NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 48; MOROCCO; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080027-8
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
48 /GS /GP
Morocco
March 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSE.EfE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

t
t
6
L
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS l
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per-
ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provida the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
and security organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
classified Facthook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or ihrough
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
r This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by a.i unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Research was
substantially completed by November 1972.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

U/il oroccc
CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated
January 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.
A. Introduction 1
Historical aspects; pop ilar veneration of mon-
archy; disaffection wit), King Hassan's style of
rule; government poli.;ies.
B. Structure and functioning of the government 2
1. Constitutional provisions 3
Primacy of King's power; parliamentary proc-
ess; succession to the throne; popular rights.
2. National government 5
Cabinet; importance of Ministry of Interior;
Royal Cabinet; role of parliament.
3. Regional and local government 6
Organization and operation of provinces; ap-
pointment of officials; popular representation;
assemblies and councils.
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

Page
4. Judiciary 7
Need to reorganize maze of overlapping sys-
tems; reforms implemented and those pend-
ing; special courts.
C. Politimi dynamics
8
Causes for declining popularity and increasing
isolation of Hassan.
1. The King
8
Autocratic rule; methods of reducing power
and influence of military and civilian leaders;
popular disillusionment with royal favoritism
and government corruption.
2. Civilian and military elements
9
Royal patronage and manipulation of elite
groups; coup attempts in 1971 and 1972 by
disgruntled officers; continuing tension be-
tween military and police.
3. Political parties
10
Hassan's success in weakening parties; lack of
grassroots support; establishment and dissolu-
tion of opposition National Front; strengths,
policies, and leaders of:
a. Istiqlal
10
b. National Union of Popular Forces
11
c. Popular Movement
12
d. Party of Liberation and Socialism
12
4. Special interest groups
13
Effectiveness of labor, youth, and student
organizations.
5. Elections
14
Procedural laws the King's prerogative; popu-
lar cynicism toward electoral process.
D. National policies 14
1. Domestic goals 14
Lipservice to social reforms and economic
expansion; attitude toward education, over-
population, redistribution of farmland; 1\io-
roccanization" of enterprises and services;
modernization of military forces.
2. Foreign relations 16
Professed nonalignment but actual pro -West-
ernism; attempts to normalize ties with neigh-
boring nations; stand on Palestine question.
ii
Page
a. The West 17
(1) France 17
Colonial ties; strains caused by Ben
Barka affair it 1965; improvement
in relations since end of De Gaulle
er.
(2) United States
Long history of cordial relations;
U economic and military aid.
(3) Other Western countries
Ties with Spain and West Germany.
b. Communist countries
Diplomatic relations with U.S.S.R., East
European nations, China, and Mongolia;
Soviet and East European aid projects.
c. The Arab world
Hassan's attempts to build image as pan
Islamic leader.
d. The Maghreb and Africa
Improved relations with Algeria; calls
for Maghrcb unity; limited ties with black
Africa.
E. Threats to government stability
1. Discontent and dissidence
Lack o:. �ity and cohesion among dissatisfied
elements: stidents, intellectuals, urban slum
dwellers, and workers; longstanding tensions
between Berber minority and Arabized ma-
jority; possibility of another military coup
attempt.
2. Subversion
Sporadic efforts of small number of leftist
students and Communists; ineffectiveness of
Moroccan dissidents in exile.
F. Maintenance of internal security
Organization, strength, competence, and leader-
ship of:
1. Poice
a. General Directorate of National
Security
b. Auxiliary Forces
c. Royal Gendarm Brie
2. Intelligence
G. Selected bibliography
17
13
18 r
19
19
21
21
23
24
25
25
26
26
27
28
Chronology 29
Glossary... 30
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1 King Hassan II photo) 2
Fig. 2 Main elements of the Moroccan Gov-
ernment chart) 4
Fig. 3 Irredentism map) 11
Fig. 4 Hassan with King Husayn of Jordan
(photo) 19
Page
Fig. 5 Hassan with Algerian Prime Min-
ister Boumediene photo) 20
Fig. 6 Police and security organizations
i chart) 24
Fig. 7 Mobile Maghzen photo) 26
iii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

Government and Politics
A. Introduction (C)
Morocco regained its independence in 1956 after 44
years of control by the protectorate powers, France
and Spain. The monarchy, which has its roots in
nearly a millennium of Moroccan history, figured
prominently in the struggle for independence and now
dominates the political scene. Although Morocco is
theoretically a constitutional monarchy with a modern
administrative apparatus, the King still rules in the
style of a traditional potentate, and politics remain
based largely on traditional loyalties and alliances and
on tribal ties.
For centuries Islam has been the most important
influence on Moroccan political life. The westernmost
outpost of Islam �which swept across North Africa in
the late seventh century� Morocco rapidly developed
into a stronghold of Muslim orthodoxy, and today it is
still one of the most conservative and traditional
Muslim states. The monarchy's survival through
centuries of tribal warfare and four decades of
European domination was mainly the result of
Moroccans' deep reverence for the King as their
religious leader, and among most of the population
this veneration for the monarchy is still intact. Also,
Islam has helped to perpetuate an age -old social
structure based on tribal relationships, personal
loyalties, and a partly feudal system which has
produced schismatic politics and discouraged the rise
of effective national parties. Only the monarchy,
combining as it does both religious and political
authority, has provided the cohesion necessary to
attract the loyalty of the majority of Moroccans.
The French. policy of divide and rule, which
deepened the historic differences between the Berbers
of the mountains and the Arabized population of the
towns and lowlands, has also had an important impact
on contemporary politics. Deeply rooted antagonism
between the Arabized majority, which dominates the
government, and the Berber minority continues to
percolate below the surface as a major factor
contributing to regionalism and political factionalism.
The Berbers resent the government's neglect of their
interests and the establishment's attempts to Arabize
them.
During the struggle against the French, King
Mohamed V became the single rallying symbol
capable of marshaling a unified nationalist
movement. Through his personal charisma and the
tremendous popularity of the monarchy in the initial
postindependence years, Mohamed V was able to
engage the support of almost all elements in Moroccan
society, and during his reign Morocco embarked on a
gradual course toward development. Lacking the
prestige of his father, Hassan II, who has ruled since
1961, has relied almost entirely on traditional support
from the rural peasantry, the Moroccan establishment,
and the armed forces (Figure 1). He has encouraged
factionalism among competing political forces, and
over the decade of his rule, Moroccans have become
seriously divided on national goals and the role of the
monarchy.
Hassan's major preoccupation since coming to the
throne has been to consolidate the power of the
monarchy by undercutting the strength of political
parties and other contenders to his authority. He has
proceeded on a domestic course which insures his
support from the Moroccan elite by pursuing policies
which protect its wealth and status. Very little progress
has been made toward development goals except in
the area of universal education, and although Hassan
pays lipservice to broad reforms, only token measures
have been taken to alleviate the country's serious
economi.. and social problems. Hassan depends on
apolitical members of the establishment to run the
government and has rewarded loyal service by royal
patronage. He has not permitted significant
constitutional limitations on his powers and has
successfully eroded the influence of political parties,
which have not participated in government since the
mid- 1960's and now probably command only meager
popular followings.
Although the majority of the tradition -bound
population accepts the monarchy as an integral part.of
their way of life, disillusionment with Hassan's rule is
on the rise. The first dramatic show of discontent came
in July 1971 when some high- ranking members of the
military, which had been the major prop of the
monarchy, narrowly failed to seize power from the
King. Only 14 months later, in August 1972, an air
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

force squadron acting under the direction of Maj.
Gen. Mohamed OtAir, the Kings closest adviser.
attempted to assassinate the King, high- ranking
government officials, and other members of the royal
entourage. These two coup attempts have seriously
weakened Hassan's power base, partl\ because they
have riot impelled him to make needed fundamental
reforms. 7'h(- corruption and inefficiency which
permeate the regime have eroded the traditional ties
I)OWeen the palace and the armed forces. Hassan
continues to depend on the armed forces for his
survival, but this is it considerably shakier prop than it
was before the attempted coups. Although students,
political leaders, and organized labor have not
resorted to extralegal measures, they have been
outspoken opponents of Ilassan's autocratic rule, the
curtailment of public liberties, and the slow pace of
economic and social change. Even among middle
level civil servants and some peasant farmers there is
9
evidence of gr unbling. Only the military is capable of
effectively challenging King lfwsan. however, and in
a time of gro%%ing disaffection and periodic todelit
and worker disorders, the unreliability of the armed
forces could cause serious problems for the regime.
In the area of foreign relations, Morocco has
strengthened its ties kith the West, although King
Ilassan still professes to follow the policy of
nonalignment established after independence.
lielations with France Cooled considerably between
1965 and 1970 because of' differences between
f'residertt de Gaulle and King Hassan over Morocco's
responsibility in tire disappearance of Mohamed lien
Barka, it Moroccan o; position leader, in Paris. :kfter
the resignation of De Gaulle, ltoNyever, relations
between the two countries were quickIN repaired.
Since 1965. Morocco has steadily worked to intprove�
its relations with other Western European countries
and the l'nited States. It leans heavily on ec�onotttic�,
military. and technical aid front Prance and the
United States, but in recent years flassan has tried to
reduce this dependency 1� accepting !invited
,assistance front (;ontnnutist countries despite his
\yariness of Soviet intentions in the Mediterranean.
Although the King gives verbal support to the
Palestinian cause, Morocco has reniained aloof front
the Arab- Israeli conflict and has concentrated on
improving relations with its neighbors in the Maghreb,
which have periodically been strained by border
disputes and ideological differences. Ilassan has
solved most of Morocc�o�s problems with Mauritania,
Tunisia, and Algeria. lielations \%ith tire revolutionary
regime in Libya, cool since the overthrow of King ldris
in 1969, have rapidly deteriorated because of 1'residen!
Qadhafi verbal support for both the 1971 and 1972
coup plotters.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government
Morocco promulgated its third postindependence
constitution in March 1972, almost 10 years after
bec�onting it constitutional monarchy. Like its 1962
and 1970 predecessors, the constitution provides for it
parliamentary system with it Prince ;Minister and
cabinet, if legislature elected in part by universal
suffrage, and an independent judiciary. Prepared
under King llassan's direction and approved by it
nationwide referendum, the document opens the way
for limited popular participation in government, but it
clearly affirms tic ntonarehy's ultimate legal and
moral authority over the instituttions of government.
(U /OU)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8
FIGURE 1. King Hasson II, Commander in Chief of the
Royal Armed Forces, a vital but somewhat shaky prop
of his regime (C)

1. Constitutional Frovisio. s (C)
While Moroccans do not view their constitutions
with a great deal of awe, adherence to the letter, if not
always the spirit, of formal legal relationships and
procedures is an old tradition. Consequently,
Morocco's three constitutions each mirror internal
political balances of power. Pronulgatet; just I year
after King Hassan acceded to the throne, the country's
first constitution reflected the new monarch's relative
weakness in contrast to his father, Mohamed V, who
had evaded fulfilling his promise to the politicians to
promulgate a constitution. King Hassan inherited
little of his father's prestige and political stature, and
leading politicians consequently were able to gain
some modest limitations on royal authority and a
constitutional guarantee for the prerogatives of
political parties. Hassan so successfully consolidated
his position and weakened the country's major
political parties, however, that by 1965, using
domestic disturbances and the alleged ineffectiveness
of parliament as pretexts, he was able to invoke
emergency powers and suspend the constitution.
Although the legal justification for his action soon
disappeared, Hassan continued to exercise extraor-
dinary powers for 5 years under a State of Exception
(in which the constitution remained suspended and
parliament prorogued), ruling for a time as his own
Prime Minister with the aid of a succession of cabinets
formed of nonpolitical personalities. All of the
country's representative groups, including loyalist
Political parties, opposed the State of Exception
because their organizations were further weakened
and demoralized by their prolonged exclusion from
normal political activity.
Taking advantage of the disarray of opposing
political forces, Hassan restored it revised constitution
in 1970 to give a legal foundation to his uncontested
rule. The document did little to dismantle the Kings
autocratic powers, however, and it so limited the
competence of the government and parliament that
the two major opposition parties, Istiqlal and the
National Union of Popular Forces, refused to
participate in �or even recognize �the greatly
weakened legislative body. Their obstinacy blocked
Hassan from achieving his primary objective in
reviving constitutional rule: political legitimacy.
Moreover, without the support of representative
groups with any semblance of popular following,
Hassan became increasingly reliant on the military
establishment as the only effective prop for the
monarchy. The first military coup attempt, in July
1971, demonstrated how undependable this prop was.
Badly shaken bN the 197 i military uprising, Hassan
initiated a series of dialogues with leading political
and economic personalitie- and promulgated the 1972
constitution as an initial step in broadening his
political support. Although the ne%y constitution still
insures monarchial supremacv, Hassan made some
concessions to political leaders' demands. However,
none of the institutions provided for under the 1972
constitution had been established at the tine of the
August 1972 coup attempt, which again cast Morocco
into deep political turmoil.
The outstanding feature of the 1972 constitution is
the ptinacy of the King's powers, which derive from
his position as chief of state and spiritual leader of the
country. The Prime Minister and the regular cabinet
are aPpointed by the King and can be dismissed at his
pleasure. Although the Print(- Minister theoretically is
head of government, the King holds sweeping
executive powers (Figure 2). He presides over all
councils of state, includiut, cabinet meetings, appoints
all magistrates and ambassadors, and ratifies all
treaties except those drax%ing on state finances, %%bich
must have prior approval from parliament. The King
is connander of the armed forces and can declare war
by simply notifying parliament.
Under the 1972 constitution, parliament is
composed of it single Ch::.nber of Ilepresentatives
which is elected for a 4 -year term and neets for two
sessions a year. The King may end a session if it
extends beyond 2 months, and parliament may not
call an extraordinary session except by an absolute
vote of its members. lletails regarding election
procedu-es and the total number of representatives are
to be determined by organic law which the King has
the exclusive right to establish; however, the
constitution does provide for two thirds of the
Chamber to be elected by direct universal suffrage and
the remaining third by an electoral college trade up of
communal councilors, members of professional
chambers, and representatives of wage earners.
Parliament can overturn the government by a motion
of censure or by refusal to support a vote of confidence
requested by the government. Both actions trust be
taken by an absolute majority of the representatives;
censure can be applied only once a year.
Although parliament is granted full egislative
authority within the broadly defined domain of law,
its competence is hedged by several executive and
royal preugatives. A watchdog judicial body, the
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, has
ultimate authority to determine the constitutional
jurisdiction of parliament. As in the past, the King's
appointees hold a majority in the Constitutional
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080027 -8

KING
HASSAN II
Supreme Court
PARLIAMENT
Constitutional Chamber
Chamber Royal
Cabinet
Special Court of Justice
of Representatives CABINET:
(2 3 elected; 1.3 appointed) (advisory)
(anticorruption)
Prime Minister
Modern Law Courts
Traditional Law Courts
ti
Other Ministers
Religious Courts
r
E
f.
Secretaries of
e
State
WL
19 PROVINCES 2 E PRFE CI r RES 19�: PROVINCES 2'P REFECT1jRE'S
;Assemblies pr,.' Assemblies Governors" Governors
J 1
u r Z2 Districts
Super Caids
COMMUNES (66ouY800) CA IDgTS::'::.. I- ARRONDIS SEMENTS
3
Rural Urban Caids Pashas
Communal Communal
Councils Councils
*Provided by constitution but
not ,elecfed'as of'.lafg'.1972
**Appointed by King_ but
subordinote t0 M inister of Interior
FIGURE 2. Main elements of the Moroccan Government (U /OU)
Chamber and can still block any bill or amendment
the King or government wishes to contest.
Parliament's budgetary control also can be
circumscribed. If the government's annual budget
fails to pass parliament, funds specified in the budget
can be allotted by executive decree. Finally, the King
can dissolve parliament by royal edict, but lie cannot
exercise this critical power again for a year, if a new
parliament is elected in the interim.
The constitution provides for the establishment of
legislative committees to assist in drafting legislation
and to continue the activities of parliament between
sessions. It also calls for a bureau of the Chamber of
Representatives to set up the parliamentary agenda.
The bureau's membership is to be selected according
to the proportional representation in parliament of the
various political parties and headed by an elected
president, who also is to appoint parliament's three
representatives to the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Court. Operating procedures and other
regulations concerning legislative committees, the
bureau, and the Chamber of Representatives as a
whole will be established by parliament itself.
4
The constitution also provides for parliament to
share in the constitutional amendment process, which
in the 1970 constitution had been the exclusive
prerogative of the Kii,g. Under the new provisions,
parliament may approve proposed amendments by a
two thirds vote of its membership, but proposals
cannot be submitted to the necessary referendum
except by royal decree, which theoretically provides
the King with a loophole for delaying or preventing
the final adoption process. The King himself may
submit a proposed amendment or revision directly to
referendum.
The capstone of royal authority is the extraordinary
power granted to the King in times of national
emergency. The constitution gives him the right to
declare a state of emergency when the territorial
integrity or normal operations of government are
threatened. During this emergency period, the King
assumes full powers to defend the country and to
conduct the affairs of state, and he alone can
terminate emergency control. The magnitude of this
prerogative was clearly demonstrated during the State
of Exception, when King Hassan ruled for 5 years as
an absolute monarch.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

Undergirding the King's authoritv as chief 4 state is
his traditional role as spiritual leader of the Islamic
community in northwest Africa and member of the
centuries -old Alaouite (Alawite) dvnasty. As the leader
of the faithful, his first duty is to assure the
preeminence of Islam. His religious primacy has its
political corollary in the supremacy of the monarchy,
which is above constitutional .w. Moreover, the King
is the guarantor of the continuity of the state and the
protector of the rights and liberties of all citizens and
minorities. The constitution expands the traditional
characterization of the King by calling him the
"supreme representative of the people" and declaring
his person both "sacred and inviolable."
The constitutional provisions which establish
Hassan 11's line as inheritors of the crown modify the
1962 constitutional precedent of strict primogeniture
and break with orthodox Islamic practice. Prior to the
succession of Hassan, a nev ruler was chosen by a
college of religious notables (ulama) from among the
male members of the dynasty without any fired
precedence. According to the 1972 constitution the
throne is transmitted to the eldest son of the King and
so on down, unless a still living King appoints another
of his sons successor to the throne. If there is no male
child, sovereignty passes to the King's closest male
relative and so on to his sons. (King Hassan has two
sons: Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed, born in August
1963; and Moulay Rachid, born in June 1970.) :S' a
new King has not attained the age of 18, a regency
council already established by the previous monarch
exercises the royal powers with the exception of those
dealing with constitutional revision. The oldest
relative, who must be at least 21, presides over the
counci:, which also must include the first president of
the Supreme Court, the president of parliament, and
seven individuals appointed by the King.
The constitution describes Morocco as an Islamic
state, a part of the Greater Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia,
Morocco), and an African state committed to African
unity. The constitution forbids a one -party system and
states that political parties, trade unions communal
councils, and vocational chambers are to take part in
organizing and representing the people. The political
rights of citizens include equality before the law,
equality of the sexes, and freedom of speech, religion,
opinion, assembly, movement, and association.
Economic and social prerogatives include the right to
an education, to employment, to strike, and to own
property.
2. National government (U /OU)
King Hassan is in effective control of the country,
making all important decisions as well as taking an
active: hand in routine and even petty matters. Most
ministerial appointments have been based on loyalty
to the King, and a minister's influence depends Iurgel
on the strength of his personality. Most cabinet
members are apolitical personalities described as
technicians. The Prime Minister's role has tradition-
ally been that of "first among equals" in the Council
of Ministers, or cabinet.
Within ministries a pattern has emerged wherein
administrative functions are freely transferred from
one area to another. Ministries are often combined
and divided, with the result that a systein of
overlapping responsibilities has evolved. As of
November 1972 there were 17 ministries, as follows:
Administrative Affairs; Agriculture and Agrarian
Reform; Culture and Islamic Affairs and Properties;
Finance; Foreign Affairs; Health; housing, Construc-
tion, and Protection of Natural Environment;
Industry and Trade; Information; Interior; Justice;
Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports; National
Education; Posts, "Celephone and "Telegraph; Public
Works and Cominunival'ons; State; and "Tourism.'
Given the frequent contradictions between a
ministry's apparent and real duties, however,
structure of the cabinet has less significance than the
individuals who compose it. In addition, a number of
other offices filled by personal representatives of the
King are often assigned ministerial rank.
Because the King's approval is necessary for all
important and many minor decisions, most ministries
are virtually paralyzed at the .working level. Officials
at all levels are usually unwilling to make decisions on
even the most elementary matters, and unless specific
programs capture royal attention, they usually
languish or receive only scant consideration by the
bureaucracy.
The Ministry of Interior has constituted an
exception to this pattern of haphazard ministerial
operations, and its elaborate organization appears to
function relatively well. This ministry controls all local
administration with the e xception of judicial powers),
and it has major responsibility for police and
intePigence forces, including military and police
auxiliaries. It has wide- ranging powers over all local
officials, from governors of provinces down to pashas
and caids. In addition to wielding considerable
administrative control, the ministry's stature and
power increased substantially during the 8 years in
which it was headed by Maj. Gen. Mohamed Oufkir,
who was the most powerful individual in Morocco
Tor a current listing f iceq government officials consult Chief of
State and Cabinet Menu. ^rs of Foreign Gonernmenls, published
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
7
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

after King Hassan until the August 1972 plot to
assassinate the King. Oufkir was a principal
conspirator in that plot, and his death a few days
later officially reported as a suicide �was probably
an execution ordered by Hassan. Some individuals in
the Ministry of Interior who were close to Oufkir have
been removed, but the overall pe of the ministry
will probably remain intact.
One politically important body which is a carryover
from the traditional system of monarchial government
is the Royal Cabinet, a flexible grouping of the King's
most trusted advisers which frequently acts as it way
station for individuals who have served in the regular
cabinet or are designated for a future post in the
government. The Royal Cabinet has taken on some
aspects of a shadow government which closely follows
all ministerial activities. Its members provide the King
with technical advice and evaluations of ministerial
proposals. Moreover, in contrast to the ministers, the
Royal Cabinet frequently initiates major policy
decisions, and it functions as tLe King's instrument for
supervising the implementation of policy.
The lack of a clear distinction between the Royal
Cabinet and the government ministers has become ap
important stumbling block in the day -to -day
operations of government. Individuals holding royal
offices oppose granting more authority to their
counterparts in the government, and they frequently
act as buffers between. the King and government
officials. As part of his general reform effort, King
Hassan has promised to abolish the post of Director
General of the Royal Cabinet, which had been one of
the most powerful positions in the kingdom.
Traditional positions of power die hard in Morocco,
however, and in all likeiiheod, members of the Royal
Cabinet will continue to act as intermediaries between
the King and government officials.
The total number of civil servants is difficult to
establish, partic; ilarly since the government's practice
over the past decade of absorbing many voting people
with university educations into the bureaucracy has
produced a fairly rapid expansion. In 1970 there were
about 222,000 emplovees within the category of
Public Administration, which includes career military
officers, teachers, the police, and national and local
government officials. Some employees in public
enterprise: are probably reflected in this figure also.
The government's program of Moroccanization of
the civil service has substantially reduced the number
of French advisers, who in the initial years after
independence accounted for over 60% of all civil
servants in the national government. The strained
relations between Morocco and France following the
z
disappearance of leftist opposition leader Mehdi Ben
Barka in Paris in 1965 also gave impetus to the
repatriation of many French citizens serving in the
bureaucracy. Although exact figures are not available,
in 1969 there were approximately 9,000 French
leachers, 500 military advisers, and 1,:500 technical
assistants employed by the Moroccan Government.
Most of the French cooperants serving in the
government hold positions bet% een the senior laver of
government officials and the mass. of Moroccan civil
servants.
The King controls the administration throi,gh his
monopoly of patronage. All important government
posts are filled by royal decree, inciuding positions in
state banks, quasi -state banks, credit agencies, and
other national offices. Appointments to high -level
offices are generally considered an opening for
personal aggrandizement, which has led to widespread
corruption throughout the administration and quasi
governmental organizations. Many high -level officials
have no real sense of public service, and their loyalty
and service to the King are usually more important to
their appointment than competence and expertise.
The quality and attitude of high -level officialdom has
provoked resentment among the relatively well
trained middle -level bureaucrats, who often have
greater expertise than their superiors. Among the balk
of civil servants, these feelings have resulted in cynical
neglect of duties and petty corruption, along with
some stirrings of opposition to the regime.
Neither of Morocco's two previous parliaments
played an effective political role. The hicameral
parliament which sat from 1963 until 1967 was largely
hamstrung by part\ factionalism and by King
Hassan's success in using royal prerogatives to block
parliamentary initiatives. Under the 1970 constitu-
tion, a greatly weakened unicameral parliament
functioned as little more than a rubberstamp for the
King's policies. The 1972 constitution more clearly
spells out the authority of the legislature than its 1970
predecessor; however, it does not appreciably expand
legislative competence. To a large extent, the future
role of parliament will be determined by the organic
laws concerning election procedur:, and ground rules.
3. Regional and local government (U /OU)
Morocco is a unitary state, and its regional and local
governments are directly subordinate to the central
government. The country is divided into 19 provinces
and two prefectures (Rabat and Casablanca) which
are administered by governors appointed by the King.
The provinces are divided into 72 administrative
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

districts (cercles) and subdivided into 28.1 caidats and
arrondissemenis, the basic units of local administra-
tion.
Governors, who are subordinate to the Minister of
Interior, have substantial power in local affairs but are
expected to clear major decisions with officials in
Rabat. They are responsible for maintaining order in
their provinces, but in the event of serious disturbances
the military commander in their area assumes
direction of all security operations. Governors are
chosen more on the basis of their loyalty to the King
than for their administrative ability. Lower ranking
officials� pashas, caids, and super caids� function as
agents of the Ministry of Interior. Caids administer
rural afe;is and pashas urban. The super -caids are in
charge of the 72 districts. Other central government
ministries have representatives in local offices, but
they are responsible to their respective ministries, with
the governors acting only as coordinating agents.
For the purposes of representation in national
elections, the basic unit is the commune. The Ministev
of Interior defines the physical limits of each
commune, which numbered 800 in August 1971. The
system of communes parallels the administrative
structure, but they have no control over local
administration. Each of the urban and rural
communes elects communal councils by universal
suffrage. When these councils were established in
1959, political leaders hoped they would form the
basis for genuine local self government, but the
councils were subordinated by royal decree to the
centrally appointed caids and pashas, who can veto or
ignore their resolutions.
The next level of the representative system is the
provincial and prefeerural assemblies, members of
which are currently elected by and from the
communal councils for 6 -year terms. In addition, each
assembly has nonvoting representatives from various
professional chambers. The assemblies have only
limited legislative power, and they are controlled by
the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, assemblies and
councils have vigorously, but so far unsuccessfully,
pressed for increased powers.
4. Judiciary (U /OU)
The protectorate powers left Morocco with a maze
of overlapping judicial systems. These included six
distinct types of court,: Berber customary law courts,
sharia and rabbinical courts applying the Islamic Ind
Jewish religious laws respectively, the secular courts of
the royal government (maghzen courts), and French,
Spanish, international, and consular courts. Since
independence the government has worked toward
combining the hest of these judicial practices into a
nationwide legal systern guided by traditional,
religious, and modern principles valid for Morocco.
Although considerable progress has been made, the
process of Arabiration and Moroccanization has not
been completed and problems still exist, particularly
since many reforms are only on paper. One of the
first major reforms initiated after independence was
aimed at withdrawing judicial power from local
officials and transferring it to new common law, or
sadad courts. 'These courts are presided over by
centrally appointed civil judges, who have jurisdiction
in minor civil and penal cases according to comnon
law. A second reform rescinded the Berber Decree of
1930, which favored the preservation of tribal
customary law in certain areas instead of orthodox
Muslim law. This decree was anathema to the
nationalists because its purpose was to further divide
Moroccans along ethnic lines. The ::erber customary
courts have been replaced by M uslim lacy courts, but
special provisions still provide for Berber customary
law to be applied in matters of inheritance or personal
status and in real estate ea;s.
Other steps taken since independence include the
establishment of a Supreme Court charged with the
appeal functions previously residing with the courts of
caseation of France and Spain. In addition, a new
penal code, drafted largely by French jurists Ind
promulgated in 1963, unifies penal legislation which
previously was embodied in several different cor;es�
one for foreigners, one for Moroccans, one for the
former Northern Spanish zone, and one for Tangier.
There is still, however, no unified civil lacy code. In
practice, for example, French or Spanish law often
supersedes the Moroccan civil law in matters affecting
European interests. A comprehensive codification of
Muslim law is underway in an effort to modernize and
reconcile various forms of jurisprudence 1:y
promulgating standardized legal codes.
he independence of ine judiciary is affirmed in the
constitution, but all magistrates are appointed by a
High Council of the Judiciary, which is presided over
by the King. The High Council is also charged with
safeguarding professional standards, particularly
regarding advancement and discipline. 'There is little
information available on how the council actually
operates.
A Special Court of Justice was named in July 1965
in partial implementation of a law promulgated the
previous March and directed against corruption. The
new court has I president, a vice president, two
advising and two alternate magistrates, and an
investigation magistrate. Under the March 1965 law,
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

penalties levied by the court may include: fines up to
the equivalent of $10,000 and prison terms up to 10
years. The court and its associated laws are the
outcome of growing public concern over government
corruption. By the beginning of 1972, a relatively large
number of middle and high- ranking officials had been
arrested on charges of corruption; however, only it few
officials have actually been tried and sentenced by the
court.
C. Political dynamics
Since acceding to the throne in 1961, King Hassan
has had unequaled authority and prestige in Morocco,
but after a decade of rule his prospects for continued
domination of the political scene have altered
significantly. The widespread popularity enjoyed by
the monarchy during the immediate postindepend-
ence period has steadily declined, and King Hassan's
inability to play an effective modernizing role while
maintaining his traditional support has alienated
important segments of the population. More
importantly, the military establishment, which
traditionally has been the major bulwark of the
monarchy, no longer provides reliable backing for
King Hassan's rule. (C)
Hassan's ability to dominate Moroccan politics has
depended largely on key support from the military and
security forces, his close alliance with traditional elites
and modern business interests, and the lack of a
credible alternative to the monarchy. For most of his
reign he has steadily whittled down the already
limited political roles of the country's representative
groups and turned it deaf ear to demands for far
reaching political reform. The heterogeneity of the
population �with differences in goals and outlook
among Arabs, Berbers, French educated urbanites,
poor and illiterate farmers, young modernists, and
traditional established families �has made it relatively
easy for the King to balance and divide to his own
advantage. Although significant opposition to
Hassan's rule has developed over the last decade, most
Moroccans �anal particularly the political leaders
have -en too narrow and parochial in outlook, too
jealous of their prerogatives, and too venal to
surmount their differences and seriously challenge the
predominance of the monarchy. (C)
Nevertheless, the military coup attempts in July
1971 and Atu 1972, which were Icd by some of the
highest ranking officers in the Moroccan armed forces,
seriously undermined the military's role as the
principal prop and coercive arm of the throne. These
two uprisings have spotlighted the erosion of military
loyalty to the King and have exposed the vulnerability
of the narrowly based regime. Without reliable
backing from the armed forces, King Hassan is more
isolated than ever and faces growing civilian
discontent without an effective military counc!r-
weight. (C)
1. The King (C)
Confident of his hereditary right to rule, liassar, has
subordinated all government institutions to royal
authority and has permitted only limited popular
participation in government. A skilled short -term
strategist and political tactician, he has succeeded in
gradually reducing the power and influence of civilian
politicians by pitting his adversaries and sometimes his
supporters against one another. He has relied on
apolitical personalities of proven loyalty to run his
administration, and he has carefully limited their
personal influence by judiciously extending and
withholding royal privileges and material benefits. He
has encouraged competition and divisiveness among
high -level military officers and civilian administrators,
thus keeping potential rivals off balance and
maneuvering against one another. However, by
carrying his divide- and -rule tactics to the point of
undermining political parties as valid participants in
the political process Hassan has engaged himself more
directly as a partisan politician and has sacrificed the
buffers which customarily shielded the monarchy from
direct criticism and accountability.
Hassan has never achieved the widespread
popularity of his father, Mohamed V, who was the
hero of Moroccan independence, and although most
of the country's tradition -bound population still
reveres the monarchy, the people have no deep
attachment to Hassan personally. By stressing the
religious and ritual aspects of his monarchial role,
Hassan appeals to the deep traditional sentiments of
the great majority of his subjects who have a rural
background and little exposure to the modern political
process. This segment of the population is largely
apolitical, however, and would probably not actively
support or oppose any regime unless the\ believed
their means for earning a livelihood or their
fundamental Islamic values were at stake.
Among politically aware Moroccans, the King's
failure to establish a truly democratic constitutional
monarchy and solve the country's economic and social
ills have cooled the popular enthusiasm for the
monarchy which followed independence. Hassan's
luxury loving style and arrogance have alienated
many educated Moroccans, who are disillusioned with
a government they realize is corrupt and inefficient.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

Reformist elements are the most bitter critics of the
King, whom they view as the protector of the status
quo, particularly in the political domain. Since
Hassan assumed autocratic powers in 1965, many
intellectuals, students, and leftist politicians no longer
view the monarchy as a viable institution to undertake
Morocco's social, political and economic moderniza-
tion. Although antimonarchial sentiments are still not
widespread, many modernists envision a strictly
ceremonial role for the monarchy.
2. Civilian and military elements (C)
Active support for Hassan's rule has centered on a
few thousand members of the elite, both traditional
and modern, whose interests are inextricably tied to his
continue; domination of political life. The King is the
center of a complex network of relationships linking
the royal family with the traditional landlord class,
religious leaders, urban merchant families, and
modern businessmen, who often have close ties with
older, established families. Many members of this
privileged class look to the monarchy to protect them
from expropriation, nationalization, and agrarian
reform of the type that has taken place in other Arab
countries in recent years. Through their close
connections with the King, many of these individuals
have increased their fortunes through special
arrangements and privileges granted by the throne.
Both the government and higher levers of the
bt.reaucraev are dominated by members of these elite
groups, most of whom dropped their poliff -al party
affiliations in the early 1960's after factionalism in the
leading party, Istiqlal, crippled the nationalist
movement. To a large extent, Hassan's efforts to
preserve his close ties with the elite have kept change
at a snail's pace. Furthermore, by tolerating the
peculations of his ministers and their proteges, Hassan
has aggravated the wide -scale government corruption
that has contributed to the regime's poor public
image.
Formerly an unshakable pillar of the monarchy, the
Moroccan military establishment has attained it
position of strength second only to the King's and has
become a potential contender for power itself. Since
1957, when King Mohamed V designated his son
Crown Prince and Commander in Chiei of the Roval
Armed Forces, Hassan has personally managed the
army. He has made all important decisions affecting
the armed forces and has personally charted the
careers of high and middle -level officers. He has tried
to maintain the traditionally close bond between the
monarchy and military through careful recruitment,
close personal association, the development of a
special caste mentality, and the judicious balancing of
military leaders so as to leave himself in the
commanding position. To reduce the threat of the
armed force; to his own power, 11assar_ has fostered
competition and rivalries among commanding officers
and between the civilian and the military elite. lie has
controlled the personal influence of all but a few high
ranking officers by manipulating command posts, and
he has rewarded lovalty by material benefits and
prestigious appointments.
Until July 1971 it appeared that the King's
manipulation of the officer corps precluded a military
move against him. However, the army attack on the
King at Skhirat palace in 1971 revealed that the
military was a formidal:.e contender for power. The
exact motives of the conspirators will probably never
Ile known with certainty, as all the leaders of the coup
attempt either were killed in the fighting or were
executed shortly after order was restored. Nonetheless,
it appears likely that disgust with widespread
corruption in the armed forces and in the country as a
whole prompted this desperate move by top ranking
officers.
Just 14 months after the Skhirat upriing, Major
General Oufkir Morocco's military strongman and
one of the King'.; closest advisers �and high- ranking
air force officers again tried to overthro King Hassan.
As .vas the case in the July 1971 coup attempt, the
conspirators were officers who had long enjoyed the
privileges and perquisites granted the military elite.
The plotters appear to have been disgusted with
Hassan for several reasons, including his lack of
sustained attention to the problems of government, his
frivolous and profligate ways, and the corruptness and
superficiality of many of the persons in his large
entourage. "These officers and their equally ill -fated
predecessors were willing to risk their favored status
rather than continue to serve tinder the King. In both
cases, the attacks on the King were planned and
executed primarily by Berbers, who dominate the
officers corps and the rank anc. file of the army. Berber
resentment of the Arabized social and political
establishment may have been another motive for these
officers, who probably felt little commitment to a
political system in which they are a minority.
The 1972 assassination attempt and Oufkir's
death reportedly a suicide but probably an executL,n
during the roundup of suspected plotters �have
heightened apprehension in the armed forces, which
never fully recovered from the 1971 coup attempt.
Many officers have little confidence in their future
under the King's rule, and some of these men
especially Oufkir's associates�may feel that
elimination of the King is essential to their survival.
9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

Oufkir's death left a vacuum difficult to fill.
Although Hassan himself has direct command over
the military, he must rely on some of his subordinates
if he hopes to soive the manifold problems facing him.
The rar':s of the general officers were seriously
depleted during the 1971 rebellion, and none of the
generals still on active duty has the dynamism and
respect needed to take firm command. Sonic of the
field -grade officers apparently have strong leadership
potential, but these younger men are less committed to
the monarchy than are their superiors. Morr e r, sonic
are considered to he deeply dissatisfied :h the
favoritism and corruption in both the mi1'tary and
civilian establishments. Also, as the King seeks eery,
leaders, he will make new enemies when officers are
shunted aside to make way for the new favorites.
Many officers, particularly those in the senior staff,
are undoubtedly still loyal to the King, but after the
defection of one of his closest advisers, Hassan is
suspicious of everyone. Tension between the palace
and the military establishment is likely to continue for
some time, and morale within the armed forces will
remain low. Although the lack of professional
leadership in the armed forces may forestall new
challenges for awhile, another strike against the King
seems a strong possibility.
3. Political parties
Hassan has accentuated the centrifugal tendencies
within each of Morocco's weak and disunifieJ
political parties and has pitted one against the other.
Through intrigue and by frequent meddling in the
parties' internal affairs he weakened first the Istiqlal,
the major party that led the country to independence,
then the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), a
leftist- oriented group which split off from Istiqlal, and
even the loyalist parties created at the palace's
instigation. The State of Exception from 1965 to 1970
further weakened the parties, whose exclusion from
government reduced their leverage with the people
and caused their organizations to atrophy. Neither the
two main opposition parties, UNFP or Istiqlal, nor the
leading loyalist party, the Popular Movement (MP),
hold effective sway over large segments of the
population. Minor parties, the Democratic Socialist
Party, and the Constitutional and Democratic Popular
Movement, are of even less importance on the
national scene, and the Party for Liberation and
Socialism, the reconstituted Moroccan Communist
Party, was ordered disbanded in 1969. (U /OU)
The UNFP and the Istiylal established a National
Front (Al- Kullah al- Wataniyah) of opposition in 1970
to boycott parliamentary elections, which they viewed
10
as a facade for the King's continued autocratic rule.
However, their inability to gain concessions from the
King, their differences in political viewpoints, and
personal antagonisms led to the front's dissolution in
mid -1972. Since then, the parties have become more
fictionalized, and the UNFP has split into two
irreconcilable wings. But despite internal squabblings,
the parties' hand has been strengthened by the 1972
attempt to assassinate King Hassan. Soon after that
attempt, the King appealed to political leaders to join
it coalition government in order to restore public
confidence in his regime. The principal party leaders
rejected his overtures, and the King appo'nted another
apolitical government, little different in composition
from its predecessors. However, h left the door open
to participation by the parties in a government that
would supervise the elections promised for 1973. After
yea -s of being out of power, participation in
government would help the parties to regain their
giassroot followings, but at this time no party is
capable of mustering sufficient support to seriously
challenge the King's supremacy. (U /OU)
a. Istiqlal (U /OU)
The isiiglal (Independence) is the largest and most
durable of Morocco's political parties, but it has been
unable to maintain an enthusiastic and disciplined
following. Its present strength comes primarily from
the urban areas, particularly the old cities of Fes and
Meknes, and secondarily from some non- Berber rural
areas (see inset to Summary Map in Country Profile
chapter). Istiqlal ha!; not participated in elections since
1963, and during the last decade its strength and
cohesion have been waning.
Prior to independence: the party's popular bast:
included the labor movement as well as modernist
elements in the coastal cities and liberation fighters. In
1959, the Istiqlal lost many of its younger and more
progressive leaders, who, having failed to wrest control
from older park- stalwarts, broke away to form the
UNFP. This split consolidated the control of the
Istiglal's original leaders, who represent the urban
merchant class and other established groups. Allal El
Fassi, a Koranic- educated traditionalist and a hero of
the independence struggle, is by far the foremost
Istiqlal leader, but he has serious health problems.
The Istiqlal extols traditional values but advocates a
reformist program designed to improve the impover-
ished lives of the majority of Moroccans. Major
objectives center on democratization of the political
system, agrarian reform, nationalization of all French
holdings, an energetic, social evolution with the tenets
of Islam as its center, and realization of the "original"
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

r. er.nar N.K.)
m to Ceut, (,r.y o
aroa clamed be Morocco
Ceuta City claimed by Marocc0
W ad.m:M�d by So�
S'.
0 Ix 2u0 300 M:r.a
o loo 200 3W t.r. MOROCCO
30 30
ad
0 C11NARY 15. O r5
lSPJO f
A
a i''"sr 1 ot f. r 'L
MAt9R1TANIA j zo
N s MALI
SENEGAL T
L:AMBIA
r J y
..r'' LPI'E8 VOLTA
....2 r-j 0
FIGURE 3. Areas claimed by Moroccan
irredentists (U /OU)
borders of the Moroccan kingdom, which once
covered a major portion of the western part of the
Maghreb and extended deep into the Sahara I -ig-
ure 3).
The Istiylal participated in the early postinde-
pendence governments and remained a leading
political power until 1963, when Istiqlai ministers
unsuccessfully attempted to force Ifassan to widen the
party's rope in government. Since 1963 it has opposed
the police of the regime but has supported the
continuation of the monarch}. 'Throughout the long
period of strained relations between the Istiylal and
the regime, El Fassi has remained on close personal
terms with King Hassan. El Fassi has been less flexible
than his UNFP partners on issues involving the
prerequisites for forming a government of national
coalition. He clearly hopes that the Istiylal will again
play a dominant political role.
Although the Istiylal has maintained its national
and local structure, its organization has suffered
during the years it has been out of power. The party
continues to put out two daily newspapers, the
French language L'Opinion and the leading Arabic
daily Al -Alain. Both papers are manage by younger
inentbers of the party and tend to reflect more militant
views than those held by the top party leadership.
Since becoming an opposition party, Istiylalis have
been frequently harassed by the gave rninent. Party
mernhers are periodically arrested, and issues of both
papers occasionally are confiscated.
The party has an affiliated labor organization. the
General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), and
an affiliated student organization formed in 1962, the
General Union of Moroccan Students (UGEM).
UGTM is not a particularly strong or effective
organization, and it has subordinated its economic
interests to politics. Similarly. UGEM has a small
membership drawn mainly front students in the
traditional Arabic educational progr nis. Most young
people connected with the Istiylal view its leaders as
too conservative and mainly interested in advancing
their own political careers.
b. .National ('nion of Popular h'orces I('1
The UNIT appeals to the relatively new groups of
intellectuals, skilled workers, salaried employees, and
others who have a Western -t pe education. The party
was launched in September 1959, follo%%ing the split
with the Istiylal earlier in that year, by former Istiylal
official Mehdi Ben Barka, former resistance leader
`lohaned El Basri, and labor leader Mahjoub Ben
Seddik.
The goventnient has harassed the UNFP on and of*f
since 1963, when over a hundred l'N FN members were
rounded up on charges of plotting arned overthrow of
the governnent. Most observers concluded that the
goyernment*s charges were a political maneuver and
that the regime did not really believe such a
conspiracy existed. The kidnapping and presumed
murder of Ben Barka in 1965 further denoralized
UNFP members, who believe the government
responsible. As a result of Ben Barka's disappearanec
and continued government harassment, a substantial
number of radical l'NFP members have sought refuge
in Europe, thus scattering party leadership.
Furthermore, to prevent government reprisals for
allegedly abetting the Jule 1911 coup plotters, the
UNI -P dissolved its local party organizations. In late
1972 the party had no rank and -file nurnbership
outside Morocco's najor coastal cities, and a serious
split between the Casablanca- and Rabat -based
leadership further eroded the part's strength. The
Casablanca wing of the party has remained closely
associated with the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT),
the strongest labor union and the only broad -based
representative group in the country. The Rabat
faction, on the other hand, is considered to be more
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

radical in outlook, and, therefore, has wider appeal for
the UNFP youth organization, the National Union of
Moroccan Students (UNEM).
Abdallah Ibrahim and Mahjoub Ben Seddik are the
two principal leaders of the Casablanca -based wing of
the party. Ibrahim, Prime Minister from 19-58 to 1960,
is a yell-respected and prominent national figure but
is viewed by many younger party members as
be,onging to the old guard. Ben Seddik has clearly
emerged as the most popular and gifted leader.
Energetic and intelligent, he is an adept politician and
a skilled labor leader. His prominence in the
opposition movement is largely the result of his
successful efforts to keep the UMT disentangled from
the clashes between the government and the UNFP.
By maintaining the organizational integrity and
dynamism of the UMT, Ben Seddik has preserved the
only major source of support for the Casablanca
group.
Ibrahim and Ben Seddik and their followers hae
preserved the UNFP's original position as the main
political channel for the nun Communist left. Their
major objectives include the establishment of a
genuinely democratic government, nationalization of
basic industries, land reform, a controlled economy,
and government welfare services. Their principles
differ from those of the traditionalist Istiylal in that
the UNFP is neutral toward the Arabic language and
Islam, and they clearly envisage the monarch as
eventually becoming a figurehead.
Abderrahim Bouabid, former Deputy Prime
Minister, is the main leader of the Rabat faction of the
party. His keen rivalry with Ibrahim and his more
radical views appear to he the major causes for the
split between the two groups. Bouabid has always
aligned himself with leftwing students and UNFP
members in exile throughout Europe, and he probably
hopes to build his power base from the ranks of
younger UNFP members. His group has not clearly
distinguished its principles from those of the
Casablanca faction, but Bouabid and many of his
followers may view the monarchy as completely
anachronistic and a major impediment to serious
political reform.
e. Popular Movement (U
Organized in 1957 in the mountainous and almost
exclusively Berber ireas of Morocco, the MP was the
first organized po:. cal expression of traditional rural
discontent among the Berbers, who resented the
postindependeace predominance of the urban based,
elite oriented Istiylal. The MP has never been
homogeneous or tightly organized, and in 1965 it split
12
into two factions. Dr. Abdelkrim Khatib heads the
splinter group, known s the Constitutional and
Democratic Popular Movement (MPCD), which
represents the Rif Berbers, and Mahjoubi Ahardane is
the leader of the MP, which draws most of its support
from Middle Atlas Berbers. Neither party, however,
has gained a strong following among the independent
minded Berbers or developed a sound structural base.
Both groups were opposition parties during the State
of Exception, but since the return to constitutional
rule they have generally supported the King. The MP
has been more succ essful than the MPCD in asserting
its influence on the national scene.
The NIP's principles are based on a vaguely defined
Islamic socialism, loyalty to the monarch, and a better
deal for farmers, including nationalization of foreign
owned lands. Party principles, however, have been less
important to the membership than the Berber
character of the party itself. To a large extent the MP
has been carried ;;,ong by the energies of its leader
NMahjoubi Ahardane, a tWionaliv known poet and
painter. Ahardane has held both the Agricultural and
Defense portfolios and was a leading deputy in the
parliament elected in August 1970. lie is highl�
critical of the National Front parties, which he
contends have little following and do not represent the
interests of the majority of the Moroccan people. His
attitude toward the King has fluctu over the past
decade. During the State of Exception he was openly
critical of the regime. Ahardane actively supported
government policy following the success of MP
members in te parliamentary elections of August
1970, in which a fourth of the nominally neutral
deputies elected came from the MP. Since the
dissolution of parliament, however, Ahardane has
again become a vocal critic of the regime.
d. Party of Liberation and Socialism (cl
The Party of Liberation and Socialism (PLS) yeas
established by the Moroccan Communists in June
1968 as a device for gaining government permission to
operate as a legal political party. The Moroccan
Communist Party (MCP) was officially banned in
1959 but had been operating throughout the early
1960's under periodic harassment from t) regime. By
mid -1966, however, propaganda and political activity
was generally tolerated a!beit closely monitored by
government officials. 'faking advantage of this
leniency, individual members of the MCP petitioned
the government to form a new party. Finally, in 1968,
the PLS received official recognition and permission to
operate openly. After only I year of overt activity the
PLS was ordered to dissolve, on the grounds that its
leaders had reconstituted the outlawed MCP.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

Although officially proscribed, the PLS has the tacit
consent of the authorities to operate on a
semiclandestine basis, apparently because the King
has never considered the party a serious threat. T he
PLS pursues a watchful police toward the regime and
avoids provoking the government and securit
officials. The party has a permanent membership,
holds semisecret but regular meetings, and circulates
appeals in the foreign press. Its leaders travel to
Communist Party congresses in the Middle East and
Europe.
The size of the PLS is difficult to gauge because
there is some risk in being identified as it party
member or sympathizer. In 1971, the party probably
had about 200 or 300 card holding members with
several thousand sympathizers. Despite efforts to
attract %%orkers and gain standing in agricultural areas,
most of the party cadre are civil servants, students,
teachers, and professional people.
The longtime leaders of the party are secretary
general Ali Yata. Abdallah Layachi, and Abdeslam
Bouryuia, who is current;, serving an 8 month prison
sentence for political activities. All three men have
attained considerable stair re as dedicated leaders, and
their persecution at the hands of the government has
earned them widespread esteem among their
sympathizers on the national level and within the
international movement.
Moroccan Communists engage in the sarne
ideological disputes found throughout the interna-
tional Communist movement but for the most part,
PLS leaders support the Soviet Union and its interests.
Some younger members have taken a more radical
line, however, and a number of Maoist- oriented
factions have split completely from the PLS. Although
the stated long -range objective of the party is to
establish "scientific socialism" in Mc �occo, party
leaders have taken a more moderate, realistic
approach to their goals, which resemble those of the
UNFP.
Before the party was banned, it published a weekly
paper; Ali Yata's attempts since 1969 to reinstitute a
publication under his own name have been blocked by
the courts and police officials.
4. Special interest groups (C)
Prior to independence in 1956 a number of special
interest groups had begun to ernerge, but it was only
after independence that such elements as labor, youth,
and students were able to refine their organizations
and expand their activities to a point where they
began to play an important role in Moroccan political
and economic life.
The most influential special interest group in
Morocco is organized labor; its largest vehicle, the
UMT, has a membership esi.mated at some 2(X),000.
The UMT is also one of the most outspoken criiics of
the government and represents the strongest
opposition farce. The UMT is headed by Mahjoub
Ben Seddik, who has resisted attempts by the UNFP to
absorb the union within the party.
Increas-ngly confident of its political muscle, the
UMT has been pressing hard for wage incrcas and
more fringe benefits, capitalizing on the inability of
the government to curb the extended strikes and
periodic walkouts which have plagued major
industries and contributed to political tensions.
Despite government attempts to undercut the
UMT's strength, the unions organization and abilit
to recruit new members have suffered far less than
political parties. Furthermore, UMT efforts to gain
benefits for workers have had some notable successes.
The UMT provides major financial backing for a
French- languu_ -ilv, Maghreb Informations, first
published in Noven. t)er 1971. The paper also receives
some support from the UNFP (Casablanca) and
generally reflects the leftist orientation of the UMT
and UNFI' leadership.
(other labor unions are generally subordinate to
their affiliated political parties, and none is as
important as the UMT. These groups include the
lstiy:al- sponsored General Union of Moroccan
Workers, the Federation of Moroccan Trade: Unions of
Free Workers, which is affiliated with the Popular
Movement, and several ether minor organizations.
Prior to the 1970 constitutional referendum and the
parliamentary elections, two government- sponsored
unions �the Union of Moroccan Workers and the
Union of Autonomous Moroccan Workers �were
formed to give government candidates a semblance of
trade union backing. Although the government
continues to fund these organizations they are likely
to wither because they lack genuine worker support.
Youth present one of the most serious challenges to
the regime. large numbers of uneducated and
unemployed young people are moving from rural
areas into the cities, where their prospects for finding
jobs are minimal. The governments two- pronged
objective of persuading young people to return to rural
areas and enlist in construction projects has not been
fulfilled. Frustrated by their plight and disillusioned
with the government, these youngsters are restive and
highly susceptible to the importunings of political
demagogs and militant student leaders. Since 1965,
when student demonstrations precipitated bloody riots
in Casablanca and King Hassan assumed autocratic
13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080027 -8

powers, students have become more antagonistic to
the monarch. Student denonstrations and strikes have
become more frequent and violent, and the harsh
police countermeasures have aroused further
resentment. Most students now believe that major
political changes must pret-ede educational reform.
The majority of universav students, including those
attending foreign universities, belong to the leftist
UNEM. Altl!.,ugh the UNENI is an independent
organization, its political stance closely parallels that
of the L'NFP and UNIT. All three organizations have
frequently coordinated their strategies and positions
on political issues, and the UNFP has often acted as a
parent organization to the UNEM by providing
organizational and probable monetary_ support. The
UNEM has hot officially backed either fact-lm of the
UNFP, but many of its members nevertheless are
probable sympathetic to the Rabat wing.
While the UNEM has usually been controlled by
members whose views parallel those of the UNFP, its
leadership has been seriously contested by Communist
students i; recent years. its ranks were seriously
factionalized in mid -1972. Although these internecine
squabbles and clashes have weakened the UNEM. it
still continues to act as a catalyst for youthful
discontent and has been able to organize effective
school strikes and boycotts. Extremism anomg the
students is limned to small splinter groups, but the real
strength of the radical militants lies not so much in
tlicir actual power but rather in their ability to gather
and magnify the frustration of increasiny, numbers of
young people.
Since 1961, the istiglal has sponsored a university
student organization, the relatively small UGEM.
which is less than a fifth the size of UNEM. The
Istiqlal does not effectively control student members,
who frequently initiate school strikes on their own.
The government has discouraged both UGEM and
UNEM from organizing or working with secondary
students. Nevertheless. secondary students have
initiated a number of school boycotts in widely
scattered cities, indicating a degree of effective
coordination. In early 1972, secondary students were
even more active than their university counterparts in
initiating boycotts, suggesting that clandestine groups
also exist among the younger students.
5. Elections (U /OU)
When he promulgated a new constitution in 1972,
King Hassan promised to revise the election laws,
which were passed in 1959. According to a special
provision in the 19 72 constitution. King Hassan has
full legislative powers to enact laws necessary ft r the
1-I
establishm- it of constitutional institutions. Armed
with this formidable prerogative, Hassan will be able
to set all procedures and ground rules for elections of
communal, district, and provincial assemblies,
professional chambers, and parliament. Soon after the
August 1972 coup attempt, King Hassan began
consulting representative groups on their prerequisites
for participAing in a new government. 'these
consultations cane� to nothing, but it is still po:
that the parties will participate in tho� government
when elections are held; they have been promised for
1973. In the meantime, the King will exercise full
legislative authority, in accordance %vith the
constitution.
Th, country's first two nationwide local and
national elections in 1960 and 1963 denunstrated that
Moroccans take a lively interest in choosing their
leaders. However, the elections held in 1970, following
the� :5 -year State of E-:ception, wore so carefully
controlled by the palace that many Moroccans have
adopted it cynical attitude toward electoral
participation. Should King Hassan ever succeed in
forming it government which includes principal
opposition groups, Moroccans may agar: become
involved in political activity.
D. National policies (C)
King Hassan's major police goals have been to
attract private foreign investment. to expand and
Arabize the educational system, and to improve the
modern agricultural sector. In the foreign police
sphere, Hassan has worked toward normalizing
relations with neighboring countries by negotiating
settlements on longstanding border disputes and by
working for greater economic and political unity
among the Maghreb nations. Although officially
nonaligned, the Moroccan Government has continued
to strengthen its close lies with Western countries,
particularly the United States and France, who are
Morocco Is major contributors of development aid.
1. Domestic goals
King Hassan has set very limited economic and
social goals so as not to endanger his support from
traditional elements, and consequently he has
alienated reformists and disillusioned many Moroc-
cans who had hoped for holder initiatives. Because he
had the support of the military, Hassan was able to
proceed for over a decade without a popular
consensus, but the situation changed significantly
following the July 1971 arm\ uprising. Since the
Skhirat coup attempt, the government has put forth it
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

4
s
E
broad policy statement emphasizing the longstanding
goals of agricultural development, educational reform,
and economic expansion. To silence criticism from
opposition headers and to shore up the regimes image
With the people, Ding Hassan has promised to reduce
unemployment, curb the rising cost of living, and
improve public health and housing. lie has also paid
lipsen to narrowing the gap between the ealthy
elite and the impoverished majority.
The government has always viewed education as a
major key to both social and economic advancement.
Over the last decade, about W(' of the annual
operating budget has been expended on education,
and significant progress has been made toward
achieving the goal of universal education. In 1963 the
government made primary educ ation compulsory for
children behveen the ages of 7 and 13, and by 1970
the s% had absorbed the fourfold increase in
school population since independence. The popula-
tion explosion since independence, however, has
doubled the number of school -age children and thus
h as wiped out half the gain in terms of the pe rcentage
of school -age children in school. Moreover, rapid
expansion of the school system has lowered the qualit
of education arid increased the dropout and failure
rates.
Another major police goal, Arabization of
education, has had great emotional and political
appeal, particularly among traditionalists. However,
practical considerations centering on maintaining 'he
French language as a useful tool in modernization
have produced half hearted and sometimes conflicting
directions on the language of instruction at the
primary arid secondary levels. By 1967 the government
had totally A.rabized the primary system by
transferring from the secondary system large numbers
of teachers qualified to give instruction in Arabic. The
rationale for this action was primarily political, in that
it enabled the government to show some measurable
progress toward the goal of Arabization. It also,
however, effectively reduced the capability of the
secondary system to provide training in Arabic, and
thus disrupted linguistic continuity between the
primary and secondary sectors. To help correct
dislocations caused by the changeover, it became
necessary to add to the secondary cycle a full extra
year devoted primarily to instruction in French.
Finally, in 1970, the government, realizing the
usefulness of French in modern disciplines, cut back
implementation of the Arabization program and gave
French equal importance in the last three grades of
primary school.
The success the government has in implementing its
promise to clean up public corruption is likely to
becone a measure by which the public judges the
regimes sincerity in earning out a policy of reform.
Many Moroccans feel that corruption has deprived
them of their just portion of national wealth, and that
the gap between rich and poor could be greatly
alleviated if corruption were stamped out. King
Hassan has moved cautiously in his antic -eruption
campaign, however, because any determined drive
would inevitably involve some major supporters of his
regi rne.
Although population control became a priority
national goal undo r the 1968 -72 state plan, Ding
Hassan and th( many traditionalists in the
governme give only half hearted hacking to the
concept because of the sensitivity of the issue among
many traditional Muslims, who value large families.
Family planning clinics and programs to inform the
public on limiting family size were instituted in 1966.
but tire results of these tentative efforts have been
negligible so far. The government has actively tried to
alleviate population pressures by relocating city
slunulwellers in rural areas through various projects
directed by the Ministrie of Interior and of Labor,
Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports, but the massive:
influx of rural people into the cities has swamped
existing programs, and the growth of urban slums
continues essentially unchecked.
The government's economic policies have empha-
sized improvement of agriculture, which is the key
sector of the economy, employing about 70i of the
population and accounting for 3051 of the GNP. he
main thrust of government investment is in the
development of a major darn and irrigation system
which will primarily benefit the modern sector.
Substantial progress is being made in completing
hydraulic projec',, but their full impact will not be felt
for some tine. The government has clone little in the
way of implementing labor- intensive or short -range
projects, and almost nothing has been done to help
small farmers.
Uneven distribution of land and complex tenure
patte have been thorn\ issues since Morocco
regained independence, and although the government
has followed a cautious policy of land redistribution, it
has yet to formulate a comprehensive agrarian reform
program. Information on land use and tenure is out of
date, and Moroccan authorities do not plan to
conduct a census on land ownership until 1973.
According to available statistics, approximately 60
of the traditional farm families have less than one
hectare, and 33% own no land. The government, a
few wealthy farmers, and urban investors own most of
the prime farmland confiscated from the French. In
1971, the government and wealthy landowners were
13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

estimated to control nearly half of all agricultural
land. During the 1960's, the government maintained
that it could not risk a drop in production by
subdividing and transferring large segments of
government managed farms to private ownership, and
through 1970 only about 100,000 acres had been
distributed to small farmers.
Although even careful, large -scale redistribution
would not totally solve the basic problem of the small
size and income of most farms, it would boost morale
and slow the rural exodus to the cities. However, the
government has been reluctant to move on
comprehensive agrarian reform because members of
the royal family and the elite own large tracts of
choice land. The regime's footdragging policy has
provoked bitter criticism from opposition politicians
since 1970, and to silence his opponents, King Hassan
announced plans to speed up reform. In 1971 about
79,000 acres were distributed, and plans called for
distributing 198,000 acres before the end of 1972. Soon
after the August 1C assassination attempt, King
Hassan again announced acceleration of the
distribution program.
The government's k; v policy in developing industry
and mining is to maintain an open door for foreign
private investment. Under its Industrial Investment
Code, the government offers a number of incentives,
including fiscal and credit benefits, equipment grants,
and concessional grants to potential investors in
tourism. To reduce the problems of bureaucratic
bottlenecks and the lengthy process of approving
projects, the government is streamlining its investment
code, and the investment commission is becoming
more liberal in its approval of new projects. The
government permits repatriation of profits and has not
nationalized foreign private property.
The government has stressed "Morro can. ation,"
which has meant bringing all parts I the country whieh prior to 1956 consisted of four distinct
governmental units �under a unified administration
and training Moroccans to replace foreign personnel.
The former goal has been accomplished, and national
services including the police, army, diplomatic corps,
social service agencies, government ministries, and
banks have been organized. Replacement of foreign
personnel, however, has been slower. At independence
there was an acute shortage of trained Moroccan
personnel to staff the government. Only 3% of the civil
servants in the upper grades were Moroccans, and only
10% in the middle grades. There were two Moroccans
trained as agricultural engineers, 30.as other types of
engineers, and none as veterinarians. France and
Spain encouraged their nationals to continue working
16
in Morocco and assisted the Moroccan Govern: nent in
recruiting additional contract personnel ii. theii
countries. It is still customary to find French
technicians and advisers working in .he government at
levels directly below that of the director of the office or
agency. Comprehensive statistics for all foreign
personnel Morocco are not avaiiable, but in early
1972 there were at least 11,000 French civilian
technicians, several thousand U.S. technical and
military advisers (including 1,680 servicemen at
Kenitra); and several hundred East Europe
technical advisers.
Despite frequent government pronouncements on
its intentions to vigorously pursue a policy of
Moroccanization of enterprises and employment,
progress toward this goal has been slow and cautious.
King Hassan's most recent plan for Moroccanization
of the tertiary sector (commercial enterprises, banks,
insurance and service companies) produced such a
negative reaction within the foreign business
community that the government quickly retreated. So
far, Moroccan officials have exerted some pressure on
the tertiary sector to voluntarily employ more
Moroccans and to take on Moroccan investment
partners. The government has taken over partial
control of some foreign banks and insurance
companies, but it has not pushed its foreign business
community to accept more than what can be
amicably arranged.
In the sphere of defense policy, King Hassan has
gradually abandoned the goal of achieving combat
effectiveness comparable to that of Algeria. For over a
decade the King gave top priority to modernizing the
armed forces whose primary mission was to maintain
order at home and to defend Moroccan borders
against Algeria. The two military uprisings since 1971,
however, have resulted in a major change in King
Hassan's attitude toward large -scale modernization of
the military. Hassan is now clearly aiming to prevent
another attempt to overthrow him by establishing
more centralized control and by redirecting military
capabilities to better serve as support for the throne.
Using the rationale that large -scale modernization of
the armed forces endangers Moroccan development
goals, Hassan has emphasized that in the future the
military will participate to a greater extent in civic
action projects and that its primary functions are to
insure internal security and to serve only as a first line
of defense against outside aggression.
2. Foreign relations
Morocco professes to be nonaligned on world issues,
and it has sought to reduce its dependence on any
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

single major power. The King's principai objective in
the conduct of foreign relations is to demonstrate
solidarity with other Arab nations, especially those of
North Africa. Virtually isolated in 1964 after a brief
border war with Algeria and faced with gradually
deteriorating relations with France, King Hassan
moved steadily toward normalizing relations with
neighboring Arab states, improving and diversifying
relations with European countries, solidifying
longstanding links with the United States, and
repairing damaged ties with France.
Since independence, Morocco has maintained close,
friendly relations with the. West, while at the same
time establishing a variety of diplomatic and
economic ties with the Communist states in order to
underscore Morocco's nonaligned status. By
maintaining the appearance of being evenhanded in
his dealings with both East and West, Morocco has
secured economic and military aid from both the
United States and Communist countries. Such aid was
particularly important during the period of strained
relations with France. During the early 1960'x, the
monarchy was able to ward off leftist critics by closing
down U.S. air and naval bases, but oppositionist
politicians continue to use the existence of the U.S.
communications base at Kenitra to embarrass the
regime. Furthermore, the Arab Israeli conflict �in
particular, Arab identification of the U.S.S.R. with the
Arab cause and of the United States with Israeli
interests �has created strains on the policy of nominal
nonalignment but actual pro Westernism. So far, King
Hassan has been able to keep anti Israeli manifesta-
tions in Morocco Nyithin bounds, but his domestic
opposition takes a more militant stand for the Arab
and the Palestinian cause. The possibility of the
opposition parties' inclusion in a new government
could provide an opening for greater pressure on
Hassan to take a firmer stand behind his fellow Arabs.
Despite these two problem issues, Morocco's
nonaligned policy has afforded the regime some
leverage on the domestic political front and has
generally helped the monarchy's image in the eyes of
the nonaligned countries of the so- called Third World.
a. The West
(1) France� Despite 44 years of colonial domina-
tion and a bitter struggle for independence, Morocco
has always regarded France as its natural partner.
Since independence, France has been Morocco's
principal trading partner and is the second largest
contributor of foreign aid after the United States.
Even during the 4 -year period of strained diplomatic
relations the two countries maintained close cultural
and economic ties. The strain on French- Moroccan
relations arose with the October 1965 kidnapping in
Paris and presumed murder of leftist opposition leader
Mehdi Ben Barka. The French Government claimed
that Major General Oufkir, then Minister of Interior,
was involved in Ben Barka's disappearance, and
demanded that King Hassan dismiss and extradite
Outkir to stand trial in France. King Hassan refused to
meet France's price for continued close relations, and
neither he nor President de Gaulle would back clown
on the issue Lecause of their strong personalities and
the resulting public furor in both countries and
abroad. Although diplomatic relations were never
broken, the ambassadors were recalled and France
refused to extend to Morocco any new economic aid or
military assistance. fhe standoff, during which many
Frenchmen left \lorocco, lasted until De Gaulle
resigned in 1969. Under President Pompidou, relations
were rapidly normalized, but by 1972, French
assistance to Morocco was still only half the amount
prior to the Ben Barka incident.
France maintains one of its largest diplomatic
missions in Rabat, and in addition has nine consulates
throughout Morocco. About 80% of the industrial
enterprises in Morocco are French owned, and French
investment is estimated at about $3.6 billion. Despite
King Hassan's pronouncements on Moroccanization,
Rabat has moved very slowly and is almost always
careful to accommodate French interests. The mail\
French teachers and technical personnel working in
Morocco help to reinforce France's strong cultural
influence. The outlook of most urban, educated
Moroccans is still oriented toward French values,
taste, and style, and the perpetuation of the French
language in Moroccan schools and its usage within the
social and political establishment assure strong French
cultural influence in the future.
(2) United States �The United States and Morocco
have a long history of cordial relations dating back to
a 1787 treaty of friendship. The close association
between the two countries centers on U.S. strategic
interest in having a friendly nation on the southern
littoral of the Mediterranean and the utility for ti,
United States in having a friend among Arab nations
at a time when it has limited access to many Arab
capitals. On the Moroccan side, the United States is
an important alternative to France for both economic
and military support. Since 1968 the United States has
been Morocco's major donor of foreign aid, and in
1971 U.S. assistance was more than double that from
France. Since 1960, the United States has supplied
Morocco with military equipment and advisers
through the permanent Morocco -U.S. Liaison Office.
IN
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

U.S. military assistance has totaled about US$67
million, extended mainly through the Military
Assistance Program.
At the time of independence, the least tolerable
vestiges of foreign domination in Morocco were the
remaining foreign military forces and installations,
including five U.S. air and naval bases. Most of the
U.S. installations were established by a 1950 secret
agreement between the United States and France
within the general framework of NATO defense
arrangements. In 1959, the U.S. and Moroccan
governments agreed (hat the bases would be
evacuated by the end of 1963. This agreement was
subsequently modified in 1963 when King Hassan
informally agreed to permit the United States to retain
for its use the naval communications facilities at
Kenitra Naval Air Station and at nearbv Sidi Yahv du
Rharb and Sidi Bou Knadel. Approximately 1,500
U.S. Navy personnel operate and train Moroccans to
operate telecommunications equipment at the Kenitra
base, which is technically under Moroccan command.
Oppositionist politicians periodic -ally attempt to
discredit the regime for allowing the base to remain on
Moroccan soil.
(3) Other Western countries� Morocco has had
some success in strengthening diplomatic relations and
increasing trade and aid agreements with other
Western countries. West Germany and the Benelux
countries are Morocco's most important trading
partners after France, and West Germany ranks third
in the amount of development assistance given to
Morocco.
Relations with Spain, a former protectorate power,
are amicable despite longstanding territorial disputes.
The Spanish returned Ifni to Morocco in 1969, but the
Spanish- controlled territory of Spanish Sahara
continues to be a matter of contention between the
two countries. Morocco claims sovereignty over the
entire area on the basis of the precolonial borders of its
kingdom and the religious links with the Saharan
nomadic tribes. Periodic border skirmishes between
Moroccan and Spanish patrols have led both
governments to try to solve their differences through
negotiations. The Moroccan Government has
downplayed the territorial dispute because of the
strong irredentist sentiments which it arouses,
particularly among the traditionally oriented Istiqlal
party members.
Other Spanish possessions, remnants of once
extensive holdings in Morocco, are Ceuta and Melilla,
two cities on the north coast of Africa with a
population of about 70,000 each, and three small,
sparsely populated island groups off the coast. Ceuta,
18
which is actually situated on a rock offshore and
connected to the mainland by a causeway, has an
excellent harbor arid a thriving tourist trade. Melilla's
port serves primarily as an outlet for the iron mines in
adjacent Nador Province of Morocco. It was from
Melilla in 1936 that General Franco launched his
attack on Spain, beginning the Civil War. Ceuta and
Melilla today aili under the respective lurisdictions of
the Spanish provin -vs of Cadiz and Malaga. The
mayors of both cities are representatives to the Spanish
Cortes, and city councils are elected according to the
Spanish Law of Local Administration.
These areas have riot recently been an irritant in
Spanish- Moroccan relations. Between 1959 and 1962
there were some efforts on the part of local
authorities under pressure from the Istiqlal and with
at least the tacit approval of the King �to enforce laws
relating to tourism and fishing which would make
Spain's retention of the cities more difficult. Since
1962, however, enforcement of these laws has eased,
and Morocco has not gone beyond verbal demands for
the return of the Spanish enclaves.
b. Communist countries
Despite Morocco's close affinity with the West and
the frequently developed therne of the irreconcilable
differences between Islamic precepts and Marxist
ideology, Morocco maintains cordial and expanding
ties with the Communist world. King Hassan is aware
that the western Mediterranean, including Morocco,
has become a target for the expansion of Soviet
influence. Although Hassan is wary of Moscow's
intentions in Morocco and North Africa, he
nonetheless is confident that the potential Soviet
threat can be contained.
Morocco established diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union in 1958 and with the People's Republic
of China the following year. Soviet- Moroccan
interchange bas steadily increased, particularly during
the period of strained relations with France, and
cumulative Soviet aid through 1970 amounted to $88
million. Major Soviet sponsored aid projeers include
the Jerada electric plant, the Mansour clam, and
agreements for future construction of a hydroelectric
plant near Marrakech. The Soviets have supplied
Morocco with some military equipment, including
MiG aircraft, armor, small arms, and vehicles.
Cultural and educational exchanges remain at modest
levels.
Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Romania, and Mongolia have diplomatic
relations with Morocco, but to protect its growing aid
and trade relationships with West Germany, Rabat
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

has restricted East Germany to a commercial office. In
addition to continuing technical assistance in
agriculture and geology, Romania agreed in 1970 to
provide assistance for petroleum and copper
exploration and some public health aid. Czecho-
slovakia provides modest military aid under a 1967
agreement. Bulgaria has about 80 technical experts in
Morocco, and smaller numbers of Poles, Hungarians,
and Czechoslovaks bring the total to about 215 East
European technicians in the country. Development
aid from Eastern Europe through 1970 amounted to
about $35 million.
e. The Arab world
Morocco's major concern over the last several years
has been to normalize its relations Nvith neighboring
Arab countries and to remain politically removed from
j the tensions in the eastern Arab world. As both secular
and religious head of a nation with an Arab culture,
Arabic language, and Muslim religion, King Hassan
sees clear domestic advantages in building his image
as a leader in the Islamic world. To this end, he
promoted the first Islamic summa` in 1969 in Rabat,
where he also hosted an Arab summit later that vear.
He has tried to maintain the credentials of it
committed Arab nation by frequent statements of
support for the Arab cause in general and Palestinian
rights in particular (Figure 4). The King views the
Arab Israel conflict as a remote problem, however,
best settled by those countries bordering Israel. His
statements of support for the Palestine liberation
movement and his call for it multiracial, multireligious
Palestinian state reflect a desire to demonstrate his
commitment to the Arab cause as well as a
determination to avoid involvement in the Arab-
Israeli dispute.
d. The Maghreb and Africa
Since the late 1960's, Morocco has called for greater
unity among the Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria,
and Morocco) to create stronger economic ties and to
move toward firmer political bonds. The three
Maghreb states and Libya had set up permanent
machinery for eventual economic coordination and
had even taken a few tentative steps toward
rationalization of exports in limited fields, but real
progress has been slow and concrete accomplishments
few. Libya withdrew in 1969, and the economies of
the other three countries suffer from the inherent
limitations common to developing nations. There is
little actual attraction toward a common market in
the Maghreb among economies which are basically
competitive. In the political area, Morocco, 'Tunisia,
and Algeria have shown a greater willingness to work
toward a community of interests, despite distrust and
suspicions stemming from border disputes and
ideological differences.
Morocco's territorial ambitions have been a major
irritant in North Africa. Morocco contests the
boundaries drawn by the former European colonial
powers, which demarcate the borders of Spanish
Sahara and of the independent states of Mali,
Mauritania, and Algeria. Although King Hassan has
downplayed these claims since the late 1960'x,
irredentism is still strong among traditionalists, and
territorial disputes continue to increase underlying
tensions between Morocco and its neighbors. The
French grant of independence to Mauritania in 1960
was particularly galling to Morocco, which refused to
recognize Mauritania until 1970.
The issue of borders and the differences between the
revolutionary- oriented government in Algeria and the
monarchy in Morocco have been disruptive problems
since Algeria received its independence in 1962. In
October 1963, Morocco's claim to it large part of the
Algerian Sahara touched off a brief border war. The
clash was quickly ended, but relations continued to be
m
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8
FIGURE 4. King Husayn of Jordan meets with Hassan
during Husayn's official visit to Morocco just 2 months
after June 1967 Arab Israeli war (U /OU)

badly strained. Algeria's subsequent military buildup
heightened Moroccan suspicions that its neighbor
might reinitiate hostilities; consequently, MoOCCO
began to strengthen its own military forces. The two
countries almost clashed again in 1966 when Algeria
nationalized the Cara Djebilet iron mine and a lead
zinc mine which straddled the Moroccan border.
The situation began to stabilize in 1967 as a result of
a greater spirit of kinship inspired by the Arab- Israeli
war, and after that war, King Ilassan and Algerian
Prime Minister Bounediene began to move toward a
detente by exchanging high -level visits (Figure 5). In
January 1969 the two leaders signed a treaty of
friendship at Ifrane, and the following year they issued
the Tlemcen proclamation promising to settle border
disputes. Although both countries have maintained
cordial interchange on Most issues, little progress has
been made on border demarcation, despite the
creation of a joint border commission i 1970. At the
1972 African summit the two leaders again pledged
their cooperation by signing a treaty for the
demarcation of disputed areas. So far, neither country
has released the details of the 1972 agreement, but the
neNv accord probably amounts to little more than a
reaffirrnati< n of its 1970 predecessor, and it is unlikely
that the border stalemate has been resolved.
Morocco and Tunisia have generally maintained
amicable relations since the early 1960'x, and the two
countries share a common view on the future of the
Maghreb. Both countries maintain moderate positions
on the Arab Israeli issue and view themselves as a
bridge between the Arab world and the West.
Relations cooled in 1960 when Tunisia recognized
20
Ma�iritania, but they improved substantially
following a meeting of the two Leads of state at the
Arab summit in 1964. By the end of the decade, both
countries had pledged to strengthen their ties arid
work for greater Maghreb unity.
Morocco's relations with Libya have deteriorated
steadily since the 1969 military overthrow of King
Idris, who had special bonds with King f lassan as one
of the four reigning Arab monarchs. Moroccan
suspicions of President Qadhafi and his Revolutionary
Command Council Nyere confirmed in July 1971,
When the Libyan regime gave verbal support to the
Skhirat rebels. Morocco's subsequent execution of
high- ranking rebel officers was strongly condemned by
the Libyans, and the Moroccan Government
alleged apparently with no justification Libyan
involvement in the unsuccessful coup attempt. The
two countries have not broken diplomatic relations,
but the ambassadors and diplomatic staffs in the
respective capitals were expelled after the Skhirat
uprising. Neither government has atter-pted publicly
to repair t1ro damaged relations, and in late 1972 each
was engaged in vitriolic press and radio campaigns
against the other.
Although Morocco is a member of the Organization
of African Unity and sends observers to the African
Malagasy Common Organization, it does not have a
close identity of interests with black Africa. The King
believes it important to show an interest in African
issues, however, and Moroccan representatives in the
United Nations and other international meetings vote
with African groups on problems of concern to African
countries.
FIGURE 5. Algerian Prime Min-
ister Boumediene and King Has-
san reviewing guard of honor
in Rabat (U /OU)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

E. Threats to government stability (S)
1. Discontent and dissidence
Disaffection with King Hassan's form of rule is
widespread, and there are growing demands for
el
reforms that would reshape the political, social, and
economic life of the country. Strikes and minor
disorders by discontented students and unemployed
youths coupled with persistent demands for reform
from opposition politicians, organized labor, and
intellectuals have brought the regime under pressure.
In essence, the ill will shared by dissatisfied elements
stems from their feeling that they are being denied a
share of political power and are not receiving
sufficient social and economic benefits. Many
individuals view the regime as corrupt and immobile,
and although anti monarchial sentiments are still not
widespread, many believe the system needs massive
reform. Students and opposition political parties are
particularly frustrated by the limited scope of
permissible political activity and the repressive tactics
used by the government to restrict public liberties. For
the most part, expression of these feelings has taken
the form of student and labor strikes, spontaneous
lawlessness, and localized clashes with the police.
However serious student riots in 1965 have
demonstrated that violence can erupt swiftly.
The prospects of insurgency or organized subversion
seem limited by the lack of a common ideology among
disaffected groups, their poor organization, and lack
of an effective means to challenge the government.
With the important exception of the conspirators in
the armed forces who led the attacks on the King in
1971 and 1972, most disgruntled groups have not
attempted to initiate extralegal action of a subversion
nature. Should strikes, disorders, and other acts of
defiance reach such proportions that military
intervention is necessary, however, the uncertain
loyalty of the army could prove perilous for Hassan 's
continued rule.
Since independence, the level of living of most
Moroccans has improved very little. The large
majority of the population still farms small plots of
land which barely provide a subsistence living because
of frequent drought. The peasants' hopes that their lot
would get better after independence have largely been
unfulfilled, and what modest gains have been made
are frequently nullified by population growth. For
those who remain in the countryside, the workings of
government seem remote and the monarchy still is an
important part of their tradition -bound way of life.
Many farmers resent the slow pace of agrarian reform,
however, and their deep personal attachment to the
King has been fading along with their expectations.
Land disputes between high ranking government
officials and peasant farmers have intensified
discontent in many rura! communities. Incidents
periodically erupt, but they have been quickly
suppressed.
An increasing number of rural villagers, particularly
young people, are moving to the cities, where
conditions in the rapidly expanding bidonvilles
(shantytowns) are worse than those in the countryside
and opportunities for earning a living are poor. In the
cities, the elegant homes of wealthy Moroccans and
members of the foreign community stand in stark
contrast to the ramshackle hats of the slum areas,
where most rural migrants are forced to live. Lack of
jobs and the wide gap between the rich and the poor
foster growing resentment toward the government,
particularly among youngsters whose opportunities for
getting an education or vocational training are
negligible. Frustrated by their plight, these
unemployed and disillusioned migrants have a natural
bond with other city slumdwellers. Among the urban
poor and unemployed, hostility toward the regime is
generally vented by joining in student and labor
demonstrations and protests. A substantial portion of
the unemployed urbanites in Casablanca participated
in the violent antigovernment riots in 1965, and they
have been a part of other less dramatic but frequent
disorders in other localities. Their major threat to the
government is the potential mass following they could
provide to the organized agitation of smaller interest
groups.
Of the various discontented groups in Morocco, the
most disillusioned and defiant are students and young
urban militants. Most of their grievances center on the
lack of jobs, the irrelevance of educathri to Moroccan
realities, the government's inept handli ig of problems
concerning students and youth, and the repressive
measures used against them. The e of
youth combined with the inability of a slowly
developing econorny to provide the necessary jobs
have created many of the problems common to most
developing nations. However, the excessively slow
pace of change in Morocco has increased tensions
between students and the regime to such a degree that
student restiveness is Morocco's most volatile problem.
Student discontent began to emerge in the early
1960'x. At that time, grievances centered on the
inefficiency of the educational bureaucracy and
parochial problems in various universities and
secondary schools. Furthermore, students were
basically voicing their fears that an education no
21
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

longer guaranteed automatic admission to elite
employment status and the privilege of joining in the
patronage system associated with the political and
social establishment. Although these frustrations and
fears are still underlying causes of student discontent,
a growing number of students no longer believe their
problems can be solved without major changes in the
political system, which they view as corrupt,
oppressive, and reactionary. They blame the lagging
pace of social and economic change on King Hassan Is
pandering to wealthy, established families and foreign
commercial inte-ests. Although many young
Moroccans espouse political philosophies ranging
from moderate reformism to Mao's brand of radical
Marxism, ideological conviction appears to be less
important as a motivating factor than anger and
frustration with their inability to effect change.
Although many students are associated with the
opposition National Front, they regard party leaders
with growing skepticism and see them as the old
guard, who are willing to sell out to the regime for only
token concessions.
Perennial student strikes have become sufficiently
widespread to affect seriously the continuity of
instruction in many universities and secondary
schools. Demonstrations and widespread boycotts
have resulted in clashes between protesting students
and police and security forces, who in some cases
respond with severe and brutal countermeasures.
Rather than quiet the students, these measures seem to
provoke recalcitrance.
Only a few extremist groups actually call for
abolition of the monarchy, but more and more
students have become openly critical of the King and
more bitter in their denunciation of government
policies. Student agitation is a threat to stability in
that it may serve as a potential catalyst for widespread
urban rioting.
Workers harbor considerable resentment toward the
government because of the slow pace of economic
reform and the complacency of the regime toward
labor interests. The workers' major grievances are low
wages, minimal fringe benefits, and poor hiring and
promotion policies. Although organized labor is a
major component in the National Front, the largest
union, UMT, has concentrated on exerting pressure
for improved benefits for workers rather than take on a
major role in the Front's fight for more representative
government, free elections, and a liberalized
constitution. B ;-n Seddik, founder and secretary
general of the UMT, has been able to keel) the UMT's
immedi: economic Clem: lh seT from dde
union's long -range politic�,, 6jectives, which p
22
those of the UNFP. So as not to risk labors gains, he
has remained aloof from the friction hetween the
palace and opposition parties, and has cautioned
UMT members not to participate in student disorders.
Workers have taken advantage of the political
tensions generated by the 1971 and 1972 coup
attempts to press their demands by staging a number
of effective walkouts, wildcat strikes, and sympathy
boycotts. A 10 -week strike of miners paralyzed the
important phosphate operation in Khouribga in 1971,
clashes between laborers and plant officials disrupted
the Moroccan Automobile Construction Company s
assembly plant for several weeks the same year, and
similar incidents have plagued other industries.
Following the assassination attempt in 1972, a rash of
24-hour strikes and more prolonged labor boycotts
contributed to serious political tensions.
Many young intellectuals in the middle and lower
levels of the bureaucracv and in various professions
and commercial enterprises are impatient and
disillusioned' with the political establishment. The
young elite consider their expertise underutilized and
undervalued and want a greater share in political
power. Additionally, they are dissatisfied with their
rate of advancement, salary levels, and fringe benefits.
Of broader concern to the intelligentsia is the lack of
freedom to express dissent and the excessive influence
of tradition in all facets of Moroccan life. They also
blame the monarchy for the slow development of the
nation and the lagging pace of Moroccanization of
business and employment. Much of their cynicism
and pessimism is expressed in open grumblings about
the King and in willful neglect of their work
responsibilities. Some have channeled their resentment
into political activism, usually within the framework
of opposition political parties. The small Communist
movement in Morocco also benefits from the
discontent of the young elite, .vho comprise the single
largest element among Communist supporters aril
sympathizers.
Longstanding tensions exist between Moroccan
Berbers'- and the Arabized majority of the population.
Most mountain Berbers believe that the\ have been
neglected and discriminated against by the Arab
dominated government, and that attempts to Arabize
the Moroccan culture threaten the Berber way of life.
Berber discontent frequently erupts into brawls
"]'he Moroccan population is overwhelmingly of Berher stock,
and the distinction between the approximately i5% called Arab and
thr roughly 25% called Berber is cultural and linguistic�. Thow
calheet t.f g h s are realh. Arabized Berbers. The so- called Berber
n�nnrih le s in the mountainous parts of Morocco and adheres to
Berber ;rxech and folkway~.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

between individual Arabs and Berbers, occasionally
developing into larger clashes involving numerous
members of both communities. Strife among Berber
tribes, however, has inhabited the formation of an
organized channel for Berber discontent. Two Berber
parties, the MP and the MPCD, represent the interests
of their leaders rather than reflect true Perber
sentiment, and neither party consequently has
substantial support. Lacking a direct channel for
political expression or decisive leadership, the majority
of the Berber people have remained aloof from
traditional Arab domination by maintaining their
isolated way of life in the remote regions of the
countryside.
During the protectorate period, the French actively
encouraged competition between Berbers and Arabs
using one group to offset the other. The French
encouraged the Berbers to join the military forces� to
counterbalance Arab domination of the political
scene �and Berbers still dominate the armed forces
today. Half of the cadets and officers through the rank
of captain are Berber and half are Arab, but from the
rank of major on, Berbers make up about 75%-805 of
the officer corps. Some Berbers have also attained
important positions in the government, and many are
now an integral part of the elite establishment.
However, the vast bulk of Berbers who have moved
into Arab dominated cities and towns are poor, and
many are unemployed.
Like their Arab counterparts, most impoverished
Berber city dwellers blame the government for their
squalid living conditions, the high cost of living, and
the lack of jobs. Their discontent takes on a distinctive
Berber coloration, however, in that they blarne Aral)
domination for their plight. Along with the rest of the
poor and unemployed, these Berbers are a potential
source of agitation.
Among the Berber elite, resentments are difficult to
identify. M uch has been made of the fact that most of
the high ranking officers who led the attacks on the
King in 1971 and 1972 were Berbers. Their alleged
antagonism toward the Arab elite: in the go ernment is
frequently singled out as a prime factor ;n their move
against the King. The personal backgrounds and
characters of most of these officers suggest, however,
that Berber disaffection was of secondary importance
to other motives. Nevertheless, their actions indicate
that, given other sources of dissatisfaction and
frustration, the Berber elite does not feel deeply
committed co a system controlled by an Arabized
majority.
Discottent within the military establishment has
W%Wlheel serious proportions in the wake of the two
coup attempts. Officers are keenly aware of King
Hassan's suspicions of them, and many men ho have
given years of loyal service to the palace deeply resent
this distrust. Many senior officers have been dismissed
or retired, and those who remain are bitter about the
rapid promotion of a number of younger officers to
command positions. Mane field -grade officers are
disgruntled with the degree of corruption and
nepotism within the armed forces, and some
undoubtedly feel they have little future in the military
under King Hassan's rule. Moreover, the junior ranks
of the officers corps, NCO's, and enlisted men are
more politically conscious than senior officers, and
some reportedly have connections with opposition
political parties. These: younger men also have close
contact with their peers outside the military
establishment and are probably sympathetic to
civilian criticism of the regime.
Despite King Hassan's assumption of direct
command of the armed forces, low morale, and Lek of
firm leadership in the officer, corps, and tension
between the palace and the military establishment are
likely to continue for some time. Thus the possibility
that another handful of officers will attempt to
overthrow the regime is stronger than ever. Moreover,
if the armed forces were called on repeatedly to
maintain public order, whole units might consider
such duty so demeaning that they .would refuse to
obey orders and thus precipitate a military takeover.
2. Subversion
Dissident groups and malcontents in Morocco and
in exile have frequently resorted to lawlessness,
political intrigue, and sporadic propaganda activit in
an M( +I lu weaken the regime's hold on the people.
Scattered cases of violence and plotting are not
uncommon. The potential for the emergk-nee of
organized subversive activity will remain as long as a
large part of the population is disaffected and believes
that the regime is not prepared to initiate meaningful
reforms. For the short term at least, these disaffected
elements are likely to remain disorganized and lack
political influence as long as the opposition political
parties, tribal elements, and special interest groups are
splintered and unable to agree on a measure of
cooperation. Although opposition politicians have
privately threatened to resort to extralegal measures,
there is no indication that they have acted on such
threats or that they are prepared to attempt to
overthrow Hassan. The only groups which currently
are engaged in Planned subversion are a small number
of leftist students.
23
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8
25X1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8
25X1

controlling racetracks and gambling operations,
issuing licenses for communications equipment, aerial
photergraph% and otht -r diverse activities, and
Controlling firearms and explosives. It also :u,niturs
and regulates the nwyenu nt of foreigners into
N1orocc�o and their ac�tiyities \%ithin the count rn
Following it reorganization in 1967, \%hen it absorbed
the personnel and presanably the mission of the
counterintelligence and counterespionage components
of the DGS\, this subdirectorate probabl\ had major
intelligence responsibilities. Recent information
suggests, lim%ever, that the sabdirec�torate no longer
conducts counterintelligence and counterespionage
operations. Nevertheless, it probablN still collects and
analyzes information pertaining to 11oroccan political
and social organizations, key Moroccan individuals of
scc�urity interest, and foreign elements and c�om-
naunities in the country. Its relationship to ;ether
organizations with similar reslxmsibilities and its
capabilit\ in the intelligence field are not clear.
b. Auxiliary Forces
'The Auxiliary Forces arc administered by the
General Inspectorate of :luxiliury Forces under the
`1inistry of Interior and are commanded b\ c�iyil
authorities on the provincial and municipal level. "I'hc
Arxiliary Forces arc of three basic types the
Administrative Maghzen (nade up of 11,500
provincial troops), the Mobile Maghzen, and the
Xur icipal Guard. The Administrative Maghzen and
the 3,000 Nlunic�ipal Guard troops arc used
6
throughout Morocco for maintaining order, guarding
sensitive areas, escorting tax collectors, controlling
cuntrab:and, manning border crossings and patrolling
the borders, and protecting people and property. Some
patrol on foot, while others ride un camels or bicycles.
These forces generidl\ supplement the activities of the
Urban Corps and the Mobile Inter%ention (:om-
panics. The Mobile Maghzen Figure ore a
motorized. rapid response organization of some 6.000
men. They remain permanently on alert and are often
used to patrol key border areas or to backstop the
:Wministratiye Maghzen, the DGS\, or the Rmal
Gendarmerie. Auxiliary Force persomiel �known as
,1laghzani �are recruited from local tribes, are often
illiterate, and receive the lowest paN of all go%ernnu�nt
servants. Thee arc not m�II trained but are probably it
reliable source of support for the Ding.
c�. Royal Gendarmerrr
"I'he gendarmerie, an elite organization subordinate
to the defense administration under the Ding, has
extensive lass enforcement responsibilities in rural
areas. Gendarmerie units arc charged \sith nuain-
teuanc�e of public order in these areas, control of
higF\y,a% traffic, sun against contraband. and
criminal investigation. Conunanded b\ an army
officer. the gendarmerie has a personnel strength of
3,500 men organized into 19 companies stationed at
eight regional command centers and one nubile unit
at the headquarters in Rabat. The basic working unit
of the gendarmerie is the brigade, some of \yhich have
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8
FIGURE 7. Mobile Maghzen (U /OU)

motorcycles or jeeps. Motorized brigades ,were fornned
specifically for rapid intervention, and their personnel
receive special training in riot control. There also are
special brigades for criminal investigation.
Although the gendarmerie is a relatively small force,
the quality of performance of the brigades is
considered good by Moroccan standards. After two
uprisings led i,y regular armed forces personnel, King
Hassan apparently has decided to rely more heavily on
the gendarmerie, ,which so far has proved itself a
dependable arm of the regime. In eni& 1972 there were
indications that Hassan planned to expand the force
to caunterbalance the regular military services. Many
gendarmerie officers are considered competent and
have received specialized training. A 2 -year
Gendarmerie Training aril Qualification School, now
located in Marrakech, was opened in 1963 to give
gendarmes special training in rural police activities.
Some officers and NCO's also receiyc training in
France.
Although the regular police units of the DGSN are
capable of handling their duties adequately under
normal conditions and are able to suppress localized
outbreaks of violence, a number of deficiencies would
limit their capability to contain widespread urban
disorders without major support from Che Auxiliary
Forces and the army. All of the police field units suffer
from shortages of properly trained administrative and
technical personnel. Police commissariats are
inefficient and generally understaffed. Except during
periods of extended alert, there are serious gaps in the
communications network between headquarters and
field units. Even in major cities, there are shortages of
equipment and much of the inventory is in disrepair.
These factors ,would seriouslw inhibit the police ill
reacting swiftly and effectively in an emergency. In
the event of widespread or prolonged Iting, the
Auxiliary Forces ,would probably be c �pled in to
support the police, but these forces are not organ;,
armed, or trained for traditional police work. In the
Casablanca riots in 1963, when the Auxiliary Forces
were finally moved in, order was restored only after
heavy loss of life. In contrast, the Royal Gendarmerie
is well trained and equipped and is capable of
maintaining order in rural areas.
During either urban or rural emergencies, the
Mobile Intervention Units of the DGSN and the
Mobile Maghzen could prove decisive because of their
ability to shift quickly to troublespots.
2. Intelligence
Morocco's intelligence services are undergoing
major changes as a result of their failure to uncover the
Skhirat conspiracy and the 1972 assassination plot.
The Ministry of Interior still has major respomsibility
for countersubversion counterespionage, and
intelligence collection, but some personnel and
responsibilities from its intelligence components have
been transferred to a new elite service directly
responsible to King Hassan.
This new organization, the Palace Intelligence
Service (PIS), is under the direction of Col. Ahmed
Dlimi, former head of the DGSN and one of the King's
closest advisers since the August 1972 assassination
attl_rmpt. The main corps of the PIS is made up of
former members of the DGSN clandestine wing who
have the greatest experience :n security and
intelligence matters. As the King's private service, the
PIS coordinates and maintains a close watch over the
activities of the various security organizations.
Although the PIS performs special technical and
surveillance tasks for the palace, this small elite corps
does not have the capability to undertake the broad
range of intelligence tasks which the DGSN can
perform with its extensive operational network.
Nevertheless, the PIS probably handles the most
sensitive security matters without the assistance or
knowledge of the DGSN.
Within the DGSN, two units, the General
Information Subdi rectorate and the Special Brigade
Subdirectorate, handle intelligence and counterintel-
ligence operations. The General Information
Subdirectorate is an overt political police force:
stationed throughout major cities and provincial
districts, with units operating out of local police
commissariats. These police units keep track of
dissident individuals and groups and gather
information involving security matters. They have
virtually unlimited powers of arrest and consequently
are the most feared organization in Morocco.
The Special Brigade, which is usually called
Cabinet 1: is the clandestine ,wing of the DGSN and
has major responsibility for counterintelligence and
counterespionage. Cabinet I has a network of
informants in various opposition organizations and is
targeted against foreign elements within the country.
The internal organization of Cabinet I has been in a
state of flux since early 197!, when its regional and
urban component were restructured to improve
security. Also, a number of its members have resigned
to join the PIS, and presumably Cabinet I's capability
has been significantly reduced as a result.
The Center for Information and Political Activities
is an intelligence- collecting unit directly subordinate
to the Minister of Interior rather than to the
Directorate General of the DGSN. Little is known
27
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

about its structure and duties except that it is
responsible for monitoring all political activity in
Morocco. It functions at all levels of government and
has access to the Ministry of Interior's extensive
apparatus throughout the country.
Military and strategic intelligence are the
responsibility of the Directorate of Intelligence and
Security, fo- :merly the Deuxieme Bureau, of the Royal
Armed Forces General Staff. This directorate has
expanded rapid; in recent years and has designated
officers in all major army units, az well as in the navy
and air force, to handle intelligence matters. Little is
known about its complex internal organization
because of the tight security practiced by its members.
The directorate is divided into two main sections: the
Surete Militaire, which handles personnel and
installation security, counterintelligence operations,
and specialized investigations; and the Foreign
Relations Section, which maintains liaison with
foreign military attaches and coilects foreign
intelligence.
The failure of the Surete Militaire to uncover either
of the two military conspiracies which nearly toppled
Kind; Hassan, however, has cast serious doubt on its
capability and even its loyalty. Although there is no
information on the internal changes within the
military intelligence services since the August 1972
attack on the King, personnel of both services
presumably have been prime targets in the overall
purge of the armed forces.
Moroccan intelligence has usually been fairly
effective in neutralizing subversion and in alerting the
police to the possibility of disorders. Temporary
detention of suspected agitators and preemptive
I
arrests of known malcontents have helped to defuse
potential outbreaks of violence and, in some cases,
have minimized the effects of protests and
demonstrations. Close surveillance and harassment of
opposition groups, punitive measures for alleged
'.wersion, and other more brutal countermeasures
gave also served as temporary deterrents to potential
dissidents. Such measures have increased resentment
toward the regime, however, and are probably
counterproductive over the long term.
G. Selected bibliography (U /OU)
Ashford, Douglas E. Perspectives of a Moroccan
Nationalist. Princeton: Bedminster Press. 1964. A case
history of political development in Morocco, with
importa:.t insights on the impact of the struggle for
independence and of Islam on the nationalist
movement.
Political Change in Morocco. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 1961. Although somewhat
dated, this work treats many of the factors which
continue to have an impact on current politics.
Gallagher, Charles F. \11orciceo and Its Neighbors.
New York: American Universities Fielcl Staff, Inc.
1967. Briefly summarizes Morocco's border claims and
analyzes its relations with surrounding countries.
Waterbury, John. "The Moroccan Putsch." New
York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc. 1971.
Chroi,1cles the events leading up to the July 1971 coup
attempt, the skirmish, and the aftermath.
The Commander of the Faithful. New
York: Columbia Press. 1970. An in -depth analysis of
political dynamics in Morocco and the role of elite
groups.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

CHRONOLOGY (U /OU)
c. 146 B.C. -A.D. 400
Roman influence and subsequent control replaces that of the
Carthaginians.
A.D. 429
Invasions by Vandals and Visigoths begin.
c. 685
Arab raiders enter through the Taza gap.
711
Forces under the leadership of the Arab governor Musa Ibn
Nusnyrancl his Berbersuballern Tariq invade Spain.
c. 788
Moulay Idriss, it descendant of the Prophet, establishes the
first Moroccan dynasty and extends hegenxmy over most of
the northern part of the country.
c. 1000
Arab tribes of the I Mal invade Morocco.
1062
Berber tribes from the south make Marrakech the new capital
and found Almoravid dynasty.
1147
Nevv confederation takes Marrakech and its leaders become
the Ahnohad rulers.
1212
Almohad forces are defeated in Spain, and Muslim power there
begins to wane.
c. 1216
The Beni Merin tribe enters Morocco, defeats the Almnhads,
and eventually establishes the Merinid dynasty.
1549
Capture of Fes marks beginning of control by the Saadians,
who had previously defeated Portuguese forces.
c. 1576
Sultan Abd al -Malik is influenced by the Ottoman Auks, who
then controlled the rest of the Maghreb, but he resists their
domination.
1664
Moulav al- Rashid becomes the first strong ruler of the Alaouite
dynasty, which started to rise to power about 1660.
1787
Morocco and the United States sign the Treaty of Marrakech
settling differences resulting from pirate seizure of U.S, ships.
1912
Treaty of Fes establishes the French Protectorate; Spanish
zones are recognized in the north and south and the existing
international status of Tangier is accepted.
1956
March
Formal independence is granted by France to French Protector-
ate of Morocco.
April
Spain relinquishes control over Spanish Protectorate of Morocco.
October
International status of Tangier is revoked; none is integrated
into Morocco.
1958
April
Spain relinquishes control over the southern Spanish zone of
Morocco.
1960
June
U.S. militarc assistance program is initiated.
1961
February
King Mohamed V dies.
March
Mohamed's son is enthroned as King Hassan 11 and maintains
royal control of the govcnunent, acting as his own Prime \lin-
ister.
1962
December
Morocco's first written constitution becomes effective, following
approval by popular referendum.
1963
October
Moroccan territorial claims lead to 3 -week border vvar with
Algeria.
December
U.S. Strategic Air Command completes evacuation of three
bases in Morocco.
1965
March
Student demonstrations in Casablanca escalate into violent
antigovernment riots joined b\ the unemployed and by young
militants from opposition factions. Violence spreads to Fes but
not to other cities. About 250 are killed, 4,000 injured, and 8.30
arrested.
29
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

1965
June
King declares a State of Exception (I'etut d'exception), dis-
misses parliament, and promises a revised constitution and new
elections.
October
Mehdi Ben Barka, exiled UNFP leader, is kidnapped in Paris.
Facts of his disappearance remain unclear, but case leads to a
deterioration in Morocco's relationship with France. In January
1966, France recalls its Ambassador to Morocco, and Morocco
recalls its Ambassador to France.
1966
October
Hassan visits Moscow. Four conventions are signed, including
a general economic aid agreement.
1969
January
Spain and Morocco sign the Treaty of Fes in which Spain agrees
to return to Morocco the enclave of Ifni.
Morocco and Algeria sign the Ifrane treaty of Friendship
December
France and Morocco agree to reestablish full diplomatic rela-
tions.
30
1970
August
King Hassan promulgates a new constitution and lifts the State
of Exception. Elections are held for a new unicameral legis-
lature.
1971
July
High- ranking army officers lead an unsuccessful coup attempt
against King Hassan at his birthday celebration at Skhirat
Palace. Loyal forces under the direction of Gen. Mohamed
Oufkir restore order within a few days.
1972
March
King Hassan promulgates a new constitution but makes no
firm promise on a date for new elections and the establishment
of parliament.
August
The King escapes another attempt on his life when three Moroccan
Air Force F -5's try to shoot down the plane bringing him from
France.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

Sr:CIirT
Glossary (U/OU)
ABBREVIATION
FRENCH
ENGLISH
DGSN
Direction Generale de la Securite Na-
General Directorate of National Se-
tionale
curity
MCP
Moroccan Communist Party
MP
Mouvement Populaire
Popular Movement
MPCD
Mouvement Populaire Constitutionel
Constitutional and Democratic Popu-
et Democratique
lar Movement
PIS
Palace Intelligence Service
PLS
Parti de la Liberation et du Socialisme
Party of Liberation and Socialism
UGEM
Union Generale des Etudiants Maroc-
General Union of Moroccan Students
ains
UGTM
Union Generale des Travailleurs Ma-
General Union of Moroccan Workers
rocains
UMT
Union Marocaine du Travail
Moroccan Labor Union
UNEM
Union Nationale des Etudiants Ma-
National Union of Moroccan Stu
rocains
dents
UNFP
Union Nationale des Forces Populaires
National Union of Popular Forces
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
31
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080027 -8