial and district (rayon) party committees
Mid their bureaus and secretaries. They are assisted by
departments similar to those assisting the republic
party central committees, though of lesser scope.
Except for a brief period between late 1962 and late
1964, when Khrushchev divided local party
organizations along functional lines into two separate
industrial (urban) and agricultural (rural) segments
(the so- called production principle), the party
structure has been organized geographically, i.e., each
party organization has been responsible for almost
everything that happens in its territory.
d. The process of control and persuasion
A key element in the hierarchical system of party
control over national life is the primary party
organization, which is vested with supervisory powers
over the public institution, ministry, factory, farm, or
other hod where it is located. These "watchdog"
organizations, moreover, are responsible to higher
party committees, not to the administrative chain of
command of these institutiCTIs. Warning or
assessments of activities in all spheres of public life are
forwarded to the appropriate level of the party
hierarchy. At each level the party committees arc
assisted by it supervisory apparatus consisting of
commissions and departments, which have the
responsibility of checking all activities within
individual sectors of public life, such as industry,
agriculture, and the like.
The concept :,f park- control from within thus
implies nivintaining in awareness of all activities at
the grassroots of national life and intervening as
necessary to keep the system functioning as effectively
as possible. Past Soviet statements on the meaning and
limits of party control have lacked precise definition,
particularly in the economic sphere. As a result, local
party leaders have sometimes been chastised for
interfering too much in management and, at other
times, criticized for failing to exercise enough
leadership.
During the period of Khrushchev's rule, party
leaders were increasingly pressed to undertake
economic training and to exercise greater authority in
directing the economy. In the early years of the post
Khrushchev collective leadership, the distinction
between party and government respons;bilities was
drawn more sharply, and the party deemphasized its
program of economic training for party functionaries,
while giving priority to their political indoctrination.
Party organizations were instructed to "assist with
advice and by example," not to displace public
institutions and organizations or usurp their functions.
More recently, the pendulum has tended to swing
back in the direction (J gii ing party organizations a
greater supervisory soli:, especially those within
planning and research organizations. Changes in the
CPSU statute adopted at the 24th Congress provided
for party control of the work of planning and research
institutes, and permitted party organizations to check
for compliance of central and local state institutions
with party wld government directives. The theoretical
separation between party and state functions
apparently continues to be honored more in the
breach than in the observance.
Supplementing the party's hierarchy of direct
controls is an almost equally elaborate system of
propaganda to guide and channel popular opinion.
The energy and capital expended by the regime on
propaganda are quite out of proportion to the normal
efforts of any government to obtain support for its
policies. The Soviet leaders use propaganda to
generate support for their policies, to convince the
masses of the legitimacy of their monopoly of power
(as the alleged representatives of the laboring masses),
and to do battle with undesirable or "alien" ways of
thought.
The party has arrogated to itself the role of teAcher,
guide, and leader of all aspects of Soviet society. its
primary control center for propaganda is the
Propaganda Department of the Party's Central
Committee. The Propaganda Department has
counterparts in the lower party committees.
Every major field of public activity has an
information agency, organized in a hierarchical
structure, to mobilize public opinion in support of a
particular set of regime policies. Each level of these
hierarchies has its equivalent -level party committee to
provide detailed guidance in the party line. Among
the principal information agencies are the indoctrina-
tion and propaganda systems of the party itself, the
youth organizations, the trade unions, the governmen-
tal ministries, and the armed forces. Every factory,
farm, military unit, and even penal institution has at
least one person charged with propaganda. Obligatory
lectures, which formerly wee, conducted at places of
.work before a captive audience, are now, with the
introduction of the shorter 5-day workweek, being
11
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organized by propagandists at places of residence
during leisure hours. Schools, the press, radio and
television, motion pictures, literature, art, and to a
certain extent science, have the responsibility of
carrying the official line to the people.
The effectiveness of official propaganda in
generating support for the leaders and their policies
cannot, of course, he v. ged statistically. Most Soviet
citizens do not believ:; everything they read in their
newspapers; in fact, many are skeptical about most
public information, domestic as well as foreign. In
public, however, they usually consider it safer to
repeat authorized points of view. Although regime
propaganda clearly falls far short of its avowed
purpose, it does have a numbing effect that aids in
maintaining stability and control. Its impact,
however, is being somewhat affected by growing
contacts with the non Communist world.
2. The top leadership
a. Politburo (S)
The dominant political figures in the U c ;.R. are
the members of the policymaking Politburo of the
CPSU Central Committee. Since the April 1973
plenum: there have been 16 full members and seven
candidate members of the Politburo. Candidate
members have a right to attend Politburo meetings
and to participate in debate, but have no vote.
In the past, Politburo members have served as both
top party administrators and simultaneously as
government administrators. This practice permitted
dominant figures such as Khrushchev to concentrate
immense power in their hands to the detriment of the
positions of their colleagues in the leadership. The
men who make up the prevent leadership thus far
appear to have learned the lessons of the past. Since
December 1965 no single individual has been
permitted simultaneously to hold executive (as
opposed to policymaking) positions in both the party
and state apparatus.
Eight members of the present Politburo hold party
executive positions, seven are state officials, and one
heads the central trade union organization. The party
executives include four members of the Secretariat, the
Chairman of the Party Control Committee, the
republic party ehiefs of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan,
and the head of the Moscow city party organization.
The state officials consist of the Chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (the titular head of
state), the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
(Premier), a First Deputy Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, the Ministers of Agriculture, Defense, and
Foreign Affairs; and the Chairman of the Committee
12
for State Security (KGB). Three members of the party
Secretariat, the party chiefs of the Leningrad city and
of the Belorussian and Uzbekistan republic party
organizations, and the 0jairvian of the Council of
Ministers of the R.S.F.S.R. make up the list of the
seven candidate members of the Politburo. The armed
forces are now represented on the Politburo for the first
time since Marshal Zhukov was ousted by Khrushchev
i n 1957.
Figure 7 shows the changes in the composition of
the Politburo over the years, and at the same time
illustrates the remarkably high degree of continuity in
its membership. Six of its members have held full
Politburo rank for more than 10 years, and two
(Premier Kosygin and party secretary M. A. Suslov)
havo, with brief interruptions, been members for more
than two decades. The degree of continuity is even
higher within the inner power structure of the
Politburo. Its senior members were already powerful in
the last years of Khrushchev's rule, and there are
tenuous '*�..as of continuity from Stalin's time to the
present. The composition and size of the group
underwent several marked changes during Khru-
shchev's rise to full power. The present regime, until
1971, maintained a small majority in the Politburo of
full -time party functionaries established by Khru-
shchev in the late 1950's. In 1971, four new members
increased the party representation (10 -5). The
personnel changes made at the April 1973 Central
Committee plenum, however, put the state hierarchy
on a basis of virtual parity with party officials. In the
past, tension at the top level between party and state
representatives has led to bitter quarrels. At present,
however, this tension appears to be relatively minor.
The Politburo is believed to meet at least once a
week to consider questions of national policy. All
Politburo members and candidate members have the
right to participate in formal sessions, but only full
members can vote. Not all members of the Politburo
participate in every session, however. Politburo
members who are republic party chiefs, for example,
may remain in their local capitals. In such cases,
however, they can register their opinion on questions
on the agenda of the meeting by telephone. Since the
ouster of Khrushchev, most Politburo decisions have
been reached by a process of consensus. National
security issues are said to be an exception to this
procedure, and decisions in this sphere reportedly
require a formal assenting vote by all members of the
Politburo. This category presumably includes most
significant issues of defense and foreign policy.
In addition to the Politburo members themselves,
members of the Secretariat and the Deputy Chairmen
of the Council of Ministers reputedly have the right to
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OC19! I M19 3 H I FEBRUARY I 1957 I 0 1961ER I NOYIER64 ER I 1966 I 1970 I DE1972ER I 973
Chesnokov
Keznetsov
MISCELLANEOUS
Mikhaylov
Yudin Shvermk Grishin Grishin Grishin Sheleei I Sheleoin e5h leoln
21
IS 17
NUMBER OF 12 11 13 13 14
POLITBURO 10 9 10
MEMBERS I r B 6 =AIL 8 7 9 9
J
Stalln �Full Member, Politburo, S Communist Party NOTE: Underlined names are included in the present Politburo.
Full-time Party Functionaries
Brerhne.� Candidate Member, Politburo, Soviet Communist Party Full-time Government Functionaries
FIGURE 7. Evolution of the party Politburo, 1952 -73 (U /OU)
13
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recommend items for inclusion on the agenda of a
Politburo meeting. The members of the Politburo, of
course, have the chief responsibility for initiating
policy recommendations in areas within their
competence as party or government officials. There is
considerable overlapping of functions among
individual leaders, and this undoubtedly complicates
the process of policy coordination and formulation.
Primary responsibility in any one sphere, however,
seems to lie with one specified leader. Thus,
responsibility in defense matters appears to rest
principally with General Secretary Brezhnev. He is ex
officio Chairman of the Defense Council, a civilian
military group which includes some other Politburo
members and makes recommendations on defense
policy in its broadest aspects for final decision by the
Politburo. Premier Aleksey N. Kosygin appears to
exercise similar responsibility for questions of
ece administration and finance. Figure 8
indicates the general policy responsibilities of
members of the Politburo and Secretariat.
The Polith-tro has no specifically designated
"chairman," and in theory its members carry equal
weight in the decisionmaking process. As General
Secretary, however, Brezhnev acts as de facto
chairman, convening and chairing Politburo sessions.
'11- General Secretary also plays a key role in
determining which questions shall be c;: �cred on the
agenda of a meeting. In this politically sensitive area,
however, he reportedly makes his decisions o: ply after
consulting with two other secretaries of Politbut rank,
Andrey P. Kirilenko and Mikhail A. Suslov. The
central responsibilities of 'the General Secretary's post
make Brezhnev the acknowledged leader of the rt_ ing
group.
After Brezhnev, Suslov and Kirilenko are the two
most powerful party functionaries in the Politburo.
They enjoy considerable personal authority within
their spheres� Suslov for ideology and the interna-
tional Communist movement and Kirilenko for party
organization and industrial management. Kirilenko
functions as Brczhnev's unofficial "deputy," standing
in for the General Secretary when he is unavailable or
has a conflicting schedule. Suslov has also acted for
Br, :zhnev on occasion.
Along with these three senior party secretaries, the
two senior state officials, Premier Kosygin and
"President" Nikolay V. Podgorny, make up the inner
circle of the Politburo. Kosygin, in addition to his
responsibilities for the economy, has wide respon-
sibilities in the sphere of defense and Foreign policy. In
the latter regard, he has played a leading role in the
execution of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East and
14
South Asia. Podgorny, as the titular head of state, is
also active in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy and
has a voice in defense matters.
The other party functionaries represented on the
Politbu,; exercise narrower responsibilities and
apparently wield much less actual power. Vladimir V.
Shcherbitsky, Dinmwchamed A. Kunayev, and Viktor
V. Grishin head important regional party organiza-
tions. Party Secretary Fedor D. Kulakov has special
responsibilities for agriculture. The latter four are
relatively junior members, having won their positions
only at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. The aged
Arvid Ya. Pelshe, who heads the Party Control
Committee �a body responsible for overseeing the
discipline of party members�is the only veteran of the
October Revolution among the present top leaders.
Those members of the Politburo with primarily
governmental functions �in addition to Kosygin and
Podgorny �are Kirill T. Mazurov, Dmitry S.
Polyansky, Andrey A. Gromyko, Andrey A. Grechko,
and Yury V. Andropov. Mazurov is the First Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and stands in
for Kosygin in his absence in much the same way that
Suslov and Kirilenko occasionally act for Brezhnev. In
addition, Mazurov has a general responsibility for
industrial administration.
Gromyko, Grechko, and Andropov are the most
junior members of the Politburo having won their
seats only at a Central Committee plenum in April
1973. Their appointment breaks the pattern
established in recent years, when the institutions they
represent �the foreign affairs, military, and security
police establishments �were not represented on the
Politburo. If these institutions can maintain their
foothold in the Politburo, their direct influence on the
policymaking process may increase.
Polvansky and Shelepin have several characteristics
in common. They are youthful, able, and ambitious
men whose careers appear to be in decline. Until
February 1973, Polvansky was a First Deputy Premier
and a rival of Mazurov as successor to Kosygin. His
loss of that post and appointment as Minister of
Agriculture marked a definite setback in his career.
Shelepin was an early rival of Brezhnev, but was
outmaneuvered by the General Secretary in 1965 -67,
losing important positions in the party and
government and being relegated to the position of
trade union chief. Both seem now to be in vulnerable
positions. Two other leaders who had suffered similar
reversals in the past, Petr Ye. Shelest and Gennady I.
Voronov, were forced into retirement at the April 1973
plenum.
Further changes seem likely in the composition of
the Politburo. At 16, its membership is comparatively
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N

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large and is likely to be reduced. The present even
number of members also means that it lacks a tie
breaking vote, a further impetus for change. In
addition, the advanced age of some of the veteran
memix rs of the Politburo� Suslov, Podgornv, and
Pelshe are in their sevei. ties and Kosygin and Grechko
will cross that line in 1974 �make changes in the near
future inevitable.
All these factors suggest that the Politburo is in for a
period of greater instability than it has experienced in
recent years. The departure of old members and the
addition of new ones will mean �as it has in the
past �a struggle for influence and advantage within
the ranks of the party high command. In any such
political struggle the General Secretary will play a key
role.
b. The General Secretary (C)
The fact that those members of the leadership who
have been adversely affected by the political shifts of
the last decade either have retained their seats on the
Politburo or have been allowed to go into retirement is
it measure of the moderation of the Soviet political
style and the strengthening of limitations on the
powers of the General Secretary which have taken
place since the death of Stalin in March 1953.
Stalin ruled as an absolute dictator, and his voice in
poNcy matters was law. His power had been achieved
and was maintained primarily through the secret
police, which he used as an instrument of terror and
intimidation. For years he either directed or connived
at the physical liquidation of his more troublesome or
ambitious subordinates. The party was subjected to
frequent and massive purges as it means of assuring his
complete dominance. The much vaunted supremacy
of the party was a fiction; in fact it was subordinated
to the secret police and a coicri,- of Stalin's closest
henchmen.
Stalin's survivors made haste to lessen the menace of
the secret police. The members of the Politburo
combined to bring down Lavrenty P. Beriva, Stalin's
police -.hief, in 1953. Beriva's execution marked the
beginning of a decline in the political weight of the
security forces, and in the omnipotence of the General
Secretary.
Nikita S. Khrushchev won the scramble that ensued
after Stalin's death to succeed to the leadership of the
party; he became First Secretary in September 19.33.
Khrushchev denounced Stalin's one -man leadership as
the "cult of the personality," and represented himself
as a champion of collective leadership., Fie soon
showed that he had more enthusiasm for collectivity as
it tactical ploy than as a guiding principle of
leadership.
16
Over the course of the next few Years, Khrushchev
succeeded in ridding himself of his most powerful
rivals. In June 19.37, he survived an attempt by it
majority of the Politburo to overturn him, and forced
the ouster of the so- called antiparty group led by
Georgy M. Malenkov, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, and
Lazar M. Kaganovich. In March 19.38, Khrushchev
took over the premiership from Nikolay A. Bulganin.
He then proceeded to consolidate his triumph by
appointing proteges who had worked under him in the
Ukrainian party organization. Three of them were
Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and Podgornv.
Khrushchev increasingly dominated the meetings of
the Politburo. He often made policy decisions
independently or in conjunction with consultants of
his own choosing. Khrushchev's highhandedness, his
predilection for high -risk policy gambles, and it series
of embarrassing political failures served to unite the
other members of the Politburo against him.
In October 1964, Khrushchev was confronted ,vith a
demand from his colleagues that he resign. He
attempted to defend himself before the Central
Committee but that body, which had supported him
in 1957, this time rejected him. Following his ouster,
an agreement was reached that divided his dual
position between Brezhnev as party boss and Kosygin
as government chief (Premier). The decision was
intended to further genuine collectivity within the
party leadership and to prevent the reemergence of a
dominant leader in tho mold of Stalin )r Khrushchev.
Brczhnev soon moved to consolidate his position as
party boss, but avoided rousing I he sort of fears among
party officials that had proved politically fatal to his
Predecessor. By October 1965, less than a year after
Khrushchev's ouster, Brczhnev �ad all his mentor's
positions except that of Premier. He had become
chairman of the �now defunct �party Bureau for the
R.S.1'.S.R., head of the Defense Council, a member of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the
chairman of the commission to :haft a new
constitution for the U.S.S.R.
Brezhnev's preeminent position was enhanced by
actions taken at the 23rd Party Congress in March
April 1966 and at the 24th Congress in March -April
1971. At the 23rd Congress he ac(pdred the title of
General Secretary, previously held only by Stalin, in
place of Khrushchev's title of First Secretarv. In
addition, a political ally, Kirilenko, was added to the
Secretariat, and Brezhnev succeeded better than the
other oligarchs in placing his own supporters in the
Central Committee. Brezhnev maintained the
strength of his claque in the Central Committee at the
24th Congress, and at least two of the four new
additions to the Politburo� Shcherbitsky and
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Kunayev �must be reckoned as al!ies of the General
Secretarv.
The results of a Central Committee plenum in April
1973 represented another net accretion of Brezhnev's
power. Two leaders with whom he apparently had
crossed swords in the past� Voronov and Shelest
were dropped from the Politburo, and two of the three
new members added (Gromyko and Grechko) have
been closely associated with the General Secretary and
his policies. The changes mean that, at least for the
near term, the General Secretary's basis of support
within the Politburo should be greater than before.
The enhancement of Brezhnev's political position
has been paralleled by an expansion-of his sphere of
activity into areas which theoretically should be the
preserve of his fellow hierarchs. In November 1969 his
appearance at the national collective fv.rm (kolkhoz)
congress took the limelight away from Polyansky, who
gave the official address as the rapporteu and he has
since continued to dominate the public conduct of
agricultural policy. He has been even more assertive in
the field of foreign policy, where he has displaced
Kosygin and Podgorny in the conduct of summit
diplomacy with Western leaders. He holds no state
positions which would legally justify his series of
meetings since 1969 with President Pompidou of
France, Chancellor Brandt of West Germany, and
President Nixon. As incongruous as these meetings
were in a legal sense, they reflect quite accurately the
realities of the political balance sheet in Moscow.
Brezhnev, despite his low -key style, is quite clearly the
"first among equals" in the Politburo.
Brezhnev has demonstrated considerable skill in his
ability to outmaneuver the opposition en route to his
present eminence. The adroitness with which Shelest
and Voronov were first divested of their power bases,
and then deposed from their Politburo seats
demonstrated his political skills.
Shelest had been on the Politburo since 1964. His
power base was in the Ukraine, where he had headed
the republic party organization since 1963. Although
originally an ally of the General Secretary, he
apparently broke with Brezhnev because of his
opposition to detente with the West, his tolerance of
manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism, and
differences over investment policy. He was ousted
from his position as chief of the Ukrainian party in
May 1972, but was reassigned as a deputy premier in
Moscow and retained on the Politburo. Shelest
remained in that position until April 1973, even
though it involved no clearly defined duties. The April
plenum finally sent him into political retirement.
Similarly, Voronov was gradually maneuvered
gong the same path to political extinction. Voronov
ran afoul of the Brezhnev majority in the Politburo
because of controversial reforms of agricultural
administration which he championed as an alternative
to increased agricultural investment. In July 1971
Voronov was edged out of his power base as Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the Russian republic,
and named to the ineffectual post of Chairman of the
People's Control Committee. Like Shelest, lie held
onto his seat in the Politburo until April 1973, even
though he had been stripped of most of his authority
and responsibilities 2 years earlier.
An earlier and more dangerous rival, Aleksandr
Shelepin, was dealt with in much the same manner.
Shelepin became a powerful figure with a strong base
in both the party and state apparatus in the
immediate aftermath of Khrushchev's ouster. He
made himself the leader of a Young Turk faction in
the party in challenge to Brezhnev's leadership.
Shelepin's ability and ambition frightened the other
members of the collective, and Brezhnev was able to
muster a majority to gradually strip his rival of power.
One by one Shelepin lost his significant posts, that of a
Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Party -State
Control Committee in December 1965, and that of
party secretary in 1967. His present post as trade union
chief is politically powerless, even though he has
retained his seat on the Politburo.
The fate suffered by these three losers in the
Kremlin's political wars also illustrates some of the
verities of current Soviet politics. Brezhnev was able to
cut them off from their sources of political power and
deprive them of influence, but he has proceeded
further only lv l great caution. The principal reason
for the curious political half -life still enjoyed by
Shelepin and until recently by Shelest and Voronov is
the app.vent delicate balance of power which exists
within the Politburo. Changes threaten to upset the
balance and weaken the position of each of the other
members �an alternative which they have been
reluctant to permit. Brezhnev, for his part, has been
slow to risk the kind of backlash which could be
produced among the other Politburo members by an
overly ruthless effort to rid himself of his opponents.
He is fully cognizant of the errors which led to his
predecessor's downfall.
Politics within the Politburo thus tend to proceed
along the lines produced by shifting factional
alignments rather than on the basis of a rigid division
on issues of principle, "liberals" versus "conserva-
tives." On any particular issue, of course, there may be
adherents of a more liberal or more conservative
position. These positions, however. are not constants,
but reflect the exigencies of politics and personal,
political, and buremeratic rivalries and alliances.
17
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c. Members of the collective (U /OU)
General Secretary Brezhnev is an ethnic Russian but
retains an identification with the Ukraine where he
made his early career as it land reclamation expert,
metallurgical engineer, and party official. Brezhnev
joined the top party hierarchy at the 19th Congress in
1952, but lost his Politburo candidate membership
and Secretariat post in the reshuffle which followed
Stalin's death in March 1953. Under Khrushchev, he
briefly headed the Navy party apparatus, then was
tapped to supervise the Virgin Lands project in
Kazakhstan. He rejoined the Politburo as a candidate
member at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, and
became it full member when the Malenkov-Molotov-
Kaganovich "antiparty" group was ousted in 1957.
He was sidetracked to the largely honorific post of
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in
1960, but bounced back to replace Khrushchev in
1964. He is a consensus -style politician. In the reaction
to the iconoclastic Khrushchev, he displaved it
tendency toward political orthodoxy and rigidity.
Since 1970, however, he has swung around to back
cons umer -ori rated policies at home and foreign
policies based on detente with the West� displaying
18
in the process a notable facility for political flexibility.
Long submerged in the collective, he has begun to
assert his personal leadership more boldly.
Podgorny, the titular head of state, is a Ukrainian.
He made his early career in his home republic. In the
1930's and 1940's he held stveral technical and
governmental posts connected with the food
processing industry in the Ukraine and in Moscow. He
was transferred to party work only in 1950, after
holding a variety of government and technical posts.
He became the First Secretary of the Ukrainian party
in 1957, a Politburo candidate member in 1958, and it
full member in 1960. He reached the apex of his power
in 1963, when he became a party secretary in addition
to his seat on the Politburo. He was considered a
potential contender for the top leadership post for a
short period after Khrushchev's ouster. However, he
lost his Secretariat post in 1966, after having replaced
the old party veteran Anastas Mikovan as Chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1965.
Podgorny has shown an ability to bend with the wind
and appears reconciled to his loss of political stature.
Under Khrushchev he was identified with relatively
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Leonid Ilich Brezhnev
b. 19 December 1906 (C)
Nikolay Viktorovich Podgomy
b. 18 February 1903 (C)

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liberal views on domestic issues, but he has more or less
reflected Brezhnev's positions since then orthodox at
first, becoming more "liberal" since 1970.
Premier Kosygin is an ethnic Russian who began his
career in Leningrad. He has been a member of the
Central Committee and an official in the central state
apparatus in Moscow since 1939. Kosygin first gained
Politburo status as a candidate member in 1946, and
became a full member in 1948. However, he was
demoted to candidate status in 1952, and dropped
completely in 1933 after Stalin's death. He lost his
post of Deputy Premier uriefly in 1956 �a position he
had held since 1940 �but regained it in 1977. He
again became a candidate member of the Politburo
after the ouster of the "antiparty" group in June 1957.
Kosygin became a First Deputy Premier and full
member of the Politburo in 1960, and replaced
Khrushchev as Premier in 1964. Kosygin combines an
interest in rationalizing planning, developing a
balanced economy;, and achieving detente with the
West.
Suslov, an ethnic Russian, is a leading representa-
tive of the party intelligentsia. He, Pelshe, and
Shelepin are the three Soviet leaders who have a
classical university education (as opposed to a
technical one). Suslov was a teacher at Moscow
University in the 1920's, entered the ranks of full -time
party workers in the 1930's, and moved up to hold a
variety of important posts, generally concerned with
ideology and propaganda. He became a member of
the Politburo in 1952, but was one of the many
dropped in 1953. However, Suslov held onto his
Secretariat post and regained his Politburo seat in
1955. Suslov alternates with Kirilenko as Brazhnev's
"deputy." He is the party's high priest in doctrinal
matters, and has a special interest in the international
Communist movement. In spite of his ideological
bent, he has shown considerable flexibility of mind
and an acute sensitivity to the prevoiling tides in the
leadership. His political skills are demonstrated by his
19
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Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
b. 21 February 1904 (U /OU)
Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov
b. 21 November 1902 MOW

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uninterrupted 26 -year career on the Secretariat. Suslov
is a champion of collectivity in the leadership and has
been careful to maintain an independent position in
the political maneuvering in the Kremlin.
r r
ze
Kirilenko has ties of long standing with Brezhnev.
Like the General Secretary, he is an ethnic Russian
with strong ties to the Ukraine where he began his
career as an aircraft designer and local party official.
1 became a candidate member of the Politburo after
the ouster of the "antiparty" group in 1957, lost this
position briefly in 1961, but came back to win it and
the number two post in the party's now- defunct
Bureau for the R. S. F. S. R. 6 inontns later. He won his
Secretariat post at the 2 Party Congress in 1966.
Kirilenko alternates with Suslov as a "deputy" for
Brezhnev. During the Khrushchev years Kirilenko
demonstrated an interest in consumer needs, but this
has since been replaced by an emphasis on ideological
orthodoxy and defense needs. He apparently
continues to support Brezhnev.
20
Pelshe, an ethnic Latvian, is the only one of the
current leaders whose party membership predates the
October Revolution. He began his career in the secret
police and as a political commissar in the armed
forces, and moved on to hold teaching posts in party
institutes. He became First Secretary of the Latvian
party in 1959, at a time when many Latvian officials
were being attacked for nationalism. He became a full
member of the Politburo at the 23rd Congress in 1966,
at the same time that he gained his present position in
the Control Commission. He may have ties to Suslov.
Mazurov is a Belorussian, and made his career in
that republic until he moved t- Moscow in 1966. In
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Arvid Yanovich Pelshe
b. 7 February 1899 (1i /OU)
Andrey Pavlovich KiriLnko
b. 9 September 1906 (U /OU)
Kirill Trofimovich Mazurov
b. 7 April 1914 (U /OU)

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the 1930's he worked variously as a highway official,
Komsomol worker, and in the army. Mazurov spent
most of World War I1 as a Komsomol worker
organizing partisan resistance to the German
occupation. He entered the republic party apparatus
soon after the war, and rose to become Premier of the
Belorussian Republic in 19x3, a member of the Central
Committee of the CPSU in 1956, and First Secretary
of the Belorussian party in 1957. He became a full
member of the Politburo in March 1965, when he was
reassigned to Moscow as a First Deputy Premier. He is
Kosygin's deputy. He has evidenced a strong interest
in rationalization and modernization of the economy,
and, uniquely among the present leaders, has called
for a "systems analysis" approach to economic
planning.
Polvansky is a Ukrainian, who began his career as a
Komsomol official in the Ukrainian city of Kharkov'
in the late 1930's. He spent most of the war years as a
party official in the Novosibirsk ohlast, was a Central
Committee official in Moscow from 1945 -49, and held
party posts in Russia and the Ukraine in the 1950'x. In
1958 he became Premier of the Russian republic and a
candidate member of the Politburo, and in 1960 a full
Tit diacritics on place manes, see the list of names at the end of
the chapter.
member of the Politburo. He became it Deputy
Premier of the U.S.S.R. in 1962, and a First Deputy
Fremier in 1965. In this capacity, he was responsible
for the supervision of the agricultural sector and
alternated with Mazurov in deputizing for Premier
Kosygin. In February 1973 he was relieved of his post
as First Deputy Chairman and appointed U.S.S.R.
Minister of Agriculture. Polvansky has been a zealous
champion of investment in agriculture, and of strong
central management of the economy. He has highly
orthodox views, tempered by an interest in doing
business with the West, especially for the needs of
Soviet agriculture. His transfer to the Agriculture
Ministry would appear to have been a demotion.
Shelepin is an ethnic Russian. Along with Pelshe
and Suslov, he has had the benefit of a classical
university education. Shelepin made his early career as
an official in the Komsomol. Having caught
Khrushchev's eye, he began a swift rise in April 1958
when he was made head of the Central Committee's
Party Organs Department. In December of that year,
lie was placed in command of the KGB, where he
supervised a general housecleaning. He became a
21
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Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin
b. 18 August 1918 (U /OU)
Dmitry Stepanovich Polyansky
b. 7 November 1917 (U /OU)

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Central Committee Secretary in 1961, and a Deputy
Premier and Chairman of the Party -State Control
Committee in 1962. He was made a full member of
the Politburo in November 1964, evidently for services
rendered in the October coup against Khrushchev. His
rise alarmed the Brezhnev group in the leadership, and
he was deprived of his Deputy Premier and Party -State
Control posts in December 1965. He was removed
from the Secretariat in September 1967, a few months
after having been named to head the trade union
organization. Shelepin is interested in administrative
efficiency and modern management methods. During
his period of ascendancy from 1964 to 1967, he was
identified with neo- Stalinism and a tough, chauvinis-
tic foreign policy line. Since his fall from grace, he has
shifted to a moderate position on domestic issues, and
has even courted liberal intellectuals.
Grishin is a Russian who has made his career in the
Moscow region. He became a Politburo candidate
member in 1961, and Moscow party chief in June
1967. He acquired the latter post in a shakeup that
followed the Arab- Israeli war, and succeeded a
Shelepin associate who allegedly had criticized the
22
leadership's handling of the crisis. He gained full
Politburo membership at the 24th Congress in 1971.
Kunayev is an ethnic Kazakh whose entire career
has been spent in his native republic. He began as a
metallurgical engineer, and served as a Deputy
Premier of Kazakhstan, Presideja of the Republic
Academy of Sciences, and republic Premier before
being elected to the Central Committee in 1956. He
')ecame the Kazakhstan party chief in 1960, lost the
post in 1962, and regained it in 196 after the fall of
Khrushchev. Kunayev won a candidate membership
in the Politburo at the 23rd Congress in 1966, and full
membership at the 24th Congress in 1971. fie has ties
with Brezhnev dating back to the latter's service in
Kazakhstan in the mid 1950'x, and seems to be one of
the General Secretary's most loyal political allies.
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Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunayev
b. 12 January 1912 (U /OU)
Viktor Vasilyevich Grishin
b. 14 September 1914 (U /OU)

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Shcherbitsky is a Ukrainian with links to Brezhnev's
old home base of Dnepropetrovsk. Shcherbitsky began
his career in Dnepropetrovsk as an engineer in the late
1930'x. He returned there after the war to begin a long
climb through the city and provincial party
organizations, becoming the provincial First Secretary
in 1955. He rose to the rank of a Ukrainian Party
Secretary in 1957, and becv me Premier of the Ukraine
in 1961. In this post, he won Central Committee
membership and the rank of a candidate member of
the Politburo in 1961. There are signs of a
longstanding rivalry between Shcherbitsky and former
Politburo member Shelest, with the former being
dropped back to his old post of Dnepropetrovsk party
chief in July 1963 at the same time that Shelest was
becoming the Ukrainian First Secretary. Shcherbitsky
lost his candidate membership on the Politburo at the
end of the year, but came back in 1965 to regain both
the Ukrainian premiership and his Politburo
candidate membership. He became a full member of
the Politburo at the 24th Congress in 1971, and
replaced his old rival Shelest as Ukrainian party chief
in May 1972. Shcherbitsky too has strong ties to
Brezhnev.
Kulakov is a Russian with ties to the northwestern
area of the Russian republic and a background in
agriculture. He was a party official responsible for
agriculture in Penza ohlast during and after the war.
In the 1950's he served successively as chairman of the
Penza ohlast council, a Deputy Minister of
Agriculture, and R.S.F.S.R. Minister of Grain
Products. After being named party chief of Stavropol
kray in 1961, he was made a member of the Central
Committee at the 22nd Congress in 1962. Kulakov
became head of the Central Committee's Agriculture
Department in 1961, and a Secretary in 1965. He was
added to the Politburo as a full member (without
having been a candidate member) at the 24th
Congress in 1971. His authority over the agricultural
sphere would appear enhanced by Polyansky's
apparent loss of broad authority in the field.
23
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Vladimir Vasilyevich Shcherbitsky
b. 17 February 1918 (U /OU)
Fedor Davydovich Kulakov
b. 2 February 1918 (U /OU)

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Andropov is a Russian with ties to the northwestern
areas of the Russian republic. He organized partisan
units during World War II, and se {ved as Second
Secretary of the former Karelo -Finn republic until
1951. fie arrived in Moscow in that year, and was
assigned to work on Komsomol and cadres affairs. He
was concerned with Soviet relations with the East
European countries from 1953 to 1967 in a variety of
capacities -as a charge d'affaires and Counselor of
Embassy in Hungary (1953 -54), Ambassador to
Hungary (1951 -57)� during the Hungarian upris-
ing �and chief of the Central Committee Department
for Liaison with Ruling Communist Parties (1957 -67).
With the latter appointment, Andropov began to rise
to the lop of the party leadership. He became a
Central Committee member in 1961, served as a party
secretary from 1962 to 1967, and became a candidate
member of the Politburo in 1967 after replacing a
Shelepin associate as chief of the KCB. In April 1973
he became a full member of the Politburo. Fie now
seems to be neutral in Kremlin politicking. Fie has a
24
reputation of being relatively sophisticated and
openminded.
Grechko is a Ukrainian and a careersoldier. He was
a colonel general and commander of the 18th Army in
World War II (where Brezhnev served with him as the
political commissar). He became a Marshal of the
Soviet Union in 1955, a member of the Central
Committee in 1961, and served from 1957 -67 as a First
Deputy Minister of Defense. He was named Minister
of Defense in 1967. He became a full member of the
Politburo in April 1973, only the second professional
military man to be brought into the policymaking
circle (the other was Marshal Zhukov in 1957).
Grechko seems to be on good terms with Brezhnev. He
has favored curbs on party meddling in military
affairs, but not on civilian control over the militarv.
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Yury Vladimirovich Andropov
b. 15 June 1914 MOU)
Andrey Antonovich Grechko
b. 17 October 1903 (U /OU)

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Foreign Minister Gromyko is a Russian and a career
diplomat with long experience in U.S. affairs. He
joined the Foreign Ministry in the 1930's, and became
head of the American Countries Division of the
ministry in 1939. He subsequently served as Counselor
of Embassy in Washington, Ambassador to the United
States (1943 -46), and the first Soviet Permanent
Representative to the United Nations (1946 -48). He
became a First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in
1953, a member of the Central Committee.in 1956,
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1957, and a member of
the Politburo in April 1973. He is widely respected as a
diplomatic expert, and has worked effectively with
successive party leaders and premiers.
C. Structure and functioning of the
government
1. Constitution (U /OU)
The Soviet constitution of 1936 gives a faulty and
misleading picture of the system it purports to
establish and describe. Earlier Soviet constitutions,
those of 1918 and 1924, did not mention the source of
supreme political authority in the country �the
Communist Party. The present constitution,
promulgated in 1936, mentions the party in a single
reference, declaring that the CPSU, composed of "the
most active and politically conscious citizens, is the
leading core of all organizations of the working
people, both public and state." The constitutional
statement that "all power in the U.S.S.R. belongs to
the working people of town and country as represented
by the soviets of working people's deputies," in fact,
means as represented by the party. Similarly, the
constitution lists a number of "fundamental rights and
duties" that purportedly insure civil rights� including
freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and
demonstrations provisions which have served as
models for other Commu list constitutions. These
rights, however, are qualified as "guaranteed by laws"
so that the enabling regulations can and do limit such
personal expression to whatever is judged by the party
to be appropriate. Again, this constitution," as
it is still referred to unofficially, outlines a federal
union in which individual republics are given the right
to secede, although the U.S.S.R. is actually a highly
centralized state and most of the republics were
incorporated into the union, and kept in it, by force.
One of the chief functions of the constitution is to
serve as a propaganda weapon, both at home and
abroad; it is used by Soy iet propagandists to
perpetuate the fiction that the U.S.S.R. is an advanced
democracy. The idea that the constitution as a legal
document should limit the operations and powers of
government is foreign to Soviet communism, since it
implies restraints on the will of the party. In
application, the constitution serves to limit the rights
and powers of the people, not of the government, and
to emphasize the duties of citizens to the Soviet
Government. The concept of unconstitutionality,
therefore, has no practical meaning in terms of the
system's operatio!-.
The constitution is notable for the frequency and
ease with which it is amended, although the changes
normally apply to minor details of governmental
structure not found in most other constitutions. The
only difference between ordinary lawmaking and
constitutional amendment in the U.S.S.R. is that the
latter requires the approval of two- thirds of the
members rather than a simple majority in the Supreme
Soviet. The requirement is of no significance, however,
since the Supreme Soviet invariably approves
unanimously whatever legislation is set before it.
The party leaders for several years have indicated an
intention to introduce changes into the constitution.
Nikita Khrushchev first broached the idea of a new
constitution in 1959 at the 21st Party Congress.
Responsibility for preparing basic provisions was
assigned subsequently to the Institute of Law of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. In April 1962 the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet created a commission to draft
the new constitution and elected Khrushchev its
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Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko
b. 18 July 1909 (U /OU)

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chairman. Brezhnev officially replaced Khrushchev as
chairman of the commission in December 1964, and a
year and a half later he declared that the new
constitution would "crown" the 50th anniversary of
the country. This was widely interpreted as referring to
the 50th anniversary of the party which was celebrated
in November 1967. That date passed without the
appearance of a new constitution, however, and no
new deadline was set until December 1972. At that
time, Brezhnev, speaking in commemoration of the
50th anniversary of the founding of the U.S.S.R.,
proclaimed that the draft of the new constitution was
expected to be ready before the next party congress,
i.e., before 1976.
The obvious procrastination which has plagued the
project suggests that the document has been
considered a political Pandora's box to be approached
only with the greatest of caution. The vague
statements about the projected constitution thus far
relate primarily to doctrinal points and statements of
goals and give little reason to ::xpect meaningful
changes in the existing system. Brezhnev, in his 50th
anniversary speech in 1972, said the new document
should take into account the social, economic, and
political developments which have allowed the party
to draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union has
acquired the status of a developed� rather than a
developing socialist society.
The governmental system of the U.S.S.R. includes
legislative bodies, executive agencies, and courts. The
Soviet regime explicitly rejects, however, any theory of
the separation of powers. The Supreme Soviet and also
the lower soviets are not merely legislative assemblies
but bodies combining all types of governmental
functions. The constitution nowhere describes the
soviets as legislatures or parliaments, although they are
the only bodies constitutionally qualified to enact
"laws" (zakony). This provision is observed formally.
Many of the edicts (ukazq) issued by the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet and decrees (postanovleniye)
issued by the Council of Ministers, however, deal with
matters as significant as those treated in laws and all
have the force of law. The Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet, it is true, is authorized by the constitution to
annul decrees and regulations of the Council of
Ministers if they are not in accord with the law, but
this authority has never been exercised. Instead, the
"law" has been changed to comply with the provisions
of the decrees.
The Governent of the U.S.S.R. is the most
important of the many agencies by which policies
determined by the Communist Party are carried into
effect. Soviet sources are explicit on the point that the
26
party is primary and the government secondary, i.e.,
that the party has the policymaking prerogative and
the government the role of execution. Little initiative
in important matters is left to government officials
(particularly those lacking parallel party positions of
authority). Moreover, the government is structurally
so extensive and the level of training compared with
that of the West so low that actual administrative
efficiency leaves much to he desired.
Party influence may be transmitted directly to the
heads of governmental agencies, thence vertically
through the lower echelons of the agencies, or it may
pass vertically through the party structure and
laterally to the several levels of the nonparty structure.
Most often, both channels are in operation
simultaneously. The hierarchical relationship of the
party and government structures is shown in Figure 2.
Party control of governmental agencies is simplified
by the presence of party officials in key positions at all
levels of government; the higher one ascends, the
closer the connection becomes. The relationship at the
highest party and government levels is shown in
Figure 1.
2. Central government (C)
The constitutional position of the branches of the
Soviet Government contrasts markedly with their real
position. The constitution designates the Supreme
Soviet as the highest organ of power, its Presidium as
an ancillary body subordinate to it, and the Council of
Ministers as an appointed instrument subordinate to
both. In reality, however, the order of importance of
the three bodies is roughly reversed. It is not that
constitutional provisions are violated �they are
adhered to in form �but that the constitution suggests
only vaguely the actual moving forces behind the
government. For ex4mpie, the Supreme Soviet, a
bicameral body consisting of the Soviet of the Union
and the Soviet of Nationalities, is actually of no real
importance as a legislative body. Normally the
Supreme Soviet meets about twice a year for a few
days each time and passes unanimously the budget
and other laws placed before it. Each chamber of the
Supreme Soviet has standing commissions with
statutory authority to exercise some legislative
initiative and to supervise the work of the
government's executive agencies. The October 1967
regulation on the commissions, however, does not spell
out their powers sufficiently to make a reality of the
Supreme Soviet's constitutional prerogatives in these
matters. Data on the Supreme Soviet are shown in
Figure 9.
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0 AGENCIES OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WITHOUT MINISTERIAL STATUS
Administration of Affairs
Administration for Foreign Tourism
Board of the All -Union Bank for Financing
Capital lnvestmencs
Committee for Inventions and Discoveries
Committee for Lenin and State Prizes in
Literature. Art, and Architecture
Committee for Lenin and State Prizes in
Science and Technology
Committee for Physical Culture and
Sports
Council for Religious Affairs
Main Administration of Geodesy and
Cartography
Main Administration of
Hydrometeorological Services
Main Administration of the
Microbiological Industry
Main Administration for Safeguarding
Military and State Secrets
Main Administration of State
Material Reserves
Main Archives Administration
State Board of Administration
State Commission for Stockpiling
Useful Minerals
State Committee for Supervision
of Safe Working Practices in
Industry and for Mine Supervision
State Committee for the Utilization
of Atomic Energy
Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union
(TAS S)
FIGURE 10. U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, July 1973 (S)
28
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PRESIDIUM
of the Council of Minist
Current Questions
Chairman, First Deputy and
Deputy Chairmen, and
!Transport!l
Foreign Economic Questions
in rvi uals desiggnated b y
oordination
CEMA Questions
the Council of Ministers
Questions
ALL -UNION MINISTRIES
i
UNION REPUBLIC MINISTRIES
STATE COMMITTEES
Automotive Industry
Aviation Industry
Agriculture
Coal Industry
Cinematography
Construction Affairs
Chemical Industry
Chemical and Petroleum Machine
Communications
Construction
Foreign Economic Relations
Forestry
Building
Civil Aviation
Construction of Heavy
Industry Enterprises
Labor and Wages
Matrrial and Techinical
Construction of Petroleum
Construction Materials
Supply
Gas Industry Enterprises
Industry
Planning
Construction, Road, and
Culture
Prices
Municipal Machine Building
Defense Industry
Defense
Education
Publishing Houses, Printing
Electrical Equipment Industry
Ferrous Metallurgy
Plants, and the Book
Trade
Electronics Industry
Foreign Trade
Finance
Fish Industry
Science and Technology
Standards
Gas Industry
General Machine Building
Food Industry
Foreign Affairs
TV and Radio Broadcasting
Vocational and Technical
Heavy, Power, and Transport
Geology
Education
Machine Building
Health
Instrument Making, Automation
Higher and Secondary
Equipment and Control Systems
Machine Building
Specialized Education
Industrial Construction
OTHER AGENCIES
Machine Building for Light
Installation ,nd
All -Union Association
and Food Industry and Household
5pecial
Construction Work
Soyuzsel'khortekhnika"
Appliances
Internal Affairs
Board of the State Bank
Machine Tool and Tool Building
Justice
Central Statistical
Industry
Land Reclamation and Water
Administration
Maritime Fleet
Resources
Committee of People's
Medical Industry
Light Industry
Control
Medium Machine Building
Meat and Dairy Industry
Committee for State
Petroleum Industry
Non ferrous Metallurgy
Security (KGB)
Pulp and Paper Industry
Radio Industry
Petroleum Refining and
Petrochemical
Industry
Railways
Power and Electrification
Shipbuilding Industry
Procurement
Tractor and Agricultural Machine
Rural Construction
Building
Timber and Wood Processing
Transport Construction
Industry
Trade
0 AGENCIES OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WITHOUT MINISTERIAL STATUS
Administration of Affairs
Administration for Foreign Tourism
Board of the All -Union Bank for Financing
Capital lnvestmencs
Committee for Inventions and Discoveries
Committee for Lenin and State Prizes in
Literature. Art, and Architecture
Committee for Lenin and State Prizes in
Science and Technology
Committee for Physical Culture and
Sports
Council for Religious Affairs
Main Administration of Geodesy and
Cartography
Main Administration of
Hydrometeorological Services
Main Administration of the
Microbiological Industry
Main Administration for Safeguarding
Military and State Secrets
Main Administration of State
Material Reserves
Main Archives Administration
State Board of Administration
State Commission for Stockpiling
Useful Minerals
State Committee for Supervision
of Safe Working Practices in
Industry and for Mine Supervision
State Committee for the Utilization
of Atomic Energy
Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union
(TAS S)
FIGURE 10. U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, July 1973 (S)
28
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and agencies (Figure 10). In addition, the chairmen of
the 15 republic councils of ministers are ex officio
members. 2
In theory, decisions are made by the Council of
Ministers meeting as a whole; in fact, the council
meets irregularly, and decisions are usually made by
the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, a little
publicized "inner cabinet" which includes the
chairman, the first deput chairman, all deputy
chairmen, and probably, in most sessions, the Minister
of Finance, with the heads of appropriate ministries or
other bodies participating as consultants. The
Presidium of the Council of Ministers, which meets at
least once a week, may from time to time delegate
responsibility to ad hoc commissions it creates for
special purposes. It is supported also by per,nanent
commissions which coordinate administration on a
broad, stipraministerial level in certain areas of the
economy; each of these commissions probably is
headed by a deputy premier (Figure 8).
Under Stalin and for some time after his death, most
industrial and other economic enterprises were
subordinate to ministries in Moscow. "All- Union"
ministries administered affairs in the republics through
direct representatives appointed by national agencies;
affairs of the central "Union Republic" ministries
were administered in the republics through
counterpart ministries staffed by men formally
appointed by the individual republic governments
with th-. concurrence of the central ministry and
responsible both to the republic council of ministers
and to the central ministry.
The industrial ministries were abolished in a
reorganization of industrial management beginning in
1957. Most of the former ministries were converted
into state committees, whose chairmen continued as
members of the Council of Ministers. These state
committees performed planning, research, develop-
ment, and certain other functions considered best
performed centrally. The managerial functions
formerly vested in the ministries were transferred to
regional councils of national economy (sovnarkhozy)
which administered most of the economic life of the
country according to the state plan. These councils
initially were subordinate to the republic council of
ministers, but later modification of the system led to
some dual subordination, primarily to a U.S.S.R.
sovnarkhoz which coordinated sovnarkhoz activities
on a national level.
Tor a current listing of key government officials consult Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
The post- Khrushchev regime has recreated the
ministerial system much as it had existed prior to 19,57.
Seven ministries involving the major defense and
defense- related industries were reestablished in March
1965, and the entire sovnarkhoz system vas
completely abolished the following October, with
industrial state committees being replaced by
ministries. In early 1973 there were central
ministries including 28 "All-Union" and 31 "Union
Republic"� compared with 52 at the time of Stalin's
death. These ministries are listed in Figure 10.
3. Lower governmental structure (U /OU)
The chief administrative units below the national
level are the union republic (S.S.R.), the oblast, and
the rayon (Figure 14). Most of the union republics
include at least one preponderant ethnic group and a
number of lesser minorities. The larger and more
socially developed an ethnic group, the higher the
governing unit that serves it. The Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), as the
largest republic, is the nucleus of the nation. It is twice
as large in area as the other 14 republics combined and
has 53.8% of the total U.S.S.R. population. The other
republics arc the Estonian, Latviwi, Lithuanian,
Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian, Georgian,
Armenian, Azerbaijan, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadzhik,
Kirgiz, and Kazakh S.S.R.'s.
The union republics have their own constitutions,
supreme soviets (unicameral), and councils of
ministers, and have otherwise been invested with some
of the trappings of sovereign states. (Indeed, it is on
this premise that Stalin based his politically motivated
bid after World War II to win Allied approval for the
separate membership in the United Nations of the
U.S.S.R.'s constituent republics. A compromise
resulted in this status being accorded the Ukrainian
and Belorussian republics, in addition to that of the
U. S. S. R. as a whole.) The powers listed in Article 14 of
the Soviet constitution as being exclusively within the
competence of the central government are, however,
so sweeping that the actual autonomy of the republic
governments is severely circumscribed. The scope of
the activity of republic ministers, including those
concerned only with local matters and lacking
counterparts at the U.S.S.R. level, is determined by
true plans drawn up by the central government, by the
national budget implementing them, and by decrees
of the All-Union Party Central Committee and the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. All republic ministries
are likewise subject to party control by the republic
central committee, exercised through the party
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organization within governmental bodies and by
direct intervention.
The principal political administrative unit below
the republic is the Oblast. An Oblast in the R. S. F. S. R. is
roughly comparable to a state in the United States.
The components of the oblast gove nts, though
bearing different names, correspond to tnose on higher
levels. Their soviets are analogous to the supreme
soviets, and the executive committees elected by them
correspond in function to the councils of ministers.
The kray, most of which have subordinate oblasts, is
an administrative territorial unit that exists only in the
R.S.F.S.R.'
Ethnic minorities have been settled, in most cases,
in distinct administrative territories, the so- called
autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts and
the national okrugs (regions). The governments in
these territories, all of which are located within union
republics and the majority within the R.S.F.S.R., are
similar in form to those of the parent republic but
enjoy far less power; the constitution of an
autonomous republic, for example, must be confirmed
by the supreme soviet of the parent republic. In
actuality, therefore, the minority groups have no real
opportunity for autonomous self government.
Below the level of the oblast is the rayon, which is
generally analogous to a U.S. county (urban rayons
correspond to the boroughs or wards of large U.S.
cities). The rayon is the lowest level at which the
subordinate agencies of the ministerial structure are
found and the level with which the citizen most often
deals.
4. judicial system (U /OU)
Soviet courts, according to the constitution of 1936,
are to be "independent and subject only to the law."
However, Soviet theor on the administration of
justice requires also that the court serve an educative
function and holds that the concept of the apolitical
judge belongs to "bourgeois mythology."
The Soviet judicial system is also distinguished by
the quasi- judicial powers enjoyed by the security
police apparatus which has tended to usurp the
competence of the courts. Before 19.53 most political
cases were in fact handled by the security police
without benefit of the judicial process. Since then
there have been efforts made to regularize prosecution,
to restrict the activities of the security police, and to
pay generally greater attention to juridical ferrns.
However, the security police, with party support,
continues sometimes to flout provisions of the law,
especially in politically sensitive cases. The
n o
organizational structure of the Soviet court system is
shown in Figure 2.
The institution with the broadest authority in the
Soviet judicial system is the Office of the U.S.S.R.
Procurator General. Since 1936, this office and its
investigative apparatus have been independent of all
other judicial organs. As redefined in a 1955 statute,
the powers of this agency extend to virtually all
organizations and persons in the U.S.S.R., and its
agents are not subject to any local authority. The
agency has two functions: supervision over the
administration of justice. and general supervisory
authority designed to insure conformity with the law
by all organs of government. In carrying out the first
of these functio. a procurator is responsible for the
investigation, prosecution, and appeal of cases which
violate the criminal code; he may sometimes intervene
in cases concerning violations of the civil code.
The Procurator General exercises complete control
over the procurators below him. He names the
republic and oblast procurators; the republic
procurators appoint the rayon procurators with the
approval of the Procurator General. The Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. formally appoints the
Procurator General, who serves a 7 -year term; all the
other procurators serve 5 -year terms. The present
Procurator General is Roman Andreyevich Rudenko
(age 66) who has held this office since June 1953, his
terms in office being renewed at the 7 -year intervals.
His present term is due to expire in 1974.
Supervision of court decisions rests ultimately with
the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court and the U.S.S.R.
Procurator General. The Supreme Court serves as the
final court of appeal for lower courts, both general and
special. Supervision and training of court personnel
and general administration of the court system �but
without the legal right to interfere directly in any court
case �was formerly the responsibility of the republic
ministries of justice. These ministries were abolished
during 1956 -63, and other organs (usually the republic
supreme court) assumed their functions. However, in
August 1970 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
reestablished the Ministry of justice. Similar ministries
have since been established in the various union
republics.
After the death of Stalin the Soviet legal system
underwent a series of reforms that culminated in a
major revision of the principles of criminal law and
procedure in December 1958. These principles, as
revised, contained a number of liberalizing provisions,
and set the basis for new legal codes in each union
republic. For example, the courts alone were given the
competence to decide the guilt or innocence of the
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accused and to pass sentence. Moreover, the position
of the accitsed was strengtheped, especially in that the
burden for proving guilt was placed on the procurator.
Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence is still not
clearly embodied either in law or in practice. Despite
liberalizations, certain crimes are still loosely defined,
and the accus:ad has no right to counsel during the
period of investigation �which can last up to 9
monihs while the accused is under detention. An
example of the serious abuse that remains possible was
the detention of four dissidents for 1 year before :hey
were brought to trial in January 1968.
The Sov1 court system does not employ a jury, but
follows the continental European practice in
employing a panel of judges. The Soviet system differs
from standard practice, however, in the use of lay
judges (formally known as People's Assessors). All
courts of first instance consist of one professional,
legally trained judge and two elected People's
Assessors, each of the three having an equal voice in
the conduct of a trial. The lay judges are not included
on the judicial panels of appellate courts.
The procedure differs in some cases of antisocial
behavior not involving criminal liability which are
decided on the republic level by so- called comrades
courts. These are assemblies of hand- picked Soviet
citizens, who seek to "rehabilitate" the defendant by
means of exposing him to the public censure of his
peers. After public discussion of the case, the court
reaches a decision by a "vote" taken among its
chairman and his assistants, usually two or three lay
assessors. These lay judges of the comrades courts,
whose decisions are not subject to appeal to the regular
Soviet courts by the defendant, can impose a variety of
minor pueishmert The role of the comrades courts
has declined con.,,:ierably from the high point it had
reached in the late 1950's. However, the involvement
of these and other extrajudicial institutions in
administering justice �for example, local executive
committees which have the authority to assign persons
avoiding "socially useful labor" to work in a local
enterprise continues to detract from the modest gains
in judicial reform since Stalin's death.
5. Electoral procedures (U /OU)
Since 1936 the right to vote has been conferred on a
very large proportion of the Soviet population,
without the discrimination against social origins
fcrmerly in effect, and without regard to race,
nationality, sex, or religion. In addition, direct popular
elections were extended from the lowest echelon in the
Soviet governmental structure �the rural and urban
soviets �to all governmental levels. Long before 1936,
however, elections had ceased to be a medium for
expressing popular opinion and had become a
propaganda device for conveying the impression of
sol'darity between the people and the regime.
The party and government devote a great deal of
attention to getting out the vote, and consequently the
percentage of the electorate who vote has always been
large. In the 1970 Supreme Soviet elections, for
example, 99.96% of the 153,237,112 registered voters
were reported to have participated. The deficiencies of
the suffrage in the U.S.S.R. do not arise from
discrimination or inequalities but from the lack of
meaning of the ballot. No meaningful choice is given
the voter because only one person is permitted to run
for each office, and the voter may simply approve or
disapprove his candidacy. All candidates for public
office are officially described as candidates of the
"bloc of Communists and nonparty persons."
On the surface, the nomination system used in
Soviet elections appears to involve some public
participation, but in reality the candidate is picked in
advance by local or higher party officials and
approved by the appropriate unit in the executive staff
of the party in Moscow. The nominating procedure, as
an analysis of the Soviet press reveals, is as follows: the
voters in each public organization, plant, or other
institution in a constituency meet to nominate a
candidate, and then the representatives of these
groups of voters meet again to discuss and settle upon
a candidate whom all will support. Almost invariably
the various organizations have nominated tale same
person. Where there are several nominees, all except
one are leading party workers who are" honored" with
nominations in many constituencies. Since no one can
"run" in more than one constituency, the "honorary"
nominations must he declined, leaving only the one
approved candidate with a place on the ballot.
Provision is made for secret voting, but the act of
entering a booth marks the voter as a person of
doubtful loyalty, since his presumed purpose is to vote
against the candidate by scratching through the name.
Soviets up to the level of oblast are elected every 2
years. Republic Supreme Soviets and the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are elected at 4 -year intervals.
Following elections, the legislatures appoint their own
officers and the government officials at the
corresponding level. Thus, President Podgorny and
Premier Kosygin serve 4 -year terms; their present term
runs from 1970 to 1974.
D. National policies
Underpinning all national policy objectives of the
Soviet Union has been a consistent determination on
31
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the part of the nation's leaders to insure the
preeminent authority of the Communist Party and the
unquestioning implementation of its decisions at all
levels of government. The successful pursuit of this
aim, together with the effective restrictions on public
dissent, Has given unity and cohesiveness to the
various programs of national policy, both domestic
and foreign. (U /OU)
The Soviet leaders' preoccupation with oov.er
originated in the circumstances under which the
Communist Party seized control of the Russian state in
1917. Although a small minority, the Communists
came to power determined that thev alone must rule
and that a new political, social, and economic order
would be established throughout the world in
accordance with their ideological conceptions. In
pursuit of these goals, the party brought the Russian
people under its absolute control by military force,
police coercion, and discriminatory economic
pressures, coupled with messianic promises of
deliverance from exploitation. During the Stalinist era,
police terror became the prime instrument of rule and
dissent in any form was ruthlessly eliminated. (U /OU)
Under Khrushchev, the regime sought to eliminate
many of the more irrational and counterproductive
features )f the police state established by Stalin. Curbs
were placed upon the powers of the security
apparatus, and the Stalinist practice of targeting entire
social strata and professional oroiup for police
o- r-
repression was ended. In the interests of generating a
degree of popular support, Khrushchev went so far as
to relax some of the draconian restrictions that Stalin
had placed upon the freedom of expression of Soviet
intellectuals. At the same time, the more prominent
features of the dictatorial system established by Stalin
were retained: the one party state; the maintenance of
an extensive police apparatus for domestic repression;
suppression of dissident opinion; and state controls
over intellectual life. In general, however, the Soviet
Union under Khrushchev may be said to have begun a
transition from a totalitarian to a bureaucratic
authoritarian order. (U /OU)
The present regime has modified, but not entirely
reversed, the policy lines laid down by Khrushchev. It
has continued, and even intensified, the trend toward
establishing an orderly system of bureaucratic rule.
Like Khrushchev, the present leadership has
demonstrated an interest in broadening its base of
popular support, and to this end has measurably
improved the economic lot of the Soviet consumer.
Unlike Khrushchev, however, it has shown no interest
in relaxing the controls on freedom of expression.
Instead, it has demonstrated a fear of the political risk
32
inherent in such moves, and has tightened controls in
an effort to eliminate expressions of dissident opinion.
(U /OU)
1. Domestic (U /OU)
With the abolition of the remaining opposition
parties in the early 1920's, the CPSU established itself
as the indispensable foundation of the Soviet state. All
aspects of national life have been subordinated to the
political aims of the party's ruling group. These aims
are stated and explained in terms of "Marxism
Len:nism," the only officially approved political
P',ilosophy in [he U.S.S.R.
Under Stalin, the U.S.S.R. embarked in the late
1920's on comprehensive and ruthlessly enforced
programs of industrialization and agricultural
collectivization, which are still the cornerstones of the
Soviet system. Virtually all means of production were
placed in the hands of the state, and all economic
planning of any consequence was centered in
Moscow. For several decades, successive production
plans, normally of 5 years' duration, have governed
economic activities. Heavy industry and defense
related production have expanded at a rapid rate,
while gains in agricultural production and living
standards have been more moderate. Trade unions
were turned into mere instruments of the party.
Private farming, except for small household plots, has
not existed since the peasants were forced to join
collective farms in the collectivization campaign
begun in 1929. Private retail trade, except for the
collective farm markets and, occasionally, ex-
perimentation in small -scale vending, was abolished
and the citizenry must buy most consumer goods from
state stores.
The post Stalin regimes have devoted much effort
to rationalizing the economy and increasing
productivity. Although continuing to give priority to
heavy industry and defense, they have given more
public attention to the goal of improved living
conditions. Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, in
particular, the regime has sought practical solutions to
redress the imbalance in economic priorities, to
improve administrative efficiency, and to deal will,
the perennial problem of technological lag in the
economy. To date, these efforts have had mixed results
and, indeed, have been pursued with varying degrees
of consistenev and enthusiasm.
One of the current leadership's first economic
decisions, in March 1965, was directed at strengthen-
ing the agricultural sector. Agricultural investments
have continued to grow in succeeding years, but this
policy has been neither unanimously approved nor has
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it prov4d to be a panacea for the ills which plague
Soviet agriculture. Opp )sition to the agricultural
investment program, for example, appears to have
been one of the factors responsible for the political
decline and fall of Politburo member G. I. Voronov in
1971 -73. The shortfalls in agricultural production that
occurred in 1972, moreover, demonstrated that
increased investments alone were not the answer to the
agricultural problem.
In September 1965 a reform of industrial
management and planning provided for considerable
decentralization of economic decisionmaking. At the
same tiple, however, the central ministerial apparatus
was reestablished, with the result that the reform was
fulfilled more in the letter than in the spirit.
Complaints of overeentralization and crippling of
individual initiative persisted even in the controlled
Soviet press. Central agencies continued to make
pretty much the same broad range of decisions as
before. The re> ult was a continuing inability of the
economy to respond either to the demands of
technological change or to increasingly sophisticated
consumer tastes.
The continuing problems of the Soviet economy led
to another attempt to invigorate industrial manage-
ment through reorganization in April 1973. Under the
new scheme, industrial enterprises and corresponding
research and development facilities are to be
consolidated into production associations, which will
assume basic managerial powers. The role of the
ministries is to be limited to the formulation of general
policy and long -range goals.
The prospects for economic success of the new
reform, as of the old, are questionable. The ministries
and enterprises certainly will resist ceding their powers
to the associations. The prospect of economically
unsound combinations of enterprises also threaten the
viability of the reform. Similar attempts at
organizational reform have in the past foundered on
these obstacles.
The basic problem of the Soviet economy is more
fundamental, however, than mere faulty investment
allocation or shortcomings of the managerial structure.
The Soviet leaders, despite their interest in improving
the effici, ncy an(' technological base of the economy,
are reluctant to fully back the kind of decentralization
and economic incentives that would contribute to this
end, mainly for fear that this would inevitably dilute
their monopoly of political power.
In lieu of basic economic reform at home, the
present leaders have begun to turn to the West as a
source of modern technology and improved
managerial methods. The desire for access to Western
goods and methods is certainly an important factor in
the complex of motivations which underlay the bid for
detente with Western Europe and with the United
States which began in 1969 -70.
Despite the innate conservatism of the Soviet
leaders, there have been significant improvements in
the economic sphere. Renewed emphasis has been
placed on scientific and technological progress;
minimum wages have been raised; more consumer
goods, such as major household appliances and even
autos, have been made available; the construction of
new housing has been accelerated (although housing
standards remain grossly inadequate); and an effort
has been made to refine the use of material incentives.
Moreover, Brezhnev, in his report to the 24th CPSU
Congress i,i 1971, publicly committed the regime to
improving the material lot of the Soviet people. The
alacrity with which Moscow moved to make up for the
agricultural shortfalls of 1972 by massive grain
purchases in the West is sufficient proof of the
leaderships desire to avoid a politically dangerous
drop in living standards. Yet, it was the consumer
sector which again had to bear the brunt of budget
cuts necessitated by the straitened circumstances in
which the Soviet economy found itself after the 1972
harvest.
Nevertheless, living conditions have improved and
popular grievances are less acute, even though the lot
of the Soviet consumer remains drab by U.S. or West
European standards. Per capita consumption is only
one -third that of the United States. By Soviet
standards, however, the material level of living is
tolerable. Most significantly, it is better than at any
time since the Revolution. There is no evidence that
such economic grievances as exist, have had any
particular political significance.
In the societal area, the regime has expressed
concern over the persistent problem of so --ial
stratification, an obvious contradiction to the
egalitarian ideals of Soviet society. It has taken
measures �in part designed to boost agricultural
production �to make the peasant a more respected
and better rewarded member of society. Related
reforms in education have included the introduction
of courses in industrial and agricultural arts in the
general schools. While education itself is free, .he
children of poorer parents are given assistance to
encourage them to continue their education, if onl, on
a part -time basis. Special programs have been
developed to prepare the children of working -class and
rural parents for institutions of higher education.
Studies produced by the fledging corps of Soviet
sociologists indicate, however, that despite all these
33
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official efforts the differences between the major social
classes �the workers, peasants, and the "intel-
ligentsia" �have not been significantly reduced.
The party continues to propagate atheism and seeks
to eliminate religious beliefs through propaganda and
harassment, including the closing of churches.
Nevertheless, many churches remain open and in use,
and Jewish prayer books, the Bible, and the Koran
have been printed in limited editions. Many measures
designed to protect the family as an institution and
offset the libertarian practices of the early days of the
Soviet regime are still in effect. Some of Stalin's stricter
measures have, however, been modified; divorce is
somewhat easier to arrange, and abortions have been
legalized once again.
Nationality problems are always otential soirees ,f
concern for a multinational state such as tl;z! U.S.S.R.
Historically, Soviet policy has oscillated between
facilitating the Russification of minority nationality
groups and encouraging the development of national
cultures (as distinct from the consistent suppression of
all manifestations of political independence).
Elements of both policies are manifested in current
Soviet practice. Minority nationalities are well
represented at all levels of the party and government,
in addition to the official autonomous territorial
organization permitted the more significant nationali-
ties. At the same tune, the Great Russian culture is
clearly dominant. Official propaganda emphasizes
both the importance of Russian as the common
language of the country and the alleged merger of all
the nationalities into one "Soviet" people.
Soviet policies in this regard have had mixed results.
On the one hand, the Soviet leaders are not faced with
any pressing national dissent, with the exception of the
Jewish minority, which represents a chronic problem.
Ou the other hand, recent events �such as
disturbances in Lithuania in May 1972 indicate that
the potential for unpredictable flareups of nationalist
sentiment remains.
Since the late 1960's, the Soviet Union's large
Jewish minority has presented the Soviet leaders with
an increasingly vexatious problem. tared by the Israeli
military triumphs over the Arab forces in June 1967,
overt Zionist and pro Israeli sentiments have grown
rapidly among Soviet Jews. They have been
manifested in demands for greater opportunities for
the development of Jewish culture in the U.S.S.R. and
for the right to emigrate to Israel. Soviet leaders at first
sought to repress the burgeoning Jewish nationalism,
but in early 1971 opened the gates to large -scale
Jewish emigration, presumably in the hope of ridding
themselves of the most militant members of the Jewish
34
community. Emigration soon grew to such levels as to
become an embarrassment, surpassing 30,000 in 1972.
To this the authorities have responded by attempting
to retard the flow through administrative means;
beginning in August 1972, prospective emigrants were
required to reimburse the Soviet state for the cost of
their education. The prohibitive rates, constituting a
form of exit tax, slowed but did not eliminate
emigration, and complicated Moscow's relations with
Western countries where sympathy for the Jewish
cause is high. The Soviets have since retreated and
allowed the eo f fees to lapse. Controls continue to be
exercised through the selective withholding of exit
visas.
The Soviet authorities have shown an increased
willingness in recent years to issue exit visas to permit
the reunion of families and to allow Soviet citizens to
visit relatives in the United States. The number
granted, however, remains very small. Nevertheless,
the Soviet government since the early 1960's has
permitted and even fostered the expansion of contacts
with the outside world. Western delegations and
tourists have been visiting the Soviet Union in large
numbers, although their itineraries and contacts with
Soviet citizens are closely controlled. The number of
Soviet specialists traveling abroad has also increased,
and small groups of Soviet tourists, considered reliable
by the regime, have been permitted to travel abroad.
Although censorship continues to be pervasive in
Soviet information media, jamming of Western radio
programs has, on the whole, been reduced, access to
Western literature has been somewhat improved, and
the Soviet press has given a broader and slightly less
distorted view of the world outside.
In spite of these departures from the extreme rigors
of Stalinist controls, the regime continues to give the
highest priority to efforts to isolate the Soviet
Population from foreign ideological contamination.
Indeed, the Soviet leaders' external policy of detente
with the United States and other Western countries
has been accompanied by an intensified drive for
domestic ideological vigilance.
The leadership continues to rely on an elaborate
system of controls over the whole range of social
activity to enforce its authority. The surveillance of
persons, institutions, and ideas by the security forces of
the Committee for State Security (KGB) and of the
ministries for the civil police is pervasive, extending
throughout Soviet society. All communications media
are controlled by the state and function primarily in
order to insure that the dissemination of information is
kept within limits acceptable to the party.
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Limits on the freedom of expression of Soviet
intellectuals remain narrow. Fallowing a period of
relaxation which began after Stalin's dr"Ith, the
current leadership has taken new steps to deal with the
phenomenon of dissidence in the intellectual
community. These have been primarily in the form of
political trials, detention in labor camps or,
increasingly, in psychiatric institutions, and the
encouragement of emigration� indeed, a form of
expulsion �of dissidents.
Beginning in 1971, the regime began a concerted
effort to suppress politically motivated samizdat
(illegal "self- published" materials). These various
efforts have resulted in some disorientation and
fragmentation of the dissident movement, but they
have not been successful in wholly suppressing it.
2. Foreign (S)
a. General
Soviet foreign policy is compounded of Communist
ideology, Russian national interests, and the
requirements imposed by internal conditions in the
U.S.S.R. The ideology underlies much of the
expansionist character of Soviet foreign policy,
assuming as it does the inevitable and continual
growth of Communist power at the expense of the
non Communist world. When the demands of
revolutionary Communist doctrine conflict with the
interests of the Soviet state, however, the problem is
almost always resolved in favor of the latter. The
internal factors affecting foreign policy may vary
somewhat with time as they do in Western countries.
Typically, however, the Soviet leaders show a strong
compulsion to weigh a policy in terms of its effect on
their ideological and power monopoly.
The line between a Soviet policy which satisfies
ideology and that which serves strictly national
interests is often indistinguishable. The extensive
Soviet land grabs in Eastern Europe during and just
after World War II filled both needs but could have
occurred just as well under the tsars. The attempts to
expand the areas of Communist influence or control in
more distant places, such as Africa and Asia, fall more
readily into the realm of ideological endeavor. Here
too, however, Soviet interests have a direct bearing on
the ideological position assumed by Moscow. Support
for wars of national liberation, for example, has been
determined in large measure by considerations of how
such support will affect Soviet relations with the
United States or with the often friendly governments
in power in countries where such wars occur. More
recently, Moscow ha: also had to be concerned about
where the particular national liberation group stands
with regard to the Sino Soviet dispute.
The finer points of ideology come into play most
clearly in the U.S.S.R.'s relations with other
Communist states. Disputes over aid to national
liberation movements, the correct road to socialism,
independence within the "Communist camp," and
numerous other contentious issues have led to
divergencies in world communism. Communist states
are increasingly twisting the concepts of Marxism
Leninism to suit the ambitions of their leaders and the
particular demands of their societies. The U.S.S.R.,
-hich has come to have a larger stake in the status
quo, tends to interpret the Communist ideology with
less revolutionary fervor than China or Cuba. The
U.S.S.R. has seen obvious advantages to itself in trying
to maintain a unified world Communist movement,
but most smaller, less powerful countries, such as
Yugoslavia and Romania, feel that their role in such a
situation can be only a restricted, subservient one.
China, of course, rejects Soviet leadership altogether.
The ideological split in the movement has also
affected Moscow's dealings with the nonruling
Communist parties. Although an overwhelming
majority of parties remain responsive to Soviet advice
or direction, Moscow has had to loosen its grip and in
some cases has lost control completely. The days when
Moscow could force the majority of the world's
Communist parties to espouse policies not in their own
interest have long since passed. This lesson was
brought home to the Soviets by the refusal of many
Communist parties �even those normally subservient
to Moscow �to support or condone the Soviet -led
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
An exaggerated concern with national security has
traditionally characterized Russian policy, and this
has been true of the Soviet regime. Protection of the
homeland is the decisive reason why Soviet leaders
have given high priority to retaining close control over
the states of Eastern Europe and to gaining more
formal Western recognition of the postwar status quo
in Europe. Similarly, with the intensification of the
Sino Soviet ideological clash, the Soviets have
conducted a mayor program to strengthen their
defenses in the areas bordering China.
The priority attention given to Eastern Europe and
China is, of course, a function of geography.
Geography also gave rise to the now well -worn phrase
"warm -water ports," to which the growth and
activities of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron,
starting the last half of 1967, lent new currency. There
are other and perhaps sufficient reasons to account for
the acute interest the Soviets have shown in the
35
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strategic lards of the Mediterranean littoral since the
late 1950's, but year -round access to the the oceans of
the world is at least a subsidiary goal of Soviet foreign
policy in the area.
Some of. the internal factors which, along with
Communist ideology and Russian national interests,
shape Soviet foreign policy are obscured by the secrecy
that surrounds so many of the Soviet regime's actions.
The Soviets have sometimes, as a consequence of an
internal power struggle, given the world an insight
into the decisionmaking process in Moscow, when the
winners and losers are identified ex post facto with
correct and incorrect policies. The general lack of open
discussion when policy is actually being made,
however, inhibits external analysis of the factors which
influence decisions. Nevertheless, it is clear enough
that the preoccupation of the Soviet leaders with
preserving ti,eir supremacy in party and government
is, more than in most countries, a powerful
determinant. This often works to the U.S.S.R.'s
disadvantage, hindering as it does the adoption of
flexible foreign policies, especially toward the non
Communist world. It places restrictions on the influx
of ideas and information, especially of the kind that
would test or bring into question any aspect of the
Soviet system. There has been it gradual but erratic
and carefully limited loosening of these restrictions as
the U.S.S.R. has come to accept the need for beneficial
exchanges with other nations, particularly those which
can help advance Soviet technology and science.
Nevertheless, the continuing restrictions on the free
flow of ideas of it political nature, from the outside or
domestically generated, continue to rob Soviet
policymakers of an important ingredient of effective
statecraft.
Stalin's successors in 1953 saw that his militant,
uncompromising policies had 'tended to unite the
West, isolate the U.S.S.R., and lessen Soviet prestige
and influence. They have been less rigid and
doctrinaire, more practical, and, indeed, more
realistic. It was not until thn 20th Party Congress �the
scene of Khrushchev's "secret speech" �in 1956,
however, that the change from Stalinism was formally
enunciated and given the necessary theoretical
underpinning. Brezhnev took another major step at
the 24th Congress in March 1971 when he enunciated
the Soviet "peace policy" which provided the
Justification for the development of a detente
relationship %vith the United States and the West.
Propaganda directed abroad continues to be an
important adjunct of Soviet foreign policy. The scope
of Soviet efforts ranges far beyond the normal use of
mass communications media in the Western sense.
36
Diplomatic notes, speeches, trade, troop movements,
cultural and scientific exchanges, and "spontaneous"
popular demonstrations in the U.S.S.R. are conducted
in a manner calculated to influence world public
opinion.
The official news agency TASS serves as the main
information channel with other countries in
distributing information on the U.S.S.R. abroad and
disseminating foreign news in the Soviet Union. A
second nev.s agency Agentstvo Pechati Novosti (APN),
also known as Novosti, supplements TASS' work.
Official statements lay great stress on APN's alleged
independence as a "public" organization in contrast
to TASS which is admittedly a government agency. In
fact, however, APN is subject to the same propaganda
controls as other elements of Soviet society.
Radiobroadcasts of Soviet propaganda are beamed to
foreign audiences primarily by the official Radio
Moscow International Service and the regime's
unofficial voice Radio Peace and Progress. A notable
trend since 1958 has been the increase in Mandarin
language broadcasts to Communist China.
Soviet foreign propaganda is also conducted
covertly, appearing� without attribution to its Soviet
origins �in publications of local Communist parties,
"friendship" societies, and international front
organizations. Soviet propaganda also finances
publication of pro- Communist articles in foreign
journals, covert support of strikes and popular
demonstrations, and clandestine broadcasting as well
as manipulation of foreign news media, both
Communist and non Communist.
Evaluation of the effectiveness of Soviet foreign
propaganda is complicated by its close relationship to
diplomatic activities, so that the problem frequently
becomes one of assessment of the total impact of
Soviet foreign policy. Another complicating factor is
that much of the Soviet image abroad is created by
Western reporting of Soviet developments, both
successes and failures. As a rule, Soviet foreign
propaganda has been most effective where it has
essentially reflected the actual state of affairs or where
it has conformed to and exploited existing attitudes
and events.
h. Soviet policy toward the West and Japan
The post Stalin leaders have intermittently followed
policies of detente toward the West in order to lessen
the dangers of armed confrontation and to further
various Soviet objectives. In 1954 the Geneva
Conference presided over the French withdrawal from
Indochina; the Austrian State Treaty, ending Allied
occupation, was signed in 1955; a limited relaxation in
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relations was apparent following a Four -Power
(United States, United Kingdom, France, U.S.S.R.)
summit conference in July 1955 and during the Soviet
campaign leading up to the proposed summit
conference in Paris in May 1960.
Khrushchev's. disruption of the May 1960 meeting,
using the U -2 incident as a pretext, ended the detente
period and ushered in a new, more militant phase of
Soviet foreign policy. The U.S.S.R. broke off
negotiations on disarmament, gave strong encourage-
ment to Castro in his hostility toward the United
States, shot down an American RB -47 reconnaissance
plane over the Arctic Ocean and imprisoned the two
"Irviving members of its crew, vigorously supported
the Lumumba faction in the Congo, and opposed
U.N. activities in that country. T a large extent, this
heightened intransigence reflected a need to counter
Chinese Communist charges of Soviet capitulati.,n to
the "U.S. imperialists."
The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 brought another
sharp turn in Soviet policy toward the West. Since that
event the Soviet Government has generally displayed
greater caution in its international commitments and
shown an inclination to stabilize power relationships.
The renc Soviet emphasis on a detente policy
has been mi.,t marked in Western Europe. The
Brezhnev- Kosygiz team which ousted Khrushchev in
1964 has sought whenever possible to reassure the
Western Europeans that the days of the cold war are
over and that there is much mutual profit to be gained
from an accommodation. Moscow has encouraged
and sought to portray the independent policies of
France as an example of the kind of cooperation which
has become possible between the Western European
states and the U.S.S.R.
Moscow's primary interests are to legitimize the
exising political and territorial divisions in Europe
particularly those in Germany �and to reduce and
perhaps ultimately to supplant U.S. influence. They
have been pursuing these goals by a combination of
bilateral negotiations and multinationa conferences.
In 1969, the Soviets began negotiations with the West
Germans on a treaty renouncing the use of force. It
was signed in Moscow in 1970 and ratified by both
sides in 1972. They also encouraged the negotiation of
a similar West German Polish treaty which was
ratified the same year. The primary Soviet motive in
both cases was to win from Bonn a final and legally
binding recognition of postwar borders.
In an effort to win general recognition of East
Germany as a legitimate and sovereign country, the
U.S.S.R. also encouraged the inter German negotia-
tions and treaties of 1972, by which Bonn conceded de
jure recognition of the existence of two German states.
Moscow had earlier signed the Four -Power Agreement
on Berlin which defined the relationship between
West Berlin and West Germany.
Apart from direct negotiations with the states of
West Europe, the Soviets pushed hard for the
convening of a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Moscow sought to have all
interested European countries and the United States
and Canada take part in the Conference which was to
put a formal seal of approval on the status quo in
Europe. By November 1972 preliminary talks on the
CSCE had begun in Helsinki with the full Conference
intended for mid -1973. Initial talks on mutual and
balanced force reduction between many European
states, the United States, and Canada also got
underway in January 1973.
While generally continuing the more moderate
policies toward Western Europe that marked the latter
days of the Khrushchev era, his successors' policies
toward the United States were initially somewhat less
forthcoming. The new rulers moved to reassert
Moscow's leadership in the Communist world by
restoring a more even balance between Soviet efforts
at detente with the West and support of Communists
throughout the world against the "imperialists." With
this objective in mind, the Soviets increased their
support for North Vietnam despite Hanoi's failure to
accept Soviet counsel on the best way to pursue its
aims. Soviet support for the North Vietnam war effort
caused problems in relations with the United States,
but the lines of communication were kept open and
there were instances of cooperation, for example in
drafting the nuclear nonproliferation treaty which was
opened for signature in 1968.
As Soviet relations with China continued to
deteriorate during the Cultural Revolution
culminating in the armed clashes on the Sino- Soviet
border in 1969 �the Soviet leaders clearly came to
perceive China as their most pressing international
problem. They began to tailor their other foreign
policies accordingly, and the China impasse helped
stimulate in particular a new desire for accommoda-
tion with the U.S. The Soviet willingness to engage in
new understanditigs and agreements with the West
was set out most authoritatively in Brezhnev's "peace
program" presented to the 24th Party Congress. The
announcement, in July 1971, that President Nixon
would visit China gave new reason for Moscow to seek
improved relations with the United States. A high
water mark was reached at the Moscow summit
meeting in May 1972 (Figure 11) where major
agreements limiting offensive and defensive nuclear
37
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FIGURE 11. The Moscow summit
meeting, 29 May 1972. From left:
Kosygin, Podgorny, President Nixon,
Brezhnev, Secretary of State
Rogers. (C)
strategic arms were signeu. �A series of agreements on
other topics ranging from space cooperation to joint
studies of ecology were also signed. Contacts and
negotiations between the two countries throughout
197." produced a major new trade agreement in
October. Though the trade agreement has been
viewed by the Soviets as a major impetus to increased
economic dealings with the United States, Moscow
has been simuitaneously concerned that Washington
may not be able to live up to the agreement's
promises, particularly the granting of most- favored-
nation treatment to the U.S.S.R. This issue has
become linked with Soviet emigration policy and
Moscow's willingness to ease its restrictive practices on
the emigration of Soviet Jews.
During the first part of 1973, both Moscow and
Washington took steps to give added momentum to
the process of detente. Brezhnev's visit to Washington
in June was concluded by the signing of a number of
new agreements, including a declaration on the
prevention of nuclear war, a statement on the
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), and an
understanding to work jointly at accelerating the
peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The SALT
series, the most important accomplishment of the
move toward accommodation, will resume in Geneva
in September with both sides having pledged at the
Washington summit to achieve major new agreements
by the end of 1975.
Moscow's policies toward Japan have been
characterized by ambiguity suspicion, and caution.
The U.S.S.R., cognizant of Japan's growing economic
strength, has been interested in expanding trade
s
contacts and attracting Japanese capital for the
development of the raw material resources of Siberia.
At the same time, Moscow has viewed the
conservative Japanese Government as the U.S.
surrogate in Asia and has displayed concern over
Japan's military and political intentions in the Far
East. In addition, Tokyo's demands for the return of
what it calls the Northern Terrorities �the southern
Kuril Islands seized by the U. S. S. R. from Japan at the
end of World War II �has been a brake on improving
relations. Moscow displayed growing interest in
establishing friendly ties with Tokyo in the late 1960's
and early 1970's �going so far as to hint at some
flexibility in its position on the Northern Territories
in part to hinder development of a Sino- Japanese
rapprochement. The Soviets were accordingly
distressed at the rapid progress in the Tokvo- Peking
relationship in 1972, and the form this relationship
may take in the future remains one of Moscow's
principal concerns.
e. The Soviets and the Communist world
The Sino- Soviet dispute reached critical proportions
in 1960. In the summer of that year Khrushchev
suspended Soviet assistance to the Chinese Com-
munists, which only deepened their antagonism. In
November, 81 Communist parties met in Moscow
where the Chinese, supported by Albania, North
Korea, and several delegations from non Communist
countries, carried on the attack against the Soviet
effort to dictate to the movement. The intrabloc
conflict was only papered over by the conference's
concluding statement, which militantly reaffirmed the
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ultimate goal of a worldwide Communist system and
asserted that the transition to such a system, though by
peaceful means "peaceful coexistence was the
trend of the times.
Khrushchev persisted in an effort to secure another
world Communist meeting that would in effect read
the Chinese out of the movement. The leadership
which ousted him in October 1964 was compelled to
follow through to the extent of holding a consultative
meeting of 19 parties in March M65. Its inconclusive
results were embarrassing to Moscow, and the failure
of the Soviet effort to reassert leader hip in the
Communist world only aggravated the prblem.
Kosygin's trip to Hanoi in February 1965 had been
undertaken to counter Chinese influence there.
Moscow's hope was to move North Vietnam back
toward a more nearly neutral position in the Sino
Soviet conflict. Soviet calculations were temporarily
upset by the chain of events set in action by a Viet
Cong attack on U.S. installations in South Vietnam
and the retaliatory U.S. air strikes against North
Vietnam while Kosygin was in Hanoi. The failure of
the Soviets to respond in some dramatic manner laid
them open to further Chinese charges of capitulation
to the United States.
During the following year, Soviet assistance to
Hanoi grew, as did the dispute with China. The
Soviets accused the Chinese of hampering North
Vietnam's war effort by refusing to associate
themselves with a united Communist aid program and
claimed that the Chinese had in fact interfered with
Soviet shipments through China. When China's self
discrediting Cultural Revolution got under way,
Moscow began talking again of a new world
Communist conference.
By marshaling the support of the loyal Eastern
European parties and a host of nonruling parties, the
Soviets eventually managed to stage the second
consultative meeting of over 60 parties in Budapest in
February 1968. No Far Eastern parties� except
Mongolia's �were among the delegations, and the
Cubans, who had attended the March 1965 gathering,
also were absent. At the meeting the Soviets used
pressure tactics to secure it communique calling for
preparations for a world Communist conference in
"Moscow. The International Communist Conference
without the participation of China finally met in
June 1969, but the victory was only a Pyrrhic one in
terms of Soviet efforts to reestablish their primacy in
the world movement.
The Sino- Soviet dispute took it new, dramatic turn
in the spring and summer of 1969 when it series of
clashes occurred along several disputed sections of the
Chinese Soviet border. The Soviet leaders combined
threats of military action against China with proposals
for negotiations in an attempt to force the Chinese to
resolve the frontier dispute. Peking finally agreed to
the Soviet demand for talks in the fall of 1969, but the
negotiations have dragged on into 1973 with no
significant progress. Nonetheless, Moscow and Peking
sought to reduce the level of tension that had
prevailed during the border fighting and took some
steps, such as exchanging ambassadors, designed to
put state -to -state relations on a more normal footing.
Sino- Soviet trade, which had plummeted to an
annual level of about US$50 million in 1969 -70, has
revived somewhat and may reach about US$350
million in 1973. Despite this increase, the U.S.S.R. is
presently involved in only 3% of total Chinese trade,
compared with 40% to 50% during the 1930's. The
latest formal trade agreement was signed in Jtine 1972,
and a long -term general trade agreement was being
negotiated in early 1973. Despite this modest
improvement in bilateral ties, however, the U.S.S.R.
and China remain at an impasse on more sensitive
issues, including the border dispute. Although there
has been no major trouble along the frontier since
1969, both countries continue to maintain and
improve their military posture in areas near the border.
Since late 1972, relations between the U.S.S.R. and
Ch...a have been marked by intense competition for
influence in such key areas as the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe, accompanied by a fresh
outbreak of public polemics. Faced with verbal attack
and China's more sophisticated and successful effort
to cultivate friends in the West, the Soviet leaders
seemed to conclude that there was little point in
turning the other cheek. They have responded in kind,
returning to a rehearsal of grievances which they had
laid aside when the border talks began. By the
beginning of 1973 relations had sunk to their lowest
point since 1969.
The Soviet decision to press for as much conformity
within the Communist world as possible at the 1968
multiparty meeting in Budapest was not prompted
solely by the Chinese heresy; it was probably
influenced greatly by problems closer to home. The
ouster of Antonin Novotny from control of the
Czechoslovak party in January 1968, the concurrent
signs of unease in Poland, Romania's determination to
flaunt signs of independence, the progress of West
Germany's new policy of rapprochement with Eastern
Europe, and, not least of all, the intellectual ferment
within the U.S.S.R. itserf evidently persuaded Moscow
that it was necessary to tighten its grip on those parties
it was still able to influence.
39
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The 1968 Budapest consultative meeting was
followed in quick succession by two sessions of the
Warsaw'` Pact nations which again illustrated
Moscow's problems in Eastern Europe. The first, in
Sofia in.late February, found the Romanians once
more at odds. with the Soviet:i and refusing to join the
other six pact members in approving the U.S.- Soviet
daft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation.
The second was a closely guarded gathering of the
six in Dresden, East Germany, in late March. The
main subject was the problem presented by the liberal
reform program being espoused by the new party
hierarchy in Czechoslovakia led by Alexander
Dubcek. The Soviet, Polish, and East German regimes
apparently feared that the program could lead to
demands in their own countries for a similar relaxation
of Communist party control. Further, despite repeated
official Czechoslovak professions of friendship and
solidarity with the U.S.S.R., the temper in
Czechoslovakia appeared to foreshadow a more
independent line in foreign affairs, especially
economic, that would run counter to Moscow's policy
of containing West Germany and might undermine
the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact.
The Soviets responded to Czechoslovakia's growing
assertiveness by leading their loyal Warsaw Pact allies
in a campaign of increasing political and military
pressure. Warsaw Pact troops massed on the
Czechoslovak frontiers, and the Czechoslovak
reformers were subjected to a growing torrent of
propaganda attacks and other pressures which
culminated in the meetings between Czechoslovak
and other Warsaw Pact leaders in late July in Cierna,
and in early August in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.
The failure of the Czechoslovaks to heed warnings
conveyed at these meetings confronted the Soviets
with a choice of allowing the Czechoslovas to pursue
their.own path or of resorting to force to eliminate the
danger that they would spark an uncontrolled political
evolution in the socialist camp. The August 1968
invasion demonstrated that Moscow believed its vital
interests were threatened.
The Soviet rationale for this action, was enunciated
in the so- called Brezhnev doctrine, or "doctrine of
limited sovereignty," which alleges that the U.S.S.R.
and other socialist states have the duty and obligation
to intervene in defense of socialism anywhere it may
be threatened. The "doctrine" underscores both
Moscow's determination to maintain its hegemony in
Eastern Europe and the essential fragility of its
position. With the passage of time the "doctrine" has
been downplayed by the Soviets but never repudiated.
The invasion preserved the Soviet position in
Czechoslovakia (Figure 12), but meant a setback for
40
Moscow in other foreign policy areas. As a result,
Moscow has been concerned to avoid a repetition, and
the greater caution induced by the invasion among the
Eastern Europeans has helped. The net result has been
to create a situation in which the Soviets exercise their
authority and the Eastern Europeans pursue their
national interests by more subtle means.
Moscow. appears willing to tolerate a degree of
deviation from the socialist norm by Eastern European
countries who wish to do so, provided the deviation
remains within certain overall limits. Thus, Hungary
conducts a somewhat experimental economic policy
and, like the new Polish regime, exercises virtual
domestic autonomy. Both countries, however, follow
the Soviet lead closely in foreign policy. Romania
pursues a somewhat independent foreign policy while
maintaining orthodoxy in its internal affairs. Moscow
remains the final arbiter and does not hesitate to show
its disapproval, as in the "war of nerves" with
Romania in 1971. That situation was made more
acute by apparent Chinese meddling in the Balkans.
Soviet- Romanian relations became more normal as the
Chinese "threat" receded, but a renewal of Chinese
activity in Eastern Europe would call forth a firm
Soviet response.
The Soviets have also sought to develop less
heavyhanded methods of coordinating bloc policies.
One new approach has been the conferences of party
leaders held in the Crimea in 1971 and 1972. More
attention has been focused on economic cooperation,
applied thru the mechanism of CEMA. Socialist
economic integration is much stronger on paper than
in practice, however. Moscow at times speaks of a
"socialist commonwealth" but clearly would not
accept the reduction in its role and influence that true
collegiality would entail.
Since 1968, and particularly since 1971, the Soviets
have made a concerted effort to improve relations with
Yugoslavia, highlighted by the Brezhnev -Tito
exchange of visits in 1971 and 1972. Moscow has
accepted Yugoslavia's nonaligned status for the
present and seems primarily concerned with building
economic and political assets that will enable it to
exercise its influence in the post -Tito era.
d. Soviet policy toward the less developed world
Stalin's successors undertook a concerted economic
and political offensive in the less- developed countries
of Africa and Asia designed to supplant the influence
of the West and, as much as possible, to align those
countries with the U.S.S.R. Military aid, starting with
the first large arms deal with Egypt in 1955, has
proved to be Moscow's most effective instrument.
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L.
Economic aid has been used more sparingly. Soviet
economic resources are constantly strained by
domestic demands, and the U.S.S.R. has generally
avoided making the kind of commitment in these
areas that might saddle it with the additional burden
of ,underwriting the economies of struggling and often
unstable countries.
A dynamic aspect of post- Stalin foreign policy has
been this effort to identify the U.S.S.R. with the
aspirations of the developing countries and to gain
influence with nationalist, anticolonialist movements
and governments. Stalin had generally regarded the
"bourgeois" leaders of the Afro -Asian countries as
members of the enemy camp. Hit successors decided
to work with them wherever imsible, hoping at least
to insure their neutrality and to help limit or lessen
Western influence. In fact, when forced to choose
between supporting the local Communists or an anti
Communist, neutralist, or anti- Western group in
power, the U.S.S.R. has often sacrificed the
Communists.
In resorting to conventional diplomacy in much of
the less developed world, the U.S.S.R. has often varied
its tactics according to the nature of the individual
country's ties with the West. To neutrals, the U.S.S.R.
offers generous terms on military and, to a lesser
degree, economic assistance, emphasizes frequent
cultural exchanges, and generally does its utmost to
keep official relations friendly. Toward pro Western
countries, Moscow has increasingly made conciliatory
gestures, including offers of economic assistance, with
the obvious intention of loosening the target countries'
ties with the West. When a country with a
traditionally fixed inclination toward the West
appears susceptible, however slightly, to a change of
orientation, Moscow sometimes offers a wide range of
enticements, including military aid.
In the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. after the mid
1950's allied itself with Arab national interests, whose
rallying point was the struggle against the remnants of
Anglo- French imperialism and against the state of
Israel. Apparently feeling that the area's natural
resources, strategic location and, in many countries,
lingering hostility toward the West offered unique
opportunities, the Soviets have shown a willingness to
involve themselves to an extent unmatched outside the
41
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FIGURE 12. In Eastern Europe, emphasis on stability and detente: Soviet and Czechoslovak
leaders in 1971. From the left: K.F. Katushev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary in
charge of bloc liaison; Vasil Bilak, Secretary in charge of international relations in
Czechoslovak Party; Gustav Huzak, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist
Party; Breihnev and Kosygin; and Alois Indra, member of the Czechoslovak Party
Presidium. (C)

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Communist world. This has included the extension of
considerable military and economic aid and in some
cases the direct involvement of Soviet military
personnel. Moscow has thus been able to make
considerable gains in supplanting Western influence
but it has not been able to escape the pitfalls that
come with abetting a radical nationalism which is
hostile to outside pressure.
just as Egypt has been the centerpiece of.Soviet
efforts in the region, so has it been the area of
Moscow's greatest disappointments. In 1958 the
Soviets were clearly chagrined when Egyptian
President Nasir became President of the United Arab
Republic and promptly suppressed the Syrian
Communists, whose steadily increasing strength
Moscow had been watching with approval. Moscow
was further upset later in the same year by Nasir's all
out propaganda attacks on communism, which were
motivated by his concern over Soviet support for the
pro Communist Qasim regime in Iraq. The ensuing
public exchange of charges between Khrushchev and
Nasir did much to inoculate Arab public opinion
against communism and encouraged Arab skepticism
42
about Soviet motives. The Soviets have since shown
more sensitivity to the danger of overtly supporting
Arab Communists and have encouraged local party
members to join forces with indigenous "progressive"
elements, such as Egypt's Arab Socialist Union. This
more prudent Soviet behavior, however, did not
prevent Moscow's most severe setback, when Egyptian
President Sadat unceremoniously sent Moscow's
military advisers and operatives packing in 1972.
The Soviets had moved rapidly to revalidate their
credentials after the quick Israeli victory over the
Arabs in June 1967 by mounting a rapid military
resupply operation. They also began a continuing
series of "friendship" visits to Arab ports by units of
their greatly enlarged Mediterranean squadron, and
acquired increasing use of Egyptian ports.
With the breakdown of the cease -fire along the Suez
Canal in 1965, Israel began damaging and
humiliating air strikes deep inside Egypt. The Soviets
acted quickly to provide additional military assistance
in support of a state so vital to their position in the
Middle East (Figure 13). In early i970, Moscow sent
Egypt a large number of SA -3 missiles manned
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FIGURE 13. Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko and Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat in happier times (C)

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initially by Soviet crews and established several Soviet
piloted fighter squadrons to fly defensive patrols.
These measures, while pro ;ding security against
Israeli attacks, also led to a serious heightening of
tension in the area as the possibility of a major Soviet
Israeli clash mounted. Tensions eased considerably
when Egypt and Israel accepted the U.S. cease -fire
proposal in August. However, Egypt's frustration over
its inability to achieve any diplomatic or military
gains against Israel after the cease -fire was
instrumental in the subsequent expulsion of Moscow's
military personnel.
Since the Arab- Israeli war, the U.S.S.R. has also
been active in other parts of the Arab world. In late
1967 it reacted in surprisingly rapid and thorough
fashion to a call for help from the newly established
Yemen Arab Republic, whose position vis -a -vis the
royalists had been weakened by the withdrawal of
Egyptian troop support following the war with Israel.
Soviet aircraft transported military supplies and such
basic material as oil to the beleaguered republicans,
and for a brief time Soviet pilots even gave airsupport
to republican fighting forces. The U.S.S.R. also was
able to capitalize on the general anti- Western
sentiment in the Sudan following the war, by
replacing the West as Khartoum's primary source of
military equipment. The gains in Yemen and Sudan
proved to be elusive, however; Sudanese President
Numavri was embittered by a Communist supported
coup attempt against him in 1970, and relations with
Yemen deteriorated because of frictions between Sana
and the leftist government of the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (Aden).
Despite this mixed record in the area, Moscow
continues to pursue an active policy in the Middle
East. It sought increased use of Syrian port facilities
following its ouster from Egypt and stepped tip the
shipment of military supplies to Syria. It maintains an
active program of military aid to Iraq and signed a
friendship treaty with that country in 1972. Even with
basically pro Western countries such as Iran, Jordan
and Lebanon, Moscow has expended considerable
energy on improving relations.
The expansion of Soviet influence among African
states has leveled off since the Khrushchev era. The
Soviets have become much less inclined to count on
local radical or "liberation" movements, apparently
feeling that few of them offer any prospect of early
success. Moscow continues to finance various African
Communist parties, but none of these is much of a
threat to the local government. The military
overthrow of the strongly Soviet supported Nkrumah
government in Ghana in 1966 was a disco uragirig and
embarrassing blow and a lesson in the dangers of
heavy investment in an unstable, albeit radical,
regime. The Soviet image in Africa has suffered also
from the open competition with Communist China,
most notably in the power struggle which split the
Afro -Asian People's Solidarity Organization and
reduced it to almost insignificant proportions. The
public airing of Sino- Soviet differences and the
consequent baring of their ambitions disillusioned
many Africans.
The Soviets are still giving assistance to some of
Africa's more promising rebellious groups. This has
involved the supply of some military equipment
(through neighboring sympathetic governments),
propaganda, funds, and even guerrilla training, but
the main Soviet effort to influence local events is made
through the normal channels of diplomacy and
economic and cultural exchanges. The most dramatic
instance of Soviet military assistance on the African
continent occurred in late 1967, when the Soviets
:>;rlifted fighter aircraft and other material to help the
federal government of Nigeria during the civil war. On
a more sustained basis, the Soviets have provided
military assistance for Somalia's armed forces and
gained in return some useful access to ports and other
facilities in that country. Nevertheless, the Soviets
have tightened their purse strings throughout most of
Africa and weigh carefully the merits of any
investment of prestige as well as money.
In Latin America, the Cuban revolution in 1959
gave the U.S.S.R. a chance to show its support for a
socialist country within the shadow of the United
States. Castro's radicalism, however, came into
conflict with larger Soviet interests in the area. The
Soviets believed that Castro's revolutionary tactics
were quixotic and historically untimely in relation to
present conditions in Latin America. Although they
tried privately and publicly to disassociate themselves
from his philosophy of "exported" revolution, they did
not lessen their vital economic and military support.
Cuba's economy is unique in its almost total
dependence on Moscow.
The Soviet -Cuban relationship began to improve
after the death of Che Guevara, which prompted
Castro to reexamine his revolutionary strategy for
Latin America and to place less stress on violence
where conditions were unfavorable. The improvement
in relations also owed much to Castro's qualified
endorsement of the Soviet intervention in Czecho-
slovakia. Castro visited the U.S.S.R. twice in 1972.
One consequence of the first visit, Cuba's entry into
the Moscow dominated Council for Economic
Mutual Assistance (CEMA) served to further
43
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underscore Cuban dependence on Soviet support. In
the wake of Havana's decision to join CEMA, the
Soviets provided some additional economic aid, but
there continue to be signs that both sides are
uncomfortable with the extent of Cuba's economic
dependence on the U.S.S.R.
Elsewhere in Latin America, the Soviets continue to
cultivate improved relations on the basis of the
conventional tools of diplomacy. A relatively recent
development in Moscow's policy has been its changed
attitude toward military regimes. The military
government of Peru has been singled out by Moscow
for special praise. The election of Salvador Allende, a
Marxist, as President of Chile in 1970 has been viewed
by the Soviets as a vindication of their thesis that
electoral tactics by Marxist parties can be successful in
parliamentary democracies. Nonetheless, the Chilean
economy is in serious trouble, and Soviet aid to
Allende has been grudging at best.
e. International organizations
The Soviet Union has been a member of the United
Nations and most of its subsidiary and related
organizations since 1945. Although outvoted by wide
margins in the early postwar years and casting more
than 100 vetoes in the Security Council during that
period, the U.S.S.R. has benefited from the
subsequent expansion of U.N. membership and now
regards the organization as a useful forum in which to
launch various "peace initiatives." However, Moscow
has retained a most conservative attitude toward the
assumption of real power by the U.N. It has opposed
any substantial amendment of the 1945 Charter in this
direction, and has insisted that peacekeeping
operations be controlled by the Security Council
where Moscow could exercise its veto.
Since the late 1950's, the U.S.S.R. has devoted
considerable attention to international disarmament
negotiations. A series of talks with the United States at
that time led to the superpowers' call for convening an
18- nation Geneva disarmament conference in 1962.
That body, which has since then grown to 25
participating states, has negotiated the f1h111'i Space
Treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty, il k it. treaty
banning weapons of mass destruction from the ocean
floor, and a convention curbing biological weapons.
The last of these is not yet formally in force. In each
case, the United States and Soviet negotiators worked
out many of the details in private, but their allies and
the nonalined members also made significant
contributions. The U.S.S.R. continues to give the
Geneva forum priority despite its propagandistic
support for a world disarmament conference.
44
The Soviet attitude toward regional organizations is
ambivalent. Moscow is nominally a member of some
of the regional economic organizations subordinate to
the U.N., but it has not been very active. Manv other
existing regional organizations were created or
expanded by one side or the other during the period of
the cold war, with the Soviet effort guided by the
desire to preserve and expand its hegemony. The
Soviets have, of course, been especially critical of
military alliances, such as NATO, aimed at restricting
Communist advances. Soviet control of the Warsaw
Pact, created in 1955 as a counter to NATO, has been
exercised as much for political as for military ends.
More in a state of flux at present is the Soviet
attitude toward the European Economic Community.
The development of this organization, particularly its
expansion to nine member states on 1 January 1973,
has forced a reexamination of Soviet policies. The
U.S.S.R. realizes that it can no longer hope to reverse
the development of the EC, but it continues to seek
ways to limit the political integration of Western
Europe. One way the Soviets have sought to counter
the trend toward West European integration is by
pressing for bilateral economic agreements with
individual countries and seeking equal status for
CEMA.
E. Threats to government stability (S)
1. Discontent and dissidence
The attitude of the majority of the Soviet citizenry
toward the regime ranges from pride in its
achievements to passive acceptance of its political and
social strictures. The dissatisfaction and cynicism
engendered by the pervasive shortfalls and imperfec-
tions of Soviet life are not of a magnitude necessary to
inspire a broad -based and active opposition.
Outspoken dissent is rare, and confined to individuals
or groups particularly sensitive to inequities. The latter
category includes intellectuals and members of
national minorities, such as the Jews.
The evident contradictions between the proclaimed
ideals of the regime and the realities of Soviet life are
at the root of much dissidence. The unwillingness of
the regime to brook any opposition or even the
expression of dissent to its policies contrasts sharply
with the lipservice it pays to concepts of socialism,
democracy, equality, and human rights. The Soviet
intelligentsia has produced a small corps of active and
bold individuals who are unwilling to tolerate in
silence this discrepancy between ideals and practice,
and who demand that the proclaimed rights and
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freedoms of the Soviet citizen be accepted and,
respected by the state. These demands, and criti-
cisms of official abuses, have been expressed in a
variety of samizdat (self published) publications, such
as the Chronicle of Current Events founded in 1968.
As a multinational but highly centralized state, the
Soviet Union is susceptible to the pressures generated
by the resentments of its minority nationalities against
the central system dominated and represented by the
Great Russians. The Soviet response to the problem of
multi nationalism has been the establishment of
autonomous territorial units for significant national
minorities and far ranging legal guarantees for the free
development of diverse national cultures. However,
the purported autonomy enjoyed by the minority
peoples is largely theoretical and is considerably
limited by controls exercised from the center �a factor
rooted in the fundamental intolerance of the system to
any form of genuine local self -rule, whether based on
cultural differences or not.
As a result, nationalist sentiment of various kinds
continues to be endemic to many of the minority
republics. Nationalist feelings and anti- Russian
sentiment have been particularly marked in the Baltic
states, the western Ukraine and Moldavia, and may be
evident in parts of Central Asia as well. Lithuania was
the scene of violent public disturbances in 1972, and
the circulation of massive petitions decrying
oppression of the national Catholic faith demon-
strated the depth of feeling in that republic. Public
disturbances are also reported to have occurred in the
Central Asian cities of Chimkent and Tashkent in
1968 and 1969. The Crimean Tatars, expelled from
their homeland to Central Asia after World War 1I,
have presented another small but irritating problem to
the Soviet authorities because of their persistent
demands to be allowed to return to the Crimea.
The Soviet Union's Jewish minority, even more than
the populations of the national republics, has
presented an unsettling challenge to the regime.
Jewish pride and interest in the Israeli state and Jewish
culture and history rose sharply after the Israeli victory
in the Arab Israeli war in 1967. Jewish national feeling
found concrete expression in demands to be allowed to
leave the Soviet Union and emigrate to Israel.
Jewish agitation, combined with widespread
support in the West for the Jewish cause, impelled the
authorities to permit a significant relaxation of the
barriers to emigration. Jewish emigration in 1971
totaled more than 14,000, and in 1972 about 32,000.
The dimensions of the Jewish exodus caused the
regime in Aegust 1972 to place new and indirect
controls on emigration through the imposition of high
exit fees, but this measure 1,as not yet appreciably
affected the emigration. Since then, these financial
controls have been tacitly ended, largely in response to
external pressures, and replaced by reliance on the
state's control over exit visas.
The Jews �and, to a lesser extent, the other
nationalities �have compounded the anxieties of the
regime by making common cause with the intellectual
dissidents. Soviet willingness to tolerate Jewish
emigration probably has been in part determined by
the leadership's interest in weakening this informal
alliance of interests by permitting the departure of
Jewish activists.
The blend of repression and tolerance which has
characterized Soviet handling of the Jews has also
typified its attempts to cope with the intellectual
dissidents. A few have been sent into de facto exile in
the West. Others, such as Petr Yakir, the most recent
reputed unofficial leader of the Moscow dissidents,
have been subject to investigation, arrest, and
imprisonment. Beginning in 1972, Soviet security
forces have made a persistent and systematic effort to
wipe out the more conspicuous underground
publications, particularly the Chronicle of Current
Events. Their efforts have met with some -but not
complete� success in reducing the flow of dissident
protest materials to the West.
The forceful but essentially pragmatic response of
the regime to the problem of dissidence and agitation
has so far proved capable of holding the most active
sources of discontent and dissidence within tolerable
limits. Moreover, the regime's policy has been
deliberately divisive. Neither the intellectuals nor the
dissidents of minority nationalities have managed to
establish the sort of broad -based support among the
rural or urban masses which would permit them to
pose any threat to the stability of the regime.
In spite of the prevailing political inertia of the
Soviet masses, considerable discontent does exist. The
evidence suggests, however, that this discontent is
basically economic in nature, and does not represent
political alienation that might develop the capability
to challenge the foundations of Soviet power. The
Soviet leadership is aware of the need to prevent
economic discontent from being converted into active
protest. It has repeatedly proclaimed its intention of
improving the situation of the Soviet consumer, most
conspicuously at the 24th Congress in 1971. The rise in
overall living standards has been slow, but appreciable
enough to keep the population quiescent. Despite the
locally adverse effects of the 1972 agricultural
shortfalls on consumer welfare, there was no evidence
45
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as of early 1973 that resulting sporadic economic
discontent would be translated into meaningful
political strains.
2. Subversion
No organized subversive groups of any real
significance are known to exist in the U.S.S.R. This, of
course, does not prevent the regime from regarding as
subversive a wide variety of special interest groups that
have proved resistant to central control. These include
nationalistic groups such as Lithuanian and Ukrainian
dissidents, religious groups such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Baptists, and the various
intellectual and dissident groups.
Representatives of all these categories have been
arrested and tried for allegedly hostile or anti- Soviet
activities. There is no evidence, however, that their
activity has posed any threat to the regime's political
or social stability.
F. Maintenance of internal security (S)
1. Police
The regular, uniformed police are a component part
of a system of internal security forces subordinate to
the primary law enforcement agency, the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD). In addition to the police, the
MVD controls the functions of several militarized and
semimilitarized internal security forces, such as the
Interior troops, convoy guards, and the like. However,
the Frontier Troops charged with border control and
the physical protection of state frontiers -are
subordinate to the primary security and intelligence
agency, the KGB. The functions and investigative
work of the MVD are generally limited to cases of a
nonpolitical nature, although it sometimes assists the
KGB in the investigation of cases involving state
security.
The local agencies of public order under the
jurisdiction of the republic MVD's have a very wide
sphere of responsibility. They are responsible not only
for the normal maintenance of public order including
traffic control in the cities, but are also in charge of
firefighting, the maintenance of governmental
archives, and administration of the penal system. In
addition, they are charged with responsibility for
combating various lesser forms of social miscondtict.
Juvenile delinquency and public drunkenness are the
two prime problem areas in this category. Alcohol
ism�a widespread social problem in the U.S.S.R.�
has been a particular target of propaganda and police
action since 1970, but with few signs of success. The
46
problem of drug addiction is still a relatively minor
one in the U.S.S.R. There are indications, however,
that it is one of growing proportions in some areas,
particularly in the Caucasus and in the Asian
republics. The efforts of regular police units in
combating social ills of this type are supplemented by
the activities of citizen volunteers. Such groups lack
the full auth(Aty of the regular police but are
nevertheless in a position to detain offenders and exert
social pressure.
The primary function of the police �the main-
tenance of public order and security �is focused on
the application of a stringent system of internal
controls. Much of their time is spent on the operation
of an elaborate and rigorously enforced internal
passport system. In "controlled areas," such as
Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic republics, major urban
areas, and the entire border zone, settlement is tightly
controlled and local MVD sections issue passports
which residents must carry at all times. All Soviet
citizens must register with the local MVD any change
in residence exceeding 3 days in cities and 30 days in
rural areas.
The MVD is in charge of applying controls on
emigration and travel abroad through its Office of
Visas and Registration (OVIR). This office maintains
branches in all major urban centers, and is responsible
for issuing passports and exit visas for foreign travel. It
is also responsible for administering the education fees
which have been imposed on emigrants to "non
socialist" countries since August 1972 but are now
suspended. These fees, which may total up to 30,000
rubles for university graduates with advanced degrees,
function as an indirect brake on emigration. Jewish
emigrants, who form by far the largest single element
in the flow of emigration, have been particularly
affected.
In addition, the MVD administers the extensive
Soviet penal system, which houses both criminal and
political offenders. Prison camps, or "corrective labor
colonies" are still a prominent feature of the Soviet
penal system. They no longer play as significant a role
in the Soviet economy as they did during the Stalinist
era, when prison labor was used for some of the major
construction projects of the period. Prison sentences,
which may range from 3 months to 15 years, are
normally served in a labor camp. Regular prisons, in
the general Western sense, are normally used for
pretrial detention and for the confinement of violators
of camp discipline.
Labor camps are divided into four categories in
accordance with the severity of the regimen: general,
intensified, strict, and special. The most severe are the
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special camps, which are generally reserved for
criminal recidivists and some political prisoners.
Although the number of inmates is much smaller than
it was in the Stalinist era, when estimates ranged as
high as 20 million, it is still quite large. It is estimated
that the total population of the Soviet penal system is
more than 2 million, with the great majority (about
1.8 million) in labor camps. Prison labor still enjoys
local economic significance in some areas, particularly
in bleak and inhospitable areas of the North and Far
East where there are serious shortages of free labor.
As a rule, the officials and uniformed police of the
MVD appear to perform their duties without undue
harshness. Nevertheless, they do not enjoy a
particularly good public image, because of a
widespread reputation for incompetence. From the
viewpoint of the leadership, however, the police force
constitutes a reliable bulwark of the regime. The MVD
is completely responsive to the control of the party
leadership, and there are no known problems of
morale of any significance.
2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities
The Soviet police and the KGB have proved
themselves to be reliable and relatively efficient
instruments for the containment and suppression of
dissidence. The activities of the most serious sources of
oppositionist activity in the Soviet Union �the
dissident intellectuals and the more militant national
groups �have been held within tolerable and easily
controllable limits. The KGB campaign against the
intellectuals took on renewed impetus in 1972 with the
opening of the so- called Case 24, an effort to put an
end to the Chronicle of Current Events, the most
significant of the regularly published samizdat
journals. The KGB campaign 'has not succeeded in
completely eliminating samizdat, but it has produced
many arrests, sent many of the most prominent
dissidents into semivoluntary exile, and frightened
others into silence.
The security forces have also enjoyed relatively good
success in damping down national agitation. The most
activist ethnic minority, the Jews, forms a special
category. The regime has reacted to the pressures of
this group �and their foreign supporters �by
permitting them the escape hatch of emigration, thus
lessening the control problems of the police and
security forces. Manifestations of discontent by other
minority groups have been dealt with more harshly,
and apparently effectively. Disturbances in Lithuania
in 1972, for i:xample, were localized and prevented
from spreading, and many of the participants were
arrested and sentenced to prison terms.
The work of the security forces is greatly facilitated
by the control apparatus of the Communist Party and
its subsidiary organizations, such as the Komsomol
and the trade unions. All have a primary responsibility
for the maintenance of the existing order, and exercise
significant control functions over their members. In
addition, powerful social inhibitions against
dissidence are at work in Soviet society. The would -be
dissident is threatened with the loss of livelihood,
public denunciation and excoriation, and exclusion
from all professional contacts and from the formal
mainstream of society.
G. Selected bibliography (U /OU)
1. Political history� general works
Chamberlin, William Henry. The Russian
Revolution 1917 -1921. New York and London:
MacMillan, 1952. Based on extensive research in
Soviet archives and libraries. A readable and generally
objective book that is still considered highly useful.
Clarkson, Jesse D. A History of Russia. New York:
Random House, 1961. A general history, con-
centrating on the last four centuries but with generous
space to the Soviet period. Useful also for its maps,
illustrations, and chronological tables.
Sumner, Benedict H. Short History of Russia. New
York: Harcourt Paperback, 1962. An examination of
the persisting main tendencies in Russian history as
seen by a distinguished historian.
Ulam, Adam B. The Bolsheviks. New York:
MacMillan, 1965. A scholarly study of Lenin and his
followers.
Venturi, Franco. Roots of the Revolution. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960. Translated from the
Italian. A thorough survey of the 19th century Russian
revolutionary movements. Contains penetrating
biographic studies of important Russian revolution-
aries.
Vernadsky, George. A History of Russia. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961 (fifth revised
edition). One of the most acclaimed introductions to
Russian history by an eminent American scholar.
Wolfe, Bertram D. Three Who Made a Revolution.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. A study of Lenin, Trotsky,
and Stalin before 1917.
2. Party and government
Armstrong, John A. Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A
Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus. New York:
Praeger, 1967. An intensive study of administration of
the Ukraine since 1930.
47
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Ideology, Politics and Government in the
Soviet Union. New York: Praeger, 1967 (revised
edition). A good introductory study of the Soviet
political system.
Barghoom, Frederick C. Soviet Russian National-
ism. New York: Oxford, 1965. Investigates Soviet
policy toward the minority nationalities in the
U. S. S. R.
Brezinski, Zbigniew. Ideology and Power in Soviet
Politics. New York: Praeger, 1962. Five essays by the
author which analyze Tsarist, Bolshevik, and Soviet
management of political affairs.
Brezhnev, Leonid I. Collected Speeches and
Writings. Moscow: 1970 and 1972. This is the first
collection of Brezhnev's writings to be published in the
Soviet Union. It includes speeches given by Brezhnev
between 1964 -72, avoiding the Khrushchev era.
Conquest, Robert. Great Terror. New York:
MacMillan, 1968. A massive, scholarly, documented
study of Stalin's Great Purge. Als provides much
material on the changes in Soviet politics and society
under Stalin. A bibliographical essay and appendices
add value to this book.
The Last Empire. London: Ampersand,
1962. A study of Soviet expansion in Central Asia and
subsequent policy toward the minority nationalities
there.
Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R. London:
MacMillan, 1961. An analysis of some of the major
issues of Soviet internal policy tinder Stalin and during
Khrushchev's ascendancy.
The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities.
London: MacMillan, 1960. A brief account of the
deportations of the various minority nationalities
under Stalin, along with a larger section devoted to
official Soviet pronouncements relevant to the
deportations.
Crankshaw, Edward. Khrushchev. London: Collins,
1966. A biography, notable for its account of
Khrushchev's career as a party bureaucrat.
Crowley, Edward L., et al (editorial). Prominent
Personalities in the U.S.S.R. Metuchen, New Jersey:
The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968. A directory
containing 6,015 biographies of prominent personali-
ties in the Soviet Union.
Dallin, Alexander and Larson, Thomas B. (eds.).
Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice -Hall, 1968. A collection of essays
outlining major post -1964 developments in both
Soviet domestic and foreign policy.
Dzvuba, Ivan. Internationalism or Russifieation.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968. An
exhaustively documented study of the theory and the
48
practice of the Soviet nationalities policy in the
Ukraine. The author, a Ukrainian, wrote this book in
1965 and attempted to have it published in the Soviet
Union �which engendered trouble with the author-
ities. The book is written in Marxist- Leninist terms,
but it nevertheless exposes Soviet ruthlessness.
Fainsod, Merle. How Russia Is Ruled. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1963. An authoritative
study of the structure of the CPSU and the Soviet
Government.
Smolensk under Soviet Rule. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1958. A masterly study
based on the complete Smolensk Party files for 1917-
38 which were captured by the Germans in Smolensk
during World War II.
Hahn, Werner G. The Politics of Soviet Agriculture,
1960 -1970. Londov: Johns Hopkins, 1972. An in-
depth study of So% iet agricultural politics over the past
decade.
Hvland, William and Shryock, Richard W. The Fall
of Khrushchev. New York::'unk and Wagnalls, 1968.
A very readable account of foreign policy ventures as
they entwined with internal struggles within the
Kremlin to culminate in the downfall and shelving of
party chairman Khrushchev.
Kolkowitz, Roman. Soviet Military and the
Communist Party. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1967. A Rand Corporation research study.
Traces the course of conflict between military and
political leaders in the U.S.S.R. over such issues as
political indoctrination in the ranks, one -man
command, and responsibility for doctrinal innovation.
Linden, Carl E. Khrushchev and the Soviet
Leadership, 1957 -1964. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1966. Analytic survey of major issues debated
during the Khrushchev era, focusing on sources of
internal opposition that ultimately brought about the
Soviet leader's ouster.
Pipes, Richard, The Formation of the Soviet Union:
Communism and Nationalism 1917 -1923. Cam
b ridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. A detailed and
seholarly study of early Bolshevik policy toward the
minority nationalities in the U.S.S.R. Includes an
excellent bibliography.
Shapiro, Leonard. Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. New York: Random, 1960. A highly
recommended and comprehensive historical survey
and analysis.
Government and Politics of the Soviet
Union. New York: Random, 1965 (revised edition). A
basic introduction to the structure of the party and
government.
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Wiling, H. Gordon and Griffiths, Franklyn (eds.).
Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1971. The well -known work
concerned with attempts to use interest group studies
in the analysis of Soviet politics. It contains
contributions by many of the most influential
advocates of this approach, and treats the role played
by the party apparatchiki, .aanagers, military, and
other groups significant in Soviet society.
Stillman, Edmund. Bitter Harvest. New York:
Praeger, 1959. A collection of dissident writings from
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Swearer, Howard R. The Politics of Succession in
the U.S.S.R. New York: Little, Brown, 1964. The role
of the party as a stabilizer in succession problems.
Talbot, Strobe (trans. and ed.) Khrushchev
Remembers. Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1970. The
controversial and fragmentary "memoirs of the
former Soviet leader. An anecdotal treatment of the
Stalinist and post Stalinist years and Khrushchev's
colleagues in the leadership.
Tatu, Michael. Power in the Kremlin. London:
Collins, 1969. Translated from the French. A det pled
and perceptive study of the interplay of political forces
and personalities in the Soviet leadership. Mr. Tatu
served as Moscow correspondent of Le Monde from
1957 to 1964.
Ulam, Adam B. New Face of Soviet Totalitarian-
ism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963
(reissued in paperback by Praeger, New York). Covers
Stalin's role, the agricultural crisis since 1953, Sino-
Soviet relations, and the CPSU 22d Congress. The
author emphasizes the growing irrelevance of Marxist
Leninist ideas.
Uralov, Alexander (pen name of A. Kunta). The
Reign of Stalin. London: The Bodley Head, 19a3.
Translated from the French. Stalinist policy toward
the minority nationalities. The author was a member
of the Communist Party from 1926 to 1937 and
contributed to the Soviet Encyclopedia.
3. Foreign policy
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., et. al. Khrushchev and the
Arms Race. Cambridge: MCC Press, 1966. A study of
the relationship between Soviet nuclear arms
development and Soviet foreign policy. Contains a
careful chronological account of what was known
about the real levels of Soviet nuclear delivery forces
between 1954 and 1964. The book has much useful
information but has been criticized for its far- reaching
analysis of data that was not complete.
Dallin, David J. Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin.
Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961. The Stalinist legacy to
his successors, the first period of transition, and the
Khrushchev era are surveyed with a view toward
establishing the variables and the constants in Soviet
foreign, policy after Stalin.
Gittings, John A. (ed.). Survey of the Sino- Soviet
Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent
Polemics, 1963 -1967. London and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968. Perhaps the best single
compilation of major issues in the Sino- Soviet split,
bringing into one volume extracts from all significant
documents through the end of 1967.
Kaznacheev, Aleksandr. Inside a Soviet, Embassy.
New York: Lippincott, 1962. The author, a former
Soviet diplomat, was serving in the Soviet Embassy in
Rangoon when he defected. His book is valuable for
information about the diplomatic and intelligence
activities of official Soviet missions abroad.
Kennan, George F. Soviet Foreign Policy 1917 -41.
New York and London: Van Nostrand, 1960. A first
class introductory study which includes a documen-
tary section that is useful for familiarization with the
jargon of Marxist diplomacy from Lenin to
Khrushchev.
Laqueur, Walter. Struggle for the Middle East.
New York: Praeger, 1969. The latest in the author's
series of works on Soviet policy in the Middle East; an
analytical examination of the multiple factors at play
in the Soviet involvement in the Arab- Israeli conflict.
Littell, Robert (ed.). The Czech Black Book.
London: Pall Mall, 1969. Czechoslovakia's refutation
of the Soviet White Book called On Events in
Czechoslovakia, which set forth Soviet excuses for its
invasion in 1968 and numerous accusations political,
military, ideological� against Czechoslovakia. The
Black Book, which was prepared by the Czechoslovak
Academy of Sciences, refutes the accusations point by
point.
Mackintosh, J. M. Strategy and Tactics of Soviet
Foreign Policy. London and New York: Praeger, 1962.
A study of the influence of military thinking on Soviet
foreign policy.
Ra'anan, Uri. The U.S.S.R. Arms the Third World.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969. Employing as case
studies the Soviet military aid programs in Indonesia
and the United Arab Republic, presents a thought
provoking analysis of Soviet objectives and methods in
the developing states.
Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence:
History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917 -1967. New
York: Praeger, 1968. The author, a professor of
49
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government at Harvard, is a leading American writer
on Soviet developments. The treatment of the Cuban
missile crisis is especially noteworthy.
Zimmerman, William A. Soviet Perspectives On
International Relations, 1956 -1967. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1969. The best of recently
published works utilizing "new" methodology;
examines internal Soviet commentary on foreign
problems as a reflection of changing attitudes among
Soviet decisionmakers.
4. judicial system
Berman, Harold J., and Quigley, John B., Jr. (eds.).
Basic Laws on the Structure of the Soviet State.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. A
collection of basic Soviet laws defining the political
structure of the Soviet state legislative, ad-
ministrative, and judicial aspects. Also includes the
Rules of the Communist Party. Documents are
presented as amended to 1 October 1968. The author,
a professor of law at Harvard University, is a specialist
on Soviet law.
Berman, Harold 1. Justice in the U.S.S.R.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963 (revised
and enlarged edition). An interpretation of Soviet law
and its function in Soviet society by one of the leading
American writers on Soviet legal institutions.
Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. A
translation of the Soviet criminal code and a detailed
commentarv.
Conquest, Robert (ed.). Justice and the Legal
System in the U.S.S.R. New York: Praeger; London:
Bodley Head, 1968. A concise introduction to the
theory and practice of law and the judicial system in
the U.S.S.R. Part of the Bodley Head Soviet Studies
series.
Soviet Police System. New York: Praeger;
London: Bodley Head, 1968. A short, accurate history
of the Soviet police system from 1917 to 1967.
Although in need of updating, the hook is an excellent
introduction to the function and structure of the police
system in the U.S.S.R. Also part of the Bodley Head
se ri es.
Grzybowski, Kazimierz. Soviet Legal Institutions:
Doctrines and Social Functions. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1962. The development
of Soviet legal institutions from the Revolution to the
early 1960's. Contains a good bibliography.
Kelsen, Hans. The Communist Theory of Law. New
York: Praeger, 1955. A useful study, that analyzes the
legal theories of Lenin, Stalin, Vyshinsky, and others.
50
Describes the theory of internati (,,gal law set forth by
Korovin and Krylov. Shows how Soviet lawyers must
operate within the framework of Communist doctrine.
Litvinov, Pavel. Demonstration at Pushkin Square.
Boston: Gambit Publishers, 1969. This book is one of
the most significant pieces of dissident Soviet
literature, partly because the author is the grandson of
Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet foreign minister under
Stalin. It is comprised of a series of notes concerning
the 1967 trials of several demonstrators arrested in
Moscow's Pushkin Square. They were protesting the
arrest of another earlier group of Soviet dissidents who
had compiled The White Book, a documentary record
of the activities, trial, and imprisonment of Sinyaysky
and Daniel, the young Soviet writers who had
published material critical of the regime under the pen
names Abram Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak.
Marchenko, Anatoly. My Testimony. New York:
E.P. Dutton Co., 1969. Translated from the
Russian. A young Soviet worker's firsthand description
of conditions in Soviet prisons and forced labor camps
in the 1960's. The book is banned in the U.S.S.R., and
the author is again in prison.
Morgan, Glenn G. Soviet Administration of
Legality �The Role of the Attorney General's Office.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. The history
of the Soviet procuracy from 1922 to 1961, and
debates in Soviet legal circles about the proper and
constitutional functions of the procuracy.
Reddaway, Peter (trans. and ed.). Uncensored
Russia. New York: McGraw Hill, 1972. A selection of
material from the Chronicle of Current Events, the
most prominent of the samizdat journals.
Vyshinsky, Andrei Ya. (ed.). The Law of the Soviet
State. New York and London: MacMillan, 1948.
Translated from the Russian. The official Soviet
interpretation of the 193E constitution and a
documented analysis of the laws relating to the courts,
elections, and citizen's rights and duties, by the former
Soviet Public Prosecutor (later foreign minister).
5. Propaganda and security
Barghoorn, Frederick C. The Soviet Image of the
United States: A Study in Distortion. New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1950. A valuable studv of how the
Soviet Union used news and propaganda before and
during World War II to mold Russian opinion of the
United States.
Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1964. A documented study
of the propaganda themes and techniques exploited
by the U.S.S.R. to influence the foreign policies of
other countries.
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Brumberg, Abraham. In Quest of Justice. New
York: Praeger, 1969. A collection of political and
literary dissident writings from the Soviet Union.
Buzek, Antony. How the Communist Press Works.
London: Pall Mall Press, 1964. An important work for
a basic understanding of the press in the U.S.S.R. and
the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. The
author worked for the Czechoslovak News Agency for
more than 10 years, holding responsible positions,
before electing to make his home in the United
Kingdom. He discusses the Marxist- Leninist
imperatives for the press to act as an arm of
propaganda and agitation, and describes how the
press works in terms of editorial direction, education
and attitudes of journalists, methods of circulation,
_organization of newspaper offices, the role of the
Communist news. agencies, means for insuring party
control over. publishing, and the evolution of the
Soviet institution.
Inkeles, Alex. Publir, Opinion in Soviet Russia.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. A study
of Soviet propaganda for the masses through oral
agitation, the press, radio, and film. Somewhat dated,
but still to be recommended.
Penkovskiy, Oleg. The Penkovskiy Papers. Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1965. Colonel
1 Penkovskiv, a senior officer in Soviet military
intelligence, furnished. Western intelligence services
with information on Soviet high- level political and
military planning from April 1961 to August 1962. His
reports, collected and published "in this book, provide
much valuable information for an understanding of
Soviet foreign policy under Khrushchev, as well as an
intimate picture of the Soviet military and intelligence
services.
Reisky de Dubnic, Vladimir. Communist Propa-
ganda Methods. New York: Praeger, 1960. A case.
study of Czechoslovakia that focuses on the
Communist Party's indoctrination of its membership
and of the intelligentsia, 1949 -58. A section is devoted
to the Czechoslovak- Soviet Friendship League, and
attention is given throughout the book to Soviet
influence on the indoctrination and propaganda
techniques used in Czechoslovakia during that
country's most repressive era.
Rozenthal, M. and Yudin, P. (eds.). The Short
Philosophical. Dictionary. Moscow: 1939 (reissued in
1941, 1951 -52, 1.954). A basic reference for Soviet
ideologists, newspaper editors, and propagandists.
Willoughby, Charles A. Shanghai Conspiracy. New
York: Dutton, 1952. Concerning the Sorge spy ring,
this book is based on data obtained from captured
Japanese documents. Especially interesting for its
account of the Comintern.
51
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.Chronology
400 -700
Territory of present day European Russia is settled by
Easters Slays.
700-800
Prosperous mercantile state with Khazar hegemony over
Slays is established between lower Volga and Dnepr rivers.
800 -912
Vikings under Rurik use river routes to penetrate Russia;
Kiyev becomes center of their dominion.
990
Christianity is introduced by Vladimir the Saint.
1237 -1240
European Russia is conquered by the Mongol Golden Horde,
beginning two centuries of Tatar rule. l
1380
Prince Dmitry of Muscovy inflicts first defeat on Tatars in
Battle of Kulikovo Field, laying basis for rise of Muscovy in 1
15th century.
1533 -1584
Ivan the Terrible reigns, proclaiming self tsar of the "third
11
1825 -1855
Nicholas I institutes reactionary regime based on autocracy
and Russification, inaugurating systematic use of secret
police against the people.
1857 -1861
Alexander Herzen's revolutionary thought in the weekly
Kolokol (The Bell) is� published abroad with profound
impact on Russian intellectuals.
1861
Serfs are emancipated and commune -type system of peasant
social organization is established.
1876
First Russian revolutionary party, called Land and Liberty
(later People's Will), is formed by Populists.
881
Mounting revolutionary activity of Populists culminates in
assassination of Alexander IL
881 -1894
Alexander III initiates severe repressions of revolutionaries
and fosters pan Slavism.
Rome, Muscovy, and beginning settlement east of Urals. 1898
March
1637
First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor
Russian pioneers reach Pacific coast of Siberia.
1689 -1725
Peter the Great reigns, embarking on far reaching reforms to
"Westernize" Russia and founding Saint Petersburg (now
Leningrad).
1762 -1796
Catherine the Great continues "Westernization" of Russia,
partitions Poland to increase European Russian territory,
inaugurates Russian drive for warm -water ports by acquiring
Crimea.
1801 -1825
Alexander I reigns, withstanding Napoleonic invasion which
reaches Moscow and in the wake of which the Russian army
penetrates France.
1825
Revolt of Decembrists, a small group of noblemen favoring
social reform, fails.
52
Party RSDLP), identified by Soviet Communist Party as
its first congress, is held in Minsk.
1903
August
Second Congress of the RSDLP is held in Brussels and
London, ending in split into Bolshevik and Menshevik
factions.
1905
October� December
First Russian Revolution results in a constitutional reform.
1914
August
Germany declares war on Russia.
1917
March
February Revolution results in abdication of tsar and
formation of Provisional Government.
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November
Bolsheviks seize power in October Revolution and Lenin
becomes Premier.
1918
March
Signing of Treaty of Brest Litovsk removes Russia from war.
Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor
Party renames itself the Russian Communist Party
(Bolsheviks).
1918 -1921
Bolsheviks ultimately prevail over foreign intervention and
civil war.
1921
August
New Economic Policy (NEP) is introduced.
1922
April
Stalin is elected General Secretary of the Communist -Party
(Bolsheviks).
December
Founding congress of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R.) is held.
1924
January
Lenin dies.
1928
October
NEP is abandoned. First Five -Year Economic Plan (1929 -33)
goes into effect.
1929
January
Trotsky is exiled from U.S.S.R.
1930
January
Forced collectivization of peasantry begins.
1932 -1933
Millions die during serious famine.
1934
December
Kirov, Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad, is assassinated; Stalin
starts "great purge" and resign of terror.
1936
December
"Stalin Constitution," which with minor modifications is
still in effect, is adopted.
1939
March
18th Congress of All -Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
is held.
August
Stalin- Hitler pact is signed.
September
Soviet troops occupy eastern Poland.
November
U.S.S.R. invades Finland.
1940
March
Finns cede territory to U.S.S.R.
August
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are incorporated into U.S.S.R.
1941
April
Nonagression pact is signed with Japan.
June
Germany invades U.S.S.R.
1945
February
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin attend Yalta Conference.
July� August
Truman, Attlee, and Stalin attend Potsdam Conference to
draft World War II peace settlements.
U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan.
1947
September
Zhdanov's "two camps" speech intensifies opposition to
West and leads to establishment of Cominform.
1948
March
Allied Control Commission ceases to function in Berlin.
June
Cominform announces expulsion of Yugoslavia.
August
Soviet blockade of land access to Berlin by French, U.S., and
U.K. occupation forces becomes total.
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1949
January
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) is created
to promote intrabloc cooperation and to counteract Marshall
Plan.
February
Anti Jewish campaign results in arrest and execution of
numerous authors.
May
Moscow agrees to lift Berlin blockade.
September
First nuclear explosion takes place in U.S.S.R.
October
Communist regime is recognized by U.S.S.R. as sole govern-
ment of China.
1950
February
Thirty -year Sino- Soviet alliance is concluded.
1952
October
19th Party Congress (first since 1939) renames party "Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union" (CPSU), revises party
rules, and renames Politburo "Presidium."
1953
January
Soviet doctors, mostly Jewish, are charged with plot to kill
Soviet leaders on orders of Western intelligence.
March
Stalin dies; Malenkov is named chairman of Council of
Ministers and dropped from Party Secretariat, leaving
Khrushchev the senior secretary.
April
Doctors' Plot is reversed.
June
Police chief Beriya is arrested for plotting to seize power.
July
Korean armistice is signed.
August
First thermonuclear device is detonated in U.S.S.R.
September
Khrushchev is named First Secretary of CPSU.
December
Execution of Beriya and top associates is announced.
54
1954
March
Central Committee approves increased grain production by
"opening up virgin lands." Committee for State Security
(KGB) is established.
April �July
U.S.S.R. participates in Geneva Foreign Ministers Con-
ference on Korea and Indochina, which concludes agreements
on Vietnam and Laos.
1955
February
Bulganin succeeds Malenkov as Chairman of Council of
Ministers.
May
Warsaw Pact establishes joint command over most Soviet
bloc armed forces.
Austrian State Treaty is signed 15 May, ending Allied
occupation.
Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Belgrade to patch
up Yugoslav- Soviet feud.
July
Big Four Summit conference at Geneva attempts to facilitate
solution of East -West problems in Europe.
1956
February
20th Party Congress convenes. Khrushchev denounces Stalin
in secret speech.
April
Dissolution of Cominform is announced.
October
Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov visit
Poland in effort to reverse Gomulka's liberalization measures;
Soviet leaders accept Gomulka measures upon being made
aware of their need to prevent revolt and when assured of
Poland's continued loyalty to U.S.S.R.
October November
Hungarian revolt is crushed by Soviet troops.
1957
February
Khrushchev's scheme for reorganization of industrial man-
agement is accepted by Party Central Committee.
June
Minority in Party Presidium votes to oust Khrushchev, who
turns the tables by appealing to Central Committee. So-
called antiparty group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov,
and Shepilov is then expelled from Party Presidium and
Central Committee.
October
Soviet Union launches first earth satellite.
Central Committee expels Marshal Zhukov from Party
Presidium and calls for tightening of party controls over
armed forces.
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1858
Maaeb
Kbrushefaev replftt" Oulganin as Chairman of Council of
Ministef while V#wwining Party First Secretary.
September
Khrushchev proposes reform to improve Soviet educational
system by increasing vocational training.
November
Khrushchev demands termination of Western occupation
rights in West Berlin.
1959
January
U.S.S.R. launches "cosmic rocket."
January February
21st Congress of CPSU approves Seven -Year Plan and
atta -�ks "antiparty" group.
September
Soviet moon rocket is successfully launched. Khrushchev
pays official visit to United States.
September- October
Khrushchr+ visits Mao Tse -tung in Peking during festivities
marking 10M anniversary of Chinese People's Republic.
1960
January
U.S.S.R. announces plan to cut armed forces by 1.2 million.
May
Khrushchev announces downing of U.S. U -2 plane. Big Four
Summit meeting on Germany, Berlin, and disarmament
canceled.
June
Sino Soviet dispute flares at Bucharest bloewide conference
and World Federation of Trade Unions General Council
session, Peking.
July
Soviet fighter shoots down U.S. RB-47 plane over inter
national waters; surviving crew is imprisoned.
September- October
Khrushchev attends U.N. General Assembly in New York,
caters to African nations, and demands U.N. reorganization.
November December
Moscow conference of Communist parties attempts to resolve
Sino- Soviet dispute.
1961
April
First manned space vehicle is orbited.
June
Khrushchev meets in Vienna with President Kennedy on
East -West issues.
August
Berlin wall is built, stopping refugee flow firma East Germaar
October
22d Party Congress adopts new party program to replace one
adopted in 1919 and revises party rules.
1962
March
U.S.S.R. participates in 1 8-nation disarmament talks which
open in Geneva.
October
Soviet missiles in Cuba create crisis.
November
Party is reorganized into virtually separate organizations for
agricultural and industrial affairs.
1963
March
Government is reorganized; Supreme Council of National
Economy is formed.
Jane
Brezhnev and Podgorny are added to Party Secretariat.
U.S.S.R. and United States agree to establish direct teletype
communication link "hot line between Moscow and
Washington.
August
U.S.S.R. and United States agree to ban all nuclear testing
except underground explosions.
September
U.S.S.R. begins purchase of an ultimate 12.5 million tons of
wheat from abroad after disastrous year in grain and fodder
production.
October
Khrushchev launches anajor &I*mical industry program with
strong accent on eheinkal Support for agriculture.
1964
April
U,,%At announces ugreertawnt to t.; cluee production of
fias(ohif hb# materials for wQppons.
Oclobw
Three -man vehicle carries pilot, engineer, and medical doctor
into space.
Khrushchev is ousted from party and government jobs,
being replaced as Party First Secretary by Brezhnev and as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Kosygin.
November
November 1962 party reorganization is reversed.
December
New U.S.S.R. regime postpones �until March 1965 �meet-
ing of 26 Communist parties called for December by Khru-
shchev to prepare for convocation of world Communist meet-
ing on Sino Soviet dispute.
55
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1965
February
Premier Kosygin 'lanoi, Peking, and Pyongyang in
effort to heal disun, in Communist movement.
A[erch
Nineteen Communist parties attending "consultative" meet-
ing disband without agreement on date for world meeting.
Brezhnev launches massive new program promising g�-rn-
ment support to agriculture on a scale unprecedented in
Soviet history.
Soviet cosmonaut accomplishes first "walk in space."
September� October
Government is reorganized; national and regional councils
of national economy (somarkhozy) are abolished and pre -1957
ministerial system is reestablished; role of profit as measure
of economic success is recognized.
December
Brezhnev announces separation of party -state control func-
tions; Nikolay Podgorny replaces retiring Anastas Mikoyan
as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
1966
February
Soviet dissident writers Sinyaysky and Daniel are im-
prisoned for antistate activities in first such political trial of
intellectuals since Stalin's death.
Unmanned spaceship makes "soft landing" on moon.
Marcb
U.S.S.R. achieves first landing of probe on Venus.
April
23d Party Congress approves directives of 1966 -70 economic
plan; Party Presidium is renamed Politburo; Brezhnev
receives Stalin's old title of General Secretary.
December
Brezhnev reports to Central Committee on deterioration in
Sino- Soviet relations and Chinese Communist Cultural
Revolution; he receives mandate to proceed with plans for
an international Communist conference.
1967
Marcb
Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, defects to West.
April
Brezhnev endorses broad united front tactics for Europe at
Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties.
June
Premier Kosygin seeks political settlement of Israeli-
Egyptian military clash in U.N. General Assembly and in
talks with President Johnson at Glassboro, N.J.
October
Soviet Government reveals cutback of agricultural invest-
ment goals approved in March 1965; Deputy Premier
Polyansky publicly dissents.
56
November
Brezhnev presides over Moscow celebrations on 50th anni-
versary of Russian revolution.
1968
January
Leading members of intellectual community protest ti ials of
young dissidents for "anti- Soviet" activities.
February
Budapest consultative meeting of some 60 Communist
parties, without Far Eastern, Albanian, or Cuban repre-
sentation, endorses Soviet call for late 1968 international
conference; Romanian delegation walks out, charging Soviet
use of pressure tactics.
August
Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops (except Romanian)
occupy Czechoslovakia.
1969
January
Attempt to assassinate Soviet leaders at Kremlin fails.
March
Soviet and Chinese border troops clash on Damansky
Island in the Ussuri River.
June
International Conference of Communist Parties meets in
Moscow.
October
Sino- Soviet border talks open in Peking.
November
U.S.- Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations open in
Helsinki.
December
Treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is deposited
at United Nations.
1970
January
Moscow moves to provide air defense for United Arab
Republic.
March
Second essay by physicist Andrei Sakharov details the need
for economic and political reform in the U.S_ if the
Soviets are to keep pace with the West.
April
One hundredth anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth is
celebrated.
August
Soviet -West German Renunciation of Force agreement is
signed in Moscow.
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1971
March �April
24th Party Congress is held in Moscow. Kunayev, Kulakov,
Shcherbitsky, and Grishin added to the Politburo.
May
U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with Egypt.
July
Politburo member Voronov demoted from post of Premier of
the R.S.F.S.R. to Chairman of the People's Control
Committee.
August
U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with India.
September
Moscow signs Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.
October
Brezhnev travels to France for summit talks with Pompidou,
his first trip to the West as party chief.
December
KCB opens "Case 24," a campaign to suppress the leading
eamizdat journal, the Chronicle of Current Events.
1972
April
U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with Iraq.
May
Politburo member Shelest demoted from post as head of
Ukrainian party and named Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R.
Brezhnev receives President Nixon for summit talks in
Moscow. The accords signed include an ABM agreement
and an interim agreement on offensive strategic weapons.
Glossary (ulou)
July
U.S.S.R. begins massive grain imports to compensate for
harvest failures.
Soviet military advisers ousted from Egypt.
Castro visit to Moscow results in the admission Cuba to
CEMA.
September
Candidate Politburo member Mzhavanadze loses his seat
after expose of corruption in the Georgian republic; the first
member to lose his post since 1966.
1973
February
Politburo member Polyansky demoted from post of First
Deputy Premier to Minister of Agriculture. Incumbent
minister, Matakevich, is fired in the aftermath of the harvest
failures.
March
Party card exchange, aimed at weeding out marginal
members, begins.
April
Central Committee plenum announces "retirement" of
Politburo members Voronov and Shelest, and the addition
of Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko,
and KGB chief Andropov to the Politburo.
May
Brezhnev travels to West Germany for summit talks with
Brandt.
June
Brezhnev makes official visit to United States 18 -25 June.
ABBREVIATION
R USSIAN
ENGLISH
APN..........
Agentstvo Pcchati Novosti
News Press Agency
AUCCTU.....
Vsesoyuznyy TReniralnyy Sovel Professional-
Council of Trade Unions
nykh Soyuzov
CEMA........
Sovei Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi...
Council for Economic Mutual As-
sistance
CPSU.........
Kommunisiieheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo
Communist Party of the Soviet
Soyuza
Union
KG
Komilet Gosudarslvennoy Bezopasinosti.....
Committee for State Security
L'
11 lot
Afinisterstvo Vnulrennykh Del............
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Oidel Vysov i Regisiralsiya
Office of Visas and Registration
Rossiyskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Solsialisticheskaya Respublika
Republic
TARS....
7'elegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza...
'Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet
Union
V 1, K S M
sesoyuznyy Leninskiy Kommunisiicheskiy
All -Union Leninist Communist
Komaomol
Soyuz Afolodezhi
League of Youth (Communist
Youth League)
57
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SECRET
Places and features referred to in this chapter(U/00
I COORDIN
5'
PN. PE.
Armenian SSR 40 00 45 00
Azerbaijan SSR 40 30 47 30
Belorussian SSR 53 00 28 00
Estonian SSR 59 00 26 00
Georgian SSR 42 00 43 30
Kazakh SSR 48 00 68 00
Kirgiz SSR 41 00 75 00
Latvian SSR 57 00 25 00
Lithuanian SSR 56 00 24 00
Moldavian SSR 47 00 29 00
Tadzhik SSR 39 00 71 00
Turkmen SSR 40 00 60 00
Ukrainian SSR 49 00 32 00
Uzbek SSR 41 00 64 00
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia 48 09 17 07
Brest 52 06 23 42
Chimkeut 42 18 69 36
Crimea regn) 45 00 34 00
Damansky Island (in Ussuri River)
Dnepr al r14) 46 30 32 18
Dnepropetrovsk 48 27 34 59
Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia........... 50 13 12 54
Kazakhstan (regn) 48 00 62 00
Khar' kov 50 00 36 15
Kiyev 50 26 30 31
Leningrad 59 55 30 A
Minsk 53 54 27 W
Moscow 55 45 37 35
Novosibirsk oblast 55 00 80 00
Penza oblast........................... 53 00 44 30
Siberia regn) 60 00 100 00
Stavropol kray 45 00 44 00
Tashkent 41 20 69 18
Ukraine (regn) 50 00 32 00
Urals (mta) 80 00 60 00
Uzbekistan (regn) 43 00 60 00
Volga a irm 45 55 47 52
Ussuri River (alrm) 48 28 135 02
5$
SECRET
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Ua
40 so ao 300 32a 1q0 2 160
B
to
Vol rask
Zaka'ryalakaya
bl Y ei tk` P Q b fj 4 i K 2
YF. L,:/.�T.'r.Y,," t .W t'1 .+.w uc....:.n r'u::.ax'4 -,od
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS AND
OBLASTS IN THE CAUCASUS
1. Adygeyyskaya AO
G 2. Karachayevo�Cherkesskays AO
3. Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR Kashkadoelnl
Severo�Osetinskaya ASSR
8. Chechanaingushak ASSN Oblast'
Br�Yugo�Osetinska a A0 surkho
7 Adzharskaya ASSR
8. Ns omo�Kerabakhskeys AO
Is 4evanskays ASSR (to Azerballan S.S.R.)
'Oerna�AltayskeyoAO 1
Vnleehne�Katakhslamkaya Olul'
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
BOUNDARY CENTER
Union Republic (S.S.R.) o
lK t s y ob l oya Oblast, Kray, or Autonomous Republic (ASSN) e
Autonomous Oblast (AO) or.National Okrug (NO)
All Union Republic administrative centers are shown. The only administrative
sale� centers shown are for oblasts having the same name as their administrative centers.
shanskoya Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative. The United States
AO government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into
so the Soviet Union.
11vula IY
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