NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 48; MOROCCO; ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080031-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
48 /GS /AF
Morocco
March 1973
NATIONAL IN i ELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per-
ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence C;
and security organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
l
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
classified Factbook. The Inventor lists all NIS units b area name and
Y Y
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the 4
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate`
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
c
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNIi1G
This document contains information affecting the r:ationol defense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
5
E'
L
r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poles to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
J
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

`c
1.
This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was sub
stantially completed by November 1972.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

(/tlorocco
CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated Jan-
uary 1969, copies of which shotald be destroyer'.
A. Defense establishment 1
Summary of components and their strengths. Mis-
sion and capabilities of the armed forces. Military
ties with Arab and other states. Spanish troops
in Ceuta and Melilla.
1. Military history 2
Growth of forces after independence and the
1963 border war with Algeria; the attempted
coups of 1971 -72 and their aftermaths.
2. Command structure 3
Alterations in the chain of commar..d; role of
former Major General of the Royal Armed
Forces; establishment of National Defense
Administration.
SECRET No FOREIGN DmEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

Page
B. Joint activities 4
1. Military manpower 4
Breakdown by age group of ;he male popu-
lation and those pLysically fit; appraisal of
Moroccan soldier; recruitment, terms of serv-
ice, and role of reserves.
2. Strength trends
Strengths of components since 1956.
3. Training
Schools and foreign assistance.
4. Military budget
Statistics 1967 -71.
5. Logistics
Domestic production, foreign sources of sup-
ply, and support functions.
C Army
Mission and major weaknesses.
1. Organization
King's assumption of control.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
Brigades, battalions, troop concentration, and
equipment.
3. Training
Details on schools and training centers.
4. Logistics
Central control of network, transportation
companies, and storage facilities.
D Navy
Limited aims and capabilities.
1. Organization
Headquarters and naval staff sections; the
"marine corps" or naval security force.
Fig. 1 Military budgets (table)
Fig. 2 Infantry troops on parade photo)
Fig. 3 Light tanks and oar armored car
(photo)
5
5
6
6
6
7
7
7
9
9
9
Page
2. Strength, composition, and vi. nosition
10
Data on personnel, fleet, and t
3. Training
10
Academy in Casablanca; Fxznc h assistance
and attendance at U.S. schools.
4. Logistics
11
Requirement submissicn to General Staff;
French su-pervision of repair work.
E. Airforce
11
Assessment of capability for combat, air defense
and grounu support.
1. Organization
11
Subordinate sections, bases, and squadrons.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
11
Personnel and airorafi� inventory
3. Training
12
Program of Marrakech academy; foreign as-
sistance.
4. Logistics
13
Reliance on foreign sources, procurement re-
sponsibilities; repair and supply facilities.
F. Gendarraerie
13
Strength. capabilities, organization, and training.
G. Paramilitary fo:res
14
1. Mobilc Maghzen of the Auxiliary Forces
14
Strength, origin, control, and competence
level.
2. Mobile Intervention Companies
14
Strength, control, urban concentration, and
,2pabilities.
Glossary
15
FIGURES
Page Page
6 Fig. 4 Navf flagship (plwto) 10
7 Fig. 5 F -5 Freedom Fighter photo) 12
ii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

Armed forces
A. Defense establishment'
The Royal Armed Forces of Moroc.!o consist of the
Royal Moroccan Army (RMA), the Royal Moroccan
Navy (RMN), the Royal Moroccan Air Force
(RMAF), and the Royal Gendarmerie (RG). Total
personnel strength is about 57,000: 49,000 in the
army, 1,600 in the navy, 3, in the air force, an l
3,500 in the gendarmerie. They comprise the third
iargest force in North Africa, following those o,` Egypt
and Algeria. In addition to the regular military forces,
Morocco has two paramilitary -type organizations--
the Mobile Maghz,-n of the Auxiliary Forces, and the
Mobile Intervention Companies cf the Directorate
General of National Security �with a total personnel
strength of 8,500. These local security forces have
some potential for augmenting or supporting the
regular ground forces during hostilities or other
national emergenc They normally operate under the
jurisdiction of the Minister of Interior but could be
subordinated to military control if required. (S)
The n i lion of the armed forces is to defend the
nationai territory and to insure internal security.
Fulfillment of this mission devolves largely on the
army, as both the navy and air forces are small and
underdeveloped and have virtually no combat
capabilities. The armed forces suffer from a shortage
of experienced leaders, as well as equipment and
logistics deficiencies, and are not capable of defending
the nation against an attack by a major power.
Neighboring Algeria, whose military forces are
numerically superior to those of Morocco, has posed
tho principal threat, although relations between tho
two countries have improved greatly since the border
conflict in 1963. The Moroccan forces are probably
capable of containing, for a few days, an Algerian
invasion along the 975 -mile common border. The
capability of the Moroccans to initially defend their
territory would depend largely on the accuracy and
timeliness of intelligence indicating the enemy's
only fragmentary information is currently availab!e on the
changes being mane in the arrr:ed forces following the coup attempt
of August 1972 This chapter is, therefore, to be regarded as an
interim study.
military objectives and axis of attack, but the
Moroccan logistic system could not support large -Male
combat operations for an extended time. On the other
hand, a successful A:gerian drive to Morocco's major
population centers would be extremely difficult
because of the considerable distances involved,
Algerian logistical limitations, and Moroccan
capabilities to harrass and delay an advancing force.
(S)
The Moroccan armed forces have a good capability
in internal security. However, questions have been
raised concerning their reliability following two
attempts on the life of King Hassan organized and led
in 1971 -72 by military officrrs. Barring a simultaneous
outbreak of violent disorders throughout the country,
the paramilitary forces would not require the
assistance of the regular forces in restoring law and
order. (S)
The armed forces constitute the largest group of
disciplined and trained manpower in the country. In
addition to performing the usual defense and security
missions, theN participat&- is civic action work. The
army has constructed roads, bridges, dams, houses,
schools, d :snensaries, hospitals, and irrigation systems
and has done emergency relief and rescue work
following earthquakes and fiaods. The military forces
also train civilian personnel for various government
agencies; the army .onducts schools for administrators
for the Ministry of interior and for livestock managers
for the Ministry of Agricultury and Agrarian Reform.
Under the military conscription law enacted in 1966,
the army provides training in various civilian -type
occup::tions for about 5,000 to 7,500 young men
serving their 18 months of military service. All these
activities have been given good publicity, with the
result that the armed forces have enjoyed considerable
respect and prestige for their contribution to public
welfare and improvement of the nation. The extent to
which military involvement in the 1971 -72 coup
attempts will alter the armed forces' role in
government and public image cannot as yet be
ascertained. (U /OU)
Military relations between Morocco and other Arab
nations are not particularly close, and Morocco
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

traditionally has been reluctant to become involved in
eastern Arab affairs. Although it inember of the Aral)
League and of the Arab League Collective Security
Pact, Morocco deployed no troops to the Arab Israeli
conflict in 1567. Moroccan support to the Palestinian
fedayeen org.nizations has inclided token financial
contributions and small -scale military assistance in
both training and materiel. Relations with Algeria
have improved and the border situation has been quiet
since the two nations signed a friendship agreement in
1969 which denounced the use of force to settle
boundary disputes. S)
Morocco is a member of the Organization of
African Unity. It maintains close military tics with
Western European countries and the United States,
but it has also accepted military materiel and training
assistance from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia.
(U /OU)
In addition to the Moroccan forces, 18,000 Spanish
troops are disposed in Ceuta and Melilla, the plazas de
soberania, or Spanish "places of sovereignity," whi
are located on the Mediterranean coast. These forces
are organized into 12 regiments, of which there are six
(three infantry, one light cavalry, one artillery, one
engineer) in each of the two plazas. (S)
1. Military history (S)
The Royal Moroccan Army, including a small,
integral air arm, was established in May 1956, shortly
after France and Spain had relinquished authority
o Moroccan territory. The initial army complement
of 15,000 men consisted of Moroccan soldiers
transferred from the French Army of Morocco. In July
1956 the total strength of the army was raised tc
30,000 by the incorporatiriv of about 5,000 men from
elements of the irregular Army of Liberation, which
had carried on guerrilla warfare against the French
before Moroccan independence, and about 10,000
men from the northern zone who were transferred as a
group from the Spanish controlled Moroccan forces or
individually from the Spanish Army of Morocco.
In the French and Spanish forces up to 1956,
Moroccan soldiers were idered highly valuable
and reliable troops. M atz) combat experience in
the French Army in Furope during World War II and
subsequently in Indochina. Most of the former French
and Spanish Moroccan units also were experienced in
security -type operations.
In 1960, the Royal Moroccan Navy was established
as the naval section of the Royal Moroccan Army and
was assigned the mission of patrolling the coastline
and suppressing illegal entry and arms smuggling. On
1 February 1961, the army air element was
2
redesigna :L -d the Royal Moroccan. Air Force, and both
it and the navy became autonomous e ntities, coequal
with the army.
Moroccan for fought the Algerians during the
frontier crisis from October to December 1963. The
strength of the army ground element was increased to
.;7,000, and the number of ground units was nearly
doubled. In military engagements the Moroccan
forces proved themselves qualitatively superior to the
Algerian forces, though the operations revealed
inherent weaknesses in Moroccan command and staff
structure.
In late 19137, the King issued a series of royal decrees
which redefined and formalized the duties of the
Minister of National Defense, established the position
of Major General of the Royal Armed Forces, created
an Inspector General Corps, and transferred control of
the Roval Gendarmerie from the Minister of Interior
to the Minister of National Defense.
During the following several years, Morocco
became increasingly concerned over the great
quantities of Soviet military equipment acquired by
Algeria, and intensified its efforts to develop a military
capability to counter the Algerian threat. As a result of
plans drawn up by a high -level commission appointed
by the King, the army began reorganizing into
brigades, territorial commands were redefined, and
additional units were deployed to reinforce the border
area.
By mid -1971, considerable progress and improve-
ment had been achieved in army reorganization, and
negotiations were underway with the United States for
he acquisition of additional equipment for the army
and air force. Although there had been no evidence
that discontent, disloyalty, or strong opposition to the
King existed among any segment of the armed forces,
on 10 July 1971, a group of high ranking army officers
nearly succeeded in overt hrowi._g him. The King was
entertaining about 500 foreign dignitaries and
Moroccan officials at the Royal Palace at Skhirat and
narrowly escaped being killed %when some 1,500 cadets
from the noncommissioned officers school at
Ahermoumou, armed with rifles and submachine
guns, arrived and began firing wildly into the crowd.
The King was held prisoner for over 2 hours, during
which time the alleged leader of the coup, Brig. Gen.
Mohamed Medbouh (Director of the Royal Military
Household) attempted to negotiate with him, but the
King refused to step down. The turning point occurred
when Medbouh was killed, presumably by accident,
and the rebels were thrown into panic and confusion.
They shortly ran out of ammunition and, left
leaderless, switched their support to the King.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

1
4
Meanwhile, an accomplice of Medbouh, Lt. 04.
Mohamed Ababou. who was CAnninand of the
NCO school, led a group of soldiers to Rabat to seize
control of key government installations, including the
radio station, the Ministries of National Defense :end
Interior, and armed forces headquarters. Loyal troops
at Rabat, led by Maj. Gen. Bachir Bouhali (who as
Major General of the Royal Armed Forces headed the
General Staff), attacked the rebels and regained
control of armed forces headquarters. Both he and
Ababou were killed.
Following the King's release at Skhi:al,, he bestowed
unlimited powers on Maj. Gen. Mohamed Oufkir
(then Minister of Interior) and Maj. Gen. Driss Ben
Omar Minister of Posts, Telephone, arid Telegraph)
to restore order. Using both the security forces and the
army, Oufkir crushed the rebellion and order was
restored to near normal within 24 hours.
It is not entirely clear what motivated the coup
plotters, but indications point to dissatisfaction with
the personalized rule and luxurious life style of the
King, and the conviction that he tolerated blatant
corruption in high places. Presumably Medbouh and
his small group of conspirators became convinced that
the King would not take remedial action, and decided
to act on their own to bring about reform.
The Skhirat affair and its aftermath severely
weakened the military establishment. The top
command structure was virtually destroyed �nine of
Morocco's 16 general officers lost their lives, including
the Major General of the Armed Forces, the
Commander of the Air Force, the Director of the
Military Household, the King's Aide -de -Camp, and
one Military Region Commander, who were killed in
the fracas. Four other generals (the Director of Schools
and three Military Region Commanders) and six
lower ranking officers were executed the next day.
Less than a month later, Major General Oufkir was
appointed Minister of National Defense and, in an
unprecedented move, was concurrently named Major
General of the Royal Armed Forces. Unlike his
predecessors in the ministerial post, General Ot:fkir
was given broad policy and decisionmaking powers
and responsibility to restructure the entire defense
organization.
In early 1972, 1,083 officers, cadets and NCO's
implicated in the coup attempt were tried by a
military tribunal. One cadet was condemned to death
for killing the Commander of the Royal Gendarmerie,
three individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment,
70 received prison sentences ranging from I to 20 years
and the remainder were acquitted. Testimony
presented at the trials supported most of the
defendents' claims that they were misled arid duped
into thinking they were going to the palace to prote(t
the King, or that they were doing their military duty
by following orders.
On 16 August 1972 King Hassan survived a second
attempt on his life. Three F -5 jets of the air force
squadron based at Kenitra fired on arid damaged the
Boeing 727 that was bringing the King :come from
Paris After the King's plane landed, the rebel pilots
strafed both the airport arid the palace at Rabat. The
army then occupied the 3d Royal Air Base, Kenitra
and arrested a number of officers. The Deputy
Commander of the Air Force, Lt. Col. Mohamed
Amekrane, fled to Gibraltar but was refused asylum
arid returned to face Moroccan justice. It was
officially announced the following da., that the
attempted regicide: was part of a plot masterminded
by Major General Oufkir to seize control. He was said
to have committed suicide, but probably he wo+
summarily executed.
According to some sources, the conspirators
numbered only 14 or 15 officers. However, over 200
officers and men, mainly from the Kenitra base, are
under arrest. It was announced 7 November that 11
had been sentenced to death. Other officers, including
the Commandant of the Navv and the Commander of
the Air Farce, have been relieved of their posts,
probably because of past association with Major
General Oufkir.
The King's reaction to this attempted coup was to
tighten the reins of his power. He announced on 19
August that he was taking over direct control of the
armed forces, aril he abolished the positions of
Minister of National Defense and Major General of
the Royal Armed Forces. Publicly he derided and
castigated the armed forces. Some steps have been
taken to formalize a new defense administration, but
considerable time will be required to restore to the
military establishment its former effectiveness.
prestige, and morale. The loyalty of the armed forces,
once the princip,;i support of the monarchy, is
doubtful, and their disaffection is reportedly serious.
2. Command structure (S)
King Hassan II has always been Supreme
Commander of the Royal Armed Forces and Chief of
the General Staff. While Hassan was Crown Prince, he
was delegated responsibility for creating the armed
forces, and he has been intimately involved in their
management and development. He has consistently
maintained close relationships with trap -level officers,
and personally made all major decisions concerning
every aspect of national defense.
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

Before the attempted coup of 1972, the Minister of
National Defense was the King's principal military
adviser and assistant. Subject to the King's final
approval, the minister formulated defense plans and
policy and was responsible for the organization,
deployment, readiness, hadget, equipment, and
training of the armed forces. The chain of command
over the armed forces descended from the King
through the Minister of National Defense to the Major
General of the Royal Armed Forces. The position of
Major General, an adaption of the French etat -major
general, was created by royal decree in 1967.
After the first coup attempt in mid -1971, the entire
military establishment was extensively reorganized.
Apparently designed to reduce the possibility of any
future uprisings, the new organization centralized
control over the combat units at the highest command
level and decentralized the territorial structure. Three
principal General Staff entities command, opera-
tions, and logistics �were established. The command
element, which included the Deputy Major General,
the Inspector General, and the Director of General
Studies, controlled the army units, as well as the navy
and air force. The Directorate of General Studies �an
advisory and coordinating body 4 senior staff officers
responsible for drawing up overall defense plans
specifically relating to the organization and operation
of units, territorial commands, and communications
centers reviewed all plans and projects developed by
the other directorates, recommended approval or
disapproval, and passed them on to the Major General
for his studv and decision. Similarly, all orders and
directives of the Major General were channeled
through this directorate downward to the other staff
elements or to the force commanders for implementa-
tion.
As of late 1972, only sparse information is available
on the operational effects of the abolishment of the
posts of Minister of National Defense and Major
General of the Royal Armed Forces. King Hassan in
September 1972 established the National Defense
Administration, headed by a secretary general, to take
over the functions of the Central Administrative
Services of the former National Defense Ministry.
Responsibility for military justice was subsequently
transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Both these
measures appear to be ad hoc arrangements. No
further changes in the command structure have been
announced.
Presumably the operations element of the General
Staff continues to perform administrative functions.
primarily for the army, but also those common to the
other services. Presumably too the separate
directorates for personnel matters, intelligence and
military security, training, communications, and
transportation continw,- to exist. The logistics element
provides all service and support for the army and
coordinates the logistics requirements of the navy and
air force. Various directorate are responsible for fuels,
munitions and armaments supply; materiel repair;
engineering; welfare and social services; and medical
services.
B. Joint activities
1. Military manpower (C)
As of 1 January 1973, Morocco will have an
estimated 3,827,000 males between the ages of 13 and
49, of whom about 68%c will be fit for military service.
Their distribution by -year age groups is as follows:
The average number reaching military age (18)
annually in the period 1973 -77 is about 17,000.
Historically, most of the nation's military
manpower has been furnished by the Berbers.
Accustomed to a harsh physical environment, he
Berbers, with training, make excellent field solic;ers.
Moroccan Arabs, normally residents of more densely
populated areas, adapt more readily to administrative
tasks and are used principally as headquarters troops
or in the noncombatant technical arms. The
Moroccan soldier, Berber or Arab, is adaptable to
military training and possesses some degree of
mechanical and technical aptitude. However, there is
a general shortage of properly qualified instructors to
develop these aptitudes.
Because of the unemployment problem, most
Moroccans consider military service highly desirable
economically. Moreover, members of the armed
forces, particularly officers w`no are generally from the
upper or governing class, enjoy considerable respect
and social status. Armed farces participation in civic
action projects arid success: in combat during the 1963
border conflict with Algeria enhanced further the
prestige of a military career.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3
TOTAL
MAXIMUM
NUMBER
NUMBER FIT FOR
ACE
OF MALES
MI:.ITARY SERVICE
15 -19
841,000
W5,000
20-24
689,000
485,000
25 -29
651,000
455,000
30 -34
630,000
430,000
35 -39
466.000
300,E
4044
311,000
185,000
4549
239,000
130,000
Total, 1549
3,827,000
2,600,000
The average number reaching military age (18)
annually in the period 1973 -77 is about 17,000.
Historically, most of the nation's military
manpower has been furnished by the Berbers.
Accustomed to a harsh physical environment, he
Berbers, with training, make excellent field solic;ers.
Moroccan Arabs, normally residents of more densely
populated areas, adapt more readily to administrative
tasks and are used principally as headquarters troops
or in the noncombatant technical arms. The
Moroccan soldier, Berber or Arab, is adaptable to
military training and possesses some degree of
mechanical and technical aptitude. However, there is
a general shortage of properly qualified instructors to
develop these aptitudes.
Because of the unemployment problem, most
Moroccans consider military service highly desirable
economically. Moreover, members of the armed
forces, particularly officers w`no are generally from the
upper or governing class, enjoy considerable respect
and social status. Armed farces participation in civic
action projects arid success: in combat during the 1963
border conflict with Algeria enhanced further the
prestige of a military career.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

Officers are commissioned upon graduation from
the Royal Military Academy or from an acceptable
foreign academy. Exceptions to requirements for
commissions can be made for individuals who meet
certain conditions and stand:_rds of service and for
those who hold degrees from universities and
engineering schools. Officers commissioned on the
basis of academia; degrees are required to undergo 6
months of training at the Royal Military Academy
and must agree to serve for periods of from 5 to 8 years.
Enlisted volunteers serve 5 -year terms.
An 18 -month compulsory service program was
enacted in 1966. Although conscription provides short
term manpower to augment armed forces strength and
permits the commandeering of civilian medical and
technical specialists, it was designed primarily to mix
diverse elements of the population by putting them
into the ranks and to train there in tasks economically
useful to the nation. Between 5,000 and 7,500 men are
inducted annually in two increments. The conscrip-
tion law also specifies that on release from active duty
all draftees must go into reserve status, in
predetermined mobilization assignments, and remain
until they reach age 50. They are subject to recall for
up to 30 days of annual training with their designated
parent unit and for an indefinite period during
national emergencies.
Available for mobilization are some 25,000 reserves
(ex- conscripts) and an additional 20,000 to 25,000
former military personnel, all subject to recall. Initial
effectiveness of recalled personnel would be minimal
because of the inadequacy of reserve supplies of
equipment and armament and because of training,
logistic, and transportation problems. Mobilization
planning is probably based on the concept of short
duration border clashes with neighboring forces.
Mobilized personnel would likely be assigned initially
to augment existing units, as was done during the
hostilities with Algeria in 1963, and additional units
would be formed if the conflict continued or
intensified beyond M plus 30 days.
2. Strength trends (S)
When Morocco bef. independent in 1956, army
personnel strength (including an air arm of 35 men)
was about 15,000. Its strength rapidly increased and
by 1960 total military strength had reached 30,800,
including an increase in air personnel to 240 and a 60-
man naval component, established in 1960. From
mid -1963 to the end of that year because of the border
conflict with Algeria, the army expanded rapidly to a
peak strength of 57,000. Following cessation of
hostilities and inactivation of units in 1964, strength
diminished to 43,000 and then was further cut back to
35,000 by early 1965 for economic reasons. The navy
and air force, removed from army control in 1964,
have both increased gradually to their present
strengths. Since 1966, army strength has again
increased, primarily because of the instituting of
conscription. Strength of the armed forces for selected
years, including the gendarmerie since 1967, is shown
in the following tabulation:
Not pertinent.
*Air and naval components were part of the army.
3. Training (S)
The Royal Military Academy at Meknes'' is
primarily an army officer candidate school, but a few
graduates are commissioned each year in the Royal
Gendarmerie. Under a new program initiated in 1971,
all nave and air force officer candidates are required
to complete the first year course at the military
academy prior to attending their respective service
academies or foreign schools for 2 or 3 vears. Joint
army /air force training is conducted at Rabat -Sale air
base, where transport aircraft are used for army
paratroop jump instruction and for heavy equipment
drop training.
The army administers induction and basic training
centers for all conscripted personnel at El Hajeb, Sidi
Slimane, and Benguerir.
Morocco is heavily dependent on foreign assistance
for training, particularly of air force and navy officers
and technical specialists for all the services. France is
the principal source of such assistance, both in- country
and abroad. The annual quota of Moroccan students
accepted by French military schools is about 300, and
'For diacritics on place names, see the list of names at the end of
the chapter.
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3
AiR
l E\D-
DATE
ARMY
FORCE
NAVY
ARAIERIE
TOTAL
May 1956
15,000
15,000
Jan
1958
30,000
30,000
Jan
1960*
30,500
240
60
30,800
Jan
1961
30,550
300
150
31,000
Jan
1962*
32,500
700
400
33,600
Jan
1963*
32,500
1,900
500
34,900
Nov
1963*
57,000
2,200
500
39,700
Jan
1964
43,000
2,300
500
45,800
Jan
1965
35,000
2,300
700
38,000
Jan
1966
45,000
2,650
1,000
48,650
Jan
1967
49,100
2,600
1,100
52,800
Jar
1968
49,300
2,600
1,500
3,800
57,200
Jan
1969
50,500
3,000
1,600
3,800
58,900
Jan
1970
49,200
3,100
1,600
3,800
57,700
Jan
1971
49,200
3,100
1,600
3,500
57,400
Jan
1972
49,000
3,100
1,600
3,500
57,200
Not pertinent.
*Air and naval components were part of the army.
3. Training (S)
The Royal Military Academy at Meknes'' is
primarily an army officer candidate school, but a few
graduates are commissioned each year in the Royal
Gendarmerie. Under a new program initiated in 1971,
all nave and air force officer candidates are required
to complete the first year course at the military
academy prior to attending their respective service
academies or foreign schools for 2 or 3 vears. Joint
army /air force training is conducted at Rabat -Sale air
base, where transport aircraft are used for army
paratroop jump instruction and for heavy equipment
drop training.
The army administers induction and basic training
centers for all conscripted personnel at El Hajeb, Sidi
Slimane, and Benguerir.
Morocco is heavily dependent on foreign assistance
for training, particularly of air force and navy officers
and technical specialists for all the services. France is
the principal source of such assistance, both in- country
and abroad. The annual quota of Moroccan students
accepted by French military schools is about 300, and
'For diacritics on place names, see the list of names at the end of
the chapter.
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

some 200 French military advisers and instructors are
in Morocco. The United States provides pilot and crew
training for both jet and reciprocating engine aircraft;
Italy has accepted a few naval trainees anO provides
helicopter pilot and maintenance training; and an
Iranian army advisory team has been in Morocco since
1968.
Training assistance from Communist countries has
been on a very small scale. In the early 1960's a Soviet
air force mission of about 30 men accompanied the 14
MiG aircraft that Morocco received, but the last
members of this assistance mission departed Morocco
in the fall of 1965. A group of Czechoslovak military
technicians was in Morocco during 1967 -70 to advise
the army on armored equipment and training, and
about 60 Moroccans have received armored training
in Czechoslovakia.
4. Military budget (S)
Estimated budgets, prepared by the various
components of the defense establishment, are
consolidated into a single military budget (Figure 1)
that is incorporated into the total national budget.
The Minister of Finance presents the national budget
to the King for approval and subsequent promulgation
by royal decree. Breakdowns by individual service are
not published.
5. Logistics (S)
Morocco is capable of providing limited economic
support for its armed forces. Quartermaste- -type items,
parachutes, small arms, and ammunition are
produced domestically, and a few heavy trucks of
some military value and communications equipment
are assembled from imported components. However,
the country is heavily dependent on external sources
for equipping its military establishment. Total
military assistance received by Morocco for the period
1954 -71 is valued at over US$156 million. The Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia have provided infantry
weapons, artillery, armor, military vehicles, and
FIGURE 1. Military budgets (U /OU)
(Millions of US dollars
1967
Defense budget 107.6
Defense budget as a percent of total
national budget 16.9
Defense budget as a percent of GNP..... 4.
1968 1969 1970 1971
128.6 131.6 138.9 143.9
16.5 16.0 15.7 16.5
4.3 4.4 4.3 na
na Data not available.
*Converted at the exchange rate of 5.06 dirhams equal US81.
0
fighter, trainer, and helicopter aircraft �in all worth
the equivalent of $33 million. France has been a major
source for materiel and has provided infantry
weapons, artillery, military vehicles, naval ships, and
numerous aircraft, all valued at nearly $45 million.
The United States in its Military Assistance Program,
which commenced in 1960, has delivered materiel
valued at $62 million, mainly in the form of grant aid.
Smaller amounts of equipment have been received
from other countries, including Belgium, West
Germany Italy, and Israel, primarily on a purchase
basis.
Transactions and negotiations for the procurement
of military equipment from foreign sources are
handled at the government -to- government level. Such
materiel is received at various ports by civilian agents
under contract to the Moroccan Government for direct
delivery to the armed forces.
Logistic support functions for the entire military
establishment are centrally controlled, coordinated,
and administered at the General Staff level. Separate
directorates are responsible for supply, materiel repair,
engineering, communications, transportation, and
medical services. The logistics system is barely
adequate for normal peacetime requirements; it
suffers not only from shortage-. of equipment but also
from inadequate numbers of qualified maintenance
technicians ai,d trained supply personnel. Actual
combat operations could not be supported for more
than a few days at most.
C. Army (S)
The mission of the Royal Moroccan Army is to
defend the national territory and to assist in insuring
internal security. The array has a very limited
capability for defense against any large -scale attack by
a well- equipped adversary and could not defend the
border for more than a few days against invasion from
Algeria. It is capable of performing its secondary
mission of maintaining internal security in conjunc-
tion with the gendarmerie, and it has contributed
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

t:.
1
effectively to civic action and nation- building
programs. Its major weaknesses are in long -range
artillery and antitank weapons, maintenance,
technical and staff officer training, and logistics (a
problem compounded by the diverse origin of
equipment and arms, some of which are obsolete).
1. Organization
There is no army chief of staff as such. Before the
post of Major General of the Royal Armed Forces was
abolished in 1972, he headed the General Staff and
also directed and controlled the day -to -day operations
of the army. King Hassan has assumed these
functions.
Territorial commands were reorganized after the
coup attempt in July 1971. The former six military
regions were abolished and smaller military sectors
formed, probably designed to prevent individual
senior commanders from developing a significant
power base. Sector headquarters were established at
Agadir, Ouarzazate, Ksar es Souk, and Oujda, and
five others were to be established at Taza, Rabat,
Marrakech, Meknes or Fes, and Tan -Tan or
Goulimine to coincide with the projected establish-
ment of three principal and six secondary joint
territorial communications centers. However, since the
second attempted coup and the King's assumption of
direct control over all units and activities in August
1972, the sector commands have apparently been
abolished.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
The Royal Moroccan Army consists of 48,900 men;
about 1,600 are officers and 47,300 are enlisted,
including about 5,000 conscripts. As of mid -1972, the
army was organized into six brigades (two motorized
infantry, one mechanized infantry, one armored, one
light security, and one parachute), and nine separate
i4antry battalions (Figure 2), one heavy mortar
battalion, two combat engineer battalions, two horse
and two camel cavalry battalions, a 1,000 -man Royal
Guard battalion (ceremonial), plus transport and
signal battalions. Since August 1972 the infantry and
armored brigades have been disbanded and their
former organic elements redeployed throughout the
country. Troops are concentrated in and around the
principal urban centers of Rabat, Taza, Meknes, Ksar
es Souk, Marrakech, and Sidi Ifni.
3 For regularly updated information, see the Order of Battle
Summary, Foreign Ground Forces, and the Military Intelligence
Summary, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Materiel in the units is of varied origin. Armor is of
soviet, Czechoslovak, French (Figure 3), and U.S.
origin; artillery, mortars, and light infantry weapons,
some of which are obsolete, are of Soviet, Spapish,
French, and U.S. manufacture. Except for tank
transporters and retrievers which are of Czechoslovak
origin, motor transport equipment is predominantly
British, U.S., Frc and West German. Major
equipment deficiencies arc long -range artillery and
antiiank weapons. Current arms and equipment
holdings would be inadequate to support sizable
mobilization requirements. The level of maintenance
is generally low, and the condition of equipment
ranges from fair to poor because of a shortage of
qualified technicians, lack of spare parts, and supply
problems connected with the heterogeneous equip-
ment.
3. Training
One of the major weaknesses of the army is the
shortage of trained personnel, particularly staff officers
and technical specialists. Training facilities are
inadequate to rneet current requirements, and
Morocco relies heavily on foreign training assistance.
France is the primary provider �about 200 Moroccan
soldiers attend French schools each year, and about 80
French Army personnel serve in Morocco as army
advisers and instructors. Spain, Czechoslovakia, the
United Kingdom, Iran, West Germany, and the
United States have provided training assistance on a
much smaller scale.
The Royal Moroccan Army runs over a dozen
schools and training centers. The Royal Military
Academy at Meknes provides a 3 -year course for
officer candidates. Applicants for admission must be
7
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3
FIGURE 2. Infantry troops on parade in Rabat (C)

FIGURE 3. AMX -13 light tanks (left) and an armored car
of the Royal Moroccan Army (right) (C)
between 18 and 23 years of age, unmarried, and able
to pass examinations equivalent to U.S. college
en';rance examinations. French and Arabic languages
are required. Based on examination results, about 75
of the highest ranking applicants are selected each
year. The first year is devoted to general academic
study (language, matbematics and science), leadership
and discipline; the second year provides practical and
technical military instruction; and the last year of the
course is branch specialization training. Those
assigned to infantry remain at the academy, and those
assigned to other arms or services go to the appropriate
branch training centers or to foreign schools. The
academy is staffed by both military personnel (sonic
French) and civilians. All instruction is in the French
language. About 50 students are graduated and
commissioned second lieutenants annually, including
a few for service in the Royal Gendarmerie and the
Auxiliary Forces.
The General Staff School established at Kenitra in
1965, provides a 10 -month staff preparatory course for
junior officers, usually captains, and 2 -week refresher
courses in staff operations for majors and lieutenant
colonels. About 35 -40 students attend the 10 -month
session. The school is staffed by French and Moroccan
army officers, and the course is based on French staff
training modified for Moroccan requirements. All
instruction is in French.
The NCO Academy located at Ahermoumou, about
40 miles east of Meknes, graduates about 800 students
a year and could train junior officers in an emergency.
The first year of the 2 -year course is devoted to
military subjects (theory and techniques, weapons,
tactics, etc.) and general education, (language,
geography, history, mathematics). The second year
provides specialist courses in adrninistratio' avid field
duty. In addition to the regular student body, about
150 NCO's from army field units attend 6 -month
courses each year to improve their general military
background, and about 50 a year attend 2 -month
specialist courses. Instructors are French and
Moroccan officers and NCO's. Equipment and
training aids, especially for automotive, signal, and
weapons instruction, are inadequate.
The Recruit Training Center, located at El Hajeb,
about 20 miles southeast %f Meknes, provides 6 -month
courses for regular army recruits and 3 -month courses
for conscripts. Training is extremely basic, consisting
mainly of physical education, close order drill,
military regulations, and individual weapons
handling. Recruits receive their actual basic training
in the units to which they are assigned. The center can
accommodate 3,000 men. Additional conscript
training centers are located at Sidi Slimane and
Benguerir.
The Artillery School at Fes is attended by officers
and NCO's for 6 to 12 months of specialist training in
field artillery, air d-�'2nse artillery, or communications.
Facilities are adequate for 200 students. Training aids
include large sand tables for artillery instruction, a
smoke -puff range for training forward observers, and a
communications laboratory. Artillery firing ranges are
at El Hajeb. Instructors are French and Moroccan
officers; all instruction is in the French language, and
emphasis is on practical application. Some infantry
personnel also attend courses at the center, and in
1971, several officer students from Tunisia and
Senegal were enrolled.
The Paratroop Training Center, located at Rabat
Sale Air Base, has facilities for about 160 trainees.
Three weeks of fundamental instruction include six
practice jumps. Instructors are personnel from the
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

k
army's parachute brigade. Training aids are meager,
but results are fairly satisfactorv.
The Signal School, located at Rabat, can
accommodate 30 students. Because of the shortage of
qualified instructors, courses are conducted only
intermittently.
The Materiel School at Casablanca provides courses
in automotive mechanics and in armament repair.
The period of instruction varies, depending on the
aptitude of students, but averages about 6 months.
Size of classes for each course ranges from 15 to 30.
Instructors are both French and Moroccan.
The Lycee Militaire, a junior milita: school
located at Kenitra, is for sons and male relatives of
military personnel, whom it prepares for the Royal
Military Academy or for a foreign university. Students
are divided into six scholastic year levels, with
approximately 60 at each level.
The Engineering School at Tetouan trains officers
and NCO's in both general and field engineering. The
general course of two 11 -month academic years is for
NCO's selected from graduates of the NCO Academy.
Capacity of each class is about 70. Four general field
engineering classes are conducted each year fo newly
commissioned engineer officers and warrant officers
from engineer units and detachments. The school also
provides specialized courses of 4'/2 months duration in
surveying, masonry, plumbing, carpentry, sheet metal
and plaster work, and electricity. Training aids are
adequate and well maintained, but the school has no
heavy equipment and equipment operators are
trained in foreign countries. The faculty of 50 officers
and NCO's includes three French officers. The quality
and effectiveness of instruction are excellent, and the
Engineer Corps has demonstrated a high level of
proficiency in erection of Bailey bridging and in
construction of military housing projects.
The Royal Equestrian School at Temara provides
instruction in riding and in the training and care of
horses for the cavalry and armored corps. The Royal
Medical Academy, adjacent to the military hospital in
Rabat, is a 6 -year school for military doctors and
veterinarians. It is administered by French Army
physicians; instructors are both French and Moroccan
military personnel.
4. Logistics
The logistic support network is a highly centralized
organization, but its effectiveness is severely hampered
by shortages of both materiel and trained personnel.
Central control, direction, and coordination of the
principal logistic functions are performed by various
service and support directorates at the General Staff
level. Small support units, including quartermaster,
engineer, materiel repair, transport, signal and
medical detachments, perform logistic services in the
,field, but technical direction remains with the parent
directorate.
Army units have organic transportation companies,
but vehicles assigned to the individual units are not
adequate to move the entire unit and its equipment at
one time. To augment the transportation companies,
there is an additional transport group of four
companies deployed to geographic areas centered
around Agadir, Marrakech, Meknes, and Rabat.
Principal warehouses, supply depots, and storage
areas are located in the vicinity of Casablanca.
However, signal equipment is stored at a site near
Rabat; ammunition is stored at Kenitra, Fes, Meknes,
Taza, Ksar es Souk, Sidi Ifni, and Oued Zem; and
quartermaster depots are located at Sale end Kenitra.
Although Morocco produces sufficient diesel fuel for
domestic consumption, army units maintain no fuel
stores of their own except for day -to -day needs, and
training exercises are frequently curtailed because of
scarcity of fuel or ammunition. Basic load levels of
ammunition do not exist; units draw munitions and
supplies for normal use from small depots scattered
around the country, but in event of an emergency,
these items would have to be requisitioned from the
main depots. Some staple items of food may be
stocked, but unit commanders usually purchase food
from local contractors and the army would probably
"live off the land" during a combat situation.
Navy (S)
The Royal Moroccan Navy is a small, coast guard
type organization whose mission is to protect the
national coastline and territorial waters, prevent
illegal entry and smuggling by sea, and enforce
maritime and fishing regulations. It is capable of
conducting small -scale antismuggling patrols in
coastal waters but is ineffective as a naval combat
force. It is handicapped by a budget that precludes
expansion or development, an insufficient number of
patrol -type ships, and an acute shortage of trained
men. The navy is totally dependent on foreign
assistance (principally French) for ships and associated
equipment and for officer and technical training.
1. Organization
The Commandant of the Royal Moroccan Navy,
whose headquarters is at Casablanca, controls the
shore establishment and the operating force of 17
M
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

ships. The naval staff ec of four sections.
Personnel and Administration, Operations and
Intelligence, Communications, and Logistics. There is
no afloat organization; ship commanders are directly
suhordinate to the Commandant.
A 450 -man infantry company, known as the
"marine corps," is an integral component of the navy.
It is primarily a naval security force and has no
amphibious assault capability. Headquarters of the
company is at Ai Hocei.na.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
Personnel strength of the navy is 1,600, of whom
only 40 are officers. There are no reserve personnel and
the potential to augment present naval strength from
the merchant marine is minimal.
All ships are of foreign origin, primarily French, and
have been acquired since 1956. As of January 1972,
the fleet consisted of the following:
1
1
2
11
1
1
patrol escort (PF
large submarine chaser (PC)
motor gunboats (PCM
patrol boats (PB
utility landing craft (LCU
training patrol craft (YP
The patrol escort is the flagship of the navy (Figure
4). Originally a British "River" class launched
it was sold to France in 1964 and purchased by
Morocco in 1965. The submarine chaser, one of the
motor gunboats, and t'_e landing craft were ordered
from French vards and delivered since 1964; the other
gunboat was transferred from the French Navy in
1960. The patrol boats are small, lightly armed
4 For regularly updated information, see Military Intelligence
Summary and Automated Naval Cider of Battle (Ships), both
published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
f'
FIGURE 4. Royal Moroccan Navy Flagship
At Macuna WOU)
10
launches formerly operated by the Directorate of
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. They were taken over
by the navy in 1967 and are usually employed in
fishery protection duties. The training craft is a former
yacht, unarmed, acquired in 1967. All ships are
normally maintained in active operational status.
Their n;aterial condition ranges from fair to poor, and
their weapons systems are obsolescent.
The principal operating base is at Casablanca, and
a secondary operating base is located on the
Mediterranean coast at Al Hoceima. Plans exist for
establishing a third base at Agadir, but no funds have
been allocated. All ships are homeported at
Casablanca and normally operate in hom. waters
extending from the vicinity of Agadir on the Atlantic
coast to Al Hoceima. They make occasional visits to
France and have called at Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and
Dakar during annual training cruises.
3. Training
The navy is heavily dependent on foreign assistance
for officer and technic -al specialist training. Most
assistance has come from France, and a french naval
mission has been at the Casablanca Naval Base since
the Moroccan Navy was establish ^d in 1960. It
provides a year of shore and afloat training for enlisted
men prior to their being sent to specialist training in
France. Most Moroccan naval officers have attended
French schools, and the entire crews of the ships
Morocco has acquire -_1 from France, both new
construction and transfers. have been trained in
France. In addition, France provides instructors at the
Royal Naval Academy in Casablanca, which provides
2 -year courses for both navy and merchant marine
officer candidates. Prior to entering this academy,
naval officer candidates hk.ve completed the first year
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

G
course at the Royal Military Academy at Meknes.
Graduates of the naval academy are commissioned
ensigns and then undergo one year of practical
training on board a French Navy schoolship.
One Moroccan officer has attended the Naval
Command Course at the U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, R.I.; another attended the U.S. Marine
Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, Va.;
and one is a graduate of the Italian Naval Academy at
Leghorn. The Moroccan "marine corps' formerly
received basic squad -level 'tactical training at Kenitra
under the sponsorship of the U.S. Marine Corps but
now conducts its own training program at Al
Hoceima.
4. Logistics
The navy has not developed a logistic supply system
of its own but submits its requirements for equipment,
supplies, and POL to the appropriate directorate of
the General Staff. Storage, issue, and records inventory
of small stores and consumables are handled by the
naval staff.
Most Moroccan navy ships are of French origin.
France also provides logistic support, including
electronics, gunnery, navigation, and engineering
equipment. Minor hull and engine repairs are
performed at the Casablanca Naval Base under the
supervision of the French Naval Mission, and
commercial drydocking and repair facilities at
Casblanca are available for navy use. However, major
overh..uls and refitting are accomplished at shipyards
in France. Fuel and petroleum supplies are procured
from commercial sources in Casablanca.
E. Air force (S)
The mission of the Royal Moroccan Air Force is to
provide air defense of the nation, close air support for
ground fc:ce operations, airlift of troops and
equipment, and surveillance of national borders and
sealanes. The air defense capability is negligible; there
is no early warning /ground controlled intercept radar,
and fighter crews are not skilled in air defense tactics.
Close air support capability is limited to engagements
of short duration because of shortages of spare parts
and ammunition. The air force is capable of airlifting
troops and equipment to support ground operations,
but this capability would diminish after about 30 days
unless outside maintenance assistance and replace-
ment parts were received. The force has never
parti!ipath -d in counterinsurgency operations, but it is
capable of assisting other security forces by performing
liaison, reconnaissance, rescue, and evacuation
functions and by providing airlift.
Future development and capabilities depend
largely on the amount and timeliness of materiel and
training assistance from foreign sources. Air force
planning has been aimed at refining the tactical
effectiveness of fighters, improving the airlift
capab0it; 11, and acquiring armed h- ticopters and air
defense _far. Air force participation in the 1972 coup
attempt has lowered its effectiveness drastically, and
service morale is probably very poor.
1. Organization
The air force was removed from army jurisdiction
and established as a separate entity- in 1964, but it still
depends on the General Staff for sonic administrative
and logistic support. The Commander of the Air Force
heads a small headquarters staff comprised of four
sections� Operations, Personnel and Training,
Materiel and Supply, and Inspection. Directly
subordinate to him are the commanders of three
operational bases, one training base, and the
maintenance and repair depot. Aircraft are organized
into four squadrons: two fighter, one transport, and
one training. No reorganization has been announced
following the attempted coup in August 1972.
2. Strength, composition, and dispositions
The personnel strength in January 1972 of 3,100
(165 officers) included 130 pilots, 160 pilot trainees,
165 other aircrew, and the remainder, ground
personnel. Only 300 of the total were conscripts. There
were no reserve personnel.
As a result of the August 1972 coup attempt, over
200 airmen were arrested. They constituted the bulk of
the operational fighter force based at Kenitra, and the
number of aircrews there dropped from 21 to five. The
verdict of their trial was announced 7 November: 11
were sentenced to death, 32 received sentences ranging
from 3 to 20 years, and 177 were acquitted. Whether
or not those freed will return to active duty is
unknown.
'For regularly updated information, see Military Intelligence
Summary and Free World Air Order of Battle, both published by
the Defense Intelligence Agency. A hrief summary of Moroccan
airfields is given in this General Survey under Transportation and
Telecommunications.
11
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

:1irc�r I't in%entor\ `ot,iIs 182 (including 52 gist of
the follo\\ing tNpes:
Fighter
20 Northrop F -5 Freedom Fighter
Figure 5
Reconnaissance
2 Northrop RF -5 Freedom Fighter
ransport
11 Fairchild C -119G Packet
10 Douglas C -47 Skytrain
Trainer
30 Fouga Magister C:11 -170
8 Nlorane- Saulnier MS -733 (in storage)
52 North American T -6 Texan 16 in
storage
21 North American T -28
Utility
11 Broussard 11tH -1521
Helicopter
12 Agusta -Bell 205
3 Daman fill-43B Huskic
2 Sud Aviation Alouette II
The 1st Fightcr Squadron at the 3d 11o\ ill :fir Base,
Kenitra, is con)priscd of the U.S. -built F -5's, the
IIF -5's, and one :113 -205 hchc�opter. The 2d Fighter
Squadron at the 2d Ho\al :fir Base, Meknes, consists of
T -28 and CM -170 'Trainers, equipped with light
n)achineguns and rockets. 'The 1st Transport Squadron
at the 1st fioxal :fir Base, Rabat -Sale, consists of
C -47's and C- 119G's. The T -6 and CM -170 trainers
make up the Training Squadron at the Ho\al :fir
Training Base, Marrakech. :\s of januar\ 1972, 138
aircraft were operationall\ assigned.
:3. Training
The air force is handicapped b\ the lack of an
adequate nrtntber of qualified personnel, particul;.trl\
pilots and tecftnical specialists. fe\% air force offic�cn
are Sraduatcs of the I3o\al Militan Ac�adctn\, and
beginning in 1971 all air force officer candidates are
required to complete the first scar academic course at
this school prior to altcncling the 13o\al :fir :1c�acletn\
or a foreign school for 2 or 3 \cars. Basic- ln!irting for all
coux�ript and culisted personnel is pro\idc�d b\ the
arnt\. Spcc�ialist instruction is acquired eilhcr on -lhc-
job or in it foreign c�ountn and considerable reliance is
placed on utilizing as instructors those pers,ourc�1 \%ho
ha\c been trained abroad.
F rance and the foiled Stale are the principal
sources of Training assistance. F rench .fir Force schools
accept about 50 Moroccan trainees annuall\. and
appro\imalcl\ 100 French :fir Force perumncl x�n c its
advisers and instructors at Moroccan air inslaCations.
Over :ill(\ Moroccan pilots and ground c�re\\ personnel
ha\c reccked training in the 1'niled State: the V.S.
:kir Force maintains it ,mall training mission at
Kenitra ill c�onnectictn \ith the F -5's and pro\idcs
1�:119lish language courses at 13abal -Sale and Mar-
rakech. :1n Italian :fir Force te:tnt at Rabat -Sale
it irbas( pro\i(I es pilot and n tit iutc tit ice instruction for
Hie MI -205 helicopters purchased from Ital\ in 1968.
Other training ill maintc�ttanc�e is supplied b\ foreign
firms whic�ft arc contracted to pro\idc on the -job
instruction both in the foreign c�omitr\ and in
Morocco.
The Koval ;fir :kc�adem\ at `larrakech air base is
primarily a pilot training facilit\ for both officer
FIGURE 5. Northrop F -5 Freedom
Fighters (U /OU)
12
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

r
cadets and enlisted personnel, but it also provides
courses in aerial photography and in repair of engines,
airframes, electrical and hydraulic systems, and radio
equipment. All flight instruction is provided by
French Air Force officers; ground instruction is given
by Moroccans, mostly NCO's, under French guidance
and supervision. The aviation cadet program is of 3
years duration, the first of which is spent at the Royal
Military Academy at Meknes. The second and third
years at Marrakech include further military
instruction, flight ground school, ski and mountain
familiarization, and elementary and intermediate
phases of actual flight training. The elementary phase
consists of 98 hours of contact flying, aerobatics,
instru: :ants, day navigation, and formation in the T -6
Texan. The intermediate phase is 66 hours of day and
night instruction in the T -6 trainer for propeller
aircraft pilots and in the Fouga Magister CM -170 for
jet pilots. Upon completion of the intermediate phase,
cadets are commissioned second lieutenant in the
RMAF. The 2 -year pilot training course fcr NCO's is
similar to that for cadets, except that the NCO's do
not attend the Meknes academy and do not receive
leadership training as part of their military instruction.
The average class consists of about 15 students (five
cadets, 10 NCO's) in each of the two phases of the
pilot course, but the attrition rate is nearly �10 and
the pilot output averages about 10 a year. The
maintenance training courses last for 6 months. Each
class of about 70 NCO's is divided into smaller groups
according to specialty. The school has 25 well
maintained classrooms and another 25 training areas
on the base. Training aids are adequate and include a
well- equipped language laboratory, which was a gift
from the Iranian Government. The quality of the
entire training program is fair, but students attain
little more than basic flight and technical skills and
require additional specialized training in foreign
schools.
Lack of tactical training reduces the readiness status
and operational capabilities of the force. No training is
received in weather flying for either ordnance delivery
or instrument proficiency. joint exercises with ground
forces are rarely conducted, although joint training
does include paradropping of equipment and troops.
About 2,000 paratroopers have been qualified, and
drops of equipment up to 2,400 pounds have been
accomplished.
4. Logistics
Morocco is completer depende,,, on foreign
sources, primarily France and the United States, for
aircraft, electronic and communication equipment,
armament and ammunition, and all other associated
support items. Aircraft procurement was handled at
the Ministry of National Defense level before that
ministry was .abolished. Procurement of spare parts
and material is handled by the materiel and supply
section at air force headquarters.
With outside ass +stance, the air force has developed
a fairly good maintenance capability for prop aircraft
and helicopters. jets are flown outside the country for
periodic inspection, maintenance, and repair. In-
commission rates range from 80% for fighters and
transports to 60% for trainer and utility types.
The air force operates the Atelier Magasin General
(AMG), formerly the French Aeronautical Industrial
Workshop, located at Casablanca /An fa Airfiold. This
facility is capable of performing major repairs and
overhauls of propeller- driven aircraft and related
aircraft systems. Maintenance specialists at the AMG
appear well qualified. Many have received foreign,
training as part of the three -phase program whereby
foreign firms are contracted to provide on- the -iob
training, both in the foreign country and in Morocco.
Sud Aviation of Fran -e provided C -47 maintenance
instruction, anild the Belgian firm Sabena is currently
instructing RMAF enlisted personnel in the
maintenance of C -119 transports.
The AMG is also the major supply depot for the air
force. It maintains various levels of stock for 28,000
different line items. Both aircraft and vehicle parts are
stocked. Two systems of inventory control are used
since some spare parts are of French and others are of
U.S. origin. Inventory control for French parts is
patterned after that of the French Air Force, and
USAF practices are used for U.S. produced parts.
Weekly RMAF C -119 flights are scheduled from the
AMG base for delivery of requested parts to the other
bases. The application of computer techniques for
programming and control of logistics functions is due
to commence in the near future. A small armament
storage facility and underground storage for 26,000
gallons of fuel are also located at the AMG.
F. Gendarmerie (S)
The Royal Gendarmerie, controlled in the past by
the Major General of the Royal Armed Forces and
coequal to the other military services, is a well- trained
and reliable force of 3,500 men. All personnel are
volunteers; over one -half of its 150 officers are
graduates of the Royal Military Academy, while a
good many others have attended French and Belgian
gendarmerie schools.
Under normal conditions, the gendarmerie is
capable of performing its mission or maintaining law
and order in rural area, controlling highway traffic,
13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

and performing military police functions for the army.
Units equipped with jeeps constitute an elite
counterinsurgency trained force. In the event of
prolonged widespread disorders, the gendarmerie
would serve as an initial shock force and be supported
by the army and other security forces. The
gendermere, in turn, can effectively augment the
army in ^ombat operations. as it did during the border
conflict wish Algeria in 1963.
The gendarmerie is organized into one mobile unit,
composed of one armored car squadron and three
motorcycle squadrons, stationed at Rabat, plus 19
companies assigned to eight regional commands.
Headquarters of these commands are at Agadir,
Casablanca, Fes, Kenitra, Marrakech, Meknes,
Oujda, and Tangier. Each company has three or four
brigades of 10 to 40 men each, depending on the
requirements of the area. Brigades are of four types:
motorcycle, jeep mounted, dismounted for posts in
small rural villages, and special for criminal
investigation and intelligence collection. Arms and
equipment include pistols, rifles, machineguns,
grenades, motorcycles, jeeps, and armored cars.
Equipment is maintained in good condition. and is
adequate for normal requirements.
The gendarmerie training and qualification center,
originally established at Fes in 1957 and moved to
Meknes in 1965, was relocated at Marrakech in 1967.
Admission requirements, both physical and educa-
tional, are higher than in the other military services.
Selection of applicants is based on competitive
examinations which require wr .tten and oral
proficiency in Arabic and French, in addition to
education equivalent to the second year of high
school. About 600 students are enrolled in the 2 -year
course. The first year is general military training,
conducted by Moroccan personnel; the second is
specialized gendarmerie training for assignment to the
various detachments, taught by Moroccan and French
gendarmerie officers. There are also shorter courses for
refresher and postgraduate instruction.
G. Paramilitary forces (S)
1. Mobile Maghzen of the Auxiliary Forces
The Auxiliary Forces, of which the Mobile
Maghzen is a part, have existed as a paramilitary force
in Morocco for centuries. (The word maghzen, in fact,
is derived from the term used historically to refer to
government controlled land.) They were subordinated
to the then Ministry of Interior when Morocco
became independent in 1956. During times of crisis
when the army was engaged in internal or external
security operations, the Minister of National Defense
assumed operational control of the Auxiliary Forces.
14
At such times, the military zone commanders had
direct authority over Maghzen units in their zones,
but the Interior Ministry retained administrative
control.
The Auxiliary Forces consist of three elements: the
Administrative Maghzen (11,600 men), the Municipal
Guard (3,000 men), and the Mobile Maghzen (6,000
men). The first two groups are auxiliary police and
perform such missions as keeping order in public
assemblv areas and rural market places, escorting
officials, and providing local administrative support.
The Mobile Maghzen units have more the character
of a military force, though a poor one; principal
missions are rapid intervention to quell disorders that
exceed the capability of the police, and patrolling and
screening key border area. The Mobile Maghzen is
organized into 40 company -size units, fully mobile
and armed with rifles and automatic weapons.
Strength of these units is about officers and 140
enlisted men each. Eight units are kep at Casablanca,
grouped administratively under a singe command, as
a reserve force. The other 32 units are disposed
throughout the country.
Except for the companies assigned to Casablanca,
which are considered the elite of the entire force, the
competence of the Mobile Maghzen is generally low.
Personnel are drawn from the rural areas and are
educated only poorly, if at all. They are adequate for
patrolling the border and for putting do -.m small local
disturbances, but for operations beyond this, support
from another security force would be required.
2. Mobile Intervention Companies
The Mobile Intervention Companies, the mebile
reserve of Directorate General of National Security
(DGSN), is a paramilitary force under the control of
the Ministry of Interior. The missions of the
companies are ma.ntenance of public order, provision
of security at public functions, and police duty during
major disasters. With a total personnel strength of
2,500, they are organized into 10 companies of about
200 men each, plus six motorcycle brigades of about
30 men each attached to selected companies. They are
based in the larger urban centers, mainly Rabat,
Casablanca, Marrakech, and Fes.
Weapons include rifles, automatic pistols, and
machineguns, all of which are adequate and in good
condition. Transport and communications equipment
are also adequate.
Under normal conditions, the Mobile Intervention
Companies are fully capable of performing their
missions, within the limits of company strength.
Under existing Moroccan internal security procedures,
the companies would be called on to suppress
disorders in urban areas but not rural areas.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

I Glossary (U/OU)
ABBREVIATION
FRENCH
ENcLIsx
AMC
Atelir. ifagasin General
Aeronautical Industrial Workshop
DCSN
T:rection Generale de Surete Nationale Directorate General of National Se-
curity
FAR
Forces Armees Royales
Royal Armed Forces
RG
Royal Gendarmerie
RMA
Royal Moroccan. Army
RMAF
Royal Moroccan Air Force
RMN
Royal Moroccan Navy
Places and Features Referred to iri !l+Is Chapter (U /OU)
COOanI.NATES
o o 1E.
Adyliget (see of Budapest)
47 33 is 56
3aja
46 11 18 58
Balaton (lake)
46 50 17 45
Balatonfiired
46 57 17 53
Budapest
47 30 19 05
Cegled
47 10 19 48
s
Danube (st ream)
45 20 29 40
J 9 I
Debrecen
47 32 21 :3S
Dunaf oldv ir
46 48 1S 56
Dunakeszi
47 38 19 08
Esztergom
47 48 18 45
Gyiir
47 41 17 38
Keeskemet
46 54 19 42
Kiskunhalas
46 26 19 30
:l lindszent
46 32 20 12
ilfiskole
48 06 20 47
M or
47 23 IS 12
N y iregyhiza
47 57 21 43
Pipa
47 20 17 28
Plovdiv, Bulgaria
42 09 24 45
i
Retsig
47 56 19 08
Szekesfehcrvir
47 12 IS 25
Szentendre
47 40 19 05
s
Szentes
46 39 20 16
r
Szolnok
47 11 20 12
Taszir
46 22 17 55
Tisza (stream)
47 30 20 40
t ijpest
47 34 19 05
Vic
47 47 19 08
Veszprem
47 06 17 55
e
Voronezh, U.S.S.R
51 :38 39 12
SELECTED MILITARY AIRFIELDS
Budapest /Tokol 47 21 18 59
t
Debrecen 47 29 21 37
Kiskunlachaza 47 11 19 05
K un madaras 47 23 20 47
Papa 47 22 17 30
Sarmell ek 46 41 17 10
e
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
5 ec:it t-r
15
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080031 -3