NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 42; THAILAND; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090027-7
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

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SECRET
42/GS/GP
Thad
April 1974
NATIOtl/
SECRET
NO FOREIGN Vj
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WARNING
The NIS is National intelligence and may not be re-
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of the Director of Ceritral Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of Naticnal Security Council Intelligent' Di-
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For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
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c
i' provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or.
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
w" tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
3A; (S) Secret
C
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Page
Page
3. Politics: Thanorn to Sanya
13
c. Communist fronts
28
4. Political parties
17
d. Communist Party of Malaya
29
S. Interest groups
19
20
3. Insurgeitcy
a. The Northeast
29
29
6. Elections
b. Tribal insurgency in the north
31
D. National policies
20
c. The mid-soutb and far south
32
F. Maintenance of internal security
33
1. Domestic
21
2. Foreign
22
1. Police
33
a. Administrative Affairs
33
E. Threats to government stability
24
b. Special Affairs
33
c. Suppression
34
1. Discontent and dissidence
24
2. Countersubversive and counter-insurgency
2, Subversion
26
measures and capabilities
34
a. Origins and development of the
G. Selected bibliography
36
Communist movement
26
b. The Communist Party of Thailand
27
Chronology
38
FIGURES
Page
pagc
Fig. I Prime Minister Sanya (photo)
2
Fig. 6 Former Deputy Prime Minister
Fig, 2 Structure of government�(chart)
3
Praphat (photo)
14
Fig. 3 King Phumiphon and crown prince,
Fig. 7 National Executive Council ph oto)
Fig, 8 General Krit Siwara (photo)
15
le
December 1972 (phelo)
4
Fig. 9 Colonel Narong Kittikachorn (photo)
16
Fig. 4 The royal family (photo)
4
Fig. 10 Thai official in Peking (photo)
22
Fig. 5 Former Prime Minister Thanom.
Fig, 11 King Pbumiphon with hill tribesmen
(photo)
13
(photo)
25
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a
Government and Politics
A. Introduction (C)
(n early 1974 'rhailand's ei.iilan caretaker
guvcrnOlCut availed mew conslitution Which was to
set np a parliamentary democracy form of
government tried and terminated severll limes since
the 1932 clop ended absolute monarchy. In the
uleatltime the form of government in mid -1974 was
Still loosely fixed by the interim C011Stiluli011 of
December 1.972 which calls for execoUve primacy,
'.,'Ilh art amininted parliament and it king ticsignatel
head of slute. 'Nhe King is a strong and unifying
national symbol who exerts considerable influence.
The executive branch d(lntinalCS all ICYCIS of
government, makes anti carries out policy, cmtrols the
legislature, and wieids some power over the judiciary.
.1 'lie Prime Minister heads the executive branch, aided
by lite bureaucratic elite who tradilionally have
included military and police officers as well asa cadre
Of civil servants. As u unitary state witit a strong
central 90vermlerit, the coutltry has no tradition of
strong local government institutions. All key agencies
are concentrated ill Bangkok, and governinen!
direction !lows from the center out and front [lie top
down through a network of officials in the provinces,
districts, communes, and villages.
Western political and legal ideas and forms have
been selectively adopted sine; the late 19th century.
in the 1932 coup d'etat, a small military-civilian
group ended the monarchy's absolute power and
transferred sovereignty to the people through a
constitutional government. Thailand has since had
nine constitutions and is awaiting a tenth, but the
usually bloodless coup d'etat has been the chief
instrument for political change. All autional elections
have been held to sanction existing regimes rather
than to choose leaders. Military control over
civilians �long a fact except briefly after 11'orld It +ar
11 and now again singe late 1973 �was formalized
vben the arrm seized complete power in 19.17, and
Military cliques ruled from then until the ']'I u
regime's upset in October 1973. The continued
presence in the government of arm)- chief fait Siwara
and other high officials of the ousted regime in early
197 -1 seers to point to continued military influence.
While active participation in politics is Itsnited,
most people. until recent months, generally concurred
with whatever the government did. '#This attitude
stenimed from the strong Buddhist faith and
traditional culture �with its respect ftor.1trthority an(]
strong sense. of national identity �from complacency
derived from at least tolerable economic cmditiorts,
and front political apathy rooted ire Thai political
histury. Since govcrnulcnt before 1932 was the
exclusive domain of tits King and court officials, there
was little mason to agonize over its subsequent
nt(tnopoly by public officials, curecreivil servants, and
Politicians in Bangkok, Traditionally the government
WaS expected to act without aloe peoples assistance,
participation, or involvement, and Since state affairs
concerned only public officials, the people accepted
official decrees and disregarded events that did not
involve them personally. Any law or obligation that
was too abusive or demanding was ignored or
evaded. Only in extrertle cases, as in October 1973,
have the people rebelled against authority. At the
same time those who govern have always beat
expected to be just, to publicly reflect certain moral
virtues, and to justify their rule by effectively
performing their political duties, [loth the monarchy
`4 1
It
R;
3;' t;. xc+ w. rm� a': aaste _'W'.rr^r.^:vrea..:e;s.r.,:= era.. x.. e= ranswmra; aaa.. sa. a>., a.. Fw. s.. a.-: roF.�..s �.a...,+r Krong Chantawong
Beall a major blow to secessionist aspirations.
Afterwards, dissidence in file region hocalne
increasingly Coal] III till ist�spotlsored.
Discontent is also found alliong tin� estimated
33,000 to 40.(00 Vietnamese refetgccs- -there were
originally 75,000�who have remained in the
northeast since french Indochina hostilities ended in
195A. The govern,' +ant's refusal to let theme bosoms
resident allied; or Thai citizens (except ihrouglt
marriage with 'Thai nationals) and its stringent travel
and registrltiou restrictions. coupled with the Thais
deep anti- Vielnamese prejudices, have promptest wide
support among these Vietnamese fo: 11anoi which
maintain :e strong degree of control (over diem.
Discontent and dissent also is found among the
peoples of Thailand's mountainnits northern
provinces, ticre the main disaffected groups ore
various non -Thai hill frihes, Elie Mims heing the most
aggressive and }ac prink largo fur C :amnnmist
recruitment. Antigovernment feeling uniting tiie tribes
sterns primarily born government attempts to restrict
their trulitional opium production and trideand their
destructive slash- and -bunt agricultural practices.
Despite efforts to offset hostility through a dill Tribe
Development and Welfare Program, many tribesmen
are receptive to Communist appeals and some leave
become active in Communist -led insurgency. The
King leas taken a particular interest in lite hill tribes
and visits them to �ictnonstratc the regimes t.Ymcent
for their well-being and security (figure 11).
Some 850,000 Muslim Mal:! s who comprise about
75% Of the people in the southern provinces bordering
Malaysia� Sullen, Patlani, Pala, and Naralhiwat�
have Cultural, religious. and economic tics with
Malaysia and are only nominally loyal to Bangkok.
They arc mostly sniall rubber planters, farnims, and
fishermen. Ahhourli the Thai Government has made
modest efforts to assimilate this nl; :nority, the Malay
language and Muslim religion predominate. A few
Muslim Malays have become involved in the
Malaysian Conmiunist rot *.cement or in separatist
activity. Tile rest elf the population� Snarly of them
rubber growers and merchants �is largely Chinese,
and many c woperate either willingly or under duress
with the Malaysian Communists, whose ctlutic
makeup is also ritastly Chinese.
Although the Chinese comprise the largest ethnic
group and have supplied many of the lop Communist
leader, in Thailand, the great majority appear to In.
loyal. Most are 'engaged in urban husiuess Und acre
Thai citizeim Well -ciff ccon.nni ^all), they have a
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4
Y
FIGURE I). King Phvmiphon with
hill tribesmen (U /OU)
%lake it tile c�ourtr%'s stability and prsperil).
Moreover, there is little (if the cultural or social Friclioll
bet cell like 'Thai and Chinese eVlnllnurlitivs that
prevails ill ;n mother [if 11eighhoriog countries.
Intermarrlagv is cons ion and over lite t�e:Ir% Ila,
resulted io creating a large Sino- Thai group whow
cultural trail~ are mostly '11616. The Inure wea)th
Chiraeae and Siuo- Thais are pronlim�nt within tile
political- economic� power Mite,
The doutimilit cenlml Thai populatiou remains
strongly loyal, hilt (here are potential sour vs of
ius(:dtlily 111A COtrld I)MOIlae aclive ill the event of it
major national crisk. Chief among lheso is the
mounting economic gulf het %vecn residents of the
greater Bangkok urban area and the pourer outlying
rural districts, 'There is also a Lrge population of urban
poor it Bangkok. Other irrituils �at least until the
Thation) regime's demise --v, m endemic official
corruption, both nalinraP and local, and the
governnicrit's aidlioritarinu awl sontelintes arbitrary
rt:ature.
Students anti intcllcruuis� particularly in Bang-
kok �have been Communist targets because of their
liberal :Intl lcflisl orienl:Uion, but close govcrtrraenl
scrutiny and the fact thin most nllivenity stllrlcuts
.van( g0vcrluI1CII1 jobs have severely cuncwd leftist
lendencies. Until the Thaooin gore rument's
overllerow is October 1973 most students (licl a..)t
respond readily to political agitation, ;and tile
government effectively controlled 111INVrsitics through
the surveillaiwe of potential provocateurs and the
cullivation of strident leaders with scholarships and
job g.: Irmk". However, doling 1973. a groundswell
of dissatisfaction with the regime� triggered by
several strident ineidenls hilt supported by labor
groups. like hnre;ulerlcy. and eitizeus in general--
prompted violent student deruuustratiuns 66th ltd to
the regime's overthrow. While the slndents have�
quieted clown, they uoeloltbtedly could be provoked to
deulwlstrate again given a similar set of circum-
stances. They continue to look for guidance to the
King, Who favored both their objec�tiyeS in October
If)73 and their eoncenlrattioo on sludies in early 1974,
'I'hatimtd's labor movoutent is stilt argauiiatiunllh
weak. II is, however, no longer polill"My impulcot.
although the Saliva government early in 197.1 had yet
to lift (lie restrictious whercb labor ussoriations
banned completely froin 1953-4.68 and lrom 1971 until
,I arch 1972 �could not contribute to political Funds
or get involved in politic~. Before Thanom's overt Iirow
these restrictions had created souse frustration and
ellemiraged clandestine Communist recruilmen(
Within the urban labor form� but for a long lithe
g0�arrlllletlit SCCtlrit' measures combined with labor
inherent Weakness, largely nullified the impact of
labor disconteat. During 1973, howvvcr, labor groups
promoted several successful strikes amt supported the
studenb in the final ollStcr of the 'I'llattot)i
government. If Saraya does not :alter Th;mout's
restrictive labor lavs. Ihesc graalps height well Feel
inclined to act against his government [is well.
i in late thickly populated central lowlands
havo traditionally accepted v hatrvergovernnicnt is it
poser, but many farmers llovi grievances� corruption
arc( ill4feelivellM of local go�errnlrnt, =K wet! as
poor schools and health facilities �that eoatld I)c
exploited by dissident denienls. Farmers and villagers
living nearest to Cnnnnunist irsurgeul areas,
2;
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particularly in llre north central provinces, have hmn
pmselylcd since [be late 1960's and by early 197.1 a
srmlll number had joined the insurgency. A serious
deterioration in the economy Or in govertlnreot
st-c116ty cotitrols in these areas could prompt further
dissent and g;rcater Cu1nt1ll -111 t illroads.
-Iaily juniorofficers in dw't at military �the main
repository of power --are Aisconlented with their lot
anI vith the military leadership. Rea-On. iilciucle [be
slow rate of promotions, the basing; of promotions on
political favoritism rather than professional merit,
corruption among; senior officers, and the negative
infhlence of politiCaI1%' preoccupied ,eaior officers oil
Ilse development Of on effective military force. Some
navy. air force, and police Officers are also mnllappy as
a result of the army's lrlditionally predombmant
position. With possiNe rite exceptions, however. these
military criffievrs world not favor a radical dring;e hi
government Organization or policies.
2. Sahversion (S)
Communist elements ---in the forth of political
parties, front groups, and insurgent forces �have horn
the brill' sobversie force of any signiflcanee ill
Thailand shim lire all *ohite inonalrchy wall OVCrthmcl1
in '1932. Although a munber of military droops have
occklur l since them, the coup groups have all spruli
from the power elite who accepted the legitimacy Of
the monarchy, the precillinence of'litlddhist .'alli es,
and the maintenance of [lie: sucioccollonlicstatils quo.
Moreover. regional dissidence in Thailand- -will, the
possible exception of separatist activity ill the
northeast after !World War ft ---was not it sigrlifieant
problem until it carne under Communist leadership in
the mint- 1960
a. Origins and development of the Comnnarr'st
mocenrent
Comtnimism was introuticccl into 'Thailand ill talc
nlid-i920's by exiled revs ittionarics front China, Java,
and Indochina who organizecl' small study cells,
prinnarily among the Chinese in Bangkok. The precise
origins of subsequent, larger Coninlnnist organizations
are obscure. Chinese cadres reportedly first farmed an
organization in '1927, directly after the Kuomintang
(KNIT)�Conimnnist split in China, which in 1.931 was
formalized as the Thailand branch of the Chinese
Cornnminist Party (CCP -'1'). Other reports also point to
tht formation in 1977 of the Communist Yotith of
Siam, which remained active until it least 1934, In
July 1929 the Nat Yang (South Seas) Comitiunist
Party, which had been established in Singapore in
26
1927 -28 as the lurk of Chinese Colnnrtlnist activity in
Southeast Asia, doimtA that a Communist Party, a
Cnnmmunist Youth Organization. a Gcncrll 1Vurkers
Union. and a Yonut! Work-r-, General Labor Union
existed in Thailand. another Comrimmist orgatliziltion
reported in "Thailand around this time vas .1 Chiovso.
Ann:mmile, and Siamese lied Cross Society. For the
most part these early organinAtions were led by, and
had the hulk of iheia following anmmg, Chinese and
alien minority groupsa most of their ener*' was
directed ai rlcigthboring colonialist rcg;inlcs.
Cmmedialely after the 1932 coup, C:ominkloist
activists began to exploit rile liberal polivies of the llev
gOVernrmeiit, bill Were quickly comitered by
enactincmt Of [lie Arili- Communist Law of 19 -va
making; adherence to comirunism punishable by fine
:Ind imprisonment, The haul v +as generally effective.
althotig;h Thai Communist% defied it by sending
delegates to the Seventh Congress Of (lie Comintern in
Ntoscnv in 1937 and by holding the First Assembly Of
Ilse All Siam Communist Dclegtatiou in Thalila"d in
December 1942. At this assembly the Ptesenl
Communist Party of 5 (CPT) was formally
inaugurated.
I)ttriug World War hl CPT groups actively i
participated in the underground Free Tbai movement
led by Pridi Phanomyo ig; and orgaltizit:i, with U.S.
and Rrilish assistallm-to work against the Japanese
Occupation forces. As with the Piet Milli) in Victilanl.
C:omrnunisl cells in upeomlrtr� villages formed the
nucleus for g ierrilla bands, bell coulllllinist influence
was less gier'asiVV'thatl ill Vietnam.
[n 1916 (lie governm ant, as a price for U.S.S.R.
agreement on 'Thailand's admission In the United
Nations, reerognized the S�viet Union iind abolished
the 1933 Anti- Communist Law. A mnttber of
Comilliulists reemerged, On the political sc'ellc ill late
19-tti, publishing propiganda in varieiwi newspaprcrs
and periodicals and advancing; a 10 -point program
calling for liberal reforms. Many others, however,
remained underground, operating through fronts and
infiltrating existing corganiratiuiis: The (TT. together
with the cxclw- ively'diitlese, CCP -T, some ccontrollcii
ranch of organized labor in Bangkok anti developed
e illfinence in the press: After the'_ [94 h nliliiair'
coup by Phibcin,111OW vcr, the Comtnunisis,wcir asg:liti
largely driven underground. Coniir-lied'. eioverl
Communist activity, including the holding, of the
CPT''s Somml ,k- ,scml)ly its the ;spring' of 1952,
culminated in the passage :later that year of :i nev
Anti -C milinarl st Law which leas since mimuirled ill,
effect,
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/_1 �:ZOIU 41];10 N =1 4 =F_F9 =W41111: 111.1i [WGI /_d:I1] llli QtItf Lty /:ltItItYtItItYItItY61
r The party's 19 -52 assembly heralded as m ajorchange
With a strt +egi I
a Maoist nsn orlon slutin g Ihat arnlyd
strriggle was Hr Ilc the principal path lu suciullsm in
I'b:hiLand and shat the peasantry Was to be the main
source Of s(rcltgtll for the rt-valutionary army.
Flowever, vigorous suppression following enactment of
the 19-52 Anli- Cmullellnist LaW severely 'ilurt the
organization and forced it further an the defensive.
The CCP -'1' 11;EJ Virtually destroyed at (Ills tnae and
disappeared as a separate entity 7" 1956, with most of
its remaining nlcrnben joining the CPT.
In the early 196()'s the (;i,'T, acting ou the (lee-,mon
of (lie Third Provisioual Ilevolutionary :Issenihly held
at 111011 Bari in 19111, began to step Rig its subversive
activities in remote border regions-- p:arliculari lire
iwrlheasl. Cninrnuaiist agents organized party cells,
indoetrinaIed villatgm. and sent cadre to Maas,
Cnrnnunrist China, and North Victnana for Enlining.
The erealion Of two Peking -based Front organizations
in late 1964 and early 1,465�ihc 'I'llailand
ludependence 141ovemerrt 6 also] [lie 'Thailand
Patriotic Front ('!'PF1� lse;*aatl, el ha shift in Cannrnunist
IacliCs to active insurgency. in early 1965 guerrilla
forces begun a series of Clashes with gtES
patrols 7ls the norliteast which peaked in early 1967.
The government then Ilcgan it cYronterinsurgcuey
effort that improved security in Ilse area and urgency
(he itsurgents' weaknesses notably their failure to
huilt! a base of popular support in the villages.
I)-hr foot] and inedicine Supplies coupled hvith
nuoun:ivig defections and government security
operations, rapidly erotlecl Conlnramlist strength, By
the sprint; of 19(ii the high level Of irlSorgcnl incidellls
dropped 4iarply and. by and large, continued at lower
levels into 197 -1. M the same little, however, an easing
in government pressure allowed the Co"Emunists to
Shift to a more can(ious, painstaking and successful
Strategy for bttiltlitig up it r irtl support base.
:After being forced in 1967 to lower the level Rif
vio)INK -e in the northeast, the insurgents then shiflcd
their focus to the norill, -where Communists had Iscen
PrOselYting atrnnng the Mcus and otter hill tribesmen
since the early l9 io's, Tile security forces' lteavv-
handed mpremion of the tribes in those years land
stirred tip tradiliona! atolipunities and cliccturagcd the
tribes En accept Cotnrthunist :assistance, training; and
leadership. By mid-M.7 it full fledged insurgency had
develnpecl. The tribal guerrillas made dramatic
Military gains and government control River the area
quickly deteriorated. In late 1968 Ilse goternment wags
also Wnfrmtcd with an upsurge of Communist -led
tribal insurgency in tide north- centrul "Iii- pnwincc"
area stroddling Phitsannlok. Phetchabun, and l,:tei
pnvinces. '((lore guerrillas managed to seriously harass
sectlrily forces and disrupt rudimentary development
programs. By 1972, however, it was Obvious that the
C(Prinnuolst political base among fie Meos was
Shallow, will) (lie Iribe inen inereaMiagi disturbed by
lite CPT's inslstellve upon imposing its political stamp
on their life,
Other but less sig"ificant areas of COUttnunisl
strength have lice" Ilse "raid south" �the interior
parts of Surat Thatli, Nakhon Si Th:untnarat, and
"prang provinces in the Kra peninsula �;and the "far
south," the Provinces borderhig on Afala Unrest
in the former area was originally based on depressed
ccwlamdc condiliuns in Ilse rubber plantation areas
and hus been kept alive by continuing governmcn,
neglect and corruption. 0,}xrt trtsurgclscy in this urea
bcgau ill 1967 but never attained the viratlence of the
lnsorgency of tie northeast and north, in part b.eausc
of its distance front logistic sotiroes. In the farsonth the
Conlnnmist cletttems ore organizationally part of the
Corntthamisl Parly of ,Viuluva, are pritnaril oriented
toward Nlallaysia, and have oniy tenuous tics with the
CPT, 'These elements first hegau moving into lire Thai
horder provinces ill 19 ?1 to escape B ritish suppre ssion.
Since 'they have generally followed a Policy of
avoiding comaet with lice 'Thai Buddhist Population
:and the 'i'llai security forces. Ilatlgkok has tint taken
vigorous counterinsurgency mc;rsurcS against Item,
b. The Carnninnist Purdy of Thailand
Little is kuowit about the current OFgani7ational
structure of the highly covert Communist Part' Of
Thailand(CPT). Mlrch,Of tile available ;nn11601i
nuldated or derives from mireliable CPT defectors.
Before (lie outhreak Of the instirgellev the party's
hcadcluarters were in Bangkok, but since then they
have shifted 111countn' with the insurgent forces.
Sonic CPT rncnlhers continue to operate out Of
Bangkok, wherc they collect funds fur the imurgerrcy
atad engage ill limited urban operations,
UPcuunin Else leading members of the party's top
cellelon, the Central Committee and Politburo, are
apparelitly scattered among the main insurgent
IhUSeti �Ill the Pi tta Pllan (hills? In tile northeast, file tri-
Pmvince area in north- cential 'I'haimoid, and the
utirthem border area straddling Nan province and
adjacent Sayaboury province in Laos. CPT dead=
(loaners prtbalily consist of no more than the
Secretary General and a few niter senior CPT figures,
with its locatols shifting from time to time as the
insurgent situation necessitates. CPT headquarters are
believed to he sOmewhere in the tri- Pmvitlec area.
Presumably members of the Central Committee or
27
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F- t IMMOIN 4 1 11 0 1:,:, =1 4 =F_" =W*1 [W /mod N 1 1:1 1 i Q ]�LI]/ /:ZrIIIIYIIIIIIIIhY61
Politburo manage to mee occasionally to coordinate
policy and tactics.
The party leadership remains slironded in mystery,
+with no c of their ie.mlily or whereabuuts
since 1968. The chief figures are almost certainly Si oo-
'I'hais, hot yomt; er leaders may well he druwtt from
ethnic Thai elcrnenis lit 1967 Wirat Angkhathawwan,
also known as Nai Sean, reportedly becanie Secretar
Ceneral of the party and tike rucking insurgent leader
in the northeast following the arrest and execution of
his pr.decessor.
[it its Ihecretical structure tite CPT follows orthodox
lines, with supreruc authority nonrinally vested in a
liepresentative Assembly which is known to satve met
only three limes; in 19 -12, 1932� and 1961. '['his
assembly Outlines general :tires and policies and selects
lite Central Committee (CC). '['Ile latter ill Will Selects
a Secretary General and Politburo from antong its uwwn
inembership. In the late 1960's the CC was reported to
number `30 mcnihcrs and Cite Politburo 11, including
the Secretary Central. 'rite Politburo appoints the
assembly and in actual praclicv controls party policy
and administration, Tile Secretary Gencral is the
principal figure [it Cite party hierarchy-, chairing both
the CC and Politburo.
In 1962 the Politburo decentralised control of party
administration by creating four regional branches of
[lie Central Committee (Northeast, North. Central
and S(;ith), better known as Regional C_ om mittees, At
cite, same tittle it created a Jungle District, with
headquarters in Na Kae district of Nakhon Phanom
province, as the field headquarters of the planned
insurgency. CPT activities in the Bangkok area
remained directly under CC jurisdiction, The
N",rtheaast ,Regional Committee is believed to he
At. in the Phu Phan (hills), probably in Na Kac.
'Ale r atlicrn Regional Committee is probably
looted in northwestern Sayaboury province of latos,
The Central headquarters, also referred to as Nest
Central or Area 7, was reported in the late 19Ws as
being either in Suplran Buri or Nakhon Pathom
provinces west of Bangkok; since then little has been
heard of this unit. The Srtuth Regional 6)mmittee is
with the small insurgent force in the mid -south region
of the Kra Peninsula. Below the regional level tite
party organization as of the late I9Ws called for
provincial committees, whose membership is
appointed by the regional committees, as well as
district and subdistrict committees farmed along the
same pattern. Below thesc:,are unit committees, which
can be formed w herever there are more than seven
CPT members, and, at lite base of the structure, the
three- to seven -marl party cell, Since '1972 the covert
28
cell slr.cltne in the northeast provinces has been
supplanted by more overt "village conurti(tees," 5
Which ore intended as forerunners of a future local
Communist administration.
The CPT in the late 1960's had an estimated 1,000
members of -whom about W) were dedicated
hardeore personnel. Xlernbership has probably
increased since then, although information is lacking;
it does not reflect the extent of aruted insurgent
strength which involved 'front 6.800 to 7,0i11) men in
ea r[y 197.1.
I.inaneial and logistic support for the CPT and the
imsorgents derives from both forrcign and [ocirl sources.
Peking fnm1e15 spine .honey. arms, and othersupplics
through Utos, provides idcauai;ical and guerrilla
warfare training -[n China, and gives propaganda
support through the China -based voice of the People
of Thailand. Hanoi's training and logistics support
increased during I 73, and limited assistance ww,
provided by the Nthet I.= Itowever, the CPT forces
:ire largely self- sustaining since :arms, food, and other
suprlies arc readily obtainable locally and in the Laos
border areas.
C. Cvmrnrlrniaf fronta
Front time to time the Cornrmuttists have sponsored a
or exploited u large number of smaller parties or front
gro ups Within Specific ethnic and functional groups
and in various geogruphic regions of Thailand. Many
of these parties and fronts have been shod lived,
others have beery marked by ch anges in name and
%inicture, and sonic have existei! more in name than in
fact.
In the period of increased Communist activity
which began in late 1961, the Thailand Independence
Movement (TIM) and the Thailand Patriotic Front
(TPF) were the preeminent front organi7 ations for the
insurgency. In November 1961 the establishment of
the TIM was announczj by the 1 of the People of
Thailand. This ww -as followed in January 1963 by a
similar announcement of the formation of the TPF,
and both organisations were immediately given
propaganda support by Peking. In Nove 196 the
TIM was :alisorbeil by the TPF1
The TPF rwas to have been exploited chiefly for
psychelogicul objectives, on both the Thai domestic
and the international scene. Repetitive'propugan lu.
and international activity, such-us, the'dispateli of
delegates to conferences, have hi�en intended to
provide it with u veneer of authenticity. tile official_
TPF manifesto included the following }bjcrtives;.to
fight for 'nittional independence (fronl', the: United f
Stifles and the"Thantim- Praphat clique'); tai fight f.ir
i
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the democratic rights of the people; Uo implement a
foreign Policy based on peace and neutrality: to
develop the national ectm omy. to reorganize the living
conditions of the people; and to develop education
and health services. The dozen or so other front
org;utlriliom announced under the "ITF hanner�
covering such fnnttionul groups as tcachcrs, yOtrths,
fanners, and plantation workers �have appeared will;
fete e.eeptions to he no more than paper
Organizations. Conuounist propaganda indicates that
the TPh 'e as intended as the political arrn of
TL;lilanti'l insurgent nlovement, acti[ag as interna-
tional spokesman for the movement much as the
National Liberation Front does in South 1'ietuarri.
Sing: the late INV.%. CPT pntpagauda 11.31 paid
increasingly less lip service to the TPF and to the
general concept of a united Goat,
d. C aninh r ppti st Party of Malaya
Driven from \lalaya in the mid- 1950's, the
Communist Party of Malaya (UNT), whose
membership is predominantly ethnic Chinese, has
since rnaitilained a skilled. lightly disciplined and
wV11- eitttipped guerrilla force in Thailand's south-
ernrnosl provinces. Clainilltg that it oluts Only to
return mid liberate Xlalaysia and Singapore, the CP \9
h as plot initiated all active insurgenet' against the 'Thai
Covernmenl. Except for the training of Thai cadre by
CPI elements in southern 'Thailand, there has beau
little evidence of conlact between the CPM anti the
"Thai insurgents, There have been reports, bowever, of
mixed bmuls operating iii Songkhla province. The
Cl'Nl has tried to capitalize fill the anti-Thai and pall-
Nialay sepliinent prevailing aniong the Ntalay
population who comprise the dontina, it Clinic group
in these. provinces. 1111 1) orantilitary army of the
C lIm� colilmonly called the C minionist 'Terrorist
Organization (CTO) or. officially, the "ladayan
National Liberation Army--hats an estitnalcd strcngt,t
Of ahau( 2,1N1t), of whom a few hundred are Mala ys. It
has also Organized the 4ladayart Conlmullist lbuth
League to serve as a recntitlnt pool, training
organiz :tlion, and reserve military forge. Members. for
the must. hart "are Chinese youths and litunher at least
2;5110, The C: TO is militarily t�ulreuehed in trite south
and' has fortified its position through Peltetnatic9s and
bribery of the police and lot glri'CElilllent officials.
Although the government has agreed to increase its
emperttion with Mulaysiitn f6rcrs, it has neither the
ve ourms�nor the desire It) mount any effective rnilitan'
or econoitlie develttpntent pr,ogrttns which cotald np .wt
1111 Cl'N1's. ccnttrti over the border area,
:1. Insurgency (S)
Coninumist insurgency in Tll.lil:uid as of early 197.1
clues not appear au immediate thm:u to 1langkok, but
statistical iodic :aura point to grulually increasing
ICVelS Of Contrm111W- iaitiI[Ld attacks, afollushe
assassinations. and propagaittla. 'rite growth it, the
slumber of irisorgent iticidentl Countrywide is reflected
in ihC following tabmilalion:
1965
45
1986
$65
1987
921
1968
1,039
1909
1,981
1970
2,550
1971
eat. 3,500
Became of regional differetims in topography,
population, Communist leadership, and goveroinent
adnttnistration, the growth of the insurgency has bean
uneven varying atnsiderthly between the itorllt,
northeast, and south. In Carly 197.1 there were an
estimated 6,891) to 7,000 arrned insurgents, ahual
3,000 coon: than in 1969, not itichuliog the estimated
2,0W CPM insurgents in the far south. Their military
c;tpa'htlitp' ba, Inounted as it result of better training,
more eslxrrience, and, above all, better weapons.
a, The northeast
me northeast, where touch of 'm ailamrs leftist
licrilagi.: is rooted. fins a long history of political
dissidence.
The Conlrnunist Pally of Thailand apigrenth�
decided on armed Slrttggle in the northeast as i�arly as
1952 and org;ani�ritional work, although periodically
disrupted by government repressive operations.
proceeded during the 1950's. The Cornlntniists claim
the first shot lrl [lie revolutionary armed struggle was
fired in the northeast's Nakhon Phitimi t province in
August 1965.
Since 1964 tile Communist% have located most of
their important base camps in the Phu Than. These
hills stretch intermillently (turn Laos Satttlt grid east
though Worn and western Saakon Nakbon and then
cast into Nakhon Phanom� Although covered ill part
by bctnw Vegetation, the hills are by no means
impenetrable. The Communists have tried to exteittl
their influence over the villages in for Phu Tharp arld
into outyiog areas. They have been trust active in the
Na Kae district of Nakhon Phannin province, which
Ims load the greatest utmtbe.rnf violent iacideids in the
country. The government admits that arrned
insurgents have considerable influence over 100 of the
district's 115 villages.
29
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Since 1972 the Communists have tried to tighten
control over villages already miler sonic form of
Cormunss, influence, primarily through setting up
villag-V ]nilitury units and political coutmtltecs. The
formation of village militia units represents a change
in emphasis front 1964 -67 whti villagers usually were
incorporated into the ranks of guerrilla units. The
strttcgy nuts� is to recruit villagers and Use theill
initially in Ihcir local areas, after the pattern used
effectively in Indochina. Although evidence is still
sketchy on the size of this effort, there are at least
CON villagers organized into such units li the
provinces of Kalasin, Sakon i\aklrou, enal l\`akluon
hthanorn. The Clt'I' hopes to upgrade line capabilities
of these militia units to the point where they taut fight
alongside the 1,800 regular guerrilla forces. This is
bring acc nip6lied by integrating the militia with
full time soldiers lit limited operations such as short
range patrols, as ;assinations, and propaganda
discussions. Recently militia elements have begun to
assutric greater military lasks such its attacking
governatenl defense posts.
Although lite militia's primary purpose is to scrveas
an auxiliary force, the ClIT has not ignored their
political potential. For example. militia units have
been used to organize public demonstrations agAnst
tine Royal Thai Covernmetrt in Khan %Vongsubdislrict
of Kalasin provinc -e and in Na Kae district of \akhou
Phanorn province, More intpOrtant,11OWMr, has been
the party's use of the militia to form the backbone of
its newest mait ifeslalioils of political conlrol �the
village committee. These organs are replacing or
supplementing "tile covert cell structun- that served as
lice initial source of Communist i�,i l+ tncr }tt the
villages. The establishment of th6w coma ;ities�
which are now in evidence in the pn;�s�iik(,w of ,tiokhon
Phanorn, Sakon Aiakhon, and Kalasi,. t.Yc village,
district, and province levels �is meant to be tile
forcruiiner of it future Incal Communist administra-
tion. District committees have also been established in
westent Worn province but to date there is nO
evidence of village -level political control,
Since committees by nature. are more sophisticated
and less clandestine political instruments than cells,
their formation marks a significant step forward by the
CPT in its attempt to create u political following in the
northeast. A conservative estimate, based in part on
captured Communist d ocumetits, indicates that a
nascent Communist political apparatus, ranging from
covert cells to full -blown committees, us reached into
some 200 villages affecting a populotiva base of some
100,000 people.' These figures, however, represent Icss
than I o of the total population of lute northeast and
30
the apparattis ren..ins confined to the nturc remote
areas of Nakhon PhawOtn, Salton Nakhon, and Kalasin
provinces. The Only other area io the narthcast that
loans seen a unlit of Conlinoltist progress is t cStent
Udorn province., a -here a revitalized party leadership
appears la lie pressing hard to establish village -lercl
conitolittecs. Tlw C.onrtntini5ts have [teen singularly
unsuccessful in budding either a viable militar} or
political apparatus in Ilse neighboring provinces Of
Ubon, Kor,t, Bodrant, and Prachin Iluri, despite years
of effort.
3 lie failure of the insurgents to expand significatilly
bevond their traditional base areas of tilt� northeast
can be attributed to a fundamental weakness of lilt That Communist apixratm �a chronic shortage (if
ideologically motivated and experienced political
cadre. This shortage, coupled with the Communist
Party's rigid ideological upproach to its ptopagantla
campaigns, has been a major factor behind the
Communists' inability to better exploit the needk and
gri^_vunces of the local populace. Although the
Communists have addressed theinsclves to sonic local
is -ties. they still tend fo forte; their propaganda against
U.S. "irnperialisini and the Sanya government, hoth
Of which have little rcleV slue to Tllat farrucrx.
Moreover, z' trmnttist political gains in the
northeast may Irc on]}' superficial. Sustainer{
government pressure against the Communists
political and support apparatus in northeastern
Kalasili province, for instance, seriously eroded their
infhtetice at the village level. This may he otil.y an
isolated cast, but it dues raise questions about the
viability of the Communists village level political
base in the northeast.
The vigorous, but short term, sappression zant-
paigns that have characterized government counterin-
surgency in the northeast have had only a temporrrp
effect on the siluutiort. Persistent military patrolling
has led to a mark-Ld decline in trtsury;cut- initiated
incidents in certain areas such as Sakon `akhote,
province, but tilt: Thais have not brought 01tmsdvc5
to uliply this lesson to tine insurgent core area in
iNakhon Phanom. Insorggent organizutional work,
aimed at the eventual resumption of a "liberation
struggle,' goes on there, largely 'Onimpeded except
during the governinent's ;sporadic suppressive
operations: lit; these argus the villager often faces the
simple choices :betnren amOrnmodatlow to Gain-
mimist P`Olitiial ceintrol, abut.. his home, or.
death. for years ,vhllagcts in the Na Kuc' d istrict of
blakhein Phandm prtiviree^c :wh .have:; reftisreI o a
cooperate with the insurgents have been ronitint Is
shot.
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