NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 41B; SOUTH KOREA; COUNTRY PROFILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080005-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, h -)wever, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS
COUNTRY PPOFILE integrated perspective of
the subject country Chronology Area Brief
Summary Map
THE SOCIETY Social structure Population
Employment Living conditions Social prob-
lems Health Religion Education Artistic
expression Public Information
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolu-
tion of the state Governmental strength and
stability Structure and functioning of government
Political dynamics National policies Threats
to stability Internal security The police
Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabili-
ties
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THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its
structure� agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and
power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and
construction Domestic trade Economic policy
and development Manpower International
economic relations
TRANSPORTATION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems
Strategic mobility Railroads Highways
Inland waterways Pipelines Ports Merchant
marine Civil air Airfields The telecom
system
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MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and cli-
mate Military geographic regions Strategic
areas Internal routes Approaches: land, sea, .:r
ARMED FORCES The defense establishment
Joint activities Ground forces Naval forces
Air forces Paramilitary
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY Structure of
organizations concerned with internal security and
foreign intelligence Their responsibilities, pro-
fessional standards, and interrelationships Mis-
sion, organization, functions, effectiveness, and
methods of operation of each service Biographies
of key officials
This General Survey supersedes the one dated July
1968, copies of which should be destroyed.
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SOUTH KOREA
A Protege's Progress 1
A Shrimp Among Whales 9 Material Modern-
ization: The Miracle on the Han Spiritual
Modernization Revitalization or Retrogres-
sion in Politics? A House Stands Divided
Chronology .............................22
Area Brief .............................24
Summary Map follows 25
This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by
the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by July 1973.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The "special relationship" that exists between the
United States and South Korea (Republic of
Korea �ROK) developed from the defeat of Japan in
World War II, and particularly as a result of U.S. sup-
port in blood and treasure following the outbreak of
the Korean war in June 1950. Since that time U.S.
forces have remained in South Korea to bolster its
defenses. In return, South Korea provides a base that
enables the United States to maintain a forward
defense position in the Far East. More recently, ROK
troops stood alongside the U.S. forces in serv_:ig as
South Vietnam's principal allies. South Korea,
moreover, is becoming an increasingly significant
trading partner and an attractive location for U.S. in-
vestment. (U /OU)
To Koreans, at least, this relationship is both more
natural and has deeper roots than is generally realized
by Americans. Throughout most of its more than thou-
sand year history as a unified country, Korea was un-
der Chinese protection, but when China declined and
fell prey to European imperialism in the 19th century,
Korea was left exposed to rival Japanese and Russian
ambitions to gain control of the strategic Korean
Peninsula. Like Japan, Korea had gone into seclusion
in the early 17th century and, as the "Hermit
Kingdom," isolated itself from all foreign contacts, ex-
cept those with China. This isolation was ended
abruptly in 1876 when Japan, aping Commodore
Perry, sent a military expedition o the port of
Chemulp'o (now Inch'on)* and "opened the door" to
Korea. Unable to protect Korea, China advised it to
negotiate treaties with the Western powers in order to
establish a body of foreign interests sufficiently exten-
sive to thwart any dangerous expansion of Japanese
influence. Beginning in 1882, therefore, Korea con-
cluded a treaty of friendship and commerce with the
United States and by 1886 had negotiated similar
agreements with all major European powers. The
United States secured the lead over the other Western
powers because many Koreans, aware of American
commercial interest in their country and often ac-
quainted with American missionaries and educators,
had come to feel that the United States did not have
the territorial ambitions of Japan and the other great
powers and thus might make an ideal successor to
China as Korea's patron and defender. (U /OU)
*For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the
apron of the Summary Map and the map itself.
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The U.S.- Korean Treaty of 1882 seemed to meet
both Korean and Chinese hopes because it included a
clause that promised America's "good offices" in any
difficulties Korea might have with a third nation. The
Koreans were disillusioned, however, to discover that
this clause remained a dead letter against persistent
Japanese encroachment and, finally, annexation of
their country in 1910. Korean hopes were dashed in
1919, when they found that President Wilson's princi-
ple of national self determination was applied in
Europe but not to Asia. Hope was not raised again un-
til World War II when the Allied Powers promised at
Cairo in 1943 to liberate Korea and make it a free a_n_d
independent state "in due course" after Japan's
defeat. Fulfillment of this promise was thwarted after
Japan's collapse, however, when the United States and
the U.S.S.R., becoming locked in the "cold war," were
unable to agree on the form of a united Korean state.
The result was that the arbitrary division of Korea at
the 38th parallel �a temporary expedient adopted in
1945 for the sole purpose of accepting the surrender of
Japanese forces then in the country �was frozen. By
mid -1948 two separate states had emerged, the
Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north.
(U /OU)
The partition disrupted the Korean economy
because most of the mineral ores and most of the
modern economic infrastructure that Japan had
developed were in the north. Lacking an industrial
base, the largely agricultural South needed massive
foreign economic aid to survive. T'-e South Koreans
felt that the United States, having participated in the
division of the country, was responsible for supporting
them. The United States, therefore, was obliged to
shoulder the burden of supporting the less naturally
endowed but more populous South. After the ROK
Government was established, the United States con-
sidered it had largely fulfilled its obligations and, after
Soviet forces had been withdrawn from the North,
withdrew all of its forces in mid -1949, leaving only an
ongoing economic aid agreement and a small military
advisory group. (U /OU)
In June 1950 Soviet equipped North Korean forces
launched a highly successful surprise attack across the
38th parallel and quickly overran most of the South.
By September, U.N. forces under U.S. command had
driven the North Koreans out of the South, but when
they then drove on toward the Manchurian border
Chinese "volunteers' ^ntered the war in great
strength. After much ,"lifting back and forth, a
military front was eventually stabilized along the 38th
parallel and an armistice signed in July 1953. The war
reduced South Korea to complete dependence on the
United States, and even after the war massive infusions
of U.S. aid were required for relief and reconstruction
as well as for equipping and maintaining the army of
600,000 men that the South felt it needed to guard
against renewed attack from the North. The extensive
and continuing U.S. commitment can be gauged from
the fact that economic aid to South Korea totaled $5.6
billion during U.S. FY1946 -72 and military aid $5.7
billion during FY 1950 -72. (U /OU)
In the 20 years since the armist'ce was signed at
P'anmunjon, South Korea's economic dependence on
the United States has been greatly reduced. It is a
success story largely of the 1960's, during which the
ROK Government under President Pak dedicated itself
to a major effort to develop a viable economy,
alleviate widespread poverty, and lessen dependence
Gn foreign aid. Two successive and highly successful
5 -year plans (1962 -71) made is possible to virtually ter
ininate U.S, grant aid by the end of the 1960's. In the
military realm, South Korea is still heavily dependent
on the United States for sophisticated weapons systems
and modernization in general, but South Korea now
shoulders a major portion of its defense burden.
(U /OU)
Internationally, the Pak government has
progressively broadened its contacts and role, nor-
malizing relations with Korea's ancient foe, Japan, in
1965 and winning diplomatic recognition from a grow-
-rig number of states (88 in mid 1973). A Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States in
1966 accorded South Korea a proud symbol of equal-
ity, and its military participation in South Vietnam was
considered by Seoul to represent an important role in
world affairs, as well as measure of its continued close
ties with the United States. (U /OU)
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Since the birth of the republic, South Korea has
taken on the character of a wayward ward rather than
that of a puppet. Its venerable but wily and irascible
first president, Syngman Rhee, was the undoing of
many an American adviser and of some important
U.S. policies, particularly during the Korean war.
While the present President, who first came to power
through a military coup in 1961, finally came
around �in response to U.S, prodding and the pressure
of public opinion �to the restoration of civilian
government in 1963, a decade later he similarly
demonstrated his independence of U.S. sensitivities by
an abrupt abandonment of all but the most superficial
trappings of democracy. (C)
An equally striking manifestation of Seoul's in-
dependent initiative was the upening of secret,
high -level talks with North Korea in early 1972 looking
toward reunification of the peninsula. Pointing to the
"delicacy" of his negotiations with the North, in late
1972 President Pak assumed almost complete dic-
tatorial control by procl aiming martial law and carry-
ing out a sweeping reorganization of the government.
Whether or not such steps were necessary. ROK
diplomacy since that time has moves: more rapidly
and flexibly than before. (U /OU)
Despite Seoul's new confidence in its ability to talk
to P'yongyang, its moves on the domestic front could
over time critically undermine the Pak regime. The
great strides made in modernizing not only the
military machine but also most aspects of material ex-
istence, which have encouraged Pak to venture upon
reunification talks, may be brought to naught if
domestic opinion becomes disaffected with the in-
creasingly autocratic rule which he has imposed. (C)
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When Allied victory in World War II freed the
Koreans from almost 40 years of increasingly harsh
control by Imperial Japan, they had anticipated finally
winning the national self- determinatio:, that had
been denied them after World War I through es-
tablishment of a free, independent, and united Korea.
Instead, the country was sundered for the first time in
a thousand years, and each of the truncated halves
became in fact the ward of one of the two superpowers.
Wardship, however, is nothing new to Korea. The
pattern of the "client- state" has prevailed throughout
most of the peninsula's long history. China was the
patron, and the relationship was specifically cast in
Confucian terms of the mutual obligations of elder
and younger brother. In practice, thus usually meant a
fairly flexible relationship and considerable autonomy
for the Korean protege. Although the Korean kings
received their authority at the hands of the Chinese
emperor and followed his lead in foreign policy, Korea
largely retained control of its internal affairs. At times,
particularly early in the history of the Korean
monarchy and near its end, when China was weak, ef-
forts were made to assert full independence from
foreign rule, but for the most part Korea had to temper
its course in deference to greater power on its frontiers.
This subservient role was forced on Korea by
geography. In the history of East Asia, the Korean
Peninsula has been a critical crossroads where larger
and stronger powers have seesawed back and forth in
centuries of struggle. The welfare and wishes of the
Koreans, even after they had come to constitute a
relatively sizable nation, were almost invariably ig-
nored. The ambitions and quarrels of its larger
neighbors have thus brought the unhappy peninsula
more than its share of bridgeheads, battlefields, and
buffer states.
Since prehistoric times nomads from Central Asia
have collided with the more settled peoples on the
eastern fringes of the Asian continent and invaded the
Korean peninsula; some even pushed on and crossed
the sea to Japan. Refugees from ancient dynastic
struggles in China escaped to Korea, and were subse-
quently followed by invading Chinese armies. To hold
the northern half of the peninsula, the Chinese planted
a flourishing colony in northwestern Korea which in-
educed the civilization of China to the Koreans and
served as a buffer against the northern barbarians from
approximately 100 B.C. to A.D. 300. From then until
the late 19th century, the rulers of China usually
retained paramount influence in Korea without any
direct presence there. Since early in the Christian era
the Japanese also sought intermittently to exert control
over part or all of the peninsula --on occasion as a
bridgehead and base for operations against China. In
the late 19th century colossal Tsarist Russia came into
the contest in its search for warm -water ports in the Far
East. In two short wars around the turn of the 20th
century Japan defeated both China and Russia, with
hapless Korea as a battleground and the eventual vic-
tim. The peninsula's pivotal position has brought little
but suffering to its people, who have a proverb,
"When whales fight, the shrimp suffers."
In one sense, however, geography has helped the
Koreans by providing clear natural frontiers within
which a remarkably homogeneous population
developed at an early date possessing a strong sense of
separate identity. Deeply entrenched rivers and rough
mountaincus terrain along the peninsula's long
northern base impede easy access from the Asian
mainland. On the other three sides, Korea is separated
from its neighbors by wide stretches of the Yellow and
East China Seas and by the Sea of Japan. Except for
sporadic raids from China and Japan in ancient and
medieval times and a major Japanese invasion in the
late 16th century, the encircling seas remained largely
inviolate until the latter half of the 19th century, when
French, U.S., and Japanese warships penetrated "Her-
mit Kingdom" waters.
Within the well- defined confines of their peninsula
the ancient Koreans developed a distinct and
remarkable uniformity of physique, language, and
culture that clearly sets them apart from their
neighbors. With few resident foreigners and no
minorities, the Koreans, North and South, constitute
perhaps the most homogeneous of the major ethnic
groups possessing independent (if divided) statehood
today. Numbering almost 50 million, the Koreans are
the 13th largest ethnic group in the world today. The
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Korean language, temperament, dress, and cuisine are
distinct and contrast sharply with those of their
neighbors. The proverbial quick temper and volatility
of the Koreans contribute to that rebellious spirit
which has won them the sobriquet, "the Irish of the
East," and has helped preserve their independent
identity in the face of foreign encroachment.
Although mountains and waters clearly demarcate
the peninsula for its inhabitants, these natural features
also produce more than a dozen topographic divisions
in the South alone which make central control and
communication difficult. The South is almost as
mountainous as the North, with the major mountain
chain running along the east coast and sending a spur
southwestward down the middle of the peninsula.
Hilly or mountainous terrain takes up at least three
fourths of the country's area. Offshore South Korea has
more than 600 inhabited islands, serveral of them 60
miles or more at sea; the largest and most important of
all is Cheju -do, a separate province in the East China
Sea.
Despite such geographic diversity �or perhaps
because of its potential threat to political unity
Korean rulers early imposed a remarkable measure
of political and cultural homogeneity. Customs,
behavior, dress, and even folklore have usually
borne the standardized stamp of the capital as
a result of the ruler's policy, which frequently included
regular rotation or exile of court officials to all parts of
the country. The basic belief of the North Asian pop-
ulation, shamanism �still widespread today �was
carefully overlaid with higher religions from China,
first Buddhism and then Confucianism, which were
also used to support centralized control.
Although the systematic introduction of Cop
fucianism as the court philosophy caused some friction
with the vested interests of Buddhism when a new
dynasty took power in the 14th century, it never led to
any serious division of the country. Confucianism
cultivated a uniform pattern of behavior and the sense
of belonging to a homogeneous, if hierarchical, family
of all Koreans. Many Buddhists continued to practice
their faith in peace, as much later a small but rapidly
increasing minority of Christians could, after an initial
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period of fierce official persecution. As in China and
Japan, the people of Korea have been generally
tolerant of all religions except when they appeared to
be linked to the political ambitions of foreign powers.
The Confucian code had the most profound impact
of all the aspects of Chinese civilization borrowed by
Korea. Not only di3 it serve to provide the pattern
governing Korea's relations with China but it also
produced the ethical foundation and the hierarchic
framework for Korean society. Korean etiquette came
to be rigidly molded along Confucian lines, helping to
curb and control the boisterous ebullience and
rebelliousness of the Korean temperament so that in
most circumstances Koreans strove to maintain a staid
sobriety or a patient stoicism. Above all, Confucianism
served to buttress the claims of the state.
The need of a strong, central authority apparently
became manifest very early in Korean history, well
before the adoption of Confucianism. It arose from
centuries of struggle between the small entities which
first contested control of the central and southern parts
of the Peninsula. Such contests soon invited the in-
tervention of outside powers. About the third century
A.D., three clans of triEa! groups, known collectively
as Han, shared control of the tip of the peninsula.
Their name survives today in the official title taken by
South Korea: Taehan Minguk, (Great Han People's
Country). One of these clans had close ties to, and
probably support from, Japan. It was eventually
defeated and incorporated into a kingdom of Silla
built up by its rival to the east. When Japanese in-
fluence shifted to a second kingdom in the southwest,
Silla sought Chinese aid against that kingdom and a
third one to the north. During the three centuries of
this "Three Kingdom Era" it became clear to the
Koreans that their internal rivalries were being ex-
ploited to aggrandize foreign powers, a lesson they
have not yet forgotten. Silla managed to unify most of
the peninsula in the late seventh century with Chinese
aid, and then forced China to withdraw its armies,
allowing Silla to become tributary but autonomous, a
Confucian younger brother.
Silla's success inaugurated a golden age with a
brilliant efflorescence of art and learning under
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Chinese Buddhist influence. All Koreans look back
with pride to this period, particularly the South
Koreans who since 1950 see in the unification of the
peninsula launched from Silla's original "Pusan
perimeter" in the extreme southeast an auspicious
augury for our day.
During the Sill- dynasty (676 =918), Korea was ruled
by kings �and frequently by strong queens� assisted
by a powerful hereditary nobility legitimized by a rigid
system of ranks. The administrative system was
organized mainly on the Chinese model, under which
officials, military and civil, were chosen through
highly rigorous civil service examinations. This system
continued relatively unchanged throughout the two
succeeding dynasties and has had a marked impact op.
Korean society. The Silla dynasty was overthrown in
the 10th century by a general who established the
Kingdom (and dynasty) of Koryo (918 1392), from
which the name Korea is derived. Korea soon came to
occupy much its present overall boundaries and the
peninsula remained united for the next thousand
years. It was not divided again into separate states
until after World War I1. The country, however, was not
spared war and devastation during this long period.
The later Koryo period was truly a time of troubles.
The Mongols, expanding across Eurasia from the
Danube to the Yalu, conquered China and invaded
Korea. Koryo managed to resist for almost 30 years,
but finally capitulated in 1250. Korean kings were
married to Mongoi princesses, and many court ladies
were sent to Peking as hostages or members of the
Mongol Emperor's harem. The Koreans were sub-
jected to great cruelty and hardship, especiLlly when
they were obliged to assist the Mongols in their two
unsuccessful attempts in the late 13th century to in-
vade Japan. The Koreans sustained heavy losses in
men, ships, and supplies when a typhoon (Kamikaze,
the "heavenly wind largely destroyed the Mongol
armadas. The Mongols were diverted from another
attempt on Japan by troubles in Indochina and
elsewhere, but kept their yoke over Korea intact for
nearly another century. Further suffering came to
Korea when Glinese forces, rebelling ag the
Mongols' waning grip, raided across the Yalu, once
more laying waste the north. In addition, throughout
this period, Japanese freebooters, who developed
sea -raids as a way of life, kept up continuing attacks
against the coasts of Korea, even raiding the island
refuge where the Korean kings had long escaped the
Mongols, and burning Hanyang (now Seoul) to the
ground.
The Koryo dynasty did not long outlive the collapse
of Mongol rule in China in 1368. An anti Mongol
Korean general, Yi Song -gye, set up his capital on the
site of Seoul, overthrowing the Koryo king in 1392 and
establishing the Yi dynasty, which reigned until the
Japanese ar:nexed Korea in 1910. The Yi revived th,!
ancient name of Choson for Korea, which is the of-
ficial name used by the North Koreans today. During
the Yi dynasty, Confucianism replaced Buddhism as
the state religion and Confucian political and social
ideals became the national standard. As in China,
ger,d government was regarded as possible only under
a virtuous, paternalistic ruler and his morally and in-
tellectually excellent scholar- officials. As in the two
earlier dynasties, the civil service was recruited on the
Chinese pattern of rigorous competitive examinations.
Successful candidates, known as yanghan, entered
either civil or military service. In theory, as in China,
the examinations were open to all aspirants, but in the
later Koryo and Yi dynasties they became limited in
practice mainly to the affluent, who could afford the
leisure to master the Confucian classics. The term
yanghan came generally to stand for the landed no
bility, and today has become roughly synonymous
with "gentleman."
This small elite group of scholar officials set the
pattern of administrative authoritarianism which has
characterized so much of the Korean political ex-
perience. The claims of a rigid and increasingly sterile
orthodoxy left little room for flexibility or mobility of
any sort. Political struggle took the form of
bureaucratic in- fighting, the most obvious form of the
factionalism which seems to be endemic in all Korean
activities.
Despite Korea's internal and external woes, the very
high level of artistic expression ac'.?_ved during the
Silla dynasty was revived and de. in both the
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Koryo and Yi eras, during which Korea made some
noteworthy contributions to world culture. In
ceramics, Korean artists elaborated on Chinese styles
and techniques, passing them on to Japan, and made
an original contribution to coloring in the blues and
greens of Korea's unique celadon ware. In painting
a similar development took place, with Korean
artists scholars carrying calligraphy in Chinese
characters to a perfection unmatched �and widely ad-
mired�by their Chinese masters. Even where the
Koreans did not add distinct contributions, they
preserved and passed on to the modern age arts which
died out in China, such as the ancient classical court
music. In technology and learning there were also
some remarkable achievements. Along with skill in
metal casting came the use of movable metal type for
printing well before it was known in the West. Shortly
thereafter the Koreans invented a phonetic system of
writing which, hoi -ever, did not come into general use
until modern times because the yangban wished to
preserve their monopoly of learning in the much more
complicated Chinese ideographic script. Despite such
occasional blighting of native Korean innovations by
the overwhelming prestige of Chinese civilization, the
Koreans developed a rich, vigorous, and quite distinct
culture of their own.
In the late 16th and early 1.7th centuries, Korea ex-
perienced renewed foreign invasions. In 1592 the
Japanese launched a full -scale invasion as part of an
ambitious plan to conquer China. The Koreans suf-
fered great reverses and the country was ravaged, but
Chinese aid and the death of the Japanese ruler,
Hideyoshi, saved them. The war produced one of
Korea's great national heroes, Admiral Yi Sun -sin, who
defeated the Japanese fleet in an engagement in which
he used the world's first iron -clad vessel, a tor-
toise- shaped warship. The abortive Japanese invasion
was followed by the successful Manchu conquest of
Korea in 1627 and of China in 1644. Korea was to re-
main a Chinese vassal state under the Manchu dy-
nasty until the end of the 19th century when Russian
and Japanese power displaced Chinese influence.
These great invasions reinforced the Koreans'
long- standing desire to avoid all unnecessary foreign
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contacts. Much earlier their kings had supplemented
Korea's natural barriers by a small version of China's
Great Wall across the peninsula's narrow ncck near the
39th parallel. In the 17th century Korea preceded
Japan in closing its door to foreigners, and it even dis-
couraged commercial activity and the mining of
precious metals to avoid arousing the avarice of foreign
interests. Korea tried to remain the "Hermit
Kingdom" even after Japan was forced to open its door
to the West, but when Japan itself applied Perry's tac-
tics, Korea succumbed and in 1876 signed a treaty
opening Pusan, and subsequently two other ports to
foreign trade. There ensued growing pressure from
Western nations especially from the United States,
France, Russia, and Great Britain �which evoked con-
siderable internal dissension over how much contact
should be allowed, and with whom. Powerful and
bitterly hostile factions aligned themselves either
behind Korea's traditional patron and protector,
China, or one of the ri al neighbors, Russia or Japan.
China hastened to have the Koreans open relations
with other Western powers to offset Japanese
predominance, at the same time seeing that China's
suzerainty over Korea was recognized.
In 1894 an antiforeign rebellion led to Chinese and
Japanese intervention and subsequently to the
Sino- Japanese war. Victorious Japan forced China to
abandon any claim to a special position in Korea.
Conservative, anti Japanese forces within the country
then turned to Russia for support, and helped the
Russians gain concessions for raw materials in northern
Korea. The Russians helped Korea reorganize its
finances and its army and then moved to acquire naval
bases on the southeastern and southwestern corners of
the peninsula. Although the British and Japanese, fear-
ing the establishment of Russian control of the Korea
Strait and the entrance to the Yellow Sea, jointly
blocked the Russian move, Russia continued to pursue
its ambitions. The Japanese ultimately responded by
launching a surprise attack in February 1904 on the
Russian fleet. Engagements were fought off the
Korean coasts and Japan made iull use of Korea as a
base of operations, despite Korea's declaration of
neutrality. After Russia's defeat in 1905, Korea became
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a Japanese protectorate, and in 1910 it was annexed
and became part of the Japanese Empire.
To 20th century Koreans, their country's subjuga-
tion as a colony of Japan seemed the cruelest of the
many blows Korea has suffered. The efforts of all prior
governments to preserve Korean autonomy had failed.
Korea lay supine and subject to harsh Japanese rule.
Nevertheless, something remained of the past heritage
and some gains were made under the Japanese. Japan
did much to modernize Korea, even though this was
done merely to integrate the area into the Japanese
Empire and to make it a strong jumping -off point for
the later Japanese invasions of Manchuria and China
proper. While Korea served primarily as a source of
raw materials for Japan, agriculture and irrigation
were greatly improved, lands reclaimed, and roads,
railroads and harbors were built. A modern infrastruc-
ture was begun, and Japanese rule brought unac-
customed efficiency and a stability that had not been
known in the peninsula for almost a century.
Despite economic gains, heavy- handed Japanese
rule and subordination of Korean interests to those of
Japan produced a chronic discontent that gave birth to
a modern nationalist movement. The high point of this
largely peaceful movement was a massive demonstra-
tion of 1 March 1919 �Samil Day �now a great
national holiday, inspired by Woodrow Wilson's prin-
ciple of national self- determination. It was brutally
repressed, and henceforth opposition to Japanese rule
was largely organized by Korean refugees in the
United States, the Soviet Union, and China. One such
refugee, Dr. Syngrnan Rhee (Yi Sung -man), schooled
both in the Korean classics and at Harvard and
Princeton, became head of a Provisional Korean
Government abroad in 1919. He finally returned to
Korea in 1945 and became the first President of the
Republic of (South) Korea in 1948 under a constitution
establishing a strong presidential form of government.
He seemed a natural choice as Korea's foremost
patriot, being a descendant (distant) of the last reign-
ing family and possessing the proper Confucian
credentials.
Unfortunately for the fate of Korean democracy,
Syngman Rhee fell too easily into the old monarchical
pattern, and after the Korean war he grew increasingly
despotic in advanced age. He was forced to resign in
April 1960 after arbitrary and fraudulent elections had
sparked a nationwide "student revolution" which the
military quieted but refused to quell. A caretaker
government produced a revised constitution for the
"Second Republic" that changed the form of govern-
ment from the presidential to the parliamentary type
and carried 'through the most democratic elections in
ROK history. Under Prime Minister Chang Myon
(John h1. Chang), the experiment in parliamentary
democracy proved short lived. Chang was overturned
in May 1961 by a cabal of "young colonels," and Maj.
Gen. Pak Chong -hui became head of the junta's
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. In 1963
Pak was formally elected President of the "Third
Republic," and South Korea reverted, in theory at
least, to civilian, constitutional government.
9
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Material Modernization: The "Miracle on the Han" (u/ou)
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During the period of Japanese administration, the
Korean economy was developed essentially as a com-
plement to the Japanese economy. A substantial in-
dustrial complex developed in the northern part of the
country based largely on local raw materials and
power, but the southern part remained heavily
agrarian in character and developed only a thin veneer
of small -sca!e industry. The material benefits from
such development, however, were largely monopolized
by the Japanese. In manufacturing, for example, 90%
of the capital and 80% of the skilled labor were
Japanese; very few Koreans acquired any technical or
managerial skills. With Japan's defeat ;n 1945, th
Korean economy virtually collapsed, having alrea
been drained to a very low level in the course of
r
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Japan's long and increasingl desperate war effort;
production fell 75% and 60% of the industrial labor
force was unemployed. The division of the peninsula
at the 38th parallel in 1945 was another great blow
because the South found itself left with the best agri-
cultural land, a surplus of unskilled labor, but little
else. At the birth of the Republic in 1948, the stand
and of living in the country was actually lower than
it had been in prewar days.
Less than 2 years later came the holocaust: all -out
fratricidal war launched across the 38th parallel by the
North Korean Communists, supported with Soviet
material and, shortly thereafter, by massive Chinese
intervention. During the war, nearly 1 million civilians
were killed or wounded, and more than 5
�n r
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million �about one quarter of the population �were
displaced. Property damage was estimated at between
$2 and $3 billion. Following the war, the need to
maintain one of the world's largest armies was far
beyond the economy's capacity. As a result, through
the 1950's the vicious cycle of poverty, inflation, and
overwhelming dependence on U.S. a; -1 other foreign
aid continued. Nevertheless, in several ways, the war
and its results paved the way for solutions to South
Korea's economic and social, if not its political,
problems. Much of the old order was swept away, in
some measure simplifying the social system. The
traditional order was undermined by the weakening of
the hold of the family on its members in the wartime
chaos, by the influence of foreign troops and
technicians, and by war -born urbanization.
Modernization was primarily the result of the crea-
tion of a modern and effective military force and ex-
tensive U.S. aid. The almost overnight build -up of
South Korea's army during the Korean war brought
with it rapid mobilization of the population.
Thousands of farm boys were enlisted and exposed for
the first time to modern organization and technology.
Far beyond this, however, was the appearance of a
huge subsociety �the military organization �some-
thing quite foreign to Korean tradition and general
experience.
k
Prior to liberation in 1945, a small nucleus of Korean
t
officers had been trained by the Japanese in Japan or
Manchuria. A few others were trained in China or
Russia and were engaged largely in guerrilla -type
t
operations against the Japanese in Korea. During
1946 -48, the U.S. forces in South Korea organized and
trained a small constabulary from a variety of such
s
elements. Its leaders were mostly bitter rivals beca.se
of the factionalism generated by their diverse
y:
backgrounds and experience. Following the establish-
ment of the republic, this constabulary was converted
Y
with U.S. assistance into an army that had reached
nearly 100,000 men by the outbreak of the Korean
war. During the war, the army was expanded almost
f
seven fold; the ROK Army today has over 500,000 men
'i
and is the fifth largest in the world.
U.S. military assistance has helped to make the
ROK military forces by far the most modern entity in
South Korea, possessed of technological and
managerial skills still scarce in the society at large. The
army replaced President Syngman Rhee's ubiquitous
police as the dominant force in the land. It possesses a
very different outlook and morale, having been ex-
posed to concepts of national ideals and goals far above
the limited loyalties of the police. Training in the
United States, particularly of some of the senior of-
ficers of the postwar crop, has helped develop
managerial skills of great potential value for South
Korea's economy.
The cutting edge of this new force in Korean society
is the officer class, both commissioned and noncom-
missioned. This class has come to constitute a social
group rivaling in numbers the traditionally prestigious
teaching profession., which has maintained its wonted
precedence by also expanding rapidly, having presided
over the educational explosion that has occurred since
1945. Both groups have their followers: the officers
with their men; the teachers and intellectuals with
great hordes of students, concentrated primarily in the
capital where so many new educational institutions
have sprung up. Loeb groups are far more modern in
their outlook� though in different ways �than the
society around them, and both became increasingly
impatient with the stagnation an4 corruption during
the 1950's under the Rhee regi In sequence, they
engineered a major generational change that brought
Rhee's regime down and subsequently established a
very different order.
Determined young officers saw economic develop-
ment as a way both to end Korea's crushing poverty
and its humiliating dependence upon the United
States. A military voup was briefly forestalled by the
student revolution, whose democratic leaders appeared
to share the young officers' ideals, though not their
authoritarian methods. When delay and indecision on
the part of the hitherto untried and little understood
democracy as established by Prime Minister Chang
Myon seemed to offer little hope for the economic
reforms that the young military officers wanted at
once, they seized power in May 1961 and set up the
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Supreme Council for National Reconstruction
(SCNR), which thereupon undertook a milita,,�led
modernization of the whole country.
General Pak Chong -hui, one of the few older officers
associated w ;ih the 1961 coup, headed the SCNR. He
was elected President in 1963, when the government
was "eivilianized" under a revised constitution that
returned government to the strong presidential type of
Rhee's time. The constitution was further amended in
1969 and 1972 to give Pak even greater leeway. Presi-
dent Pak is a peasant's son whose military career was
boosted by the prestigious prewar officer training he
had undergone in Japan. His twin goals for Korea
reflect his background as a peasant and as an officer:
agricultural improvement and technological advance-
ment. He is a good example of the modern, scien-
tifically trained officer who nevertheless retains a deep
bias against urban life and politicians. Democratic
political values have been subordinated to economic
considerations under Pak, as under the Japanese. In
fact, in many ways Pak's Korea is reminiscent of the
bureaucratic, economy- oriented, militarily efficient,
depoliticized, and rigidly anti communist regime un-
der Japan. The great difference of course is that it is a
strongly nationalistic government of, by, and for
Koreans.
In any case, the Pak regime has reaped remarkable
economic results. Under a series of 5 -yoar plans,
natural resources and manpower have been mobilized
to achieve economic modernization. Although the Pak
government has resorted to centralized planning,
governmental direction and support, and even out-
right public ownership and operation, it has eschewed
any reference to socialism and describes the country as
a "capitalist showcase." By and large, the government
has not been coercive and has carried out its economic
plans pragmatically and with deft flexibility. The
South Koreans like to look to West Germany as an ex-
ample of the successful survival of a divided country;
they point with pride to their own "M;i on the
Han." (The Han River is the "Korean Rhine" and the
nation's main inland waterway.)
South Korea achieved an economic breakthrough in
the mid- 1960's which has basically altered the
12
1;Imc.'r l .�:.....,_r,-- W
economy. Sparked by an expansion of manufacturing,
which about doubled its contribution to the gross
national product (GNP) between 1961 and 1971, the
real GNP grew at the extraordinarily high average rate
of about 10% annually. During the decade, per capita
GNP rose from $100 to over $250. The government has
already set a goal to achieve a per capita GNP of
$1,000 by 1980; even half that in real terms would be a
great jump. During the 1960's living standards im-
proved, particularly in the cities. In the process, South
Korea is becoming more urban than some of the in-
dustrialized countries of Europe; it is moving out of
the less developed category and may be considered a
semideveloped country. In late 1972 the Director of
the Economic Planning Board foresaw South Korea
achieving a self- supporting economy in the 1980's.
In the meantime, however, South Korea remains
heavily dependent on its ability to continue to reduce
imports and expand exports, and on continued in-
fusions of foreign capital, including aid as well as in-
vestment. In these respects, Seoul depends heavily on
economic relations with the United States and Japan.
These two countries account for about 70% of ROK ex-
ports, 67% of its imports, 90% of foreign private invest-
ment, and the bulk of official economic aid.
The most immediate economic problems facing the
Pak regime include inflation, a lagging agricultural
sector, inadequate housing and other largely urban ills,
and the growing inequality of incomes making for
large, depressed sectors of the population. Basic ser-
vices are still unavailable to many, particularly in the
urban slums. Poor sanitation, industrial pollution, and
a high incidence of disease and delinquency plague
many Korean poor and detract from the success of in-
dustrial progress. The Pak government, concerned with
a population growth rate of nearly 3% between 1955
and 1965, has succeeders in cutting it down to about
2 primarily through birth control measures. Abor-
tion has recently been legalized and the government's
goal is to reduce the rate of growth to 1% by 1981.
Social welfare is still largely in private hands, though
the regime has talked about moving in a comprehen-
sive way to meet the crying need for action in this
field.
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"Spiritual" Modernization (u/ou)
The group of junior officers who brought Pak
Chong -hui to power in 1961 had no political program
other than to weed out corruption and accelerate
economic modernization. They claimed they were
only carrying through the unfinished business of the
student revolution of the previous year to save Korean
democracy from corrupt, inefficient, older generation
politicians. However, they felt the need for an ideology
more attuned to the modern world but compatible
with the Confucian heritage, with which Pak and most
of his associates are still deeply imbued. They sought
some systematic guide to action which would at least
popularize their economic goals and help mobilize
public support. Because of passions aroused by the
Korean war, anticommunism was a cardinal tenet for
the military �as it was for most older Koreans.
Nevertheless, anticommunism had been so abusively
exploited by President Rhee that it could no longer
have the vigor of a fresh appeal and could not arouse
the fervor that the colonels required in order to rally
popular support.
Democracy as an ideology also had drawbacks for
the military. Rhee had consistently abused presidential
powers, and his successor, Chang Myon, had been too
indecisive and his supporters too beset by factionalism
to win any wide support for his own hopeful
democratic experiment. Nevertheless, Pak recognized
the strong attachment to the democratic ideal of most
articulate Koreans, as demonstrated by the students
and intellectuals during the upheaval in 1960. He has
professed his adherence to democratic principles but
also has warned against a democracy "imported lock,
stock, and barrel" from the United States, recom-
mending instead a "Koreanized form of welfare
democracy." Even today the Pak regime preserves the
forms of constitutional democracy, however far it has
departed from its spirit.
Because Korea has been subjected to such sweeping,
kaleidoscopic changes in the space of just one genera-
tion, there are insistent demands for a new spiritual
identity. Both the student revolution and the military
coup were carried out by representatives of a younger,
very different postwar generation. Its members had
been more exposed to modern education and a variety
of new influences and sources of information. They
were the first generation to be broadly educated in the
native script, Hangul, a truly more national means of
self- expression than the Chinese writing system for-
merly prescribed. Thanks to the easier, popular script
and the "educational explosion" of the postwar era,
literacy has jumped from about 21 in 1945 to 88% in
1970. Literacy is no longer the privilege of a small, ex-
clusive elite; its spread ended the elite's monopoly of
power, weakened the authority of the family and of
class distinctions, and brought rural areas into touch
with the modern city and its life. Combined with the
impact of the war -born urbanization, postwar educa-
13
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Proliferating universities are attended by nearly
200,000 students� including 50,000 coeds almost
a 2,000% increase since the end of World War II

1
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tion developed a new, widespread consciousness of
social and political affairs which could not be ignored.
At the same time, it was becoming clear that Korea
would remain divided for some time to come. Rhee's
strident calls for a "March North" were quietly
dropped and a new national identity for the South
was becoming acceptable. The government has
sought to snake this meaningful by stressing
that reunification �still the cherished goal of all
Koreans �would become possible through diligence
and discipline, and by building up South Korea's
economy until it left the North far behind in any kind
of competition.
The emphasis on the program of economic develop-
ment and modernization has lent a certain elan to the
government's efforts, but it also has tended to obscure
some of Pak's more arbitrary acts that contravene con-
stitutional procedures and civil liberties. Yet something
more than the dramatic success of the economic
development program was needed. Nationalistic ex-
hortations voiced in a suprapatriotic vein have
reappeared and remain a perennial theme, but with
diminishing effect. Memories of the Korean war are
fading, particularly among the young, who might
recall at most the discredited Rhee's abuse of the
national defense theme. Shortly after they seized
power in 1961, the military leaders promptly called for
"spiritual" as well as economic modernization, incor-
porating these goals in an ambitious, if short lived,
National Reconstruction Movement that stressed
austerity, diligence, and "national morality." After
that particular program was phased out, President Pak
elaborated a "National Renaissance: Social
Reconstruction and the Remaking of Man" in Korea.
He called for new ethics, stressing the deficiencies of
his people in the pioneering or entrepreneurial spirit
and in a sense of national honor.
A man of grim and austere mien, Pak has always dis-
played the pttritarical streak that was characteristic of
the young colonels who ha4 organized the coup. Their
suspicion of "corrupt politicians and capitalists" is
reminiscent of attitudes held by young officers in
prewar Japan, whose influence Pak undoubtedly felt
in his formative years. Despite his interest in economic
14
modernization, Pak has a distrust of Western beliefs; at
the time of the coup he had had less contact with
Americans that most senior officers. He disparages
Western liberalism and "Americanizing" influences,
and the "Revitalizing Reforms" he has enacted since
late 1972 include a reduction in the hours of English
taught in the schools and the introduction of "national
education" in Korean ethics and history. Western
terms are to be replaced on shop signs and Western
"pop" songs discouraged.
Ever since its earliest days, the present regime has
made periodic efforts to "clean up" the cities, whose
"debilitating" influence Pak deeply distrusts. Hun-
dreds of hoodlums, petty criminals, and prostitutes
have been apprehended and removed from the capital
for varying periods of rustication. Shortly after the
coup, coffee- drinking and nightclub dancing were
banned for a time, and more recently, legislation has
been directed against "decadent tendencies" such as
miniskirts, long hair, and the like. To discourage the
drift to cities and keep Koreans "down on the farm" a
broad new program has been enacted to make the tax
burden much less onerous for rural and small town in-
habitants and to improve living conditions there.
Despite his evident dislike of foreign influences :nd
the effects of urbanization, Pak likes to think of
himself as playing a modernizing and westernizing role
like that of Peter the Great of Russia, the Meiji
emperor of Japan, or Ataturk of Turkey. His recent
reforms, like the early National Reconstruction Move-
ment, combine ethical exhortations with broad
economic measures and call for a balance between the
spiritual and the material, the East and the West.
Some of the "Revitalizing Reforms" enforce Confu-
cian strictures while others �more sumptuary in in-
tent� curtail the practice of deeply engrained Confu-
cian rites. In May 1973, "Mothers Day" was con-
verted to "Parents' Day" to stress filial piety and
respect for the aged. On the other hand, the new law
on Family Ritual interferes with the traditionally strict
observance of matrimonial and funeral ceremonies.
June brides were scarce in 1973 as many couples
rushed to the altar in May to beat the deadline
that restricts expenditures on wedding cerPmonies.
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Such interference with the age -old traditions that
are deeply held are part of the social engineering that
Pak feels his people need. Although government
spokesmen occasionally justify the reforms as being
designed only at making the Koreans a more disci-
plined people, they also serve both to expand and
demonstrate the regime's power and control. These
features are evident in the accelerating Sae Maul Un-
dong (New Community Movement), which now in-
cludes urban as well as rural restructuring. The Prime
Minister recently hailed it as a program for improving
"social discipline and revitalizing the virtues of
Some Confucian customs are re-
ceiving new stress, such as en-
couraging children to bow to
their elders on New Year's Day
diligence, self -help, and cooperation." It is too early to
tell how much progress has been made in these direc-
tions. Corruption, for instance, still appears in high
political quarters. Nevertheless, Pak's ability to subject
so many aspects of Korean life to his reforms clearly
buttresses his political control. In the dozen years he
has dominated Korea, Pak has been concerned fun-
damentally with reviving some modern approximation
of the old Confucian order that was the fabric of
Korean life and the means whereby Korean rulers
through the centuries presided over public mores and
maintained highly centralized power.
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"Revitalization" or Retrogression in Politics? (c)
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President Pak, a peasant's son, keeps in touch with his "riceroots" by
leading off in paddy planting on the anniversary of the 1961 coup
The revival_ of past patterns is perhaps clearest in
Pak's approach to political "renovation." His style
combines some modern political methods and forms
with the age -old tradition of authoritarian rule. The
President's autocratic proclivities, however, finally
became painfully clear in 1972. In late 1971 he had
and the arrest or harassment of those who might ob-
ject. He justified these actions on the grounds that they
were needed if he was to engage in a successful dialog
with the North over the issue of Korean reunification.
Pak's move was no spur -of- the moment improvisa-
tion. it had been long prepared in secret, though the
proclaimed a state of national emergency, partly to precise timing was perhaps fortuitous. As early as
j prepare the country for talks with the North. Then in November 1969, Pak proclaimed in a major speech
October 1972 came his sweeping "Revitalhiing that the 1970's would be a "decade of national
Reforms," along with martial law, rigid censorship, revitalization." Moreover, the October reforms merely
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complete the process of concentrating power in the
President's hands, begun when Pak first assumed that
office in 1963. In fact, the term "revitalization" sub-
sumes all the goals of the original coup. In mid -May
1973, on the twelfth anniversary of the coup and the
eve of the first session of the newly emasculated, hand-
picked National Assembly, Pak stated that the spirit of
the "Revitalizing Reforms" was "identical with the
spiritual basis of the Military Revolution."
The early efforts at "spiritual mobilization" had
been undertaken partly to prepare the way for the
revolution in political life which some of the coup
plotters had envisioned. In part, they also served as a
substitute for the long -range political program that the
military leaders were hardly prepared to provide.
These leaders had no ready -made panacea beyond
their strong commitment to economic development,
and Pak has even yet to develop any systematic
program of political organization or ideology. He has,
rather, effectively improvised and gradually gathered
ali the threads of power into his own hands.
No direct attack has been mounted on the concept
of popular, democratic government, and a facade of
constitutional forms has been maintained. Despite the
abuses of democratic forms under President Syngman
Rhee, wid the subsequent failure of Korea's closest ap-
proach to democracy under Rhee': immediate
successor, the ideal of democratic government is not
discreaited. Korea's history and political experience,
however, provide a poor base :or nurturing democracy.
The strong paternalistic and authoritarian traditions of
Korean governments, continued by the Japanese and
to a remarkable degree by Rhee, inculcated a
master servant relationship between people and
government. There has been little or no opportunity
for political parties or even interest groups to mature
and compromise. Neither has there been any sizable
middle class with the interest, training, and opportu-
nity to participate in public affairs.
The "cold war" confrontation between the United
States and the U.S.S.R., and the lingering affects of the
Korean war played into the hands of the rightwing ex-
tremists, whose whole stock -in -trade was anticom-
munism. Even moderate opposition parties were
proscribed before they had any chance to leaven the
political process. The government of Prime Minister
Chang Myon was fatally handicapped by the barren
conservatism and bitter factional bickering among the
only political survivors of Rhee's practice of divide,
destroy, and rule. The concept of a golden mean, or a
middle -of- the -road approach, is totally missing in
Korea.
Because the military leaders had no systematic
ideology to substitute for democracy, they looked
abroad to militarily -based regimes elsewhere in Asia.
The plotting Im the 1961 coup began shortly after
army takeovers in Burma and Pakistan. After the coup,
study missions were dispatched there, as well as to
South Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan. The example
of Chiang Kai- shek's party, the Kuomintang, in par-
ticular, influenced the thinking of the junta leaders.
Again, the recent "Revitalizing Reforms" followed
hard on similar trends in Thailand and the Philippines.
Whatever Pak may have imported from abroad,
however, his style is closest to Korean tradition. His
"administrative democracy" is little more than the ad-
ministrative authoritarianism of the past, plus modern
methods and efficient; There is precious little room
for any expression of public opinion through political
parties, the legislature, or the media, and little regard
for the concept of an independent judiciary and the
protection of individual freedoms. What the military
has managed to exploit successi'ully, however, is the
energy and modern training of a younger generation
free of the trammels of tradition. The youthful military
leaders were quick to enlist the force and enthusiasm of
the new pastwar generation released in the 1960 stu-
dent revolution but not effectively channeled by the
Chang Myon regime. In his first years of power, Pak
coopted the almost puritanical zeal for reform of his
youthful cohorts. The old, Japanese trained
bureaucracy was replaced by younger, much more
broadly educated recruits to provide a more effective,
"revitalized" civil service.
Nevertheless, in the early days following the coup its
leaders were so eager to get an economic program mov-
ing that many older, less motivated types were also
accepted. In time, the more enthusiastic young
17
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reformers no longer set the tone. This trend was rein-
forced by the move to restore civilian government in
1963. Senior officers, donning mufti, managed to get
the lion's share of important posts, largely due to their
more extensive administrative experience. The zealous
young colonels who had occupied the top posts in the
SCNR lost out in the shuffle and this reFulted in a
general change of tone under the present "Third
Republic."
This did not mean, however, that political reform
was dead, but only that Pak was working with
somewhat different means in the same general direc-
tion. The military leaders generally had been highly
reluctant to honor their original pledge to restore a
constitutional form of government, and did so only in
response to a variety of pressures. U.S. prodding was
perhaps the most important inasmuch as they were
well aware of their dependence upon U.S. goodwill. A
significant factor, too, was that there was still strong
attachment to the principle of democracy despite the
weakness of political parties. At least equally impor-
tant, however, was division and mutual suspicion
among the military leaders. Their infighting, com-
bined with cases of ineptitude, left some room for
democratic opinion to put pressure on Pak to restore
civil government.
The dropping of the more radical junior officers
from administrative posts of importance and the con-
cession to civilian participation under a constitutional
framework did not prevent the gradual growth after
1963 of the role of former military men in Pak's
government. Even more significant, however, has been
the growth of executive power concentrated in-
creasingly in Pak's own hands. Particularly since
1968 -69, when Pak pushed through a constitutional
amendment enabling him to run for a third term, he
has steadily increased his powers, most spectacularly
since October 1972. Under the October reforms, the
way is paved for Pak's lifetime presidency even more
clearly than it was for Rhee in the mid- 1950's.
This situation merely postpones the succession
problem. The only constitutional succession that
Korea has experienced was hardly a normal transition.
President Rhee's forced resignation in April 1960 was
18
followed by drastic revision of the constitution in June
and elections in August. The election victor, Chang
Myon, became Prime Minister, but he was ig-
nominously turned out of office less than 9 months
later by the military. Rhee had persistently eliminated
any potentially strong successor as a threat to his
power, and Pak appears to be pursuing his example
here, too. He has played off the military factions
against each other, and by occasional rustication
abroad has kept his nephew -in -law, Kim Chong -p'il,
first head of the South Korean Central Intelligence
Agency and now Prime Minister, from becoming too
powerful. The chief architect of the coup, Kim had
quietly organized a sort of Trojan -horse Democratic
Republican Party (DRP), which won Pak his first term,
having had a head start when parties were permitted
to reappear in 1963.
Suspicious of politics, Pak has kept all political par-
ties, including the government's own DRP, from
becoming strong forces which might support a
challenge to his position. The DRP has helped to
preserve the facade of democratic government, but its
job has been purely electoral. Pak now calls for parties
"on the American pattern� active only on the eve of
an election," as he has put it. In fact, their role has
beep rigidly curtailed under the 1972 -73 reforms. The
DRP is confined largely to propaganda peddling and
training youthful supporters.
Pak's curbing of the DRP is in keeping with his
careful control over all his former comrades -in -arms
occupying positions of power. The military constitute
the only force which could conceivably mount a
successful threat to his authority under present con-
ditions, and many ex- officers are well entrenched in of-
fice. Some of them have also built up private fortunes
through bribery and corruption, thus flouting Pak's
strictures. Officers on active duty are still prone to
Korea's endemic factionalism. In early 1973 Pak cracked
down by arresting one of his oldest associates, the
commander of the Capital Security Command, who
had been building up his own personal following and
had broached the idea of expanding the military's role
in running the nation by having it supplant the ex-
isting civilian political organizations. In Pak's reaction
i
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there was little solicitude for the principle of civilian
participation; his primary motive was doubtless to
protect his own power from any possible threat and to
demonstrate that he would tolerate suspicious activity
by no one.
"Korean democracy" remains the name of the
game. In reporting state policies at the opening of the
new National Assembly in May 1973, Prime Minister
Kim Chong -p'il announced that the ROK "had
succeeded in surmounting the superficial imitation of
J
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1
Western -style democracy we have established our
own democracy in accord with our traditions and
history." This "revitalization" has, however, reduced
the role of the parties and the legislature and curbed
civil liberties to the point where domestic critics,
primarily the intellectual and Christian communities,
privately maintain that South Korea can no longer
claim to be the "frontier of freedom," but instead is
becoming a mirror image of the totalitarian regime in
the North.
19
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A House Stands Divided (c)
:r
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The rationale for Pak's assumption of autocratic
powers in 1972 was the newly- opened dialog with
Pyongyang. Whereas alarm at student demands for
direct talks with North Korea had provided the im-
mediate occasion for the coup in 1961, a decade later
Pak had come to feel that the changed international
situation required Seoul to take some initiative on the
basic issue of Korean reunification. His first feeler was
the August 1971 proposal for talks between the South
h and North Korean Red Cross societies, which led to
t; secret high -level political talks that were not made
public until 4 July 1972. These talks continue with
20
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considerable caution and hesitation by both sides, but
are kept alive by mutual self- interest and world trends,
as well as by the fundamental longing of all Koreans
for their historic unity.
National unity remains the ultimate goal. As a
natural geographic and economic entity which ages
ago produced a unique ethnic homogeneity, Korea
was the least divisible of the postwar divided countries.
The Korean people are ever mindful of their
1,000- year -old history as a unified nation, contrasting,
for example, with the long separatist history of the Ger-
manies. Today, though they have been separated for a
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First session in Seoul of the North -South Red Cross talks; South Korean delegation
on right

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generation, all Koreans remain deeply motivated by
the underlying desire for unity.
The problem of reunification has figured large in all
postwar Korean governments, but it remained for the
Pak regime specifically to replace Syngman Rhee's stri-
dent demand for a military "March North" with the
present call for" peaceful competition for reunification
of the fatherland." Seoul's 5 -yezr plans have been
dedicated to building up the South's economic
strength so that it might become a "magnet" for the
people of North Korea. Pak's recent reforms and con-
stitutional revision specifically prescribe ad infinitum
the fundamental goal of a universal effort to achieve
national unity.
Following the Korean war, Seoul's official formula
for Korean unification remained U.N.- supervised elec-
tions throughout the peninsula, a formula which
P'yongyang has always rejected. North Korea has
always refused to recognize any role for the United
Nations in Korea. The development of an East -West
detente and growing doubts about the permanence of
a U.S. role in the ROK's defense largely determined
Pak's decision to open the dialog with the North.
Security conditions remain vital. Rhee had refused to
sign the 1953 truce agreement ending the Korean war,
thus leaving the two Koreas still officially at war, and
huge opposing forces still stand constantly alert all
along the Demilitarized Zone. Pyongyang has ceased
its efforts to foment revolution in the South by infiltra-
tion and guerrilla raids, and Pak apparently desires to
use the present dialog to involve Pyongyang in a
relationship that may preclude further hostilities.
Finally, in light of Korea's tragic history, both North
and South have a common interest in solving their
problems without foreign intervention.
Thus far, the talks have served to reduce tensions
between the two Koreas, but at the same time they
have shown each side hov little it can influence the
other. It is clear that there is little prospect of unifica-
tioc: in the foreseeable future, but there may be steps
toward some humanitarian, cultural, or economic ac-
commodation, as Seoul has proposed. Pyongyang
professes to desire more far reaching steps, particularly
in the field of disarmament, but Seoul is certainly un-
likely to concur in the North's demands for the
withdrawal of U.S. troops. Seoul's anxieties stem from
a long- standing senb, of inferiority vis -a -vis the North.
It wishes to postpone indefinitely the departure of
American forces and to continue the U.S. supported
modernization of its own. It will resist the dissolution
of the U.N. Command, though it has now acquiesced
in the termination of the United Nation's politi-
cal role in Korea, represented by the U.N. Com-
mission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea (UNCURK), which actually has been moribund
for some time. Since P'yongyang's recent successes in
following the ROK's example of winning greater inter-
national recognition and respectability, Seoul has
given up its rigid diplomatic refusal to be represented
in any country or international organization where
Pyongyang is present. Its new flexibility now extends
to recognition, not of the North Korean regime, but at
least of the de facto existence of two Koreas. This ma-
jor policy switch, announced in June 1973, tacitly
recognizes that the peninsula will remain divided for
the foreseeable future. North Korea's President,
Marshall Kim Il -song, so far rejects President Pak's
proposal for dual representation in the United Nations
as perpetuating the division of Korea, and calls for a
"Confederal State of Koryo," named after the first
Korean dynasty, to unify the entire peninsula.
However, Kim has accepted observer status at the
United Nations.
Pak's use of the unification issue to justify imposi-
tion of the most restrictive political controls the South
has known since 1963 has its rationale in the fear that
the talks with a seemingly less hostile North may
weaken his people's resolve to keep up their guard. On
the other hand, should it become apparent that the
talks are getting nowhere, the Southerners' restiveness
with these onerous controls might reintroduce the in-
stability that delayed all progress under preceding
regimes.
21
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Chronology Wou)
1910
August
Korea is formally annexed by Japan, ending 500 -year rule of
Yi dynasty.
1943
December
China, the United Kingdom, and the United States assert in
Cairo that "in due course Korea shall become free and
independent."
1945
August
U.S.S.R. enters war against Japan. Allies order Japanese in
Korea to surrender to Soviet forces north of 38th parallel and
to U.S. forces south of it.
December
The United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States
agree at Moscow on "reestablishment of Korea as an inde-
pendent state" following a period of trusteeship by the
United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and China;
China subsequently concurs.
1946
March
U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission is established to assist in
forming a provisional Korean government; discussions lead
to deadlock on major problems.
1948
May
U.N. supervised elections are held in South Korea but
rejected by Communists in North Korea.
August
Republic of Korea is established in the south, with 5yngman
Rhee (Yi Sung -man) as first President.
September
Democratic People's Republic of Korea is established in the
north, with Kim II -song as Premier.
December
U.N. General Assembly declares the Republic of Korea the
legitimate government in South Korea.
Soviet troops are evacuated from North Korea.
1949
June
All U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea except for a
small military training mission.
22
1950
Jane
North Korean forces invade South Korea.
October
U.N. forces cross 38th parallel in pursuit of North Korean
forces; Chinese Communist forces intervene.
1953
July
Armistice agreement between U.N. Command and North
Korean Chinese Communist side signed at P'anmunjom.
October
United States -Korea Mutual Defense Treaty is signed.
1954
April �May
"Geneva principles," as basis for settlement of overall
Korean question, formulated at Geneva Conference on Korea.
1956
May
Rhee reelected President for third term, but opposition leader
Chang Myon (John M. Chang) defeats Rhee's running mate
for vice presidency.
1960
March
President Rhee and Liberal Party gain sweeping victory by
rigging elections.
Apri'.
Student demonstrations in Seoul against election rigging lead
to violence and declaration 4 martial law; Rhee resigns and
Foreign Minister Ho Chong becomes acting president.
June
National Assembly passes constitutional amendment adopt-
ing parliamentary form of government.
August
Yun Po-son becomes President and Chang Myon becomes
Prime Minister of Second Republic, following Democratic
Party victory in general elections.
1961
May
Military junta led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong -hui and Col. Kim
Chong -p'il seizes government in bloodless coup.
June
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction assumes all
executive and legislative power.
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1962
December
Major constitutional changes ratified in national referendum.
1963
October
General Pak wins narrow victor- over former President Yun
Po -son in presidential elections.
December
General Pak inaugurated as President of Third Republic.
1965
January
National Assembly votes to send noncombat troops to South
Vietnam.
August
National Assembly approves dispatch of first combat troops
to South Vietnam.
August� December
South Korea -Japan normalization accords ratified and in-
struments of ratification exchanged.
1966
March
National Assembly approves dispatch of additional combat
troops to South Vietnam.
1967
February
Korea -U.S. Status of Forces Agreement enters into force.
May
Pak Chong -hui is reelected for second term as President.
1968
January
31 -man North Korean commando squad tries to seize Blue
House (presidential mansion) in Seoul.
1969
October
Constitutional change to permit presidential third term
ratified in national referendum.
1971
April
Pak Chong -hui wins third term in close election by defeating
Kim Tae -chung of the New Democratic Party.
August
Seoul proposes talks between North and South Korean Red
Cross societies for purpose of reuniting families separated by
the Korean war.
1971
September
Informal talks between Red Cross societies start.
December
President Pak declares state of national emergency to tighten
controls on the population in conjunction with the North
South talks.
1972
August
Formal Red Cross talks between North and South Korea
begin.
October
President Pak declares martial law and abrogates constitu-
tion preparatory to making major government changes.
November
Constitution rewritten to give the President sweeping new
powers.
December
Pak Chong -hui elected to extended 6 -year term.
1973
March
Withdrawal of South Korean forces from South Vietnam
completed.
23
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Area Brief (u/ou)
LAND:
Size: 38,000 sq. mi.
Use: 23% arable, 10% urban and other, 67% forested
Land boundaries: 150 miles
WATER:
Limit of territorial waters (claimed): 20 -200 n. mi.
Coastline: 1,500 mi. (excluding offshore islands)
PEOPLE:
Population: 32,377,000 (mid -1973)
Ethnic divisions: Homogeneous; small Chinese minority
(approx. 20,000)
Religion: Strong Confucian and Buddhist tradition; pervasive
folk religion (Shamanism); vigorous Christian minority (13%
of the population); Chondokyo (religion of the heavenly way),
eclectic religion with nationalist overtones founded in 19th
century, estimated 718,000 members (1972)
Language: Korean
Labor force: 10.2 million (1971); agriculture, fishing, forestry,
48.5 manufacturing and mining, 14.2 transportation
and communication, 3.6 construction, 3.4 commerce
and other services, 30.3%
Organized labor: About 10% of nonagricultural labor force
GOVERNMENT:
Legal name: Republic of Korea
Type: Republic; power centralized in a strong executive
Capital: Seoul
Political subdivisions: 9 provinces, 2 special cities; heads
centrally appointed
Legal system: Combines elements of continental European
civil law systems, Anglo- American law, and Chinese classical
thought; constitution approved late 1972; has not accepted
compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Branches: Executive, legislative (unicameral), judiciary,
National Conference for Unification (NCU)
Government leaders: President Pak Chong -hui; Prime
Minister Kim Chong -p'il
Suffrage: Universal over age 20
Elections: Presidential every 6 years indirectly by the NCU;
last election December 1972. Two thirds of the 219- member
National Assembly is elected directly for the same period
within 6 months of the presidential election, remaining one
third nominated by the President and elected by the NCU
for a 3 -year term. Last election February 1973: Revitalization
Group, 73 seats; Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 73
seats; New Democratic Party (NDP), 52 seats; Democratic
Unification Party, 2 seats; Independents, 19 seats
24
Political parties and leaders: Revitalization Group (ap-
pointed), chairman Pak Tu -chin; Democratic Republican
Party (DRP), acting chairman Yi Hyo -sang; New Demo-
cratic Party (NDP), chairman Yu Chin -san; Democratic
Unification Party (DUP), chairman Yong II -tong
Voting strength: Popular vote in December 1972 election,
11,196,484; DRP 38.8 NDP 32.8 DUP 10.2 Inde-
pendents 18.1%, Invalid 0.1%
Communists: Communist activity banned by government
Other political or pressure groups: Federation of Korean
Trade Unions (FKTU); Korean Veterans' Association; large
potentially volatile student population concentrated in Seoul
Member of: ADB, Colombo Plan, ECAFE, FAO, GATT,
Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims,
IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, IHB, IMCO, IMF,
INTELSAT, Inter Parliamentary Union, INTERPOL,
ITU, UNESCO, U.N. Special Fund, UPU, WHO, WMO,
World Anti- Communist League (WACL); does not hold
U.N. membership
ECONOMY:
GNP: US$9.7 billion (1972 current prices); per capita GNP
$300 (1972)
Food: Not self- sufficient in foodgrains; grain imports reached
2.92 million tons in 1972
Electric power: Production 11.8 billion kw.-hr. (1972) or
370 kw.-hr. per capita; installed capacity 3,871,000 kw.
!972)
Major industries: Textiles and clothing, food processing,
plywood, coal mining, fishing, cement, chemicals, and chemi-
cal fertilizers
Exports: $1.6 billion (f.o.b., 1972); textiles and clothing;
veneer and plywood; wigs; electrical equipment, fish, and
raw silk
Imports: $2.5 billion (c.i.f., 1972); machinery and transport
equipment; foodgrains; chemicals; wood, petroleum, textiles,
and iron and steel
Major trade partners (1972): Exports �U.S. 47 Japan
25 imports �U.S. 26 Japan 41%
Exchange rate: Bank of Korea average annual exchange
rate: 393 won per US$1 (1972); rate fixed at 400 won per
US$1 at the end of 1972
Fiscal year: Same as calendar year
COMMUNICATIONS:
Railroads: 1,987 route miles: 1,910 miles 4 gage (325 miles
double tracked); 77 miles 2 (narrow) gage; all government
owned
Highways: About 25,650 miles: 1,845 miles concrete or
bituminous surfaced (including bituminous surface treat-
ment), 18,610 miles gravel, crushed stone, or stabilized soil,
3,200 miles improved earth roads; 1,995 miles unimproved
earth roads
.�..rte�- yw: eia: ttlA: .'Ci'fA3S$,uG>< "L't::. -wkt:
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CONFInF N,r[AL
Inland waterways: About 1,000 miles navigable; for most part
use restricted to small native emit
Pipelines: 278 miles refined products
Ports: 10 major and 18 miner
Merchant marine: 126 ships 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling
934,323 g.r.t. or 1,543,053 d.w.t.; includes 81 dry cargo, 24
tankers, 12 bulk cargo, 2 combination passenger- cargo, 5
specialized carriers (October 1972)
Civil air: 19 major transports; 8 additional transports are
leased by the Korean Air Lines
i
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Airfields: 262 total, 126 usable; 50 have permanent- surfaced
runways; 11 with runways 8,000- 11,999 ft., 17 have runways
4,000 -7,999 ft., 2 seaplane stations
Telecommunications: Domestic and international services
satisfy country requirements; about 748,474 telephones;
about 3.8 million radio receivers, 1.9 million wired- broadcast
speal rs, I million TV receivers; 67 (ROK), 17 (U.S. Armed
Forces) AM stations; 6 (ROK), 3 (U.S. Armed Forces) FM
stations; 12 (ROK), 7 (U.S. Armed Forces) TV stations; 1
submarine cable (not in operation); 2 tropuscatter -links to
Japan; 1 ROK International Satellite station, and 1 U.S.
Armed Forces transportable satellite terminal for inter-
national military communications
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Places and features referred to in this General Survey (ulou)
an
1
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COOn DIYATF.S
COORDINATES
IN
'h'.
o
'N. 'F..
36 34
128 44
Osan
37 09 127 0-1
Andong
36 4
1'2U 14
Paen'n 6n do NI
6 Y B
37 07 124 40
Ans6ng ch'On (strm)
36 01
126 1
Pan 6'in hang (harbor)
B J B
35 29 129 26
Changhan g�
35 38
126 o 55
North Ka
P'annnm 6m, ore
1
37 59 12610
Changhang -ni (Icty)
35 12
129 09
P'aro -ho reservoir).....................
38 07 1L7 ;a
Chang -san (min)
37 08
128 12
P' ohang
36 02 129 22
Cheju
33 31
126
Pukp' y6ng- ni..........................
37 29 129 O8
Cheju -do (isl)
3:3 20
126 30
P' unggi
36 52 128 32
Chinhae........
35 08
128 40
Pusan
35 06 129 03
Ch' 6nan
36 48
127 09
P'yC)nggang, North Korea
38 25 127 17
ClO ngha ri(
37 26
129 11
P' y6ngt' aek............................
36 59 127 05
C11' 611gj u
36 38
127 30
P'y6ngyang, North Korea...............
:39 01 125 45
Ch'6ngnyangni- Bong
37 34
127 03
Sach' 6n
35 05 128 06
ChC mju
35 49
127 09
Sam ch' bk
37 27 129 10
Ch' 6rw6n
38 15
127 13
Sa m ch' 6np 'o...........................
34 55 128 04
Chosa
35 11
127 24
Sa m nangjin
35 23 128 50
Chukpy6n- ni(lely)
:37 03
129 25
Seoul..
37 34 127 00
Chu m unjin
37 53
128 49
S6gwi- ri
33 14 126 34
Ch' unch '6n
37 52
127 44
Sokch' o
38 12 128 313
126 37
Chungang -myoji (anch)
34 50
128 12
SOkp' o- dong...........................
36 28
34 58 127 46
Chungjo
36 14
126 42
S6 mjin -gang (strm)
37 28 127 38
Ch'ungm u
34 51
128 26
Songhyft -ni Ucly)
37 30 129 OS
Chungny6ng- gul (railroad lunnel)
36 56
128 26
Songj6ng- ni
34 55 128 32
East China Sea
29 00
125 00
Songp'5 (100
33 27 126 56
Hadon
35 04
127 45
S6ngsan- ni
37 52 127 40
lIaep' y6ng
35 10
127 33
Soyang-gang (siren).....................
Haeundae
35 09
129 10
Suwon................................
37 16 127 01
llalla -san (ml)
33 22
126 32
Su 6n
35 10 129 07
H a North Korea
39 54
127 3'2
Taeby6n
35 13 129 14
IIangch 'on
34 32
126 94
I' aegu..
35 52 128 36
Ilan -gang (slrm)
37 45
126 11
Taehung- ni............................
35 53 127 02
127 26
Hoengsan- ni(Icly)
38 07
126 59
T aejbn.
36 20
36 28 127 16
Hong -do (isl)
34 41
125 13
Taep' y6ng -ni (Icty)......................
129 24
lRingna North Korea (rsta)
39 50
127 38
Ulchin
36 59
35 33 129 19
Ilup'o- ri(lety)
36 41
129 28
Ulsan.................................
35 30 129 2.1
Hwan i -ri (let+
37 10
128 59
Ulsan -man (bay)
35 59 128 23
Hwangj6ng
37 33
127 43
W aegwan- ni...........................
37 46 126 30
H y6ngsan -gang (slrm)
36 01
129 23
W6lgon- ni (lely)........................
37 21 127 58
Imjin -gang (sirm)
37 47
126 40
W6nju.
39 10 127 20
I nch' bn
37 28
126 38
W6nsan, North Korea
126 50
Iri
35 56
12(3 57
W6n w6n'6n
36 59
127 30
Japan, Sea of
43 30
135 45
Yangp'y6ng6m nae......................
37 29
124 00
Kaes6ng, North Korea
37 58
126 33
Yellow Sea............................
36 00
127 38
Kamp' o
35 48
129 30
Y6ju...
37 18
126 3.1
Kanggu
36 22
129 24
Y6 m -ha (strm).........................
37 35
128 56
K anggy6ng
36 09
127 01
Y6ngeh' 6n.............................
35 58
36 10 12r 4r
KanB 8
n6n
37 44
128 54
g g........................
Y6n don
log 54
Kim hae
35 14
128 53
Y6n o -d 8
dun
B BP on
37 31
128 37
Kim p' o
37 38
126 42
Y6ngju.
36 49
37 33 126 58
K odubawi
37 09
128 50
Yongsan (rsln).........................
126 32
Kohan-ni (lay)
37 12
128 52
Yongsan -gang (slrrn)....................
34 54
128
K orangp' o- ri(lety)
37 59
126 50
Y6ngw61
37 11
127 44
Korea Strait
34 00
129 00
Y6su...
34 4,1
KCtln -gang (sirrn)
36 00
126 40
Selected airfields
Atrnho- an strm
35 50
128 29
127 02
Kunsan
35 59
126 43
A- 511..
36 58
126 30
Kuryongp'o -n (lcty)
35 59
129 34
Cheju International..........
33 30
128 57
Kwangju
35 09
126 55
Kangnung....................
37 45
128 56
Ky6ngju
35 50
129 13
Kini
35 11
126 48
Man' on an (stun
BY B B
35 53
126 40
Kim o International
P
37 33
126 37
Masan
35 it
128 34
Kunsan AB
35 54
126 49
Mokp' o
34 47
126 23
Kwangju
:35 07
127 02
Moraedun g............................
35 32
128 22
Osan AB
37 05
129 25
M osulp' o
33 13
126 15
Pohang
35 59
129 08
M ukhojin- ni(lay)
37 33
129 07
Pusan International
35 10
8 42
2
Munsan- ni(lcly)
37 51
126 47
R- 813.
35 08
128 05
M uryong -san (min)
35 35
129 24
Sachon.
35 05
129
N aju
35 02
126 43
Samchok
37 30
56
126 56
N akton an rn
g B (sir m)
35 07
128 57
Seoul AB
37 31
Nonsan.
36 12
127 05
Suwon.......................
37 14 1 27 01
128 40
6nyang
35 34
129 07
Taegu International
35 53
an
1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2

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Hong-do(1 -6)
fit// ri C I r t�
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o
Names end 6oundery representation
are not necessarily authoraative 126
9.73
Or
4,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2
Cheju -do

South Korea
Internal administrative boundary
National capital
Pus Internal administrative capital
�r�+- Railroad (4'8!i2' gage)
Railroad (26" gage)
Expressway
Road
Airfield
L Major port
Populated places
(,000,000 to 6,000,000
O 150,000 to 1,000,000
O 50,000 to 150,000
Under 50,000
Seoul 6,000,000
Spot elevations in feet
Scale 1
0 10 20 30 4p 50
Statute Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50
Kilometers
1
Ullung -do
i
Sea of
Jap
c D
0
i
Economic Activity
INDUSTRY
8 Iron and steel 0 t Plywood ard vene
A Shipbuilding and repair 4L Smelter
Tetiles A Automotive assert
Q Food processing Electronics
Q Chemical Petroleum refining
Cement A Thermal electric p
9 Fertiker U Hydroelectric pov
Major fishing port
MINING
Sn Tin Fe Iron ore
W Tungsten G Graphite
Cu Copper Ka Kaolin
JW Anthracite coalfield

Textes
k t Food Processing
Chemical
p� A
AO Cement
Fertilizer
n g S 'ti I Major fishing p
t s 4 F MINING
S r ngQu Sn Tin Fe h
It; I W Tungsten G
f
I Cu Copper Ka M
Z
Anthracite oc
Changgi -aP
r
Ybngil
ma -36-
.Y Kuryongp'o -ri i
nMu
egu.''
a Kamp o
Kew 68
a
o a
i Pangbjin-hang
7 Ab' lsan -man
t 44
W I vak
i fia r Kmnxae,; art O ul
y aebybn O
aeundae
c c o -811 I U� e p i)
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h\ohae .Kaddk -to
so a, Koje -do I
Qv nazi.. o
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D o sasuna si\ o S J
o a
c Z
r Chin
p
i Q sk s
Honshu
hara
a
C
o p
o
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30
e
d �1
ar
Kit aWOO
J a p a n cneja
o
D ukuoka mil'
0a u
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A
0
ell Kyushu
o Kurume
Hirado-
Uku- shima shima
D
e
t'r o a Sasebo
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2

0 a
Cheju
Economic Activity
INDUSTRY
Vegetation and
Land Utilization
CULTIVATED AREAS
Paddy crops
Dry crops
UNCULTIVATED AREAS
Forest
Scrub, brush and
barren land
Inch'bn U o Q D
�o
Iron and steel
Plywood and veneer
Shipbuilding and repair
Al Smelter
Textiles
aft Automotive assembly
Q Food processing
Electronics
Q Chomical
Petroleum refining
Cement
Thermal electric power
4) Fertilizer
Hydroelectric power
K Major fishing port
MINING
Sn Tin
Fe Iron ore
W Tungsten
G Graphite
Cu Copper
Ka Kaolin
JffW Anthracite coalfield
0
Hwach'on. 11
Ch'dngp'ydng -ni
4) Fe
.Ch'Ongju
G
G 1 Masan
p Kwangju Ka
e4 Naju 'J
O u
0 o�okp' :.J
o n
0� V
O I
CZ O
op O
Cheju
Fe
I
Pok 'yongi S.
S
W e
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Cu
S.a aQ
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2

Electronics Kunsan
Food proc A
Q sling W TaeAu Fe Q AA
Q Chemical $11 Petroleum refining Yongnam' Ulsan
Cement A Thermal electric, power O s
c Fertilizer A Hydroelectric 9r a e
Pov' Masan Cu Fe
OK Major fishing port O e Kwangju Ka
MINING p I) O Q
Fe Iron ore u L.Naju
Sn Tin cU
W Tungsten G Graphite D 42gmu t Pusan
ok cb
Cu Copper Ka Kaolin yep 11 o Chinhae
Anthracite coalfield O V co
p o O Yosu
0 Q O p
Cheju
'unch'iin
Kangniing
4`
U. 0 D YYonju
Population
Persons per square mill
v Ch AnAhr
111
1 259
c T
0 50 100 200
Persons per square kilometer
V Pod
0
nW
e
et
p e
usan
�t
Honshu
c
r
-3d
c o
KitakyoshO
Cheju
a
ut
kuoke
IF"
f
r
Waahi on!
'shades `L
j/l/$jll
Kurume
O chadona,
t;
r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080005 -2