NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 42; THAILAND; ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090024-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 24
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
SECRET
021GS /dF
r
r
s
Thailand
April 1974
A
V
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
31� A.
V
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
u, portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nortgovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligsnce or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
WOU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
w
1 74ai&0j
CONTENTS
This chapter auperwdes Me armed forces ca er-
ape in :e Crneral Surveo rlatrrl Afawh 1970,
A. Defense establishment i
1. Milita.y history 2
2. Command structure 2
B. 19int activities 4
1. Military manpower 4
2. Strength trends 5
3. Training 5
4. Military budget 6
5. Economic support and logistics 6
6. Uniforms and insignia 6
SECRET No FonE[GN DmEm
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
i
d.
a
iI
lm
Ri11 fiNSKai Yffira'S'rt*(T Vim' 74G4o''Cr
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
Page
Page
C. Army
11
4. Logistics
17
12
5. Marine corps
18
1. Organization
6 Naval air arm
18
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
13
3. Training
13
14
E. Air force
18
4. Logistics
5. Army aviation
14
1. Organization
10
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
19
D. Navy
i
3. Training
19
1. Organization
16
4. Logistics
21
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
16
3. Training
F. Paramilitary
21
FIGURES
Page
Page
Fig. 1 National defense organization (chart) 3
Fig. 4 NC:O's and enlisted men s uniforms
Fig. 2 Armed forces persoimel stre�gth
and insignia (sketches)
9
(table)
Fig. 3 Officers' uniforms and insignia
5
Fig. 5 Wing and squadron disposition table ?D
(sketches)
7
i
d.
a
iI
lm
Ri11 fiNSKai Yffira'S'rt*(T Vim' 74G4o''Cr
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
11
tU
4
:it'I
a,
S
cl
r
y v
t
B:
i
Armed Forces
A. Defense establishment (S)
The regular armed forcers of Thailand have a
Personnel strength of about 206,000. The army, with
132,100 personnel, dominate. the urrncd Curers and
const�lutes the country's chief deterrent to foreign
attack. It also plays the preeminent rule in combating
CoininuniA- directed insurgencies. Thc navN ]tas a
strength of 27.3111), including a 0,000 -man marine
warps, and it 1 inventory of about 161 ships and
craft. The air force has A6,600 persanmea and 3 19
aircrlft, almost al] of U.S, rnauufactuW. I'Itew are the
only indigenous S1:ATO armed forces on the
Southeast Asian mainland. The regular armed forces
arc augrnr�oted b) the Border 01itrol Police (131 the�
Police Aerial Iteinfnrcemeul Units (PARU). Special
Action Forces (SAP). =ettd the Marine Police Force
(parun�litan a MPOrlonts of tile Thai National
Police). as well as a part -lime Volunteer Defense Corps
supervised by the Ministry of Interior. lm wartime or
other national emergency, control of the police
organization (excludir:g the Metropulitam Police)
would he transferred from thr Min�stn of Inlerior to
the Ministn of Defense.
Among the regular armed forces, the navv is the
least Significant evert though the marine corps
component is considered to he reasouablvsvell teemed
and ��d I'his lack of nmsequence dates from all
unsuecc%sful bid for political power by tite navy in
1951. Following the suppression of the rebellion, the
navy was largely neutrali as an effective conihat
force. Nevertheless, it 11115 cont�uued to m;.rrve defense
budget allocations since reasons of national prestir;c
r. that 'Thailand have a navy. As a result,
valuable resources have been expended to keep barely
sca�worlhy vessesls afloat and to buy new ones which
gratify the Thai national cgo but are of questionable
utility.
The air force, which joined the army in suppressing
the navy rebels in 1951, has not been as inhibited in its
development as has the navy_ While some senior
officer% have been politically active, the bulk of the
officer corps has remained relatively unpoliticized.
The air force refhs almost cxclusiveiv on U.S. materiel,
training ruethods, and operational concepts It 3%
probably the best trained and Ied of the three major
services,
The arm% is by far the most important branch of tile
armed forces. Between the 1332 n�volttlion, which
overthrew the absolute monarchy. and October 1973,
the army had been Thailand's preeminent political
organization. During most of this period, military
officers had occupied the position of prime minister
Until late 1373. army officer, held marts kes cabinet
posts They were abiquilou., oil the boards of large
commercial corporations avid heade the majority of
the numerous state- contToiled corporations which are
engaged in industries as varied as transportation and
mt-ir refining. The area of responsibility assigned to
the army alfieer corps extended far beyond national
defense, and for many of its members, military duties
were Completely overshadowed by other inlerrsts.
'Cite military is presently maintaining a very low
profile pmlilicakiy as a result of the student riots in late
197:3 and the ithsegw forced resignations of Field
Viarshak Thanum. who was Supreme Commander of
tea� Armed 1�orces, Prime Mini ter, Defense Minister,
and Foreign Nf i:,tster, and Field Marshal Praphal.
who was Deputy Supreme Commander. Deputy Prime!
Minister, Minister of Interior, and Director of the
National Police_ They are now in exile. 'Cite Army
Commander in Chief, General Krit Sivara has given
his unqualified support to ate newly installed civilian
caretaker government headed by Sanya Thammasak.
If the civilians are a ble to aciminister the country
competently, future military coups may be avoided
and Thai officers may form a political party to seek
power within the parameters of the constitution.
Primary defidencics [hat scriausly limit the armed
forces capabilities in both conventional warfare and
counterinsurgency operations are the following: the
absence of strong Minister of Defense guidance to and
pressure on the individual services to perform assigned
tasks; lack of it sound logistical base; insufficient
forward deployment of tactical forces; marginal
equipment maintenance, minimal alr defense
capability; ;tit inadequate mobilizalinn base;
inadequate, financial support, and insufficient
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
penouuol slre�ngill ill colldml ,lief comba' %uppurt
units Tho c�apabihtm�% of tilt para jilt] itan torte Ill
perform the couulrnnuert!erlr% nn %%nttl ,at- re
i,% Ilw t;cnrralll lO%% quaitt% of It-adt-r%bip..nadequalo
ire 4 rumpom�nl,. Auld Ili- drfir :rd delim :ltiuu Of
respun IIithl% Inch re,olls in poor %�ilimlmatiun and
vwv (Iupli(-atiorl
]'haifand', naIInoal deft�11,e polio% ham bet-,)
directed to% and militan cooperali,m %%itIt its allic,
noth I% an aclkv parlivip,oit in SI'.:\TO mi.i in s ekinyt
firmer dt�icll,r euuTlnitrm'ots from tit(- l noted State
1'fti pnfic% %tV111% front tilt a %%an rots% of Th.,i wilit,ln
Il�adrr%tilat mithoul slot sla II I ial forcign.l %i %l :erce� :uuf
soarvv, Iif %it ppI%. the coantrl %c oil ld he jncapablc (if
%nl,p,)rtitlg a modern militan force.
I. Military history
Till fir%% %1rp% to ntoderniie Ihr 'Thai lltilitan
rstablishrne11l m'rc Laken ill the mid -19111 ci
ultder 11'estt-nt inflo'uce hill�scaJt- modt-mlZlltion ctrl
\1'eslem lint'%- litmwwr. did roll occur until the Out%et
of tit(- 2011t evotur% it i, it ource of pride I o the Thai
that the change% %%t -rt- efhc�ted In their nun officer%
mitts litllr a%sistaltc(� fnllu foreige ad%l %t-r%.
Close e�O uith \%-toll force% ma% first raa(lr- in
lsuropc 1) the %mall Thai vNjwditiunar} force In
\1'Orld War I I)tlnng World War If. an cut.It" yr anti
J,tparlo,e tlydergnnrrtd force nits raised ill Thaila lld
mitts the help cif 13ritisll- and Ameri Can- Irlir(�d "Foe
I "hoi agents, and at Illc vlose of tilt- uardctac�Illneuh
Of Allied troops, principall l3riti,ll. AIUlrallarl. and
hidfao, were brie fll in the eutmtn to participate ill
vivton cert-ma11iv,. A Thai iIt fit n(rc b:atialiOn
%upplenit ntrct b% till�: �11 naval and air VIVU1111k, Nits
among the first conlitlgeltt, to join the L'. farce%
winch undertook la repel the Contnninist in%asiou of
South Kore;: in 1950 (L'.OU)
Since 19:10 U.S. in(lm�nce ha-, beeta predominant in
the Thai militan. At tilt' end Of World Afar 11, Elie
Thai aunt d forces were equipped with triscellartcous
ttlaterit�I acgmired Over the previous two decades from
japan, the United States, and various European
countries. Stockpile depletion ObSo IV' once of
Clltltpme�rll, a11d worldwide rapid It-clinical adva itcvs
aide a cnmpreltensivv mnderniZatinn program a
matter of high priority for lilt- armed farces. It was
recognized that this would require n�uc}l out%i(ie sill,
gild in 1950 the (�nnolr% 'We,rd into a militan
assistance agreement witil the C State% under
which it modernivz6on program involving advice.
rrlalcricl smppurl, and training was bcgrn. L'util June
1967 the program -as fur d under the U.S Militan
Assistance Program (iv1AN1 From Jul) 1967 until June
1972. t S. onlitar% ati kLitict� to Thailamf %%a fum;cd
Ir(1113 L S Ut�parllneut of Dvirme wr%icr blulgets
tMilit:ln �1 �islanve St Fundl fll Jill% 1,)72 tilt-
L S wsionwd %uPporl of Thailand aodei 11:11'
fuadirig Till- 11i11�d Stale, liar Supplied 11to%I of tilt'
eguipuu�ut fur all comp meats of tilt jrtue(I fora�, a%
%loll its in in its operation. mairte11a11vi. and
lactWilt tIIII)Itnlent %icabl' mlrnbor of officer,
from Al grad's aad,(�(%W.- brou�hos ha hall tltilit.10
trairlinl,r in the 1, Failed Slate% Tlly irnpot�t of thi%
.1% %ociatiuti uith the V S militan ha, profoundh
iufhrencctl the form and orieot'Itlolt of tilt- milita�
e%tabllslllm�rt '1 bai tactical and %trateglc cline/
ha%e beer hlrthrr chlnchliumd b% a %%nciatjclrt %%ith Iht-
anned force, of tilt olher SEA t'O countries I (:I
A% Ilse jnten %il% of lilt cvnlnterin %nrgenc% effort ill
Ills Republic of 1 it�lt1 :1111 inerea%c(I. L' S -lr:l% -(rid
\a%, e�tigiret-r:uuf to istical support fort. �%:Ind L S
Air port�' Malts mused jilt Tbanland (the I:1%t ju %;real
%Irvligth �tm, %t f' S hand-bu %ed mr operation, azaiml
tilt� \ortll irlrlarnvsv %%rry flunrt ow of Thai
airfivido. .lilt] %mall Gritish, ,1t- %lydi :ill, aloof \e%%
7,ealand engillver and logistical support comlingenh
mere ernplo%e�d all %:lrion% laigi%tical project%, jneluchug
mi cumlrttclltrn Tilt� 111t it %IIr('� Il lit It'naII%
strergOwtard die det(mki� capabilitit�% of tilt- armed
force% and winfurced 'Thailand its i t ke% part of tit(-
lmti-(.nml)llAoi %t %ecrlrit\ Nlt�i11 ill Sonthea%t Asia 4(. i
I -4-hur tnc�re�a%inglt Illn�atened In Communist man
Of national liberation lit Soullleasl :Asia. Thailand %VTlt
J %olunlee�r regiment in 196. to juir the� rlon-
(:+uwminist forces fighting in tilt. Republic of jetsam
and laler e%pandt�d Ille fur(�'� to a %olutlteer dici%inu
Uurtmg 1972 tilt- j.4 'I 1 1 Ilai unit arm withdra%vn from
Sneteh Vie�tttam, and Thai presence %%a% ended in
Jarman 1973. (SI
2. Command structure
Umfer the� interim constUtttirm adopted in 1072, the
King is Cnrmrlamder ill {thief of tilt- Armed Forces
(Figliry I he i%, however a con %tiltotiomal figurcilead
mhos' nti Ii tan dot ICS arc prirllarl l% ceremonial
AIthuugh Ile is a %lroleg and unifying national S%TnbOI
actual c�Ontrul i% Vested in Ire Nritne Minister through
Ill� Millistrr of Defense Sinn� the Ouster of Thanoin
and Fraphal, there Ila% been much discussion alum
abolisllinr the Supreme Command Prescott% the
Supreme COTTIntand 1% ftniclioning as it coordination
agt-nc% I let me(n the %VT%*V% alld the Mirlistr% of
Defemt-. A tit-%% Suprvine Commander has not hc�en
apptlinted.
TItt- COMIC�il of 44 iitistrrS (cabinet), w�itll the
National Securit% Council ftirCti(eniag as ptlriltllrtt[It
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200090024 -0
v
FIGURE 1. National defense organizolion W
d corm
tor. is reymv,ible for rooint:airloig notional
Wvllrit tll(l for all Illatlers conccrimig nntioil:rl
(le�h�rnt- The Nafitm;il Set (;ou,wil uollsi%t, let tilt
Prime \IIni,Irr as ch:ti Film it. Iht- I)rp tit Pri nn'
\Minister as deputy chairman. the Sec�n�t,M (:enerill of
he National SecorilN (:otnlcil. Ihr \linkton of
I)4.14- Finance. Fnrvign Affoin fntrrinr. and
Cnuumtuicatitnls, an(I the Supreme Cnnlnl:ulder of
the Armed Forces, i position +tltic�ll has beer) t;icanf
sine�,. late 1973 (l' OCi
'llte� \linislry of Defense is dirert_s responsible for
flit- maintenance chit clt-phry mew of adegimle armed
forces It- pnnidc for Ihr nalitlr :ll dofensc 11 is:alvrst-d
h+ a 13- member Dofcnse Council headed fry flit-
\9inisler of Defcuse and inclttdrs tilt' ('rider Secrvtary
of Defense and Ills depth the Supreme Commander
and Iris three deputies: the Cltie�f of Staff of the
Supreme Comrnand Ileadqu ;lrters ;nut Ili, fli rt
deputies: lilt- vonlmandvrs in chief. depnfv
c in c�hit�f, arld chief of stuff for all fill(-(.
roilil;m services; and three� additional officers of
91-Fl rill rink who have pc�rviotuh hol(1 high rleililars
posifinns err who have otherwise distillgoisIted
theruselv(�s. Tile Drfrnse Comlc�il advises Mlle \liniAer
of Defense oil general tililitar% policies, budgelary
maR(-rs, nhlbilizalion, c�nnsc�ription, all(] speciial
matters prewtitecl by the Nlinisin of Defense.
Tlu� \lillmll n1 Drfrm(� inchldt-s Ihr Office ul Ow
t rider S(' 1 ('r(�t:lr \(III01 11 (Nllnllilw(I 111 I(IlOtmAr.itr+e
:Illd illdit,(rl.l! dcp,ertrneols. .and .l Supreme'
(:anlroaml
1111 lulnt st,lff func�tious The in(llnlrl,(I
rlrmrnl operates unit- of Illc fac�Icirics (llticlr slrppls
tilt- ,Arrilvd filrces Till. Soprcut�(:nnnn:illd Ii(-ullyllar-
Ivrs of Ilse Snpretlle- oinmande -r +rl tilt- `kilned Fnrcc,
u,ts I'll a Ill 'Aied it- \Iircle 1(111() to wwrcisr
inlcrmrdiate mijiml mar tic three armed st-mc-t-,
The Supreme (:amnnolel Im %illt-. Ioiut talf
inclu(1i119 ,v%vraI dircclur:(le+ In jet al pra(�Iict-
houe+e�r. tilt- Ministry of Delcnse� and flit- Supreme
Colilmaild I leadquurter,. located in Bangkok. etercise
little direcl :mthoril% mvi the component services
This is a rc.ull of the ihu�ncr of all orGanii tliorc:tl
-quit alvid of Illc l S. Joini lriefs of Sluff .otcl. until
(h�toher 197:3, 11(� Iloltlinl; of sc%vml kt-v politiv,al-
milit;m posillons vo ic'urrerlty In a amtnbt-r of senior
riffivviN \l:iltt-rs of Iriv.h import;our are milally
inferred dir(�c�tiv tll the Priurc \1Prlistcr. ohrl nonnalls
('nihldl, aillr tile- \linistry of Defense and sercit.'
1 'otllaarldt-r, before i% %oink tlrd,.rs. a cmnhcrsoFlit
proct-dun� uhic�h fr(-gist�nll% results in c�nmprnniise
solrlticlits or dVIA%S, (S)
lItIlmi ,h the tilt#-(� ser%ive% tht�eot-tic:d[y are equal.
Ise� area+ is Ill" (lominan( vonymiew Sensor grim
offieen ncc upy the key pusifinns ire tit(� armed fclr(�es
.trnt anal in into+ govertienvia pasts. "!'ht-
pre�t-uline111 position of flit- anus is based oil its
Polilleal pimer tac�elteired lhnmgh a succession of
militar+ VOUITO Mill ou Ihr ~troll): assumption tll:tl the
main effort in defernt� (till focus on the Thai gj
fort.-vs ICren nucler flit- current cf+ilian Voverrrttu�nt.
Irrn} Collunandc�r in (thief Cenetid brit, a veritable
military strongniail, sus heal appointed to an p%_
Officio positime. Director of Peace- twrcpiilg. scilielk
a[lorvs hint to altend cabitim nu (-tings 7 hat officials
regard the s(�:1 Mind air defense of Thailand a+ harr;ell,
tilt- n(- potlsihilih of the l'nifcd States and other
SI ?ATO allies. 'I'll(- Supre�rne ;omrninrel Ile:ultlllar-
ter% Forward s +as eslcsblislle�d in April M61 (o serve as
tilt� "llelells staff of the� Tliiti Sl�:ATO Force
He;nlquartcr fl imme SEATO HIO Fivc� ha+ nevt-r
beet inli l(-meuted, the Forward lieadquarle'rs is
Primarily responsible for action oil urgent matien of
an operational nnfure. It is vested with Ile#- authority
for the coordination bel+veen a.ilied farces err I'llailalld
and local goverunlrot agencies, sp, cificalh in matters
of resoitrcr allocation :till aperttioncd support. The
For wa"I I lcaduuarters also prepares contingency
plats and studies and rec�ommewls Policy for
operatinns focused nn :anlbod't :l cad IAas. (S)
,3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
t
F
F
'r
B. joint activities
1. Military manpower (S)
As of janitan 197 -1, l had 9,80 -MM males
in the ages 15 -49 Fstimale> of available
tnale% hr :r
year age groups and tau� maxrnnnn
number fit (or
inilitar% sm ice are as follo-%
TOTAL
MAXIMUM
e7Je1501
"'Uhl HER Ft'r Fan
c.k OF MALES
?IEUTAR%SEIMCB
15-19 2,07D.Ow
1,379,000
20-24 1,860,0m
1,17 9 000
25 -29 1,444.000
904,000
30.34 1,328,000
817,000
35-39 1 ?77,000
743000
90.44 1,027,000
555,000
4549 801,000
393,000
Total, 1549 9.807,000
5,970,000
it is estimated that the average nurltber of males
re ;lChing military age (18) annually ill the period
197 -1 -78 will he about 42400
,Most military personnel arc ohtained lbrougle
conscription The lary c number all pllysic :Illy fit men
permits the selecting of those roost fit in filling tilt'
conscription gontas. teach year idx�tt 10,(XIO Jaen lire
chosen by lottery and are inducted in Iwo CcntilLACIlts
(Lilly and Numnherl. Under the 1954 draft law. all
Thai males must register at ago 18; at 21 they are
liable for 2 years of ctmpulsor% military %orvic�e�,
ltecanasr of inadequate feinelS the term cif service lilts
been shortened by 6 to 10 months a number of times.
but present requirements are� that inductees serve a 2-
year term. A small nulrahrr of %%omen volunleen art-
accepted and serve in such fields as administration
arts! nursing.
Generally the prestige of the military service stands
;at it high level. I'MIOMinan0% of rtrrd background,
the utcrage'1'hai cmimted man has little or no formal
educai -mid nu experieocr with modern mechanical
e(Iuipnlent. lie hies, however, an interest ill lc:an)ing
and generally tins aptitu(les which, it properly
developed, produce it good fighting man. lie is
patriotic, wilt :t deel) svitse of loyalty to his King and
respc- I for his superinr%; K responsive to discipline; and
is inured to physical hardship. Ilowever, the enlisted
Olen are Often not properly utilized. and uelltistihallly
large hullers arc assignal to guard details and as
orderlies at various headquarters.
Morale nand discipline throughout the armed forces
are generally good, clespilt- low -lxey scales For officers
Land enlisted men. in general, ho%vever, enlisted alien
consider military pay, benefits, ;and allowauees better
than those� .f Civilians Wit h:asimilardegrccof training
and rxprne�nce. The indiviclital soldier is Well fell.
Wcats a +marl etntifonn, and enjoys lilxr:r!- pass and
furlough privilegvs. Ilk individual L:Lre is it's good or
better than that received by civilians. I)ISSatlsfacti[at1
among junior officer With luausing, pay. ar the rate of
promotions normally is healed by politically conscious
senior officers because dissension auutng junior
officers. dc,pitc� their lack of orgculiZattion as a pressure
group, has gerteraled cetllp r'ot'ors lee the Ira%t.
The vu%tom of promoting officers oo tier basis of
p )lit iv I reli Ili i;iy rat t'r than on the� hasis of
professional cvralinetenct.. has had an unfavorable�
effect on the quaint of leadership. The mlihe�r of field
grade officers is relatively high- however� :Laid
company -grade officers arc� generally conlixtent.
Arnud farces officers of all ranks who have attended
U S. and other 11'eskvn service sehnols tend to be rllorc
alert, aggressive, and knowledgeahle alwnt modern
%%arfarc than ;err their conlenl[Nuaries who have
remaitled in Thailand '113r effoctiveness Of officers
.Lod noncommissioned officers is improving steadily;
ho%vrver, senior officers Irequent1% Iack iniliativr.
suprrvison ahili1%. and the rapacity for sustained
effort under difficult condition. There has been it
gradual improvement in leadership Within each of tilt'
military services k% i t rv of the retirement of the
senior officers and their replacement by more
Competent %onordinateS
The armed forces nnaintaiet no organized reserve
emits. hi the array. however. prr%Otlrlol who hay.
completed their lams of nilitary service comprise a
large reserve force which is subjeel to mobilization.
Upon release' from active duty. NCO's and conscripts
We carried for a masinrton of 23 years in various
categories and classes all reserve status. The first
categon consists of conscripted persomrel who have
compleicd their terms of regular compulsory service or
those registered persnnnel who have compacted their
military training course First category personnel,
totaling ahorit 500,(1)0, are further subdivided into
three classes. 'iehe first clams are those Who have bcetl in
the reserves for less than 7 years; they comprise the
army s "ready" reserve. The second class are [)lose
who have heert in the reserves from S to 17 1
third class are those who have linen in the reserves
from 18 to 23 years. The second categnry consists of
personnel who are registered hul who (lo not erller the
service until the age of 30. These are considered as
second-class" reservists, and oo reaching the age of
10 they h eeonae thiael- class." !'Item x�lrartiion, artm
officers are assigned let tilt- reserve until the following
ages are reached: company- grade, 45 years; field-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
i
grade. .50 year%: colonels arid gvnerals 55 years. All
qualified personnel not on active Betty are retained in
reserve s(alus uulil at least 1111+� age of -15. All nay%
I)ersouot�I who have st-rvel oil active dllt% and leave
been separated in good standing are mbjeCl to recuJI
milil the age of 60. All physically yaalifird male air
FONT personnt-1 who have beelt released after serving
oil active dub are retained in reserve slldus unlil clue
age of 60. Iblwever,lhesc re�svrves have only yen
lirn;;ctl refresher training, their military usefultirss
after they have heed col of file service far uuerr Iban a
few Near% 11111"1 he regarded :is doubtful.
2, Strength trends (S)
Army and air force strengths 11aye increased
substantially during the past decode, �..hily navy
strength has risen only slighliy.
The decision of the Miltistry of Defense in January
1966 to require that all conscripts inducted �ifler \lay
IP66 seer the frill 2 -Near tour leas rc�sldlctl ill bringing
army strength up to 132.11M. Large- scale tnnbilization
for a protracted period would impose a ht-avv burden
that wuldd strain national manpower resources.
However. these resourceS ore More tha11 adcqualr to
support present ma1111ing levels.
A major prlblemt for all three soviet-", a n d
especially tilt- navy. has hecn the retention of
Iechtlically qualified lte�rsonnck, The navy has a
penally system widch permits a than to buy his way
(lilt cif obligated service incnrre�d :after special pruning.
'['hi% annuals to USS2; peer mouth of obligaini utvicr
for naval cadviny graduates. Commerical finis also
nccd tcchnicalh qualified personnel and we willing to
pay a roan's penalty i order to aegmire his services.
Assigned strength of late air force has hecn
increasing steadily, chiefly because of a fn�rze� ore
resigoali0ns :yid r�tirenreitls. K fforls in increase the
enrollment M lite Airmen's "Technical Triining School
and the Squadlan Officers' School will continue. as
will lbc freeze on reAgualions and rt�tiTUlentS� in hope
of increasing air force manning levels.
Iriguro 2 gives the armed fora�s str�11gilis fu: the I:ist
decade.
3. Training (S)
The conventional and special warfare taclics
employed by Cite Thai armed forces are based on U.S.
doctriuc. All Thai service schools pattern their courses
after those of the Unilcd Slates. The program of
instruction and the problems presented for student
soli fion frequently arc direct trausialions 0f those
obtained by a U.S. Intined instructor. Over9.000 �unit
armccl forces personnel have been Wined ill U.S.
FIGURE 2. Armed forces personnel strengths (S)
�[neludeM 6.300 mririnex
lnililun schools and installatilnn. and mom of Eht�se
lucu have Sabst-gacrtlly served a% eomntaudants and
instniclors of Thai tntiuiug iustitutians. In additiotl lo
this ati d to the instruction received frnn [lie j USMAC
mission or U.S. Nel�ibile 'Training Teams. 'Thai
personnel have worked with specially deployed U S.
units in joint field exercises in Thailluul. However. the
persistcucc of a tendency on lbe part of Thai officers to
keep control highly centralized and their reluctance to
dclt-gale auth;trity through 1101.lal c�o0unond
chamuels have largely offset the gain '112-1 this tr doing
should have affordVd.
The� Directorate of lsducatiou and Bestweli of lilt-
Supreme Command I leadquarters operates the Armed
Iorcvs Academies Preparatory School in Bangkok.
Craduates of its 2 yearcourse are assigned in the army,
navy. or air farce academies acvorditl;, to personnel
requirements of each service. The coupe of instruction
at each of the service academies is 5 %cars. Upon
graduation. a cadet receives a bachelor of science
clegr�c and is commissioned. Specialized courses for
officers up to major and equivalent are conducted by
the branch and technical schools of each service.
The Armed C'orc�1�s Staff College, at Bangmik. is
maintained liv the� Supreme Command Headquarters.
Tile College tntins senior armed forces officers in joint
:5511 cttrnbined operations and lire planning of such
operations. The National Defense College, also at
Bangkok and under tits Suprenic Command
1 provides advanced study for high
ranluvg military and civilian persomtel in military.
economic, and political aspects of the national
defense Nonc nimissioned officers may g11alify for
llte Australian and SI :ATO- supported Military
Technical 'Training School o perated by lbe Supreme
Command headquarters.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
Aln
rllrAl.
YGAII
11tHY
YAYY
Full.F
Iis.
1002
711,000
31.0311
16,7011
117.000
1063.
52,000
31.030
16,620
1 28,000
1964.
82, OGO
21 .410D
17,9011
121 000
1005...
83,000
21.600
38,1300
323,11W
1066.
88,000
22.300
10,200
1.30,1810
1607.
99,009
21,800
21,4011
142,8UO
1908
300.000
21,SOil
2-1,100
146,
1069..
loo,68D
21,000
20,370
154,1100
1070...
117,000
22.500
39
t70.000
1073_..
125,000
22,500
33.501)
181.000
1072.
125,U00
22,500
33.500
1811�000
1073
133,100
�27,300
46.600
206,0116
�[neludeM 6.300 mririnex
lnililun schools and installatilnn. and mom of Eht�se
lucu have Sabst-gacrtlly served a% eomntaudants and
instniclors of Thai tntiuiug iustitutians. In additiotl lo
this ati d to the instruction received frnn [lie j USMAC
mission or U.S. Nel�ibile 'Training Teams. 'Thai
personnel have worked with specially deployed U S.
units in joint field exercises in Thailluul. However. the
persistcucc of a tendency on lbe part of Thai officers to
keep control highly centralized and their reluctance to
dclt-gale auth;trity through 1101.lal c�o0unond
chamuels have largely offset the gain '112-1 this tr doing
should have affordVd.
The� Directorate of lsducatiou and Bestweli of lilt-
Supreme Command I leadquarters operates the Armed
Iorcvs Academies Preparatory School in Bangkok.
Craduates of its 2 yearcourse are assigned in the army,
navy. or air farce academies acvorditl;, to personnel
requirements of each service. The coupe of instruction
at each of the service academies is 5 %cars. Upon
graduation. a cadet receives a bachelor of science
clegr�c and is commissioned. Specialized courses for
officers up to major and equivalent are conducted by
the branch and technical schools of each service.
The Armed C'orc�1�s Staff College, at Bangmik. is
maintained liv the� Supreme Command Headquarters.
Tile College tntins senior armed forces officers in joint
:5511 cttrnbined operations and lire planning of such
operations. The National Defense College, also at
Bangkok and under tits Suprenic Command
1 provides advanced study for high
ranluvg military and civilian persomtel in military.
economic, and political aspects of the national
defense Nonc nimissioned officers may g11alify for
llte Australian and SI :ATO- supported Military
Technical 'Training School o perated by lbe Supreme
Command headquarters.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
Juiot Iraining ewercises invuhiog anuy. [tile y, aucl
air fore(- c�nntingenls halo heen cvomlueled it tee
initiatier of tilt- t'nited States and Sl' :A'1'0 Simi-
1962. the armed lorces have detnoustr.Ued greater
efft -Ok toss and coordinaliun i[t 51 {ATO- sponsored
111,1 Bet and CIitIII)Illeel l S -'Thai c�ourttt�ritisurgeo-
ct held training, vwrcises in %ulm�rable honker arras.
Jot It army, air force. and pokier itihtidissidetht
operations reflect considerahlN improved interserwive
:end ilttrrlgvllvy erupe�ratioti. Sitiee 197 1. the I llai
d I'll u�d services h:rwr emduc�tecl annual joint field
Ir.iining ewereix�s (JI'7�C1 which hacr actnalh been
major countehilMirgell" uperll 011% TIIV largest of
Ihcse. Oprrilions Phu Ktsang. leas eunducted is early
IU72 JI��I=\ 16 and JFT\ 17, conducted ill 1972 and
1973. respec�tice!%. shoji ed iniproveme�nts in Ingistkes
.Ind fire support over previous o1wratiom These
t 1perltiolls Ilaw'e given the armed fomes valnablc
e wperience and training in conducting nudtihattaliun
OIN�rllti1111%.
4. Military budget.
The Thai military budget is prepared ire the
Nlioistry of Dcfl�nse. based oil estilnatt, of
expenditures submitted by the service Chiefs, and
approved by the National Assembly. Ik cause of the
November 1971 coup and the sospl�Ilsiotl Of the
parliantentan system. the I973 budget was approved
En elccrce. (I W
During recent years the inilitan budget has ranked
secxmd among milieu categories of expenditures ire the
central government bticiget: it averaged over 17.a"i of
central governmrnl expendilur�s and about 3.55 of
GNP. Details as to lhr allocation of foods la the :trntcd
forces oil either :1 service or fmlc�tional batiks are not
mailable. 4lilitun budgets for fiscal yearn 1970
through 1973, in millions of U,S, dollars (the Thai
fiscui year ends 30 September of the year designated)
are as followvs:
FY 1970 FY 1971
FY 1972 FY 1973
Military budget ?.23.3 213.7
253.3 270,7
Percent of central gov-
ernm^nt budget 170 17.7
I8.2 182
Percent of CNP 3.4 315
GA 3.6
S. Economic support and logistics
Thaihoid has a limited industrial capability to
produce materiel for its artned forees. Agriculture is
the most important seetur it% the eetw with rice
and rubber the leading commodities produced attic]
exported. l.(xaI rtrennfacluriug is dominated by
tradition,l agrictilturtl processing industries milling
elf rice, sugar, creel flour Other important incerstnes
include refining of imported erode nil. :nselTlb of
molor v ehicles from imported vouiltonenls, ,and the
Tnuuufactlrriul!, of MoICIlt (l' OU I
Domestic production in direct support of t ile arnn�d
farces is limited to small itrins anmtlmilion.
cluarterinaster l%'pe supplies (uniforms. hoots. ;tilt]
le ulsl. and slit oil patrol and torpedo boal%, all other
iilitary materiel most be imported. 'I'bere are plimn
far kohl Ioro(luetion of the 11'es11 :e�rTt. ,:l- cle�signeel
.sail -nim Ill: 3.3 rifle b late 197:3. The L'idled Still(
h;rs been the principal stlpplirr of %Wilporis ,rod
equipment. bnt BvIgittin. West Cerlrtany. the L nitet]
Kingdom, and Japan have uc�rtsionallw furnished
some c�quipnu�nt Rrtwrc�rt 19x1 and l';7?. 1'hail:rnd
rec�eiced USSI, I billion in mililarw assistance from the
Ullilcd States, must of it it% grant aid (S)
6. Uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
Uniforms of the arm (i forces are made front good
quality material lurk are well tailored 'Three 1 ylle�s of
uniforms ;Ire atithorize�d. servic�t-, dress, amt find For
must ocuision% officers :oid etdtsled men swear the�
%VF%'tce� uniforn Tart etc olive drab cotton and olive
drab wools are used for both serciee and field
uniform... and dark -bloc tnuterial for the dress
ueilurot. Nirvs uniforms are made- from cotton or
WOOI �n (�111111 ill while. tan. or dark blue A tan
uniform �Mich rita% be scorn during duly lloun
consists either of :n long sleeved Opl�n- collar shirt with
shoulderboards and long trousers or Shorls ur of it
blotcsc with shoulderboards (similar to that warn by
U.S. Nav} Officers), shirt with tie, and loo-, trousen
Air force service and dress uniforms are made front a
gray hllle cotton or worsted cloth.
Arm% and air force wl- ice uniforms (sittsisl of a
single breitstecl coat with fnlIr gold blrttOoS. m :olching
trousers. service or garrison cap, and black shoes. With
this uniform. anti% personnel wear no olive -green shirt
and tic; and air force. it while shirt and black lie. Fu
u(lditialt to the Single breasted coat, air force
persemnel are authorised it short mcdilun-blue-ryhlnred
service jacket which is also worn with a shirt and tie.
Service cap hands of arny peminoel arc distinctive� it)
Color, according to the grade; magenta for general
officers; Were for other officers: and green for enlisted
men. Crap bamis for all air force personnel are titediunt
blue.
The traditiona navy -bhre service uniform warn by
naval officers and chief pett% officers itteludes a
double- breasted coat. matching trousers, and service
cap with while crop cover. Petty officers and seatnten
wear a while 2- piece sailor -type uniform and a flat hat
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090024-0
stp.ct U14"ORM
SI?mCf -w FORM
Wme "No"
GROUND FORCES
mm ow
GIKRAt 0EUIE.AmIl
SKCIM COLON11 tjUfjHA.I oA)oq
"ID Colo-It Coto.[(
CAIM ,11.1
III 1.114M, Ell
XttAlt INSIONlA
."I", cl 5
AND SKCTA1 C010"EL
NAVAL FORCES
AUMI*Aj ADm7AA VICE ADMIRAL REAR ADMIRAl
X IKE IKE,
14 Aw 00 Im
CAN" CCIAMA1 11FUIERAW UfUlWAKI
cc�.,MR
JUNIOR SUB tifUIXNANT
Ir
'UMNA,w
CAV IL 11.A
AIR FORCES
w
MARSHAL Of 14 OUR 0111F me vice
No YOKE AAAJIVIAL
JIM
SQUA."ON PC
LFAMR MWIM
IND
FuGliT Fhor
o(nCtit OFFICER
C" "410NIA
FIGURE 3. Officers' uniforms and instgnic (UJOU)
d
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090024-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
i
E
I"
it
SFRvlcl .�otN
SkRGI LYI ORp4Li .LD )r riL
OO PORL
NAVAL FORCES
11w
cl.Rf Offi, Orr��IL .ri:El PE 11Y ()/iKfr: i �.It; Dl r, plrvrR
psi hss o c4 o .,Lss
Pf- 1011cfe Rf T" O-c" D! Orr.i_tR
'St c1 L,sS 7L C'1$5 3. :LSS CLS *ISIt:New
1 rIH. I... Oct. tR1
SF..NLN
AIR FORCES
MD M
AS ER IEc -.1c,t Slot SE4GEAVf SERGE.u1 wRMAM
A14 -AAS u4M L.1 CAP IFtSIGN4
it, UASS 4 UAS5
J. lz v
A NW
to cuss
SERVKE VNIfORY
FIGURE 4. Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (UJOUI
9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
GRJUND FORCES
�S. ER
SERGELVI
SERGc
151 CFLSS
S.,
SERGELwir
SkRGI LYI ORp4Li .LD )r riL
OO PORL
NAVAL FORCES
11w
cl.Rf Offi, Orr��IL .ri:El PE 11Y ()/iKfr: i �.It; Dl r, plrvrR
psi hss o c4 o .,Lss
Pf- 1011cfe Rf T" O-c" D! Orr.i_tR
'St c1 L,sS 7L C'1$5 3. :LSS CLS *ISIt:New
1 rIH. I... Oct. tR1
SF..NLN
AIR FORCES
MD M
AS ER IEc -.1c,t Slot SE4GEAVf SERGE.u1 wRMAM
A14 -AAS u4M L.1 CAP IFtSIGN4
it, UASS 4 UAS5
J. lz v
A NW
to cuss
SERVKE VNIfORY
FIGURE 4. Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (UJOUI
9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
11
If.-
`ter
with black hand hCaring the ncune of the ship on
wh,ch the individual is serving, or his duly
assrgrlrnent.
White or d:oik -blue dress uniform-%, authorized for
wear by all serice personnel, include a single- breasted
coat with standing collar.
Field uniforrns worn by Thai armed forces personnel
are generally similar to those worn by the U.S. forces.
The army officer' service uniform has metallic
grade insignia on shoulderboards which are the same
color as the uniform; the dress uniform has pink and
gold- colored shoulderboards for general officers and
scarlet and gold- colored for field- and company -grade
officers. With the ivy blue service uniform, all iaval
officers wear gold colored stripes on the sleeves of the
coat to denote grade; on 'ItIICr uniforms. flag officers
swear gold- colored shoulderboards with silver metallic
grade devices; and senior and junior officers, gold-
Colored stripes on black shoulderboards. On service
and dress uniforms, general officers of the air force
wear silver metallic devices on gold- colored
shoulderboards; shoulderboards of other officers are
blue with gold- colored cloth stripes. Senior NCO's of
the army and air forces wear metallic grade insignia on
shoulderboards, other enlisted Wren wear cloth insignia
on the sleeve between the-elbow stud the shoulder.
Chief petty officer grades ire the navy .ire denoted by
C113111 chevrons on Shoulderboards: petty officers and
seamen wear embroidered cloth insignia on the sleeve
between the elbow and the shoulder. When wearing
du' or field uniforms, offices and NCO's Of the nave
and air force display gold colored metallic insignia of
r-ink un the left collar lab of the shirt.
Army officers wear metallic gold colored branch
insigni, on the right collar tab of the field uniform
shirt and on tite right lapel of the service uniform coat.
Metallic gold colored unit devices are worn on the left
collar lab of the shirt and the left lapel of the service
uniform coat. Naval officers branch or specialty is
indicated by various colored cloth stripes interspersed
between insignia of grade stripes. Specialist ratings are
indicated by gold colored metallic devices worn on
shoulderboaMs. of chief petty offic;rrs and seamen. Air
force ufficers wear gold colored metallic unit devices
on hoth lapels Of life service uaiforin mat. Aviation
badges are displayed above the tipper left pocket of
the uniform by authorized personnel.
The ranks Of brigadier general (armry), commodore
(navy), and air commodom (air force were phased out
in 1961. They have been replaced by special colonel.
captain, ai-I group captain in their respective service...
Ili the army the special col wears the colonel's
rank insignia and general officers' collar insignia. Tile
navy and air force made no distinction it, insignia
between the rc�w rntk., and tine rcgtdar captain-
group captain rank. Winter service uniforms and
insignia for ufftc�er are shmcn in Figure 3; for
NCO and enlisted personnel in Figure I
C. Army
The Royal Thai Aron- is the dominant military
service of the armed forces of f hail.uid. It has
gradually improved and cinlinuCS to improve its
combat readiness and can cope with military
situations ranging from localized insurgency In some
overt aggression. With t' b. assistance it poorly
equipped armed force has been transformed since
1950 into an army of growing pnofessinind rnmpe(ence
and using modern weapons cull rCluipmerit- In the
past lire army was oriented almost exclusively toward
a conventional ground defense mission. but events in
Laos and South Vietnann',avc aleled 'Thai leaders to
the need In strengthen counterinsurgency capabilities
against the established pattern of Communist
attack� subversion, insurgency, and guerrilla
Operations. The army*, increased involvement in
counterinsurgency and civic action work. its operation
of several Special Operations Centers at sensitive
border locations since 1963, and the commitment of
military units to countersubvenion and antiguerrilla
Operations in tine north and uurthcasl beginning in late
19615 represent a significant departure from u
longstanding government policy which assigned to the
police parannolmt responsibilitw for harder security
and countersuhversion. (S)
Certain inherent deficiencies in the military
establishment tend to restrict gains that cold be nnade
through the increased supply of materiel and trained
personnel, 'Thailand's military pmparcduc-,s against
either widespread insurgency or direct attack is
seriously impeded by a lack Of adequate command
supervision at all levels and by insufficient combined
:ern. and field training of units above battalion level.
Other chronic weaknesses impairing unity effective
mss are the preoccupation of senior officers with
politics and their personal economic interests. a lack of
:.in effeetivc bogisti" sy %hem, mndermanned combat
and combat support units, and a poorly coordinated
combat intelligence system. Tile negligible local
production o f sear materiel and the resuhanl
dependence upon foreign sources for weapons and
equipment also limit the defensive capability. (S)
On the positive side. Thai military leaders have
coorcraled closely wide the United States and SEATO
in implementing programs designed to increase emit
in
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
and per%ounel %treoglhs, to ck-1,vlop tilt- aruty's logistic
%uplwrl r :lpabilitirs. :(lid to pro%idc Special forc�e�% -tope
training to the *nn and %(spporting paratnilitar%
cct tit ILL nt-nts of lis t- national pnl.,r aII(I tIIv l nf tit tt-t-r
IN-leose :orp% Gilt- field rsprric�ncrof thee 'I'lt.ti t rrnop,
ist 1 ie�taar.t ban ud(led .I crosnbal�lrtined elrnu�nt
esperienced in battle and ire corking s%IIII all It. (I
mililam fore%% ender jeoint eornnl,uld iSt
The arrn%, assisFed It% olio�( nsiblar% and
1mramilitar% force., is p�ttenliall capable of
soppre%stug iucipiestt iasorgenc% The conduct of
vounterknxtrgencl, operations and ci%ic- ueGon has
i tit wcwed sonw%%Icat is ruvvitt tears. In vorl% 197.1
there uery 17 .S(H) troops committed to cvunterimur-
genc% internal secsrrih. Alld de%eloprrlt�Ill pr)grcras.
All three artm arras and the .9th NIili tit r% (allele
(114.10 Illar Thai lit ndl are engaged in cr)unleriusur-
getl('} aclion. The arn% could prol)alsl\ ccitllstaud
attack In tilt- forces of Mal:nsia, 1. ws. :anlbocha. In
Bunn((, acting indc )CH del It] A,Iso. c%IwI1 prtpl-rk
(IireClt-d, tronpS %%nuld prnbahl�. fight %colt against all
attack. b% North Vietnam art(] or (:Irma lint a major
invasion b% either of ILe�se e�olnttfit's could not he
crullaiIV( %wit Ili ntt innroe(tr. is foreign assist :nsce in
troops and materiel. (S)
I. Orgarlirartion (5)
The 0msrnander in Chief of the Are� is assisted by
a Pepin} Commandcr in Chief. t%wo AS%iStAIlt
Cnrnrnanders in Cllief, and it Chief of Staff. %%h t is not
analogous to the U.S Arm% Chief of Staff but acts in
an advisor% c�apucit% %with responsibilit% for
supervision of plans and programs for the arrrlx The
Chief of Staff is assisted b% is depot\ and threo
assistant chiefs of staff for penonncl, operation., arc
logistics. All Arm% Council, composed of ranking staff
aW%lants and ke% tactic -al oflic�erS under the
chairmanship of the Commander in Chief of the
Arun\, is lit� principal :advisory body an major poll -it's
of li'te armll.
TlIe Arru. Gencr.(I Ile::dquarters in Kingkok
collsprisc% several staff sections: a general staff, special
staff, technical sluff, and training staff. The general
staff consists of a secretariat, a comptroller, and four
direclorales� PersonFICI (G -I lntclligc��sa� (G -2).
013--rations (G-3). Logisiias (G -4). The geucral Staff
organiialtion and functions closely parallel those of the
U.S. Army. The spacial st uff is et;nc rne(1 plainly with
admirlistralive and fiscal matters arid the discipline
it, :(I Welfare of troops. It is orga Ili 4ed into five
departments hca(IMl bV the Adjutatlt General, lira
Provost Marslltal General, lite Inspector Central, and
i the Chiefs of finance and Special Services. The
12
Iec�hnicaI sluff is rvyponsiblc for (Ili' ell}Inrtlar% arrn%
lec�Inic�al sere we rutluirvineut. It consists of eight
depurinu�It 0rduauve. 1: 1I>'IIIVt-r. Signal. (lt1arl4-r-
MANI1 Trampnrl.tlion. \lt-dic;d. \etcrivan and
Remount, and Post t�:ngineers I v t staff is
cortc�ern i s ith till' e(111C.1 Tonal and Ir.Iining activities
of tilt arrll% a ll(] ar1Tl% WSVI'll I'S. 11 11a L'0tnj)0I1(�nt
lht- Territorial Dc -1v%4- lh�partont-nl. the Arim Vivid
I- urces, the Arne \1 :rr Co]Irgr, the Command still
General Sluff Colhrgc, and the Chulac�holnklao 11mal
Mililar% Academ\. Training imialloboo are located
priniarth in Ili� Bangkok area
For :ubnii i%trati%e and tactical purposes, Thailand
is di%idvd into four Major territorial c�mmIr MIS, and
lht-sc :trt� dir�cd% rt�sponsil lt- to tilt' :annnan(ler in
Chef of the Artn% 'Three :rte dcsit;rsated area% area
coa1111WHls. cootaillmg oily iufitn di%isioo each, slid
the foord, is I %Inidlt�r iudelmndl�ni cv)srintand, KolMn
a% it "militan virc�le c�ontaimm- a rcgirnenlal combat
team. Saborditkatt- to lilt. thwe :tans areas are other
rllilitun circles as %cell us olilitan districh %%hide
fnnelion u% adnlinistrulive %u1)t-nrnnlancls A unit
con"quig of lhreo infanta regiment% lilt traditioualh
designotell Lilt- c:naln division and ;ill antivircraft
:trtiller% disisiun stationed in Bangkok .tr(� dirrclh.
under the (:ommander ilk C }lief of the Ann%, in ore tilt
special forces group all([ tilt- airborne battalion. The
territorial commanders hart� command, mobilization.
itod srcurit% mspomibilitiv %imiiar to those cif
umilim�ntal are% corm antirrs ill the United Slates
The orgallirttic:n ernplo} ell b% the area cotnolaod
headquarters is not suitable for it field arrnS
iwmiquarlers In -cause of tit(- lack of sufficient spectral
and adnli11 islr :dive staff personnel for lac�tical.
logistical� and administrative planning rmdvr vilartime
conditions- Fo provide direction and coordination
craters for c�(rla)teriltsurgerlc) opt-rations, ):onward
irn5 fic�adquarlrrs have bce�n established in north.
cc�rltrid. and northeast Thailand.
Tile chain of crorinsmld procced from conll�al fore%�
units upn;uds through division hcudcluarten ill the
arlIM axa cy)Imnund headquarters to the Commander
in Chief of die Arms. 'me three infantry divisions
leave a marginal combat capability and function
principal aS an administrative headquarters. The
lack elf an cffeclive Iactical fore(' Structure Stems fmnl
Thailand*s limited experience in modern warfare and
political considerations involved in providing
sufficient rcmlrnand pxuitions for the relativehv large
number of high ranking officers. Subordinate to each
infantry division are front two to four regimental
headquarters. �rile infantry regiment become
regimental combat teams when augmented by a field
artillery battaliau, a trink compare. and an engineer
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
cYml Ilia ny. From the rtalk,lpoini of trui Ili, kg :Old
0131�rational readiness. ill(. basic laciirti fnrmntio4 is
tilt infanta battalion. I'be unils of the c1),lb;lt ;Arils
'or( orgautzed along the lines of tilc triaugmlar
organizatiam of the U.S. Arm) during World 1lrar 11.
but [alli of 1)gmolzu(irm anti equtl)rru ul are adaplcd
In "Thai requirenlenls.
2. Strength, cefmposilion, and disposition, (S)
TW current deluilctl iub,rmui�on, we tole Illltfary lntelli efire
Sfrrun,ent, published quurterly, and Sir oiler of Beilde Soraaulnr,
Forrifin Gmlirid Farecs, pub[� hall annually by the Defcase
1 m [ntell�gem[e Agency.
1�1111 field :Irtiilct% battalion. 'There ik ;iltio:lri avi;tlian
departmleol ()'u� ul 'lot' flee trlf;udn ditNM" .tall an
indepemdcnt r(.gimenlal [-otnhat It� ;un sycn .ic�ti(att�d
in 1971 and equipped prin�arils frn�n resourc�rs (tf tilt.
former Tlkai Volunleer I -orc( in lilt. Republic- of
Vielmanl. Ilowever, 131)(11 the division and the
m�gilncrol :err current[: tntderslr (.mgtb ;aid ill an
urgamirtliorml mud trtinimg staluS, Oat, infanir
divistori, another tra(IiliunaBti cicsign,cl(.d tilt� [av:dn
diviSiom. the uuliairc�rtft division are staliooed in
Bangkok: a third infatitn division is i1t the mirth, and
a fourth ill the northeast. The incicjivial nl reginivnlal
c�oinbat Icaul is Stalinm�d ill souillern Thailand.
The hcayiesl concentralimi of tronps� roughly -W;
o. fatal ilnuy s(renglh and including raa)Or infaniry,
cav:dr%, and artillery ,nits �is in the Bangkok area. A
sec�nndan area of concenlrttio, is in northeast
!'bail:uui, uplxlsilt the ,lost likeli iuvasian roulcs into
Thailand frml Lies. The Southern and imrllowe.term
harder areaS are only lightly defended.
The over[wucenlralirn of nmvn and units in the
Riui oA area and the paucity of tlllits in tiro field
severCly hantpers the army's readiness to rricet th
threa( of invasium or of subsemsutn and iusurgene ill
[Ile hin(vilands DePloyrllen[ of military units to
o1i6ying regions to defend lilt, bnrdcr is difficult
because of the inadequacy of the rail and road
network Ili(] airlift ettlpabilil}. Additiouall%. such
deployment nurivalhr emtailS it serious budge[:rr�
slraiu Irt�causc of the Thai custom of paying per (5em
I, troops OIx�rltiug away from their parent garrisons.
:3. Training (C)
Individua] basic training Of conscripts and recruits is
carried out i1) battalion (mining ccmipanic�s. The
JUS1\'Ir1C- i1Jsti9ated cfforl to set tip a central training
installation resulted it, the eslablislnnen( in 1954) of
the Recritit Training (:enter at Pran Bari. Efficiently
administered and well equipped, this center was
similar F(I a U.S. Army IcplacrrneOI trlinilfg ernier.
Iiowever, trainees from the First Aram Area only were
a- migm'd to the center, and theref0're the spacious
installation never Operated it full capacity. 7'he
Recruit Training Center was closed down in 196G, a
""'I" of Thai persistcnce in adhering In the
traditional practice of training and assigning
wnSeriPls to uui(s in 1m11ne areas throughout their
(ours of dtlty.
Unit (raining tit) to and iueltiding battalion level is
gcneratiy satisfactory, hilt field training above
battalion lev is seldom cmttducted. Ills: result of hOtll
hudget,try eonside ra I I nits and kite lack of interest i1)
such (raining on [lie part of senior arrgv officers,
I9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0
�file antis leas till all wd pl�nunocl slreugth of
15(},110) troops, but evnibut :old sup1mrt arnis arc
older strcugth. Actual slrengtil is 192,1(1), cYlmisling
Of 11.600 Officers. it ,GO) \CO's, and 68.9()o oilier
enlisted melt. Thew totals include permunmcl of the
small Wonwit's Artily Carps, 100s1 of wklose lneinbcrs
perform administrative and clerical duties in Ill(-
Adjutant C,cocrai I)ch'rtmc,l(. tinder MAP. the
United States has agreed to support ec�rlain Thai 11mvp
levels when units rrleet certain stipulalions; it, mill�
1972 there were 11500 MAIi- supported lrimps (ill
tllat time alltINOOZ(l MAP support streug(h %%-as
1.15,61 1).
The arm}' is c�(luippcd Prirllarily with Kurean war
s'in(agc� U.S. we;lpons and equipincut supplrmrntld
13 nlmdcrn gIx�s. 'I'lm� principal field artiller weapons
are Of U.S. origin and include 75-mrn pack howitzers,
r
f0irrnn hocsit.,:rn
f'kulgkok, provides airlift support to police and other
gincnnucut ageocics ill cewnter'nsurgcncc. Cunt
monist suppression. or other law enforcenleitl
operations. The division op rates out of staging b:ise�s
throughout the eourltn�. Ik�cause of a lack of sufficient
aircraft, the division does not have the capability to
handle all airlift requirvinelals.
Special Acl:on Fortxs (SAP). an elite clement of the
Provincial Polite, are quick reaction units used to
supplement police and mllitar%� forces Etl CnllntCRltSllr
genev operti'nus. These fortes permit depioyanent of
units to Inert emergency situations without
interrupting normal police assignments. Although
highly trained and %veil equipped. the SAF have
insufficient strength and 'uadequale air support,
tvI!'cIl limits their effectiveness in currying out their
22
ussignet{ ntissimi 'I'lie SAI� art� ar4artizell Intel 5
rontpanies inlet 3: separale platt,olls. atld their total
strellath k 3,5W
the '1 \I.lriut� 1 1 43lit�e lalso kouurt as tile- M'al'e
Palicu 's cltat4etl ssith presentin4 stnu441ui4.
ell t-tistoms aotf esporl n�4aiatiolm enfurtitig
Ian in harbor areas, Prest�otiug cspiuua4r ant'
polilical tlislurbanuts 'u crnastal ,irt�as. eufort -tot;
shippiu4 and safety rustulaliltns nn %I- 9tfirn+ u�ssels.
trill prnhibitilt4 thu illr4al rout, or evt of aliens and
erirrs'nals
Vlurine�
polity strength is "bunt I 7(1(1 ulen
inue has ?fi fo:ues wont; the Viekooe. in the Ctrllod
Thail:url. and on tit(. Straits of .lalatxa It has" tol"I
of 176 crtfl. illcludirig three IKt) -font pmirol craft.
thn�e MI-foot putrul craft. I(i Ili the SU- (el IM -font
ranAv. 32 is the 20- too 30 -foul range, ,utd S1 sllalin"-
llraft pnnitit bnals "llu� smaller c�rtft are list.(] for
p:tlrllllllg llli:i lid ujitumiw.. and tit(- Itilll;eT t'r aft ;1 r1'
enga4ed in e�eiastal patrol
TIIV \iitrire Polie�e had been plagued ssith
111milewt craft and inad-Itlitte beul4elar% supluirt
limo see, 4osc�rttoetlt apps al to 1969 ell a -sear
project for strengllteitiflit and niodemizing the force
ilicludes the building of it rluntber of llttxiern patrol
boats. "lliCIl have intprlvrd its effectiveness
The Volunteer Defense Corps VIN :i is a port -time
farce eslablished as it village iloille guard -type militia
to supplctneat the Prov'nci:tl Polite in pmrid'ng 112CUI
Nct�urits. 'I *lle MitiMer Elf hiterior is till C-11lrl:lnding
General of the VDC, anti the� Minister of Defense is his
deptity Regiaral headquarter are located ill each
provincial seat :lid are cotliTill sided b: the provincial
t,awmoir-
Strength of the VDC is a1, {troxint :tech 49.W). All
persttluiel bare been trolled ill a sPecl:t' program
th�sigiled to pri�parc a COMAersubvets'olt cold village
defense force, Al most 13,000 VD(: members are on
full tide� duty status \'Dc: persomtel Itave, to a
limited degree� participated sucts,sfully in field
training exercises and Cnlniteri list rgerecy operations
with army an.l honler putrul police "nits. VDC
effectiveness is �tampered l� i t fuck of truosportation,
firepo wer. "till car munic:itions- R"POTIsibility fns ;he
VDC is divided, 1'he Department of Loral
Administration provides :ttlnl'uistritivc support, the
army provides we:gotis, training, and leadership. file
VDC is organized inlo province Lcotnpanies. fronti
bonder plate -3us, disttiict corup:ulics. village security
tearns, and nailrou(l utlits-
NO FOREIGN DISSF-11
SeC1IET
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090024 -0