NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 25B; MALTA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
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SECRET
25B /GS /5P
Malta
July 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE -SURVEY
SECREF
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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D
t
Malta
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the political coverage in
the General Stervey dated May 1967.
A. Introduction
1
B. Structure and functioning of the government
4
C. Political dynamics
7
1. Political forces
7
2. Malta Labor Party
7
3. Nationalist Party
9
4. Splinter parties
10
5. Roman Catholic Church
10
6. Electoral laws and practices
11
7. Voting patterns and participation
12
SECPr No F OREIGN DIssEm.
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Page
E. Threats to government stability 19
F. Maintenance of internal security 20
1. Police 20
2. Intelligence and security services 21
3. British forces 22
4. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities 22
Chronology 23
Glossary 24
FIGURES
Page
D. National policies
12
1. Domestic policy
12
2. Foreign policy
15
a. General objectives
15
b. United Kingdom
15
c. Western Europe
16
d. United States
16
e. Middle East and North Africa
17
f. Communist nations
17
g. International organizations
18
Page
E. Threats to government stability 19
F. Maintenance of internal security 20
1. Police 20
2. Intelligence and security services 21
3. British forces 22
4. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities 22
Chronology 23
Glossary 24
FIGURES
Page
Fig. 7 Valletta and Grand Harbour photo) 13
Fig. 8 A tanker at the drydocks I photo) 14
Fig. 9 Prime Minister Mintoff signs base
agreement photo) 16
Fig. 10 Prime Minister Mintoff in Peking
(photo) 18
Fig. 11 Organization of Malta Police
Department chart) 20
I
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Page
Fig. 1
Valletta rises from the ruins photos)
2
Fig. 2
Police disperse Nationalist rally
(photo)
Fig. 3
Royal Navy at anchor in Valletta
3
(photo)
4
Fig. 4
Stricture of government chart)
5
Fig. 5
Mintoff campaigning photo)
8
Fig. 6
Party representation in parliament
(chart)
12
Page
Fig. 7 Valletta and Grand Harbour photo) 13
Fig. 8 A tanker at the drydocks I photo) 14
Fig. 9 Prime Minister Mintoff signs base
agreement photo) 16
Fig. 10 Prime Minister Mintoff in Peking
(photo) 18
Fig. 11 Organization of Malta Police
Department chart) 20
I
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A. Introduction (C)
Malta, it parliamentary democracy .within the
British Commonwealth, shares many traditions with
the United Kingdom as it result of over 160 years of
British rule. British efforts after World War II to rid
itself of an outdated colonial role conflicted with the
long held assumption �not least on the part of the
Maltese �that the islands could never he ec( tonti-
cally independent. Nationhood in September 1%. *4 did
not really settle the question of Malta's future status,
because concurrent defense and financial agreements
with the United Kingdom gave the British control over
key elements of Maltese foreign policy. One of the
major objectives of the new Malta labor Party (M I.P)
government is to break this hegen)eny, and an accord
between Malta and the United Kingdom reached in
1972 is it major step in this direction.
Malta's modern political development began in the
early 1800's with the British occupation during the
Napoleonic 1t'ars. In 1802, the Maltese people
petitioned London to take the islands under British
sovereignty, and 12 years later the United Kingdom
formally acquired Malta as part of the Treaty of Paris.
r)r,e of the foremost concerns of the British throughout
much of the ensuing colonial period was the redaction
of the influence of the "Italian faction" in Malta.
Many leaders of the upper class identified culturally
with Italy and argued that had it not been for the
Un ted Kingdom, Malta would have been included in
the movement for Italian unification.
By the late 19th century this cc, ,flict. now highly
poli, icized, focused on the question of which
langt:ages� Italian or English and Maltese �would
predominate in the schools and the government. The
Italian interests were represented by the Nationalist
Party (NP), while pro British sentiments found
expression in the Progressive Constitutional Part.
London, for its part, sought to encourage the stunted
pride of the Maltese in their Punic (as opposed to
continental European) heritage �a novel approach
given the efforts of the imperialist contemporaries of
the United Kingdom to check nationalist movements
elsewhere. This focus took the form of official
assistance in the revitalliallml of the Maltese
language. Upper class resistance to the overall British
program %was bolstered by the opposition of the
Catholic hierarchy to middle class English ideas of
:Iemacrtcy, liberalism. and commerce. The Italian
element recei ed it telling blo%% in 1932. wl,en English
Mid Maltese were given cite status of official
larguages. Several tries -it limited atilonomw were
made Iet%een 1921 and 19�`3:3. But virtually every time
the Nationalists came to power. they clashed with the
colonial administration. and the United Kingdom
suspended limited self- government. In 1933 the
Constitution was withdra%%it. and with the suhsequent
rising international tension the British dropped further
exlx rinients in self government until shortly after
World War II.
Although doinesti disputes were submerged. World
War 11 was nonetheless a watershed in Malta's
political development. Successful withstanding of the
intense Axis aerial bombardment and ship blockade
from 1941 to 1943 Figure I) strengthened nationalism
and cernented Anglo- Maltese bonds. In fact, the
people of Malta we:e awarded the Ceorge Cross in
1942 for their "heroism and devotion" during the
siege. Furthermore. the attack on Malta by Fascist
Italy signaled thy- decline of the NP "Italian faction."
In the longer term, ncwcrtheless. the d'ininished
postwar world role (if the United Kingdom eventually
made possession of Malta more it liability than an
asset.
When Maltese political life resumed under a tiesw
Constitution in 1947, national leaders and issues were
significantly different. The NP still represents 1 the
upper classes and depended on support from the
Roman Catholic Church and the tradition- minded
farmers, but while some of its members retained their
pro Italian personal sentiments. its program was more
generally pro- Westrrn European and "Malta
centered." The M I.P �an offshoot of Maltese trade
unionism during the 1920's�replaced the Progressive
Constitutionalists as the major alternative party and
came to power in 195 The election issue, unlike that
in most other colonies after Aorld War 11, was "full
integration" with the mother country, it program
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.l
.'Ir� .xt
F
fit
i
l
FIGURE 1. Valletta's Old Bakery Street in 1942, after 1%xis air raids, and rebuilt, in
native golden limestone, to its old form (U /OU)
backed by the M I.T. For the United Kingdom, which
surprisingly enough did not reject the proposal out of
hand, it v as as if it police of L'Angleterre d0utre rater
(England Overseas) was about to take root in
Whitehall.
'fhe mixed emotions, not 1 say apprehensions, with
w hich the Maltese watched other colonies achieve
independence was perhaps best expressed in the
ensuing efforts by the ruling M LP under Prime
Minister Dominic Mintoff to obtain Maltese
representation in the British Parliament as well as the
benefits of the British welfare state for Maltese
citizens. However impracticable this scheme may have
been or, geograp!. and religious grounds alone, it
represented the desire of many Maltese tc nurve the
colonial stigma while retaining the econonlik �Ua� fits
of British protection. Among the vlaltcse, however,
were many who opposed the scheme from the outset
(Figure 2). For a United Kingdom which �on the eve
of its misadventure at Stiez �still perceived itself as it
great power, the scheme was attractive as it means of
maintaining military facilities at a kr ;y Mediterranean
strongpoint.
2
Tory Prime Minister Anthon% Eden signalled the
fundamental U.K. accord with the i :,tegration
proposal by appointing it distinguished bipartisan
committee of Members of Parliament icy study its
feasibility. At the end of 1955 the committee report -d
that the proposal was ac,,ptable. Before they would
reconimu ;cl passage to the British Parliament.
however. the Maltese people would have to
"demonstrate clearly and unmistakably" drat they
favored integration. The referendum, which was held
in Fehruary 1956. won a deceptive i4 of the vote:
the strong opposition of the NP the Catholic
Church had caused such massive abstentions that the
proposal received the approva of only 44i of the total
electorate.
In the months that followed, Mintoff and the
oritish Government began to draw back from their
original positions, and tensions started to build. The
less than overwhelming results of the referendum
provided a rallying point for anti- integration forces in
both the United Kingdom and Malta. Significantly,
too, one consequence of the Suez fiasco w:) the
installation of it new Prime Minister in London, who
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f
began to recognize that the sun wits setting on the
Empire and that perhaps the U.K. future lay in
Europe. For his part, Mintoff's stance on the financial
aspects of integration hardened. When the Maltese
leader failed to win his economic demands, he made a
total about -face and became it vehement advocate of
immediate independence� claiming that the United
Kingdom was deliberately keeping Malta economi-
cally dependent to insure ease retention of its military
facilities. Strikes and demonstrations fomented by
Mintoff, wtth the support of the powerful General
Workers Union (GWU), led in 19,38 to the resignation
of the Mintoff government and eventually to
suspension of the Constitution and reimposition of
direct rule from London.
With integration a dead sue, Malta moved rapidly
toward independence. New elections were held in
1962, and the NP was returned to power. The
Nationalists desired independence but wanted Malta
to remain closely linked to the United Kingdom and
other Western nations. Primarily because of
intervention by the Maltese hierarchy of the Roman
Catholic Church, which made it a mortal sin to vote
for the M LP, Mintoff's share of the popular vote
dropped from 56.4% to 33.8%. The Nationalist Party's
percentage of the vote increased front 38 to 42.1
and on the basis of that plurality Giorgio Borg Olivier
became Prime Minister.
The three smaller parties did not want indepen-
dence at all, at least for the time being, because of the
damage they said it would do to national prosperity.
Furthermore, Mintoff and Borg Olivier were in sharp
disagreement on what kind of independence
eonstIIiiIkill th(�% wanted� whether the church's
freedom to intervene in poiltics wouhl continue, cued
whether Malta should he tied to it deferne ,tnd
economic arrangenu�nt Keith the United Kingdom
which would in fact limit its sovereignty in foreign
affair. In the r !t(1 Borne Few concessions In civil rights
For non Catholics �hut not to electoral Freedom from
church pressures- -were Forced on Borg Olivier by the
britis6 and on the Maltese church by the Vatican, and
10 -year defense and finance agreements with the
United Kingdom were agreed to. In contrast it. the
prolonged debwe over integration, the Malta
Independence Avi was whipped through all stages of
the (egislattve proce ss (hiring the last 2 weeks of july
1964, and Malta became independent on 21
September 1964.
Persisting opposition to Mintoff by the church
helped the NP win another victory in the March 1966
elections, but this time with a decreased popular and
parliamentary lead over the M I.P. 'I'll(- 1966 election
eliminated the three smaller parties from parliante�n-
tary life, clarifying the conflict between the two major
parties.
'I'll(- Nationalist administration continned, charac-
terized by the seemingly contrasting qualities of
hureaueratic ineffectiveness and stagnation, coupled
with the achievement of economic well being. The
bureaucratic inertia. however, eventually contributed
to it downturn in the economy. a depression which.
according to the opposition, stentrned largely from
Borg Olivier's inability either to delegate authority or
personally to take the initiative. In addition,
Opposition Leader Mintoff made headway with
claims that h(� could Jo a better job of completing the
independence of Malta from the Western poi�. rrs and
establishing ties with its non- European neighbors in
the Mediterranean. livers after Borg Olivier obtained
more beneficial terms for the balance of the U.K.
einancial accord in late October 1970, he failed to
capitalize on favorable local reaction by calling early
elections.
In the 1971 contest the M Lt' returned to power with
the main objectives of stirrnlating the economy and
providing it higher standard of living for the Maltese
people. To accomplish this end, Prime Minister
Mintoff asserted, Malta must shed its centuries old
"fortress image" and adopt a neutral position in the
Mediterranean, so that it will be free to trade with and
accept aid from any source. Shortly after corning to
office, Mintoff severed Malta's informal ties with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
removed the small NATO naval command from the
island, and refused the U.S. Navy further entree into
3
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FIGURE 2. Labor government uses police to disperse
Nationalist rally, protesting the plan for integrating
Malta into the United Kingdom, 1955 (U /OU)

FIGURE 3. British wgrships take
on pro�.1slons In Grand Harbour,
1972 (U /OU)
Malta. He also began to press, often flamlmyantly, for
renegotiation of the defense and financial agrernents
s with the United Kingdom. He argued that Malla
should receive larger payments from the British for use
of the defense facilities (Figure 3) and for denying
them to nations of the Warsaw Pact for milit use.
After prolonged negotiations and the withdrawal of
almost all British forces, an agreement was ,igned in
London on 26 March 1572. In return for an annual
payment of 14 million pounds for 7',. years. Malta
granted the British continued base rights, with
provision for use of U.K. installations by at least some
NATO members. The accord also states that Warsaw
Pact nations are to be denied military use of Malta.
Although the new agreement has been looked upon
by almost all Maltese a, an important foreign policy
success fc Mintoff, the extended negotiations
exacerbated the islands' economic difficulties.
Unemployment increased significantly, several
manufacturing firms folded, some retail outlets closed,
and the flow of tourists slowed. The return of British
troops and their dependents helped restore much.
needed purchasing power, but the new U.K. -Malta
accord by its, If will not soon alleviate the remaining
problems. As a direct result, the Wntoff g.wernment
has lost much of its initial popularity. Elections %ell
before the legal deadline (September 1976) are not
iikvly, unless government plans progress, the economy
picks up, and unemployment is substantially reduced.
In the meantime, the one vote parliamentary margin
of the M LP will probably be maintained For as long as
recjuired barring some unforeseen and unsettling
event� though a combination of tight party
discipline and antipathy toward its Nationalist
opponents.
Mint4f's preoccupation with foreign affairs
through early 1973 resulted in tea little activity on the
r
4
domestic front. The conftontatio v ith the United
Kingdom in late 1972 and early 1973 was at least
tempura::!} settled when Mintoff accepted a special
payment from the NATO allies as partial compensa-
tion for losses caused by the sterling float. With the
I1.K.4-vlaltest dispute under wraps and consideration
of tl,t deta of aid commitments front other Western
nations and the People's Republicof Chino underway.
Mintoff had it renewed opportunity to concv;strate on
his goal of making the Maltese economy self
sustaining. Newly available funds were used largely to
reduce the national debt rather than for reinforcing
the infrastructure. creating n( production, and
paying higher wages, as many expected. Capital and
current .crc reduced. and revenue
increased. Coupled with this policy have been apiwaals
to all sectors of the community to accept sacrifices
"with patience and patriotism." To this end, the very
real stimulus Mintoff has given to national pride is an
important plus. Depressed economic condition and
heavy unemployment, however. have since led to
increasing dissatisfaction. even among many of his
supporters.
B. Structure and fun ^tioning of the
government (U /OU)
`aalta's governmental structure was devised by the
British colonial administration and is modeled on the
British parliamentary system Figure 4). On( major
difference from RA!ish practice, however, is the
privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church.
Although thy Constitution contains it general civil
rights provision, it specifically excludes matters of
adoption. marriage, div and burial, where cation
law is operative. Furthermore, them is no legal
prohibition, as there is in the Uoitec' Kingdom, against
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HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(55 seats)
e
C
PRIME MINISTER
MINISTERS
ELECTORATE
0001 Election
N Responsibility
y Appointment
*Personal representative of Queen Elizabeth 11 in'
her capacity as Queen of Malta.
FIGURE 4. Structure of government (U /OU)
"threat of temlx;ral or spiritual injury" from the clergy
in connection with elections. These factors make
possible a large measure of clerical influence in
government.
Theoretically authority rests %%ith the Queen of
Malta (Queen Elizabeth If of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland) represented by her Governor
General, and with the unicameral parliament. As in
the United Kingdom, however, the monarch's power is
limited to ceremonial duties, advising on and
assenting to acts of the Prime Minister and
parliament, and certain politically nonpartisan
functions, such as appointing the electoral commis-
sion.
The House of Representatives, commonly called the
Malta legislative assetnbly or parliament, is made up
of 55 members. They are elected at least once every 5
years by direct universal suffrage. The Speaker of the
House is elected by the members and maybe from
outside their own number. The Governor General. as
titular executive appoints as Prime Minister the leader
of the majority party, or if no one part should
command a majority, tilt� party leader who is able to
form a majority from a coalition of parties. Ile also
nominally appoints, upon recommendation of the
Prime Minister, the individual ministers to head each
of the government departments. Together with the
Prime Minister they form the Cabinet. which is
collectively responsible to the parliament.' Cabinet
ministries are as follows:
Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs
Development
Education and Culture
Finance and Customs
Health
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs
Labor and Social Welfare
Public Works
Trade, Industry, Agriculture, and Tourism
1 For a currant listinyt of I:ec dos ernnu�nt officials consult Chir of
Slate and Cabiru�1 Members of Foreign Gorernnu�nls. published
muntlih hs the Directorate of Inb�Iligence. Central Intelligence
Agvnu).
5
Britlsh Crown
49J
GOVERNOR
GENERAL
IN 1 11 1111
JUDICIARY
Superior Courts
(8 Judges)
Inferior Courts
(9 Magistrates)
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The Constitution also provides for an official
Leader of the Opposition. He receives, in addition to
his salary as a member of the parliament, it
government salary and staff. The Prime Minister is
required to consult him on government appointments
to such agencies as the Maltese Broadcasting
Authority and the Public Service (civil ser -e)
Commission.
The approximately 11,000 white collar civil
servants who staff the ministries are selected and
promoted by competitive examination. Their
number almost 9% of the total labor force reflects
the heavy dependence of citizens on government
employment. The civil service offers both economic
security and a way up from the working classes. This
overstaffed body is highly protectionist in outlook and
organized into unions, which jealously guard the
status and position of each member. Furthermore, the
tradition of patronage makes civil servants especially
vulnerable to pressures for favors from it wide complex
of relatives, religious society and social club fellows,
and hometown friends. These factors partly explain
the extremely conservative outlook of the civil service
and its general resistanc to modernisation and
streamlining of functions. The Institute of Public
Administrati.,.c was created in the 19:50'x, however. to
improve the professional competence of officials and
staff through part -time attendance at lectures,
conferences, and seminars. Political officials also are
encouraged to take the institute courses.
The Mintoff government is committed to
eliminating incompetents from the civil service rolls,
which, it claims, have been padded with tilt�
supparters of the former Nationalist government. The
Laborites, with their reputation for efficient%, have
tightened up discipline considerably and made some
progress in increasing productivity. The government
claims additionally that corruption is slowly being
stamped cut.
For all its size and ponderousness, the Maltese.
Government has at least the virtue of centralized
simplicity, as there are no legally established local
governmental bodies on the main island of Malta and
only a civic council on Gozo, wiih quite limited
functions; there are also only a few regional branches
of the central government. With the exception of the
police, regional branches of the post office, and local
medical dispensaries, government programs�
including even water ojpply, sewerage, and street
lighting �arc administered directly from Valletta, the
capital. The police are viroially the only official
representatives of t!ic l vernment operating
extensiveiv at the local level, and their duties as
6
distri:nntors of voting certificates and relief items, as
census takers, and as advisers on income tax and other
government forms probably take more of their tirne
than actual law enforcement. This centralized system
results both from Malta's small sire and from the
essentially military nature of earlier governments
under foreign control.
F ront time to time the issue of establishing a system
of local government is raised, and the present
administration, in principle, is in favor of granting
legal status to thc informally constituted civic
councils. Only the civic council on Gozo has legal
standing. In the years after World War II, civic
councils began to spring tip in Malta, and there are
almost 30 of them, eaeb with its own separate rules.
Their makeup includes representatives of local
organizations�religious, cultural, and sporting �and
usually the parish priest. Some localities conduct
elections for council posts, but for the most part local
leaders fill these positrons by appointment. The
continued absence of local government administration
is ao important factor in perpetuating clerical
influence in political life. A,though the coanc�ils
perform a useful function in helping to improve the
cultural level of the community and in providing it
lord ou! ct for tom,, .tints 10 the .-ntral authority,
their effcutiveness is uneven. 'There is it definite need
for .t more active municipal effort in cleanup
campaigns, welfare assistance, and local planning to
assist the government in Valletta.
The confederatio� of civic councils, which was
established in 1966, forutally petitioned the
government in early 1971 for assistance iii settill" up
municipal bodies that would he elected by univec,.cl
suffrage. The Mintofl government has responded to
this request with a pledge to produce it White Paper on
municipal government. Among the problems to be
considered are what powers Valletta would devolve as
well as how a new system would be financed. So far,
council activities tend to he nonpartisan, but local
elections, if held, would he sure to have it strong
political character. Democratically elected councils
would also undermine the political strength of the
church.
A partial relaxation of central authority has already
taken place on Gozo and Kennmuna (C:otnino). In
response to it prolonged feeling of neglect by the
capital, at civic council was formed in Gozo in 1961,
with one commissioner from each village on Gozo and
one from Kenununa. The council is permitted to
administer some of the gcvernmenl's purely local
programs (such as sanitation and street lighting) on
Gozo and Kemmuna, and in effect acts as a special
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pressure group representing their interests in dealing
with the central government.
The eight Maltese judges divide their duties on the
various superior courts. The highest tribunal is the
Constitutional Court, whose four judges and Chief
Justice review laws and executive acts. Tliv other
stlper::r courts are the Civil Court, the Commercial
Court, the Criminal Court, and the Court of Appeal.
In addition, it single judge presides over the
Arbitration Tribunal and another justice over the
Land Arbitration Board. The Chief Justice is President
of the Court of Appeal and a member of the Criminal
Court. Judges are appointed by the Governor Ceneral
on advice of the Prime Minister and serve until
retirement at age 60. Usually the post of Crown
Advocate General (attorney general) is apprenticeship
for judgeship.
Nine magistrates sit in the inf rior courts: the Court
of Magistrates of Judicial Police for Xlalta and th,-
Court of Magistrates of Judicial Pulicc for Gozo and
Kerumuna. The magistrates conduct iti(luests and
investigate deaths, thefts, fires, explosions, and
maritime incidents. They make inquiries into criminal
cases and investigations of complaints about unpaid
bills, violations of sanitary codes, and other matters of
public concern.
C. Political dynamics
1. Political forces (U /OU)
The political forces active in Multu since World
War II remain centered about the Nationalist Parh,
the Malta Labor Party, and the Roman Catholic
Church, but the balance among the supporters of
these three groups is shifting. I'll( church's political
influence, while still great, is waning because of it
growing anticlericalism which the MLP has
encouraged and exploited and because of the
moderating influence of the Vatican. Many farmers
traditionally Malta's most conservative group �have
at least part -time: jobs in the Valletla area to
supplement their, income and are influenced I% the
ideas of their new, often anticlerical, urban coworkers.
The General Workers Union has an independent and
significant influence in Maltese life and politics, as
well as it role in helping shape M LP policy. As a
byproduct of the transition from a military to an
industrial economy, Malta is developing a middle
class of businessmen and entrepreneurs. Significant
segments of this new bourgeoisie, which in some cases
includes the sons of the old landowning families, have
voted for the M I.P. Finally, better education for more
Maltese, vidumced geographic nubility of workers
looking for new jobs, and improved cormnunication
with the outside world all are breaking downs the
urban -rnr,J division and changing �if slot ly �the
politica, as well :is social outlook of the Maltese.
These changes arc rcflcctc(I in politics. The three
parties which opposed independence all failed to win
seats in the 1966 election and hall virtually
disappeared by the 197 1 t+-ctiorl. 'Phis developme� it
has produced it clearer split between the pro Western
a, .0 essentially traditionalist NP and the M I.I, whose
leaclt r voices Iris adtniratitu for "INsitive neutralism."
Personalities play :Ir especially prominent role in
politics. The Maltese are interested in politics. as
demonstrated by the fact that over 90; of the
electorate has voted in the past three elections. As in soy
+any aspects of life, however, the almost feudal
tradition of dependence on it leader still prevails. The
forceful personality and image of efficiency of Uorn
Mintoff possibly have been as important in the sue�cess
of the M I.P as has in% alternative program it has
offered.
2. Malta Labor Party (C)
A comparatively recent arrital on the Imlitical
seen the X1I,11) dates only from the 1921f s. It %%as
created b% the ;Wi much as the British Labor P:arh
In-gall with the 1' arliannvotar% Bepresen tit I!on
Committee of the British 'Trades Unions Congress. 'The
M LP still depends on industrial %%orkers� particular1%
th, members of the G11'I' �for the bulk of its sill ort.
although in 1971 the M LP won the votes of ell ;.ny
independent, middle class Maltese who were surfeited
with the bureaucratic inertia that characteriz the
Nationalist administration. 'There is no longt�r a formal
link between party and GWI'. and :he union
leadership sometimes criticizes the part%.
The socialism of the N11.P is modeled on the
pragmatic example of the British Labor Parh and
envisages it role for both private and public ecynonaic�
activity. The party, moreover, is less interested in
socialist doctrine than in claiming more benefits for its
members. Its present leader, Prime Minister Mintoff,
Ill's been influenced by the late Aneurin Bevan and
others in the Ieftwings of Western European socialist
parties, by President 'Tito of Yugoslavia. and by Aral)
leaders, such as the hate Jarnal 'Abd al -Nasir and
Tunisian President dabib Bourguib t. Although he
may be somewhat to the left of many of his follower..
Mintoff h;,s voiced admiration of a mixed ecvmom%.
such as that of Israel.
7'he ;Malta Labor Part% is extremely well organized.
with local, district. and regional cynarraittees. It also)
H
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E.
lists cut �ffectiye press and public mlalions program.
The NII.P is nu�niher of the Socialist International
and is affiliated with the Afro -Asian People's
Solidarity Conference.
The MMP programs and activ; ties are csentially
those of Dotn'tintoff, possible the most callable a�id
almost certainly the most dytrntie politician ill the
Islands (Figure i). lie runs the party with an iron hand
.nd does not tolerate open dissent. All important and
many unimportant lxlicy decisions arc made by
Mintoff with ininimal advice from political leaders
and civil servants. lie takes ;Measure in showing his
subwdinates (ofien coircctlo that he knows more
about their work than they do. It is likely that he
formulated much of contemix)rary government policy
during the 1:3 years he spent in opposition. Some
decisions, however, arc made on the spur of the
moment and have resulted in confusion and mistakes.
The *1 LP government program is ambitious, it is
aimed at nothing less than creating an ecouoniical1%
viable and fulh independent Malta. The Prime
Min'tstei has made it clear that `here goals cast he
achieved only if the people accept sacrifices, and in
this regard he has effectively exploited latent
ttatiotialistn. Mintoff's preoccupation with foreign
affairs during most of his first IS months in office �in
postindependence Malta �has. however, had it
dampening effect on the development of economic
lxlicy :aid progress on related domestic fronts. The
economy has languished. and little concrete action has
been taken on such problems as modernizing the
educational system or augmenting the construction of
badly needed lo%v -cost horsing.
Before indelxmdence Vlintoff made touch of his
visits to Bonn, Cairo, Belgrade, Moscow, and Algiers,
as well as to art Afro -Asian Peoples Solidarity meeting.
claiming promises of financial support and possibly
military equipment to overthrow the govertrnent if
K
independence were granted without curhing the
influence ol, the church or ridding Malta of British
military buses. After indepetulence he abandoned the
threat of violent overthrow of the government.
Throtighout, however, he has kept up his part}'s
fraternal contacts with West European socialists and
with like- nniuded individuals elsewhere, both in and
out of }rovermnent.
Mintoff's base of support at home was narrowing by
early 1973. The decline in popularity stemmed
principally from unfulfilled expectation that the large
annunt of money obtained from the March 1972
Malta U. K. base agreetnc�nt would result in
initnediate tangible benefits to the Maltese people.
The anticipation of material benefits was not ill
founded. While in office from 1955 until 1958,
Vlintoff, aided by it generous budget provided by the
United Kingdom, nude good to it great degree his
election promises to extend social services. Numerous
public works, such as schools and roads were
undertaken, and Vlintoff made serious attempts to
Modernize agriculture. This time around, however, the
average citizen has not \vt reciped the benefits of the
iiic�reuscd income generated by (he .!greenivnt with bite
L itited Kingdom. Rather. Vlintoff concentrated on
reducing the budgetary deficit and followed an
austerity program disliked by most Mah -se. l lis threat
in November 1972 to abrogate the base agreement
listless the British made up the losses Malta incurred
because of the sterling float and also the resulting
series of minicrises have contributed to increased
public clisenchunhaent with his leadership. The
Maltese, concerned about tit(- departure of British
forces and the impact this would have on the sluggish
economy. appeared to have some reservations about is
leader who constantly embroiled them in it protracted
crisis. Finally. Miit toff's abrupt manner has
c�oit tri1)itted to this unpopularity. Ilis hrntal
humiliation of Cabinet niiiiisters or other subordinates
has had it chilling .feet on his standing with the
public.
Despite this diminution of popular support.
M ;stGff's hold on the V11.P leadership appears firm.
Through shrewd and assiduous inaneuvcring he
continues to exercise tight control of the party
machinery and parliamentary group and the
politically powerful General Workers Union. Barring
any rash acts by the unconventional Prime Minister
and assuming that the economy_ will turn up, Vlintoff
should be able to remain in command until 1976,
when he is required to call an election.
Should Mintoff be forced from office, the MIT
would probably seek an interim successor. Minister of
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FIGURE 5. Prime Minister MIntoff on the
campaign trail in 1971 (U /OU)

justice and Parliamentary Affairs Anton Buttigi -g, a
spoken for the landowners, the more prosperous
popular and capable politician, would probably be
businessmen, the professional classes, and, to it large larg
acceptable to all elements of tile parh�. Although in
extent, for the church. The part also draws support
agreement with Mintoff on many iss ues, Buttigieg's
from white cellar vv ii servants and, because of the
moderate image and less abrasive style might enable
church's opposition tot the MLP, from manly of the�
him to hold the party together. Lorry Sant, the
lower classes. The farmers, traditionally the poorest
ambitious Minister of Public "Yorks, would be another
contender for the leadership. The former fiery chief of
and the most backward Maltese a> well as the most
the largest labor union had been a rising political force
ardently religious �arc especially strong Nationalist
prior to being coopted into Mintoff's Cah ?net. Sant's
supporters.
political base in the dockyards has been weakened,
The party has dropped pro It alianisrn as part of its
however, since he left his union post, and he still lacks
political program, although man%� of its -aders and
Mintoff's appeal among the nonworking class.
wealthier supporters still emphasize their Italian
Nevertheless, Sant, who has mellowed somewhat since
descent. 'I'll(- party's leader, G. Borg Olivi had his
assuming public office, remains a strong figure in the
Christian name legally changed from George to
left of tl:e party and in the long term is likely to he
Giorgio when he rrtered politics. In fact, notes of the
Mintoff's successor.
party's executive meetings were iaken in Italian until
No discussion, of the MLP would he complete
the summer of 1971, when younger members fo =rced it
without mention of its conflict with the conservative
change to Maltese.
hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Malta. The
Dependent on of least tacit support from the strong
r dispute centers on Mintoff's anticle ric�alisrn. In 1955.
for example, Mintoff's unwillingness to pay homage to
conservative elements of th e Catholic Church, the
the influence of the church was reflected in his refusal
parh has opposed the extension of civil rights to non
upon taking office to make the customary call con the
Catholics in matters of personal law, suet: as adoption�
Archbishop of Malta. Growing in intensity during the
marriage� and burial. The NI' also supports a tux
1950'x, the dispute reached a peak over Mintoff's
structure that f
favors the� wealthy and the church.
attempt to "fully integrate" Malta into the United
although its 1971 campaign platform contained
Kingdom. The hierarchy's clear aversion to that
Proposals that seemed to break with this long held
proposal directly contributed to the failure of the
Position. The parh advocates good relations .rith all
's
attempt and the eventual collapse of the first Mintoff
countries, particularly Xialta Mediterranean
g overnment. During the M LP's years in opposition
g g
neighbors, but it is staunchly anti Communist and
animosity gave way to open hostility, as the church
pro Western. 'I'll(- NP advocated independence in the
interfered directly in the electoral process. In 1962 the
1S�0 s and 1960'x. albeit with especially close ties to
hierarchy declared a vote for the Malta Labor Party to
the United Kingdom. Its platform, in gene-al,
be a mortal sin. During the 19647 campaign church
Provided sufficient opportunity for the opposition to
leaders backed off this position, but Nu�y� still issued a
charge that the Nationalist administration (19(12 -71
pastoral letter advising against voting for Labor.
%yirs interested only in defending the status yuo, and
A reconciliation took place in 19(19 :hen the
those charges ucd to its narrow defeat ill the
contrib
church agreed to maintain ncutruli' in future
1971 election.
elections. The hierarchy adhered to the a greement
Giorgio Borg Olivier, who is formly pro-Western in
during the 1971 campaign, although some parish
outlook, has been the Nationalist leader sine( 1950
priests indirectly opposed the MLP. Since taking
and Prime Minister twice (1950 -55 and 1962 -71 lie
office, Mintoff has managed to avoid conflict with the
is it man of intelligence and integrity, but he h f ailed
still influential church. tic even managed, through
to provide vig >ous leadership either to his party or his
some exceptionally clever maneuvering, to create the
nation. His inertia and in(lec�isiveness when he was
impression with the public that his old nemesis,
m
1 nmc Minister iniihitcd government perfc nuance
Pr ime
Archbishop Michael Gonzi, supported the efforts by
ud blurred the popular impact of its successes.
the Labor government to renegotiate the base
Personal problems, notably marital, exacerbated his
agreement with the United Kingdom.
natural tendency to delay difficult decisions.
Furthermore, as Prime Minister, he was slow to take
3. Nationalist Party (C)
others into his confidence and reluctant to delegate
authority. Cabinet ministers hesitated to offer advice
The pro- Italian party in 19th century Maltesr
on policy matters and often failed to make decisions
politics, the Nationalist Party (NP) has consistently
which fell within their competence. As it result, Borg
9
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Olivier made all but the most minor decisions, and
government operations sometimes cane� almost to a
halt.
Following the NP defeat at the polls in June 1971,
the party fell into a state of disarray. The shock of the
setback, coupled with the new Prime Minister's
vigorous pursuit of "just" financial recompense from
the British for the use of Maltese military facilities,
contribuA to an ineffective NP performance ii, the
unfamiliar role of the loyal opposition. In addition,
some of the younger Nationalists blamed the fall from
power on the lethargy of the party's warhorses and
began to push for new leadership and policies.
By early 1972, however, the Nationalists seemed to
have sorted out many of their intraparty problems and
began to assert themselves more skillfully in
parliamentary debates. Although party elections
confirmed Borg Olivier's hold on the leadership, this
action probably reflects the belief of mane
Nationalists 'hat to change leaders now would push
the party toward a split that might redound to the
benefit of the Malta Labor Part. Borg Olivier is still a
relatively strong vote getter, and the NP needs his
presence for the foreseeable future. Party members
elected Vincent Tabone, formerly Minister of Labor
and Social Welfare, to the post of deputy leader and
several of the younger leaders to positions in the
shadow cabinet. They appear to he working well with
Borg Olivier and Tabone, but others �still dissatis-
fied� continue to call for it wholesale rejuvenation of
the party.
4. Splinter parties (U /OU)
In the past minor parties played an important role
in politics, but during the 1960's they went into it
decline that culminated in 1971 in their virtaazd
disappearance. In 1962, for example, three healthy
minor parties polled almost one quarter of the vote
and won nine parliamentary scats. :Four years later,
these same parties gained Iess than 9% of the vote and
lost all of their parliamentary representation. By 1971,
only the Progressive Constitutional Part- remained in
the field, and its handful of candidates drew only 1
of the vote. Despite tha bleak history, the prospect of
establishing a system of local governient and rumors
of dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Mintoff's
autocratic manner within the ruling Malta Labor
Party raise at least the possibility that the minor
parties may ex,i- rieace a comeback.
The smaller parties grew either from personal
quarrels with leaders of the major parties or from
disagreements about whether or to what degree Malta
should have independence. The Progressive Constitu-
10
tional Part- was the pro- British party of the 19th
century and one of the two dominant forces in Maltase
politics. It is led by Miss Mabel Strickland, the
energetic but aging daughter of its pre -World War II
leader. Miss Strickland drew most of her preindepen-
dence votes from the pro British community, which
opposed separation from the United Kingdom. Iler
newspapers� notably the Times of Malta� usually
give tacit support to the Nationalist Party.
The Christian Workers Part- was forned in N61
by Anthony Peiligrini, who had been Deputy Prime
Minister under Mintoff in 1955 -58, in protest against
Nlintoff's increasingly anticlerical pc?sition and
domineering methods. Pelligrini was rumored to have
received money from the church and from the British
to enable him to provide an alternative to Mintoff for
workers who do not want io clash with their church.
His chief program was to abolish the income tax, and
he apparently would have made up the loss of reven e
by taxing heqvily the foreign financed industry. The
Christian Workers' Party was disbanded early in 197!
Most ;;f its supporters probably voted for the M LP in
the 1971 election. because Mintoff resolved the party's
dispute \i the church hierarchy.
Herbert Ganado's Democratic Nationalist Party was
dissolved soon after the 1966 election. It had split front
the Nationalist Party in 1958, because it opposed
independence before Malta was economically viable.
Ganado may then have tried �with church backing
to oust Borg Olivier from NP leadership. In many ways
the program of the Democratic Nationalist Party was
similar to that of the NP, especially in opposing
socialism and supporting the church's privileged
position. Ganado� exiled from Malta during World
War 11 beeatise of his pro Italian sympathies
depended for support upon members of the upper
classes who iti!1 identified more with Italian than with
British and Maltese culture. Canado's efforts in 1966
to be taken hack into the Nationalist fold were
blocked by Borg Olivier s continued bitterness over his
19:58 d Most of Ganrdo's followers have
return(] to the NP.
Parties of the far left have made only brief and
desultory appearances. The major weaknesses of the
extreme left are its hack of dynamic leadership and
ideological disagreements among its leaders. At
present, only the inactive Communist Party of Malta
(CPM lays claim to the left of the political spectrum.
The CPM, which was founded in 1970 and is led by
Paul Agius, has fewer than 100 members.
5. Roman Catholic Church (C)
The traditional role of the Roman Catholic Church
in Maltese life underlies the willingness of so many
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voters to accept its political guidance. To mane
N laltese it is only natural and right that the church,
which has been their protector, spokesman, and
patron over the centuries, should still exieful its
interest to every phase of their lives. 'Their communal
life is still closely tied to their parish life, %%ith the
priest as the appointed headman. Mane N'laltr,e still
believe in their priest's power to damn there for the
%N av they vote, and mam others� minvially those
with social status to lose �are responsive to till- threat
of ostracism from church- centemd societ%. The
church's position as the islands' largest landos%ner also
gives it it special interest fn domestic police.
The conservative Maltese hierarchy, under the
leadership of the aging Archbishop Michael Conti
tb. 1:3 M.ay ISS3), has long had it contentious wlation-
ship with Mintoff. Church leaders began their active
and open opposition to hill) about 1960. n,tetnsibly
because he had fncrcased his ties with thl- Socialist
International and joined the� Afro -Asian People's
Solidarity Cmifl-rence. lit 1960 th(� church issued an
interdict against NI LP officers (lifted at till- time of
iodependence) and its iwwspape�rs lifted in junv
1966). An interdict against attending part meetings
has also been dropped. The church made it it mortal
sin to vote for the `ILP it! 1962, and clerical pressure
apparently persuaded mam voting professioualS and
inte�llee�tuals who had voted for the� party in 1953 to
:0,andon it in 1962. In 1966 tit(- hierarchy. in response
to Vatican urging, hinited itself to it pastoral letter
informing the faithful of their duty to vote against it
party which opposed the church's interests. Some
parish priests, however, are believed to have taken it
parishioners who world tint promisv thl-y were voting
against Mintoff.
Perhaps because the hierarch\ recognized that its
dispute with the MIT seas doing the church more
harm in the eyes of the� electorate than it inflicted oat
the part', open hostility gradvall ceased. A forms,)
reconciliation took place in April 1969, when church
leaders acquiesced its the principle of nrnninterferviiev
in politics. A pastoral letter issued it fl--.y days prior to
thu 1971 election confirmed this rule (if conduct. hilt
also urged the electorate
to vote for those c. ndidates who provide a guarantee
for good and honest leadership for the future inspired
by the Cathu'.ic teachings upon which the islands'
glorious history is based.
Archbishop Conti surely would have liked to go
further. The letter. however, provided sufficient
rationale for some conservative priests to exercise their
political influence in support of Nationalist
cand4lates.
The churc-h's political influence t on the wane, and
it is unlikely that it will ever recapture till- powerful
position it held in the past. The opening of Malta to
foreign economic interests and the heightened literacy
rate are making more and atom Maltese aware cf till-
modern world and able and eager to judge for
themselves on political issues. Moreover, the authority
of the parish priest in the rein, villages will be reduced
even further if the central government gives approyitl
for the establishment of it WSte�nt of local government.
Nevertheless, Malta remains strongly Catholic. and
the influence of the church will continue for the
foreseeable future to he the single most important
moral and cultural force in the daily lives of most
citizens.
6. Electoral laws and practices (U /OU)
All Maltt over 21 years of age may vote except
those who are ins -ine, currently under prison sentence
Of more than ,a year, or previously convicted of all
eleciion offense. Elections since World War II have
been generally fair, although the `1 IT claims that
clerical interfe -vii v has made them less than free.
Prior to till- 1971 election, vac�h of the 10 electoral
districts (nine in Malta and ora(- for Cozo and
KNiul)ur,a) elected five delegates to it 50- mentber
llotise o' lil-pmsl-ntatives. In 1970 the government
antendl-d the Constitution to inc�rl-asl- the number of
seats from ..30 to 53. Au extra seat was awarded to each
of till- five more populated districts (ranging from
apprexiinately 1,: 000 to 21,000 coivr:, per unit). while
the others remained st.!!ic. In those arias the number
of voters ranges front about 14.000 to 17.000 per
sow as it means to improve its reelection chances and
at the saute time till- easiest way to take population
increases into accowit without implementing the
electoral hrntndary changes recommended by all
official commission. The ante�ndntent. by establishing
an odd nurnhcr of representatives. minimizes the
chances of an evenly split pariiantent in case of it very
close election.
Voters in l-uch district elect delegates by it complex
and time- consuming system of proportiomil represen-
tation based on the single transferable vote. Each
voter marks candidates in order of preference. as far
down the ballot as lie wishes. The quota needed for
election is one -sixth plus one of till- total valid voles in
each district. Surplus votes which any candidate
receives over this quota become a pool of votes,
transferred in succeeding counts to the next choice
candidate on each ballot. If there are no extra votes to
be transferred, a surplus is created by eliminating the
candidate with the lowest number of votes and
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r:
t li
assigning his ballots to the next choice candidate
indicated n each. '['his process continues, count by
count, until the five candidates finaliv are elected.
A casual election, called for if a candidate is elected
from more than one district or if a member of the
House o` Representatives dies or resigns, does not
scan the voters go to the polls again. Instead the
surplus (in this case, total) votes of either a winning
rindidate who vacates his seat to represent another
district or who has vacated his seat through death or
resignation are transferred to the remaining candidates
by the procedure already described. In this case the
(quota for election is 50% of the number of votes
received by the original winning candidate. If no
candidate receives the necessary .30%, the vacancy_ is
filled by cooption by the new parliament.
7. Voting patterns and participation (U /OU)
The 1971 parliamentary election, which hrought
Malta its first post itidependence Labor government
TOTAL SEATS
SS
Progressive
Constitutional. 1 (4.8'J SI* SO*
Democratic Nationalist 14 (9%)
ChristianWorkers 4
12 28
16 (4n) (50.876)
Malta Labor Party (347,)
Nationalist Party I 26* I I 28 I I 27
of vote) 4 270) 47 i 48 .170)
1%2 1966 1971t
(Feb) (Mar) (June)
There are only 50 elected members. In 1962 the Natinnalist
Party selected the Speaker from outside parliament; in 1966
the party chose one of the elected members as Speaker.
In 1966, 5 other parties received 107. of the vote, but won
no seats.
A constitutional amendment in 1970 increased the number
of seats from SO to 55.
t In 1971, the Progressive Constitutional Party received
1.0% of the popular vote; others received 0.1 None
of these won seats.
FIGURE 6. Party representation in parliament (U /OU)
12
(Figure 6), was complicated by a number of factors
not present in IW. i, when the Nationalists retained
power by a comfortable margin. In addition to
elimination (f overt church opposition, the MLP
probable won a majority of the young voters -23`'i of
the eligible voters were under :30 �many of whom
re voting for the first time. Labor picked up the
bulk of the votes that in previous elections had gone to
splinter parties. The campaign by the Laborites was
better organized and more oriented toward the issues
than was the effort by the relatively colorless
Nationalists, who were very vulnerable to the charges
of bureaucratic stagnation.
The 1971 election, with a 92.91 participation by
the 181,800 eligible voters, was the heaviest turnout
since World War if. The Maltese are politically active.
and their participation in the electoral process has
shown a consistent upward swing over the last 25
years. The rising literacy rate and the fact that 2 !i
days including the weekend �arc allotted for voting
contribute to the high interest. Moreover, the absence
of local government on the main island means that
most Maltese may get only one chance every 5 years to
express an opinion on their elected officials.
D. National policies
1. Domestic policy (C)
Although still in preparation, the new development
flan is related to the governments stated goal of
completing the transition front the British supported
garrison economy to national self sufficiency. Most
other issues and policies relate to this goal and often
Ore judged primarily by how they affect it. The
administration aims to expand and develop industrial
production as rapidly as possible in order to increase
employment and exports, to expand the tourist
industry, and to reduce and even eliminate the
massive deficit of the government -run drydocks. To
achieve this, Mintoff has sought and will continue to
seek foreign assistance, and he will endeavor to
1r.mote private foreign investment. He will also try to
restrict wage levels and price increases and to boost
expenditures on priority infrastructure projects, such as
expansion of civil facilities at Lu(1a Airfield and
modernization of the Valletta port and drydock
complex (Figure 7).
To accomplish these ambitious goals, the Mintoff
government has called on all citizens, regardless of
station, to accept sacrifices in support of the national
interest. Mintoff is seeking nothing less than a
revolution in Maltese attitudes toward life and work.
His arousal of latent nationalism has thus far had a
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positive impact on instilling the people with a greater
sense of purpose and identity. On the negath side, un
austere fiscal policy a preoccupation with foreign
policy to the detriment if domestic affairs has cost the
Mintoff government considerable popular support.
The M LP campaign platform, together with Mintoffs
own public record, clearly forecast the style and
direction of the ne%v government, but the expectation
of change did little to less. �r the ferment and
controversy that arose when changes did in fact take
place.
Because of the delay in formulating the uew
development plan, government activity on the
domestic front has usually lacked direction and is
often ad hoc, with perhaps some inspiration drawn
from the M LP campaign platform. The government,
however, has begun to take measures to relieve what is
the highest level of unemployment since indepen-
dence. Mintoff inherited it slumping economy from
the NP administration, but the uncertainty created
by his controversy with the British drove employment
to politically nnacceptable levels. 'Thus far, the chief
response to this difficult problem has been to establish
a labor corps for some of the unemployed. The Pioneer
Corps formed in 1973 to replace the Emergency
Labor Corps �is supervised by the Malta Land Force.
The corps is organized along paramilitary lines.
Although members participate in some n tare
exercises, their nutin duty is to %%ork on various public
works projects. Authorized strength is about 3.700
officers and mei;.
Although the government is known to consider the
program it success, the corps is. at hest, a very lion �d
partial solution. In the short run Mintoff continues to
he faced with the task of creating it(-%% jobs at a rate
sufficient to absorb the current unenrplo%vd along
with additions to the labor force. Over the longer term,
the anticipated increase in government expenditures
on major infrastructure projects should help alleviate
this problem. In addition. changes in educational
police that lay greater stress on technical education
should provide more skilled manpower, which in turn
should help attract it(-%% industry to the islands.
The governinent -owned Malta I)rydocks Corpora-
tion continues to present a special problem. It
contributes alvmt one -fifth of the manufactnring
output, employs about of the labor force, and is an
important source of foreign exchange. It has been
operating in the reel since it was transferred to the
Maltese and commercialized over it dt'cade ago. The
Royal Navy. had run the dr docks (Figure Vii) as it
,crniwclfare operation, leaving successive Maltese
Governments to grapple with the problem of
rationalization �a nettle that both Nationalist and
Laborite politicians have been unable or unwilling to
grasp.
I:i
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FIGURE 7. Valletta and Grand Harbour (U/OU)

FIGURE 8. A tanker undergoes
repairs at the drydocks (U /OU)
Hard hit by it drop in shipping traffic when the Suez
Canal was closed in 1967. the drydocks were plagued
by costly strike and politically inspired indusW:tl
action until Mintoff became Prime Minist-r. Sit:ce
then. labor disputes have virtually disappeared, twd
the workers have been given equal represeneation with
the government in the management of the drydocks
and the new port cargo handling company.
Nonetheless, mane workers remain disgruntled,
because their newly enhanced position has not led to
the benefits they expected. Government efforts to
increase productivity have not been successful. In fact,
despite it record workload in 1972, losses are expected
to exceed USS3 million.
'fhe M LP legislative program has been innocuous
for the most part (e.g. decimalization of the currency)
and passed almost mechanically by the parliament.
Among the relatively few hills with it political cast
were an increase in social welfare benefits and
improvement of the grogram of free legal aid for the
poor. A hill reducing the voting age from 21 toy 18
years received a parliamentary majority, but it failed
to secure the necessary two thirds vote for passage of a
constitutional amendment.
'Che 18 -year -old vote and other issues have raised
questions about the constitutional amendment process
and even the validity of the Constitution itself. Many
NMI? leaders point out that the 1964 referendum
approving the new Constitution was passed only by a
slim margin and actually received approval from less
than 50% of the total electorate. Moreover, the
1-4
document was subsequently ratified by illy it simple
majority of the parliament. Thus, they argne� that the
section of the Constitution requiring a two- thirds
parliamentary vote for aniendinents is improper or at
least illogical. 'I'll(- government has cast a further
shadow over the Constitution by failing to reactivate
the Constitutional Court, whose five justices review
laws and executive acts. 'I'll(- Nationalist opposition.
regardless of %vhether or not it favors the constitutional
matter under consideration, has refused to join with
'lie government in voting on changes in the�
Constitution until Mintoff ai(rees to convene the
court.
Rumors that the Mintoff government will propose
major constitutional changes circulate regularly. In
addition to lowering the� voting ago. the administra-
tion is alleged to be planning it change in the system of
proportional representation� possibly to follow the
West Ger.uan model, which requires splinter parties to
win at least bpi of the vote before taking seats in
parliament. Such it law would limit the possibilih of
formation of it third party. with its clear threat to the
slender M 1,1 majority. Nationalist Party leaders have
declared that they would fight "illegal" changes and
expressed fear for the "democratic process." Although
it seems likely that Mintoff may attempt at Some point
to change the method of amending the Constitution.
NP fears do not appear justified. Mintoff's actions are
more correctly attributable to normal politicking
designed to detract from Nationalist accomplishnunts
rather than to maintain himself in power illegally.
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Apart from this, there appears to be a sufficient
number of Labon members of parliament who would
refuse to support exrraconstitutioual moves by
Mintoff.
2. Foreign policy (C)
a. General objectives
Foreign affairs have beer. Mintoff's forte since he
took office, and, as )romise(l in his election campaign,
he has given foreign policy a decidedly new direction.
Mintoff holds that foreign rights to militar�.
establishments in the islands should be terninated,
and that Malta should adopt a neutral 1x)sition in the
Mediterranean in order to trade freely %with and accept
aid from any source. To this end, he successfully
renegotiated atucc.ments with the British that not only
returned control of key aspects of policy to Malta but
almost tripled the amount of meney received under
the old base arrangements. In addition. Mintoff has
carried on extensive discussion: with a large number of
non Western nations in an effort to expand political
and economic contacts. The high point of these efforts
was Mintoff's weeklong visit to the People's Rep :h1ic
of China and its subsequent extension of a US$45
million interest -free loan.
Prime Minister Mintoff, like his predecessor, serves
a�, his own Minister of Commonwealth and Foreign
Affairs, and the conduct of foreign policy is carried on
essentially by him. The absence of organized pressure
groups gives Mintoff wide latitude in pursuing his
objectives. Only the M LP parliamentary group, which
has lobbied against a final break with the United
Kingdom, has successfully brought pressure on him.
Nevertheless, imponderable factors inhibit Mintoff
from making a precipitate move away from Malta's
historic European ties. One is the inherently
conservative nature of tile: people, which, in these
heavily Catholic islands, is reinforced by the
traditionalist beliefs of the hierarchy of the Maltese
church. Another is the attitude of the moderate wing
of the M LP, which is concerned over some of
Mintoff's foreign policy goals and his freewheeling
tactics. Moreover, the generally negative view of
Arabs held by most Maltese has a dampening effect on
Mintoff's efforts to promote a special relationship %%ith
the pro -Arab nationalist regime of Libyan President
Mu`ammar al- Qadhafi.
b. United Kingdom
Mintoff's attempts to demonstrate the independ-
ence of Malta are best exemplified by a new
relationship with the United Kingdom. The
sympathies of the previous Nationalist government lay
with Western Europe, and British influence was
understandably the strongest. lit 1964, at the time of
independence, Malta signed a 10 -year defense and
financial agreement with the British which granted
responsibility for the military security of the islands to
the United Kingdom and gave it veto power over third
country military use of Maltese harbors and airfields.
In return, Malta was to receive approximately U.`iN40
million in development aid; it had already received
about two- thirds of these funds at the time of
Mintoff's election in 1971.
Shortly after taking office, Mintoff began to press
often quite flamboyantly --for renegotiation �f the
agreements with the United Kingdom. Ile claimed he
wanted a greater return for use of the defene facilities
on the islands and for denial of these facilities to
Warsaw .'act nations. After a series of prolonged and
hitter negotiations, it ne�w Malta-U.K. accord was
signed in London on 26 March 1972 (Figure 9). The
agreement, backdated to September 1971, is sched-
uled to run for 7 i/, %cars. L return for an annual pay
unent of US&36.4 million �made up of contributions
from NATO nernoers, chiefly the United Kingdom,
the United States, ltaly. and West Gernnu.y�
Malta granted the British continued base rights. with
provision for the use� of U.K. installations by NATO
members. Italian and Dutch naval vessels visited
Valletta in 1972, and Mintoff has indicated that at
least some other NATO nations would also be
permitted access. Warsaw Pact states are denied
military use of Malta. and a confidential annex calls
for U.K. approval before Malta can grant long term
military use of the facilities to any other country. This
latter point is less than ai,tight and nay prove
troublesome. In addition to the� base rental payment,
Mintoff secured over USS40 million in bilateral aid
from various NA'T'O allies.
In Malta, the settlement was hailed by all but the
most partisan opposition, but th excitement following
the signature of the accord has .vaned with the passage
of time. More importantly, Mintoff in late 1972 and
earl` 197' brought into question the continued
validity of he agreement so recently signed. In an
effort to gain additional concessions �and perhaps to
distract the population from pressing economic
problems and again rally them around him in a
renewed hassle with the United Kingdom� M ill toff
threatened to abrogate the agreement unless the
British or NATO made up the losses suffered because
of the pound devaluation and unless the United
Kingdom settled other outstanding bilateral issues. A!,
of spring 1973, the crisis was not full. resolved, and
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the question of how long the agreement might last was
moot. Although Mintoff's foreign policy efforts haye
provided it stimulus to national pride, the average
citizen has received few concrete benefits from the
newly enhanced financial status. Indeed, ma n
Maltese have suffered material lossed under the M I.P
.Aministration. Moreover, charges that Mintoff's
arbitrary hargaining tactics have inflicted long term
damage on relations with the United Kingdont and
other NATO members h ;ve been increasing.
c. Western Europe
Mintoff would like to strengthen relations with
Western Europe, particularly with social democratic
governments. He is likely to judge relationships on the
basis of the economic benefits accruing to Malta.
The Maltese still have strong love -hate feelings for
Italy. There is still a considerable Italian influence,
mostly cultural, and it is reflected in Maltese interest
in Italian television, sports, and fashions. Rome is
currently popular with Mintoff, but his strong anti
Italian bias might reassert itself if Rome abandons its
forthcoming attitude. Aside from the financial
contribution toward the rental payment of the U.K.
base agreement, Italy has provided significant
economic and technical aid. Italy has also given
Malta important diplomatic support in the forums of
both NATO and the European Communities (EC).
16
\9ntoff feels an affi!dty for the Social Democratic
government of Chancellc.r Willy Brandt and, during
the first few months of Mintoff's administration,
relations were affable. Ilis brusque manner and
constant demands, however, offended Brandt, and
relations have cooled. *Nevertheless, West Cernrtny
continues to remain an important potential source of
hilateral aid. private investment, and tourism for
Malta. viintoff has considered Prance it sourer of
economic benefits for Malta. Continuing French
concern with Mediterranean affairs may present
Malta the opporhrnity for further gain.
d. United States
The Maltese are curious about the� L i:,ted States
and well disposed toward it. There are small but well
organized Maltese conunuttities in tit(, United
states especially in New fork, San Francisco, and
Detroit� contprised for the most part of Maltese who
have prospered in America. Unlike tit( immigrants to
Australia, wlto seldom return. Maltese Americans go
back on frequent trips or even periods of residence,
ing picture of opportunities in
and they paint a glow
the United States. Both political parties hope for
increased U.S. aid and investment.
Mintof f's views of the United states are ambiguous.
lie admires and respects American strength and
tech,iological progress. At tit( same time, he oplioses
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FIGURE 9. Prime Minister Mintoff and British Defense Secretary Lord Carrington sign
Malta -U.K. accord in London, 26 Mnr -h 1972 W/OU)

the U.S. military presence in the Mediternuueau,
ciains not to understand U.S. foreign policy, and has
sonic inherent dislike of the United States last
Point possibly results front a combination of factors:
imagined had treatment in Washington while on a
Leader Grant in 1965; failure to obtain nn official
invitation to come to Washington for high level talks
both while in opposition and in office; the attack on
his father by a drunken American sailor on shore leave
in Valletta; and his belief that former U.S.
Ambassadors to Malta have been pro-Nationalist.
The stationing of U.S. Navy repair ships in Malta
and the increase in Sixth Fleet visits beginning in 1965
were enthusiastically received by many Maltese and
may have been an import factor in the reelection of
the Nationalist gov ernment in 1966. U.S. naval visits
were suspended by Mintoff shortly after taking office.
Ile holds that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should not
have milit use of facilities on the islands, because it
might contribute to "super power' rivalry in the
Mediterranean.
e. Middle East and North Africa
Mintoff has long sought better relations with the
Arab nations. tie believes that Malta's cultural,
historical, and linguistic tics with the Middie East and
North Africa, his long time friendship with Israel, and
his own abilities make him the one person uniquely
capable of solving the Middle East dispute through
personal diplomacy. At present he is not actively
pursuing this ambitious goal. More pragmatically, he
views this region as fruitful ground for economic
activity that would redound to Malta's benefit:
exports would stand it better chance of successful
competition there than in the highly developed
markets of Western Europe. Even many pro- Western
Nationalist Party supporters agree that Malta should
establish closer economic relations with the Middle
East and North Africa.
Mintoff has paid close attention to relations with oil
rich Libya, which has responded with some bilateral
aid as well as timely diplomatic support during his
disputes with the British. In addition, commercial
opportunities in Libya for Maltese businessmen have
expanded under the MLP administration. Mintoff
shares Libyan President Qadhafi's view that the
Mediterranean should be a "lake of peace," devoid of
the Soviet and U.S. fleet. and that all the littoral
states should cooperate closely. Mintoff would be
interested in attending any nonaligned or regional
Mediterranean conferences, as he envisions Malta as
the link between the northern and southern
Mediterranean states. In ?act, he took the lead in
promoting a meeting in November 1972 in Valletta of
the foreign ministers of Malta, Italy, Libya, and
Tunisia to discuss subjects of mutual concern. The
four nations have held further talks on the working
level, and Mintoff may hope that these discussions
will be the nucleus for some eventual Mediterranean
grouping.
Malta still attempts to maintain good relations with
Israel despite Mintoff's pro -Arab leanings. The
Israelis, who raised their resident charge to
ambassador in October 1971, leave provided Malta
with limited technical and economic assistance, but
there are no current programs.
f. Communist nations
Mintoff, unlike his predecessor, has taken an active
interest in expanding diplomatic and economic
relations with Communist countries. Malta now has
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China, North Korea. Yugoslavia, Albania, and all
Warsaw Pact states. Apart from the People's Republic
of China. no missions from these countries have been
established. Even though Mintoff has concluded
cultural exchange and commercial agreements with it
number of than, no significant results have been
forthcoming. Only the U.S.S.R. has shown any interest
in setting up a resident mission. Mintoff has
maintained a cool but correct stance with the Soviets
and apparently has tied permission to open an
embassy to a substantial improvement in commercial
relations and an offer of economic aid. A compromise
could be effected by allowing Moscow to set up a
small resident trade mission. For the present the Soviet
presence in Malta is limited to the one man TASS
bureau set up in May 1972.
ilinioffs choice of Romania, the most independent
member of the Warsaw Pact, as the first Communist
country to visit after taking office suggests a special
affinity for it. Bucharest views positivel% Mintoff's
strong assertion of national sovereignty, seeing it as an
example fMr leachers of all small European countries.
Politics aside. assist ante for offshore oil development
appears
to be the major purpose behind his interest.
The Prime Ministers visit to Peking in April 1972
resulted in the establishment of the Embassy of the
People, Republic of China and an interest -free loan of
US$45 million (Figure 10). Sonic $:3 million will be
provided in hard currency, and the remainder has
been allocated for equipment and technical assistance.
Peking 'ias a resident mission of sonic 10 to 12
officials �large by Maltese standards �and its
presence could he dramatically increased by the
arrival of Chincse technicians to plan aid projects. The
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chief project, the planning and design stage of which
is expected to be coinpleted in early 1974, is the
construction of it drydock and quity for ships of up to
00,0(H) tons. Cr;nstruction of a chocolate factory and
a glass factory is also planned. Although relations
between Valletta aid Peking have been excellent so
far, it is very likely that the Chinest. may experience
vexing problems with Mintoff in carrying out the
assistance program.
By courting Mintoff, the Chinese apparently hope
to fowstull the development of Soviet influence in
Malta. They also sec it propaganda advantage in
hacking Mintoff's enclorsenient of the "lake of peace"
concept.
g. International organizations
Malta takes very seriously its role ill the United
Nations. Under the Borg Olivier adininistrrtion Malta
usually supported U.S. proposals and positions, but
the Mintoff government steers it generalk neutral
course. Firru direction front Vzillett i to the delegation
is often spott\ hecai e the small staff of the Foreign
Office is unable to draft timely instructions.
15
Maila's participation in other international bodies
is limited by the expense of representation. In addition
to membership in the United Nations and some of its
specialized agencies. usually as it beneficiary, Mcdta is
it ineniber of the international Monetary Fand, the
Council of Europe, and the Conlmnnweafth of
Nations (and some of its conunittees). Reports that the
\Mintoff goyernnient niay proclaim -lalt i it republic
have circulated from tinie to time. Such ,ui event
could not autoniatically remove Malta from the
Coni Ilion wealth. Indeed, Conutumwealth member-
ship is compatible with \lintoff's neutralist views and
provides it source for assistance. Nlalt:i subscribes to
the principles of the General Agreenient oil 'Tariffs and
Trade and applied in 1972 for nicnihcrship in the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop
nient. Presirnahly, the expense of full nicnihcrship has
kept Malta froth joining the Organization for
N.conomic Cooperation and Development.
Malta concluded au association agreenient with the
FAiropean Coniniunities in julN 1970 which will lead
to it full customs union in 10 years. 'I'll(- agreement,
worked it by the fornier Nationalist iidni ?nistration,
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FIGURE 1 Accompanied by Vice Premier Li Hsien -Mien, Prime Minister Mintoff
and his delegation visit the Peking No. 2 Cotton Mill, 1972 (C)

was essentially designed to give the NP same
preelection prestige rather than to secure significant
economic benefits for Malta. There appears to have
been little internal coordination and virtually none
with private business during the negotiations with the
EC Commission. Local Maltese and expatriate
businessmen have been unanimously critical of the
terms. For example, only it small portion of Malta's
important textile exports to EC countries qualifies for
immediate tariff cuts. Mintoff has sought revision of
this and other aspects of the agreement. The EC:
Commission has not prepared any formal proposals for
renegotiation of the accord and probably will not do
so until directed by its Council of Ministers. [n the
meantime, negotiations will focus on securing it tariff
arrangement for Malta in the U.K. market during the
transition period of British entry into the EC.
In July 1971 Mintoff terminated the arrank ^meats
covering NATO facilities and forces in Malta. Since
achieving independence in 1964, the relationship
between Malta and NA had never been clearly
defined. There had been loose consultative ties, and
two command units Headquarters, Allied Forces,
Mediterranean (HAFMED) and Naval Headquarters
for Southern Europe (NAVSOUTI-1) �had been
located on the islands at different periods of time.
The Nationalist government would have liked
membership in NATO. This was opposed by the
Italians, who wanted the Mediterranean headquarters
moved to Naples, and by the French, who objected to
giving to a former British colony concessions which
had been denied to Algeria. In 1965 Prime Minister
Borg Olivier, under attack from the MLP for giving
more to NATO than Malta was getting from it, tried
to win from the North Atlantic Council a defense
guarantee or at least a declaration of "interest in
insuring" Malta's security. This time the Norwegian
and Danish Governments, reluctant to hurt the
electoral chances of a fellow labor party, ioined the
opposition, and Borg Olivier had to settle fora N %TO
declaration of "interest in" Malta's security and
"willingness" (rather than commitment) to discuss
any threat to its sovereignty.
E. Threats to government stability (S)
'rhe only serious threat to the stability and
orderliness of Maltese political life is the danger of it
massive increase in unemployment. Mintoff's periodic
threats to terminate the base agreement �a move
which would mean not only the departure of large
numbers of British troops but also the loss of some
6,000 civilian jobs �could lead to precisely that
situation, unless alternative sources of immediate
ernplojinent could be found elsea. here. Mintoff is
keenly aware of this, and it is i t prame reason for his
reluctance to force the United Kingdom out and rely
on other countries, which might provide aid hilt not
jobs. Short of such an economic disaster, the Maltese
remain it law abiding, deeply religious people,
particularly immune to Communist arguments.
Furthermore, although Malta no longer has all
informal tic with NATO, it is still closely linked with
the Western alliance through the hale agreement by
which the UiiiMcl Kingdom and some of ilk I)artners
are pledged to provide an annual payment mild 1979.
Although there is some dissatisfaction because the
Prime Minister's n.-w policies and ori(-ntation have not
brought immediate tangible economic benefits, it is
highly unlikely that any organized groups would take
to the streets or resort to massive violence. Some in the
Malta Labor Party �and even Mintoff himself �were
sometimes cited in tile past as being capable of using
violence to attain power .while still in opposition, but
these same militants are unlikely to turn against
Mintoff and lose the fruits however small at
present �of being in power. Certain influential leaders
in the General Workers Union, it key base of support
for the Prime Minister. .would be it moderating
influence on more radical M LP members. The
opposition Nationalist Party is not only disincLned by
nature to resort to subversion or force but also is tor)
poorly organized to do seq.
The Soviet Union is interested in Malta's potential
as it starting point for activities in North Africa and the
Middle East. Soviet efforts, peaceful and low key thus
far, have nut with little success. Mintoff has adopted
it correct but cool stance toward Mosco%%, partly
because he genuinely wants to keep Malta neutral and
partly because the Soviets apparently haw(- not been
willing to offer any large amounts of hard cash. Soviet
attempts to obtain a resident diplomatic mission have
been fruitless. 'I'll(- Soviet news agency TASS has
recently opened an office in Malta, which will give
Moscow it small foothold. No Western journalists were
based on the islands as of early 1973. hich gives
"TASS an additional propaganda advantage. The
Nationalist Party press has already begun to attack the
activities of the 'rASS correspondent. claiming he has
frequently been seen with Paul Aguis, self- styled
leader of the Communist Party of Malta.
The ardent Roman Catholicism of most Maltese
.works against the growth of any significant
Communist sentiment. Th -re are fewer than 100
Communists in Malta, and even this small group is
Split between Maoists and 111IS5ian- oriented leftists
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who probably understand little about ideologicitl
consideration. No more than 30 of these would
approve of violent action, even in the unlikely event
the party should opt for this course of action. Although
Corntnunist leader Agius has nade several representa-
tions to the Soviet Antbassaaor to. Malta, Moscow
undoubtedly is aware that its o%vn interests can hest he
served by courting Ni lintoff Lind the M l.P.
The Communist.; use friendship societies with
various Communist countries is front groups and have
circulated sonte leaflets and have demonstrated
against the United States in connection with the
Vietrtant \var. The party has also distributed sonic
Russian propaganda on the islands, as have several
front organizations which have largely the same
membership as the Communist part. The volume of
Soviet literature conning to Malta front London and
from Soviet merchant ships apparently showed it
substantial increase in late 197 I.
Agius' prestige rose when he organized and led it
successful clentand by the farmers for increased milk
prices in 1971. Since they are perhaps the most
conservative and tradition -hound segment of Maltese
society and are traditional supporters of the
Nationalist Party, his success as it "peasant" organizer
arty yet hear some fruit. Agius ippvals also to workers,
intellectuals, and students to join the� party. and he
nuty try to enlist the tacit support of more liberal
young I'ricsts in order to counter clerical influence
against the Communists. Despite these efforts, the
Conuntmist Party of Malta retrains an insignificant
political force with only it minimal capability for
org,ttnized subversion or iolence.
F. Maintenance of internal security
1. Police (S)
Malta has it police force of approxinnttely 1,400
members, including abort 5.5 officers. The Malta
Police Department (MPD) is made up of headquar-
ters, eight regional districts, the 'Traffic Division, the
Immigration Section, and the Criminal Investigation
Division (CID) (Figure 1 i
Tile police force is substandard for Europe.
principally because of inadequate training, it dearth of
tnodern equipment, and internecine rivalries and
jealousies that prevent effective cooperation between
Prime Minister
I
Police Commissioner
Criminal
Investigation
Division
Headquarters
Immigration
Regional Traffic
and
Section*
Districts Division
Administrative
Division
Special Branch
Valletta"
Customs Branch
Central
Eastern
Southern
Water
Northern
Western
Gozo
*Although subordinate to the Deputy Police Commissioner,
the superintendent has a direct line to and frequently
works directly for the Police Commissioner.
*Superintendent of the Valletta Regional District is also Water Superintendent.
FIGURE 11. Organization of Malta Police Department (U /OU)
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I
regional districts and headquarters. Although police
administration is theoretically centralized, each
district superintendent exercises considerable
autonomy. In the latter half of 1972 the efficavy of the
MPD was further impaired by a quarrel between
Polic- Commissioner Alfred Bencini and Prime
Minister Mintoff over alleged interference by the
latter in police affairs, specifically his "arbitrary"
appointment, to the force. Bencini, who had been on
"sick leave" since mi Auklst 1972, resigned in early
1973. His brother, Edward Bencini, replaced him in
March 197:3. Tile new commissioner may well be more
subservient to `:iintoff. The dispute has had it
deleterious effect on morale and operations in the
M PD.
Radio equipment and traffic control vehicles have
been in particularly short supply, although the radio
capability improved in 1972, and further improv-
ements are expected. Becauso of the infrequency of
major crimes, such as murder, specialized criniv
laboratories with modern investigative and forensic
medical research facilities were never set up:
investigation of felonies is hindered by lack of such
facilities and specialized techniques. Investigation of
narcotics traffic also is restricted I;. inadequate
specialized training, Glues are quickly developed.
however, and the police have it %ery good record of
arrests and convictions.
In 1972 capabilities in contraband control were
somewhat enhanced. Malta received several
helicopters from the West Germans, who further
undertook to train personnel of the police department
and of the Malta Land force (M LF) in their ttse. The
MPD has assigned several men, including pilots, to
work with the M LF maritime troop, which operates
the helicopers and the new antismuggling patrol boats
received from the. United States and 'Vest Germany.
The department has applied for membership in
Interpol and has impro-A its relations with Italian
authorities in an effort to control smuggling more
effectively.
The Immigration Section of the MPD has
consistently operated with relative efficiency. Both its
Special Branch, which conducts surveillance, and its
Customs Branch are considered reasonably good. 'file
effectiveness of the Special Branch can be attributed
partly to the small size of Malta and the nature of its
society, which make it easy to obtain information and
to keep track of selected individuals.
Admission to the police force is by competitive
examination, and advancement through the rank of
superintendent is supposedly based on merit, with
examinations carried out by an impartial body. '['his
system is followed tile greater part of the tithe, but the
commissioner exert ices considerable� influence in
eliminating those whom he considers politically
unreliable. As was evident in late 1972, the Prime
Minister may also interfere in appointments and
profnotions. Proficiency it English is required for
admission to the force, itad the equivalent of a high
school education is generally deco ,nded. Most officers
with the rank of superintendent or higher have a
University degree, and many of them also have law
degrees.
Policing the tnusually law- abiding population is
relatively easy. Since the police in the countryside
Spend much of their time on public service duties
which elsewhere would be tile clot' of local
government funetiouaries, the population lends to
regard them primarily as helpers and advisers. The
police do not find it necessary normally to carry arms
or sticks, althoogh weapons are available, should they
become necessary. to the mid- 1960's some members of
the MPl) wer: trainee in riot control, including the
use of tear gas, by British military Unfits stationed in
Malta.
The police fore(- is loyal to the government and
quite reliable. A large proportion of the force belongs
to the Malta Labor Party. Although some in the
Nationalist Party have accused the force of anti
Nationalist bias, there haye been no known significant
displays of it.
2. Intelligence and security services (S)
Malta has no intelligence service, either civilian or
military, and internal security is the responsibility of
the regular police under the jurisdiction of a senior
inspector and superintendent attached to the Criminal
Investigation Division. The CID has about 24
members, i t fvw of whom received training from tlfe
British intelligence service 011-3) in London. In
general, the CID men are well trained. The head of
the division reports directly to the Police Commis-
sioner, who in turn reports directly to the Prime
Minister.
The ability of the police to conduct counterin tell i
gence operations is considered poor. There is no
known national intelligence system apart from the
Maltese diplomats in it few posts who collect
information and report to the Foreign Office. 'There
are no specialized intelligence officers or personnel
within the office to analyze and evaluate the input
from diplomats in missions abroad. Oil several
occasions the CID has asked British military
counterintelligence authorities to conduct inves-
tigations and operations for it.
21
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3. British forces (C)
The British forces on Malta do not normally take
part in internal peacekeeping, but their presence
almost certainly acts as a brake on antigovernment
violence. It is not known whether or to what degree
these forces would actually be used to back up the
police if a situation beyond local control developed.
The British High Commissioner has voiced his
reluctance to become involved in any matter that
might appear to be interference in the internal affairs
of Malta. Nevertheless, British forces could be
depended upon to act to insure the security of their
base areas.
Although under the Visiting Forces Act of 1966 the
British military maintains jurisdiction over its
personnel, a British servicemen accused of a crime off
a British base and in off -duty status is subject to local
22
law and jurisdiction. Since the Malta Lahor Party
came to power in 1971, local officials have acted on
their prerogatives and have been a little tougher than
heretofore with British servicemen who have broken a
Maltese law.
4. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities (S)
The need for countersubversive or counterinsur-
gency measures is limited. The ability of the police to
handle widespread rioting or terrorism, in the unlikely
event it should occur, is probably minimal, however.
The police have had some training in riot control and
could probably cope with small scale disturbances.
Should a general outbreak take place, the police
doubtless would coordinate their efforts with the
Malta Land Force and might request help from British
forces on the island.
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Chronology (u/ou)
1500 B.C.
Phoenicians begin colonization of Malta.
218 B.C.
870 A. D.
Malta is under control first of the Roman and then of
Byzantine Empires. Inhabitants converted to Christianity
in the first century A.D.
60 A.D.
Saint Paul shipwrecked on Malta.
870 -1090
Arabs rule Malta.
1090
Normans conquer Malta.
1530
After being ruled by various feudal monarchs, Malta is ceded
to the crusading Order of Knights of St. John.
1565
T!ie Knights successfully withstand the Great Siege by
Turkish forces, thus checking the Mediterranean conquests
of Sultan Suleiman I of the Ottoman Empire.
1798
Napoleon takes Malta and ousts the Knights.
1814
Malta emerges from the Napoleonic Wars as part of the
British Empire.
1921
British grant Malta it Constitution providing limited internal
self- government.
1930 -36
United Kingdom twice suspends and then revokes the
Constitution. The underlying issue is the degree of influence
of the Roman Catholic Church on the government.
1940 -43
Malta sustains serious destruction from bombing by the
Germans and Italians.
1947
September
United Kingdom restores internal self government to Malta
with a new Constitution.
1955
February
Malta Labor Party, led by Dom Mintoff and favoring
integration with the United Kingdom or alternatively,
self- determination, wins election.
1958
April
1llintoff government resigns; riots follow and Constitution
is suspended.
1961
United Kingdom approves new Constitution granting
self- government.
1962
ebruary
Nationalist Party, led by Georgio Borg Olivier and favoring
independence within the British Commonwealth, wins
election.
August
Prime Minister Borg Olivier formally requests Maltese
independence with membership in the Commonwealth.
1964
September
Malta becomes independent under it new Constitution.
Agreements for mutual defense and for financial ass�tance
are signed with United Kingdom.
1966
March
Nationalist Party wins reelection.
July
United Kingdom's proposals to accelerate withdrawal of
British forces from Malta cause bitter U.K.- A9alta political
dispute.
1971
April
Association Agreement, with the European Communities
comes into force.
June 16
Malta Labor Party wins election and Dom Mintoff begins
his second term as Prime Minister.
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smil r
1971
Jane 22
Sir Anthony Mamo, the first Maltese to hold the post,
appointed Governor General following Mintoff's specific
request.
August
Mintoff requests NATO to remove its naval headquarters
from the island.
1972
March
A new Malta -U.K. accord is reached, ending prolonged,
acrimonious negotiations.
April
Prime Minister Mintoff visits People's Republic of China.
Glossary Wou)
ABBREVIATION
CID
CPM
GWU
NiLF
NILP
MPD
N P
1973
Jsnuary
Prime Minister Mintoff threatens to abrogate the base
agreement unless Malta is comrensated for base rental losses
caused by the sterling float in June 1972.
NATO contributors to base rental payment except the
United Kingdom agree to give Malta special payments to
compensate for losses caused by the sterling float.
February
Prime Minister Mintoff agrees to accept first quarter base
rental payment from London.
April
Malta accepts NATO special payment, although it is dis-
satisfied with reduced amounts caused by the floating of
major currencies in February.
NAME
Criminal Investigation Div'cion
Communist Party of Malta
General Workers Union
Malta Land Force
Malta Labor Party
Malta Police Department.
Nationalist Party
24 NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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S1.-.(:11r1.