NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 49; LIBYA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080013-3
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORTS

terj a I a 1-11 a I' ffan
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080013-3

...wie". 7Ar.;.k L Yt..:..ti .:i F._' il... G. 6...'' IMQFAUF 'K �..ciU-+.+- .r.++a- e�_.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per i
ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
pari.cularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact-
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually 1 pdates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, arfd the intelligence
and security organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the mayor
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NiS units is published in ',he Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which :s also bound into the concurrent
classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or 1'1rough
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 18, vwions 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11632 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
36 (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
r+
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

WARNING
The NIS it National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U/OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

L.,.I....I^ o
w
k
LIBYA
This chapter supersedes the coverage of government
and politics in the General Survey dated Aywd, 1970.
A. Introduction 1
B. Structure and functioning of the government 3
1. Constitutional system 3
2. Central government 3
a. The Revolutionary Command Council 3
b. The cabinet 5
3. Regional and local government g
4. Judicial system 9
SECRSr
f
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

b
t
F
Y.
y,
FIGURES
Page Page
Fig. 1 Structure of government chart) 4 Fig. 3 Structure of judicial system chart) 10
Fig. 2 Members of the Revolutionary Com- Fig. 4 Rally in Tripoli photo) 12
mand Council photos) 6 Fig. 5 Demonstration in Tripoli photo) 13
Page
Page
C. Political dynamics
11
E. Threats to government stability
21
1. The RCCs rule
2. adhafi's primacy
Q p cY
11
12
1. Discontent and dissidence
21
3. Other political forces
13
a. Residual regionalism
21
4. Political parties
b. Political complaints
21
a. The Libyan Arab Socialist Union
14
c. Anti- Egyptian sentiment
22
b. The Bath Party
15
2. Subversion
22
5. Elections
16
F. Maintenance of internal security
23
D. National policies
16
1. Police
23
1. Domestic
18
2. Intelligence and security services
23
2. Foreign
18
3. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
a. The Maghreb
1;1
measures and capabilities
24
b. Other regional alignments
19
G. Selected bibliography
25
c. The struggle against Israel
19
Chronology
26
d. The West
20
e. The U.S.S.R
20
Glossary
27
FIGURES
Page Page
Fig. 1 Structure of government chart) 4 Fig. 3 Structure of judicial system chart) 10
Fig. 2 Members of the Revolutionary Com- Fig. 4 Rally in Tripoli photo) 12
mand Council photos) 6 Fig. 5 Demonstration in Tripoli photo) 13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
u
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

Government and Politics
A. Introduction (S)
The young officers who led the coup that toppled
the monarchy in September 1969, dramatically
changed the course of Libyan politics. Libya had been
ruled by King Idris since 1951, when the United
Nations created an independent nation out of what
had been an Italian colony. Idris ruled as a virtua!ly
absolute monarch, and his adi 'nistration was
discriminatory and corrupt, even Icy Middle East
standards. Under Idris, Libya held itself aloof from the
Arab Israeli struggle and kept open close ties with the
United States and the United Kingdom.
The nationalistic army officers who ousted Idris
have turned things around, both at home and abroad.
The government is still authoritarian, but a different
group is in power; the 11 remaining army officers of the
ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),
headed by the fiery President Mu'ammar al- Qadhafi,
clearly the strongman of the government. The council
has eliminated all traces of the monarchy and its
tribally based administration. It has suppressed
opposition from old regime sympathizers and dissident
t ibal groups, and established a vigorous security
apparatus that monitors the activities of opponents,
both real and imagined. Individuais favored unc er the
preceding administration have been scattered into
exile, imprisoned, or have dropped judiciously out of
sight. President Qadhafi and the RCC appear to be in
firm control. The Libyan President makes most policy
decisions and continually harangues the population
into doing things his way. He has an uphill struggle
against Libyan apathy, but his tilts at such enemies as
"western imperialism" and his number one enemy,
Israel, are popular.
It is clearly a government in which ideology counts.
Qadhafi has launched a cultural revolution"
designed to rid Libya of foreign ideologies and restore
a fundamentalist version of Islam. He claims to have
given power "back to the people" by authorizing the
setting up of "popular committees" in most
governmental and cultural institutions, public
utilities, and private companies. These committees,
which can make recommendations for dismissals and
promotions, have been under the council's control,
and the gesture appears to have been made partly for
proplgando reasons �to promote Qadhafi's cultural
revolution and undercut domestic critics of his
Policies. One of the tasks of the committees is to root
out subversives� Marxists, Communists, and "the
arrogant and educated classes'; it is these groups that
have been most critical of Qadhafi's pet project, a
merger with Egypt.
In actual fact the government has been unwilling to
permit partisan politics or public participation to
interfere with its policies, and the country's sole
political party, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union, is
little more `!ian a civil arm of the council. The council
is careful to maintain its direct ties with the military,
which is still vital to its security. Although the military
does not intervene directly in affairs of state, some key
officers- particularly those who participated in the
1969-coup �still have some influence with their fellow
officers on the council. The council is also bolstered by
the presence of Egyptian garrisons in Libya� tangible
evidence of Cairo's support for the Qadhafi
government.
Qadhafi's scheme for a reformed and modernized
Libya initially borrowed heavily from Egyptian
President Nasi: s socialism, a rather vague formula for
a classless society gronaded in Islamic principles.
(i;asir has been Qadhafi's idol since his early youth.)
To this end the government Arabized schools, social
institutions, and many private concerns, and
established a leg,-,I code based almost exclusively on
strict Islamic law' It eliminated most of the corruption
that existed under the old regime and, particularly iii
the last 2 years, has begun to channel a substantial
portion of its massive oil revenues into economic
development and social welfare. The problems of
distributing wealth more equitably in a country that
until 1957 had an economy based entirely on primitive
agriculture are, however, enormous.
Over the past 4 years, the Libyan "revolution" has
picked up a momentum all its own and bears more
and more the stamp of Qadhafi's impetuous and
visionary personality. Qadhafi has a more religious
view of the world than Nasir; he believes that Islamic
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

principles should be central to all aspects of society
and that it is his duty to restore Arab self- respect and
unite the Arab people. Qadhafi's highly personal
Islamic crusade has strong political ramifications.
Believing that union with Egypt will give him greater
leverage in his campaign against Israel, he sees the
merger as a first critical step in the battle to restore
Palestine and achieve an Aral) solution to Middle East
questions. Qadhafi also needs Egyptian manpower
and expertise to carry out his ambitious economic
development plans.
The merger with Egypt probably presents more
problems than it solves. Most Libyans feel that they
have little to gain except Egypt's enormous debts and
poverty. The average Libyan fears that he will be
swallowed up by the Egyptians and is alarmed it the
prospect of a massive immigration from Egypt. There
vie already about 150,000 Egyptians in Libya and the
lion issue has exacerbated the traditional animosity
between the two peoples. The union has also created
discord with Libya's collective leadership. Some
council members have strong reservations about
formal ties with Egypt, and all of them are worried
about their status in a joint Libyan- Egyptian power
structure. Qadhafi has stated that Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat will be President of the merged countries,
but that all "power would be in the hands of the
people." Through this device, or through the force of
ab ideas and personality, the Libyan leader may
believe that he can come to dominate Sadat, whom he
regards as an unworthy successor to Nasir.
Backed by its vast oil wealth, Libya has become an
ever more active player in Middle East politics.
Qadhafi is uncompromising in his attitude toward
Israel and has carried his campaignj against Tel Aviv
into Black Africa, Latin America, and the Persian
Gulf. The feday ^en, however, are viewed by Qadh::fi
as the single most effective and reliable instrument
against the Israelis, and Fatah as well as other terrorist
organizations have received generous financial
assistance and unqualified moral support from the
Libyan regime.
Qadhafi's de potion to the Palestinian cause,
coupled with his suspicion of other Arab leaders, were
the primary reasons Libya did not become actively
involved in the 1973 Arab Israeli conflict. Qadhafi
viewed the war as a risky military venture waged solely
for the political and territorial gains of Cairo and
Damascus rather than for the restoration of historic
Palestine to the Arabs. Qadhafi had long suspected
that both Egypt and Syria would eventually forsake
the Palestinians in an effort to regain their own
territory lost in the 1967 wa and with the outbreak of
i
y
fighting in October 1973 Qadhafi believed that his
worst fear would ultimately be realized. Although
Libya dutifully threw its considerable financial and
material support behind the Arab armies, Qadhafi
openly denounced Egypt's handling of the 1rar and
bitterly decried President Sadat's acceptance of the
cease -fire accord. For Qadhafi, the recognition of
Israel, however, indirect, and the prospect of a
negotiated settlement sponsored by the great powers
are anathema, for which he holds other Arab le. ders
immediately responsible.
Qadhafi's rejection of the 1973 war and the Arab
motivations which he believed inspired it accounts for
Libya's half hearted implementation of the Arab oil
embargo against the United States and the
Netherlands and of the oil supply sanctions against
Europe and Japan. Qadhafi has long been an
outspoken proponent of using Arab oil as a political
weapon in the Middle East struggle; nevertheless, he
apparently views the October embargo as a venture
which would only hasten a settlement with Israel.
On the world stage, the Libyan President is
bothered by the detente in U.S.- U.S.S.R. relations, for
he fears that the superpowers may make a deal to
divide up the world at the expense of the small non-
aligned countries. Qadhafi therefore supports the
organization of the nonaligned countries to stand up
to the superpowers, both of whom he views as
imperialist.
Tripoli's inability to strike at Israel directly has
made Qadhafi increasingly antagonistic toward the
United States, which he sees as a hostile force
completely aligned with Israel. For some time Qadhafi
has tried to promote concerted Arab pressure on U.S.
economic interests as a way of changing Washington's
policies, but Arab oil producers have been reluctant to
go along with him. Qadhafi has threatened to take
unilateral action, such as cutting off ail exports to the
West. He is aware, however, that his oil income of over
$1.6 billion a year gives him clout in Arab politics,
particularly with Egypt and is unlikely to move
precipitously.
Qadhafi is also cool toward Communist regimes,
which he views as dangerous subversive forces.
Suspicious of Soviet ambitions in th Middle East, he
has turned down Soviet offers of military training.
Qadhafi criticized Egypt's reliance on the U.S.S.R.
and probably encouraged Cairo's break with Moscow
by word and wallet. He has denounced Iraq's
conclusion of a friendship treaty with the Soviets, and
Libyan media regularly criticize Communist states,
particularly those like the U.S.S.R., with significant
Muslim minorities. Libya nonetheless continues to
purchase large amounts of Soviet military equipment.
1, j
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

The prospects for Libya under Qadhafi are for more
of the same. If union with Egypt becomes something
more than a paper reality, however, Qadhafi's
personal vulnerabilities may become more acute as his
volatile, inexperienced, and uncompromising outlook
is pitted against the realities of Egyptian power and a
wary Egyptian leadership.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (C)
1. Constitutional system
The Libyan Government is a constitutional republic
whose central government consists of a Revolutionary
Command Council and a cabinet. Regional and local
governments consist of dist-; As, subdistricts, and
mw.icipalities. The government structure (Figure 1) is
a unitary system under which the central government
controls regional and local governments through
determination of policies, appointment of personnel,
and all,�ation of funds.
The locus of power rests with the 11 military
members of the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC). The 1969 provisional constitution ratified the
RCC's absolute power in policy formulation, and
legislative and executive functions. Moreover, Article
IS of that constitution authorized the RCC to take
whatever measures it deemed necessary to safeguard
the revolution and the regime. As RCC Chairman,
Col. Mu'ammar al- Qadhafi is de facto President of
Libya and is referred to as President. Qadhafi has thus
far dominated politics, although other RCC members
do play a significant role in policy formulation and
imp:ementation.
Libyan governmental institutions have been
modified in preparation for the merger of Libya d
Egypt, but how much practical impact their merger
will have is difficult to determine. The joint Libyan
Egyptian merger study committees established by the
August 1972 Banghazi Unity Declaration were given a
broad mandate to study and develop proposals
concerning such basic issues as constitutional affairs,
political organizations, judicial affairs, virtually all
aspects of governmental administration, and the
merging of the two economic systems.
The provisional constitution of the Libyan Arab
Republic was promulgated on t 1 December 1969. The
constitution is a formal description of the system of
government which came into being following the
army coup in September 1969, and thus the
constitutional prescriptions and the actual system are
not too far apart.
The constitution describes Libya as a free
democratic Arab republic whose people are part of the
Arab nation, and are desirous of comprehensive Arab
unity. Islam is the state religion, and Arabic, the
official language. The constitution makes no provision
for democratic popular elective representation in the
government, and the few rights of private citizens that
are delineated are subject to circumscription by law.
The constitution broadly describes the goals of the
state to include the achievement of socialism through
social justice, the creation of a system of
comprehensive economic, social, and cultural
planning, and the attainment of affluence and the
peaceful elimination of class distinctions through
sufficient production and the just distribution of
wealth. The Revolutionary Command Council is
established as the supreme authority in the Libyan
Arab Republic, with legislative and policy formulating
functions. RCC decisions are final, and not subject to
review by any other governmental or judicial
institution. The constitution makes no mention of the
formal head of state, but in practice the chief
executive has been RCC Chairman Qadhafi, although
the Prime Minister, and other RCC members, may
undertake some of the formal and ceremonial
functions. Executive succession, likeHise, is not dealt
with, nor does the constitution define the composition,
membership, and the methods of internal operation of
the RCC. The RCC appoints a Prime Minister and a
cabinet whose functions are to implement RCC
policies and laws through the administration of
various ministries and through the submission of draft
legislation to the RCC. The constitution maintained
the existing judicial system and delineated certain
individual judicial rights of the accused such as the
presumption of innocence until proved guilty, the
right to a defense, and a prohibition against mental or
physicai torture.
2. Central government
a. The Revolutionary Command Council
The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is the
collegial ruling body of the Libyan Arab Republic.
RCC members were drawn from among the Free
Officers Union, the group of army officers led by
Colonel Mu'ammar al- Qadhafi that carried out the
September 1969 coup. It is not known if the RCC
existed as a formal leadership body of the Free Officers
Union prior to the coup, or if Qadhafi created it after
the coup by selecting his most trusted officers to serve
on it. At any rate, the existence of the RCC was
apparent very shortly after the coup, although a
public announcement identifying its original 12
3
Al
t
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

oirsnn�usseeQ Ke
Oil
Revolutionary Command
council
President� Mu'bmmor
Qadhafi
10 others members in mid 1973
CABINET
Prime Minister
Supreme Local
Administrative
Council
Ministers:
Agriculture and
Information
Agrarian Reform
Justice
Civil Service
Labor and Social
Communications
Affairs
Defense
Petroleum
Economy
Planning
Education and
Treasury
National Guidance
Youth and Social
Foreign Affairs
Affairs
Health
State for Agricultural
Housing
Development
Industry and
Affairs
Mineral Wealth
Interior
y
Governor
members was not made until January 1970. Qadhafi
has been RCC Chairman from the very start, and
RCC membership has been unchanged except for one
member who died in August 1972 and has not been
replaced (Figure 2).
The December 1969 provisional constitution
ratified the absolute power of the RCC in policy
formulation, and in legislative and executive
functions. Moreover, Article 1S of the constitution
grants the RCC carte blanche authority to take
whatever measures it deems necessary to safeguard the
revolution and the regime. RCC meetings are held
frequently and in secret, with no formal minutes
taken. Meetings are usually held at Azizia Barracks
outside of Tripoli, where Qadhafi maintains his office.
i
T
4
All" sa aY.: ^Jn, u..
Supreme Guidance
Council
Supreme Planning
Council
The mechanics of RCC meetings, such as how agendas
are drawn up, disagreements resolved, decisions
reached, or even the number of members required for
a quorum, are not known. it is certain that
disagreements among RCC members do occur at these
meetings, and RCC discussions are generally open and
sometimes heated. Qadhafi is apparently willing to
listen to divergent viewpoints of other RCC members
but, on issues about which he feels strongly, he
invariably gets his way, especially if he threatens to
resign. The other RCC members realize full well that
Qadhafi is the binding force of the RCC and the
regime, partly because of the Nasir -like veneration he
is held in by other RCC members his popular public
image, and his ties to the military levels of power via
i
i
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

the Free Officers Union. Once an RCC decision has
been reached, it is issued as a law, decree, or policy
statement through the public communications media,
to be followed later by publication in the Libyan
Official Gazette.
t j
The RCC's controlling power is further expanded by
the wide- ranging positions held by individual RCC
members in other government institutions like the
cabinet, councils such as the Supreme Guidance
Council or the Supreme Planning Council, the
Pop Resistance (militia), the military, and others.
Participation by individual RCC members in
essentially civilian administrative positions has been a
point of contention among RCC members throughout
the years. On the one hand, the :;rmy, which played a
minor role during the Idris regime, was very distrustful
of the civilian bureaucrats. Only the military,
especially RCC members, had "pure motives" which
would insure more efficient administration of
government programs. On the ether hand, Qadhafi
has asserted that RCC members assumed such
administrative duties only with the greatest
reluctance, considering them to be "sacrifices."
Qadhafi has claimed that the RCC members only
wanted to be "good soldiers," although presumably
they could have performed a policy formulating
function through the RCC while remaining aloof from
routine government operations. The question may not
have been fully resolved when the first cabinet, which
did not ccntain any RCC members, was announced.
When the two military members of that first cabinet
were accused of plotting a coup against the RCC in
December 1969, Qadhafi promptly took over their
cabinet portfolios himself, and the RCC has been
involved in government administration from then to
the present time.
Ever since taking power in September 1969, the
RCC has been besieged by mundane administrative
problems either passed Tong to them by civil servants
unwilling or afraid to make decisions, or directly from
citizens. Currently, some of the positions previously
held by RCC members, especially in the cabinet, have
been reverting to civil servants. This may indicate that
the RCC; has developed a greater confidence in the
ability of civil servants to carry out RCC policies.
The status of the RCC in a fully merged Libyan
Egyptian state is uncertain. Certainly there would
likely be a diminution in the power of individual RCC
members. Whether the RCC as a formal bodv wntild
continue in existence is also open to question, and
there have been rumors that Qadhafi would dissolve
the RCC and replace it with a smaller sovereignty
council that would merge more easil-� into the
government of a unified state. Some RCC covert de
facto control in such a state might be maintained if
Qadhafi carries out a rumored plan to dismiss all
officers in the Free Officers Union from the armv and
place them in civil service positions.
b. The cabinet
The constitution charges the cabinet with
implementing RCC laws and policies, and with
studying and submitting draft legislation to the RCC.
Although the cabinet serves at the pleasure: of the
RCC, individual cabinet members are const,tutionally
responsible to the Prime Minister. Whether the Prime
Minister's power over individual cabinet ministers
extends to the right of dismissing them is not clear,
although he can dissolve the entire cabinet by
personally resigning. In practice the problem has never
arisen since the RCC has taken the responsibility of
dismissing cabinet members, and the Prime Minister
had always been Qadhafi (with the exception of the
first cabinet) until July 1972 when Major 'Abd al-
Salam Jallud, also an RCC member, was named Prime
Minister. The constitution provides for joint RCC
cabinet meetings at the request of the RCC chairman
or two cabinet members, and such meetings are
occasionally held. The routine mechanics of cabinet
meetings such as the frequency of meetings, the
manner in which agendas are drawn up and decisions
reached, and the size of the cabinet have evolved
through practice.
Once in power, the Qadhafi regime redu,_d the
number of ministries and has experimented with
various organizational arrangements since then. In the
September 1969 abinet, which consisted of 13
ministries contrasted 24 under the monarch RCC
members staved in the background, while 2 other
military officers and several civilians held ministerial
responsibility. From December 1969 on the RCC
members felt obliged to hold a significant number of
ministerial posts. Subsequent cabinets included an
increased number of ministries.
A major reorganization of the cabinet was
announced in July 1972 and it was noteworthy in
several respects. For the first time RCC members held
only the key ministries of Interior and Defense, plus
the Prime Minister's position. Qadhafi apparently
retained his portfolio as Minister of Defense (although
the position was not specifically announced), but
relinquished the Prime Minister's position, which he
had held since January 1970, to the number- map
in the RCC, Jallud. Jallud probably is the most adept
administrator among the RCC members; and,
reflecting this, he has put together a cabinet composed
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

i oil
r
0
Lt. Col. Abu Bakr Yunis
labir, Armed Forces Mai. Mustafa ol- Kharrubi, Armed Forces Mai. Khuwaylidi al- Humaydi, Minister of
Chlef of Staff Deputy Chief of Staff, Chairman, Libyan Interior
Arab Socialist Union, de facto administrator
of Cyrenoica region
FIGURE 2. Members of the Revolutionary Command Council (C)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
Mai. 'Abd al-Salom Jc!lud, Prime Minister
Mal. 'Abd al- Mun'im al -Tahir al -Huni,
Director of General Intelligence
Col. Mu'ammor al- Qadhafi, Chairman of
the RCC and de facto President of Libya

Capt. 'Omar 'Abdollah al- Muhayshi, Public Mal, Bashir Howwadi, Secretary General
Prosecutor of Libyan Arab Socialist Union, President of
People's Court
of young, well trained, and technically competent
individuals. I Wh Qadhafi chose that particular time
to give up His p omition as Prime Minister is unclear, but
it followed rumors of a severe rift within the ranks of
r. the RCC. A major reason for Qadhafi's giving up the
post, and one cited by him, was his displeasure at
being immersed I
Mal. 'Awad 'Ali Hamza, Director, Central
Administrative Control Department
41t
Mal. Mukhtor al- Qarawl
The gradual increase in the number of ministries in
the cabinet, along with a multitude of reorganizations,
dissolutions, and recombinations of various govern-
ment organizations, reflects past RCC: disenchantment
with the poor performance of civil servants. Qadhafi
has publicly castigated civil servants for their irti a
government, which d hi t rd hi m the tim operrtion to of a ne nd obsession with personal pecuniary matters, and
concentrate on y q several times his irritation has reached the paint where
significant policy
questions, especially se has threatened it
that of merger with Egypt. resign. Qadhafi's irritation with
the bureaucracy has driven him to take such
'For is current listing of key government officials, consult Chie unorthodox measures as posing as a common citizen to
of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published check on the performance of civil servants or removing
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligencv, Central Intelligence all the chairs from the offices of employees in a
_J AgCf1 ministry in an attempt to prod them into more lively
I
7
C
1�'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
Mal. Muhammad Nalm

h,
ss
I
i
if not more efficient, performance of their duties.
Qadhafi's traditional Islamic ethics and his energetic
and impatient revolutionary fervor to implement
programs have collided with a bureaucracy that still
reflects many vestiges of the previous regime.
During the monarchy the civil service was plagued
by inefficiency, incompetence, and corruption. Libya
suffered from a lack of competent indigenous
manpower to staff government organizations, and the
problem grew more acute once oil revenues began to
be used for economic development and demand for
trained administrators increased. The bureaucracy
reflected the political and social environment in which
it existed: tribal and kinship relationships were
determinants of success, not the competent
performance of duties. Moreover, the ;gay of the civil
service was low compared with the private sector, a
factor encouraging graft and corruption.
The 1969 army coup paralyzed the bureaucracy.
Not only did the coup threaten the traditional
processes, but initially there were no RCC policy
guidelines for civil servants to follow. Inertia and
unwillingness to make decisions on the part of civil
servants resulted in a grinding slowdown of the
bureaucracy as even petty matters were referred to the
RCC for decision. The RCC has tried to counter the
bureaucratic deficiencies by such means as increasing
the salaries of civil servants, strictly prohibiting
corruption, recruiting Egyptians and other foreigners
to staff government organizations, reorganizing
government organizations, creating new policy and
supervisory institutions like the Supreme Planning
Council and the Central Administrative Control
Department, dismissing, forcibly retiring, or
encouraging voluntary retirement of senior civil
servants, and publicly enhorting civil servants to adopt
a revolutionary spirit. Whether these measures succeed
in reviving the moribund bureaucracy remains to be
seen, but the problems will grow more a mte as Libva
pursues its twofold progra.s of expanding, and of
replacing non -Arabs with Libyans and other Arabs.
Qadhafi has expressed confidence that once merger
with Egypt is realized, the more experienced
Egyptians will be able to solve the problem of finding
sufficient numbers of trained administrators.
3. Regional and local government
The military regime has not radically altered the
structure of regional and local goverirnent that it
inherited from the monarchy, although the RCC
immediately dismissed the incumbent provin(�sal
governors and replaced them with senior district
officers. There are 10 provinces (muhafazat) each run
by a governor who is assisted by a provincial counci
where members continue to be appointed. Subordi�
nate to the provincial governments are 32 district!
(mutasarrifiyat) each governed by a distriel
commissioner (mutasardj} The districts have 175
subdistriets (mudiriyat) with each one being governed
by a subdistrict commissioner (mudir). Alse
subordinate to the provincial government are the
municipalities, each of which is governed by a mayo
and a municipal council. A comprehensive basic law
for local government was issued in late May 1970, and
in accordance with this law, province, district, and
subdistrict boundaries were redrawn in July 1970 and
revised the following December. The stated aim of the
new law was to destroy tribal influences in the
previous system of local government, plus instituting
administrative efficiency through decentralization.
A Supreme Local Administration Council was
established in November 1970 with the task of
implementing the system enunciated in the basic local
government law. Council duties include the overall
coordination of policies relating to local government,
supervising the transfer of administrative jurisdiction
from various ministries to the provincial councils, and
coordinating local projects and b; dgets with the
national development plan and budget. The Council
chairman is the Minister of Interior. Other members
are those ministers heading ministries whose activities
bring them within the purview of provincial and
municipal councils.
The governor, who is appointed by the RCC, is the
executive of the province and is responsible for security
and well being in his province. From an administra-
tive viewpoint, he is the nominal superior of the civil
servants who work for the operating ministries within
the province. His police powers include the right to
take necessary action to insure civil order in cases of
tribal dispute regarding ownership of land or wells
until competent authorities can render a judgment.
The governor is assisted by a provincial council
composed, according to the 1970 local government
law, of the following members: those who are elected
by a then unspecified "popular organization" and
appointed by the Minister of Interior on recommenda-
tion of the "popular organization officials of the
"popular organization" who are selected by the
organization in consultation with the governor, and
members of those ministries that are involved in
provincial matters, for example, Health, Treasury, and
Housing. The law directs that elective members shall
constitute the majority. Under the transitional
provisions of the law, the Minister of Interior appoints
such councils until a "popular organization" is
No
_.I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

r- +tpyr. ,.g;i rA` a:ro;r
w. nff., w+ nnnanwW,. eHY`! N!� aLM!+ i'�. iv.. M!�54;'F..:VM.?C..'.3r'.W."rW^ T?.:I. v..- .tr�`.!wwpev!wN
formed. In practice, this has been the manner in which
members of the provincial councils have been chosen,
although now that the Libyan Arrlb Socialist Union
has been c -_wed as the "popular organization� it is
possible that elective members wil. begin to appear on
these councils. Duties of the provincial council consist
of supervising the implementation of local plans and
coordinating those plans the national develop-
ment plan. The counc:i also approves the budget for
the province, comments on the national development
plan, and insures and helps plan for local services such
as water, sanitation, and transport.
District commissioners arc, directly subordinate to
the provincial governor and perform duties as directed
by the governor. These duties apparently are primarily
of an administrative nature. Subordinate to the district
commissioners are subdistrict commissioners who
likew perform those duties assigned to them by the
governor. Assisting the subdistrict commissioners are
local chiefs mukhtars). The duties of mukhtars were
set out in a separate law issued in September 1970. In
an attempt to eliminate past tribal influence in the
selection of mukhtars, the law states that applicants
for the post will be given a competitive examination
administered before a committee formed by decision
of the provincial gover.or. The appointment is made
by the province governor on the basis of this
examination. A mukhtar's term of office is 4 years,
provided he does not violate any laws. Mukhtars
register births, report crimes, issue identification
certificates, and maintain a "charge sheet" which
records all matters brought before him. The mukhtar
cannot travel out of his locality without the prior
permission of the district commissioner; this provision
appears to be directed at decreasing the role of
nomadic or seminomadic tribal leaders.
Within urban areas, government power rests with
mayors and municipal councils. Municipal councils
are composed of members selected from among those
directly elected to the "popular organization" in
whose area the rnunicip:.-dity is located. The number of
members is determined by the national cabinet on
recommendation of the Minister of Interior. These
members are appointed by the Minister of Interior on
recommendation of the "popular organization" which
has consulted with the provincial governor. The final
group of council members are ex- officio members
drawn from ministries whose work is involved in the
municipality. Elective membc:s shall constitute the
majority of the council. The mayor is the president of
the municipal council and he is appointed by the
national cabinet on recommendation of the Minister
Of Interior. The supervision of day -to -day local
services such as the registering of births and deaths,
transport, sanitation, and burial of the dead are
among the duties of the municipal council. The
council can raise a local guard, similar to officers of
the court, for implementing its decisions.
On the provincial and municipal levels, but not on
the district and subdistrict, the responsible
governments can raise their own revenues through
various taxes, license fees, and proceeds from utilities,
although in some cases, the approval by the Minister
of the Interior is required. Funding for the economic
development plan is made by the central government
through the various ministries.
The creation of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union
(LASU) in 1971 eliminated uncertainty in the local
government basic law about the "popular organiza-
tion." To date, it appears that while provincial
councils have been established, no LASU members
serve on them. On the municipal level, mayors have
been appointed by the national cabinet, but the
composition of municipal councils, if they even exist,
is not known.
4. Judicial system
The military regime has retained the structure of the
judicial system that existed under the monarchy
(Figure 3), and it appears that in ordinary matters the
system has functioned pretty much as it had earlier.
0 ,dhafi has shown an interest in ensuring that justice
Ile dispensed promptly and fairly, and has also
declared that the system must conform to a greater
degree with Islamic jurisprudence. A contradictory
trend has been the establishment of a special Peoples
Court for trying enemies of the regime.
The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land.
The lower court system consists of courts of appeal,
courts of first instance, and summary courts;
jurisdiction extends to all matters of civil and criminal
law. In addition to these courts there is a parallel
structure for Sharia (Muslim) courts which form an
integral part of the judicial system. Presumablv,
informally constituted tribal courts still function, at
least in remote areas of Libya but they are not part of
this system. Tribal courts may have become less
important with the implementation of the 1970 local
government basic law, which gives power to the
Province Governor to act in cases of tribal dispute over
non- registered land or wells to insure public security
until "a judgment is issued by the competent
authorities," presumably meaning a decision reached
in the normal judicial system. Further, tribal disputes
have been alleviated, in theory at least, by the
February 1971 law which transferred tribal titles to
land and wells to the state.
6!]
ti
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

FIGURE 3. Structure of judicial system (U /OU)
Courts of appeal normally hear appeals against
judgments rendered in courts of first instance.
However, when sitting as courts of assize, they have
original jurisdiction in serious criminal cases involving
offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment.
They usually have three members when they are
sitting as courts of appeal and five members when
sitting as courts of assize. The courts of first instance,
which usually have one judge, exercise original
jurisdiction in most civil and criminal cases and hear
appeals from the sunimary courts. The summary
courts come within the organizational structure of the
courts of first instance. They sit at various localities
within the area of jurisdiction of the courts of first
instance and have original jurisdiction in minor civil
cases.
Tribal sheikhs exercise jurisdiction over aspects of
life controlled by tribal law and custom such as
distribution of lands among tribal members,
settlement of disputes among tribesmen over water
and grazing rights, and even intertribal and intrrtribal
10
killings, though perhaps 'less so at present than in the
past.
Sharia courts have jurisdiction in matters of
personal status (marriage, divorce, and inheritance)
involving Muslims. Courts of appeal exist for cases not
settled in the courts cf first instance. The highest
officials of the Sharia judicial system are the Grand
Mufti and the Deputy Mufti.
RCC displeasure with the performance of the
judicial system became evident by early 1971, when
Qadhafi met with judges, public prosecutors, and
Ministry of Justice officials to discuss citizen
complaints about delays in litigation. Part of the
problem has stemmed from the lack of competent
indigenous legal talent. The RCC has relied very
much, as did the monarchy, on foreign, especially
Egyptian, personnel to staff Ministry of Justice and
judicial positions. In late 1971 the RCC created the
Supreme Council for Judicial Institutions, replacing
the Supreme Judicial Council. The function of the
new council is to supervise and coordinate all facets of
the judicial system, and to express opinions on all
matters concerning legal institutions. Chairman of the
council is the RCC Chairman, with the Minister of
Justice being the Deputy Chairman. Other members
include the President of the Supreme Court and the
Public Prosecutor.
During the monarchy the Supreme Court was
directly responsible to the King and it exercised
jurisdiction over cases involving constitutionality. It
also provided advisory opinions to various officials on
questions concerning draft laws. Under the current
regime the power of the Supreme Court has
diminished since the constitution specifically sates
that RCC laws are not subject to judicial review. The
extent to which the cabinet and various ministry
officials seek Supreme Court advisory opinions
concerning draft legislation is not known. In
November 1972 a Libyan was named a President of
the seven member Supreme Court, replacing an
Egyptian who had held the post since 1969.
In December 1969 the RCC announced the
formation of a special People's Court that would try
those individuals who had been implicated in plotting
"treachery, treason, and the undermining of the
revolution," meaning the two military members of the
cabinet who had been accused of plotting a coup
against the RCC. Another law was issued at the same
time that outlined crimes against the state that would
be prosecuted before the People's Court. Death was
decreed as the punishment for armed opposition
.against the regime, while imprisonment awaited those
who spread provocative propaganda, caused class
hatred and dissension, disseminated political or
economic rumors, or demonstrated against the regime.
0

I
0
coup.
A major anomalous trend in the Libyan judicial
system, when it is compared with the development of
judicial systems in other Arab states, has been
Qadhafi's insistence that Libyan jurisprudence
conform to a greater degree with Islamic law, This has
resulted in such laws as that which requires
compulsory payment of the traditionally voluntary
alms tax (zakat). In a more bizarre vein, Qadhafi
announced in October 1972 that Libya would begin to
app' the old Islamic penalties for thievery and armed
robbery which consist of the amputation of the right
hand or the left foot. He did concede to modern
sensibilities by saying that such penalties would be
carried out by qualified surgeons in hospitals, with the
victim under anesthesia. Since these types of penalties
have yet to be carried out, Qadhafi might have
announced them merely to dramatize his intent to
"Islamicize" Libyan !aw.
Despite the constitutional injunction that Libyan
judges are independent and shall make their rulings
guided only by law and conscience, the RCC holds
very powerful controls over the judiciary. Its right to
appoint and dismiss judges, establish special courts,
issue decrees (such as the one concerning crimes
against the state) that can be very broadly interpreted,
and the ability to influence judicial organization and
policy through the Supreme Council for Judicial
Institutions gives it great de facto powers in the
judicial sector, if it chooses to exercise them.
C. Political dynamics (S)
Since its overthrow of King Idris in September 1969,
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has
wielded near dictatorial power in Libva tracked by
the army and two Egyptian garrisons ba:,ed in Libya
since 1969, the RCC has successfully fragmented
opposition from old regime sympathizers and it has
encountere,a no other serious opposition to its rule.
President Qadhafi, whose primacy on the council is
frequently affirmed by the 10 other members, is the
key figure binding the junta together. Qadhafi's
personal style of leadership overshadows that of any
potential rival and has been an important stabilizing
influence during the regime's 4 year in power.
1. The RCC's rule
Members of the RCC began to plan their route to
power during the early 1960's when they formed a
secret Free Officers organization while attending the
Royal Military Academy at Banghazi. Although the
exact size of this clandestine organization has never
been established, it was widely believed that about 70
Free: Officers a dually plan�cd and executed the
overthrow of the monarchy. The membership of the
RCC was deliberately kept secret for several months
after the coup probably to cover up internal
maneuverings among the Free Officers. However,
since its formal announcement in December 1969, the
composition of the ruling junta has been unchanged
except for the death of one member who was killed in
a car accident in 1972. The stability of the
membership is one clear indication of the RCC's
predominance over its parent Free Officers
organization and of the strength of the fraternal bonds
which have developed among the 11 men during their
years in power.
Initially, the t1CC attempted to govern behind a
facade of civilian rule, but the young officers
distrustful of civilian politicians �soon took over
direct control of all key ministries. Although
administrative authority has gradually been turned
back to civilian officials, the council carefully
monitors their activities and is quick to check any
opposition to its policies. More importantly, RCC
members continue to exercise tight control over the
administration of the defense establishment and
security services.
Qadhafi and his colleagues have been unwilling to
brook any opposition of any sort, and the country's
sole political party, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union
(LASU), is little more than an instrument for domestic
propaganda. Using all the tools available to an
authoritarian regime, the RCC has tried to organize a
broad popular base, but so far only the younger
generation within the small, politically- conscious
publi,, has responded enthusiastically to their military
For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron
of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map
itself.
11
w
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
The People's Court has been used to try old regime
J
officials held for crimes they had allegedly committed
during the monarchy,
k'
as well as journalists who had
been accused of "crimes against the state." People's
Court verdicts are not subject to appeal, although the
RCC apparently does ratify them. In at least one case,
the RCC ordered that defendants be retried because
the sentences they had been given by the court were
i=
considered too light. The People's Cour` is not subject
z;.
to regular judicial procedures. The public response to
r'^
People's Court trials has been marked by boredom and
disinterest, despite the fact that they are publicized
and televised.
The RCC has the power to commute sentences and
grant amnesties or pardons, and it has reduced
sentences on a large scale on anniversaries of the 1969
I
0
coup.
A major anomalous trend in the Libyan judicial
system, when it is compared with the development of
judicial systems in other Arab states, has been
Qadhafi's insistence that Libyan jurisprudence
conform to a greater degree with Islamic law, This has
resulted in such laws as that which requires
compulsory payment of the traditionally voluntary
alms tax (zakat). In a more bizarre vein, Qadhafi
announced in October 1972 that Libya would begin to
app' the old Islamic penalties for thievery and armed
robbery which consist of the amputation of the right
hand or the left foot. He did concede to modern
sensibilities by saying that such penalties would be
carried out by qualified surgeons in hospitals, with the
victim under anesthesia. Since these types of penalties
have yet to be carried out, Qadhafi might have
announced them merely to dramatize his intent to
"Islamicize" Libyan !aw.
Despite the constitutional injunction that Libyan
judges are independent and shall make their rulings
guided only by law and conscience, the RCC holds
very powerful controls over the judiciary. Its right to
appoint and dismiss judges, establish special courts,
issue decrees (such as the one concerning crimes
against the state) that can be very broadly interpreted,
and the ability to influence judicial organization and
policy through the Supreme Council for Judicial
Institutions gives it great de facto powers in the
judicial sector, if it chooses to exercise them.
C. Political dynamics (S)
Since its overthrow of King Idris in September 1969,
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has
wielded near dictatorial power in Libva tracked by
the army and two Egyptian garrisons ba:,ed in Libya
since 1969, the RCC has successfully fragmented
opposition from old regime sympathizers and it has
encountere,a no other serious opposition to its rule.
President Qadhafi, whose primacy on the council is
frequently affirmed by the 10 other members, is the
key figure binding the junta together. Qadhafi's
personal style of leadership overshadows that of any
potential rival and has been an important stabilizing
influence during the regime's 4 year in power.
1. The RCC's rule
Members of the RCC began to plan their route to
power during the early 1960's when they formed a
secret Free Officers organization while attending the
Royal Military Academy at Banghazi. Although the
exact size of this clandestine organization has never
been established, it was widely believed that about 70
Free: Officers a dually plan�cd and executed the
overthrow of the monarchy. The membership of the
RCC was deliberately kept secret for several months
after the coup probably to cover up internal
maneuverings among the Free Officers. However,
since its formal announcement in December 1969, the
composition of the ruling junta has been unchanged
except for the death of one member who was killed in
a car accident in 1972. The stability of the
membership is one clear indication of the RCC's
predominance over its parent Free Officers
organization and of the strength of the fraternal bonds
which have developed among the 11 men during their
years in power.
Initially, the t1CC attempted to govern behind a
facade of civilian rule, but the young officers
distrustful of civilian politicians �soon took over
direct control of all key ministries. Although
administrative authority has gradually been turned
back to civilian officials, the council carefully
monitors their activities and is quick to check any
opposition to its policies. More importantly, RCC
members continue to exercise tight control over the
administration of the defense establishment and
security services.
Qadhafi and his colleagues have been unwilling to
brook any opposition of any sort, and the country's
sole political party, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union
(LASU), is little more than an instrument for domestic
propaganda. Using all the tools available to an
authoritarian regime, the RCC has tried to organize a
broad popular base, but so far only the younger
generation within the small, politically- conscious
publi,, has responded enthusiastically to their military
For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron
of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map
itself.
11
w
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

I
leaders. For the bulk of the Lihvan people, the
revolution and the LASU remains remote from the
tribal ties and inward focused values which have
shaped their lives for centuries.
Aware of this narrow popular following, the council
has been careful to strengthen its direct links with the
military, which is still vital to its security. The regime
frequently pays public tribute to the Free Officers
Union, which is probably the most privileged group in
Libyan society. Although the organization probably
does not intervene directly in affairs of state, it
sometimes serves as a consultative bodv to the RCC
particularly on those issues in rolving the entire
defense establishment. All officers in the armed
services enjoy special status and perquisites, and even
the needs of the rank and file soldier are generously
met. As further insurance of the military's loyalty,
armed forces personnel are permitted only limited
contact with foreigners in Libya and they are carefully
supervised while on assignments outside the country.
Finally, Egypt's endorsement of the RCC and the
very tangible suppor` of two Egyptian garrisons
stationed in Libya have served to guarantee the
regime's control over the country. The Egyptian
government is anxious to ensure Libya's generous
financial contributions to its treasuries and to
maintain some measure of political leverage over its
we stern neighbors. Although Qadhafi's meddling in
Arab politics has frequently irritated President Sadat
and Nasir before him, the Libyan leader's affinity for
Egypt has given them ample reason to protect his
regime.
2. Qadhafi's primacy
Within the RCC, Qadhafi is the key personality and
undisputed leader among his colleagues. While he
does not completely monopolize power, Qadhafi is the
charismatic force (Figure 4) which pushes the rest of
the council from one initiative to another. He has fired
the imaginations of many young people and has won
at least grudging respect from some members of the
older, more cautious generation. His efforts to
construct in Libya a state that is modern, militarily
strong, socialist and Islamic app, -als to many Libyans,
who acutely felt the Arab defeat at the hands of the
Israelis in 1967. Qadhafi's preoccupation with
Arabization and his expulsion of the Italians has also
struck a responsive cord in most Libyans, who have
developed a deep distrust of foreigners as a result of
centuries of colonial domination.
Qadhafi's unshakable belief in Islam guides almost
all of his actions. He is genuinely committed to the
idea that Islamic principles should explai�, and
12
organize all aspects of societ More important, he
believes that it is his duty to restore the Islamic religion
to its rightful place in society and to unite the Arab
people. For him, the existence of Israel and almost
every setback to the Arab cause are attributable to
human frailty, especially a default of faith and a
departure from moral principles. This view is expressed
in his inflexibility, xenophobia, impatience, and
frequent periods of frustration and disillusionment.
The other members of the eau "cil recognize
Qadhafi's personal primacy, anu they undoubtedly
realize that he could survive politically without them.
They too are followers. They share their generation's
sense of Arab humiliation and are frequently
captivated by the idealism which Qadhafi dramatizes.
While few if any of Qadhafi's colleagues share his
sense of religious and patriotic mission, they appear to
be dedicated to him personally and to most of his
goals. Although alliances do shift among the l I m,�n
depending on the issue and even though Qadhafi has
not always been able to dictate to them, no real
challenge to his leadership has emerged.
After Qadhafi, the pecking order in the RCC is more
difficult to establish. As the regime has become more
institutionalized, some members have assumed areas
of authority which serve as the only real indicators of
their weight within the council. Major' 1hd al -Salem
Jallud, who became Prime Minister in 1972, is the
regime's chief administrator and the main negotiator
with other governments on the RCC's priority
economic and military matters. Jallud and Major al-
Huri, the longtime head of the security services, arc
generally conside ed second only to Qadhafi. Maj.
Yunis Jabir, chief of staff of the armed forces, and his
k r.
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
FIGURE 4. Qadhafi addressing a large gathering
in Tripoli (U /OU)

deputy, Major Kharubi, maintain close daily ties with
the military, and, like Qadhafi who acts as de facto
defense minister, they have direct influence over the
regime's primary source of power. Three other
members, Majors Hawwadi and Humaydi and
Captain Muhayshi, have less easily defined spheres of
authority, but they have undertaken important
responsibilities in domestic affairs. Majors Najm,
Hamza, and Qarawi, perhaps the least forceful
members of the collegium, handle a variety of duties,
but they appear to take their lead on most matters
from Qadhafi.
Most council members appear to value collegiality
even more than individual loyalties, and alliances
among them seem to shift depending on the issue in
controversy. Although Qadhafi has won the council's
approval on most issues, he periodically has come up
against overwhelming objections to his proposals and
has had to back dow-i. The most persistent cause of
tension within the council seems to center on
Qadhafi's pro Egyptian policies and his ultimate goal
of forming a complete Libyan- Egyptian merger. Some
members of the council apparently have serious
reservations about the union scheme which they
believe would eventually bed -)minated by Egypt, and
they are well aware that much of the Libyan public
shares their fears. So far, Qadhafi has been able to
maintain his colleagues support on most matters
involving Egypt. However, his plans for union of the
two countries could prove to be a critical test of his
leadership and indeed the cohesion of the collegium.
3. Other political forces
Qadhafi and his coterie of officers were greeted
initially with a great deal of enthusiasm from those
groups who were most strongly opposed to the
monarchy� students, teachers, and young bureaucrats
and professionals (Figure 5). Found for the most part
in the urban middle class in Tripoli and Banghazi,
these groups are part of the younger generation, many
of whons were educated in other Arab countries or the
West where they have been exposed to new idev s and
ideologies.
Many of these young people believe that major
changes must be made in Libya, and they share many
of the sentiments and goals of their leaders. For
example, there are varying degrees of anti Western
feeling;, focused on such issues as Western friendship
for Israel and identification of the United States and
the United Kingdom with the conservative and
repressive monarchy. Pan -Arab nationalism is strong
among young people, and many revere President
Nasir's efforts to restore Arab dignity in the realm of
international affairs. Among ihis younger generation,
the regime's strict non aligned policy, its radical star J
toward Israel, and its tough negotiating line with
Western oil companies in Libya have been extremelv
popular.
In the past decade, however, the growth of Libyan
nationalism throughout the intelligentsia has been
significant. Many advocates of this new nationalism
are more concerned with national unity and Libya's
own interests than with those of the greater Arab
world. Although they are strongly Aral) nationalist in
outlook and desire to identify Libya closely with Arab
causes, most Libyans want their country to assume
influence in the Arab world as an independent state
rather than as junior partner in a union with Egypt.
Aware of the development potential that has resulted
from oil revenues, they do not want to see Libyan
wealth squandered on other countries or military
adventures. Although this sentiment has not coalesced
into any major political national movement, many
Libyans are beginning to express their disapproval of
the RCC's pursuit of a unified Arab state
particularly Qadhafi's proposal in August 1972 f rr
union with Egypt. So far, opposition to the union
scheme has been limited to private grumblings and
some public demonstrations, particularly in Cvrenaica
where anti Egyptian sentiment is strongest. Neverthe-
less, the contro:-!rsial polic has the potential for
fostering sustained opposition to the regime, which
Qadhafi can ill- afford to ignore, particularly since
some members of the RCC also have reservations
about closer ties with Egypt.
Some elements in the armed forces share these anti
Egyptian nationalist sentiments with the Libyan
13
FIGURE 5. Tripoli demonstration in favor of new
RCC government, 1969 (C)

public, but the majority of the military strongly
4. Political parties
supports the RCC and will probably continue to do so
as long as they feel their o,vn special status is not
Prominent individuals of influential tribes and
families have long been
threatened by the regime's policies. The Free Officers
in competition for political..
are the key influence within 'he military, and they
leadership, L political struggle has traditionally
serve as the privileged phalanx insuring their
taken forms other than that of political party rivalry.
subordinates cooperation with the regime. Very little
Parties have no foundation in the traditional life of the
information has come out about the size and
Libyans and have had only a sporadic existence. The j
organization of the Free Officers Union, whose
Italians banned Libyan political parties during the
members are sometimes referred to as Unionist
period of their rule between 1911 and World War I1.
Officers in keeping with their goal of Arab unity.
In 1947 and 1948 the British allowed party activity
Fewer than a dozen offia--s have been positively
identified as members of the organization, but the
only as a means for permitting Libyans to air their
number of Free Officers has probably grown in
views on the country's future. However, these parties
proportion with the expansion of the regular officers
were banned by King Idris in 1952 following a violent
F
corps. The RCC undoubtedly realizes the difficulty of
episode in Libya's first elections.
U
ensuring the loyalty of new officers if they were denied
From its earliest days the RCC seemed to be
entry into the organization, and the ranks of those who
searching for a way to draw important segments of the
collaborated in the 1969 coup have probably been
population into its programs and to inspire enthusiasm
augmented by many recently commissioned junior
for the revolution in the average Libyan. At first the
officers. just how interested the Free Officers are in
military leaders' suspicion of parties and politicians
politics is also difficult to establish. Some apparently
apparently kept them from establishing a formal
have a very deep commitment to Qadhafi personally
organization, and for nearly two years they relied on a
and have supported him in some disputes within the
series of popular rallies to promote support while
council. However, the organization probably has no
maintaining the ban on organized political activity. In
firm leadership and may well encompass a broad
1971, however, Qadhafi announced the formation of
spectrum of personal alliances.
the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (LASU), which,
The conservative elements in Libyan society have
despite official denials, is the only legal party in the
been largely discredited by the regime and they are
country. The P i'th Party, a pan -Arab political i
unlikely to regain the influence they formerly enjoyed
movement, still has some members and sympathizers f
under the monarchy. Mary of the more prominent
-n Libya, but its influence has diminished I
among them particularly tribal leaders and members
cor,siderably because of the regime's strict surveillance
of aristocratic families �are in exile or detention as a
and occasional harassment of anyone associated with
result of the initial purges following the 1969 coup.
the Ba th Party.
Moreover, for those who have survived these purges,
the threat that the regime will dredge up corruption
a. The Libyan Arab Socialist Union
charges against them has curbed their political
The LASU was established first and foremost to
activity. Much of the opposition, which the regime
serve the regime and after some fits and starts in its
appears to have quelled, emanated from Cyrenaica,
early development it has become a fairly effective civil
Idris' home region.
arm for the RCC. According to Qadhafi's wishes the
i
Despite the regime's efforts to mobilize enthusiasm
party is modeled after the Egyptian Arab Socialist
for its policies among average citizens, the bulk of the
Union and its structure reflects Nasir's design for a
Libyan public remains apathetic toward their
social and political organization which links
i revolutionary
leaders. Although the government's
leadership with the masses.
j efforts
to administer social benefits and development
Soon after formation of the LASU, Qadhafi made it
programs have made some Libyans aware that the
clear that the new organization would not function as
regime is concerned about their welfare, most have not
a regular political party, but would serve rather as the
developed a national consciousness and have little
major instrument for applying socialist principles to
commitment to any national authority. The Libyan
the Libyan situation. The RCC carefully monitored
people, many of whom fear Egyptian absorption, have
elections of party officials even at the local level where
made %nown their opposition to the' regime's plans for
in several instances vote rigging caused the regime to
I
a Libyan Egyptian merger. Their resentment so far
void the results and reschedule new elections. Finally,
has been expressed through discriminatory treatment
after much fanfare the first National Congress was
of the Egyptian community ir, Libya rather than
convened in Tripoli in March 1972 and, as expected,
being directed at the RCC.
Qadhafi was named LASU President.
14
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

0
i'
Theoretically, the National Congress, which consists
of around 500 delegates, is the supreme ruling body of
the party. Between sessions of the congress, its Central
Committee headed by an executive council handles
party affairs. There is little information on the actual
workings of these party organs, but it appears that a
Secretariat General headed by RCC member
Hawwadi actually controls the day -to -day business
and acts as the regime's controlling arm in the party
structure.
Below the national organization are the 10
provincial (or govemate) units, most of which are
headed by RCC members. These provincial units are
divided into district, and finally into basic units. These
units, numbering over 2,000, are scattered throughout
cities, villages, government agencies, and private
enterprises. In some cases, the LASU basic units have
merged with labor unions and the distinction between
union and party activity has become somewhat
blurred. Very little information is ailable on the size
of the party or qualifications for membership, but
some reports indicate that there were over 200,000
LASU members in late 1972. Most government
employees probably feel that party membership is
necessary to protect their jobs, and they most likely
account for a substantial but unenthusiastic portion of
the rank and file. Moreover, the LASU appears to
serve as an umbrella organization which has absorbed
labor, student, and other youth groups.
The RCC has tried to impart prestige and
responsibility to the LASU and council mere' =ers seem
to take their duties quite seriously. Party activity is
generally aimed at selling the regime's policies to the
public through the media, popular rallies, and the
party structure itself. Qadhafi has taken a particularly
active part in many party programs and frequently
spends a great deal of time addressing special seminars
and meeting with LASU members at the local level.
He has also instructed party officials to look after the
needs of ordinary citizens and to help them take
advantage of public health, education, and housing
programs.
In additi )n to serving as a pipeline to the public, the
LASU is an instrument with which the government
demonstrates its power and authority. LASU units in
the predominantly American -owned petroleum
industry have demonstrated their ability to pressure
the companies on such issues as Libyanization,
increased pay, and general working conditions.
Similarly, the orchestrated demonstrations and
protests mounted from time to time by the regime
depend mainly on LASU manpower, ind hundreds of
Party me mbers can be turned .)ut in fairly quick order.
For example, massive demonstrations in failr of union
with Egypt were staged during the unity conference
between Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi in August 1972
as part of the regime's pressure campaign to draw their
reticent neighbors into the merger scheme.
There has been much fanfare in Libya regarding the
November 1972 announcement of the merger of the
LASU with its Egyptian counterpart. Cooperation
between the two parties, however, has been limited to
the executive level, and very little integration is
expected to take place. If the union between the two
countries ever assumes real substance, the more
vigorous leadership of the Egyptian ASU may well
inspire an independent spirit in its Libyan partner, but
mutual suspicions will undoubtedly prevent any
meaningful consolidation of the two parties even at
the highest echelons.
b. The Bath Party
The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party, commonly
known as the Bath Party, represents a pan -Arab,
socialist reform movement with international
headquarters in Damascus, Syria, and regional
branches in various other Arab countries. Between
1958 and 1961, when Syria and Egypt were joined in
the United Arab Republic, President Nasir attempted
to use regional Bath parties to achieve his objectives
and permitted Ba'thists to operate in Cairo. With the
breakup of this union in 1961, Nasir and the Bath
Party became enemies, and now Nasir's followers work
separately to create their own brand of Arab unity.
Syrian Ba'thists in 1956 helped a Libyan, 'Amir al-
Tahir al- Dughayyis, to form a Ba'thist group among
members of the Libyan Students Club in Cairo. Later
that year, 'Abdallah Sharaf al -Din, a member of this
group, returned to Libya and began forming Bath
cells in Tripoli and Banghazi. Using the members of
the Bath group in the Cairo Libyan Students Club as
a core, the Bath Party expanded its organization in
Libya to include secondary school students, minor
government officials, and trade union officers. In
1961, however, the Libyan Government imprisoned 87
members of the party, and since they, the Ba'thists
have been unable to reorganize themselves success-
fully.
Soon after the RCC established firm control
following the 1969 coup, several prominent members
of the Bath Party made bids for positions in the new
government. However, Qadhafi's vehement anti
Ba'thist sentiments quickly dashed their hopes and
many members of the party either left the country or
15
It

1n 0�n0TQ5
r
severely curtailed their political activities. Qadhafi
views the Ba`thist movement as a corrosive, atheistic
influence and a serious threat to his Nasirite principles.
In 1971, he expelled some 70 Palestinian Ba`thists for
alleged subversion, and he has kept a close security
watch on Libyan sympathizers who have remained in
the country.
5. Elections
Elections are alien to Libyan traditions and the
people have had little opportunity to become familiar
with modern electoral practices. Under the monarchy,
the only elections ever held were for deputies to the
House of Representatives, and the government
blatantly controlled every stage of the election process.
The RCC has abolished even the facade of democratic
institutions and the only elections held since 1969
have involved Libyan participation in the Confedera-
tion of Arab Republics (CAR), and the establishment
of the LASU official structure.
Although the military regime has conducted
elections with a minimum of direct interference, the
RCC views the electoral process as a means for
drumming up public enthusiasm and it has used
various methods to ensure the results it wants. For
example, to guarantee support for Libyan participa-
tion in the CAR, the referendum on the federation
charter was conducted on 1 September 1971, the
anniversary of the Libyan revolution and a day
charged with emotional spirit for Arab causes.
Moreover, black boxes were used as receptacles for
negative votes, a ploy which played upon the str )ng
Muslim superstition that black is evil and dangerous.
Not surprisingly, the referendum was overwhelmingly
accepted 1 y d record turnout of voters.
Elections for LASU officials and for deputies to the
CAR Assembly have been carried out in routin�
fashion. Suffrage has been extended to both males and
Females, but there is no information available on the
age requirements for participation in either election.
AHI candidates for LASU offices and for deputy
representatives to the CAR must be registered
members of the LASU, and all LASU members are
required to vote. The RCC has carefully monitored
each stage of these elections and has intervened on
several occasions to prevent vote rigging and to insure
that all candidates meet nomination requirements.
The regime has also criticized those campaign
practices which play on tribal ties and family
influence.
16
D. National policies (C)
I. Domestic
In attempting to reform Libyan society, Qadhafi is
trying to cast off the psychological fetters of centuries
of foreign domination and to instill a sense of national
identity and pride in Libyans. He views these steps as
essential in revitalizing and uniting the Arab world.
Under the BCC's direction the last vestiges of the pro
Western Libyan monarchy have been eliminated; in
its place the full panoply of the early regime of Egypt's
Nasir� except for the People's Assembly �has been
reproduced. Qadhafi's goal is to harmonize the
political and economic structures of Libya and Egypt
in preparation for a complete merger of the two states.
Qadhafi is aiming at a classless society marked by
social justice, equal opportunity, and a more equitable
distribution of income. Many schools, hospitals, child
care centers a9d roads have been built and the welfare
services expanded to a reasonable level. The
corruption and patronage in the government that
flourished under the monarchy has been largely
ended, as has the tribally based administration; local
chiefs must now take competitive exams. The
government has provided subsidies for housing and
education, but no money handouts in the Saudi
Aiat-i.n fashion. A major problem has been in getting
the welfare programs to nonurban Libyans and in
helping the rural dwellers to take advantage of the
services available.
To reduce foreign influen -c in Libya and reinstate
the primacy of the Arabic language and culture, the
government has Arabized schools, social institutions,
and many private concerns and established a legal
code based almost exclusively on strict Islamic law.
English street names have been replaced with Arabic,
and all travellers to Libya must carry Arabic- language
passports. Although Qadhafi has made exceptions to
this rule when it serves Libya's own economic and
political interests, the regulation has been enforced
ag::inst all natioualities, causing considerable
Disruption.
The government has also moved against foreigners
resident in Libya. Thousands of lifelong resident
Italians have been evicted and the United States and
United Kingdom have evacuated their bases, at
Libya's request. To be sure many Italians have
returned, but they we Italians untainted by the
colonial connection. All these antiforeign moves have
struck a responsive chord in the average Libyan,
..1
0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

r. -'..t ...::7rT.C: ;t �n��yaf �FM! J ^ry'IrF"IAMaVesle
1,, 1
C
whose mistrust of foreigners has been fed by centuries
of foreign domination. Qadhafi's religious bent also
fits in with the conservative values entrenched in the
religious tradition of the country. There has been
criticism of some of Qadhafi's measures such as
banning entertainment and alcohol and not much
enthusiasm among studenas and businessmen for his
attempts to instill revolutionary fervor. This lack of
response probably provoked Qadhafi to call in mid
1973 for a "cultural revolution" which would include
the destruction of books containing foreign ideologies
and the rooting out of "sick people" �ma rxists,
capitalists, the bourgeois bureaucratic class, and
arrogant intellectuals. Qadhafi backed up his rhetoric
by arrests, mostly of leftists and members of the
conservative religious Muslim Brotherhood; he also
"returned power to the people" by the creation of
"popular committees" to be elected in villages,
schools, industry and branches of the government. The
committees must be approved by the RCC and follow
certain vague guidelines, but some are apparently
taking matters into their own hands, creating
problems, particularly in the important oil industry.
Qadhafi has said that the committees, when trained,
will be given arms.
In the economic field, Libya wants to increase its
control over the petroleum industry and still receive
the revenues and profits which are the mainstay of its
most cherished domestic and foreign goals. Libya last
year negotiated an increase in the price of oil and as of
mid -1973 was discussing with the major oil companies
operating in the country the extent and manner in
which Libya would become a partner in local
petroleum operations. Libya had been asking 50%
participation in oil company operations while the
companies were offering 25 similar to agreements
with Arab Persian Gulf states. In May 1973 Libya
increased its demands to include 100% ownership of
the oil companies equity by the Libyan Government.
The government, however, does not appear to be
prepared for a wholesale nationalization of the
industry; in fact Qadhafi has said that Libya would do
that only if all oil producing Arab countries did so. In
the meantime, efforts are being made to develop
purely Libyan oil companies.
Libya is trying to lessen its dependence on oil by
diversifying the economy, building up agriculture,
commerce ;.nd industry. The biggest push is in
agriculture, where the government aims to make the
country self- sufficient in food as soon as possible.
Agriculture has been allotted $720 million under the
current 3 -year development plan and as much as $1.8
billion will be earmarked for agriculture over the next
10 years, Ambitious land reclamation projects are
planned, involving the expansion of irrigation
facilities and the settlement of farmers, who will be
provided with adequate housing, schools, medical care
and access to markets. All ports are slated for
improvement and five seawater desalinization plants
are planned. A number of smaller industrial plants are
being constructed. Libya has been experimenting with
a mixed economy in which cooperation between the
public and private sectors has been stressed. Semi-
autonomous government corporations have proiifer-
ated, many of them new and inexperienced. The
expansion of the public sector has been the result of
the government's desire to achieve "Arab socialism"
i.e., more control over the distribution of the nation's
wealth and of its social, economic and political
development.
In preparation for the merger a joint Libyan
Egyptian economic committee has been set up and
has probably made some minor decisions on joint
development goals; it is unlikely that progress has
been made on such key issues as an integrated
currency or direct Libyan support for development
projects in Egypt. There is, however, considerable
cooperation between the two countries. A number of
large Egyptian companies are carrying out develop-
ment projects in Libya, particularly in housing and
agriculture. There are about 150,000 Egyptians in
Libya, providing skills and advice to both the public
and private sector.
The investment climate is poor because the
government has not reconciled tho conflicting goals of
obtaining foreign know -how with the desire to be free
of foreign influences. In addition, most foreign
enterprises nationalized in the wake of the 1969
revolution have not received compensation.
Another of Libya's goals is to create a politically
dependable, proficient and well- equipped military
establishment. Although the armed forces have not
been tested in battle, they are well equipped, well
paid, enjoy considerable social prestige, and are under
tight RCC control. Their weaknesses lie in their
distaste for hard physical training, lack of qualified
personnel, and their inability to maintain equipment.
The government takes care to insulate them from
foreign influences; only the Egyptian training mission
has substantial contacts with major elements of
Libya's armed forces. The two Egyptian battalions in
Libya are there to provide support for the Libyan
revolution. The government's elaborate security
services and militia complement the armed forces in
the maintenance of internal security. These elements,
like the single political party, the Libyan Arab
Socialist Union, are directly responsible to the RCC
17
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080013 -3

i
i
and represent increasingly effective tools available to
the RCC in carrying out its domestic and foreign
policies.
Libya faces many obstacles in achieving its
domestic goals. The population of about 2.2 million,
which is predominantly illiterate and unskilled, is
quite inadequate for its development needs. Achieving
a more equitable distribution of wealth is difficult in a
country where, except for the cities, the settled
population consists of nuclearized, lonely settlements
separated by hundreds of miles of desolate desert; less
than 11% of the population is nomadic. Despite the
country's ambitious road program, large areas
remain isolated. Finally, despite the government's
strong desire to Libyanize the economy, it will remain
for a long time dependent on foreign assistance,
especially in the area of technical assistance. Libya
must also contend with the torpid, overlarge
bureaucracy inherited from the monarchy. The
prospects for the development and diversification of
the economy are also hampered by the regime's
tendency to subordinate such practical goals to their
reforming zeal and their ambitions to lead the Arab
world.
2. Foreign
President Qadhafi is the principal architect of
Libyan foreign policy, but many of his views are
shared by the other members of the ruling
Revolutionary Command Council. Qadhafi's foreign
policy moves stem from a fundamentalist belief in
Islam, and a deep conviction that it is his duty to unite
the Arab people, as other Arab leaders are not doing
their part. These apparently unshakable convictions
explain his intractable militancy, his willingness to
subordinate purely Libyan interests, and his eagerness
to challenge the United States or any other power he
views as blocking his visionary goal of Arab destiny.
j The Libyan leader's desire to take the lead in Arab
affairs is partly a reaction to centuries of foreign
occupation and the low esteem other Arab countries
l;ad for Libya under the monarchy. The lightning
swiftness of the Arab- Israeli war in 1967 �a war in
which Libya had no part� amplified the sense of
shame of the young officers who pulled off the coup
against the monarchy in 1969. They are determined to
avenge their humiliation and redress the balance in
Libya and the Arab world's favor. Under their
leadership, Libya has become zealous in its pursuit of
Arab unity, and the most committed of any Arab state
;o an armed confrontation with Israel.
Militant leaders of other Arab countries are goaded
by a similar sense of humiliation to lead the Arabs in
somehow overcoming the Israelis, but are cir-
cumscribed by economic weakness. In contrast,
Qadhafi and his colleagues, by the accident of massive
petroleum reserves, have far more money than they
can use for constructive internal projects and thus
have the means to finance whatever strikes them at the
moment as furthering Libyan leadership of the weak
a,id divided Arab world. Libya has been able to
purchase top quality arms for its as yet untested armed
forces, to provide the major foreign subsidy to Israel's
principal adversary, Egypt, to be the major trainer and
paymaster for the Arab fedayeen, and also to provide
money and /or arms to prospective insurgents opposed
to Israeli allies including such unlikely groups as
Northern Ireland's Catholic terrorists, Black Muslims
in the United States, and the Philippine Muslims. The
extent of such aid to client states is probably not
realized by most Libyans.
The Libyan President has an almost mystical
attachment to union with Egypt, which he sees as a
forerunner of the eventual union of the Arab nation;
he also realizes that Libya's oil resources will probably
not last much more than 20 years and that Egyptian
farmers, technicians and expertise are needed for
Libyan development. There are many obstacles to the
union, not the least of which are the conflicting
personalities of the reckless Qadhafi and the more
drab, cautious Egyptian President Sadat. Anti
Egyptian sentiment in Libya is strong, and certain key
military officers have threatened to withdraw their
support from Qadhafi if he goes ahead with the
merger. Libyans genuinely fear absorption by Egypt,
which has a population of 35 million as opposed to
Libya's 2 million; the presence in Libya of
approximately 150,000 Egyptians has also been an
irritant. Some "Libya Firsters" also fear that Qadhafi
is diverting funds that could be better used at home.
Libya will bring about $3 billion in ready revenues to
the union; Egypt will bring a similar amount in
foreign debts, owed mostly to Communist countries.
The practical obstacles to the union are many. How
can Libya's professional army of 18,000 be joined with
250,000 Egyptian conscripts who earn one -tenth as
much? What will become of the relatively high
average Libyan annual revenue if it is combined with
the much lower Egyptian one? The merger is clearly
not popular with Libyan students, who think the
Egyptian regime is not revolutionary enough, the
conservative merchants, nor the civil servants, who
fear that their salaries will be reduced.
On the Egyptian side President Sadat is not
enthusiastic, but he wants to protect his position with
Qadhafi, who had been giving Egypt about $250
i
NO
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

million annually, until 1972, when the amount started
to dwindle. Qadhafi has voiced a determination to go
ahead, "even if it means civil war." Qadhafi is
vulnerable on the merger, however, for it is the one
policy of his that is genuinely unpopular, and his
continuing advocacy of it in the face of popular
opposition may prove his undoing.
a. The Maghreb
t
C
i
To balance his close, but frequently strained ties
with Egypt, Qadhafi has from time to time turned his
eyes toward Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco �with
varying degrees of success. Libya's particular brand of
Islamic, Nasirite Arab nationalism does not sit well
with the traditionalist, Western oriented regimes in
Morocco and Tunisia.
The enmity between Qadhafi and King Hassan of
Morocco is imllacable and each is bent on
overthrowing the `her. Libya applauded the abortive
coup against Hassan in August 1971 and has been
providing arms and money to exiled Moroccan
dissidents who have been engaged in terrorist incidents
in Morocco on a small scale.
Relations between Libya and Tunisia are outwardly
good, but Tunis suspects that Tripoli may be stirring
up the Tunisian dissidents it harbors in Libya.
Qadhafi views Tunisia as powerless and faltering
while awaiting President Bourguiba's death; he
expects that once Bourguiba is gone Tunisia will
become more radical and thus more suitable for close
association with Libya.
The pragmatic Algerian President Boumediene is
willing to give Qadhafi support in their common
struggle against Israel but draws the line at toppling
Hassan and has urged Qadhafi to stop sending Libyan
supported Moroccan dissidents through Algeria into
Morocco.
b. Other regional alignments
Other alignments ;rave not fared well. The vaguely
linked combination of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan in the
1970 "Tripoli Pact" was broker in the autumn of 1972
as Libya and Sudan took opposing sides in the
bickering between Uganda and Tanzania. The fate of
the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR) grouping
Libya, Egypt and Syria is also obscure. Tripoli
mistrusts the Ba'thist regime in Damascus as laic, if
not atheist, and prefers to hold it at arms' length;
Damascus, for its part, suspects Qadhafi of stirring up
trouble in Syria.
e. The struggle against Israel
In addition to an annual contribution to Egypt,
which amounted in 1973 to $59 million plus arms and
equipment, Libya provides over $100 million to the
fedayeen and to an assortment of clients for the
announced purposes .)f furthering Muslim solidarity
and the solidarity of nations and groups opposed to
Israel and its supporters. Most of Qadhafi's energies
and a considerable amount of Libya's budget has been
consumed by activities directed at the number one
enemy, Israel. Libya has given at least $50 million in
arms and supplies to the fedayeen� including Fatah's
Black September Organization �over the past year
and is now their main supporter. Qadhafi also
provides training facilities in Libya for perhaps as
many as 2,000 guerrillas, gives logistical and cash
support to various fedayeen operations, and has
extended documentation and asylum. Although the
Libyan leader has frequently stated that terrorism
should be aimed directly at Israel, his frustration with
Arab inability to meet the Israeli challenge may now
have led him to favor terrorist operations outside the
battle area.
Qadhafi has conducted an anti Israeli diplomatic
offensive in both Africa and Latin America. Israel's
setbacks in Black Africa and a gro�.ving fedayeen
presence there have in part grown out of the Libyan
leaders' ability to provide at least the promise if not
the fact of generous financial benefits from his
country's oil wealth. Qadhafi is helped by the myth of
beneficence that surrounds his activities and by the
desperate need most Black African countries have for
financial assistance.
Even before the October 1973 war, Tel Aviv had
been ousted from five African countries: Uganda,
Chad, Congo, Niger, Mali, and Burundi. Qadhafi
undoubtedly encouraged Ugandan President Amin, a
Muslim, to break with Israel by promising him aid,
although other factors were involved. No large
financial package materialized, although Libya did
send materiel and troops during the Ugandan exiles'
invasion last fall and will open up a branch of the
Bank of Libya in Kampala; the Ugandans are also
buying military equipment with Libyan money.
Chad, which has a large Muslim population, broke
with Israel last November. Chad's Christian president,
Tombalbave probably hoped that the move would
induce Qadhafi to stop supporting the Muslim
insurgency in Chad. After alks between Tombalbaye
and Qadhafi in December, the Chadians claimed
Qadhafi promised them su!,stantial development
funds. A Libyan military delegation has visited (;had
and returned home with a sizable shopping list. So far
no funds have turned up and Qadhafi continues to
support the insurgents, albeit at a reduced level.
Conga and Niger broke with Israel following the
latter's announcement in December that it was
reducing its representation to nonresident status. Niger
had been receiving modest Libyan aid even before the
19
f y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080013 -3

break with Israel and was anxious to avoid difficulties
with Qadhafi. Mali �next doer to Niger followed
suit on 5 January. Niger and Mali have large Muslim
populations; Congo does not, but has long been pro
Arab in outlook. Mauritania �the African country
tLat has received the most hard cash from Qadhafi
has from independence aligned itself with the Arabs.
It is a safe bet that these countries were hoping for
financial rewards. In the past year, however, Q. dhafi
has been less open handed than formerly, and they
will probably have to come up with good projects
before he agrees to finance them.
Libya is a large contributor to the African
Liberation Committee of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) as well as to African liberation
organizations. Using the implied threat that
contributions will stop, Qadhafi has tried to persuade
African countries to break relations with Israel, and
until Ethiopia broke relations with Israel during the
1973 Middle East war, he lobbied to have the OAU
seat moved from Addis Ababa to Cairo.
d. The West
Qadhafi's urgent fc,reign policy concerns �Arab
unity, the liberation of Palestine, the revival of Arab
glory and power� demand that he confront any
foreign power that he sees posing a threat to those
concerns. He has not forgotten France's colonial role
in sundering the Arab world (nor its current
"neocolonialist" role in Chad), but Paris' largely
commercial view of its relations with Libya (above all,
its wiliingness to sell Libya over a hundred modern
fighter aircraft) suits Qadhafi, who sees Paris as at Icast
neutral in the Arab Israeli conflict. The delivery of the
aircraft (some of which Qadhafi has now transferred to
Egypt in violation of his agreement with France) has
been tied into economic, agricultural and technical
cooperation agreements, making France the fourth
largest supplier of goods and services to Libya.
Relations with the United Kingdom are cool. The
United Kingdom evacuated its base at El Adem in
1970, at Libya's request, and in late 1971 Qadhafi
nationalized British Petroleum (BP) in retaliation for
what he claimed was U.K. complicity in Iran's seizure
of three Persian Gulf islands. Qadhafi wished to
preserve the Arab character of the islands and saw
Iran's move as a non -Arab encroachment. Negotia-
tions between BP and Libya concerning compensation
have not yet taken place, and Qadhafi's outspoken
support of the Irish Republican Army continues to be
an irritant. Qadhafi's moves against the United
Kingdom (and also the United States) strike a
responsive chord among Libyans, whose xenophobia
stems from centuries of foreign domination.
20
Libya views the United States as an adversary
because of its support for ls,jel, or as Qadhafi has put
it "the friend of my enemy is my enemy." Qadhafi's
frustration with his inability to strike at Israel more
directly has made hin increasingl antagonistic
town. the United States. Last year he cut back the
U.S. ciplomatic presence (as well as that of the United
Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.), and he continually makes
propaganda assaults against U.S. policy throughout
the world.
Qadhafi has visions of getting the small, nonaligned
countries to _stand up to the superpowers, and it is
this �as well as a desire to undercut Israel �that has
led him to turn his attention to Latin America
particularly to countries that have Arab minorities.
Libya has recently established relations with Panama
and has announced plans to open embassies in Brazil,
Chile and Argentina. Panama is reportedly attracted
by Libya's oil money; any inroads the Libyans could
make there at the expense of the United States would
not displease Qadhafi. Libya has also reportedly been
financing covert action :nd propaganda activities in
Latin America.
e. The U.S.S.R.
Qadhafi's deep religious convictions are the basis of
his dislike of "godless communism" �Mara, Lenin,
and the lot. He is aware that Soviet support for the
Arab cause stems from Soviet ambitions in the area
and seems sincerely convinced that the superpowers,
all of whom he views as imperialist, may make a deal
to divide up the world at the expense of the smaller,
nonaligned nations. Qadhafi condemned Egypt's past
reliance on the U.S.S.R. and undoubtedly encouraged
Sadat's break with Moscow. His anti- communism
takes the form of broadside attacks against the
U.S.S.R. and other East European states as well as
attacks on Communist parties in the Arab world.
Nonetheless Qadhafi continues to do business with
Moscow while castigating it. In the past 2 years Libya
has purchased $118 million worth of arms from the
U. S. S. R.
Libya has been cool to Peking, which it views as
atheistic but not an imperialist threat, partly because
of its great distance. Tripoli recognized Peking when it
was admitted to the United Nations, but it has not
established relations or exchanged diplomats. The
Libyans continue to have good relations with Taiwan,
which has an embassy in "Tripoli It appears likely that
if a real Libyan- Egyptian merger takes shape, the new
entity will establish relations with Peking and end ties
with the Nationalist Chinese.
Libya attaches little importance to its membership
in the United Nations, an organization which 'Tripoli
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

X
1
J
r
r
believes is completely dominated by the superpowers.
Although President Qadhafi apparently still believes
that the U.N. General Assembly is a useful
propagi nda platform for the smaller, nonaligned
countries, he views the veto -power of the United States
and the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council as one more
example of "imperialist" control over the interna-
tional community. The voting of Libyan delegates in
U.N. bodies almost always reflects Tripoli's Arab
interests and its strict policy of nonalignment. Libya
has consistently supported the nationalistic aspirations
of peoples in dependent or colonial areas and has
taken the side of the Afro -Asian nations as opposed to
Western powers. Although Libya participates in most
of the specialized agencies affiliated with the United
Nations, Qadhafi has little faith in the ability of the
international community to solve important issues. He
vehemently opposes a negotiated settlement of the
Middle East dispute and has repeatedly condemned
U.N. efforts to deal with Arab- Israel differences.
E. Threats to government stability (S)
1. Discontent and dissidence
During its 4 years in power, the RCC has had to
deal with a variety of malcontents and scattered cases
of political intrigue, but so far the regime has not been
seriously threatened. The government enjoys the
passive support of the inward looking Libyan
population, which �with only few exceptions �has
shown little inclination for risk taking political
activism. There is no evidence of organized subversion
among those groups that have a capability to
challenge the government. Such discontent as exists is
generated primarily by dissatisfaction with specific
policies rather than generalized anti regime sentiment.
a. Residual regionalism
The most bitter critics of the regime are found
among conservative elements in Cyrenaica, par-
ticularly wealthy families, tribal leaders, and former
officials of the Idrisid monarchy. Under the old
regime., these groups had considerable authority and
prominence, but since the 1969 coup they have lost
their influence and to a lesser extent their prestige.
They deeply resent what they see as the government's
lipservice to republican principles, its reckless policies,
and dictatorial control. More important, they fear the
RCC's campaign to discredit anyone suspected of
corruption and other crimes committed during the
monarchy. Many businessmen, prominent public
figures, and former politicians �many of them from
Cyrenaica �have been totally discredited by the
government. Others are under detention and the
roundup of suspected offenders still goes on.
Although the RCC has tried nog to exacerbate tribal
sentiment and has scrupulously avoidet he politics of
regionalism, many Cyrenaicans interpret the regime's
campaign .against those associated with the monarchy
as discrimination against them.
This regional allegiance� although on the wane �is
still a worrisome problem for the RCC. Periodically,
clandestine groups suspected of being based in the
eastern province have circulated anti- regime tracts,
b t there is no evidence that such groups amount to
much more than small, poorly organized collections of
dissidents. No legally constituted organizations in
Cyrenaica could effectively challenge the regime. The
RCC has dismantled the once powerful Cyrenaican
Defense Force �the principal prop for King Idris;
most, if not all, of the senior officers have been retired
and junior officers have been integrated into regular
army units and the urban police force. There is no
evidence that these elements have agitated tribal
rivalries or generated any serious tension within the
armed forces. Nevertheless, should other problems
threaten the cohesion of the military, the Cyrenaicans
could be expected to follow regional objectives.
b. Political complaints
Many middle class Libyans are discontented with
their prospects under the regime. Although many
businessmen, professionals, and bureaucrats are
sympathetic to the regime's support for Arab causes,
they resent Qadhafi's subordinalrt of domestic
interests to Pan -Arab goals. They are particularly
alarmed at what they see as the squandering of Libyan
money on other Arabs' interests.
Many sophisticated Libyans are frustrated by the
limited scope of permissible political activity and their
total inability to influence Qadhafi and his colleagues.
Some have simply ignored RCC policies, while others
have more openly criticized their leaders. Qadhafi's
cultural revolution inaugurated in April 1973 hus been
directed at silencing these critics.
Under the auspices of the cultural revolution, nearly
2,000 "popular committees" have been unleashed in a
campaign to intimidate and discredit the regime's
detractors throughout the small, educated n.iddle
class. Many professionals, bureaucrats, and other
prominent public figures have had their homes and
offices rifled by police and "popular committee"
members in search of what Qadhafi calls subversive
literature and other evidence of foreign influences.
Some have been temporarily dismissed from their
`As
21
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080013 -3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080013 -3

positions on the pretext that their qualifications must
be reviewed. Such police -state tactics have deeply
alienated many Libyans. Those who have been
hardest hit by such action are in no position to
threaten the regime; nevertheless, they could well
become a core of outright opposition to the
government.
I
I
M1
e. Anti Egyptian sentiment
The most volatile issue in Libya is President
Qadhafi's pro- Egyptian policies. Relations with Egypt
have been problematic since Libya gained indepen-
dence in 1951. Strong cultural and historical ties bind
the two countries together and many Libyans view
Egypt as the natural leader of the Arab world. During
King Idris' reign, most of the younger generation of
Libyans resented Libya's separation from the
contemporary Arab world and they looked to Egypt as
the spokesman of their Arab nationalist sentiments.
Initially, they supported the RCC's close cooperation
with the Egyptian leadership and its identification
with Nasir's stand in Arab politics. The bulk of the
Libyan people, however, have long distrusted their
large and powerful neighbor and have resented
Egypt's long record of interference in Libya's domestic
affairs. Moreover, as the politically sophisticated
segm: nt of the population has developed a keener
sense of Libyan nationalism, many have lost their
initial enthusiasm for closer ties between the two
countries.
The government's importation of many Egyptian
advisers, technicians, skilled workers, and military
personnel has been the most immediate cause of
complaints. Most Libyans deeply resent working with
Egyptians, who are frequently better trained than
their Libyan counterparts. Moreover, the possibility
that Egypt's large surplus of educated professionals
and skilled and common workers will continue to flow
into Libyan cities has increased the Libyans'
apprehensions that their jobs will eventually be
jeopardized. Another major source of irritation has
been Qadhafi's financial commitments to Cairo.
Libyans are not quite certain how much of their
country's wealth is being funnelled into the flagging
Egyptian economy, but most disapprove.
For the most part Libyans have vented their
frustrations directly on their Egyptian co- workers. As
ill -will has continued to mount, however, many have
begun to openly criticize the regime. Qadhafi's
scheme for a union between the two countries has
been privately denounced by the vast majority of
Libyans whose strong feelings on the issue erupted into
violent demonstrations in early 1973. Since then, most
people have resigned themselves to what they
probably see as the inevitable drift toward a much
closer alliance with their neighbors. Nevertheless, their
anti- Egyptian sentiments will remain� periodically
erupting into open clashes with the Egyptian
community in Libya �and perhaps fostering a
situation in which budding oppositions feel they can
marshal a common cause to use against the regime.
2. Subversion
From time to time, a handful of Libyan exiles who
fled the country following the 1969 coup have tried to
muster foreign support for a counter -coup against the
Qadhafi regime. Most of the exiled dissidents are
former officials of the Idrisid monarchy who escaped
to various European and Arab capitals during the
purges that followed the demise of the monarchy.
Although they probably remain in touch with one
another, these individuals appear to represent little
more than a disorganized and dispirited collection of
malcontents. They have had no real success in their
efforts to gain backing for their cause and have �at
least temporarily� stopped lobbying in those Arab
capitals which presumably would be sympathetic to
their hopes to unseat the RCC. Omar Shalhi, the most
colorful member of the exile group, is the most
committed to the overthrow of the Libyan
Government. Despite his persistent efforts, however,
Shalhi has never been able to attract more than moral
encouragement from Qadhafi's detractors in Morocco,
the primary haven for the exiles. Moreover, he has
little support in Libya beyond his imprisoned brother
and some other followers.
Soviet intelligence activities have been detected in
Libya, but these and other Communist intrigi!cs have
been sharply curtailed since 1969. There is some doubt
as to whether a Communist party formally exists in the
country at all. It is more likely that Libyan
Communist activity is confined to a very small group
of individuals who identif-� with Communist causes
and are sympathetic to its principles.
For the first few years following the coup, Qadhafi
did not translate his strong anti Communist sentiment
into much more than public denunciations of
communism and periodic but essentially harmless
harassment of suspected sympathizers. This en-
vironment, however, no doubt convinced any of those
associated with Communist activities that they could
no longer safely stay in Libya. Although the regime
has still not launched a serious campaign against
them, many of those suspected of having Communist
leanings have been arrested since the advent of the
cultural revolution in mid -1973. The government
22
gg
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
25X1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
25X1

a
i
Il k
1
K
X
G. Selected bibliography (U /OU)
Golino, Frank. "Patterns of Libyan National
Identity." The Middle East Journal, Summer 1970,
The Middle East Institute. E;;plains the complex
variables which have shaped Libyan nationalities and
describes the problems of forging a sense of
nationalism.
Khadduri, Majid. Modern Libya, The Johns
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963. Interesting history of
the Libyan struggle for independence, the Idris
7WW
monarchy, and the forces which influence the current
regime.
Patai, Raphael. The Arab Mind, Charles Scribner,
New York, 1973. Analyzes the dynamics of Arab
psychology. Patai's work is a particularly relevant
explanation of the attitudes and behavior of President
Qadhafi and the 10 other members of the
Revolutionary Command Council.
Wright, John. Libya, Ernest Berm Limited,
London, 1969. Although somewhat dated, this work
treats many of the factors which continue to have an
impact on current politics.
25
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

Chronology (u/ou)
5
s;
N
1
i
i
1580
Ottoman control is extended throughout country but is only
nominal or partial is some areas.
1835
Second Ottoman occupation of Libya begins, following
period when the governing authorities had been virtually
autonomous.
1911
Italy occupies Libya.
1943
January
The United Kingdom and France assume control of Libya
after defeat of the Axis powers in North Africa.
1947
February
Italy signs peace treaty renouncing claim to Italian
territorial possessions in Africa.
Allied powers fail to agree on the ultimate disposition of
Libya; question is r- ferred to the J.N. General Assembly.
1949
November
General Assembly recommends independence no later than
January 1952.
1950
December
Idris, Emir of Cyrenaic&, is proclaimed King of Libya.
1951
December
Libya becomes an independent state.
1952
February
First national elections are held.
1953
March
Libya joins the Arab League.
July
Libya signs 20 -year Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with
the United Kingdom.
1954
October
U.S.- Libyan base rights agreement goes into effect.
1955
September
Diplomatic relations are established with the Soviet Union.
26
1957
June
Oil discovered in commercial quantities.
Military assistance agreement is signed with the United
States.
1963
April
A royal proclamation announces the abolition of the federal
system in Libya and the establishment of a unitary state.
May
Libya becomes a member of the Organization of African
Unity.
1967
Jane
Riots protest failure to aid other Arabs in war with Israel.
August September
Libya attends Khartoum summit conference and pledges
$84 million annually to compensate Egypt and Jordan for
losses suffered during the June 1967 Arab Israeli war.
1969
September
The monarchy is overthrown by a group of young officers
in a bloodless coup, and the Libyan Arab Republic is
established.
December
United States and United Kingdom agree to evacuate military
bases.
1970
Januar
France announces agreement to sell Libya over 100 Mirage
aircraft.
March
United Kingdom evacuates Tobruk and El Adem bases.
June
United States evacuates Wheelus Air Base.
July
Qadhafi announces discovery of another plot, involving
retired police officers and old regime political figures,
allegedly aided by United States.
September
Death of Egyptian President Nasir makes Qadhafi most
important inspirational leader of radical Arabs.
'_'s'
X
T
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3

ernIn- if@I&ro
c
1971
April
Libya negotiates agreement on petroleum.
Formation of Con!ederation of Arab Republics� Libya,
U.A.R., and Syria �is announced. Tripartite union exists
only on paper.
June
Formation of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union, patterned on
Egypt's only political party, is announced.
July
Qadhafi's support errbles Sudanese President Numayri to
regain power, uf'er being briefly ousted by Sudanese
Communists.
Qadhafi's expression of support for Moroccan air force
officers who unsuccessfully attempted to kill King Hassan
precipitates suspension of diplomatic relations between the
two countries.
1972
August
Libya and Egypt agree to full merger by September 1973.
Glossary (u/ou)
S rcR t:-r
SECRET
1973
February
Libyan airliner is shot down by Israel over Sinai.
March
Libya attacks U.S. aircraft flying over Mediterranean near
the Libyan border.
April
President Qadhafi initiates a "cultural revo:ution" Bud calls
for the formation of "popular committees" with the
authority to run the country's private and public institutions.
June
President Qadhafi announces the nationalization of U.S.
owned Bunker Hunt Petroleum Company.
July
40,000 Libyans participate in a "March on Cairo" to
demonstrate popular support for union with Egypt.
October
In the war with Israel, Libya calls the Egyptian and Syrian
aims of regaining their territory insufficient and decries
acceptance of the cease -fire accord.
ABBRF.v1ATION
ARABIC
ENGLISH
CAR..........
Ittihad al- Jumhuriyat al-'Arabiyah....
Confederation of Arab Republics
CYDEF.......
Al- Quwwai al- Mudajaah al- Bargah....
Cyrenaican Defense Force
GI............
Mukhabarat al- 'Ammah
General Intelligence
GID..........
Idara al- Mabahithah al- 'Ammah......
General Investigations Directorate
LASU
Ittihad al- Istarakiyah al- 'Arabiyah
Libyan Arab Socialist Union
Libiyah
OAU..........
RCC..........
Majlis Qiyadat al- Thawrah...........
Organization of African Unity
Revolutionary Command Council
A1- Munazzamah al- Mugawamah al-
Popular Resistance Organization
Sha'biyah
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3
27
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080013 -3