NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 49; LIBYA; ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080014-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORTS

I ffIffl" rfflr In c
A
i
0 i
SECRET
49/GS/AF
Libya
February 1974
NATIONAL INTELLIGE
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080014-2

J r ns. sls r res, ff e
wv.ue.error.rw. -.wN*: exert' Y, w9,'_? 11t! Y� T9JaCuax!+7Aprk^yaeocn.r.a. wren
F
r
J^
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2
i<
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now
x.
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per
ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters Country
1
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transporta" ion and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
and sacurity organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
f
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of ,Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and
numb" and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence t.gency.
1
i
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Cc itral Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This nocument contains i- formation affecting the national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 791 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
i
I
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED BY 019611. EXEMPT I -RO1'. GENERAL DECLASSIFI.
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11632 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
SB (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
r
J^
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

FX1
z:
Y'? AN.. akYl,. J'! R41 b;) i4' '..eof_Yt`�.'rt.L".`ya'`F� r .s,T ;f;p,9y �Vl::'!ECY "n+p"P ;R'�'F^ c7M .Mrc! y7
t
I
WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National St curity Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U/OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

J 0 1 ffit. is@ 1 ffan
Page
Page
D. Navy
9
E. Air Force
Organization
11
12
1. Organization
10
1.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
10
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
3. Training
12 f
12
3. Training
11
4. Logistics
12
4. Logistics
11
F. Paramilitary
13
FIGURES
Page
Page
Fig. 1 Command structure (chart)
3
Fig. 4 T54/55 medium tank (photo)
7
Fig. 2 Defense budgets (table)
6
Fig. 5 Major military installations (nwp)
8
Fig. 3 Ferret scout cars (photo)
7
Fig. 6 Libyan destroyer escort (photo)
10

0
Armed Forces
A. Defense establishment
The coup which overthrew the Libyan monarchy on
1 September 1969 was instigated by virtually
unknown junior officers of the Royal Libyan Army.
They were supported initially by noncommissioned
officers and were joined by various senior army and
Libyan National Security Force officers within hours
after the first announcements. The comparatively
bloodless takeover came from a totally unexpected
source, but the plotters apparently had planned and
coordinated their activities carefully. By the end of the
second day, the new regime was in control of Tripoli
and had immobilized the strike forces of the National
Security Force in Banghazi, Al Bayda', and Tripoli,
thereby neutralizing the primary remaining threat to
its successful takeover of the country. Factors
contributing to the coup included resentment over the
political influence and favoritism bestowed by King
Idris on poorly qualified senior officers of the army,
dissatisfaction with the procurement of weapons from
the United Kingdom, which would have required the
long -ter. 1 presence of hundreds of British technicians,
and the failure of the government to adopt a more
militant attitude regarding Israel. (C)
The armed forces consist of the army, navy, and air
force, which prior to the coup had a total personnel
strength of about 8,300 men. The three services were
established more for prestige purposes than to meet
actual defense requirements and were totally
ineffective as a combat force. For defense against
external aggression, Libya relied on the 20 -year
defense treaty with the United Kingdom. Signed in
1453, this treaty not only committed the United
Kingdom to assist Libya in time of war, but also
permitted the stationing of British forces in Libya. In
addition, an agreement negotiated with the United
States in June 1957 committed the United States to aid
in the development of the Libyan Army for the
maintenance of internal security and for self defense.
The U.S. agreement was broadened in 1962 to include
aid in developing the Libyan Air Force. A subsequent
Libya -U.K. agreement provided aid for the Libyan
Navy. (C)
The desire of the government in power after 1969
for involvement in the Arab war against Israel called
for the development of a modern military force and
the reduction of dependence on the United States and
the United Kingdom for support. By June 1973,
personnel strengths of all 3 services had been
increased, bringing the total number above 23,500.
Several years earlier, base agreements with the United
States and the United Kingdom had been prematurely
terminated, and military assistance from both
countries greatly diminished. The Libyans shifted
their sources of military aid to Arab countries and
other nations sympathetic to the Arab cause. Egypt
assumed a predominant role in the training of army
personnel both in Libya and in Egypt. It has stationed
troops in Libya for dispersal and training of its own
forces, for advice and training of the Libyan Armed
Forces, and also for the support of the ruling junta. In
accordance with an agreement between the Libyan
and Egyptian leaders, several thousand Libyan
soldiers were rotated to Egypt in January 1970 for
training and duty along the Suez Canal. Although the
Libyan contingent was recalled before engaging in
combat, the move represented Libya's only
commitment of personnel to the joint military Arab
command. During the October 1973 war with Israel,
Libya contributed substantial military equipment and
financial aid to the raL cause, but no army or navy
units were sent to the front. Some Libyans, however,
may have flown Libya:r Mirages which had been
deployed to Egypt in early 1973. (S)
Before the 1969 coup ail weapons and equipment in
use in the Libyan Armed Forces were of Western
origin, primarily British and U.S., acquired through
purchase and grant aid. The influx of Egyptian troops
and advisers ntroduced Soviet -made equipment
which presaged extensive Libyan purchases of military
equipment from both the U.S.S.R. and Czecho-
slovakia, deliveries of which began in 1970. Two
contracts for the purchase of military equipment from
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2
pr +r:
the United Kingdom had been concluded by the King.
and Interior were arrested on charges of plotting a
The Libyan Government canceled the one for a
coup attempt; however, it is pc:ssible that the ministers
mobile air defense and missile system, and the British
were removed from office to prevent potential t
Government eliminated some 200 tanks from the
opposition to Qadhafi's pro Egyptian policies. Again
second one. The remainder of the equipment ordered
in September 1970, some 80 army and police officers
s
under the second contract, including other armored
and some civilians were arrested in Cyrenaica for I
vehicles, antiaircraft guns, and field artillery pieces,
allegedly plotting against the regime. At the time there
were to be delivered on an as- needed basis. A destrover
was no clear indication that these individuals were
escort designed to be missile equipped, also purchased
actually aiming to unseat the RCC, but apparently
under the second contract, was turned over to the
their criticism of foreign and domestic policies could
Libyans in February 1973. Negotiations for the
not be tolerated by the government. (S)
purchase of eight additional C -130 transport aircraft
The rapid growth of the Libyan Armed Forces does
from the United States have been completed, but
not represent an equivalent improvement in their
approval from the U.S. Government for delivery has
capabilities. Personnel are generally unskilled and
not yet been obtained. In early 1970, the Libyan
inexperienced, and there is a dearth of qualified
Government contracted for the purchase of some 120
officers. Even if the ambitious improvement program
jet figl�,ters from France; deliveries are to be completed
continues at its current pace, Libya will not develop a j
by the; end of 1974. (C)
military organization capable of fulfilling its primary
In audition to the armed forces, there existed before
mission of national defense in the near future. While
the coup a National Security Force with a total
the armed forces technically possess ticc apability to
strength of 20,000. This force, part of which was
maintain internal security, which is also their
organized along paramilitary lines, was favored over
responsibility, their responsiveness in the event of
the army by King Idris and had primary responsibility
widespread disorder would be contingent on the
for maintaining internal security. The National
political situation at the time. (S)
Security Force, considered more trustworthy and loyal
than the army, was relied on to counter any coup
1. Military history (C)
attempt by the regular armed forces. Most of the men
The Libyan Arab Republic Army come into
and ,uipment of the National Security Force,
existence on 1 September 1969. Its immediate
including all the weapons and vehicles of the mobile
predecessor, the Royal Libyan Army, descend from
strike forces, have been incorporated into the army
the Libyan Arab Force, popularly known as th Sanusi j
since the coup. What remains of the original National
Army, which was formed early in 1940 by Libyan
Security Force is a corps of generally unarmed urban
exiles and refugees residing in Egypt. Other Libyans
policemen. (C)
Two significant developments connected with the
who had served in the Italian Army and volunteers
1969 revolt were: 1) the lack of strong opposition
from the province of Cyrenaica soon joined the force,
encountered by Revolutionary Command Council
which offered its services to the British military
(RCC) forces in neutralizing and bringing under
authorities in the war again_ t Italy. Staffed by both
control the various units of the National Security
British and Arab officers, the force reached a
Force, particularly the Cyrenaican element which had
maximum strength of five battalions, two of which
heretofore been considered the King's staunchest
took part in the defense of Tobruk in 1941. (``leer units
supporter; and 2) the subsequent merging of National
were employed in garrison duties and in intelligence
Security Force personnel with the rebel army forces.
operations behind enemy lines.
This was the first time the National Security Force and
In 1943 most of the Libyan Arab Force was
the army operated as a joint force, rather than as
absorbed by two police forces formed by the British
compe�itors or rivals. Reportedly, however, jealousy
military administration in the provinces of Cyrenaica
and animasity remains between the army and the
and Tripolitania. The remaining members of the
former National Security Force personnel, who are
force, some 120 men, were designated to form the
now policemen. (S)
Emiral Guard to serve as palace guards and escorts for
The only serious challenges to the regime of Col.
the Emir. The title of the guard was changed to the
Mu'ammar Qadhafi and the RCC have come from its
King's Guard when Libya became independent in
own ranks. In Dec ember 1969 the Ministers of Defense
1951.
2
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

1 he Libyan Government decided to form a federal
army in 1932, and the King's Guard, then stationed at
Tripoli under the command of a British officer, was
moved to Susahr in Cyrenaica to form the nucleus of
the Royal Libyan Armv. The British Military Mission
arrived in December 1952, and the 1st Infantry
Battalion was formed in early 1953 from the former
King's Guard personnel, officers and noncommis-
sioned officers who transferred from the Cvrenaican
police force, and recruits from the three provinces. A
Turkish army officer became the first Chief of Staff of
the Royal Libyan Army; he was succeeded by Iraq;
army officers in this position until 1960, when a
Libyan officer assumed commwid. The navv and air
force were established in 1962 and 1963, respectively,
as specialized components of the army, but they have
since become separate services.
The British Military Mission departed in January
1972 at the request of the Libyan Government. A U.S.
Military Liaison Section within the U.S. Embassv.
which in 1970 replaced the U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group established in 19,57, was closed in
March 1972.
i
2. Command structure (U /OU)
Supreme command of the armed forces is exercised
by the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command
Council who is concurrently Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces and de facto Minister of Defense
(Figu -e 1). Headquarters of the Revolutionary
Command Council and the Ministry of Defense fare
both located is Tripoli. A National Defense Council
was established in January 1970 arid task, d with
responsibility for nv.tional defense and preparedness of
the armed forces. Its members include the Ministers of
Defense and Interior, the Commander in Chief and
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Chief of
General Intelligence Service, a number of members of
the Revolutionary Command Council, including the
Chairman, plus any number of ad hoc members. As
the military policymaking body, the council passes
decisions on arms supply, strengths, organization,
human and material resources, and related matters
such as civil defense activities. On the advicc of the
National Defense Council, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Fofces issues orders affecting the rmv, navy.
and air force. Armed forces headquarters in Tripoli
'For diacritics on place narnes see the list of uatnes nn the apron
of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the nryT
itself.
Chmrmnn, Reeolunone,y Commnnd Counn
Commnnde. in Chief
Minister of Defense (de fnctol
FIGURE I. Command structure (C)
houses a general staff which administers the affairs of
all three services. The general staff, which previously
consisted of six directorates, has been expanded in
concordance with the over -il army development
progr'rm. A minimum of 13 directorates have been
identified, and there are indications that the number
.will grow as reorganization becomes more defined.
Some responsibilities of the former Directorate of
Movements have been dispersed to independent
directorates for 'Training, Intelligence, and Signals.
Other functions, such as the formation, disposition,
and command of units, have been absorbed by the
new Directorate of Administration, which also retains
its responsibilities for mobilization and demobiliza-
tion, appointments, promotions, transfers, retirements,
and discharges. Separate directorates have been
created for Legal Affairs and Medical Services. Some
functions of the Directorate of Contracts and those of
the all- encompassing Directorate of Ceneral Services
and Supply have been assimilated by the newly
established Military Works arid Property, FJec�trical
arid Mechanical Engineering, Supply, and Transpor-
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2
r
Nerronnl Defense
Council
Armed Forces
Chief of 50f
D room..,..
Tre ,ng
haelhgence
s g ely
Admimmnnon
Legel Affei,s
Medicel 5e�ces
mrrnUt
r.
Mih:nry Works and
Property
Elemicelend Ne,henicnl
Engmeving
1,
SvPply
Trensportnhon
Ordnenc
Accoum
Chief of Stnll Commnnde,
Commnnd
A Nnry
Air Force
FIGURE I. Command structure (C)
houses a general staff which administers the affairs of
all three services. The general staff, which previously
consisted of six directorates, has been expanded in
concordance with the over -il army development
progr'rm. A minimum of 13 directorates have been
identified, and there are indications that the number
.will grow as reorganization becomes more defined.
Some responsibilities of the former Directorate of
Movements have been dispersed to independent
directorates for 'Training, Intelligence, and Signals.
Other functions, such as the formation, disposition,
and command of units, have been absorbed by the
new Directorate of Administration, which also retains
its responsibilities for mobilization and demobiliza-
tion, appointments, promotions, transfers, retirements,
and discharges. Separate directorates have been
created for Legal Affairs and Medical Services. Some
functions of the Directorate of Contracts and those of
the all- encompassing Directorate of Ceneral Services
and Supply have been assimilated by the newly
established Military Works arid Property, FJec�trical
arid Mechanical Engineering, Supply, and Transpor-
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

tation directorates. Still in existence, but with slightly
altered duties, are the Ordnance and Accounts
directorates.
Since the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces also
acts as Chief of Staff of the Army, he exercises
command and control of the army, while in the navy
and air force this function is delegated to the
commanders of the respective services.
B. Joint activities
1. Military manpower (C)
As of 1 January 1974 Libya had 489,000 males
between 15 and 49 years of age, of whom about 58%
were physically fit for military duty. Distribution by 5-
year age groups was as follows:
The average number reaching military age (17
annually will be about 20,000 in the 5 -year period
1974 -78.
All military service is voluntary. High pay scales
have facilitated recruiting efforts, but strength quotas
for the expanding armed forces have not been
successfully met. A conscription program to induct 200
men a month was scheduled to begin in early
September 1969, but the coup prevcrted its
implementation at that time. Increases in personnel
strength have begun to taper off, and if voluntary
enlistments continue to fall short of requirements, the
government might find it necessary to enact a
compulsory national service law to maintain force
goals. Procurement of men suitable for specialist and
technical training presents a major problem, and those
so trained are frequently lost to civilian industry.
Generally, military personnel are in fairly good health
and able to endure hardships. Morale is a variable
tactor in the armed forces since strong and conflicting
sentiment- inherent in the Libyan population, remain
within the military environment. In r.ldition to local
rivalries, opposition to the preponderance (if Egyptian
influence has been a r iajor point of dissension
throughout the military. Liberal promotions and
i
TOTAL
MAXIMUM
NUMBER
NUMBER FIT FOR
ACE
OF MALES
MILITARY SERVICE
13 -19
100,000
65,000
20 -24
89,000
55,000
25 -29
75,000
45,000
30 -34
69,000
40,000
35 -39
55,000
30,000
40-44
52,000
25,000
45 -49
49,000
25,000
Total, 15 -49
489,000
285,000
The average number reaching military age (17
annually will be about 20,000 in the 5 -year period
1974 -78.
All military service is voluntary. High pay scales
have facilitated recruiting efforts, but strength quotas
for the expanding armed forces have not been
successfully met. A conscription program to induct 200
men a month was scheduled to begin in early
September 1969, but the coup prevcrted its
implementation at that time. Increases in personnel
strength have begun to taper off, and if voluntary
enlistments continue to fall short of requirements, the
government might find it necessary to enact a
compulsory national service law to maintain force
goals. Procurement of men suitable for specialist and
technical training presents a major problem, and those
so trained are frequently lost to civilian industry.
Generally, military personnel are in fairly good health
and able to endure hardships. Morale is a variable
tactor in the armed forces since strong and conflicting
sentiment- inherent in the Libyan population, remain
within the military environment. In r.ldition to local
rivalries, opposition to the preponderance (if Egyptian
influence has been a r iajor point of dissension
throughout the military. Liberal promotions and
i
4
y
lucrative wages have contributed somewhat to esprit
de corps and have reduced, at least temporarily, the
potential for insubordination. On an individual basis,
the soldier is basically loyal to his immediate
commander and will usuaily follow his instructions.
Personnel are required to be Libyan citizens
between 17 and 25 years of age and to meet physical
and mental standards. Technicians and men with
previous military service have been exempt from the
age and physical requirements. The initial enlistment
period, which has been 5 years, with subsequent
reenlistment periods of 2 years, may have been
extended by the military government. As recently as
1968 as many as 80% of armed forces personnel were
illiterate. Improvement in the educational system,
which began under the King, have contributed to the
increased literacy rate for persons 15 years or younger.
Accordingly, educational levels of military personnel
can be expected to show a rapid increase in ensuing
years.
Since the present government came to power, most
of the senior officers of the former Royal Libyan Army
have been forced into retirement. Originally
commissioned from the ranks of the former Libyan
Arab Force, they were, in general, inadequately
trained for command, and their continuance in service
was in the nature of a reward for wartime service or for
rendering personal services to the King. Younger
officers for all of the armed forces are drawn from
modest to well -to -do urban families and are fairly well
educated. They are widely diversified in their
geographic, tribal, and racial origins, and most of
them have studied and traveled abroad. As a goup,
they are conscientious, well disciplined, and take their
duties and responsibilities seriously.
Enlisted personnel, most of whom are tribesmen
from the rural provincial areas, are selected largely on
physical standards only, with little or no regard for
education or background.
Libya has no reserve system or organization, and in
an emergency, expansion of 10rc�es is achieved by the
recall, on an individual basis, of former military
personnel.
In both the army and the air force, large numbers of
Egyptian officers serve in an advisory role alongside
their Libyan counterparts, providing both the
technical expertise and the leadership experience
which the younger Libyan officers generally lack.
2. Strength trends (S)
In the 21 years the Libyan military services have
been in existence, personnel strength has gradually
4
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

risen from a total of 120 to over 23,000, as shown in
the following tabulation:
for incorporation into the total national budget. The
budget is then submitted to the Revolutionary
Command Council for approval and adoption into
law. (U /OU)
Libyan budgets for fiscal years 1969 and 1970 (1
April -31 March) were prepared under the Idris regime.
Prior to the coup in September 1969, the National
Security Force was considered to be a separate
organization, and funds for its maintenance were
included as a separate life item in the defense budget.
After the coup about one quarter of the National
Security Force's personnel were merged into the
regular armed forces and are now funded under the
armed forces budget account. The sharp drop in the
total defense budget between FY70 and 71 reflects this
merger as well as the deletion from Libya's published
budget of the Defense and Arab Cooperation
category. This category covered investment outlays for
the defense establishment, purchases of foreign
military equipment, and Khartoum aid payments.
Data on investments are not available; however, based
upon known materiel imports, Libva is estimated to
have paid about $52 million for equipment in FY71
and $110 million in FY72. The Khartoum aid
payments for these 2 fiscal years were $71.5 million
and $59 million, respectively. When the estimated
materiel payments and the Khartoum aid contribu-
tions are combined with the published armed forces
budgets for these years, the totals are $207 and $253
million. These totals, which do not include an
allowance for investment for the defense establish-
ment, more closely approximate actual defense
budgets for 1971 and 1972. Data are not available for
making a similar approximation for FY73. Libyan
published defense budgets for FY1969 through
FY1973 are shown in Figure 2. (S)
Not pertinent
Personnel strengths are expected to continue to
increase, but at a slower rate than in recent years, as
the services develop. The accelerated growth rate in
1970 -1972 demonstrates government emphasis on
military buildup. No known force goals are available,
but the Libyans' ability to produce any sizable force
will be restricted by the small manpower reserve.
available. The services already lack sufficient
personnel to utilize effectively the equipment
hand. In view of the additional aircraft remaining on
order, the air force will be confronted with an even
larger problem unless remedial action is taken.
3. Training (S)
All major arm units, the air force, and the navy
participated in the first large scale, Libyan joint
military maneuvers in August 1972. Subsequently, a
number of smaller joint exercises ,ve been
conducted. In December 1971 a combined Libyan
Egyptian exercise involving army and air force units of
both countries was conducted near Banghazi.
A small number of navy and air force officers are
graduates of the Military Academy at Banghazi. A
large proportion of servicemen are U.S. or British
trained. Since late 1969 Egypt has been providing
training for officers and enlisted men both at its own
facilities and in Libya.
4. Military budget
The defense budget is prepared within the Ministry
of Defense and submitted to the Ministry of Finance
5. Economic support and logistics
Libya has no capability to produce military
materiel other than some simple quartermaMer items.
Revenue from oil exports, however, enables the
country to make fairly substantial foreign military
materiel purchases. Libya's economv has exhibited a
high growth rate in the past decade as a result of the
development of its petroleum industry. However, its
economic structure has changed little, and the
depressed agricultural sector remains the largest
employer of Libya's workers. Manufacturing is on a
small scale and is mainly devoted to the processing of
agricultural products. (C)
From 1954 to 1970, the United Kingdom was
Libya's primary source of military equipment.
Through 1972 the United Kingdom supplied materiel
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2
ARMY
NAVY
Ant FORCE
1952
120
1956
1,850
1957
2,300
1958
2,700
1959
3,000
1960
4,200
1961
5,000
1962
5,200
80
1963
8,200
100
95
1964
6,200
190
150
1965
6,200
200
150
1966
6,300
200
130
1967
7,200
215
140
1968
7,500
215
220
1969
9,500
400
400
1970
16,000
1,700
700
1971
16,000
2,000
2,000
1972
16,500
2,500
3,000
1973
18,000
2,500
3,000
Not pertinent
Personnel strengths are expected to continue to
increase, but at a slower rate than in recent years, as
the services develop. The accelerated growth rate in
1970 -1972 demonstrates government emphasis on
military buildup. No known force goals are available,
but the Libyans' ability to produce any sizable force
will be restricted by the small manpower reserve.
available. The services already lack sufficient
personnel to utilize effectively the equipment
hand. In view of the additional aircraft remaining on
order, the air force will be confronted with an even
larger problem unless remedial action is taken.
3. Training (S)
All major arm units, the air force, and the navy
participated in the first large scale, Libyan joint
military maneuvers in August 1972. Subsequently, a
number of smaller joint exercises ,ve been
conducted. In December 1971 a combined Libyan
Egyptian exercise involving army and air force units of
both countries was conducted near Banghazi.
A small number of navy and air force officers are
graduates of the Military Academy at Banghazi. A
large proportion of servicemen are U.S. or British
trained. Since late 1969 Egypt has been providing
training for officers and enlisted men both at its own
facilities and in Libya.
4. Military budget
The defense budget is prepared within the Ministry
of Defense and submitted to the Ministry of Finance
5. Economic support and logistics
Libya has no capability to produce military
materiel other than some simple quartermaMer items.
Revenue from oil exports, however, enables the
country to make fairly substantial foreign military
materiel purchases. Libya's economv has exhibited a
high growth rate in the past decade as a result of the
development of its petroleum industry. However, its
economic structure has changed little, and the
depressed agricultural sector remains the largest
employer of Libya's workers. Manufacturing is on a
small scale and is mainly devoted to the processing of
agricultural products. (C)
From 1954 to 1970, the United Kingdom was
Libya's primary source of military equipment.
Through 1972 the United Kingdom supplied materiel
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

1 0ni� 1101P &5
FIGURE 2. Defense budgets (S)
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
1969
1970 1971
1972
1973
Defense Budget bi.8
338.(1 84.0
51.0
121.6
,firmed Forces 40.2
46.0 84.0
84.0
121.11
National Security Force 82.0
92.6
Defense and Arab Cooperation Fund... 145.6
2 na
Defense budget as a percent of national
nn
na
budget 27.7
28.4 �7.8
*6.o
�6.7
Defense budget as a percent of estimated
GNP
11.6 �2.4
*2.3
art
NOTE-- Dollar values for fiscal years 1939 througl. 1972 converted at .357 dinars
(pounds)
equal
81.00. For FY1973 dollar values converted at .329 dinars
equal $1.00.
na Data not available.
Not pertinent.
*Not cn ;.parable with previous years because of changed
budgetary practices.
valued at over $53 million, including mortars,
recoilless rifles, antiaircraft and antitank artillery, all(]
armored vehicles as well as most of the country's naval
ships. The United States also supplied significant
quantities of ground and air force equipment valued
at $46 million. (S)
Since 1970 the Soviet Union has become Libya's
major supplier of ground forces materiel and has
agreed to deliver equipment valued at $129 million,
including a variety of infantry weapons, artillery,
armored vehicles, and trucks. Additional Communist
materiel has been received from Czechoslovakia under
if $19 million contvic�t to provide armored vehicles and
trucks. Since 1970 the principal non- Communist
suppliers have been France, which 11 -s delivered fighter
and trainer aircraft and helicopters valued at over
$166 million, and Italy, which has delivered $8
million worth of vehicles and artiii, (S)
The navy and sir force are logistically supported by
the army, and their requirements are incorporated
with those of the army for presentation to higher
authority for approval. The logistics system does not
fur Aion in if manner capable of supporting extensi\e
operations. (C)
C. Army
The missions of the army are to defend the nation
and to maintain internal order and public security.
The army is capable of controlling isolated or localized
dissident activity; In event of sustained, widespread
disturbances, however cooperation from the. local
police forces would probably be required to control the
situation and restore order. The armv is ineffective as a
combatant force and incapable of defending against
aggression by Algeria or Egypt. Major weaknesses and
deficiencies inc�Irt, c the following: dispersion of units
along the� I, 100 -mile littoral, with slight c�apiIbiIit\ to
mass forces; little field training; inexper,eiced
leadership; it logistics system inadequate to support
field operations; and an insufficient number of trained
technicai service personnel to m equipollent in
operating condition. The array has had little
organizational struc�tnae above battalion level capable
of panning and irnplementifig un adequate training
program, bill efforts are undenyay to remedy this
situation. No uniform stand of profic�ien art
kntwn to be established. (S)
The individual Libyan soldier is 4 hard% Arab or
Arab Berber stock, resistant to hardship and ,,rncnable
to discipline, hilt usually bit ndic�aplied by a lack of
formal echtc�ation and mechanical and technical
aptitudes. Among officers if weakness is the general
lack of initiative; decisions on even the most tri,;ati
m ttters are often referred to headquarters level for
resolution. (U /O(J)
I. Organization (S)
Command authority is vested in the Chief of Staff
of the� Armed Forces who is concurrently Chic} of Staff
of the Array.
Prior it the September 1969 coup, the army was
organized into a two brigade force �one each in
Tripoli and Barrghaxi �with general headquarters at
Al B ayda' Afte it short interim period in which the
brigades were disbanded and headquarters transferred
to Banghazi, if large -scale reorganization was
undertaken. I he brigade concept wits regenerated hot
did not follow the previous pattern; neither did it
conform to the organizational plan drawn up by the
61
J
s
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2

lf is l� WE s I NI&lff.
w
to
a
FIGURE 3. Ferret sco i -ors of the reconnaissance
battaiions in Tripoli parc:,t (S)
British Military Mission, which called for the
formation of a field army of one armored and one
infantry brigade and the creation of an air defense
command. Under the, guidance of Egyptian military
advisory personnel, the army has been reorganized
into two mechanized infantry brigades, one armored
brigade, a Republican Guard brigade, and an airborne
commando battalion. Territorial deployment is based
on a two district concept, with one district comprising
the eastern region of Cyrenaica and the other, the
regions of Tripolitania and Fezzan.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition` (S)
The army has more than doubled its precoup
strength of 7,5(X) as a result of an earlv massive
recruitment program and through the transfer of
"For current detailed information, see the Order of Battle
Summary Foreign Ground Forces and the Military Intelligence
Summary, both published be the Defense Intelligence Agency.
approximately 7,000 men from the former security
force. The gain in officers has been disproportion to
that of enlisted personnel, however, due to a series of
actions which removed nearly all officers in the rank of
major and above from active service. To offset the
officer loss, some warrant officers and cadets who had
completed I year at the military academy were
commissioned, but Fheir number was not sufficient to
fill the existing vacancies.
While the brigade structure has been adopted, units
continue to be dispersed in battalion -size strengths
along the heavily populated coastal regions and at
Sabha in the former Fezzan Province. There are five
infantry battalions with authorized strengths of 600
and a commando force of at least 300 highly
motivated recruits. Three reconnaissance battalions
and four tank battalions of about 300 men each are
presently organizer) but the Libyans have sufficient
vehicles to outfit additional units (Figures 3 and 4).
Two 600 -man Republican Guard battalions are
probably tank equipped as well. An air defense
artillery battalion of approximately 300 men in each
mechanized infantry brigade may be attached to an
air defense command if Libyan SAM units become
operational at sites under construction. Field artillery
battalions, also of about 300 men, are stationed in
each region. Signal, Engineer, Transport, Medical,
and Military Police companies arc located both in
Tripoli and in Banghazi ;..tad serve units in their
respective regions.
3. Training (S)
Training is inadequate for current and planned
requirements. The ouster of senior officers in the
aftermath of the coup greatly depleted the already
7
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2
FIGURE 4. T54/55 medium tank (S)

scarce supply of qualified instructors. Other factors
adversely affecting the status of training include
inability to plan and execute programs, insufficient
training aids, diversity of equipment, and the
tendency of units to train on an as- needed basis in an
informal, unstandardized manner. Moreover, there is
a general ignorance of mechanics and the sciences
with a consequent inability to comprehend preventive
maintenance or to understand the workings of more
sophisticated equipment.
Shortly after the coup great emphasis was placed on
I military training for college and high school students.
This included both boys and girls. Uniforms were
issued and drills were held on a regular basis. This
mandatory training, which included arms instruction,
came under heavy criticism from students and their
families and by late 1970 had been eliminated. In
April 1973 basic weapons training was begun for
members of the newly formed popular committees,"
but arms have not been distributed.
A large basic training center has been established at
Misratah (Figure 5). In the past, recruits received 4
months of basic training at the Recruit Training
Center at Kassala Barracks in Tripoli. Some training is
FIGURE 5. Major military Installations (S)
8
4
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080014 -2
Yj

f
..r.... fvm.. ....M�- �.i l'f6Ml "n.iwk!M:.'ST+.tvV +v..N YtMV.:f :w. ?7YS