NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 39B; NATIONALIST CHINA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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V IM SECRET
MY
MU. 39B/GS/GP
.1
H
!Nationalist China
April 1974
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
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CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the political cover-
age in the General Survey dated August 1970.
A Introduction
1
B. Structure and function of government
3
1. General
3
2. Constitution
4
3. Central government
6
a. National Assembly
6
b. President and Vice President
6
c. Executive Yuan
7
d. Legislative Yuan
7
e. Judicial Yuan
7
f. Examination Yuan
8
g. Control Yuan
9
4. Provincial and local governments
9
5. Civil service
10
i SEMET
LNA4RiaRQfSC* 1xM'... wN4. P' is. IV.� m. rw �w
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I
Page Page
C. Political dynamics 10 F. Maintenance of internal security 23 L i
1. The President and the Premier
10
1. General
23
2. The Kuomintang
11
2. Police and the internal security services
24
3. Election laws and practices
14
a. Police
24
4. Succession
16
b. Internal security services
26
D. National policies
17
G. Intelligence
27
1. Introduction
17
1. National Security Bureau
27
2. Domestic
18
2. Military intelligence agencies
28
3. Foreign
19
3. KMT intelligence activities
28
E. Threats to government stability
21
H. Suggestions for further reading
29
1. Discontent and dissidence
21
Chronology
30
2. Communist subversion
23
Glossary
31
t
I
FIGURES
Page
Page
Fig. 1 President Chiang Kai -shek photo)
1
Fig. 3 Premier Chiang Ching -kuo photo)
11
Fig. 2 Constitutional structure of the GRC
chart)
5
Fig. 4 Vice President Yen Chia -kan photo)
17

M
M
0
9
Government and Politics
A. Introduction (C)
The Government of the Republic of China (GRC),
which combines traditional Chinese, modern Western,
and contemporary Communist governmental con-
cepts, is in form it constitutional republic. According
to the constitution, adopted in 1947, governmental
powers are shared by the Executive, Legislative,
Judicial, Examination, and Control Yuans (branches).
The parliamentary function is shared by the
Legislative Ynan and the National Assembly, the
latter of -which is constitutionally an elective body that
exercises "political powers on behalf of the whole body
of citizens."
Obvious discrepancies exist, however, bet- een
constitutional provisions and political realities.
Historically. the CRC essentially has been a one- party,
one -man government. Governmental power has been
concentrated chiefly in the executive ,ind, more
specifically, in the person of the increasingly feeble 86-
year -old President, Chiang Kai -shek (Figure I
Moreover, President Chiang dominated the Kuonin-
tang (National Peoples Party �KMT) a monolithic
political organization, in his capacih as Director
General. In turn, the Kuomintang exercises firm, and
pervasive coi trot over governmental and political
proc,sses. Since raid -1972, President Chiang's
declining health has confined him to a hospital and
ended his active participation in political affairs. The
mantle of power has descended to his son, Premier
Chiang Ching -kno. The Premier has been carefully
groomed by his father to take up the leadership and,
although the succession has occurred carlir-r than was
expected, it has gone smoothly.
Although power theoretically resides in the people
through the right of franchise, wily a few limited,
controlled elections have been held since the removal
of the central government to Taiwan in 1949. As a
result, those Chinese from the mainland who were
chosen in the national elections of 1947 have
continued to dominate the central government's
elective bodies. Beyond this, the maintenance and
enforcement of a st, of martial law since the retreat
to Taiwan has circumvented many of the individual
rights and guarantees in the constitution.
1`
Iu
I
The Rennblic of China (ROC), like th I'cople's
Republic of China (PRC), lays historic claim to
"Taiwan. This clain, is bases; on Chinese ownership
prior to the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-95; the Cairo
Declaration of 1913, which promised the return of
Taiwan to China and which was reaffirmed in the
I'visdam Declaration of 1945; and Japans renuncia-
tion of smoreignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores
(Penghu) islands in the peace treat\- of 1952. The legal
static, of the province remains somewliat anomalous,
however, since no stlecific disposition of the territory
was made in the e,( -aty.
The GRC's move to Taiwan resulted in a unique
political phenomenon. A national superstruetnre was
imposed upon the provincial government, with both
having jurisdiction over essentially the sane
administrative and geographic :area. Not only h." this
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FIGURE 1. President Chiang Kai -shek (C)

resulted in constitutional inconsistencies, but it also
has greatly compromis the integrity of the Taiwan
Provincial Government, which serves as the passive
and unobtrusive agent of the central government.
Prospects of survival appeared bleak in the initial
years following the retreat of the GRC to Taiwan.
Disorganized and dispirited national leaders went
ahcut the task of reestablishing central governmental
institutions and restoring required government
service;. Desertions. defections, and defeats had
demoralized both the armed forces and the KNIT. A
Chinese Communist invasion of the island appeared
imminent, particularly following President Truman's
assertion on ,3 January 19,30 that the United States was
not committed to the defense of Taiwan. The prospect
of collapse from internal subversion was hardly less
sobering. The native Taiwanese were sullen and
resentful as a result of both the intrusion of the
mainland refugees and the harsh suppression of a
Taiwanese uprising in 194T in protest against 2 years
of Nationalist misgovernment and brutality. The
pro,rlems of inflation and corruption, prime factors in
the Chiang regime's collapse on the mainland,
accompanied the regime to Taiwan. Added to all this
was the question of whether the predominantly
agricultnral economy of the island would be able to
sustain an additional 1.5 million persons. There was
unevrtaint that these major problens, whose solution
aas required if 'Taiwan was to velop into it
springboard for the "counterattack" ag.:inst the
mainland, would he surmounted. Moreover, the
11M.'s standing within tht� international communit
N as rendered precarious by expulsion from the
mainland and by recogniCon of the People's Republic
of China by a number of governments.
A thoroughgoing transformation has been ac-
complished in the more than two decades the
Nationalists have been on Taiwan, and the GRC has
emerged as a model of internal stability with the
region. Failure of the Communists to follow np their
victory or, the mainland and the ability of tic
Nationalists to regroup restored the latter's confidence
and nosol The outbreak of the Korean war in
raid 19:x(1 and the subsequent dispatch of the U.S.
Seventh Fleet to the Formosa 5trai! largely nullified
the threat of a Communist invasion from the
mainland. These developments were followed in 19,54
by the conclusion of the Sino -U.S. Mu!ual Defense
"treaty, which committee! the United States to the
defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores islands.
Reginni ig in 1931, the armed forces were reorganized
and were given modern equipment and training,
mainly by the United States. With the gradual
2
reduction of U.S. grant military aid during the 1960's
and its termination on 30 June 1973, the (,RC has
been compelled to rely on its oxvn financial resources
for further modernization of its military establishment.
As it result of effective countermeasures b% the
national intelligence and security forces, subversion
was brought under firm control by 1932, and by the
mid- 1930's the problem was nominal. There have
been some modest recurrences of subversive activities,
however, and uncertain future prospects could offer a
potential for subversion. During the past :3 or 4 years,
the decline of Taiwan's international political stature.
U.S. efforts to normalize relations with Peking, and
mainland efforis to win support on the island for
eventual reunification have raised questions about the
future of tit( Nationalist regime on Taiwan. The
regime must cope both \%ith native Taiwanese
advocates of it juridically_ independent Taiwan as well
as with dissatisfied groups within the island's
mainland Chinese community. Debate -within the
leadership over v. course will best serve their own
interests, and the survival of the regime could
engender domestic unrest. The smooth assumption of
control by Premier Chiang Ching -kuo, however,
precluded uw, chance that Taiwan might he subjected
to the strains of an immediate succession crisis.
Moreover, the present KM "T leadership appears to
have learner several lessons from their loss of the
mainland. They are well aware that continued
economic prosperity, controlling inflation, and cutting
clown on corruption are necessary if the regime is to
maintain c;ornestic support. Unless the regime should
nm into opposition on the scale of a massive,
organized uprising. the nation's security forces appear
fully capable of maintaining internal security.
Although community tensions have eased in recent
years aad there is more Taiwam se re :cplivity to
Chiang Ching -kuo than to earlier mainland leaders,
native Taiwanese still feel some resentment toward the
CRC, mainly because of their virtual exclusion from
policynuaking and command positions in the central
government, the ruling Kuomintang, the government
sector of the economy, and the armed forces. To a
somewhat lesser extent they are also resentful of the
burdens of taxation and military conscription they are
required to assume to maintain tic disproportionately
large military establishment, as well as the denial of
personal rights under martial law and the unwilling-
ness of the central government to permit an opposition
political rnovenient. Moreover, they generally do not
identify thetnselves with the Gli(:'s goal to regain
control of the mainland.
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'4�.1
A serious challenge to the GRC under prevailink
conditions, however, can he largely discounted.
Uncertainties over the islands future appear to have
convinced many Taiwanese that they must acquiesce
to the Nationalist regime to preserve what they have.
The Taiwanese are achieving, alheit slovdy, increasing
representation in political and governmental
institutions. While they have not acquired substantial
political power, they dominate politics at the
provincial and local levels and have achieved
supremacy in the private sector of the economy. At the
national level they have gained more repre,entation
than ever before. Ambitions young Taiwanese
politicians are becoming increasingly willing to enter
the KMT in the well- founded belief that it is the only
way to success. Once they start working within the
systern, they often acquire an intc-est in its
perpetuatio The governments land reform program
was well received by the peasantry. The standard of
living is one of the highest in Asia, and it is rising
rapidly. In addition, the Taiwanese view time as their
ally and are disinclined to challenge the government.
To do so would not only risk the material and social
benefits already achieved but also invite harsh
retributive measures and in the Taiwanese vies%,
would risk chaos and invite Communist intervention.
Taiwanese der not desire Communist control and
appear for the present to be almost insesceptible to
Communist propaganda.
Although the Nationalist government officially
remains publicly committed to the recovery of the
mainland, this therne has lost its reality and is being
giver di fill r,;shifig emphasis by national leaders. A
reordering of priorities has emerged it fact, with
emphasis on the development of 'Taiwan into it
modern, economically progressive island. No military
offensive against the mainland is seriously contem-
plated. F,ven the minor sabotage and if
operations directed against the mainland by GRC
agents have generally come to naught, and operations
from Taiwan appear to hav been stopped after 1969.
F.rnphasis on economic development has caused
technocrats to assume an increasingly responsible role
in national plans, and greater amounts of national
resources are being used for economic and social
development programs.
The hallmarks of GRC foreign policy have been the
preservation of the (RC's identity abroad as the
legitimate government of China and an uncornpronais-
ing opposition to communism. In pursuit of both of
these airns, the (AW, has relied heavily_ on the United
States to holster its defenses :111(1, to a lesser extent, to
advance its economic development.
For about two decades the GRC displayed virtually
no flexibility in foreign affairs. Peking's success in
expanding its international relations, symbolized by
the PRC's replacement of the ROC in the United
Nations in October 1971, led to growing anxiety about
the future status of Taiwan. A concerned leadership in
Taipei adapted some\yhat more flexible tactics in
foreign policy as the Nationalist regime continued to
decline in international status. Starting in 1969 an
increasing number of countries switched their
diplomatic relations from Taipei to Peking. The visit
of President Nixon to Peking in February 1972 and the
exchange of liaison offices between Peking and
Washington in February 1973 have increased the
Nationalists apprehension concerning their future. A
particular! hard jolt was the diplomatic recognition
of Peking by Japan, which has been if major trade
partner for the ROC. "Taipei has quietly tried to
maintain informal ties with nations recognizing
Peking, and wherever possible it has continued to send
technical missions abroad, particularly to those
African and Latin American nations which continue
diplomatic relations with Taipei. By such efforts it has
enjoyed some successes in offsetting their growing
political isolation. but the problem of their future
international status remains unsolved. Thus far, the
ROC has been reasonably successful in suhstitnting
trade relations for diplomatic relations.
B. Structure and function of government
(C)
1. General
Although the central government theoretically
shares its powers with governmental systems at the
provincial, count}, awl municipal levels, obvious
discrepancies exist between constitutional provisions
and governmental practices. The influence of the
central government, for vicars dominated by the now
inactive President Chiang Kai -shek and now tinder the
leadership of his sun. Premier Chiang Ching -kuo, is
pervasive. Since the exodus of the (AW to Tai%%an, the
central and 'Taiwan provincial governnu�nts have
exercised jurisdiction within practically identical
geographic boundaries. As it result, the provincial
government has functioned mainly as in unquestion-
ing and pliant :agency of the central government.
The maintenance of martial law for more than 20
years has :accentuated the nondemocratic aspects of
executive power. Although extensive individual rights
are guaranteed by the constitution, their exercise may
he limited "for reasons of preventing infringements
:3
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upon the freedoms of other people, averting an
imminent crisis, maintaining social order, or
advancing the general .welfare." This constitutional
provision is the basis of restrictions known as
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of
Communist Rebellion, .which have been in force since
their adaption by the National Assembly in April
1948. The Temporary Provisions enabled the President
the following month to declare a state of martial law
without obtaining the pproval of the Legislative
Yuan. The Temporary Provisions also stated that the
President was to call an extraordinary session of the
National Assembly not later than 25 December 1950 to
decide whether or not the provisions were to remain in
force. This requirement was not met, however,
because of the disorganization resulting from the
withdrawal of the central government to Taiwan in
1949. Continuation of the President's emergency
,owers has been maintained by subsequent sessions of
the National ;Assembly, which has consistently bent to
the President's will oil basic policy questions.
Alert to any advantages that might ensnc from the
excesses generated by the Cultural Revolution in the
PRC, the National Assembly in 1966 gave the
President two additional extra constitutional powers at
t :w same time it renewed his emergency authority.
The first permitted him to establish what was its effect
to be a planning agency for the recovery of the
mainland. Under this authority ti e National Security
Council (NSC) was created in early 1967.
Until his incapacitating illness in the summer of
1971, the NSC was dominated by its chairman,
President Chiang Kai -shek. The NSC is empowered to
formulate major policies, decide on general
mobilization, lay down principles for national
reconstruction, administer civil affairs and supervise
the military government in "liberated areas, and
determine basic policies for suppression of the
"Communist rebellion." 'Technically the NSC also has
authority over the National Security Bureau (NSB),
the supreme coordinating agency for the ROC's
intelligence and security community. Despite its wide
mandate, however, the NSC; has not produced
practical results. Its reorganization in the summer of
1972 by Premier Chiang Ching -kuo appeared further
to reduce the NS(: s potential as a locus of power, and
it has served only in a secondary consultative role in
the Chiang Ching -kuo government.
The other power given the President allowed him to
"readjust the administrative and personnel organiza-
tions of the central government's and to hold elections
to fill vacancies in the central government or add
representation to reflect population increases in
4
Tai%%an and in mainland areas that might he
recaptured by the GRC. Under the latter authority.
elections were held in December 1969 to select 15
members to the National Assembly and additional
members to the two elective yuans of the central
government. Further elections held in December 1972
gave the KMT its usual sweeping victory at all levels.
The party scored it clean sweep in races for county
magistracies and mayors of large cities, 58 of 73
seats in the Provincial Assembly, 43 of a3 new
National Assembly seats, and :30 of 36 new seats in the
Legislative Yuan. Ten ne%w members were elected to
the central gove-nment's Control Yuan in February
1973 by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, with the
KNIT %winning nine of the seats.
2. Constitution
The constitution of the GRC was adopted in
December 1946 by a constitutional assembly
convoked to fulfill the promise Chiang Kai -shek made
during World War 11, to end the 20 -year period of
KMT "tutelage" and inaugurate a representative
form of government. The constitution derives chiefly
frorn the political precepts of Sun Yat -sen and is
fundamentally democratic. Subject to the limitations
and restrictions engendered by a continuing state of
martial law, the constitution enumerates the freedoms,
rights, and duties of Chinese citizens, including the
rights of election, initiative, referendum, and recall. It
grants suffrage to all Chinese over 20 years of age and
includes it broad bill of rights guaranteeing freedom of
domicile, speech, correspondence, religion, and
assembly, and all "other freedoms and rights of the
people that are not detrimental to social order or
public welfare. The umstitution also enumerates
obligations the citizen has to the state, including
payment of taxes, military service, and the "right and
duty to receive citizens e.lucation." The constitution
further commits the government to limited state
socialism by assigning it responsibility for the
enactment of progressive economic and social
legislation and by according it broad control powers
over educational and cultural institutions. Opportu-
nity for employment commensurate with the capacity
and ability of the peopie is encouraged, and the state
is required to provide assistance and relief to the aged,
the infirm, the disabled, and the victims of natural
calamities, as well as to give special protection to
working women and children.
The constitution provides for an elective National
Asernbly, a President elected by that body, and, in
accordance with the theories of Sun Yat -sen, a
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Ie SR La TEN TNW& ff
6
government consisting of five independent branches,
called Moans, which perform executive, legislative,
and judicial functions plus the traditional Chinese
functions of examination and contmi. Each of the five
Yuan is under the direction of a president, vice
president, and secretariat. The parliamentary function
is shared by the Legislative Yuan and the National
Assembly; tit�� latter exercises "politico' powers on
be half of the whole body of citizens.'
Fite actual structu :c of political power differs in
man} respe front the formal governmental structure
described in the constitution a�td shown in Figure 2.
During the lifetime of Chiang Kai -shek the
paramount authorih has been the President of the
RC. This extreme concentration of mower is
explained primarily by three factors: 1) the Chinese
political tradition of vesting virtually unlimited power
in one person: 2) the forceful and pervasive personality
of Generalissimo Chiang Kai -shek; and 3) Chiang s
position as Director General of the KMT and
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The
constitutional limitation of the two pre sidential terms
has pe repeatedly set aside, most recently in 1972, so
that the Generalissimo could stay in office. I'he
purported reason for this suspension, appro%ed by the
Generalissimo as in alternative to it constitutional
amendment, was the emergency resulting from the
"civil war" with the Communists. Since jol) 1972
President Chiang has been unable to perform his
governmental functions clue to illness and advanced
age. Since then his son, Premier Chiang Ching -kuo,
has beco!nc dic center of political power and
authority', but he seems to he more responsive to senior
aides than was his father.
4" -A
a
a
NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
(6 -Year Term)
NATIONAL SECURITY
PRESIDENT COUNCIL
President
VICE PRESIDENT Vim President
(6 -Yaw T
CONTROL
LEGISLATIVE
EXECUTIVE
JUDICIAL EXAMINATION
YUANe
YUAN
YUAN
YUAN YUAN
Yuan President
Yuan President
Yuan President Yuan President
Vice Presldanf
Vice President
PREMIER
Vice President Vice President
(6 -Yaw Term)
(3 -Yaw Term)
Grand Justices
Vice Premier
Auditor
and Minister
Gercrol
AW. 0
1
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
PROVINCIAL
ASSEMBLY"
Govemor^ k
LtBR/lOS1 or AKA
P I 'I
COUNTY
COUNTY O,t OTY GOVERNMENT 1 le(IIOIM CCLIBIm
OR CITY
2 Co" vrm Cad&XR
ASSEMBLY
County Magistrate 3 t
or City Mayors**
eM ad'/gpl le *80 C*AW jUM ftEs Bf/ eel bded by i.rleAr
t a wl.' .Bd(LIxM a(.. r�w P M i alBd
b y jMW Ot AAIII!(OORW OW GIER IM)R iii. 0. R, t&r,: tEllw
_0s0sl &AW Ibi" vAwA ire ow ill
�*want Bit f4ii ,v.ao a,I 0WW
FIGURE 2. Constitutional structure of the GRC, 1973 (U /OU)
j
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3. Central government
a. National Assembly
The highest organ of government is the National
Assemhly, which theoretically implements Sun 1'at-
sen's doctrine that political power should be held by
the people. The Assembly's powers include the right to
elect inc President and Vice President, to act on
impeachment measures initiate against the President
or Vice President by the Control Yuan, to amend the
constitution, to ratify anry constitutional amendments
introduced by the legislative Yuan, to alter national
boundaries, and to initiate national legislation when
requested by the President.
Under the constitution, members are elected for
year te from regional and occupational groups.
The first National Assembly elections were held in
1947 and resulted ;n a 2,962 member holy. Those
me mbers from th mainland who fled to Taiwan in
1949 have continued to comprise the overwhelming
majority of the Assembly, although their ranks have
been greatly reduced by deaths, resignations, and
retirements. Central government elec' ;ons held in
November 1969 and December 1972 added it total of
68 nee me mbers, as well as n:.v members to the
Legislative and Control Yuans. In late 1973 Assembly
membership was 1,102. The decisions to hold the
elections were based officially on the desire to give
added representation to Taiwan Province, since its
population had more than doubled since 1947. More
practical but unexpressed, reasons were that the
elections provided a means of increasing membership
in the central governments principal branches since
their membership had dwindled over the vears.
without., however, increasing the power of the
Taiwanese in these branches of the government
meaningfully. flans for larger scale elections in the
1'uans were cut clown substantially shortly after
1'remier Chiang took office.
Since the constitution was adopted, the National
Assembly has met every 6 years since 19.8 for the
purpose of choosing the President and Vice President
and sanctioning the continued exercise of emergency
powers by Hie President while it state of War with the
Communists exists. The Assembly is summoned into
regular session by the President 90 clays before the
expiration of cacti presidential term, but extraordinary
sessions are called for such purposes as the ratification
of constitutional amendments. A special 10 dav
session was convened just prior to the session in
Febnnary 1966 to discuss giving the Assembly the
powers of initiative and referendum, but the onl
action taken \vas to increase the salarie!, of its
members, a hpical ex:,rnple of compromise, whereby
the Assembly acceded to the Presidents \%ill in
exchange for personal perquisites. A presidium of 8.3
members is elected from among the delegates to serve
as a steering committee, kith members of the
presidium presiding in rotation mer plenary sessions of
the Assembly. In addition to its regular committees,
the National A, sembl' has it permanent secretariat
headed by it secretary general. In recent scars. the
Assembly has remained largely inactive, except during
its regular sessions every 6 vears.
b. President and V %ce President
The President, who must he a Chinese citizen and
he at least 40 years of age, is titular head of state and
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. With the
consent of the Legislative Yuan, he appoints the
President (Premier) of the Lxecutive Yuan and the
auclitar general of the Control Yuan, and he
promulgates lays, treaties, and declarations of war.
He may also ask the Legislative Yuan to reconsider
any hill enacted by that body, if the executive branch
thinks it enforcement will he particular) difficult or
inexpedient, but his request may he overruled hy_ it
two thirds vote of the� legislators in attendance.
Of prime importance is the Presidents power to
issue ordinary and emergency decrees. The President is
also authorized to declare martial law and, under it
issue emergency decrees "in case of a natural calantih,
an epidemic, or it serions national financial and
economic crisis." The Temporary Provisions Effective
During the Period of Communist Rebellion, adopted
by the National Asscntblc in 1948, nullified the
original constitutional requirement of legislative
approval for the Presidents emergency actions, but all
decrees issued by the Nesident mnst he countersigned
by the Premier, who is constitutional) responsible to
the Legislative Yuan. As Commander in Chief of the
armed forces, the 1resident also controls the military
establishment. "Thus in practice the President possesses
almost unlimited a tit horith, but his powers are
informally limited by extraconslitutional factors such
as pressure front other KMT and government leaders.
Possible reaction from the people if it were to follo\y
grossly unpopular actions is also it factor, but of lesser
significance than pressures that can he exerted within
the leadership. Moreover, the aulhorih of the
['resident over subordinate leaders and his countrvrnen
may be eroded if his government proves dvinonstrably
unahle to induce the I'nited Slates to take account of
Taiwan's interests.
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a
Like the President, the Vice President must be it
Chinese citizen and be of least 40 years of age. He
likewise serves a 6 -year term normally and is restricted
c�onstitutionallw to two terms. The Vice President has
no significant crmstitntional functions except to
succeed to the presidency if the office becomes vacant
or to exercise the functions of the presidency if the
President should be unable to attend to office due to
any cause. Since President Chiang Kai- shek's
incapacitation in Jule 1972, Vice President Yen Chia
kae has undertaken marry of the ceremonial duties of
the presidency, but he has not officiall.c assumed the
office nor does he exercise its executive functions.
Premier Chiang Citing kuo has acted as de facto he.td
of the government in the day -to -day administration of
affairs and in the formulation of policy.
c. Executive Yuan
The highest administrative organ in the national
government is the Executive Yuan, which ftmctions
primarily as a cabinet. Second only to the President in
influence and power, the Executive Yuan is under the
supervision of a president, or Premier, as he is known
informally. The Premier is appointed by the President,
with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. Ministers,
chairmen of commissions, and ministers without
portfolio compose the Executive Yuan, and are
appoh tcd by the PreAdent upon the i.�comniendation
of the Premier.'
The Executive Ynan is responsible to the Legislative
Ynan, to which it must submit its administrative
policies and reports as well as the national budget. The
Legislative Yuan may question members of the
Executive Yuan and disapprove or alter policies. If the
Executive Yuan objects to it hill or policy resolution
passed by the Legislative Yuan, it can request it
"reconsideration," which is in effect it veto. An
executive veto may he overridden by it two- thirds
majority of the Legislative Yuan in attendance, in
which case the Premier roust acquiesce or resign.
Because of KNIT dominance in both the Executive
and Legislative Ynans, major impasses between the
two bodies under previ:iling conditions arc unlikely;
consequently, an executive veto normally would he
sustained. In practice the Legislative Yuan does not
initiate legislation, but it enacts measures
occasionally with modifications� suhrrtittcd to it by
the I ?xec�utive Yuan.
'For a current listing; of kc' n c�
go%eunnt officials comalt Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Member of Foreign Gocern� published
nwnthh In the Dirvetorate of Intelligence, entral Intelligence
Agenc
d. Legislative Yuan
The Legislative Yuan, it unicameral body, is the
highest lawmaking organ in the state. Its members are
elected for -vear terms by geographical and
vocational constituencies and may be reelected. The
first Legislative Yuan was elected in 19.17 and had 760
members when it first convened in 1948. Until
December 1969 it was composed of members chosen in
the 1947 election who withdrew to Taiwan in 1949
and have since remained active, plus alternates elected
in 1948 and designated between 19.19 and 1951 to fill
vacancies that occurred during those years. Eleven
new members were eluted in 1969 and 36 in
December 1972, giving it 161 members as of January
1973.
The Legislative Yuan is empowered to adopt laws,
review budget estimates. ratify treaties, and declare
war. It may also force the resignation of the Premier,
either by it motion of censure or by overriding it veto.
The Legislative Yuan also administers grants -in -aid to
local governments and resolves jurisdictional disputes
between the central and local governments. The
Legislative Yuan in practice serves mainly as it gadfly
of the Executive Yuan, however, deriving its principal
influence as an institution from its ability to bring
minor e mbarrassment to executive officers by
questioning them.
The Legislative Yuan meets twice a year, from
February to May and front September to December,
but its sessions max be extend( if necessary.
Extraordinary sessions may be convoked upon request
of the President or of at least one- fourth of the
membership. A quorum consists of not less than one
tifth of the entire membership resident in Taiwan, and
hills and resolutions are adopted by majority vote.
e. Judicial Yuan
"I'he Judicial Yuan, the highest judicial organ of the
state, interprets the constitution and has the power !o
unify the interpre of laws and orders."
Moreover, it has responsibility for the adjudication of
civil, criminal, and administrative cases, as well as the
discipline and punishment of public functionaries,
except those tried by military courts. The president
and vice president of t1w Judicial Yuan are appointed
by the President. with the consent of the� Control
Yuan.
I'll( four judicial agencies of the Judicial 1 uan are
the Council of Grand Justices, the Committee for the
Discipline of Public F inictionarie�s, the Administrative
Court, and the Supreme Court. Members of the
Council of Grand Justices are appointed to 9 year
6
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terms by the President, with the consent of the Control
Yuan. 'Phis body is responsible for interpreting the
constitution, settling conflicts between national and
local laws, and resolving divergent constitutional
interpretations rendered by judicial agencies. This
authorit can he exercised only upon application by
nationa: or local organs of government and when
doubts arise between two or more departments of
government about constitutional interpretations. Tae
Committee for the Discipline of Public Functionaries
metes out penalties to government officials who have
either been impeached by the Control Yuan or been
referred to the Committee by competent authorities.
The disciplinary action may take the form of
dismissal, demotion, salary reduction, or reprimand.
The Adminisfrotiye Court is responsible for the
adjudication of administrative suits brought by
individuals who seek redress for alleged wrongs or for
illegal administrative acts by government agencies.
The Supreme Court, the highest tribunal, is the court
of final appeal in both civil and criminal cases. It
consists of it number of civil and criminal divisions,
each of which is formed by a presiding judge and four
associate iudges.
A rey ular system of civil and criminal courts
functions below the Supreme Court level, with all
judges appointed for life. District courts, set up at the
municipal and count' levels, handle civil and criminal
cases of the first instance. High courts, which operate
at the provincial level (their number is determined by
the sire of the province), hear appeals from the district
courts and theoretically take under advisement cases
of the first instance pertaining to insurrection, treason,
and other forms of conspiracy against the government.
In practice, however, these types of cases have been
handled by the military courts under the provisions of
martial lane. Appeals may lie made from the high
courts to the Supreme Court. Formerly, the entire
court systern was under the Ministry of Justice of the
Executive Yuan, hiit in 1960 the Council of Grand
Justices roiled that all courts should he under the
jnrisdic�tion of the Judiciai Yuan. Neverthele,;, the
Ministry of Justice, which is also responsible for the
administration of judicial and penal institutions and
for t1w selection and appointment of judges,
procurators, and other personnel in the high and
district courts, has continued to exercise jurisdiction
over the lower courts.
The civil, criminal, and penal codes are modeled
after continental European codes particularly those of
France and Germany, while retaining sonic Chinese
features. Judges are admonished constitutionally to he
��above partisanship and to "hold trials inde-
S
pendently, free from any interference," hot political
pressures h.ye played an important role in major
judicial proceedings.
The legal and judicial system has a number of
weaknesses and deficiencies: sonic judicial officials
have been amenable to corruption and pressure; law
schools have been unable to provide a sufficient
number of adequately trained legal personnel; rules of
evidence, as viewed by V-'estrrn juridical standards.
have not been developed sufficiently: and judicial
uncertainties persist. Failure to implement the 1960
ruling of the Council of Grand Justices that thr
nations entire court system be placed under the
jurisdiction of the Judicial Yuan has inhibited judicial
independence and permitted the Executive Yuan to
influence legal decisions. The influence the Executive
1 has on the Council of Grand Justices. in
particular, can he see:: in the fact that appointees to
the Council of Grand Justices serve only 9 -year terms
and thus are more susceptible to external influence
than regular judges who have lifetime appointments.
Even more serious, the continuing national emergency
has compromised many constitutional guarantees -nd
encouraged arbitrary procedures. For these reasons,
the judiciary has been unable to command the full
confidence, respect, and esteem of the general
popular c.
J. Examination Yuan
Functionally analogous to the U.S. Civil Service
Comn the F.xatnination Yuan is the content-
porar.� manifestation of the ancient Chinese tradition
or administration by a scholarly elite chosen through
public service examinations. The president, vice
president, and commissioners of the Examination
Yuan are appointed by the President, with the consent
of the Control Yuan. The Examination Yuans three
principal components are the Examination Yuan
Council. the Ministry of Examinations, and the
Ministry of Personnel. The Yuan selects civil service
personnel through competitive examinations and is
responsible for such related matters as salary scales for
government employees, promotions and transfers,
tenure policies, personnel commendations, and
retirement and death benefits. The government
bureaucracy has four ionnal ranks of officials and the
examination system is intended to select candidates
under each.
In practice, Kuomintang domination of the
government has discouraged the selection of
appointive officials on a nonpartisan basis. The GIiC
has put a premium on personal loyalty to Chiang Kai
shek and the ruling group. In consolidating his
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pusitloll as his fathei c succcsutr Chiang C:bing ill
has engaged in similar 1:ractices. ttith important
powers 4 appointment cmceOtrated in the
Department of Organizational Affairs. Although
important Official., have seldom, if ever, been
appointed from its rasters. the E*xatnination Yuan has
served a useful purpose in preparing registers of
technical and professional persuotiel and rank -and -file
oi;lcials for appointment to minor civil sem ice posts.
g. Control Yuan
I,ik the E :xuminalion Yl1all, the C:nntrul nail is a
eart)(WIr from the traditional Chinest syslem of
supervi inn and control of public fmic�tionaries.
Constitu- ionaallx the liighesl control organ of the state'
it has the powers (of consent. impeachment, censure
.Ind autlit The r,itiler suhsl]nlial illflocncc of this
body tied% es mainly from its occasional interpcllations
and invest gulions c�f officers of the Exec]t,e Yuan. III
theory [lie appoiulinent of lhP presidenl, vice
president, and justices of the Council of Grand j usliccs
of the jmixial Yuan and the president, vice presiclenl,
alld commissioners of tilt Lxamivatioti Z non is
contingent III-Hill the u(msent of the Control Yoan. The
Control Yuan also lilts power to censum Iliv behavior
Of public functionaries ill boll tl cerltril and local
governments. Any impeachment or violation of law
OF dereliction of slut% is referred to the judicial Yuan
for disciplinar; action. 'Impeachment proccvdim: s
itgaiust the President or Vice President of the G111"
which may br instituted by tin less than ow-fourth of
the Control Yuan file illbershi1), Illlut he presented to
the N;Itinnul Assembly for dispositinn Criminal cases
are referred to the aplpropriate court%. Thr N'Iirli Stry n1
Audit, under the Control Yuan. audits government
accounts.
Members of the Control Yti:iu, according to tau�
eonstitntion, im indirrictl% eleeled by the provincial
level governments for(i -year terms The removal (1f the
(:1[C, to Taiwan has required file usual extended
(Pill"` of all ll]CTItbCrx elected Oil 1IIC MaiOlalid and on
Taiwan prior to 1973. A quunnn is formed "when
more than one -fifth of the total members lire present,"
and a resolution or motion may he adopted by ;l
majority vole of those members in :I ttendauce. "Tan
new members were added to the Control Yuall ill
1970, and ten mom were elected in February 1973,
giving tile� Ynan a total memhcrship of i$.
4. Provincial and local governments
The umism tit intt provides for elective pmvillcial lit Id
local goverIMICnls possessing some degree of
]utonolny. �again, however, the centre goverimiciit's
expulsion from the mainland bas compromised the
II1tCgrill of tjle COIIstitiltinn. The "T ;liMilll Provincial
CovPntnlent t T1'G i has been dominated since 19-19 ht
Iht� central gmvnimenl. tthich is �tiperimposed upon
:t. "The ndminislrative jurisdiction of the "TPG
eoconlpa%ses'Taixtall. cxrept I aipei Cit%, sovcrai small
islands in adjacent loiters, and the Pescadores. Tilt-
of the "I "PG is ('11 kit ll;- IISiIIg-hSi11AN 1111, just south
Of "T'ai- ClIIIng.
During the emergenct, the gut crnur is appointed bt
Ill(. President of the G11C: upon noulinatioll bt the
President of pile Exec�utitie loan. Governor I -isich
Tit ng -111i it, olle of the felt native -born Taiwanese to
hold high political office in the KM'I was named to
the post in \tar 1972. The governor in turn appoints
the c�oancilors, almost equally dkidmI between
mainlatidt�rs and native Taiwanese, upon recom-
fuendatioll bt the I "welitive Yolitt. The 17- member
council is Iht� pclligmaking body of tile TPG; it meets
trtcklti, ttitlt the goycrnor serving as vx- offivio
Chairman. The governor is assisted b% a secretariat. 12
departments (civil affairs, finance, reconstruction.
education. agricidture and forestrt. social affairs.
comrnrntications, health. Information, budgets,
ilecounts and stati .tics, Audit, .111d persounich. a food
bureau, and various offices for such essential services
]s public health, budgets and accoulik, police, ]fill
personnel.
A popularh elected Provincial Assembly provides ;I
fonun for airing Taiwanese c icws, but it exerts little
if.fluencr over the governor and his execulivv branch.
N4embers of the unicameral T- iwan Provincial
Assemble, presently consisting of 73 members. are
elected directly by the ciii, -its of the counties (lisicri)
and municipalities every a years, and quotas are
deternlilml on the basis of population. The streaker
and deputy s1waker are elected by the assvinhlymen in
secret ballot. :w assembly meets for 2 months every 6
months, but may he called into spccpal sessiotl by the
govenlor or by more than one- third of the ;assembly's
members. In the December 1972 elections the KNIT
won 33 setts, while ntlim gained 15 seals.
On I jnly 1967, Taipei became a special
municipality administered directly by the ceaitral
goverttinent. its mayor is directly appointed by the
central government. Under the cnnstitulian. Taipei's
status is comparable to that of a separate province.
Taipei lilts a city council consisting of -19 members
who are directly elected by the people every -1 years
from multi member districts whose size is detcrillillyd
by population. The council nlcels for a0 days even (i
nttxtlhs, but reap be called into session by the mayor
orby more than one -third of litecouncil's metnhen. In
the Decembr� 1973 elections, the KN'I'T won �I5 of the
-19 seats.
t i.
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%S in the cam of tilt pratinwe. ho 11 c�ouitt% and
mt III icyktl pxmer, are derv,ed .!boost %hull% from the
t�enlral gmernment AI this Ie%(�!, the emernuleril i%
m adtd In a counts magvttate or cite ina% \%Ito is
rlettrd for a t %eaf terra and net\ be reelected once
(:aunt; and itltmic�ipal grnernments ha%e riancil%
detil.craUre bodies. \rith rnetnbers elected for 4 -Near
turns If an art or resolution ill a local vouricil is
c�on%idt�red difficult to enforce. the pro%incial
s;mernntent ma\ retnne it for recoi+sitlt�ration If the
vounc�il upholds till- measure h% an affirltlati \r 'Lott- of
Into thirds of livae t�auncilo(% in altvildallce. ho%\ e%:�r.
it tht,n becomes %alid At the hsivu wail municipal
Imds, the idutinistr:iliicin composes tilt- hurea:" of
c�i\il affairs, finance, education, recomlrnction. police,
he;rltlt. and tit\ eollretton illuge% are admirusterml
b% elected chief assictrd by village councils At all
Ir%rls of loeill gmenimrnt, finiuu�ial resrtircrs are
forager. :tilt] local official% nil %t solicit ildditional
grants from Ieit;hrr authorities
5. Civil service
'I'll(' (.Iliilest� Cildl x�r% is an imlilnlian of lollg
standing. frith rxtrnsivc and detailed reiulations
based nn it S%StVlli of publit� (�runinatian amt
rveri itnimil There are three hpe� of (.\at(linations�
high. general. ant-! %prciot �t icru to c boast- officers for
service in tilt f(,ur civil service ranks The first, for
%eieior -level ;tdn�ini%Irator%, is open to toll' Rr
graduate%. qualific.f teclillici :efts, and ollicial%of loner
risk %elecitid for proittotion. The gvncrid oxamination.
opell la high School graduates, is used to seleei iurlior-
lex(rl civil %rni.v personnel The special e\amination%
are open to individuals with technical %kills. Although
Chil u�rvicr malttillatiott% are u%11s11% held annual!\
and arc given wide public�ih, onl\ it %mall percer+tage
(sf civil 'emilth aw ac�tuall\ selected from the roil% of
those Who pa%%, and none of the offivi :el. in more
important rank ha" bear %rlec�lecl through e%amilla-
tion Mainlanders predominate in Ihl- ceatrad
gover.mient hureaurrne%. while Taivanesr are most
numerous ill provincial and local govertrrient%, with
older maiii oilers (wcul in>; the top pxisition
Frequenlly, military officer are given %mb %inec�tlrv%
lifter reiimnit�nl from WTI iCe.
The IrtldiIiollril Chinese desire to enter the
hnmauc�rac�y has been undrrruined b% the loo Salaries.
he:evr political (firection, and unrealistic polic�ie%
"\Bell for sit long plagued the civil sen�iev ilk Taiwan.
lfetnulierttion is so illeaget Ili:tt lil.tu% officials have
second jobs and engage in pelt% gr.tft Adrancenment
often is slow" and the chalinds of work air frequent\
clogged with super- anniv .i (-evil sercauts who resist
Ip
tctireme�nt ht-t-atlu� of meager pensions Indiffert�ner.
di%sati %fac�tion, and lack of iuitiati\e are common
atnoug offic�iais al all Ie%els it >;ort-mmeut In Soitu�
stmernment organitatiom, such a% dir Tilivall Power
Compam. Ifiv ](riot Co mni%sion oil Hisral 11monstruc-
Lion and %omv departinrnt% of the \linistn of
Kconoiniv Affairs the 13:t% is better than in old -line
gint-minenl offiev%. and it grvatrr sense of
responsibilit% exists ]'tie toll echelons of the Ministn
(if Foreign (fain ;tad of the Chinese Foreign Servce
are staffed b% compett varver officials of mctm ,in
srr\icr Since bewaring l'rcotit�r in \la\ 1972. C1uanr
(:)it mt. kuo Ili IlLtd omit� suc�c�e%% ill his efforts to print;
rw%t. \ontirer. more competent pt�rionnel- --both
Ta(uarn�u� iit(] ne:tinl:uulrrs �into all lc%e�ls cif Ow
Lim vrnrnent
C. Political dynamics (S)
1. The President and the Premier
V ntil Jul% 1972. [tell %e\ere� ilines% complivated lilt-
infirmitiv% of age. President Chiang kai 11A h:ld
dominated the political. nrihtan. and economic lilt of
tilt- Iteptibliv of (:hita since 1925 A% it \outhful
professional soldier. Chiling Kai IIA phi%ed ;ill avti%e
role in till' e%l ;thli%hlitent (if the Satioualist
(.tn ern mei It it Iter t c n\erl I os\ of the \f.i nettel
D%ire%l% ill lull and %tits closet\ associatr(I %%ills the
f otnding of the K \IT in 1912 Sub%rtpurnlh Chiang
hre�aniv it protege of l)r Still lilt -sell. and folitMiag
Dr Sun's death Ili 1925, hr ht,gan to drift lma\ from
the left%%ing of tilt KMT lie 19211 lit commanded tilt
Northern E\Iwdition. thr,"1 1 %%hick the \atiotialists
gained control of tilt- Wier Tangtzt, %all%�\ In Mardi
1927 hr tinted against his Comillotiist allic%. and a
month later he captnrt�d \ankirtg and e%tahlishrd the
Nationalist Gmernment there Defeat on the
mainland b% tilt Conml(ini%t% in INS) forced Chiang
io hi% final refuge on Tai\%an but (ailed to tuedermine
%eriouSi\ lei% firm trip on the gme rlrment he had
headed for %o Ioi(g
In later Nean Chiang Kai -%hlrk began to delegate
atilhorik to lti% San. Chiang Chitig kuo, or to the
Premier of the moment Up until mid -1972. h(mi -Nrr.
President Chiang made the basic deCisioels on all
mater of nalintud polio\
Since Iii% father'% incapacitation Chiang Ching -lion
tFigum 3}, who has been Premier sinc�r \-lay 19,2, tills
been the de facto head of Iht� regime Although tic
lacks hi% hither'. charisma. ht- ha% had it l period of
grooming in carious important position%. such as
\jir,i%Ivr of f }eh�tist� orvt eer. mer the \varrs Ching
kuo hti% beer1 able to tirarleener hi% supporters into
_1.
l
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positions of power and anthorih The trJnsfcr of
pow-r after July 1972 thu% "as accorllplislied srnoolhl%
;Wd Prerllier Chiang (:hint; -ktlo is fulls in control of
file regime. Since beC0110119 Preinivr- lie has
consciously morked to establish his o:t n 'mag' %%ill,
Iliv pl-ople br making frequent appearance% ill ptlblic
throaghot.rt Taiwan that :ire widelN repor(ed in file
local rnt'dia.
The Kuornintang
As the GftC is essentially is our -niau government. so
it is c svnlially it one -party governnleut 'f'he K\IT's
political tutelage osterlsibli ternlin:lled ill 1917, but
the party's political hegemony has not breu altered.
even Ihouglt it is not s;Inetinrlyd by law. Important
posts in the government, the artned forces. and till- last,
enforcement and security agencleti:Ire oiunopoli %ed b%
KNIT IlleIrlbers. Policies are fornluialed within KNIT
codicils and iniplumented by KNIT nlcnlbers %%�hcl
bold governniviit positions, :vul p:trtc status trill
influence often arc of greater significance than official
dale posts. As in the governnlev I. (ht- d (lIInn:Int figure
within the party has liven Chiang Kai-shek, who serves
:IS DirM01' 0 110 ll. Since (:hiang's he :dlh declined,
Premier Chiang Ching -kuo. who is it member of the
policy- setting Standing Conmlitlet of Ihr Parl"'s
1 (:Cenral Committee, probably lets as de facto party
chief. '4'he relationship hetwern flit' KMT and (Ile
GRC is sitrnlar to Ili-it between ruling Con11nm1ist
parties :Ind their national goverome�nts.
The structural orgauizali(ln of till KNIT is
essentialh the same as Ihat of most national
Gonlalunist p:lrtics 'file KX1�f is divided into
tCrritorial Itllits %spiel encoalpass 60111 Tals%:lll and
osersras Chinese -orziniunitiv%. and into (LI110011:ll
Unit. %shish largely parallel inlporlant go%croine'nt
,Ind pnlfe- s; gaup, Itt flit bas,' of flit- p%rinnid.d
striwturc is the local unit, or cell. c�onststing of form
Ilirce It IS rnembvers Thi is flit K \1'1"s most dircct
link %%ith the ;;encral public. as it c�on%vv, (hr park 's
message tied is responsible for inl-nibersbip reerait-
relent ithosc Iht� local unit are the subdistrict, district.
c�ounh. and provincial organi Each l %el of
1 IrgJlli Zit1a11 Ill:lillt.13M ;1 central Corn I711tte' and ill]
advison vornillittev Coin [nit(ecs in the base IvAvI are
clt�cted direelk b% (he part% nlenrbcnlnp, but al
higher hsels the% an� chosen h% park congrevvN
eleelt,d ill turn b% congrv%sesal the nett lower Icsel lie
pmclice, ho%%v%er. central conirniller slates are often
ch-wrtniucd ill aclsancr Its higher parts echelons 1'he
counts and pro%incial c�onge -,%v% corn out ports
dire slithin their jurisdictional compclrner. The
count% ('ongcs' is contit�ncd annually. (ht- pro%incial
congress invek hicn,lialh The district and subdistrict
Jsst�rrlblivs fits flit- c'aagresses are known at this Iese�I1
arc composed of the� entire parts menlbvrship in their
rvspective areas
The National Parh Cnngess theoretic'alk is t.:.
higlieQ part% authority It is charred a0111 till
fortnulaliori of policies. objce�ti e%, and programs, is
-Il as the election of the Director (;vticrll and fli
Central Crnlmittec 'hhe principal operating organ of
the KMT is the Central Parts liew1cluarter% Till
bod%� nhic�h is under the direction of it eurviarx
general. celtlsists of tilt� \aliaual Parts :ollgmss, the
21- mernbvr Standing Committee. cho%vn Ix the 99-
nlenlber Central (:oTimi ittev, and the Central
Advison Collllmtter �a large' colrnn3ttee oillllbenng
cell orcr 100 nu tnbcn� appointed by Elie Director
(:etirrll bell silbiect tie confirmation by the Nat'lorml
Parh Congress. Anteing tiff' ongoing n"potl5illilitiV% of
the Central Parh lleaclgnarters is direct control of
party members without fist-d residence, such as
railroad workl-rs, u':uilen. other %ocationul groups, amt
overseas 01inesr
Becansl- [lit Central Advisors Counniltee is iargeh
hotiorary will till :ent .d (;ontiliticc (�onscros only
t wife it year. lilt- Director GrnemI relies greatly on the
Standing CamullUev, which meets Iwice a %seek, The
Standing (:ommiltee issm�s (letters, slakes appoint
nlcnls, and even modifies resolutions {rallied In vithrr
the� NalionaI ]':Ire% Congers or The (:etllral
Conunittee, although it does not spl-cific�alk ha%�c
such :olthoril\ flit, Standing 0iiiii .ttee ostensibly
also lllakt-s ded"iolls dealing with the KNIT and
government internal policy and admintslrition, but
W
t
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FIGURE 3. Premier Chiang
Ching -kuo (C)

actually it merely provides a mechanisms for police
formulation and decisionmaking since the Director
General makes all important decisions and may veto
actions taken by it. The Standing Committees role
therefore has been to give legality to the decisions of
the Director General, who sen ,s chairman of the
body. As the Standing Committee very rarely
challenges the decisions of the Director General, so the
National Part Congress seldom takes issue syilh
policie�, drafted in the name of the Standing
Committee. under Chianti Ching -kno's leadership,
the Standing Committee is apparently decreasing in
importance and is fulfilling only a proforrna role.
Since the reorganization of the part headquarters
in the spring of 1972, the major organs of the Central
Committee are the Secretariat. seven departments,
and four committees as follows:
Departments:
Organizational Affairs
]Mainland Operations
Overseas Affairs
Cultural Affairs
Social Affairs
Youth Activities
Womens Activities
Committees:
Policy Coordination
Disciplinary and Evaluation
Finances
History Compilation
The old organization had consisted of the Secretariat,
six sections, it number of committees, and it board, By
streamlining the Central Part headquarters, the
KMT leadership hoped to rednce the duplication and
overlapping of responsibilities among the various
components. The reorg anization also entailed some
redistribution of power within the party hierarchy.
"The Secretariat is responsible for the party's overall
routine and ad hoc administrative and business
matters, for the management of the agenda and
records of the party congresses, meetings. and
conferences, and for the Intclget and finances.
The Department of Organizational Affairs is
responsible for the functioning and maintenance of
party headquarters up through the provincial level,
including the meeting of personnel requirements and
the supervision of cadres. It also implements party
policies and programs and supervises the estab-
lishnw nt. reorganization, and utilization of headquar-
ters bodies set up to serve part goals. 'I'll( Department
of Mainland Operations is charged with maintaining
and providing v,uidance for covert operations on the
mainland, planning and supervising psychological
12
warfare, sabotage, and intelligence operations, and
performing communications duties, -,rch as liaison
kith advance base and overseas stations. It also
reportedly conducts studies on international
coin nnnnism and reports on Chinese Communist
activities. Under the reorganization, this department
may have become responsible for most of the party
security functions previously within the pin-view of the
abolished Sixth Section. The Department of Overseas
Affairs concentrates on countering Peking*s proselyt-
izing among Chinese living abroad. It handles such
matters as organizing, training, and conducting liaison
activities with overseas Chinese movements, providing
direction for overseas propaganda efforts, organizing
training for overseas Chinese students. and recruiting
for the KMT atwong the overseas Chinese communi-
ties. The Department of Cultund Affairs engages in it
broad range of domestic propag informational,
and cultural activities. Heavy emphasis is placed on
disseminating the teachings of Sun Yat sen. The
Department of Social Aff airs apparently assumed the
duties of the former Fifth Section (Mass Mcvements),
directing its activities and efforts rnAnly toward such
groups as youth, professional, labor, business,
religious, and social organizations. Each department is
divided into a number of functional divisions.
Other Central Committee organizations include
committees for financial affairs, party 1
evaluation and discipline, and police coordination.
In October 1973 KNIT membership on 'Taiwan and
the offshore islands was reported variously to be
"approximately 600,000" and nearly 1 million. The
discrepancy appears to reflect the KM'T practice of
claiming more members than actually take part in
party activities. Reflecting its claim to Fee an all -China
party, in 1968 the KNIT reported that it had 17
provincial -level party headquarters, 260 hsien branch
party headquarters. 2,675 district party headquarters,
6,5x3 district branch headquarters, and 79,200 culls.
KMT leaders also claimed to have 103 organiza-
tional units in overseas areas and to have more than
85,000 members among the overseas Chinese,
distributed as foilows: Asia, 73`.' United Stales, 21 SC':
Africa, 2`'r: Europe, I and Oceania, 3r'. Although
not citing specific figures, leaders also claimed a 2Wr'
increase in membership and an 87i increase in the
number of organizational units in mainland China
between 1963 in(] 1967.
In accordance with Director General Chiang Kai
shek's instructions in his directive "Urgent Tasks To
Be Carried Out by the Government and the Party in
the Future," party leaders in late 1963 launched the
Second 'Three Year Plan for the Development of Party
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LL
Organizations. All park headquarters were instructed
to "pay special attention to the recruitment of
Taiwanese and young intellectual women.' A total of
2500)0 new KNIT members were to be recruited
during the 3 year period. with specific quotas assigned
to the various part} headquarters and to occupational
and profesionai groups. According to the recruitment
directive. 8U i of the 230,(00 were to he native
Taiwanese (approximately 65 "i of the 74,552
members recruited during 1966 were Taiwanese); 60'i
were to he youths; 255(' were to be young women,
working women, and housewives; 2551 were to he
recruited from the armed forces. and 6.5rr' were to have
had at least it middle school education. Moreover,
priority consideration was to be given to tht
recruitme of scientific and technical personnel.
Party leaders also support a program whereby the
retirement of older members is encouraged.
in addition to its regular membership, the KNIT has
mobilized a wide range of mass organizations to insure
broad popular support for the party and to improve
Party services to society, as well as to strengthen the
Party itself. These organizations include labor,
industrial and commerc agricultural, veterans.
cultural, religious, professional. anti youth and
women's groups. The party's mass movement
activities are centered mainly in. the youth movement,
however, and are carried out chiefly through the
China Youth Anti- Conununist National Salvation
Corps, some of whose activities are fwer. 'I potential for T.Iiwan(.se
dissidence has also been diminished by according
them the appearance of political primacy at the
provincial and lower levels, growing representation in
the KMT, and a dominant role in the private sector of
the economy. Moreover, close government sur-
veillance of anv open challenge to the regime and
pnrishment for those who do challenge it make
advocacy of independence a risky prop:sition. For
(,xanple, Deng \ding -min, one of the most outspoken
antinainlandvr members of the Taiwanese intel-
Icchal community. was convicted in April 1965 for
72
printing a pamphlet strongly critical of President
Chiang and the KMT. Although Chiang suspended
Peng's sentence of 8 years imprisonment, apparently
as a result of pressure from the United States, others
have not fared as well. Peng, who for some years was
regarded locally as the leader of the TIM, was closely
watched after his release, but in early 1970 he escaped
from Taiwan. He currently lives in the United States,
but his reputation locally has declined drastically.
partly because he failed to bring any benefits to the
TIM in Taiwan and partly as it side effect of the
Shanghai Communique.
The loosely knit independence n ^meat overseas
has been characterized over the past two decades by
periods of relative vitality on the part of Tai\tanese in
Japan and the United States, but for several \ears the
movement has been leaderless, factionalized, and
moribund. The government has successfully induced
several independence leaders to return to Taiwan and
openly support the GRC. Increasing concern about the
future international stutns of 'Taiwan and the helief
that the Shanghai Conununigtie has precluded
independence has minimized TIM's appeal to
potential nc\y recruits, who apparently consider that
subversion is not it viable alternative under present
circumstances.
Of greater concern to the KMT leadership since
1972 has been the� step -tip in propaganda from the
mainland directed at convi..:ing major segments of
Taiwan's society �army, KMT, bureaucrats, students,
and inteilectuals �that eventual reunion with the
mainland is inevitable, and appealing to individual
interests and to Chinese patriotic feelings in order to
hasten the day. So far, Peking's campaign, as well as
the efforts of the pro independence groups hay( Kwon
few converts; some students have evidenced interest in
reunification. some have engaged in pro- indepen-
dencc activities, �ul their nunhers are very small and
they have had no success. Since Taiwanese constitute
the� overwhelming majority of the armed forces, they
are natural targets of those who .iry actively promoting
Taiwanese independence or reunification with the
mainland. Alertness by the authorities, periodic
rerr.ii: -ter, to the major commands about the potential
threat, and intense political indoctrination of
members of the armed forces hay( prevented this from
developing into if serious problem. In general,
Taiwanese thus far have expressed a rather clear
preference for their present ruler and virtually no
receptivity to mainland nle.
The government relies primarily on its police and
intelligence agencies to control subversion. Ry means
of an elaborate net of informants in military units and
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printing a pamphlet strongly critical of President
Chiang and the KMT. Although Chiang suspended
Peng's sentence of 8 years imprisonment, apparently
as a result of pressure from the United States, others
have not fared as well. Peng, who for some years was
regarded locally as the leader of the TIM, was closely
watched after his release, but in early 1970 he escaped
from Taiwan. He currently lives in the United States,
but his reputation locally has declined drastically.
partly because he failed to bring any benefits to the
TIM in Taiwan and partly as it side effect of the
Shanghai Communique.
The loosely knit independence n ^meat overseas
has been characterized over the past two decades by
periods of relative vitality on the part of Tai\tanese in
Japan and the United States, but for several \ears the
movement has been leaderless, factionalized, and
moribund. The government has successfully induced
several independence leaders to return to Taiwan and
openly support the GRC. Increasing concern about the
future international stutns of 'Taiwan and the helief
that the Shanghai Conununigtie has precluded
independence has minimized TIM's appeal to
potential nc\y recruits, who apparently consider that
subversion is not it viable alternative under present
circumstances.
Of greater concern to the KMT leadership since
1972 has been the� step -tip in propaganda from the
mainland directed at convi..:ing major segments of
Taiwan's society �army, KMT, bureaucrats, students,
and inteilectuals �that eventual reunion with the
mainland is inevitable, and appealing to individual
interests and to Chinese patriotic feelings in order to
hasten the day. So far, Peking's campaign, as well as
the efforts of the pro independence groups hay( Kwon
few converts; some students have evidenced interest in
reunification. some have engaged in pro- indepen-
dencc activities, �ul their nunhers are very small and
they have had no success. Since Taiwanese constitute
the� overwhelming majority of the armed forces, they
are natural targets of those who .iry actively promoting
Taiwanese independence or reunification with the
mainland. Alertness by the authorities, periodic
rerr.ii: -ter, to the major commands about the potential
threat, and intense political indoctrination of
members of the armed forces hay( prevented this from
developing into if serious problem. In general,
Taiwanese thus far have expressed a rather clear
preference for their present ruler and virtually no
receptivity to mainland nle.
The government relies primarily on its police and
intelligence agencies to control subversion. Ry means
of an elaborate net of informants in military units and
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b,
L
goyenrnu�nt offices, registration and extensive� Provincial Working Committee serving as the primary
screening of citizens. issnance of identih cards, and
censorship of the mails, the security forc�cs have been
able to neutralize quic�kk and effec�tiyeh any
orgam..ation or grotp that threatens, even re�motek, to
oppose the government. Although these controls have
been somewhat relaxed, they are still sufficient to
inhibit subversion. Efforts of opposition elements to
organize- even for such limited purposes as local
elections, have been only sporadic and successfully
thwarted.
Popnlati �n control methods have changed
noticeably since the GRC's flight to Taiwan in 1949.
fhe government initially relived on direct police
measures, large- sc�alc arrests. and other punitive
measures to maintain political stahilih and stamp out
potential threats. It has since come to adopt more
positive policies in an effort to \vin popular support.
partic�nlarly as scc urity conditions have improved. The
sec�urih agencies are less inclined toward overt use of
police powers, instead favoring preventive measures
and more subtle pressnrrs. Nonetheless. the
government would not hesitate to use its police powers
aggressively and ruthlessly ,tanip oul real or potential
threats.
The go\ernnu�nt seeks to remove or lessen
nnderl. causes of political and social discontent he
promoting economic development programs. property
ownership, bigber levels of living� improved
education, and a broad range t.` social services.
Moreover, n.tional leaders are making ono� efforts to
break clown distinctions between elements of the
populace and to promote national unit, while
fostering givater popular participation and involve-
nu�nt in political and governmental processes. The
exercise of political and personal freedonis is more
pronounced than heretofore although restrictions
remain, as shown by the absence of nu�auringful
political opposition, by government supervision and
control of the communications media, and by
limitations on freedom of speech. \Iost of these
restrictions are justified on the basis of the Ili ng
emergency, but it truly open soviet) retrains larger
alien to dw Chinese experiem c :un vvay.
2. Communist subversion
Communist subversive activities in Taiwan were
particularly apparent in i9 -19 and 19.O. and it limited
rec wrence was reported from 1962 to 1966. The
intervening and subsequent periods have been
generally quiescent. Subversion at that time was
�Ak 6v direct acts of sabotage. assassination,
kidnaping, and extortion� with the so- called Taiwan
agen 1 for such activities. The operational aims of
Peking s program of subversion were to create it feeling
of despair among the population, to sabotage the
monetary system and the economy, and to cache
military equipment in preparation for a Communist
led revolt that would be supported by an invasion
from the mainland. After the Communist regime
consolidated its hold on the mainland in 1949, it
sought to coordinate its subversive efforts in Taiwan
with it military offensive against the island.
The Peking regimes plans vycre frustrated h}
President Truman's decision to resist the Communist
invasion of South Lorca in June 1930 with armed force
and by his declaration neutralizing" Taiwan. During
the carp� 1950 the GRC sectrih services :!r-troved
nuc�b of the Chinese Communist Part ,rganization
in Taiwan, which had successfully penetrated all
levels of the military and government in the confusion
of the Chinese civil war and the GRC retreat from
the nwlnland. About 1951, the Chinese Communist
Irndergr01111d adopted it polic�\ of withdrawal, and its
agents dispersed and went into hiding. According to
GIW wetirity officials, there has been no formal
Communist organization in Tat;wan since 1934.
CRC estimates in early 1969 set the number of
active Communist agents in 'faiw�an at about 1.000
pwsuniably limited to the fcvy c�aclres who evaded the
government's r:;undup in the early 1950 and it small
number of at tints who were subsequently infiltrated.
"I'here� is no indication that these agents in Taiwan are
in a position to mount serious guerrilla or sabotage
operations. There probably is a residue of �sleeper�
agents who could be activated to support an assault
front the ma; :Jand.
F. Maintenance of internal security (S)
1. General
A c�onrplex and elaborate police and svetirih
apparatus that includes government, part, military,
and civilian organizations is maintained in Taiwan.
Its primary wsponsibilities are the preservation of
internal securih and public order through enforcing
the criminal and civil codes and police regulations,
while at the same time maintaining paternal control
over the populace. Mane antigovernment and anti
KMT activities are regarded as Communist inspired
by the authorities, who thereby justify the use of
repressive action which under other circumstances
vyould be regarded as extralegal. The police and
intelligence apparatus, v.hose operations fregnently
constitute an impediment to the full exercise of civil
23
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0
X
The Sixth Section was primaril} responsible for
conducting and coordinating Chinese Nationalist
propaganda programs directed at mainland China. It
also engaged in propaganda activities in Hang Kong,
Southeast Asia, Japan. and. to a lesserextent, Taiwan.
The section also acted as General Secretariat of the
interagency Psychological N arfare Guidance Com-
mittee, %,,Ach coordinated CRC militarv, civilian, and
Kuomintang psychological warfare. It administered
the multimillion dollar facilities of the Mainland
Broadcasting Division, which beams both shorhyave
and rnediurnwave broadcasts to mainland China. The
Free China Relief Association, in conjunction with the
Sixth Section. mvelcorned and provided shelter for all
refugees from mainland China who arrive on "Taiwan.
The Sixth Section interrogated and assisted in the
rehabilitation of these refugees, and used them to
advance GRC propaganda. The section Conducted
propaganda activity for the CRC through such
international Organizations as the Asian Peoples' Anti
Communist League. The section also helped arrange
and sponsor National Day Double Ten celebrations
among overseas Chinese c�nmmunitics, arrange] anti
Communist propaganda displays on Taiwan, and
participated in KNIT negotiations with leaders of
other political parties on Taiwan to line up their
support for Kuomintang programs and policies.
i
i
29
H. Suggestions for further reading (U /OU)
Chien Twang- sheng, The Cocemment and Politics
of China 1912 -1949 (Stanford University Press, 1970
paperback ed.) A detailed study of the origin and
structure of the Republic of China's political
institutions.
Fairbank, John K., Reisc�huer, Edwin O., Craig,
Albert M., Fast Asia -The Modem Transformation
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1963). The standard
history of East Asia. The chapters on China coyer the
impact of the West, the Chinese Revolution, the rise of
the KNIT and Chiang Kai -shek. and the Communist
victory over the Nationalists.
Manc�all, Mark, ed. Formosa Today (New fork.
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). Contains cha pters by
various authors concerning Taiwan's history, politics,
culture, and soc�ieh.
Mendel, Douglas, The Politics of Formosan
Nationalism (Berkeley, University of California Press,
1970). A well written account of Taiwanese
nationalism and nationalist organizations. Heavily
biased in favor of the Taiwanese.
Payne, Robert, Chiang Kai -shck (N( fork,
Weybright and "Palley, 1969). A relatively unbiased
and complete biography of the leader of Nationalist
China.
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Chronology Wou)
1913
December
Cairo Declaration states Allied objective of restoring to China
territories stolen by .Japan, incluc'ing "Formosa and the
Pescadores.
1915
July
Potsdam Proclamation reaffirms t.iat terms of the Cairo
Declaration shall he carried out.
October
China regains control of 'Taiwan after 50 }cans of .Japanese
rule.
1946
December
First National Assembl' adopts constaution to he pronittl-
gated I .January 1917 and effective 25 December 1017.
1917
February
Rioting on Taiwan occurs its result of oppressive measures
of Nationalist regime; large numbers of Taiwanese are lain.
November
General election for National Assembly is held.
1918
April
Chiang Kai -shek .s elected China's first President under
terms of new eonstitullion; First National Assavnhly approves
"ucnaporarv" provisions of constitution graoling emergenvy
powers to the President during period of anti- Conrtnunisl
campaign.
1949
January
President Chiang announces his retirement from office in
fa� or of %'fee President, Li Tsung -jen.
December
('hinese communist forces take over control of mainland and
estnhlish the People's Republic of China WIW); (-R(' with-
draws to 'Taiwan and establishes seat of government at
Taipei.
1950
January
C.N. Security Council rejects Soviet proposal for expulsion
of (.11c delegation and seating of Chinese Communist
representatives, in first of annual discussion of Chinese
representatio
March
Chiang Kai -slick resumes office of President.
April
Executive Yuan gra tits Taiwan Province authority to estab-
lish self government by electoral process in districts and
municipalities.
June
Presid -nt Truman orders V.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol Taiwan
Strait to prevent hostile activity by either Communist., or
Chinese Nationalists.
1951
May
U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group MAAG) is
established on 'Taiwan.
1952
April
Treaty of peace is sigr I between GRC and .Japan.
1953
January
Legislative Yuan adopts Land -to- Tiller Act as GIW land
reform program.
i 95
March
National Assembly approves indefinite extension of "tem-
porary" provisions of the constitution.
President Chiang is reelected President by National
Assembly.
December
\lutua l Defense "Treaty with the U.S. is signed by (.RC.
1958
August
Battle of "Taiwan Strait is precipitated as Chinese Conl-
nntnist.s begin concentrated bombardment of (luenloy
(Chin -men Tao).
September
U.S. Marines arrive on 'Taiwan for joint maneuvers; U.S.
warships convoy R(1(' ships carrying supplies to Quemoy.
October
Joint ('.S. -GlIC communique deenlphasizes liberation of
mainland by military force.
30
i
3