NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 48; MOROCCO; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080024-1
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SECRET
4d /GS /CP
Morocco
March 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS
COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the
subject country Chronology Area brief Sum-
mary map
THE SOCIETY Social structure Population
Labor organization Living conditions Social
problems Health Religion Education
Artistic expression *Public information
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolu-
tion of the state Governmental strength and sta-
bility Structure and function Political dynamics
National policies Threats to stability The
police Intelligence and security Countersub-
version and counterinsurgency capabilities
THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its
structure agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and
power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and
construction Domestic trade Economic policy
and development Government finances Man-
power �International economic relations
TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS Appraisal of systems �Strategic mobility
Railroads Highways Inland waterways Fipe-
lines Ports Merchant mar-he Civil air �Air-
fields �The telecom system
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate
Military geographic regions Strategic areas
Internal routes �Approaches: land, sea, air
ARMED FORCES The defense establishment
joint activities Ground forces Air forces Para-
military
This General Survey supersedes the one dated
January 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.
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orocco
The Lion of the Maghreb No Longer 1
The Geographic and Cultural Amalgam The
Weight of HistorN- Plus c'est la Meme Chose The
Poor Not Enriched With or Without tho King
Chronology .............................15
Areabrief .............................20
SummaryMap follows 21
The Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by
the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub
stantially by November 1972.
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The Lion of the Maghreb No Longer
Moroccan National Emblem
The Arabs have an ancient saying that Algeria is the
man of the Maghreb, Tunisia its woman, and
Morocco its lion. Probably the proverb originates from
Algeria's central location in '.North Africa, with
smaller, weaker Tunisia on one side and, on the other,
the more rugged, untamed Morocco �the country that
is Al Maghreb al Aqsa, or the Far West of the Arab
world. As Algeria strives to become a strong nation
through industrialization and as Tunisia struggles for a
better life for its people, the record of the independent
Maghreb countries validates pats of the proverb, but
not in the case of Morocco. The promise of pride and
strength implied in the analogy to a lion has not been
fulfilled, for Morocco has become economically the
least progressive and politically the most troubled of
the Maghreb states, resembling less and less the image
of the proverb and its own national emblem. (U /OU
Morocco is unusual among the Arab countries in
that it has known no total eclipse of its statehood.
When the Ottomans held most of the Middle East and
North Africa in the 17th and 18th centuries, Morocco
retained its separateness and royal succession. Even
during the years of the French Protectorate (1912 -:56),
the sultanate *vas preserved. (CI /OU)
Today Moroccan society includes a sophisticated,
French speaking elite and large numbers, particularly
the youth, who look toward Westernization and
mpdemization. At the same time, the past is evident in
the rl?Et,ect for Islamic piety and traditional culture
paid by both the learned and the uneducated. The
past is also evident in the Moroccan Go%ernment,
which is in many ways a medieval anachronism. King
Hassan 11 has ruled the country since his investiture in
1961 as a personal fiefdom. As a result, serious
endemic economic and social probiems have
worsened. The gap bet%veen the rich and poor has not
been narrowed, and the people on the whole have a
little les; than those in the rest of Maghreb. (C)
The gross domestic product (GDP) of Morocco on a
per capita basis is equivalent to about US$170 a
year �more than $100 below Algeria's and almost $40
under Tunisia's. The sectoral distribution of the CDP
remained practically unchanged thro the
1960'x. Manufacturing consistently contributed only
about 12% of it, while that sector of the Algerian and
the Tunisian economies grew substantially. Morocco's
average economic growth rate of 4% a year in the
1960's lagged behind those of the two other countries,
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and it was in fact largely erased by the high yearly
2.9% growth rate of the population. (U /OU)
Because of the population increase, inflation, and
declining purchasing power, the standard of living of
most of the people has actually been falling. In rural
areas, where about 65% of Morocco's 16 raillion
people live, subsistence agriculture has become
increasingly difficult. Thus, ever growing numbers of
peasants flock to the cities in search of a better life.
They live in bidonvilles (literally, tin -can towns) on
the outskirts of the cities, and they swell the ranks of
the unemployed. (U /OU)
The job market is expanding much more slowly
than available manpower or skills. Despite the great
strides made in education since Morocco recovered it's
independence in 1956, the literacy rate (about 20 is
the lowest in the Maghreb, and the type and quality of
training bear little relationship to national manpower
needs. Many secondary school graduates are among
the unemployed, who comprise almost 28% of the
urban and 19% of the rural labor force. Morocco has
made some effort to alleviate the unemployment
problem probably the greatest one it faces �with a
public works program, but it has been less successful in
this endeavor than Tunisia, which has cut the
unemployment rate to about 15 (U /OU)
Until 1971 a laver of political stability covered these
fundamental economic and social concerns. Then
King Hassan joined that dwindling group of Middle
Eastern monarchs whose staying pomyer is speculative.
A number of high- ranking officers in July 1971 led
1,500 cadets of the noncommissioned officers' school
in an attack on the palace at Skhirat, where the King,
his senior advisers, and the diplomatic corps were
celebrating his birthday. Just 14 months later, air force
pilots tried to shoot down the Boeing 727 that was
bringing the King home from France. Behind this
attempted regicide was the Minister of Defense and
head of the armed forces General Staff, Maj. Gen.
Mohamed Oufkir. It was officially reported later that
he had committed suicide, but it is more likely that he
was summarily executed on the King's orders. As the
officers involved in the earlier unfuccessful coup either
were among the some 100 persons killed during the
storming of the palace or were executed soon
thereafter, the specific motives of the rebels may never
be known. Their distinguishing characteristic seems to
have been a common distaste for the corruption in the
government and for the patronage systern by which
the King runs the country. (C)
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Since the attempted coup in August 1972, King
Hassan has taken over personal command of the army
and apparently seeks to maintain his regime by
balancing the various military and security forces. He
has made it plain that he will deal ruthlessly with
dissident elements and that he is not prepared to make
meaningful concessions to the demands of the political
parties. 'they still hope to share Hassan's power, but
they have become increasingly ineffective since
parliament was dismissed in 1465 and they were ex-
cluded from participation in government. Convir. A
of his own rghteou3ness, Hassan seems unwilling to
relate the attempts on his life to his failure to effect
improvements in the welfare of his people. (C)
The apathy with which the public responded to the
attempts on Hassan's life reflects the general dulling of
political interest throughout the country. It indicates
as well that Hassan has squandered the legacy of
popularity left him by his father. The throne has
become shaky in Morocco only recently, as the
country's problems have mounted. (U /OU
Upon independence in 1956, Morocco's prospects
seemed better than Tunisia's, although not so
promising as Algeria's. The country is not well
endowed with natural resources, but it does have more
cultivable land than any other Maghreb state.
Moreover, the relative ease with which independence
was achieved gave the country an advantage. After the
Algerian rebellion broke out and the Moroccan
resistance began to tie down troops that France could
ill afford because of its preoccupation with Algeria,
I was granted to Morocco more quickly
than even the most optimistic nationalists had
anticipated. It was not accompanied by revolutionary
upheaval as in Algeria, nor by the sharp divisions in
the nationalist movement and crises with France that
marked the Tunisian strug (U /OU)
The Moroccan nationalist movement was
distinguished from those of most other countries in
that it came to center around the ruler of the land.
Because the French Protectorate was built on the
fiction that Sultan Mohamed V� Hassan's
father �was the sole authority qualified to speak for
Morocco, he .vas exiled in 1953 when his sympathies
turned to the nationalists and he refused to sign
decrees drafted by the protectorate authorities.
Enthusiasm for the deposed sovereign then rose to near
idolatry. He was restored to his throne in 1955,
following the French change of policy, and he was
supported by the important Istiqlal party as the
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national leader. Symbolizing his intention to introduce
a more modern type of government, he changed his
title from Sultan to King and convoked a
constitutional assembly. The way toward
constitutional monarchy seemed to be paved. (U /OU
Developments throughout the Maghreb in the mid
1950's and early 1960's conjured up an image of a
united region. It was argued by Western political
scientists, and some of the nationalists too, that the
three countries shared an identity derived from Berber,
Arab, and French influences. If they became a single
nation, they could be supported largely by Algerian
resources (oil and natural ,as), led by Tunisia's
dynamic Habib Bourguiba, and inspired by
Mohamed V, who �as the heir to a 300 -year -old
dyr =asty which claims descent from the Prophet �was
the acknowledged religious leader in 'the area. It soon
became apparent, however, that widely differing
political systems and philosophies and methods of
economic organization and management far
outweighed common interests. Although a slow trend
toward bilateral collaboration is now emerging, the
dream of Maghreb unity has been put aside. All of the
states have their special problems, and the stable
future of none is assured. Yet Morocco in the 1970's
has more political and economic troubles than the
others. (U /OU)
Some of the reasons for Morocco's relatively poor
record are obvious. It lacla Algeria's ail, which has
given that country the capability of industrializing,
and it has not had Tunisia's Bourguiba, who has
literally talked his nation into modernizing. Observers
also point to the King's enthusiasm for golf and to the
chicanery of government ministers, and they blame
the state of affairs in Morocco on the frivolity a.1d
cornption of its leaders. Underlying these all too valid
explanations, however, is a blend of historical,
sociological, and geographic elements that has
rendered the process of modernization particularly
difficult. (C)
Throughout history Morocco has been a hard land
to conquer and, once conquered, to control. Although
the sultanate dates from the eighth century, national
unity is a relatively recent phenomenon, for many of
the tribes and regions of the country were brought
under central government control only at the time of
the French Protectorate. Moreover, many Arab lands
have had longer and more pervasive contact with the
West than Morocco has had, despite its proximity to
Europe. The country is heir to a modernizing trend
introduced by the protectorate and also to centuries
old attitudes and customs. In this situation, the old
often proves more influential than the new. (U /OU)
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The Geographic and Cultural Amalgam (u/ou)
Even in a continent outstanding for its geographic
diversity, the contrasts in Morocco are striking. It is the
massive mountain complex of the Middle, High, and
Anti Atlas, with the desert in the south and the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean on the west and
north, that gives the country its variety. Beyond the
Middle Atlas, the land is a great red plain, colored by
its weathered sandstone. Towering above it are the
peaks of the High Atlas, which reach over 13,000 feet
and are the highest and most rugged in North Africa.
To the north, these mountains are snou or
covered with forests of evergreen oaks and conifers,
while palm groves rim the foothills and the southern
slopes are barren and sunbaked. South and cast of this
Atlas chain, and plains extend into the Sahara.
Many of the settlements in the south �only about
500 miles from :u the tiled -roof villages of Morocco's
Mediterranean shore �are walled and battlemented
citadels. These are the call ,hs, the elaborate mud
forts that served as redoubts during tribal wars. Later
the term casbah came to be applied� somewhat
erroneously �to the old sections, or the nwdinahs, of
the cities. With their mazelike streets, these walled and
ancient urban casbahs seem to bring the Middle Ages
into this century, and they are proving an important
attraction in the tourist boom.
Morocco is intermediate in size between Algeria and
Tunisia and is far more mountainous than either. In
the north, the Rif mountains, which are the
southernmost extension of Europe's Alpine system, rise
steeply from the Mediterranean coast. Just to the east
of 'rangier �that cosmopolitan city which commands
the point where the Mediterranean meets the Atlantic
and which was long under international control �port
towns, including Spanish -held Ceuta and Melilla,
4
perch on mountain ledges; and all of the cities and
towns of the coast are oriented toward Eprope. Inland,
the villages are more isolated. Elaborate terracing
procedures make agriculture possible, but the crops
often are not sufficient to feed the local population.
South of the Rif are the Middle Atlas mountains,
flanked by Morocco's two principal rivers: the Own er
Rbia and the Moulouya, which flow, respecti to
the Atlantic and the Mediterrancium As these
mountains merge into the High fl-as, every cultivable
patch of ground at the low r elevations is lutilized to
grow wheat, barlt sorghum, almonds, and
vegetaules. Irrigation ditches, cut into the slopes, bring
water to the fields from mountain streams. T e next
anti losre :,f the 'Moroccan ranges is the Anti Atlas.
SoutF of this area the desert begins, and lack of rainfall
p%nnbits :-agriculture except in the oases And in the
riverbeas, whose subsurface moisture is t.:.pped when
the rivers dry up in summer.
The Atlas Mountain. ensure Morocco a more
plentiful water supply than any other North African
state. Although all the country is hot and dry in
summer, winter storms blowing from the Atlantic and
the Mediterranean drop unoistd on the coasts, on the
Atlantic lowland, and on the Rif and Atlas slopes
facing the sea. Rains are ctiiaracteristically irregular,
violent, and brief, however, and drought years are not
uncommon. 1'i �cipitation always decreases sharply
from north to south, antil semiarid and eventually
desert conditions prevail.
Morocco's heartland lies between the Atlantic
Ocean and the great are formed by the foothills of the
Rif and Atlas mountains. It is a rich argicultural area.
The coastal plain, known as the Rharh, and the basin
of the Sebou River produce citrus fruits, the country's
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main commercial crop, and farther inland cereals,
sugar beets, grapes, and olives are grown. This central
and coastal area ;s also the most densely populated
and economically advanced part of the country. It
contains the important phosphate mines, and its
agriculture supplies the food processing industries.
Casablanca
All the country's major cities are in this area. The
old imperial capitals of l Meknes, and Marrakech,
together with the former garrison cite of Rabat,
describe a triangle between the coast and the Middle
and Iligl Atlas mountains. In 1912 the French began
to restore Rabat �the cite the Sultans bad founded as
a stronghold (or rihut) against unfriendly tribes �and
it is today the political capital of the country, wbile
Casablanca remains the commercial capital.
The different character of Morocco's cities reveals
the varying impact of foreign influence. Sea,
mountain, and desert did not isolate the land, but they
did limit and direct the extent to which it ryas
penetrated. Despite its proximity to Europe and long
coastline (roughly 800 miles on the ltlautic and 300
on the Mcditerrancan). Morocco was never really
open to the commerce of the seas. Spanish and
Portuguese at various limes in history disputed for
control of the shores, but the very regularity of
coastline, providing no natural shelter, acted as it
barrier to maritime influences. Casablanca, Morocco's
largest port, did not develop until the French built
costly breakwaters, and the other harbors of the
'For diacritics on place names, see the list of names on the apron
of the Summary Map and the map itself.
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country are manmade, with the exceptions of Spanish
held Ceuta and Melilla.
Land access to Morocco has also been difficult. To
the east, the narrow Taza corridor, separating the Rif
and the Atlas, stil.' affords the only easy route from
Algeria. And to the south, the historical route of the
caravans from deep Africa into Marrakech winds
tortuously through desert and mountains.
Migration into Morocco was never very great.
French and Spanish settlers at the time of the
protectorates numbered only about 500,06, as
contrasted to over 1 million Frenchmen in Algeria.
Once inside the country, all newcomers throughout
history tended to concentrate in limited areas, forcing
the indigenous peoples back into the mountains and
out of the best Land but never themselves permeating
the country. Thus the French imprint is very strong in
Casablanca and Rabat and the modern sections of
other cities. Trees lire the streets, and the high white
buildings resemble those the French built in
Indochina.
Spanish influence, coupled with the stronger French
imprint, inclines some observers to call Morocco the
most diverse of Arab lands. Tetouan, once the capital
of the Spanish zone, is indeed a Sp: ;nish city with
crenellated stone %valis and iron grill work. Spanish
influence is evident in Morocco's heartland too, for it
entered the country centuries before the protectorate
and through another path. As the Christians regained
Spain in the Middle Ages, the Moors from Andalusia
settled in Morocco. Many were employed as artisans
and craftsmen, particularly in Fes, where they
emulated the Alhambra at Granada, combining in Al
Qarawivin University, for example, Spanish grace and
elegance with African austerity.
The European mark in Morocco is indelible,
particularly among the small core of the elite who are
as much at home in Paris as in Casablanca. French is
still the main language of instruction in most
postprimary schools. This European influence,
however, has been small compared to the Arab
transformation of the land. The invasion of Arabs from
what is now the Syrian area in the seventh and eighth
centuries and the larger one they mounted from
Egypt in the 11th century were far more pervasive
than the coming of the Europeans in the 19th century.
Yet historians doubt that the Arab invaders reached
Morocco in large numbers, and they too had their
main impact on the cities. It is the cities that are the
core of Arab Morocco Arabic in language and in
values �for Islam gave its style of living to every
0
region -f easy access. In the mountainous areas, better
defended by nature, it impressed its influence on
beliefs but had marginal effect on manners and
customs, which retrained faithful to the past.
The dominant threads of rural life in many parts of
Morocco are still Berber. Living in settled
communities, the Berbers retain tribal ties and follow,
to so:- degree, customary laws. In striking contrast to
the veiled women in the Arab cities, the Berber women
go unveiled and wear colorful dress. According to some
observers, the way of life is more open and democratic
in Berber communities than it is in Arab settlements.
The population consists of the Arabized majority
and a Berber minority. Language is the dividing line.
Although Berber is not a written language and no
standard form of it exists, estimates of numbers
speaking a Berber dialect in Morocco range from 25%
to almost 50% of the people. Many of them, however,
know Arabic as well and have become Arabized
Berbers. Intermarriage between Arabs and Berbers has
been frequent, and physical characteristics are not
distinguishing. Speaking of the dilution of the
bloodstrain of the Arabs as they spread from the
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The old quarter of Fes, a medieval, Arab city. The pyramidal roofed
building is the tomb of Idriss II, who fortified Fes about A.D. 809.

Arabian Peninsula throughout the Middle East and
North Africa, former U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare
once commented that anyone is an Arab who says he is
an Arab. While an exaggeration with regard to
mankind as a whole, the remark is perhaps valid for
Morocco. Historically, Berbers could become Arabs by
learning the language and identifying thernselves as
such. Over the centuries many of the Berber tribes did
just that.
Despite the blending of the two peoples, Arab
Berber differences are real. The French :Wade much of
them in pursuing their policy of divide and rule. They
operated separate schools for the Berbers in attempts
to Gaulicize them; they packed the army with Berbers;
and they tried to establish special courts based on
Berber customary law rather than on the Islamic
Sharia. This division of the society was opposed by
Arabs and Berbers alike, but most Moroccans today
nonetheless identify themselves as one or the other.
W;rile many Berbers share all the privileges of the
Arabic- speaking elite, those removed from the towns
did not learn Arabic, and they became the more iso-
lated, poorer elements of the society. As the country
has developed, ethnic identity has been reinforced by
the rur.:l -urban division, and ethnic problems have
been aggravated by the gap that exists between the
elite and the masses. Thus many impoverished Berbers
blame Arab domination for their plight.
Yet these differences should not be overemphasized.
The two peoples have coexisted, for the most part
peacefully, for over 1,000 years. Perhaps because the
Berbers in some ways resemble the Kurds (both are
mountainous people living 'in Arab or other foreign
lands and speaking a different language), observers
have expected them to share the Kurdish desire for
independence. However, no separa`:5t movement has
ever developed among the Berbers with the exception
of the uprising against the Spanish and the French led
by Abdel Krim in the 1920's, and that revolt appeared
to be a drive for local autonomy in the Rif rather than
an effort to unite the Berbers. Recently attempts have
been made to read meaning into the fact that the at-
tempted coups of 1971 -72 were led by Berber officers,
but for various reasons the ethnic identity of the rebels
seems simply incidental. As a lingering result of the
French practice of recruiting Berbers into the army,
almost all of Morocco's high- ranking officers are Ber-
bers. Although more of the younger officers are of
Arab origin, the domination of the Berbers is still such
that they would be involved in any army plans or ma-
neuvers. Moreover, Berber officers were among the
1.1
loyalists as well as the rebels, and a number of them
on both sides lost their lives at Skhirat.
Cleavages and animosities among Berbers are often
as severe as between Berbers and Arabs. The basically
pluralistic Moroccan society revolves around family,
tribe, and region, with Arab or Berber identity only
one factor in the complex of loyalties. Many Berbers,
in fact, do not identify themselves as such but use
instead regional names. The Shluh, for example, are
the Berber agriculturalists of the High and Anti -Atlas
mountains.
In this diverse land, the great unifying factor is
Islam, the official religion of the state and the faith of
almost all the people. Even Islam, however, is marked
by variations in belief and practice throughout the
country, for the Berbers were quick to embrace the
religion of Arabs, but they evolved their own forms of
it. In the countryside particularly, the animism of
ancient times found sustenance in Muslim beliefs.
Nature worship persisted, and religious observances
included magical practices. In addition, cults of .saints,
or marabouts, developed, based on the concept that
certain persons possessed special holiness (barakah)
and were able to perform miracles. Later a type of
popular mysticism spread under the guise of religious
brotherhoods. Some of these brotherhoods carne to
extend over a large part of North Africa and
established networks of lodges called zawiyahs. In
periods of weak central government, they fulfilled
social and political functions as well as religious ones.
Meanwhile, the cities stood as centers of Muslim
orthodoxy, and eventually reform movements grew up
in them. In Fes in the 20th century one such
movement set out to purge the country of unorthodox
practices, of which the zawiyahs were considered the
protagonists. Connected with this movement was a
new Moroccan nationalism; a tacit alliance had
developed at the time of the protectorate between the
zawiyahs and the French, who gave the brotherhoods
a degree of autonomy in return for their loyalty, and
the nationalists thus attacked them for their
connection witn the French and their divisive
influence. Opposition to the brotherhoods has
continued since independence and has resulted in the
disintegration of most of them.
Dilution of spiritual concerns undoubtedly has
taken place among the urban educated. At times,
there is tension between the more permissive way of
life imported from Europe and the Islamic code, for
religion is still a strong influence in Morocco. The
popularity of the pilgrimages to holy sites and the well-
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kept wartbouts' tombs that dot tilt' couutr\ side give
evidence of the importance of faith to most of the
people. I1eligious and temporal authurit\ arc
condbined in the institution of the nonarc�h if not iu
the person of the King, and those associated \sith
Want through descent or scholarship contiune to
command respect throughout the socielc. For nam of
the people, religion remains intermi\cct ccith belief in
IIistoric�aI c�onti it ii t\ prevaiIs in \lorocco as in no
other Maghreb country. Its past is one of the rise and
dismemberment of enpires. :1t times one or another of
them spread into Spain or spilled over into :1lgeria.
although central control of the domains that no\\
constitute tit(- country \\as often tenuous. The thrmw
nonetheless nr,(cle possible it measure of ,tnit\. for the
earring tribes (suallk subscribed to lbe religious �if
not the temporal� a tit horit\ of the S,tltan. Officially,
the Country remains today the Sharifian Empire of
Morocco, meaning that it is rule bs it Sharifian
fatnil, i.c., one of the slrtn�afa Mho claim desccrt from
the Prophet Muhanimad.
In(lcpendenc�e was lost unl\ during the I I sears of
the protectorate, and cveu then the slItauate "ill
malc\oleut or benewleut mud beings Rich
tntut I,e hectored, 1 :ro )it iated, ur a\oicled.:1u(I earn
the puritanical turn that Islas, took it. Morocco hits
nut lost its cffec�t. In contrast to lilt ru,s(lues of !,lost
.krah countries \\Rich arc freer open to the public�,
those in \lorocco are closed to it( ill- usliills. '1'1Ic onl\
cweption is one nrt,ulue in Rabat, opened b�, special
permission of the King to further tourism.
retained as an institution. l the rest of the :grab
ssurld, Morocco its ne\cr part of the (Roman
Pntpire. In the I ;lh cent ur\. hen and
T unisia ,gem token b\ the "lurks. Morocco u:uutged to
stale them off. using as it counlenseight Spanish and
Portugmcsc interest in its coastal areas. Certainl\
"Turkish domination as in none of the conquered
lands an enlightening influence, but in North .\fric�a it
did implant it neasure of administratke control that
it lacking in Morocco.
The French did better than the "larks in \\inning
Morocco. In 1912 tit,- Trcat\ of Fcs its signed making
the country it French I'rotec�lorate. and subse(luentl\
Spanish zones \\ere established in its northern and
southern extremities. Occupation b\ the French,
m
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The Weight of History (u/ou)

however, was of relatively short duration, end its
accc.mplishment was a long and bloody affair. They
had come to Algeria in 1830, completed its conquest
about 1880, and had held Tunisia since 1881,
but despite the Fes treaty� effective control over all
of Morocco was not established until 1934, after
fighting that resulted in almost 50,000 French
casualties.
Most Arab countries have had at least three or four
generations of contact with industrialized nations; and
their Westernization �which is largely a matter of
education �has be ^n phased out over a longer period
than har Morocco's. For that country, independence
meant isolation. Not content with holding out against
political seizure in the mid -19th century, Morocco
strictly limited its commercial exchanges with the
outside world. Closed against outside influence, the
country became engrossed in internal struggles, for
Berber tribes, the soldiers of the Sultan, religious
personages, and town bourgeois were in frequent
collision. These convulsions resulted in social
stagnation, just when Europe was evolving at
increasing speed.
This 19th century isolation was, in a ser_se, a
continuation of the past, for Morocco was left more
alone than many eastern lands throughout history.
Even the Roman occupation was confined to parts of
the north. The first Moroccan ruler about whom firm
data exist way Juba I1, son of a Berber chieftain iii t he
Algerian area whom the Romans educated and placed
in control of Moroccan territory about 25 B.C. lie
married the daugater of Anthony and Cleopatra and
established a court of evident sophistication at
Volubilis. Traces of this rule remain only in this
limited area, indicating �in comparison to far more
extensive ruins in the rest of the Maghreb �that
Morocco was only lightly held by the Romans.
Not until the Arab invasion at the end of the
seventh century did Morocco begin to assume its
present character. Whatever the strength of Arab
Berber differences today, history records a truly
remarkable degree of accommodation between the
two people. Although the Berber tribes initially
resisted the Arabs, less than 50 years later (in 711) they
were fighting as comrades in Spain. Appealing to the
religion of the newly converted people or, perhaps, to
their lust for booty, the Arabs were able to lead Berber
forces to invade Europe, and they penetrated as far
into Gaul as Poitiers. Essentially, the invasion was
Berber, commanded by the Berber general
Tariq �who gave his name to the Rock (Jabal in
10
Arabic) of Gibraltar �but it was an Arab operation,
directed from Damascus. Spanish lands were allotted
to the Arabs and, in the end, the% came to contr -t the
principalities that developed there.
Morocco at that time was a province of the Arab
Caliphate. The first truly independent Moroccan
Kingdom grew from the arrival in Tangier in 788 of
Moulay Idriss, a descendant of 'Ali and Fatima, the
daughter of the Prophet. He had escaped from the
Arab eost after compromising himself in a rebellion
against the Abbasids in what is now Iraq. As a sharif,
he was able to assume command of Berber tribes in the
neighborhood of Volubilis, where he had settled. With
their aid, he soon established the city of Fes as his
headquarters and began to carve out in rudimentary
form the type of Moroccan Kindgom .hat has existed
ever since.
This basic nature of the government remained
unchanged, although the dynasties that followed that
of Moulay Idriss �the Almoravid, Almohad, the
Merinid, and the Saadian �came not from the Arab
east but from the Berber south. The present Alaouite
(Alawite) dynasty also came from the south. Although
the Alaouites claim to be a Shari;ian family, coming
originally from a town on the Red Sea, they had lived
for centuries in Tafilalt near modern Erfoud. The
founder of the dynasty was Moulay al- Rashid, who
succeeded in wresting Fes from Saadian control in
1667.
The succession of these dynasties n Morocco,
however, did not mean unification. Throughout the
centuries, the country remained an amalgam of tribes,
very loosely bound together by the link of religion. It
was divided into what came to be known as the bled al-
makhzen, or lands of government, and the bled al-
siba, or lands of dissidence. The latter was free o:
nwkhzen taxes and military levies, and the tribes that
composed it maintained that status as long as th -v
could repel the forces of the sultan. Usually
makhzen comprised the lowlands between the Rif, the
High Atlas, and the Atlantic, and the siba was a
phenomenon of the mountains and the dese. t, but the
distinction between the two was sharp neither in time
nor in geography.
The makhzen itself represented essentially medieval
and feudalistic control, emanating alternately or
concurrently from Fes, Marrakech, and Meknes.
'Literally, the word makhzen means storehouse. Its application to
the government points to the fact that the main purpose of the
sultanate administration was the collection of taxes. Bled indicates
the Moroccan pronounciation of the Arabic word bilad (country).
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Alliance- building was its kry element. The sultan used
diplomacy and the gra9ting of privileges to ?n the
cooperation of local officials �the caids and the
pashas. (Indicating historical continuity, these titles
are still used for the agents of the Ministry of Interior,
who administer modem Morocco.) Originally, they
were members of the tribal groupings they
administered, supposedly in the name of the sultan.
Some of the caids of the larger southern tribes were
only nominally subordinate to the makhzen. In fact,
they often presided as lords over territories defended
by their own armies, and at times they joined the siba.
With the coming of the French. the tribes lost
military pa! ":y with the central authority, and the siba
was eliminated. At the same time maily elements of
makhzen administration were retained. General (later
Marshal) Louis Lyautey, who presided over the
pacification of Morocco, developed the concept of
indirect administration. He found it easier to control
the country by using local chiefs, and also this policy
conformed to official desires to preserve indigenous
institutions. The caids and pashas were subordinate to
the French chefs de region, but they were allowed a
considerable degree of autonomy. In some cases, their
positions were bolstered by augmenting their property
rights. Thus much of the tra ditional government and
political system survived the French rule relativelv
intact.
The medieval quality of this system of government
was brought before world press and television in
1953 �just 3 years before Moroccan independence
when Thami El Glao the Pasha of Marrakech,
collaborated with the French in deposing the Sultan.
As a rival and enemy of Mohamed V, the Pasha
supported the French when the Sultan began to
oppose them. Subsequently, he organized a demon-
stration of tribesmen to protest the rule of Mohamed
V and to justify the French scheme to replace the
monarch with a little known but docile member of
the Alaouite family. Two years later, persuaded
that the French were about to restore Mohamed V
to the thr ne, Thami El Glaoui went to him,
kissed his feet, and asked his pardon. The scene was
reminiscent of 1076, when Henry I1' of Germanv
submitted to the Pope at Canossa.
Reflecting the nature of the society, the nationalist
movement in Morocco was conservative and religious
origir It grew frorn the coming together of urban
it '!eetuals who called themselves Salafists and who
s r' for Islamic reform and the purging of the
brotherhoods. One of the leaders of this group was the
tutor of Allal El Fassi, the present head of the Isti--lal
party. El Fassi himself first won prominence in the
1930's by opposing the so- called Berber dahir (decree),
by which the French attempted to limit the
application of Sharia lacy. These defenders of Islam
naturally opposed administration by a Christian
power, so the transition from a religious orientation to
one that was overtly political and from reformism to
separatism was an easy one. It resulted in the founding
of the Istiq!al party in 1943.
The independence struggle was also in the
beginning largely an elitist affair, Arab and urban in
origin, but its goals came to be supported by resistance
groups Nyho fought the French in the countryside and
by the growing labor movement. All this while, the
society was changing pi,.foundly. The modern
infrastructure was being established, modern medicine
was contributing to the population growth, and
peasants were being dra%yn off the land by the lure of
wages in development work.
11
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This latter part of the Drench aphorism ("The mure
things change, the more they stay the same." is often
quoted by observers to describe the palace politics of
Morocco. Using techniques reminiscent of those of the
old nwkhzen, King Hassan manipulates his senior
officials and acts to prevent the formation of any
group powerful enough to threaten him. In a sense,
the real politics of the country is the competition for
patronage among the ministers, the trusted advisers of
the King who form what is known as the Royal
Cabinet, and other members of the military and
civilian bureaucracy. Changes in tile society and
government are promised and some are initiated, but
fundamental reform hay yet to take place.
The p-wers of the monarchy grew gradually after
independence. In the early governments. Istiqlal party
members held most of the important ministerial posts,
and they were in a position to bargain with Mollarned
V for it constitution and the holding of elections.
Disagreements within the party, however, soon gave
the King the upper hand. At a time of labor pretests
and clashes between the tribes an remnants of the
Array of National Liberation, the Istiqlal was unable
to form it government. 'thereafter the King appointed
ministers answerable to him "personally' and not to
the party. The army responded to his appeal to halt
the fighting in the countryside, and the piocess of
reforming it into it national force that would serve as
an appendage to the palace was initiated. In the
absence of a popular mandate through elections or
legal rights under a .written constitution, political
parties were iielpless.
King H .scan has made gestures toward
participator\ democracy. Under his rule, three
constitutions have been promulgated and two national
elections hw, e been held. The 1962 constitution
esiablished a bicameral legislature and granted limited
popular representation. In 1965, however, in the wake
of riots in Casablanca and disagreements among
members of the King's coalition in the House of
Representatives, the King accused the parliamen-
tarians of irresponsibility and dismissed the leg-
islature. He then reverted to personal rule through
courtier governments. Another constitution was not
put forth until 1910, and the elections for which it
provided were boycotted by the important political
parties and were apparently rigged. Reform measures
taken after the Skhirat massacre included vet another
constitution, but it also places no meaningful
restrictions on the Kings authority. He retains his
rights to appoint and dismiss ministers, to declare a
1?
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Hassan rides to Friday prayer, 1971.

1
state of emergency, to control in large measure the
composition of any legislature that might be elected,
and to dissolve it at will.
The division of the opposition and personal rivalries
within the political parties have consistently ,abetted
the monarchy's exercise of unrivaled power. The
Istiqlal, which upholds traditional values but
advocates a constitutional monarchy and such
measures as land reform, was badly weakened in 1959,
when the younger, more liberal elements broke off to
form the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP).
Representing the non Communist left, the UNFP has
been harrassed by the government since soon after its
formation. Like the Istiqlal, it has atrophied because
of its long exclusion from power, and in addition it
lacks unified leadership. Other parties, such as the
Popular Movement, continue to function in Morocco,
but they have never had a signifi �ant following.
Despite the weakness of the parties, the King
continues to consult with their leaders. In 1970 the
Istiqlal and the UNFP formed the National Front of
Opposition in an attempt to wrest some power from
the King; and Hassan has offered them participation
in government but on h s own terms. He held 28
meetings with party leaders in late 1971 and early
1972 to discuss with them their assumption of
ministerial portfolios. In the end, the talks turned out
to represent perhaps an exercise in political theatrics. A
new government was formed in April, comprised once
more of the King's men and of apolitical technicians.
Overtures made again to the parties in late 1972 had
the same result.
Much has been made of the corruption of the men
who surround the King. It is true that a number have
used their offices for material gain, that bribery
smooths the working of the bureaucracy, and that
patronage and favoritism are components of the
system. Moreover, the King has in the past dealt
lightly with offenders Only one minister had been
removed from office for corruption before 1971. Then
the Ministers of Finance, Commerce, and Tourism
and the Director General of the Bureau of Mines were
dismissed, tried, and sentenced after General Medbouh,
who was executed for his part in the 1971 wup attempt,
discovered they had tried to get $1 million from Pan
American World Airways in return for supporting a
bid for a hotel site.
Yet it is also true that many of the King's supporters
are honorable men and well intentioned. Why have
they accomplished so little in bringing about economic
growth and an equitable distr;' -rtion of income?
Analysts have argued that use ol power in Morocco
tends to be defensive, that it is seldom considered a
means to chart a new course. Behind this theory is the
obvicus fact that the King has followed the technique
of bui:ding up clientele groups, and he has found it
easier to govern in this way and with the support of the
military than to deal with political parties or with
individuals representing constituencies.
These clientele groups are drawn from the
Moroccan elite, which itself is small. Members grew
up in the protectorate years, and they belong to the
prominent families of old Morocco. (As many trace
their origins to Fes, complaints about the power of the
Fassi �as the bourgeoisie of Fes are called �are
commonly heard throughout the country.) They
benefited from independence because they were the
ones w ith the money to buy the property the French
wanted to sell, and those with the power to arrange
transfer of the funds got bargain prices. The fortunes
they subsequently amassed, while by no means great
ones by Western standards, are sufficient to encourage
maintenance of the status quo.
The elite, moreover, is characterized by an elaborate
system of mut;al obligations. Often commercial,
marital, and social ties cut across political differences.
Allal El Fassi of the Istiqlal, for example, is a personal
friend of the King as well as the leader of the
opposition to him. Most members of the elite or their
associates have participated in the King's patronage
system, and thus they tend to feel powerless as the
monarchy distributes rewards and privations. The
attempted regicides of 1971 -72 indicate that the elite is
changing, perhaps drastically. But in the past, few of
its members have been willing to endanger their well-
being or that of their colleagues to achieve the goals
they may sincerely hold for the society.
The result seems to be a sort of shifting and col-
lective leadership, always controlled by the King, in
which no one is responsible. There is no lack of
planning and activity, but very little happens. A case
in point is the family planning program. It was
established in 1966, and in the Five Year Plan of 1968-
72 it was cited as a national priority objective. One
measure of the program called for employing and
training 600 full -time family planning field workers a:
the rate of 120 a year. Special funds were allotted to
the Ministry of Health for the purpose. In 1968
a group of 33 was trained to do family planning
information work, and they began their activities in
various parts of Morocco. No additional workers were
trained, and in 1970 the Ministry of Health disbanded
this small group. Unless the birth rate declines, the
population will double in 24 years.
13
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We have often said that our socireconomi.: polio% is
aimed at enriching the poor without impoverishing the
rich. Unfortunately, for reasons there is no need to set
forth nos%, we have seen that .chile the poor have not been
enriched, the rich have increased their fortunes. Thus the
A aP between the tvo categor,es has onl% widened.
This situation is intolerable in a country like ;Morocco.
King Hassan, 4 August 1971
The reasons which the King declines to set forth for
not enriching the poor are various, and manv have
economic logic behind them. With limited resources,
the government has been reluctant to take measures to
endanger production levels or to disrupt the rural
sector. Its Policies have emphasized economic growth
and long -term benefits rather than measures to
achieve a more equitable distribution of the gains.
Little attention has been given to that Problem,
although fewer than Wr' of the people reportedly
receive more than half the national income.
In agriculture, which has been receiving about half
the government investment, most of the projects
14
undertaken are those with long gestation periods, such
as dam construction. The benefits, moreover, accrue
mainly to the modern sector, which consists of tie
lands confiscated by the government after
independence or sold by Europeans to Moroccans,
together with some farms still owned by Europeans.
This sector provides nearly all the agricultural exports
(mainly citrus fruits and vegetables), but it employs
only about a quarter of the rural population.
Investment would benefit the small farms, on which
most of the people live at a subsistence level, supplying
there with fertilizers and introducing modern
techniques through extension services. however, the
disparity in efficiency between the large and small
farms is very great, and the government is eager to
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The Poor Not Enriched (c)

increase the exports that the former provide. These
exports finane: the import of capital goods and also a
significant part of the food supply. Once an exporter of
wheat, Morocco now must import enough to feed its
population even in good crop years.
Underlying agricultural problems is the antiquated
hand tenure system. Most of the pasture land is still
under tribal ownership, a fact which discourages
individual development effort,. An estimated 7% of
the farmers own over half of the cultivated land, 60%
own less than an acre, and 33% have no land at all.
The government has distributed about one -sixth of the
land it nationalized after independence, but the large
estates particularly those of the wealthy
Moroccans �have not been disturbed. Public de-
mands for land distribution are mounting, and land
reform is an important issue of the political opposition.
Meanwhile, the government is caught between these
demands and its reluctance to jeopardize the high
production levels of the large farms.
This dilemma and other problems of the
government were aggravated throughout most of the
1960's by an economic standstill. Midway in the
decade the government curbed spending to relieve
inflationary pressures. Then drought years cut inputs
to the food processing industry and caused a slump in
consumer demand, reinforcing the depressing effects
of the reduced government spending. The result was a
sharp increase in unemployment. Moreover, the
mining industry has been in trouble. Outputs of iron,
lead, and zinc ores have declined as mines have been
depleted. Morocco has held its place as first or second
in world exports of phosphates, depending oil the level
of U.S. sales in a given year, but that industry is
threatened by falling market prices and new foreign
competition.
Since 1968 the econciny nonetheless has been
healthier, largely because of several good crop years.
Sharply increased government investment and revived
consumer demand resulting from the good harvests
prompted a resurgence of eco.,omic activity
throughout the country, and it has beer reflected in
rising private investment. Moreover, Morocco has
succeeded in putting itself on the world tourist map,
thus creating work and bringing in foreign exchange.
Both tourism and the relatively high level of private
investment, which the government has encouraged,
are threatened by the political instability evident since
1971, but to date its effect does not appear to have
been serious.
Although the Moroccan economy relies heavily on
assistance from the West, it is not without
development prospects. The returns from investment
in irrigation projects are just forthcoming and will
reduce dependence on rainfed agriculture, while
production can be further increased by new efforts to
obtain higher yields. An agreement has been
concluded with the European Economic Community
which gives Moroccan production preferential entry
into the Common Market countries, and it may serve
as an inducement to foreign investors to establish
factories there. The textile industry is meeting
domestic needs, new industries such as automobile
assembly have been established, and there is room for
great expansion of tourism.
Cautious efforts are being made to achieve a more
equitable distribution of income, although they by no
means approach the bold initiative suggested by the
King's oratory of August 1971. A progressive tax on
incomes amounting to the equivalent of over
US$10,000 was instituted in that year. Moreover,
indirect taxes which, together with customs duties,
have accounted for about half of budget
revenues been reduced. Distribution of
government land to the peasants has been speeded up,
and measures have been taken to encourage labor
intensive industries with hopes of reducing
unemployment. While the best of governments could
find no quick or easy solutions to the problems of
Morocco, evidence of concern for the welfare of the
people may assuage discontent.
15
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With or Without the King (s)
After t%%:, attempts on the life of the King within 14
months, a "wait- and -see" mood prevails in Morocco,
and it permeates as well all comment on the future of
the monarchy. Hassan owes his life to the ineptness of
the coup plotters; and now the officer corps, which
had been the throne's main prctp, no longer supplies
reliable backing. His purging of senior officers, some of
whom undoubtedly have their own supporters both in
the military arid among the civilian elite, and his
sharp criticisni of the armed forces must have increased
the numbers of those antagonistic to him. Moreover,
students, teachers, and laborers have not lost the
disruptive capability they demonstrated in riots of
1965. Hassan has assumed control of the military and
strengthened his supervision of government
administration, but his record as a dilettante does not
augur well for efficient and effective rule.
16
Yet the King is a shrewd man who has proved
himself adept at rranipulation, and assessment of his
rule is not wholly negative. Holding a law degree from
Bordeaux University, he combines the style of the
West with the traditional Nay of life in a manner
perhaps *sell suited to his country. As he moves his
court to his numerous palaces in an aura of privilege,
wealth, and luxury, he preserves an aloofness that may
be expected by the nass of people who regard him as
their religious leader. At the same time, he ;s the
leader of the Westernized elite Li ,d he holds press
conferences which occasionally have the give- and -take
quality of those in Europe and the United States.
Hassan's maior achievement is in the age -old art of
statecraft, anc: his foreign policies have benefited his
country. Maintaining a posture of nominal
nonalignment but actual pro Westernism, Morocco
since independence has obtained about $860 million
in U.S. aid, approximately half as much from France,
and almost $120 million from Communist countries.
Despi!e the opposition of the Istiqlal and the UNFP,
the King has permitted the United States to retain
naval communication facilities in and near Kenitra,
probably seeing in the informal agreement an
assurance of U.S. aid. This arrangement i:: threatened
by the possibility that Hassan may seek to end it in
order to strengthen his credentials among the
nonaligned states or to allay domestic citicism. And
he has another issue �that of the Spanish
Sahara �whose activation would serve the same
purposes. Hassan occasionally speaks out strongly
against continued Spanish control of this territory, and
he also a,L, for the return of Ceuta and Melilla, but he
takes no action in these directions to seriously
aggravate Madrid.
While maintaining good relations with the West,
Hassan has worked to build his image among Arab
and African countries. He was elected chairman of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) at a summit
meeting of that organization Ire hosted in Rabat in
June 1972. Although he has kept his country relatively
removed from the contagion of the Arab -Is: ,eli
conflict and has not been inclined to sacrifice
Morocco's U.S. ties to Arab solidarity, he is on good
terms with all the Aral) states except Libya. Those
relations were naturally chilled when the Libvan radio
called on the coup plotters to try again after the 1971
attempt on the King's life failed.
One of the most important objectives of Hassan's
foreign policy has been the development of a corn
munity of interests with his Maghreb neighbors. The
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major irritant in relations with Algeria had been Mo-
rocco's claims to a !arge part of the Algerian Sahara,
and they led to a brief border war in 1963.
Evidently recognizing Morocco's inability to press
these claims, Hassan downplayed them, and in 1972
an agreement was signed for demarcation of the
disputed area. Moroccan relations with Algeria and
Tunisia are presently low key, and the parameters of
meaningful economic cooperation are limited by
the lack of complementary resourses. Nonetheless, the
leaders of these states have exchanged friendly visits,
resulting in agreements calling for the denunciation of
any pact or force directed against another and for
increased cooperation.
In domestic affairs, Hassan has been autocratic but
not, for the most part, repressive. His crackdowns on
the opposition have, to date at lease, been sporadic.
Morocco is rare among the Arab and African states for
a multiparty system; and the right of criticism, though
restricted, is unccmmon for that part of the world. The
Istiqlal continues to put out the leading Arabic
language daily newspaper, Al Alam (The Banner), and
has used. it to denounce such measures as the 1970 and
1972 constitutions. In August 1972 the paper carried a
statement blaming the King's policies for the attempt
on his life. These issues were confiscated, but no
further action was taken against the paper. In fact, if
one of the attempted coups had succeeded, Moroccans
would almost surely have less opportunity to express
dissent than they do now.
Morocco also has one of the few independent trade
union organizations in African and Arab countries.
The Moroccan Labor Union (UMT), with some
200,000 members, is an influential group, which
supports but is not allied with the leftist UNFP and
openly criticizes the monarchy. Although the power of
the UMT has been hurt by the great extent of
unemployment in the country, it has pressed hard for
wage increases and had some success. Perhaps seeing
in the UMT a counterweight to army influence,
Hassan has not been willing to use force to curb its
extended strikes and periodic walkouts.
For several months after the Skhirat massacre,
Hassan did succeed in creating a sense of an
impending better future. He promulgated a new
constitution, promised elections, proclaimed a fight on
corruption, raised sal. r:zs, and lifted the tax on
sugar �an important item in the diet of the Moroccan
poor. However, as he postponed elections, appointed
another cabinet with -at party participation, and
relied increasingly on the army, it became apparent
that the main lesson Hassan had learned from Skhirat
was to give more intimate and protected birthday
parties. There have been few real indications that the
lessons learned from the second attempted coup
have been more profound.
Yet it is not too late for the throne to become an
agent for change in Morocco. The King could institute
meaningful land reform, develop a new class of
technicians to guide the development of cooperatives
and other projects, shift the tax burden to those able to
bear it, and expand the civic action and public works
programs engaging the army and the unemployed. In
short, Hassan could lead a campaign for social and
economic betterment, and he is in a better position to
do so than any successor would be. He is less likely to
be troubled by regional and other divisive tendencies
in the society, for his position still commands respect,
especially in the countryside. Such a campaign has
been led by the Shah of Iran, whom Hassan is said to
admire. And at various times during his reign Hassan
has pledged reform and an "agrarian revolution." If
change does take place in Morocco and if it is directed
by the palace, it will be healthy for King and country.
17
r
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CHRONOLOGY (U /OU)
c. 146 B.C. -A.D. 400
Roman influence and subsequent control replaces that of the
Carthaginians.
A.D. 429
Invasions by Vandals and Visigoths begin.
c. 685
Arab raiders enter Morocco through the Taza gap.
711
Forces under the leadership of the Arab governor Musa Ibn
Nusayr and his Berber subaltern Tariq invade Spain.
c. 788
Moulay Idriss, a descendant of the Prophet, establishes the
first Moroccan dynasty and extends hegemony over most of
the northern part )f the country.
c. 1000
Arab tribes of the Hilal invade Morocco.
1062
Berber tribes from the south make Marrakech the new capital
and found Almoravid dynasty.
1147
New confederation takes Marrakech and its leaders become
the Almohad rulers.
1212
Almohad forces are defeated in Spain, and Muslim power there
begins to wane.
c. 1216
The Beni Merin tribe enters Morocco, defeats the Almohads,
and eventually establishes the Merinid dynasty.
1549
Capture of Fes marks beginning of control by the Saadians,
who had previously defeated Portuguese forces.
c. 1576
Sultan Abd al -Malik is influenced by the Ottoman Turks, who
then controlled the rest the Maghreb, but he resists their
domination.
1664
Moulay al- Rashid becomes the first strong ruler of the Alaouite
dynasty, which started to rise to power about 1660.
1787
Morocco and the United States sign the Treaty of Marrakech,
settling differences resulting from pirate seizure of U.S. ships.
18
e.
1912
Treaty of Fes establishes the French Protectorate; Spanish
zones are recognized in the north and south and the existing
international status of Tangier is accepted.
1956
March
Formal independence is granted by France to French Protector-
ate of Morocco.
April
Spain relinquishes control over Spanish Protectorate of Morocco.
October
International status of Tangier is revoked; zone is integrated
into Morocco.
1958
April
Spain relinquishes control over the southern Spanish zone of
M -)rocco.
1960
June
U.S. military assistance program is initiated.
1961
February
King Mohamed V dies.
March
Mohamed's son is enthroned as King Hassan II and mainta?ns
royal control of the government, acting as his own Prime Min-
ister.
1962
December
Morocco's first written constitution becomes effective, following
approval by popular referendum.
1963
October
Moroccan territorial claims lead to 3 -week border war with
Algeria.
December
U.S. Strategic Air Command completes evacuation of three
bases in Morocco.
1965
March
Student demonstrations in Casablanca escalate into violent
antigovernment riots joined by the unemployed and by young
militants from opposition factions. Violence spreads to Fes but
not to other cities. About 250 are killed, 4,000 injured, and 850
arrested.
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1985
June
King declares a State of Exception (Petat dexception), dis-
misses parliament, and promises a revised constitution and new
elections.
October
Mehdi Ben Barka, exiled UNFP leader, is kidnapped in Paris.
Facts of his disappearance remain unclear, but case leads to a
deterioration in Morocco's relationship with France. In January
1966, France recalls its Ambassador to Morocco, and Morocco
recalls its Ambassador to France.
1966
October
Hassan visits Moscow. Four conventions are signed, including
a general economic aid agreement.
1969
January
Spain and Morocco sign the Treaty of Fes in which Spain agrees
to return to Morocco the enclave of Ifni.
Morocco and Algeria sign the 1frane Treaty of Friendship.
December
France and Morocco agree to reestablish full diplomatic rela-
tions.
1970
August
King Hassan promulgates a new constitution and lifts the State
of Exception. Elections are held for a new unicameral legis-
lature.
1971
July
High ranking army officers lead an unsuccessful coup attempt
against King Hassan at his birthday celebration at Skhirat
Palace. Loyal forces under the diwvtion of Gen. Mohamed
Oufkir restore order within a few dui'
1972
March
King Hassan promulgates a new constitution but makes no
firm promise on a date for new elections and the establishment
of parliament.
August
The King escapes another attempt on his life when three Moroccan
Air Forev F -5's try to shoot down the plane bringing him from
France.
19
J
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c
AREA BRIEF*
LAND:
Size: 158,100 sq. mi.
Use: About 32% arable and grazing land, 17% forest and esparto,
51% desert, waste, and urban (1965)
Land boundaries: 1,240 mi.
WATER:
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi. (fishing, 12
n. mi.)
Coastline: 1,140 mi.
PEOPLE:
Population: 15.8 million (July 1972 est.), average annual
growth rate, at least 2.9
Ethnic divisions: 99.1% Arab Berber, 0.2% Jewish, 0.7%
foreign, mainly French
Religion: 98.7% Muslim, 1.1% Christian, 0.2% Jewish
Language: Arabic (official); several Berber dialects; French
predominates in business, government, diplomacy, and post
primary education
Literacy: 20%
Labor force: Almost 5.9 million (1970 est.); 69% in agriculture,
10% in industry and mining, 10% in commerce and govern-
ment
Organized labor: About 5% of the labor force, mainly in the
Union of Moroccan workers (UMT)
GOVERNMENT:
Type: Constitutional monarchy
Capital: Rabat
Political subdivisions: 19 provinces and 2 prefectures
Legal system: Based on Islamic law and French and Spanish
civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts in Constitu-
tional Chamber of Supreme Court; has not accepted compul-
sory ICJ jurisdiction
Branches: Constitution provides for Prime Minister and min-
isters named by and responsible to King; King has paramount
executive powers; unicameral legislature (two thirds to he
directly elected, one third indirectly 1; judiciary independent
of other branches
Government leaders: King Hassan II
Suffrage: Universal overage 20
Elections: Last parliamentary elections held 21 and 28 August
1970; elections for new parliament created by the constitution
adopted 15 March 1972 have not been held
Political parties: Istiqlal party, National Union of Popular
Forces (UNFP), Popular Movement (MP), Constitutional and
Democratic Popular Movement (MPCD), Democratic Socialist
Party (PSD), Party of Liberation and Socialism (PLS), estab-
'The material in this brief is drawn from the January 1973 issue
of the semiannual NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook; it is Unclas-
sified /Official Use Only unless otherwise indicated.
20
lisped in June 1968 and banned Septemlrr 1969, is front for
Moroccan Communist Party (MCP), which was proscribed in
1959; Istiqlal and the UNFP formed a National Front in July
1970 to oppose the new constitution
Voting strength: August 197 elections were nonpolitical;
1 March 1972 constitutional referendum tallied 98.7% for new
constitution, 1.25% opposed, and National Front abstained
from voting
Communists: 300 est.
Member of: Arab League, ECC (association until 1974), FAO,
IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, ILO, IMC, IMCO, IMF, ITU,
OAU, Seabeds Committee (observer), U.N., UNESCO, UPU,
WHO, WMO
ECONOMY:
GNP: $2.7 billion (1970, constant 1966 prices), about $170
per capita; average annual growth 5.4% during 1968 -71 (C)
Agriculture: Cereal farming and livestock raising pre4domi-
nate; main crops wheat, barley, citrus fruit, wine, vegetables,
olives
Major industries: Mining and mineral processing (phos-
phates, smaller quantities of iron, manganese, lead, zinc, and
other minerals); food processing, textiles
Electric Power: 748,000 kw. rapacity (1971); 1.9 billion kw. -hr.
produced (1971), 116 kw. -hr. per capita
Exports: $488 million (f.o.b., 1970), food products 51 phos-
phates 23 other 26% (C)
Imports: $686 million (c.i.f., 1970); food 17%, raw material
and semifinished goods 43%, equipment 24%, consumer goods
16% (C)
Major trade partners: Exports �France 36 U.S. 2
imports �France 31 West Germany 9 Italy 5 Benelux
5 U.S. 14%(C)
Aid:
Economic Includes about $720 million from the United
States through June 1970; Communist countries, about $80
million
Military�U.S., $67 million; France, $41 million; and Com-
munist countries, $33 million delivered through June
1970(5)
Monetary conversion rate: 4.59 dirhams= US$1 (selling rate)
Fiscal year: Calendar year
COMMUNICATIONS:
Railroads: 1,100 mi. standard gage, 93 mi. double track; 493 mi.
electrified
Highways: 32,180 mi.; 11,200 mi. bituminous, 3,250 mi.
gravel, crushed stone, or improved earth, 17,733 mi. unimproved
earth (C)
Pipelines: Crude oil, 85 mi.; refined products, 307 mi.; natural
gas, 18 mi.
Ports: 8 major (including Spanish controlled Ceuta and Mel
lila), 12 minor
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SECRET
c:
Merchant marine: 13 ships (1,000 g.r.t. or over) totaling 36,900
g.r.t., 48,400 d.w.t.; includes 11 cargo, 2 specialized carrier (C)
Civil air: 10 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 143 total, 87 usable; 23 with permanent- surface
runways; 2 with runways over 12,000 ft.; 10 with runways
8,000 11,999 ft., 40 with runways 4,000 -7,999 ft.; 4 seaplane
stations
Telecommunications: Superior system by African standards
composed of open -wire lines, coaxial multicorductor and sub-
marine cables and radio -relay links; principal centers Casablanca
and Rabat, secondary centers Fes, Marrakech, Oujda, Sebaa
Aioun, Tangie! and Tetouan; 170,000 telephones; about 1 mil-
lion radio and 300,000 TV receivers; 24 Moroccan AM, 1 Voice
of America AM, 3 FM, 17 TV station 11 submarine cables
DEFENSE FORCES:
Personnel: Army, 49,000; navy, 1,600; air force, 3,100 (130
pilots); Mobile Maghzen of Auxiliary Forces, 6,000; royal gen-
darmerie, 3,500; Mobile Intervention Companies of the
SECRET
national police, 2,500; Males 1549. 3,827,000 (January 1973
est.), of whom about 68% fit for military service; about 175,000
reach military age (18) annually (S)
Major ground units: 1 light security brigade, 1 parachute
brigade, 9 infantry battalions, 1 heavy mortar battalion, 4
cavalry battalions. 1 Royal Guard battalion. 2 motorized infan-
try brigades, 1 mechanized infantry brigade, and 1 armored
brigade which were disbanded in late 1972 consisted of 9 in-
fantry battalions, 4 iiiiery battalions, 4 tack battalions, 3 re-
connaissance (armored infantry) battalions, 1 assault gun
battalion, and 1 antitank gun battalion; sts tus of these units
has not been determined (S)
Ships: 17 (15 patrol, 1 amphibious, 1 service) (S)
Aircraft: 182 (52 jet, 113 prop, 17 helicopters) (S)
Supply: Produces some small arms and ammunition; dependent
on U.S., France, Czechoslovakia, and U.S.S.R. for other ma-
teriel (C)
Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1971,
$143.9 million. 16.5% of total budget
21
.d.r,.......Y ..a
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0
Places and features referred to in the General Survey (U/OU)
COORDINATES
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W.
a r .N.
PW.
Abda (tribal area)
32 15
8 55
M oha m media..........................
Agadir
30 24
9 36
Moulouya, Oued xtrm)....
33 42
7 24
'ill
Agadir (admd)
30 00
9 00
Moyen (Middle) Atlas (mountain range)...
35 06
33 30
2
4 30
Ahermoumou
33 50
4 24
Na dor................................
35 11
2 56
Ain el Aouda
33 48
6 47
Na :or admd)..........................
35 00
3 00
Aft Ammar
33 05
6 10
Ouarzazate............................
30 55
6 55
Aft Melloul
30 21
9 30
Ouarrazate (admd)
31 00
6 30
Al Hoceima
35 15
3 56
Oued el H eimer........................
34 27
1 54
A] Hoceima (admd)
35 00
4 15
Oued Sous (siren).......................
30 22
9 37
Anti -Atlas (mis)
30 00
8 30
Oued Zarjoune
35 44
5 27
Asil ah
35 28
6 02
Oued Zem
32 52
6 34
Atlas Mountains (rots)
32 00
2 00
GlIjda.......
34 40
1 54
Azilal
31 58
6 34
Oujda admd)
33 00
2 00
Azrou
33 26
5 13
Oum er Rbia, Ou:d (sirm)
33 19
8 20
Ben Slimane
33 33
7 07
Penmarch, France......................
47 49
4 20
Benguerir
32 14
7 57
Rabat..
34 02
6 50
Beni Idir (area)
32 52
6 47
Rabat -Sale (admd)
34 02
6 50
Beni Mellal
32 20
6 21
Ras el Aswad (cape)
35 41
5 17
Beni Mellal (admd)
32 30
6 30
Rharb (tribal area)
34 30
6 02
Beni Oukil, Station de (rsta)
34 38
2 02
Rif, Er (mountain region)
35 00
4 00
Berrechid
33 16
7 36
Safi....
32 18
9 14
Bine el Ouidane
32 06
6 26
Safi admd
31 55
9 00
Bleida ruin
30 22
625
Sale...
34 04
6 48
Bou Arfa
32 32
1 57
Sebaa A ioun...........................
33 54
5 22
Cap Spartel (cape)
35 48
5 56
Se.bou, Oued (strm)
34 16
6 41
Casablanca
33 37
7 35
Settat admd)
33 00
7 30
Casablanca (admd)
33 37
7 35
Sidi Allal Taxi.........................
34 31
6 20
Ceuta (Spanish possession)
35 .52
5 20
Sidi Bou Knadel.......................
34 08
6 44
Chaouia (tribal area).
33 12
7 20
Sidi el Aidi, Gare de (rsta)
33 07
7 38
Chefchaouene
35 10
5 16
Sidi Ifni
29 23
10 10
Djebel Jeer (gasfield)
31 25
9 14
Sidi Kacem
34 13
5 42
Doukkala (tribal area)
32 55
8 25
Sidi Rhalem (oilfield)...................
31 25
9 35
Draa, Oued (strm)
28 40
11 07
Sidi Slimane
34 16
5 56
El Guefaf
32 55
6 46
Sidi Yahy du Rharb....................
34 19
6 19
El Hajeb
33 42
5 22
Skhirat.
33 52
7 03
ElJabha
35 13
4 40
Souk el Arba du R harb.................
34 41
5 59
El Jadida (admd)
32 54
8 30
Sous, Oued (siren)......................
30 22
9 37
El Kelaa des Srarhna
32 03
7 24
Tadla plain
32 30
6 20
Erfoud
31 26
4 14
Tafilalt
32 23
4 30
Essaouira
31 31
9 46
Tafilalt( oasis).........................
31 18
4 18
Fes
32 02
4 59
Tanerhift
32 24
4 49
Fes admd
34 00
5 00
Tanfit.
30 56
5 49
Figuig
32 06
1 !4
Tanfit. Plaine de.......................
32 57
5 00
Gara Djebilet, Algeria (mine).
26 45
7 2Q
Tanger (admd)
35 45
5 45
Got- limine
28 59
10 04
Tangier
35 48
5 48
G u.�. duds
34 29
2 03
Tan- Tan.......
28 26
11 06
Guercif
34 14
3 22
Tarfaya
27 57
12 55
Haouz (p lain)
31 30
8 00
'Tarfaya (admd
28 00
11 00
Hassi Bellal
34 18
2 11
Taza admd
34 00
4 00
Haut (High) Atlas (mountain range)
32 00
6 00
Taza, Trouee de (pass)
34 15
4 00
Helmer, Oued el (foundary)
34 27
1 54
Temara
33 55
6 55
Ifni (area)
29 15
10 08
Ifrane
33 32
5 06
SELECTED AIRFIELDS
Imi n -Irfi (mine)
30 04
8 24
Imini
31 06
7 17
Al Hoceima -Cote du Rif.................
35 11
3 50
Jerada
34 19
2 09
Casablanca /A nfa.......................
33 34
7 40
Kaaba Tadda
32 36
6 16
Casablanca/ Nouasseur..................
33 22
7 35
Keehoulah (gasfield)
31 31
9 20
Fes/ Saiss
33 56
4 58
Kenitra
34 16
6 36
Kenitra
34 18
6 36
Kenitra (admd)
34 00
6 00
Marrakech
31 36
8 02
Kettara, Mine de (mine)
31 52
8 10
Meknes
33 53
5 31
Khemisset
33 49
6 04
Rabat Sale
34 03
6 45
Khenifra
32 56
5 40
Tangier /Bouk half.......................
35 44
5 55
Khouribga
32 53
6 54
Tetouan
35 34
5 22
Khouribga (admd)
32 56
6 36
Tetouan (admd)
35 35
5 30
Ksar el Kebir
35 00
5 59
Tindouf, Algeria............,,..........
27 42
4 09
Ksar es Souk (admd)
31 00
4 00
Tit Mellil
33 34
7 29
Lugar, Spain
36 47
3 24
Tiznit..
29 43
9 43
Marrakech
31 38
8 00
Tleta Sidi M barek Bou Guedra..........
32 16
8 59
Marrakech (admd)
32 00
8 00
Touissit
34 29
1 46
Mechra Bel Ksiri
34 34
5 57
Volubilis (ruin)
34 04
5 33
Mediouna
33 27
7 31
Youssoufia
32 15
8 32
Meknes
33 54
5 33
Zafo...
34 57
2 44
Meknes (admd)
33 00
5 30
*%ouia Ahanesal
31 51
6 07
Melah, Oued (sirm)
33 43
7 24
fAda.....
32 49
4 57
Melilla (Spanish possession)
35 19
2 57
Zellija- Botlbeker.............
34 29
1 43
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0
Morocco
International boundary
Province or pr6fectunl boundary
C National capital
GQa ablanca Province or pr6fecturn capital
--F- Railroad
Surfaced road
Unsurfaced road or track
Airfield
.l, Major port
Populated places
8 Over 100,000
0 25,000 to 100,000
e Under 25,000
Spot elevations in feet
Scale 1:2,430,000
0 25 5 0 75 100
Statute Miles
0 25 50 75 100
Kilometers
Mohammedis
Sidi Said 71
w*ou (damJ
Atlantic
32
Ocean
COP
C
tinit
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Q
r a k
13

wo
Chd e 1 i
S
FernaMo I Eatepona
Spain
Igeciras La Linea M e d i t e r r a n e a n
Gibraltar
Tarifa
Strait of Gibraltar S e a
Punta Almine I
Sp vo Uta
s Ras el Aswed
Tang Cap des I
Asilah Trois %urches
1
J a Pen6n de
Alhucemas Ida Islay
U D Pen6n de Vdlez (sv. v
Al
t de la Gomera Ho N,t Cnafarinas i
(spa
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Mehdiya 5
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Raba
Rab El Kanse a 'd t j i w
a 1 Y
(dam) Ip1 ti.,� Y
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76 r .3968:., 4L' r �i a v
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Tendrara
rachou(dam) el Atdi ,rs J r"a r
tat Alt Ammar
20.38
Settat uribga l s henifra _`Edf/ �7 5-35
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IM i dpi .-.f
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Tadla
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4r F
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SOWS
WOW
Algeria
Ethnol
7-
r
F 1
101
Population
Persons per squire mb
0 20 10 130
0
Persons per square kbmster
9ased on 1960 census
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Beddouz
f
A t
/v J
anti S..' mm Jr
6ou ui en
Mina
da
Ketfra
a 4,
O Q 'r _JS r,a�
Ea aouira kech
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Cap Rhrr
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83 0.
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Sidi
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Al
Cap Drda
r ifs ..p' S
28 Cap Juby
de
Tindouf Seb
Q ut
J
i Spanish Sahara
500977 1.73 r
olsr%
Central Intelligence Agency For Official Use Only
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i
Population
Portent per two allt
a UI
Penes per pears kbmbr
Ballad on IWO consus
28
Econanic
AGRICULTURE
Principal agricultural and lip
ama (cereals, citrus, olives
sheep and goats)
Irrigated areas
MINING
Fe Iran
Pb Lead and zinc
Ph Phosphate
Q Chemical complex
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a Summary Map

T
w
SECRET
r
z�Y
s
r
a
h
\A
(i
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