NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 99; PHILIPPINES; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090002-4
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SECRET
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December 1973
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irlf is t. INS?- &ff-
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Troubled Ally
The Republic of the Philippines, an archipelago of
more than 7,100 islands lying some 400 miles off the
Asian mainland between the Pacific Ocean and the
South China Sea, is a nation of great beauty and many
problems. A 16th century territorial creation of
colonial Spain, it was granted independence in the
wake of World War II after nearly 50 years of
American tutelage. It survived a difficult reconstruc-
tion period and the challenge of a serious Com-
munist -led insurgency (the so -called Huk movement) to
become for a time one of the most stable and rapidly
developing countries in Southeast Asia. Set apart from
its neighbors by the degree to which its customs and in-
stitutions have been affected by its colonial heritage (it
is, for example, the only predominantly Christian
country in the area and the only one �save, perhaps,
Singapore �where English is so widely spoken), it
remains linked to the United States by an extensive
network of political, military, and economic
agreements. (u /ou)
These close ties between the United States and the
Philippines have lost some of their earlier warmth. As
the passage of time has dimmed memories of wartime
collaboration and the extent of American post
independence assistance, Philippine nationalism
has taken on an increasingly anti -U.S. tone. But al-
though it is now fashionable �and good politics
for prominent leaders and journals to attack the
remaining special privileges enjoyed by U.S.
businessmen and government agencies, few Filipinos
as yet seriously seek changes which might drive out
American investors or undermine the U.S. guarantee of
their co! ntry's security and territorial integrity.
Moreover, since Washington has responded to
Victim of violence in Mindanao
manifestations of Philippine nationalism with un-
derstanding and restraint, there is still a considerable
reservoir of good will on both sides. For their part,
Americans of all ages have become firmly accustomed
to thinking of the Philippines as a friendly bastion of
democracy and free enterprise in an otherwise chaotic
and strife -torn region. (u ou)
Indeed, the Philippine Republic's original political
system� established and refined during a decade -long
and war interrupted transitional period as a
semiautonomous commonwealth �had many com-
mendable features. It was not, nor could it have been,
a carbon copy of the American model. Rather, it was a
unique blend of American -style democratic in-
stitutions, of a strong executive and a centralized form
of government (reflecting the influence of over 300
years of Spanish colonial rule), and of a complex corn
padre system of social values which placed overriding
importance on real or ritual kinship ties. Firmly based
on regular elections, a free press, and a tradition of
civilian control over the military, the system gave the
average citizen a satisfying sense of participation in
national affairs (a feeling which was bolstered by the
generally ready accessibility of their elected repre-
sentatives) and provided aspiring politicians an
avenue of upward mobility. (u /ou)
This highly personalized system was, however, both
vulnerable to manipulation by unscrupulous leaders
and distinctly resistant 1 evolutionary change. Behind
their democratic trappings, the political processes were
run from the outset by and for an oligarchy composed
of a relatively small number of extremely wealthy
families. Such talent as arose outside its ranks was
generally quickly coopted by this ruling elite. As a
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result, the country's two major political parties �the
Liberal Party and the Nacionalista Party� differ little
in overall philosophy and have served primarily as in-
struments for advancing the interests of rival factions
within the oligarchy. Moreover, since ambitious of-
ficeseekers are generally unburdened by any sense of
loyalty to their party, switching from one to another
has been common. (c)
Only one of the Philippine Republic's early
presidents, Ramon Magsaysay, possessed enough pop-
ular support and strength of character to successfully
challenge the power of the oligarchs. His
enlightened administration brought domestic peace
and considerable economic progress to his country in
the mid- 1950's. But Magsaysay was killed in a plane
crash in 1957, and his successor quickly fell back into
old ways. Once again Philippine politics became little
more than a game of musical chairs in which the
wealthy and those who aspired to be wealthy vied for
the spoils and favors of public office. A sense of respon-
sibility to the national interest or the general welfare
was notably lacking. With few exceptions, politicians
tended to be preoccupied with assuring that benefits
accrued to themselves, their immediate families, and
their extended kinship groups. Nepotism and the
abuses associated with it were �omrnonplace and were
condoned by traditional social mores. Corruption ex-
tended from the highest levels of government to the
lowest officials in the most remote villages. Violence
was a regular part of political life. Private armies
flourished, and every election had its quota of political
murders. (c)
Under these circumstances, signs of trouble soon
reappeared. The country's rate of economic growth
began to fall off in the early 1960's. As boom con-
ditions receded. the peasants and the urban poor
became increasingly fretful about their government's
failure to honor oft- repeated promises of a more
equitable distribution of the nation's wealth. By
mid- decade, economic grievances, resurgent
nationaiism, rising popular expectations,
and the unsettling impact of changes in the inter-
national environment had combined io generate a
clearly perceptible undercurrent of domestic discon-
tent. (c)
In t965, popular disenchantment with President
Diosdado Macapagal enabled the tough and in-
telligent young President of the Philippine Senate, Fer-
dinand Marcos, to defeat his former political ally at
the polls. Despite the new chief executive's vigor and
evident ability, however, the next 4 years brought little
progress toward remedying the country's basic ills. A
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self -made member of the oligarchy and a politician
who had not hesitated to bolt his party to run for the
presidency on the opposition slate, Marcos was too
much a product (and captive) of the system to be able
to force through the sweeping economic and social
reforms he had advocated in his campaign speeches.
On the other hand, he was also too ambitious to be
bound very long by the accepted rules of the game.
Setting his sights on reelection to an unprecedented sec-
ond (and, by constitutional provision, final) term in
office, he launched a skillful public relations campaign
centered on his modest but undeniable achievements
in increasing rice production, building new roads and
schools, and curtailing smuggling. (c)
As time passed, it seemed increasingly likely that for
better or for worse the 1969 presidential elections
would mark something of a watershed for the Philip-
pines, Most observers were agreed that Marcos was
developing a sufficiently favorable image to win hand-
ily. The optimists among them hoped that he would
use his popular mandate to curb the stifling influence
of the oligarchs and to crown his final years in office
with genuine progress toward needed reforms. The
pessimists, on the other hand, feared that Marcos'
egoism and burning ambition might precipitate sorne
sort of political crisis, and in the end they proved to be
right. (c)
Marcos not only wanted to win reelection, but he
wanted to win by an overwhelming margin. To this
end he employed bribery, fraud, and coercion on a
scale unprecedented even in Philippine politics. His
reckless expenditure of public funds nearly bankrupted
the economy. His heavyharded tactics and his subse-
quent efforts to find some way to avoid relinquishing
power at the expiration of his second term in 1973
alienated many of his former supporters in all walks of
life, occasioned massive student demonstrations and
politically oriented street violence, contributed to a
revival of Communist insurgency in the countryside
around Manilla, and generally polarized the body
politic as never before. These developments, coupled
with the stinging rebuke he received in the November
1971 offyear elections, when opposition Liberal Party
candidates registered unexpectedly heavy gains,
prompted Marcos to !cO, -ore and more to the
previously apolitical military for support. (c)
Soon after his reelection, Marcos began to fill key
military command positions with officers personally
loyal to him and to blame almost all political
demonstrations and violence; on Communist con-
spiracies. From time to time he threatened to impose
martial law, and in the late summer of 1972 he decided
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that he could wait no longer. Disastrous floods had
just compounded his country's economic woes, and
there were signs of increasing opposition to his plans to
secure enactment of a new constitution which would
give the Philippines a parliamentary, rather than a
presidential, system of government �and, coinciden-
tally, enable Marcos to retain power as his country's
first Prime Minister. (u /ou)
On the evening of 22 September, within an hour of
what seems likely to have been a staged attempt on the
life of his defense secretary, President Marcos set his
carefully laid plans in motion. Martial law was
declared. In predawn raids, government troops seized
control of all communications and n:.olic utilities,
and many preminent anti Marcos critics� including
newsmen, politicians, students, and some elected
officials �were arrested. All newspaper and broad-
casting offices were closed, and tight travel re-
strictions were imposed. There was, however, no
bloodshed. On the night of the 23rd of September,
President Marcos went on the air to justify the moves
he had made and to announce new ones, including
plans for social reforms tinder the rubric of a "New
Society" program. (u /ou)
No one really believed the official explanation that,
in strict conformity with the existing c(. istitution, mar-
tial law had been imposed solely because the nation
was imperiled by a Communist rebellion. The only
effective Philippine Communist organization, the
Peking- oriented "Marxist- Leninist" group, and its
military arm, the New People's Army, were still too
weak to justify such drastic action. Yet most Filipinos
tended to accept Marcos' secondary thesis that martial
law provided a virtual last chance for curbing crime
and overcoming domestic roadblocks to reform. Pleased
by the President's moves to confiscate all private
firearms and to round up known criminal elements, as
well as by his promise to expedite long- stolled land
reform measures, the Christian majority showed little
resentment over the loss of some of their civil liberties.
Similarly, the heavyhanded and sometimes extralegal
measures which Marcos subsequen -.1y employed to
hasten passage and adoption of a new constitution and
to have himself installed as the all powerful head of an
authoritarian transitional government �one with an
indefinite mandate and no obligation to lift martial
law evoked more of a wait- and -see reaction than any
great degree of public outrage. (c)
Nevertheless, President Marcos' actions have in-
troduced a considerable degree of instabilitv into the
Philippine equation. First of all, he m st deliver on his
promises of reform or lose such popuiar support as he
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still retains, and progress here, particularly with respect
to the critical issue of land reform, has thus far been
painfully slow. Secondly, Marcos has both consciously
involved the military in political affairs and failed to
designate an heir apparent. Thus serious internal dis-
orders, his assassination (an increasingly credible
possibility, or simple ambition could trigger a military
takeover. Finally, Marcos' attempts to disarm the pop-
ulation and tighten the control exercised by the central
government over all provincial and local jurisdictions
have exacerbated Manila's already strained relations
with the country southern :,ased Muslim Filipino
(Moro) minority of some 2 million persons. What
began in December 1972 as a new series of scattered
clashes between Muslim insurgents and government
forces in Mindanao and the Sulu Islands burgeoned
into a small -scale civil war with widespread inter-
national ramifications just 3 months later. Even if cool
heads ultimately prevail on all sides, pacifici- and
reconstruction of the affected areas will likely require a
great deal of time and money. (s)
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The American Stake (s)
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World War 11 wreckage on Leyte
The Philippine Republic is not, of course, the onlv
developing country in Asia to experience both growing
domestic difficulties and a shift from at least nominal
democracy to martial law or one -.man rule in recent
years, but nowhere else has such a broad range of im-
portant and long -term U.S. interests been brought
directly into question. In the first place, the Philippine
Islands ��bv virtue of their location near the midpoint
of a lhie of friendly nations which stretches from South
Korea and Japan to Indonesia and Australia acre a kev
external security. In return, the Philippine Republic
has provided Washington with two major bases of stra-
tegic iml, to U.S. operations in East Asia and
the westem Pacific �the Subic Bay naval complex and
Clark Air Base �as well as with a number of smaller
military installations and communications centers.
These facilities are from 1,350 to 1,770 miles closer to
the Southeast Asian mainland than similar in-
stallations in Japan or on Guam, and they played a
critical role in support of U.S. and allied forces during
factor in America s Far Last �n defense system. Under the Vietnam conflict. What is Icss widely recognized is
a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements dating the fact that their importance to the United States has
from H47, the United States has for all practical pur- in no way been reduced by the negotiation of the Paris
poses v,ssumed full responsibility for the voting nations accords.
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In the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, which was in-
troduced as the new basis for American foreign policy
in July 1969, the United States has altered its posture
in the Far East. It has aimed for a lower and more
positive profile by working to bring an end to direct
American military involvement in Indochinese affairs
and exploring ways to effect a steady improvement in
relations with both Peking and Hanoi. Unavoidably,
American actions in this regard have shaken old Cold
War alignments as well. But while Washington now
places greater emphasis on self- reliance, it has no in-
tention of shirking its established role with respect to
Asian security and economic development, much less
of simply withdrawing from the regional scene. In fact,
the viability of the Nixon Doctrine depends to no small
degree on the maintenance o. a sizable American
presence in Southeast Asia.
The U.S. naval, air, and communications facilities
in the Philippines developed over a long period and
extensively modernized and expanded during the Viet-
nam war �are ideally suited for this purpose. Even if
an acceptable alternate location could be found, these
facilities could be duplicated there only at a cost of
hundreds of millions of dollars. Under the terms of ex-
isting agreements, the United States is to enjoy un-
restricted access to these installations until 1991. But
previous concessions extracted by the Philippine
Government have demonsirated that the scope and
duration of American base rights in the Philippines
are not cast in concrete. President Marcos himself has
repeatedly affirmed his intention of raising this issue
as a bargaining counte; in negotiations covering all
aspects of U.S. Philippine relations. More troublesome,
however, is the possibility that th^ increase in internal
instability which has accompanied the recent shift to
authoritarian, one -man rule could result in an upsurge
of anti Americanism or other changes in the political
environment that could place the future of U.S. basing
arrangements in serious doubt.
Mounting instability in the Philippines could prove
costly to the United States in economic terms as well.
Pr American investment in that country now
totals about $1 billion. Beyond this, the United State:
is presently contributing some $500 million a year to
the Philippine economy through such things as base
expenditures, military and economic aid grants,
veterans' payments, and a persistent trade deficit. By
any measure, America's cumulative economic stake in
the Philippine experiment is substantial. Delicate
negotiations scheduled to begin in late 1973 have as
their airn the protection of U.S. business interests and
the development of normal and mutually beneficial
economic relations following the expiration in 1974 of
the reciprocal privileges set forth in she
Laurel Langley Agreement. These talks could all too
easily be disrupted �or such new arrangements as
they ultimately astablished be upset �by some ad-
verse turn in Philippine domestic affairs.
Finally, the recent course of developments in the
Philippines has presented the United States with a
number of political problems and dilemmas. For ex-
ample, it was quite acceptable for Washington to
provide generous economic assistance to a popularly
elected �if somewhat corrupt and inefficient� regime
in Manila and to help it cope with the threat of Com-
munist insurgency. Marcos still needs such aid as
much or more than ever, but his at least temporary
abandonment of democracy and the shift of foci's
from Communist to Muslim insurgents have creased a
genuine danger that any well intent:.. ^.neU help
rendered to his regime by the United States might be
widely misconstrued and resented not only in the
Philippines but in neighboring states as well.
Moreover, the growing communal conflict in the Min-
danao -Sulu Archipelago area has renewed old tensions
between the Philippines and Malaysia and has en-
gaged the concern of other Muslim nations through-
out the world, thereby threatening to reverse the
encouraging trend toward greater international
cooperation in Southeast Asia and disappointing U.S.
hopes that the Philippine Republic was beginning to
play a truly constructive role in regional affairs.
Despite the troubling implications of what has been
happening in the Philippines since September 1972,
there has so far been little if any rcal damage to U.S.
interests. What happens in the future will depend
heavily on President Marcos �on his determination to
press forward with needed reforms, on his skill in
reaching mutually acceptable compromises with his
domestic opponents (particularly with dissident
Muslim groups), oa his willingness to reinstitute
democratic rule at the earliest practicable opportunity,
and on his simple ability to survive at least long
enough to insure an orderly and legal transfer of power
to a civilian successor.
There is reason to hope that Marcos is sufficiently
appreciative of the importance of retaining American
good will to the receptive to Washington's advice. But
even so, it is far too early to predict just how w sely and
effectively he will employ his newly expanded po wflrs
or what additional difficulties he is likely to encounter.
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Rugged Land, Sturdy People (ulou)
The political and social evolution of the Philippine
nation has been heavily influenced by the fr. gmented
and rugged nature of its terrain. Its nearly 40 million
people live on a cluster of islands �the higher reaches
of a partially submerged and still actively volcanic
mountain chain �which stretches more than 1,100
miles from north to south arid, at its widest point, over
650 miles from east to west. Allegedly definitive but
markedly varying figures for the total number of
islands in the Philippine archipelago abound, but no
one, not even the Filipinos themselves, really knows
how many there are. Indeed, it w.)uld require major
effort just to keep track. New ish rids appear from time
to time as volcanoes thrust their smoking cones above
the sea. Some endure, while others vanish again under
the ceaseless onslaught of pounding waves.
In total lard area the Philippine Republic, is slightly
larger than the state of Arizona, but most of its islands
are tiny. Fewer than half even have names, slightly
more than 800 are inhabited, and only 462 have an
area of as much as 1 square mile. In fact, just 12
islands account for about 95% of both the country's
land area and population. The largest and most pop-
ulous is Luzon, which is about equal in area to Ken-
tucky. Site of the bustling port city of Manila (the
republic's de facto capital) and its pretentious suburb,
Quezon City (the official capital), this relatively fertile
and mineral -rich island is the political and economic
heart of the Philippines. To the south, the island of
Mindanao is nearly as large but, unlike Luzon, it is
largely forest covered and, despite a rush of internal
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migration in recent years, mo of it is still sparsely
populated.
The eastern rim of the Philippine archipelago marks
the edge of a very old Asian continental shelf. Here
towering peaks and ridges often rise directly from the
sea. The floor of the Pacific drops off abruptly to the
east, and the Philippine Trench, with its low point of
34,440 feet below sea level, is the second deepest ocean
area yet discovered. Unfortunately, the eastern islands
also lie astride a major geologic fault, and destructive
earthquakes are frequent.
Almost all the larger islands are mountainous, and
sparsely sett'ed uplands make up some 6551 of the
country's total land area. Rugged north -south trending
ridges and spurs �with elevations ranging from 600 to
over 9,500 feet combine with the dense forests wl;ich
still cov r more than half of the land to divide the
islands iut(. isolated and, in some instances, virtually
unexplored sectors. (In fact, hundok, the Pilipino
(Tagalog) language term for Luzon's mountain
country, has entered the American language as
"the boondocks"� military slang for just about
as far from civilization as a person can 1;et.) In
addition, numerous volcanoes, more than 20 of
which are still active, stand alone rr in clusters
throughout the island chain. One forms an island in
the center of Lake Taal, 40 miles south of Manila. In
1911 it snuffed out the lives of more than 1,300 people,
and its latest eruption �in September 1965 �also
caused widespread destruction and many fatalities.
Another, the equally active Mount Mayon, which
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overlooks the southern Luzon port of Legazpi, is over
8,000 feet high and is considered by some to be the
most perfectly shaped volcanic cone in existence.
Most of the larger islands have narrow coastal
plains, and several have excellent natural harbors, but
only four� Luzon, Mindanao, Negros, and
Panay �have extensive lowland areas suitable for in-
tensive agriculture and capable of supporting high
densities of population. Of these, the most important is
Luzon's central plain, which stretches from the
Lingayen Gulf south to Manila Bay. Approximately
100 miles long by 40 miles wide and covered by a
1,000- foot -thick blanket of fertile alluvial soil, it
provides enough food for almost all the people in the
Manila area.
The Philippine archipelago lies between 4 and 21
degrees north latitude and has a tropical maritime
climate typified by high temperatures, high relative
humidity, and one of the highest average annual rain-
falls (about 100 inches) in the world. But because of
differences in elevation, in proximity to the sea, and in
exposure to storms, there are many climatic variations.
In general, the eastern parts have an abundance of
rain in all seasons, with maximum rainfall occurring
between October and April. The western parts, on the
other hand, generally experience a dry season at that
time of year especially those areas that are sheltered
by mountain barriers from the then prevailing easterly
winds �and receive a high amount of rainfall from
late spring to early fall when they are exposed to the
strong southwest monsoon. Typhoons periodically lash
Luzon and the Visayan Islands from the east or
southeast during the summer and autumn months,
severe ones occurring about once a year. The high
winds can cause much destruction in exposed areas,
but the worst damage to life and property results from
the heavy floods which usually accompany these rain
filled storms and from the high waves and tides along
the coast.
As might be expected from the nature of the climate,
the islands have many small streams which become
mountain torrents in the rainy season, but there are
only a few rivers large enough for navigation by even
small vessels. Nevertheless, the nation's water resources
are important not only for local commerce but also for
their hydroelectric potential and for irrigation. Indeed,
this last use is likely to become increasingly critical to
the economy. The country's relatively fertile soils and
tropical climate permit the raising of a wide variety of
crops, including rice, corn, sugarcane, coconuts, sweet
potatoes, bananas, abaca (Manila hemp), tobacco,
and coffee. However, inadequate irrigation, tenant
farming, and the failure to make wider use of chemical
fertilizers and pesticides have contributed to keeping
per acre yields among the lowest in the world.
There is no question that in some ways nature has
been unkind to the Philippines. Over the years, high
winds, torrential rains, floods, earthquakes, and
volcanic eruptions have taken an enormous toll in life
and property. On the other hand, the young nation has
been rather generously endowed with natural
resources. Much of the country is still relatively unex-
plored geophysically, but its known mineral wealth in-
cludes extensive deposits of copper, chromite, iron,
nickel, and bituminous coal, rich gold fields, and com-
mercially exploitable amounts of silver, lead, zinc,
manganese, and mercury. Its dense forests support a
substantial export trade in valuable tropical hard-
woods. Its coastal waters abound with fish, mollusks,
and crustaceans, which furnish the principal source of
protein in the Philippine diet. In addition, the warm
seas in the Sulu Archipelago area sustain a thriving
pearl industry.
The oldest pecFl of the Philippines �the small and
dark skinned Negritos who still live a primitive, semi
nomadic life in some parts of Luzon, Mindanao, and
Palawan �are believed to have entered the area some
30,000 years ago across land bridges then connecting
the islands to Borneo, Sumatra, and the Malay Penin-
sula. Subsequently, peoples of Malay stock come
from the south in successive waves, the earliest
by land bridges and the later arrivals by boats
called baranoays. Closely related to the pres-
ent -day inh- oitants of Indonesia and Malaysia,
they settled in small, isolated family groups
in coastal coves and estuaries and along river
valleys. The original inhabitants of these places were
either assimilated or driven back into the mountainous
interior regions.
More than 1,000 years ago, trade brought the
islanders into contact with peoples as far away as India
and the Middle East. Marco Polo wrote of their
archipelago in the 13th century, describing it as a
place frequented by Arab and Chinese merchants. The
Arabs introduced Islarn in parts of Mindanao and the
Sulu Archipelago in the 14th century, ultimately ex-
tending its influence as far north as present -day
Manila. For their part, the Chinese built upon their
temporary dominance of trade in the area to establish
tributary relationships with a number of petty island
chiefs for a brief period in the 15th century.
7

When the Western world in the person of Ferdinand
Magellan, a Portuguese explorer in the service of
Charles I of Spain, appeared on the scene in 1521,
most of the islanders were of Malay stock. Their com-
munities, called harangays after the boats in which
many of their ancestors had arrived, were ruled by
chieftans known as datos. Under the rulers were a
nobility, freeholders of land, and a servant class which
originated from prisoners taken in wars between the
petty principalities or from men who had lost their
freedom through indebtedness or punishment for
crime. Loose confederations of datos, formed under a
hybrid system of sultans and rajahs, existed in the
south, but for the most part the datos were divided
from one another by both geography and factional di-
putes. Family kinship was the basis of the social struc-
ture and, except in the areas under Muslim influence,
animism was the dominant religious belief.
Philippine society still reflects its origin in small,
self- sufficient groups. Not one of the local languages is
the mother tongue of more than 259 of the popula-
tion, family and community ties remain strong, and
cooperative labor is common in many areas. The ma-
jority of the population still lives in small villages
where nearly everyone is related by either natural or
ritual kinship. Society is still mainly agricultural and
largely dominated by a small landowning class.
Yet for all the diversity in local dialects (the 1960
census reported as many as 75) and customs, and
despite the influx of a multiplicity of racial groups in
the past, the Philippine population is both relatively
homogeneous and possessed of a broad cultural unity.
For one thing, the islands have been a true melting
pot. Over the years the dominant Malay group has
simply absorbed the bulk of the other ethnic com-
munities through intermarriage. Strong infusions of
Chinese and Spanish blood have contributed to
marked variations in physical appearance, and
anthropologists speak of more than 40 distinct
ethnographic groups. But in 1973, more than 95% of
the Philippine population was still predominantly
Malay in origin. Scattered pockets of indigenous
Negritos, a sizable ethnic Chinese minority, and a
number of snialler alien groups� primarily Americans
and Spaniards accounted for the rest.
The cultural bonds which link most residents of the
Philippine Islands are, however, perhaps less a product
of this common ancestry than of the impact of their
colonial heritage. The Philippine nation was subjected
to Western colonization before it had developed a cen-
tralized governmental structure, and therefore it was
especially vulnerable to penetration by alien political
and cultural influences. In contrast to the situation in
other nearby dependent areas, where colonial and in-
digenous institutions tended to exist as competing
systems, there was a general and lasting fusion of local
and Western traditions. Today, just as before in-
dependence, Spanish and American derived values
dominate much of Philippine life.
As the result of energetic missionary activities, first
and foremost by Spanish Catholic orders but later as
well by Americans, Germans, and Belgians of both
Catholic and Protestant persuasion, some 93% of the
Philippine population is Christian. Although
Pilipino (derived from Tagalog) has been designated
as an official national language. English is spoken by
nearly 40% of the people and continues to be an of-
ficial language and the formal language of both
government and instruction. Spanish, while no longer
widely used, is still popular in fashionable circles. Both
the educational and governmental systems, albeit the
latter now to a lesser degree, bear a strong American
stamp, and both suffer from a continuing conflict
between old Spanish elitist tendencies and newer
democratic traditions. Similarly, practices and at-
titudes of Spanish origin still strongly affect the
agricultural scene, while American concepts and
methods prevail in the more modern sectors of the
economy. But little that the Filipinos have borrowed
from abroad has escaped local adaptation. This is par-
ticularly true in the political field where, to the oc-
casional despair of both Madrid and Washington, in-
digenous kinship ties a id rivalries have traditirmally
played a key role.
S
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The Long Road to Independence (u/ou)
Although Magellan's primary mission had been to
find a westward route to the E ast Indies, then Enrope
principal source of spices, his landing on Cebu �well
to the north of his t arget--in 1521 established Spain's
clairn to what he chose to call the St. Lazarus Islands.
(Some 20 years were to pass before Spain changed the
name of the archipelago to the Philippines in honor of
Grown Prince Philip, later King Philip II.) Magellan
also gained the dubious distinction of being the first
European victim of the intricacies and passions of the
islands' clan oriented society. lie -*vas killed on Mac
tan, it small island near Cebu, by a chieftain. While
perfectly willing to swear allegiance to the remote
Spanish King, this worthy was moved to mayhem by
the demand that he also submit to the authority of a
(:chit rajah who had accepted Christianity and allied
himself with Magellan.
Leaderless and with their flotilla reduced to a single
vessel, a handful of Magellan's men managed to com-
plete their circumnavigation of the globe and to return
to Spain in 1522. In the decades that followed, other
Spanish expeditions followed Magellan's route around
South America and across the Pacific to the Philip-
pines. But Madrid's attention was still focused on the
spice -rich East Indies and it was not until 1565, when
governor designate Miguel Lopez de Legaspi reached
Cebu from Mexico at the head of a well -armed ex-
peditionary force ;!iat the Spanish conquest and
colonization of the Philippine archipelago began.
Once started, the subjugation process was carried
out with great enthusiasm and dispatch. Moving
northward from Cebu, Legaspi founded Manila and
established it as the administrative capital in 1572.
Spanish conquistadores and friars fanned out over the
9
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islands, and by 1600 this formidable alliance of sword
and cross had brought virtual;y the whole archipelago
under the control of the colonial administration. True,
the Spaniards c.e never able to completely subdue
the Muslim Filipino inhabitants of Mindanao and the
Sulu Archipelago� dubbed the Moros by Madrid in
memory of its ancient foes, the Moors of North
Africa �or the primitive Igorots in the mountains of
Luzon. Nonetheless, they left an indelible imprint on
their island dependency. They established the
territorial limits of the future Philippine Republic and
imbued the population with a sense of common
national identity. They Christianized most of the in-
habitants and accustomed them to centralized govern-
ment. They established an elaborate judicial system
based on both Roman and customary law. They in-
troduced formal Western -style educational institutions
in 1582, and extended them to include a rudimentary
public school system some 250 years later. Toward the
end of their colonial tenure they fostered the develop-
ment of both export- oriented plantation agriculture
and light industry.
But there were negative aspects and legacies of the
Spanish colonial era as well. For the first 200 years,
revenues to support the colonial administration were
obtained primarily from heavy taxes, payable cash
or through involuntary labor, and a lucrative galleon
trade involving the exchange of Mexican silver for
such Chinese luxury goods as silk, carpets, and jade.
The taxes and widespread corruption on the part of
both civil and religious officials resulted in con-
siderable popular discontent. The galleon trade en-
couraged a substantial influx of Chinese entrepreneurs,
generating strong feelings of envy and ill will among
the indigenous population which have persisted to the
present.
Then toe,, Spain's persistent problems with the
Muslim Filipinos not only are reflected today in the
continued unwillingness of the Muslim minority to
submit fully to the authority of the central govern-
ment, but they also laid the foundations for the current
territorial dispute between the Philippines and
Malaysia over Sabah, a part of the island of Borneo
that had originally been part of the Sultanate of Sulu.
The British seized Manila in 1762 during the Seven
Years War, and when they withdrew they took with
them the Sultan of Sulu whom the Spanish had be -2n
holding captive there. An official of the British East
India Company subsequently returned the Sultan to
the Sulu Archipelago and restored him tc his throne:. In
gr Ac, the Sultan of Sulu ceded much of his do-
10
main (including his possessions in North Borneo) to t:e
English company. This transfer of sovereignty was
short lived. The Filipino Muslims drove the East India
Company out in 1775, but in 1878 another arrange-
ment was concluded between the then reigning Sultan
of Sulu and two British businessmen, the owners of the
British North Borneo Company. Under this agreement,
Sabah was placed under the control of the two
Englishmen; the Malaysians say it was ceded, the
Filipinos claim it was only leased. In any event, the
English c. itrepreneurs later turned over their rights and
interests in tie area to the British Government.
Undeterred by the fact that few Sabah residents show
any desire to become Philippine citizens, Manila con-
tinues to insist that the Sultan of Sulu never relin-
quished sovereignty over the area, and that London
therefore never had the right either to make it a crown
colony or to dispose of it through incorporation into
M alaysia.
The intense nationalism reflected in the stubborn
Philippine stand on the Sabah issue was also born dur-
ing the period of Spanish colonial rule. Although a
privileged class of wealthy and well educated Filipinos
of mixed parentage gradually appeared, Spain made
no significant effort to prepare the islanders for
self government or otherwise to satisfy their
nationalists, aspirations. As a result, an active Philip-
pine independence movement emerged in the late
19th century. A major rebellion erupted in 1896, and
despite the ultimate success of the Spanish authorities
in persuading its leaders to go into voluntary exile in
Hong Kong, it was stil, simmering when the sinking of
the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February
1898 led to war between Spain and the United States.
Less than 3 months later, Commodore George
Dewey sailed into Manila Bay and destroyed the
Spanish fleet lying at anchor there. His victory gave
new heart to the rebels. Their leader,. General Emilio
Aguinaldo, returned from Hong Kong with American
assistance and once again rallied his countrymen
against the Spanish. Buoyed by the successes of his
forces and convinced that the United States merely
wished to assist the Filipinos, as it had the Cubans, to
gain their freedom, he proclaimed his country's in-
dependence on 12 June 1898. Although subsequently
barred from entering Manila by the terms -f its sur-
render `,o an American Expeditionary for(e, he con-
vened it constituent assembly in the neart)y town of
Malolos which drafted a constitution that was strongly
influenced by American traditions. This constituti ^n
was promulgated on 23 January 1899, and Aguinaldo
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kjr
was promptly elected President of the first Philippine
Republic.
In the meantime, however, the United States de-
cided to retain the Philippines. This decision was
prompted by fear that the Philippines might otherwise
fall under the domination of another foreign power,
the desirability of having a base from which to protect
and expand American interests in eastern Asia, and a
growing feeling that it was America's duty to bring the
advantages of democracy to iess fortunate peoples.
Despite these considerations, many Americans actively
opposed the decision. In fact, the Treaty of Paris, by
which Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States
in return f )r an indemnity of $20 million and certain
temporary trade concessions, was approved by only a
one vote majority in the Senate. Not surprisingly, it
was even more vigorously opposed by the F "ninos.
President Aguinaldo declared war on the United States
in February 1899. The ensuing conflict was exceed-
ingly costly and bloody for both sides. Effective Filipino
guerrilla tactics prolonged the hostilities, and more
than 2 years passed before Aguinaldo was captured
and organized resistance to American occupation
collapsed.
Despite these inauspicious beginnings, the United
States quickly made good on its pro.nise to train the
Filipinos to govern themselves. Wi; h the end of the
fighting, military government was replaced by a
Philippine Commission which included a minority of
Filipinos and had an American governor at its head.
After 1907, this commission shared legislative powers
with the elected Philippine Assembly. In 1916, land-
mark legislation (the Jones Law) gave the Filipinos
considerable autonomy and clearly established that
the ultimate aim of American policy was Philippine in-
dependence. The latter issue had been something of a
political football, and America's major political parties
continued to bicker over the means and timing of such
action. But by the early 1930's, depression -born
economic problems and growing isolationist sentiment
combined to create a general consensus in the United
States that it would be wise to give the Filipinos their
freedom as soon as possible.
In 1934 the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-
McDuffie Act, authorizing the extablishment
of a transitional Commonwealth of the Philippines
and promising complete independence after 10 years.
Under the provisic.�ns c this act, the Filipinos drew up
a constitution patterned on the U.S. model. With a
few amendments, this constitution remained in effect
until January 1973. The Commonwealth was in-
augurated in 1935 with is a election of Manuel
Quezon as President and Sergio Osmena as Vice Presi-
dent. The constitution provided for a unicameral
Congress� changed to a bicameral body by con-
stitutional amendment in 1940 �and an independent
judiciary headed by a Supreme Court. The Philip-
pines operated under this regime until the Japanese oc-
cupation in early 1942.
The Japanese began their assault on the Philippines
just 10 hours after their attack on Pearl Harbor, and by
the end of 1941 they had taken virtually the entire
archipelago. Quezon and Osmena were evacuated to
the United States shortly before the surrender of the
surviving American and Filipino defenders on Bataan
and Corregidor in May 1942. The Japanese established
a puppet republic with the prominent Jose P. Laurel as
President. Laurel, like Quezon and Osmena, was a
member of the Nacionalista Party. Although lie en-
joyed a favorable reputation, his conviction ti:at
collaboration was the best way to insure the safety and
well -being of the population was not widely shared by
his countrymen. Many Filipinos, including future
presidents Ramon Magsaysay and Ferdinand Marcos,
chose to join armed resistance groups which harried
the occupation forces from forest and mountain bases.
One such group, the Communist -led Hukbalahi3p
(Huk), later became the nucleus of an insurgency
directed against the nation's own postindependence
government.
Osmena succeeded to the presidency of the Philip-
pine Commonwealth upon the death of Quezon in
August 1944 and returned to his comitry with General
MacArthur in October. The problems facing his ad-
ministration were staggering. Full control of the
islands was not wrested from the Japanese until
September 1945. Philippine society was torn between
guerrilla and collaborator; the countryside had been
raped and plundered; and Manila, which contained
most of the Commonwealth's factories, universities,
hospitals, and modern institutions, had been reduced
to rubble. The country was ill prepared for in-
dependence, but few Filipnos were willing to wait
much longer. The general elections which had been
scheduled for November 1945 under the
Tydings-McDuffie Act were postponed but 5 months.
When they were finally held, Osmena was defeated by
Manual Roxas, a former Nacionalista Party protege
who had broken with him to found the Liberal Party.
On 4 July 1946, independence was declared and Roxas
became the first President of the new Philippine
Republic.
II
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ynrn�r�r'an
The Presidential Era (c)
i
r
In the months just prior to independence, the
United States had poured more than $150 million in
loans and other aid into the Philippines, but the full
impact of this assistance was not felt until long
thereafter. When Roxas was inaugurated, the Philip-
pine scene was still in a state of chaos: two thirds of the
country's sugar mills lay in ruins; most of its mines
were out of operation; 60% of all farm animals had
been destroyed; and moral and social values were
seriously corroded, the war having promoted
widespread acceptance of violence as a way of life and
disrespect hor both authority and property rights.
Moreover, the explosive issue of how to deal with war-
time collaborationists remained unresolved. Roxas
himself was not untainted, for although he had refused
an offer of the puppet state presidency ultimately
assumed by Jose P. Laurel, he had subsequently
accepted a position in Laurel's cabinet. There were
also a host of potentially troublesome political and
economic questions that were sidestepped in the rush
toward independence and which remained to be
settled w ith the United States.
Much of Roxas' time during his early months in of-
fice was devoted to defining his country's new
relationship to the United States. His efforts yielded
some encouraging results. Generous American aid in
the form of cash grants, gifts of surplus materiel,
veterans' payments, and loans, was soon forthcoming.
12
In addition, the Filipinos were granted a 28 -year
period to make the transition from duty -free transac-
tions to full tariffs in their trade with the United States.
On the other hand, Roxas was in no position to strike
a hard bargain and, as it turned out, Washington proved
to be somewhat less forthcoming than the Filipinos
thought was their due as former colonial subjects and
wartime allies. Furthermore, there were strings at-
tached to American assistance which have been a
cause of irritation in U.S. Philippine relations ever
since:. For example, passage of the Philippine Trade
Act of 1946 (subsequently superseded by the
Laurel- Langley Trade Agreement of 1955) hinged on
Manila's willingness to surrender control of its cur-
rency to Washington and to enact a constitutional
amendment giving U.S. citizens equal rights with
Filipinos in the exploitation of Philippine natural
resources and in the ownership and operation of the
country's public utilities. Similarly, conclusion of a
military assistance agreement in 1947 was implicitly
tied to satisfaction of Washington's demand for a
number of military bases under a 99 -year lease. A base
agreement was reached, but its terms were modified in
1966, with the result that the leases on all remaining
U.S. installations will expire in 1991.
American assistance enabled Roxas to launch a ma-
jor reconstruction program and to encourage the
development of new industry. Just before he died of a
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Molaconong� Philippine White House

X
heart attack in April 1948 :,e also managed to settle the
collaboration question by agreeing that those accused
of cooperating with the Japanese had acted in good
faith. On the other hand, his administration established
the pattern of corruption that has plagued Philippine
politics to this day. Although he managed to pre-
vent the Phiiippine Communist Party from securing a
foothold in the national legislature, his failure to
alleviate the plight of the rural population� suffering
from the ills of tenancy, absentee landlordism, and
grinding poverty� created fertile conditions for the
growth of a Communist -led insurgency in the coun-
tryside around Manila.
The wartime Huk guerrilla movement, which had
refused to disband after the Japanese surrender, was
quick to exploit this opening. Under the leadership of
Luis Taruc, it won many sympathizers by turning its
guns first on the landlords and later on the establish-
ment as a whole. Peasants who hesitated to lend their
support to the Huks were often terrorized into coopera-
tion. Despite Roxas' efforts to counter the Huk threat,
the rebellion continued to grow.
When Roxas died, lie was succeeded by Vice Presi-
dent Elpidio Quirino, a relatively weak leader who
managed to retain the presidency in the 1949 general
elections through wholesale employment of fraud and
strong -arm tactics. The Quirino administration was
marked by a sharp rise in corruption and economic dif-
ficulties and by the cresting of the Huk insurgency.
The Huks stepped up their offensive operations in
1949, and within little more than a year they had
succeeded in gaining control over much of central and
southern Luzon as well as parts of other islands.
At this juncture, President Quirino appointed
Ramon Magsaysay �a relative newcomer on the
political scene but well known as a wartime guerrilla
leader �as his Secretary of Defense. Magsaysay purged
and reorganized the army, initiated a civic action
program, captured the central apparatus of the Philip-
pine Communist Party in Manila, and combined
successful field operations against the rebel forces with
the promise that Huks who surrendered would be
given land of their own on Mindanao. These tactics,
coupled with the force of Magsaysay's personality
and repu'ation broke the back of the Huk movement.
M agsaysay's dedication to clean and responsive
government put him on a collision course with
Quirino. His use of troops to prevent foul play during
the 1951 congressional elections resulted in a stunning
defeat for Quirino's Liberals. In 1953 Magsaysay
resigned his government post to campaign foi the
presidency on the Nacionalista ticket. He won hand-
ily, and his victory ushered in an era of enthusiasm
and reform.
Following his inauguration, Magsaysay opened the
doors of the Presidential Palace to the public and es-
tablished a number of commissions and agencies
designed to make the machinery of government
accessible to the most humble Filipino. He took firm
steps to counter corruption and inefficiency in govern-
ment. Important advances were made in such fields as
industrialization, improved agricultural methods,
irrigation, school construction, land reform, resettle-
ment of landless tenant farmers, roadbuilding, and the
development of rural credit facilities. Even though
Magsaysay was unable to deal with the entrenched
oligarchy as effectively as he wished, his concept that
sovereignty resided in the people rather than with the
elite profoundly influenced the thinking of a vast
number of his countrymen.
Both Roxas and Quirino had pursued a policy of
close cooperation with Washington (the latter even
drew down his meager forces facing the Huks to
send a battalion to fight as part of the U.N. forces in
Korea), but during the Magsaysay administration
U.S. Philippine relations reached a degree of warmth
unmatched before or since. In 1954 Manila hosted the
establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion (SEATO), a regional defensive alliance with
headquarters in Bangkok. The following year, the
United States and the Philippines negotiated the
Laurel Langley Trade Agreement, which removed or
softened many of the more controversial elements in
the 1946 trade pact. Under this agreement, which was
designed to govern the economic relations of the two
countries for the next 20 years, the United States
relinquished the right to control the currency ratio
between the dollar and the Philippine peso. The parity
provisions of the 1946 trade agreement were made
reciprocal, and Filipinos were granted the same rights
in the United States as Ame. icans were accorded in the
Philippines. The Philippine: sugar quota was extended;
gradually diminishing quotas were established for cer-
tain other Philippine goods entering the United States;
and provision was made for a phased mutual incease
in customs duties on all other commodities over the
20 -year period.
Vice President Carlos P. Garcia succeeded to the
presidency when Magsaysay was killed in a plane
crash in March 1957, and in 1959 he won election to a
4 -,year term of his own. Garcia was a professional
politician who relied on the Nacionalista Party
13
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Eri 0�n0Te &5m
machine to carry him to victory. An indecisive leader
and manifestly le-,s dedicated than his predecessor, he
failed to carry out Magsaysay's reform program. His
tenure was marked by a return to much of the corrup-
tion and lack of concern for the general welfare that
had characterized the pre Magsaysay period. To
maintain popular support, Garcia inaugurated a
chauvinistic "Filipino First" program of economic
nationalism and deliberately exacerbated differences
with the United States. While this policy met with
some positive response in the cities, particularly in
Manila, it was unpopular in the rural areas. In the
1961 presidential elections notable for the introduc-
tion of a rapid polling station reporting system which
made it difficult to juggle the vote count� Garcia was
decisively defeated by Diosdado Macapagal of the
Liberal Party.
Lime Magsaysay, Macapagal was not of the elite
class, and also like Magsaysay he ran on a platform of
socioeconomic reform and honest government. One of
his first acts was to free the peso from a 2 to 1 peg to
the U.S. dollar and thereby wipe out a flourishing
black market trade in foreign exchange. He also
managed to force an ambitious land reform bill
through the Philippine Congress, but this law �like
most of Macapagal's other reform measures �was
never implemented. Throughout his administration,
Macapagal's domestic programs suffered from a lack
of trained personnel, inadequate financial resources,
and his own inability to overcome the resistance of en-
trenched special interest groups.
In the international field, however, Macapagal did
succeed in replacing the basically negative chauvinism
of Garc.a's foreign policy with a more positive ap-
proach to regional affairs and in d-^veloping an image
of the Philippines as a distinctly Asian and totally in-
dependent country. His pursuit of a separate Philip-
pine identity took various forms �for example, he
changed his country's annual independence day
celebration from d july to 12 June, the date in 1898
when Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the
Philippines �and sometimes produced an adverse re-
action in Washington. Nevertheless, U.S. Philippine
relations recovered some of their pre- Garcia warmth,
and by mid -1965 the two countries were moving
toward resolution of a long- standing dispute over
criminal jurisdiction and the negotiation of a new
military base accord patterned along the lines of the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
Despite his positive accomplishments, Macapagal's
inability to deliver on his promises of basic reform,
14
coupled with his failure to solve his country's persistent
rice shortage problem, cost him much of his initial
popular support. In November 1965 the electorate
turned to Ferdinand Marcos in hopes that his strong
personality and reputed ruthlessness would enable him
to overcome the powerful domestic forces opposing
socioeconomic raange. Marcos' record during his first
and second ter ns as President has been summarized in
earlier paragra .)hs. Operating within the framework of
the then existing political system, he was unable to
make much progress toward resoution of his country's
basic dit;i :.,,lties.
Since mid- September 1972, however, Marcos has
completely changed the rules of the game. By concen-
trating so much power in his own hands, he appears to
have put himself in a far better position to implement
needed reforms. Nevertheless, he is still faced with all
the old problems including the deep- seated
economic ills, the regionally, economically, and
politically based dissidence, the pervading influence of
the oligarchy, and the growing nationalistic sen-
timent� that he and his predecessors have had to con-
tend with in the past. Moreover, as indicated earlier,
his moves have introduced new elements of instability
into the domestic scene, provoked a virtual rebellion in
the south, and seriously complicated his countrv'�
relations with its neighbors and with Washington.
Thus the road ahead is unlikely to be easy.
The Years Ahead: Old Problems
and Some New Onys (s)
Most of the problems facing Marcos are in-
terrelated, and thus it is difficult to analyze any one of
them in isolation. Nevertheless, it is clear that much
will depend on Marcos' ability to improve his coun-
try's economic performance. Philippine society, like
that of virtually all other developing nations today, is
subject to sharply rising popular expectations.
Moreover, the socioeconomic reforms� particularly
land reform envisaged under Marcos' current New
Society program will be expensive. Yet over the past
few vears, the increase in real GNP bas barely out-
paced a growth in population of about 3% anrrr311y.
As a result, per capita income has registered little im-
provement, and in 1972 was less than $200.
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'7
Slum in old quarter of Manila
Antigovernment sign in Manila
before martial law was declared
w
Adr.
PRIT.
RTI LA v Agriculture is still the backbone of the Philippine
J econornv, employing about half the total labor force
and accounting for the of PlliliPPillv export
earnings. Despite its importance, however, the agri-
cultural sec!or has been seriously neglected. Moderni-
No WORS WT nation and irrigation progrnis
1111 not been pushed.
Inefficient and socialk disruptive sharecropping re-
Illains widespread. Even Marcos cjInIp.l
to promote a "Green Revolution through the
IlIctioll of high yielding varic!ies of seeds has run into
difficulties. After all encouraging spurt, rice produc-
tion began to lag again in 1971, and large-scale itl
ports have had to be resumed.
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15

a J@TO�Wn Te &5m
s;
i
i
i
t
Despite a steady increase in mineral production,
overall industrial performance has fallen short of ex-
pectations in recent years as well. In part, this is at-
tributable to longstanding protectionist policies. While
intended to provide a secure market for local business,
high Philippine tariffs have resulted in the develop-
ment of an inefficient manufacturing sector that is
plagued with the twin ills of substantial overcapacity
and products which are generally noncompetitive on
the world market. Marcos, aware of this problem, is
attempting to rationalize some sections of Philippine
industry; progress, however, has been slow.
In the meantime, difficulties and imbalances in the
agricultural and industrial sectors have resulted in ris-
ing unemployment in the cities and underemploym�nt
in the rural areas. Inflationary trends have caused a
decline in :eal wages; the consumer price index rose
22% in 1971 and, despite the introduction of austere
anti inflationary monetary and fiscal policies, climbed
another 8% in 1972. In addition, domestic economic
problems have continuc;d to hamper the government's
efforts to overcome persistent balance of payments dif-
ficulties.
Philippine foreign economic relations in genr;ral�
foreign trade in particular suffer from an oN ercon-
centration of products and partners. Just four primary
commodities (sugar, coconut products, logs and lum-
ber, and copper) account for 70% to 75% of the
country's total exports. As a result, export earnings
have fluctuated widely, thereby contributing to re-
current and sometimes massive trade deficits as well
as to the accumulation of a foreign debt, which by
1973 had risen to over $2 billion. Moreover, although
the Japanese havr. recently entered the picture in a
major way (Japan presently accounts for about one
third of all Philippine trade), the Philippine economy
is still heavily dependent on American consumers,
credits, and products.
When negotiations for a new accord to replace the
expiring Laurel- Langley trade and investment agree-
ment begin, consideration will have to be given io the
fact that the United States presently not only takes
some 40% of all Philippine exports but is also the major
market for a number of Philippine primary produ ^ts.
Almost all Philippine sugar exports, for example, are
sent to the United States. Moreover, Wvshington [as
provided a total of over $1.8 billion in economic
assistance to Manila since 1946, and is still its principal
source of foreign aid. Despite Japanese inroads, about
25% of all Philippine imports are still obtained from
the United States.
16
In addition to purely economic problems and
restraints, Marcos is faced with a number of social and
political obstacles to effective reform. Among other
things, he must overcome the inertia and inequities in-
herent in his country's deep- seated kinship system.
Moreover, there is no question that his success in ad-
vancing his New Society program �and thereby in
reducing popular discontent �will also depend heavily
on his ability to cope both with the oligarchy and with
a much larger group of relatively well -to -do officials
and businessmen who have a vested interest in the
status quo.
Marcos has silenced the opposition press and re-
duced petty corruption Ile has lashed out at the
oligarchy and has jailed some of its members. Little
progress, however, has been made toward implement-
ing his key scheme for turning over about 5 million
acres nf rice and corn land to the tenant farmers
working it. Furthermore, although Marcos has im-
plied that he intends to dismantle the economic
empires of virtually all the oligarchs, his critic:, have
noted that the two wealthy families he has moved
most fore -fully against �the Lopez and Osmena
families �were w.d remain his bitterest political
enemies. Thus the issue of the future role of the
Philippines' traditional political and economic elite
remains in doubt.
The imposition of martial law has forced the opposi-
tion Liberal Party into the background, but Marc.)s
must still contend with plots hatched by disgruntled
politicians and oligarchs, with a restless non -Com-
munist left composed of students, intellectuals, and
reformist priests, with the subversive activities of
various Communist groups, and with the Muslim
revolt in the south. The re!ative importance of these
threats to domestic stability could well change er a
period of time. Indeed, it is possible that further in-
ternal difficulties could strengthen all anti Marcos
forces and even encourage them to coordinate their
activities. In the late spring and early summer of
1973, however, the Muslim situation was the most
ominous. t
'The non- Communist left was relatively quiet. The tiny pro
Soviet Philippine Communist Party (PKP) represented nu threat.
The militant and avowedly Ma,.ist Philippine Communist Party
Marxist /Leninist (PKP -M %L) was believed to have fewer than
20)0 members. Despite grandiose membership claims, the PKP
M /l: s front organizations probably could muster no more than
3,000 activists. And although active in parts of Luzon and tit,
isayas, thr PKP -M /l: s military ann �the New Peoples Army
was estimated to have an armed cadre of only about 1.300 men.
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The roo of Filipino Muslim discontent in the
Philippines are old and deep. The Muslims of Min-
danao and the Sulu Archipelago have consistently
resisted encroachment, whether Spanish, American,
or Filipino Christian. In recent years their suspicions
and resentments have been nourished by an influx of
Christian homesteaders and speculators seeking
traditional Muslim lands in western Mindanao and by
governmental indifference or even hostility to Muslim:
interests. Since the Muslims regard their rifles both
as symbols of manhood and as their only reliable
defense against the depredations of nonbelievers
and the central government alike, the incidence of
bloodshed has iended to increase apace. Nevertheless,
the situation remained manageable until the govern-
ment announced its intention of picking up all private
weapons under the provisions of rre ,.'dent Marcos'
martial law decree. Tliis announcement not only
offended Muslim custom but also was interpreted by
many Muslims as a tactic to expand and perp �tuate
Christian dominance in the Mindanao -Sulu
Archipelago region. They refused to s�. their
arms, and for the next 4 or 5 months there was a stand-
off as the two sides took each other's measure.
In February 1973, Marcos commenced preparations
for launching a major offensive against the Muslim
dissidents, but his plans miscarried. Faced with early
reverses in its offensive, the central government risked
censure from Malaysia and the Arab nations by mak-
ing greater use of close air support, naval gunfire, and
armored r !rsonnel carriers. More ominous, it began
forming armed Barrio (village) Self Defense Units �in
some cases said to consist of anti- Mtislim
vigilantes �in Christian areas, thereby exacerbating
religious tensions and making the conflict more in-
tractable.
In his initial appeals for additional U.S. military
assistance, Marcos laid the blame for the fighting in
the south on Communist- influenced M uslim separatist
organizations and foreign intervention. But like his es-
timate that there were tb ^n nearly 17,000 armed
Muslims facing his forces, this analysis was self serving
and well wide of the mark. The insurrection had in
fact been provoked by ill conceived government
policies. True enough, Libya's militant President
Qadhafi had loudly espoused the rebel cause, and
Malaysia was working quietly to use Marcos' troubles
with the Muslims to pressure him into renouncing his
country's claim to Sabah. Nevertheless, the covert sup-
port �arms, money, and training furnished the in-
surgents by and through the tough minded and free-
wheeling Chief Minister of Malaysia's self- govern-
ing Sabah State had been limited. While certainly a
contributing factor, it could not be counted as a
primary cause of the crisis. Similarly, all the known
Muslim secessionist organizations in the southern
Philippines were weak, and there was no concrete
evidence to support Marcos' assertion that they were
dominating or guiding the uprising. Nor did there
appear to be any factual basis for his claim of signifi-
cant Communist influence over the rebels. While
available data were admittedly fragmentary, it seemed
likely that Marcos was overstating Muslim armed
strength by about 10,000.
Nevertheless, the situation Marcos faced in the
south was serious enough. The Muslims were well
armed with modern weapons, including mortars,
mach neguns, and rockets, and they exercised de facto
control over large areas. Moreover, they were
operating over familiar terrain and among a generally
sympathetic population. Although the government
had deployed nearly 11,000 men, including two- thirds
of its infantry battalions and most of the Philippine
Constabulary's local units, it was unable to gain the
initiative. The small (29,000) Philippine Army, bur-
dened with its new administrative duties under martial
law and confronted with the growing Peking- oriented
PKP -M; L threat in the north, was taxed to the limits
of its capabilities. The country's first military
draft� inith ed in May 1973� offered no quick and
effective solution to this mar,, ower problem. In fact,
even if the United States had been willing and able to
provide all the additional military assistance that Mar
co had requested �which it was not �it seemed most
unlikely that government forces could soon score a
decisive military victory over the Muslim insurgents.
Fortunately, there were signs that Marcos was
heeding the urgent advice offered him both by
Washington and by his ASEAN partners and was try-
ing to pave the way for a negotiated settlement with
the Muslim dissidents. In early April 1973 he co icedec
that the Muslims did, in fact, have many legitimate
grievances. Shortly thereafter, he dispatched two
engineering battalions to Mindanao to help with com-
munity electrification and road repair projects. He
toned down his charges of foreign intervention, and as
summer approached he seemed to be considering bury-
ing the territorial claims that had prompted Malaysia
to allow Sabah to be used as a logistical base for the
rebels.
The Sabah issue is, in fact, illustrative of a broader
problem: how to reconcile a consciously fostcrM and
17
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growing spirit of Philippine nationalism with
pragmatic considerations of national interest. Like
mop' other Philippine politicians in recent years, Presi-
dent Marcos has sought to manipulate nationalistic
sentiment to his own advantage. His predecessor,
President Macapagal, was the first to press the Sabah
claim, but ii was Marcos who raised it to a point of
honor in 1968. Similarly, Marcos has tended to adopt a
particularly assertive posture vis -a -vis the United
States whenever he has wished to distract popular
attention from domestic problems. But such tactics are
becoming more tricky. The character of Philippine
nationalism has changed. Once confined for the most
part to a small circle of leading families, it is now a
broadly based and powerful political force. Moreover,
as more and more members of the better educated
postwar generation have come of age, there has been a
weakening of many of the restraints which previously
kept Philippine :nationalism fron, developing a strong
and consistent anti -U. S. tone.
Marcos must move very carefully if he is to avoid
releasing passions which could greatly complicate his
efforts to protect basic Philippine political and
economic interests in the Nixon Doctrine era. However
strong the urge to rally popular support under a banner
of chauvinism, he cannot afford to alienate
Washington o- his ASEAN partners, and neither can
he risk foreclosing any movement toward limited rap-
prochement with Peking. Yet he must maintain his
nationalist credentials. Martial law has at least tem-
porarily freed him of the worry that rival politicians or
a jingoist press might attack him over such foreign
policy concessions as he may feel compelled to make.
But if only bottled up, Philippine nationalism could all
too easily be exploited by the Maoists and other ex-
tremist groups. Hence Marcos is faced with the
twin �and demanding �tasks of giving his coun-
tryinen's nationalist aspirations a more pragmatic and
positive cast and of linking them more directly to
achievement of his ;-rojected New Society reforms.
18
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Chronology (u Jou)
1565
Spain establishes first permanent settlement at Cebu; begins
colonization of the Philippines.
1572
Manila founded ')y the Spanish.
1896
August
Katipunan Society under Andres Bonifacio and Emilio
Aguninaldo begins revolt against Spain.
1898
December
Philippines is ceded to the United States by Tre ty of Paris.
1899
January
Malolos constitution is promulgated; Aguinaldo is elected
President of first Philippine Republic.
1916
August
.Jones Act creates first elective legislature and vests greater
powers in Philippine Government.
1934
March
Tydings- McDuffie Act provides for Philippine Common-
wealth and full independence in 10 years.
1935
September
Elections are held for President, Vice President, and National
Assembly; Manuel Quezon is elected first Commonwealth
President.
November
Commonwealth is formally established; United States retains
control of defense and foreign relations, supervisory rights
over certain financial questions, and the right to intervene
to preserve the Commonwealth.
1941
December
Japanese initiate air attacks on Philippines 8 December; fall
of Corregidor on 6 May 1942 ends organized resistance.
1944
October
United States forces under Gen. Douglas MncArthur land on
Leyte and begin reoccupation of Philippines. Organized
Japanese resistance ends in September 1945.
1945
November
Manuel Roxas is elected President.
1946
July
Philippines is granted independence by the United States.
U.S.- Philippine Trade Agreement provides for an 8 -year
period of free U.S. Philippine trade to be followed by 20 years
of gradually imposed tariffs; Americans are given equal rights
and privileges in exploiting Philippine natural resources and
operating public services.
1947
March
U.S. Philippine Military Base Agreement grants to United
States the use of bases in Philippines for 99 -year period; is
followed by signing of Military Assistance Agreement.
1948
April
President Roxas dies; Vice President Elpidio Quirino assumes
presidency and is elected to office in November.
1951
August
Philippines and United States sign Mutual Defense Treaty;
the United States pledges to act "in accordance with its
constitutional processes" in defense of the Philippines.
1953
November
Ramon Magsaysay is elected President.
1954
September
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Agreement
"Manila Pact is signed.
1956
January
Laurel- Langlcy Agreement revises 1946 trade agreement;
provides for less rapid imposition of U.S. duties on imports
from Philippines.
1957
March
Magsaysay is killed in air crash; Vice President Carlos Garcia
succeeds him as President and is himself elected in November.
1961
November
Diosdado Macapagal, Vice President under Garcia, is elected
President.
1962
June
Philippines formally claims sovereignty over part of British
North Borneo (now Sabah); joins Indonesia in opposition to
proposed formation of Malaysir,.
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1963
December
September
Diplomatic relations with Malaysia resumed; moratorium
Philippines breaks relations with-Malaysia following formal
on Sabah issue continued.
inauguration of Malaysian federation.
1964
1970
May
January �April
Jesus Lava, Secretary General of the Communist Party of
Students demonstrate against Marcos' plans to Perpetuate
the Philippines, is captured after many years of hiding.
himself in office.
Consular relations are established with Malaysia.
November
1965
November
National election of delegates to constitutional convention.
Feaainand Marcos wins election to Presidency over incum-
1971
bent Macapagal.
January �May
1966
Students again demonstrate against Marcos' political
June
ambitions.
Full diplomatic relations are resumed with Malaysia.
June
July
Constitutional convention convened.
Marcos signs to send civic action group to South Vietnam.
August
September
Marcos suspends writ of habeas corpus in wake of bombing
at political rally; restored in some areas in September.
U.S. military bases agreement of 1047 renegotiated to provide
f.; a 25 -year tenure dating from 1966.
November
1967
Marcos' Nacionalista Party suffers severe setbacks in Senate
November
elections.
Marcos' Nacionalista Party wins significant gains in the
1972
off -year elections.
September
1968
Marcos imposes martial law.
March
October
Strained relations develop with Malaysia over revelation of
Philippine plotting against Sabah.
Long smouldering Muslim rebellion breaks out in south.
July
December
Philiupine- Malaysian talks in Bangkok on Ph:_ippine claim
Constitutional convention completes work on new con
to Sabah collapse.
stitution calling for parliamentary system.
September
1973
Malaysia suspends relations with the Philippines as a
January
result of Sabah dispute.
Extra-legal citizens' assemblies ratify new constitution, but
December
Marcos delays full implementation in favor of continued
Marcos quietly suspends Philippine claim to Sabah,
indefinite period of one -man rule tinder martial law.
1969
March
November
Sabah issue stirred tap again by Marcos claim of Malaysian
Marcos re- elected to unprecedented second term.
involvement in Muslim insurgency problem.
20
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C' Area Brief
LAND (UIOU)
Size: 116,000 so. mi.
Use: 53% forested, 30% arable land, 5% permanent pasture
12% other
WATER: (UIOU)
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): Under archipelago
theory, waters within straight lines joining appropriate points
of outermost islands are considered internal waters; waters
between these baselines and the limits described in the Treaty
of Paris, December 10, 1898, the U.S. -Spain Treaty of
November 7, 1900, and the U.S. -U.K. Treaty of January 2,
1930 are considered to be the territorial sea
Coastline: About 14,000 mi.
PEOPLE: (UIOU)
Population: 40,194,000 (estimated 1 July 1973); density 346
persons per square mile; 32% urban, 68% rural (1970
census)
Ethnic composition: Approximately 96% of the population
of Malay stock; 2.5% indigenous tribal peoples, and 1.5%
Chinese or other
Religion: 84% Roman Catholic, 9% Protestant, 5% Muslim,
2% animist or followers of traditional Chinese religions
Languages: National language, Pilipino (Tagalog); leading
foreign language, English; other vernacular languages
include Cebuano, Iloco, Hiligaynon, Bikol, Samar- Leyte,
Pampangan, Pangasinan, and Muslim Filipino (Moro)
tongues
Literacy: About 83% of the population age 10 and over (1970
census)
Labor force: 11 million; 51.2% agriculture, forestry, and
fishing, 12.2% manufacturing and mining, 3.7 construction,
12.2% commerce, 4.5% transport and utilities, 16.2%
services
GOVERNMENT: (UIOU)
Legal name: Republic of the Philippines
Type: Republic
Capital: Quezon
Political subdivisions: 72 provinces
Legal system: Based on Spanish, Islamic, and Anglo-
American law; parliamentary constitution passed 1973;
judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court; legal
education at University of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila
University, and 71 other law schools; accepts compulsory
ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations; currently being ruled
under martial law
Branches: New constitution (currently suspended) provides
for unicameral National Assembly, a
branch under a prime minister; judic
Supreme Court with descending aut
Appeals, courts of First instance i
municipal courts in chartered cities, an
nd a strong executive
ial branch headed by
hority in a Court of
n various provinces,
d justices of the pence
in towns and municipalities; thr,e justices have considerably
more authority than do justices of the peace in the U.S.
Government leader: President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Suffrage: Universal over age 18
Elections: Elections suspended for the indefinite future
Political parties and leaders: Liberal Party, Gerardo M.
Roxas; Nacionalista Party, Gil J. Puyat; all political party
activity now suspended under current state of martial law
Communists: About 1,300 armed insurgents
Member of: ADB, ASEAN, ASPAC, Colombo Plan,
ECAFE, IAEA, ICAO, IHB, Seabeds Committee (observer),
SEATO, U.N., UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO
ECONOMY: (UIOU)
NDP: $6.7 hillion (est. 1972
Agriculture: Main crops �rice, corn, coconuts, sugarcane,
abaca, tobacco
Fishing: Catch, I million tons (1971)
Major industries: Agricultural processing, textiles, chemicals
and chemical products
Electric power: 2.9 million kw. capacity (1972); 10 billion
kw. -hr. produced, 251 kw. -hr. per capita
Exports: $1,106 million (f.o.b., 1972); sugar, copper
concentrates, logs and lumber, coconut oil
Imports: $1,230 million (f.o.b., 1972)
Major trade partners: (1972) exports -40% U.S., 34 %Japan;
imports -32% Japan, 25% U.S.
Aid:
Economic--U.S. (FY46 -72) $1.8 billion committed; Japan
(reparations), $550 million extended in 1956, $337 million
drawn through 1969; IBRD (1953 -72), $268 million com-
mitted
Military �U.S. (FY46 -72) $673 million committed
Monetary conversion rate: 6.78 pesos= USS1.00 (May 1973)
(floating rate)
Fiscal year: 1 July -30 June
COMMUNICATIONS: (C)
Railroads: 2,177 mi.: 727 route miles of government owned
3'6" -gage common- carrier lines on Luzon and Panay; 19
industrial lines of four different gages totaling 1,450 miles
most are short lines of very narrow gage
Highways: 45,690 miles; 2,084 miles concrete, 2,324 miles
bituminous, 4,478 miles bituminous surface treatment,
23,770 miles gravel or crushed stone, 13,034 miles of earth
roads
Inland waterways: 2,000 miles; limited to shallow -draft
vessels
Pipelines: 158 miles for refined products
21
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Ports: 11 major, !00 minor
Merchant marine: 170 ships, 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling
834,931 g.r.t., 1,202,539 d.w.t. (Oct. 1972)
Civil air: 83 major transports
Airfields: 386 total, 273 usable; 42 with permanent surface;
6 with runways 8,000- 11,999 ft., 26 with runways 4,000-
7,999 ft.; 6 seaplane stations
Telecommunications: Excellent international radio, sub
marine cable, and communications satellite ground station
services; interisland services are adequate but intrrisland
domestic services are inadequate; over 350,000 telephones;
nearly 6 million radio sets; about 500,000 TV sets; over 100
primary AM, 8 FM, and 16 TV stations; submarine cables
extend to South Vietnam, Hong Kong, Guam, and the U.S.;
international satellite station; troposcatter link to Taiwan
Y.
DEFENSE FORCES: (S)
Military Manpower: Males 15 -4.), 9,209,000; about 65% fit
for military service; average number reaching military age
(20), 1974 -79, about 392,000.
Personnel: Total, 79,000; general headquarters, AFP, 3,400;
army, 29,000; navy, 11,500 (including 3,200 marines); air
force, 8,200; constabulary, 26,900
Major ground units: 2 light infan:ry divisions; 3 separate
infantry brigades; 1 engineer brigade
Ships: 122 ships and craft
Aircraft: About 235 (54 jets)
Supply: Provided almost exclusively by the U.S. Military
Assistance Program; minor amounts from Japan, Australia,
and Italy; virtually no domestic production capability for
military equipment
SECRET
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Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u/ou)
NAT E S COORDINATES
o fE.
o tN
Agno (strm)
16 02
Agus (sirm)
8 11
Agusan (sirm)
9 00
Agusan del Sur (prov)
8 30
Albay Gulf (gulf)
13 10
Arnpayon..............................
8 58
Angat (strin)
14 53
Angeles
15 09
Antipolo
14 35
Antique (prov)
11 1()
Arayat, Mount (min)
15 12
Bacolod
10 40
Bagacay
11 49
Baguio
16 25
Balabac Island URI)
7 57
Balayan Bay (bay)
13 51
Baler.................................
15 46
Baler Bay (bay)
15 ,,o
Baliwasan
C r 5
Basilan
6 42
Basilan Island (isi)
6 34
Basilan Strait (str)
6 49
Bataan (prov)
1,1 1()
Batangas
13 45
Batangas Bay (bay)
13 43
flauan
13 48
Bauang
16 31
Benguet (prow)
16 30
Bicol (sirm)
13 44
Bohol is
*0"MWWW
9 50
NAT E S COORDINATES
o fE.
W.
PE.
120 08
Luzon (isl)
16 00
121 00
124 12
Mactan Island (isl)
10 18
123 58
125 31
Makati
14 34
121 02
125 50
Malolos
14 51
120 49
124 00
Mandaluyong
14 38
121 03
125 36
Manila
14 35
121 00
120 46
Manila Bay (bay)
14 30
120 45
120 35
Marawi
8 01
124 18
121 10
Maria Cristina Falls (falls)
8 11
124 12
122 05
Mariveles
14 26
120 29
120 45
Masbate (isl)
12 15
123 30
122 57
Mayon Volcano (mi)
13 15
123 41
125 14
Mindanao (sirm)
7 07
124 24
120 36
Mindanao (is!)
8 00
125 00
117 01
Mindoro (isl)
12 50
121 05
120 47
Mindoro Occidental (prov)
13 00
120 55
121 34
Mountain (prow)
17 05
121 10
121 35
Muntinglupa
14 23
121 03
122 05
Naga
13 37
123 11
121 58
NRSugbu
14 05
120 38
122 03
Navotas (port)
14 39
120 57
122 05
Negros (isl)
10 00
123 00
120 25
Negros Occidental (prov)
10 25
123 00
121 03
Nueva Ecija (prov)
15 35
121 00
121 00
Olongapo
14 50
120 16
121 01
Paete
14 23
121 29
120 20
Pnkiputan Strait (sir)
7 07
125 40
120 40
Palawan (iql)
9 30
118 30
123 07
Palawan (prow)
10 00
118 45
124 10
Pain panga (siren)
14 47
120 311
�A�
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Philippines
i i Railroad (3'6 gage)
Road
i Airfield
Major port
Populated places
Quezon 754,452 (1970)
O Over 100,000
0 20,000 to 100,000
Under 20,000
Spot elevations in feet
Scale 14,000,000
0 so 100 150
Statute Miles
0 50 100 15
Kilometers
0
0
e
0
Ph,lippine
5 'e a
o
Catanduanes
island
Industry and Mining
0
a o
INDUSTRY
Fabricated metal products
Hydroelectric powerplant
J
Thermal powerplant
Petroleum refining
'Narvacan
Forest products processing
Cu
Food and tobacco processing
12 Au
Textile and fiber products processing
Barlo Cu
Cu Cr
MINING
F
Cr Chromite
Cr
C Coal
QFamands Manila area
Cu Copper
small q%-
Au Gold
Que on
Manila
Fe Iron
11' Tagcawa,
Nasugbu
AF
Ni Nickel
b Calsugg 1-
y ovrr I w.-.. .....N
"on
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)gas t U
6
angao e
(f 0 (lam
a Estan
e E
o Iloilo Silly
0
9 La ndota
ISo C U C
Bayaran

TJ TA :'A ELVA ME a] :'JM :'A= 1M =NWA
-4,
A
0
incinnat,
O
n
Balud pan
T l
45 il
'0 di:
and Mining 0 *Ocoyo d
metal products
Tic powerplant Puerto Princesa
werplant
refining Narvacan
Jucts processing Cu
Dbacco processing Au
fiber products processing Cu
Cu Cr
F
Imite Cr Jr
eLl'arn'annda Manila area Zamboanga
w Imal
QUO oaf 0
Manila y Tagcowayan
Natugbu
If b III Au F
Batangas F e.
Tabangao
Leo 0
Cu
.0 Estate
Bog T clob a
o Ilollo Je SSAY e
La Cerlota e O ab
Bala Cu Au
N'
Bayawan d 4 0
Gingooll utuan
t
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090002-4
ff 11.011 �1 111 IN I If
All other crops
9.6
cco I
A Abaca
m
T Tobacco
Land Utilization
Major fishing port
Cultivated land
Commercial forest
Fishpond development
Uncultivated land
PRINCIPAL CROPS
R Rice
C Corn
N Coconut
S Sugarcane
All other crops
9.6
cco I
A Abaca
m
T Tobacco

01:
15
on
�17 W
120 58
Pampangn. (provy.'. 15 4
0
1 "Td
'1 6
Duayan
0 07
125 15
Pandacan (part of Alanila)
14 36
121 00
Bukidnon (prov)
8 00
125 00
Panay (W)
1 15
122 30
Bulacan (prov)
15 00
121 05
Pasay
14 33
121 00
Butuan
8 54
125 35
Pasay (Rizal)
14 33
121 00
Cabanatuan
15 29
120 58
Pasig (sirm)
14 36
120 58
Cadiz
10 57
123 18
Poro Point (pl)
11 58
124 20
Cagayan (strm)
18 22
121 37
Porn Island (isl)
16 06
120 06
Cagayan de Oro
8 29
124 39
Port San Vicente
IS 30
122 09
Cagayan Valley (val)
17 30
121 45
Pulupandan
10 31
122 48
Calarrba
14 13
121 10
Quezon
14 38
121 00
Caloocan
14 38
121 03
Rizal (prov)
14 35
121 10
Camalig
13 11
123 39
Rosario
14 25
120 51
Cam arines Norte (prov)
14 10
122 45
Roxas
11 35
122 45
Canlubang
14 15
121 05
Samar (isl)
12 00
125 00
Capiz (prov)
11 24
122 34
San Carlos
10 30
123 25
Carmen
15 01
120 32
San Fernando
15 01
120 41
Casiguran
16 17
122 07
San Fernando
16 37
120 19
Catubig (sirm)
12 34
125 01
San Fernando Point (pl)
16 38
120 17
Cavite
14 29
120 55
Sangley Point (pt)
14 30
120 55
Cavite (prov)
14 15
120 50
Sail Jose
15 48
121 00
Cavite Peninsula (pen)
14 26
120 53
San Juan
14 35
121 07
Cebu
10 18
123 54
San Jtanico Strait (str)
11 20
124 58
Cebu (isl)
10 20
123 45
San Pablo
14 04
121 19
Central Luzon Valley (pin)
15 30
120 40
San Pedro Bay (bay)
11 11
125 05
Corregidor Is!and (isl)
14 23
120 35
Santo Domingo
14 14
121 03
Cotabato
7 13
124 15
Sipalay
9 45
122 24
Cotabato (prov)
7 00
124 40
Sorgogon
12 58
124 00
Cuartero
11 21
122 40
Spratly Island (isl)
8 38
111 55
Cubi Point (pt)
14 48
120 16
Subic Bay (bay)
14 45
120 IS
Dagupan
16 03
120 20
Sulu (prov)
5 30
120 30
Danao
10 32
124 02
Sulu Archipelago (i818)
6 00
121 00
Dao
11 24
122 41
Summit
11 06
122 38
Daraga,
13 09
123 43
Surigao
9 45
125 30
Davao
7 18
125 25
Surigao del Norte (prov)
9 46
125 38
Davao del Norte (prov)
7 30
126 00
Tabangao
13 42
121 05
Davao Gulf (gulf)
6 40
125 55
Taal (lake)
13 55
121 00
Digos
6 45
125 20
Taal, Mount (Yntn)
1,1 00
121 00
Dumaguete
9 18
123 18
Tacloban
11 15
125 00
Dumarao
11 16
122 41
Tarlac
15 29
120 35
Floridablanca
14 59
120 31
Tarlac (prov)
15 30
120 30
Gapan
15 19
120 57
Tawitawi Island (isl)
5 10
120 00
General ",anto. (Rajah Buayan)
6 07
125 11
Toledo
10 23
123 38
Guimaras Island (isl)
10 35
122 37
Tondo (part of Manila)
14 37
120 58
Guimaras Strait (sir)
10 30
122 44
Tuguegarao
17 37
121 44
Iligan
8 14
124 14
Valenzuela
14 42
120 58
Iligan Bay (bay)
8 25
124 05
Visayan Islands (i.31s)
11 00
123 30
Iloco8 Norte (prov)
18 10
120 45
Zambales (prov)
15 20
120 10
Ilocos Sur (prov)
17 20
120 35
Zamboanga
6 5
122 04
Iloilo
10 42
122 34
Zamboanga del Sur (pror)
7 30
122 25
Iloilo (strm)
10 42
122 35
Iloilo Strait (str)
10 43
122 36
Kalibo
11 43
12222
Selected airfields
Kalinga-Apayao (prov)
17 45
121 15
Laguna (prot
14 10
121 20
Bacolod
10 39
122 56
Lanao del Norte (prov)
8 10
123 55
Baguio
16 23
120 37
Lanao del Sur (prov)
7 55
124 20
Basa A B
14 59
120 29
La Paz
10 43
122 34
Cagayan de. Oro
8 25
124 37
Larap Peninsula (pen)
14 18
122 39
Clark AB
15 11
120 33
La Trinidad
16 28
120 35
Cubi Point NAS
14 48
120 16
Lebak
6 32
124 03
D Z Rom ualdez
11 14
125 02
Legazpi
13 08
123 44
Davao
7 08
125 31)
Lepanto
16 52
120 46
Fernando A B
13 57
121 07
Leyte (isi)
10 r)o
124 50
Iloilo
10 43
122 33
Ligao
13 14
123 32
I,aoag
18 11
120 32
Limay
14 34
120 311
Mactan International
1() 1(
123 59
Lingayen Gulf (gulf)
16 15
120 14
Manila International
14 31
121 01
Lipa
13 57
121 10
Sangley Point AB
H 30
120 54
Lubang Island (isl)
13 46
120 11
Zambonnga
6 55
122 04
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090002-4

ynrn�r�r�a�n
Malaysia
u
u
�CU%O valt
ISLANDS it o s ski Cady
J
Cup San Jose a P F. 12Y f t
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e 8
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Island n
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CAGAYAN Baia
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6 13, f
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Olutanga Point
Island
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Basilan Island
ANGUTARAN o"
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37 D mara0
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d c`
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rP9 Illgan to
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Iligan
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lambu n
Lake Mindanao
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8111019 y+ +w* ee
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9
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strait
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Cape San
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v
6e -7
8
Pulau Wengas
(Indonasia)
a V SARANGANI
S e a iSIANDS
PULAU -PULAU NANUSA
o o (Indonas4)
q ulau Karakelong
(Indonesia)
Names and �oundary representation
are not necessarily authornstive
a z n
dr a
Bat
O
t
D
D
0
O c
0
a O
0
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090002 -4

a _5.. i v.. .....at{i l[L'?f x UCy'7,,,' r wl'.�l'f .t a \.".iF X r p r ...x: tt.. =Y it 5
111- nv
C olambu
Fe
e O Cotabala Aa O
Zemboanga D Fe 1 .'Basco
Basil J
yso
tt arao
O a
0
o a o
D a8 2 Administrative
Bang ad .Tuguegaran Divisions*
Vipan 5 Tahu
Is an
4 .ono SO
6 La a 11 '''nvJnco boundary
San Fernando 9 _a� boon Province capital
1115 r
o 19- �b
San pro
Balant
e 18
o Trace 1
0
22
.0 O b
T'72
Population*
an t
guegarao
Persona per square mile
Jolo
fit
0 26 130 520 1820
65
C
0 1q 50 200 lop
Persons per square kilometer
'eg �M
D
INDEX TO PROVINCES"
Because complete data from the 1s70
I. Balanes
15. Ouelon
census are nor yet available. the den
b 8n
1. Cagayan
shies shown are based on the 1960
census
O
ha T r
aeu a
in
slogan
10 Reiss
La Carlou 4 V I
uihu
Jolo
a
0
D
a
O
Puerto Princess
66
a
Q
15
ue_anl O
P p'
Sa5ta o 1 2 �Oaet (27
24 1 1
Lucen 2
Pili� 6 Use
Lepalpi
Wage lJ/ 31.
2 n Sorsopon
28 'Romblon a
(((((fJJJJ Masbate Color n
33 Q 3 3'
e pan
I(aliho Boron6
O
3 oaaa 37
41 Tacloban
Iloilo 4
0 San Jose de Bac la oil
Boenavlsla 44
eh Maas
47 Suri'a 49
Z n3 ap iar
Oum uete ajao
a 5
Dipole 53 ,Pi
roquleta ayan 56
52 wi
51 an t 0 Mal bola
7
Pagadlan`.- 58 59 62
S Tagc
Pagalungan
60
J
63
J9
ada Davao City
Jolo
fit
65
C
D
INDEX TO PROVINCES"
I. Balanes
15. Ouelon
28. Mindoro Occidental 41, Iloilo
54, Misamis Oriental
1. Cagayan
16 Zambales
29. Mindoro Oriental 42, Negros Occidental
55 Agusan del Norte
3. Jocos Norte
17. Tarlac
30. Marinduque 43. Negros Oriental
56. Agu:in del Sur
4, Ilocos Sur
18. Bataan
31. Albay 44, Cebu
57. L enao del Norte
5.Abra
19.Pempanga
32.Sarsagon IS. Leyte
58. Loran del Sur
I Kalinga Ape;ae
20. Bulacan
33. Romblon I6. Southern Leyte
59. Bukidn in
1. Mountain
21, Rital
34, Masbate 47. Bohol
60. Cotabato
8. La Union
22. Cavile
35. Northern Samar 48. Camiguin
51. South Cotabato
9. Benguet
23. Laguna
36. Samar 49. Surlgao del Norte
62. Cava, del Norte
f0. Ifugao
24 Batangas
37 Eastern Samar 50. Suogao del Sur
63 Davao del Sur
11. Isabela
25. Camannes yorte
38. Aklan 51. Zamboanga del Norte
64. Davao Oriental
12. Nueva Vizcaya
26. Camannes Sur
39. Capir 52. Zamboanga del Sur
65. Sulu
13. Pangasinen
27, C,alandusnes
40. Antique 53 Misamis Occidental
66. Palawan
14, Nueva Ecija
59 charfined apnc
(Nnvrncr revel) an nor shown c,ccnf Davao
der. shown are pie :970 AdeguaM mhrrmaron n
not a-lahle to
chow houndnrms nl the p-r-es crenred s,rce
1970:
Nueva Vilcaya and
Ouinno from Poeva Vilcsyt (12)
Negros Oriental
and Siquilor from Negras Oriental (43)
Lanao del Sur and
Marsnaw from Lanao del Sur (58)
Colalu. Sultan Koil,,: and Maguindanao from Cotabato (60)
m
Sulu and Tawilawi
from Sulu (65)