NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 41B; SOUTH KOREA; ARMED FORCES

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SECRET
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South Korea
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WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
ti
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
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I
Z
South or
A CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the armed forces cover-
age in the General Survey dated February 1970.
A. Defense establishment I
1. Military history 2
2. Command structure 3
B. joint activities 4
1. Military manpower 4
2. Strength trends 5
3. Training 6
4. Military budget 6
5. Logistics 6
6. Uniforms and insignia 7
C Army 7
1. Organization 8
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 8
3. Training 13
4. Logfstics 14
5. Army aviation 14
SECRET No FOREIGN Dimm
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Page
Page
D. Natty
15
E. Air force
1. Organization
15
1. Organization
18
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
16
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
19
3 Training
17
3. Training
4. Logistics
17
4. Logistics
20
5. Marine corps
17
F. Paramilit
FIGURES
Page
Page
Fig. 1 DMZ guard post photo)
2
Fig. 8 Warrant and enlisted uniforms and
Fig. 2 ROK observation post along DMZ
insignia chart
(photo)
2
Fig. 3 On watch with field telescope photo)
2
Fig. 9 ROK troops in field training (photo)
14
Fig. 4 ROK troops in South Vietnam
Fig. 10 Tanks crossing river photo)
14
photo)
Fig. 5 Defense organization chart
4
Fig. 11 ROK destroyer Seoul (photo)
16
Fig. 6 Personnel strengths (table)
6
Fig. 12 ROK coastal minesweeper Samcla'ok
Fig. 7 Officers' uniforms and insignia
photo)
16
chart)
9
Fig. 13 Principal air force units table)
19
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Armed Forces
A. Defense establishment (S)
The armed forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK)
have as their primary missions the defense of the
country against external aggression and the
maintenance of internal security. Well organized and
moderately well equipped, they are considered fully
capable of executing their internal security mission
and adequate tc, protect their country against North
b
Korean aggression. They would require prompt and
extensive outside assistance, however, to do more than
temporarily check it North Korean attack supported
by either Chinese or Soviet forces.
The armed forces are organized into three major
components and have a total personnel strength of
about 622,000. The army, numbering about 548,000
men, constitutes 8894. of the military Manpower; it is
the fifth largest ground force in the world and the
third largest in non Communist Asia. The navy, with
a complement of 45,500 men (including 25,900
marines), operates a total of 240 ships and craft,
including five destrovers and three destroyer escorts.
The air force has approximately 28,500 personnel and
379 aircraft, including 228 jets. The Korean National
Police, a civil law enforcement agency consisting of
approximately 49,000 men, including 800 maritime
police, could in the event of hostilities assist the
ground and naval forces in the maintenance of
internal security in rear and coastal areas. The
Homeland Defense Reserve Force, a civil defense -type
organization, also assists the military and police in
apprehending North Korean agents and in guarding
lines of communication and installations against
sabotage. The force numbers about 2 1 million men.
The armed forces are modeled after those of the
United States, utilize U.S. equipment, and employ
U.S. tactical doctrine and techniques modified to
meet South Korean requirements. They are well
organized. well trained, and ably led. Shortcomings
are primarily in logistics and air defense; ROK
military personnel generally lack experience in
logistical operations, and the various services suffer
from equipment shortages. Some shortages will be
alleviated in time through the U.S. Military Assistance
Program (MAP); deficiencies in logistical skills arc
being overcome as a result of U.S. sponsored technical
training and through on -the -job experience gained by
ROK Armed Forces personnel in managing their
logistical organization.
South Korea could not support the country's
military establishment without extensive U.S.
assistance; accordingly. U.S. aid is a factor of
paramount importance in South Korean military
planning. During U.S. FY1950 -72, the Republic of
Korea received military assistance valued at about
USS5.7 billion;, The U.S. Military Advisory Group,
which has functioned in South Korea since 1960
(under an agreement signed on 26 January 1970 and
amended on 21 October 1960), has also been
instrumental in the development of the ROK Armed
Forces. In 1970, the Military Advisory Groups of the
army, navy and air force were reorganized into a Joint
U.S. Military Advisory Group �Korea (JUSMAG�
K). Advisory effort was reduced and emphasis placed
on logistics, research and development, data
processing, and other technical fields.
The U.S. Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treatv
of November 1954 commits the United States to
render assistance to the South Korean Government in
the event of external armed attack against any
territory recognized by the United States as being
under the republic's administrative control: opera-
tional planning assumes that ROK forces will operate
under U.S. control. Strategic planning has been
primarily defensive in nature because Korean military
leaders realize they lack the resources for successfully
executing a major offensive action. ROK combat
troops are disposed along the southern boundary of the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) (Figures 1, 2, and 3) in
semipermanent defensive positions. A continuing
program of maintaining and improving these field
fortifications is conducted under the supervision of the
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FIGURE 1. ROK Army troops gua ding the DMZ against FIGURE 2. ROK observation post typical of those along
North Korean infiltration (U /OU) the DMZ (U /OU)
.L
Eighth U.S. Army. Plans envision maintenance of the
Positions along the DMZ in the face of Communist
attack and withdrawal, when necessary, to ;previously
determined defense lines. This strategy is designed to
contain Communist penetration until outside aid
becomes effective and a connteroffensive can he
mounted.
Beginning in 1965, the South Korean Government
contributed some 50,000 troops to the collective
defense of South Vietnam, including two army
infantry divisions, it marine corps brigade, supporting
units, five amphibious vessels (three LST's and two
LSM's), and it noncombat force. The marine corps
brigade and a few army support units returned to
South Korea in early 1972, and the remaining forces
were withdrawn in early 1973. Personnel in these RUK
military contingents gained significant combat and
leadership experience as a result of this commitment
(Figure -I). In addition, participation in the Vietnam
war provided the ROK forces with a greater
appreciation of, and capability to solve, logistical,
training, and doctrinal problems inherent to combat
operations in the field, thereby contributing to their
increased operational readiness.
1. Military history
'I he Republic of Korea has no ex' cnsive military
tradition, but since 1948 it has developed a powerful
military establishment with it strongly anti
Communist orientation. The ROK Army's predecessor
was the South Korean Constabulary, which was
created by the U.S. Army Military Government during
2
the post World War II occupation of South Korea.
Following establishment of the republic in Augnst
19.18, a tiny air arm, the precursor of the air force, was
organized under arm\- control. It became a separate
service in 19 -19.
The navy originated in 1945 its it coast guard. It
designated us it navy in 1948, but at the outbreak of
the Korean conflict in 1950 it had not progressed
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FIGURE 3. DMZ battery commander on watch
with field telescope (U /OU)

FIGURE 4. ROK troops equipped
with U.S. 40 mm grenade launcher
and World War II carbines in South
Vietnam (U /OU)
.1
V 3
x
much beyond the status of it fishery- protection and
antisnitiggling patrol force with an aggregation of
obsolete craft. Following the (:onununist invasion of
South Korea in June 1950, the navy received a few
U.S. naval vessels, and more transfers were made
during the Korean war.
The. marine corps was activated as part of the navy
on 15 April 1949. Daring 1949, it took part in
antiguerrilla operations; with tile. outbreak of the
Korean war, the then existing units were formed into it
regiment and atta.-hcd to the Ist Marine Division.
USMC, for participation in the Inch'anl landing.
Other operations included the Inchon Seoul.
Wonsan, and Flamhung- Ilungnam campaigns.
The ROK iniIitary forces have, sinve their
beginning, received materiel, training, all advisory
assistance under the U.S. Military Assistance Program
(MAP). When the United States withdrew its forces in
1949, a military advisory group remained to guide the
newly established military forces. The military
structure collapsed under pressure of the Communist
invasion of South Korea in 1950, but the military
forces were reorganized, expanded, and eventually
actively employed in operations against the
Communists.
Since the Korean armistice in 1953, the ROK Armed
Forces have continued to develop aucl expand under
U.S. guidance, with consequent improvement of
South Korea's defense posture. The military forces
have been reorganized, extensive training programs
have been instituted, and additional weapons and
'Par diacritic% oo place naanes sec the list of names on the apron
of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map
itself.
equipittent have been furnished by the United States.
After 1966 certain supplementary assistance was
furnished to the ROK forces from U.S. Department of
Defense service budgets (Military Assistance Service
Fund), e.g., items of equipment for South Korean
units in South Vietnam.
'I'll( army was able to maintain its integrity and,
With c�ontinucd U.S. guidance and support, remained
an effective force during the unstable period following
the military coup of 16 May 1961. The cony brought
military elements into a position of political leadership
and terminated it period of instability that began in
April 1960, whcn a student led popular uprising
toppled the 12 -year regime of President Syngnnuu
Rhee.
2. Command structure
The legal hasis for the armed farces is stated in
general terns in Article 51 of the constitution The
article simply designates the President as Commander
in Chief and declares that the organization and
formation of the armed forces shall he determined by
law (tile South Korean national defense organization
is shown in Figure 3). The President is assisted and
advised on security matters by the National Security
Council, established by South Korean Government
Law No. 1308 of 14 December 1963. The coincil is
composed of the President (who serves as chairman),
the Prime Minister, the Director of the Economic
Planning Board, the ivlinister of Foreign Affairs, the
Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the
Minister of National Defense, and the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, although not a statutory
member, is authorized to participate in the inceings.
3
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and bears responsibility for strategic planning and for
the overall operations of the armed forces. The
chairman is directly responsible to the President, but
the staff is administratively subordinate to the
Minister of National Defense.
Operational control of the ROK Armed Forces is
vested in the United Nations Command (UNC). The
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
(CINCUNC), however, has delegated operational
control of the individual ROK services to the
Commanding General of the Eighth U.S. Army, the
Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Korea, and the
Commander of U.S. Air Forces Korea. In the event of
hostilities, CINCUNC reassumes direct control.
During the May 1961 coup, the military regime
ignored the command agreement by ordering several
armv and marine units to Seoul to support the coup.
Several troop commanders who refused to take orders
from any authority other than the United Nations
Command were relieved of their commands and
arrested. The regimes control actions compromised
the U.N. commander's operational control over South
Korean forces and temporarily upset relations with the
United Nations Command; the regime, however,
subsequently reaffirmed its acceptance of the principle
of subordination of the ROK Armed Forces to the
United Nations Command.
Advice and training assistance is given to the .army,
navy, and air force by the Joint U.S. Military Advisory
Croup Korea.
B. Joint activities
1. Military manpower (S)
Manpower requirements f the large military forces
maintained by the llepublic of Korea since the Korean
war have been met with difficulty. As of 1 January
1973 there were an estimated 8,213,000 males in South
Korea between the ages of 17 and 49, (if whom about
5,200,000, or roughly 63 %vzre fit for military
service. All males are required to register at age 17 and
be available for call, with certain exceptions, between
ages 18 and 40. By law a 36 -month period of active
service is required of all able bodied men; however,
conscripts are required to serve only 30 months. The
term of voluntary active service is 2 years for the army
and marine corps and 3 years for the navy and air
force. Voluntary enlistment and reenlistment rates in
the army are negligible. The army and marine corps
acquire most of their personnel through conscription;
the navy and air force are composed almost entirely of
volunteers.
N
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The Minister of tional Defense is assisted by the
Vice Minister, the Assistant Minister for Manpower,
the Assistant Minister Comptroller, and the Assistant
Minister for Installations and Logistics. Administra-
tive and technicaf support is provided the ministers by
it staff consisting of an administrative division and
seven bureaus� Planning; Finance; Manpower;
Personnel; Logistics; Installation; and Information,
Education, and Public Relations. The Minister of
National Defense is appointed by the President and
charged with the functions of military administration,
military command, and control of the armed forces;
however, he is primarily an administrator, with the
responsibility for implementing presidential policies
and decisions.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), subordinate to the
Ministry of National Defense, was established on 1
June 1963 by Cabinet Decree No. 1325. Membership
of the JCS consists of a chairman, appointed by the
President for it 2 -year term, and the incumbent chiefs
of the three military services. It has been the practice
to appoint the former army Chief of Staff to the
position of chairman. Although not a regular member,
the Commandant of the ROK Marine Corps may act
as a member when corps matters are discussed. JCS
organization, in addition to the office of the chairman,
includes a director and five bureaus Personnel
Planning, Strategic Intelligence, Operations Planning,
Logistics Planning, and Communications and
Electronics. The JCS, organized to operate like its U.S.
counterpart, is concerned with major military matters
4
FIGURE 5. ROK national defense organization (S)

The number of men available for military service
and the maximum number considered fit for duty, by
5 -year age groups, are as follows:
TorAL MAX[NItMf
NUMBER NUMBER FIT FOR
ACE OF DiALES MILITARY SERVICE
15 -19 1,740,000 1,200,000
20 -24 1,582,000 1,035,000
25 -29 1,380,000 895,000
30 -34 1,246,000 790,000
35 -39 999,000 600,000
40-44 678,000 380,000
4549 588,000 300,000
Total, 1549 8,213,000 5,200,000
The average number reaching military age (18)
annually, 1973 -77, is estimated at about 345,000. All
males are considered to he in the military reserve until
age 37 whether or not they have served in the armed
forces. Only the army and marine corps have active
organized reserves. The army maintains 10 reserve
divisions staffed with permanent cadrer. These
divisions, though skeletoni provide the means for
quick expansion of the regular army in the event of
mobilization. Three are ready reserve divisions with a
cadre totaling about 10,800; the remaining seven are
rear area security divisions with a total strength of
a
about 18,200 regulr armv personnel. The marine
corps has a reserve pool of about 86,000 personnel.
About 300 billets are maintained to train officer and
enlisted marine reservists.
During the Korean war, personnel in the armed
forces demonstrated that, on the whole, Koreans are
staunch, tough fighters when properly trained and led.
The average Korean soldier is inured to hardship and
is capable of sustained effort over long periods of time
on a meager ration that would be considered barely
subsistence diet by the average Western soldier.
Trained from childhood to fit himself into a
hierarchical society, the Korean adjusts readily to the
discipline of military service. He may attempt to
evade military service, but once inducted he generally
resigns himself to duty, accepts the authority of his
officers, and learns the fundamentals quickly. Korean
officers have not vet thoroughly grasped the necessity
of thinking problems through, of estimating possible
consequences of a military maneuver, and of
considering possible alternatives to a complex
operation. Hence, by Western standards, Korean
operational planning is frequently incomplete or ill
conceived.
Koreans tend to develop loyalty to individuals
rather than to the position occupied by a superior, a
service, or a unit. Basically, they rely more on specific
orders than most Western soldiers and, therefore, are
more dependent on the immediate presence of their
leaders. As a result, the performance of the individuals
usually reflects the ability of the individual
commander to a greater degree than is the case among
modern Western troops. In the absence of the leader,
the general lack of initiative and independent
judgment of the average South Korean soldier tends to
seduce his effectiveness in critical situations.
Most South Koreans Zack mechanical or technical
experience and require greater time, effort, and
training than U.S. personnel to acquire technical
skills. Few are equipped for success in highly technizal
and scientific fields because of their lack of a proper
educational foundation. They are highly literate and
learn rapidly, particularly skills that require manual
dexterity.
Armed forces personnel are considered loyal and
reliable. Morale in the military services is considered
generally good, although the army in past years has
been plagued with the problem of absences without
leave and desertions. Arm\ officials periodically take
steps to reduce this problem by instituting military
deserter apprehension programs and enforcing rigid
punishment of deserters and AWOL personnel.
Additional disruptive factors detracting from the
strength and stability of the armed forces are low pay
scales and the endemic factionalism and struggle for
power which consumes so much of the time and
energies of leading military personalities. Retirement
policies not only are a source of discontent but also
have resulted in a loss to the armed forces of valuable,
experienced senior officers, since manv officers in their
early forties are being retired if passed over for
promotio�
2. Strength trends (S)
With U.S. aid, the armed farces have grown rapidly
and have been maintained at a relatively high
strength level. In 1954 the United States agreed to
support a 20- division army and other services up to a
maximum strength of 720,000, although the agreed
force level is now 626,800. Overall armed forces
strength has steadily increased; however, the army was
reduced from 19 to 18 divisions when ROK divisions
returned from Vietnam. Since 1964 navy strength has
grown by 21% and air force strength by 23 Marine
corps strength increased by 25% during 1966 -71 but
was subsequently reduced by the same percentage in
early 1972, upon the deactivation of the brigade that
served in Vietnam. Figure 6 shows armed forces
personnel strengths since 1960.
5
i;n,..;.,. ""L-n wr. :fs. ti:.. ::.K's r. w...i... .,cw,nK'- .ro.tx a. ar`+H�,wc,r +ur..,... �...v.. :u.rw. w.... .a +.r..w
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FIGURE 6. Personnel strengths (5)
"lot included are ROI{ Army personnel serving with U.S.
units iu Korea. The number of personnel s. assigned varies but
is generally about 10,000.
3. Train;.ig (S)
ROK military training has been supervised by U.S.
Military advisers since 1948, and training units of the
army, navy, and air force approximate those of the
U.S. services in organization and methods.
The Ministry of National Defense operates a
National Defense College, corresponding to the U.S.
National War College, for senior officers and key civil
servants. It also operates the Armed Forces Staff
College; this school is designed to prepare selected
military officers for duty in high echelons of the arrned
forces and is attended by field -grade officers from all
services. The staff college fills the gap between senior
service schools and the National Defense College.
Each of the three services has an academy for training
officers, and each sends selected officers and enlisted
men to U.S. military schools and training establish-
ments..n addition, between 1962 and 1970, selected
army and marine corps personnel received military
training in West Germany, Canada, Republic of
China, France, Italy, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Malaysia. These individuals provide a pooi from
which instructors are drawn. The armed forces
probably will continue to depend upon U.S. military
training facilities, particularly for advanced technical
training.
4. Military budget (C)
The annual military budget is prepared in the
Ministry of National Defense in coordination with the
Economic Planning Board. This budget is incorpo-
6
rated in the central government budget which is
submitted to the National Assembly for final
approval. Since 1963, the assembly has approved thy-
military budgets without major changes.
The budget for the armed forces. during the past
decade, has ranked first among major categories of
expenditures in the central government budget.
During recent gars, it averaged 2251 of the central
government budget and-1.1 of the GNP. The animal
increases in the military budget'0 1968 -72
averaged just over 28 The main wason for these
increases was the vasty improved Korean economy
and the concurrent reduction of direct budgetary
support provided by the United States. The U.S.
contribution to the South Korean defense budget was
reduced from 34% in 1968 to about 551 in 1972. South
Korean self financed military budgets, in millions of
U.S. dollars, for 1968 through 1972 are as follows:
1968 19F9 1970 1971 1972
Ministry of National
Defense budget 173.7 217.2 270.7 361.6 458.7
Military budget as per-
cent of central gov-
ernment budget 21.0 19.3 20.7 24.3 26.4
Military budget as per-
cent of GNP 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.4
NOTE Converted at the exchange rate of 373 won equal
US$1.00.
5. Logistics
South Korea has little capacity to provide industrial
support for its armed forces and, although largely
agricultural, is not self- sufficient in food. Manufactur-
ing is the most rapidly growing sector of the economy
and provides basic consurner goods, some petroleum
products, industrial chemicals, and fertilizers. Industry
also assembles some transport equipment such as
rolling stock and automobiles using imported
components. The economy is heavily dependent on
imports of crude oil and sonic refined petroleum
products. (U /OU)
Domestic output in direct support of the armed
forces is limited to small arms ammunition, uniforms,
some quartermaster -type equipment, and some
petroleum products. All other nlilitary materiel is
imported, primarily through the U.S. Military
Assistance Program (MAP), which has been the only
source of military assistance. During U.S. FY1950
through FY1972, U.S. equipment valued at
US$3,235.1 million was grant aid. In addition to
purchases in the United States, sonic radarequipment
has been obtained from Japan. (C)
The Bureau of Logistics in the Ministry of National
Defense is responsible for overall logistical support of
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MARINY
AIR
ARMY
NAVY
CORPS
FORCE.
TOTAL.
1960.......
534,000
15,700
25,100
22,000
596,800
1961.......
525,000
15,200
24,600
22,600
587,400
1962.......
507,000
15,300
23,900
21,500
567,700
1963.......
510,000
15,800
24,500
23,300
573,600
19614.......
524,000
15,100
24,700
23,400
587,200
1965.......
524,000
15,800
24,600
25,600
590,000
1966.......
527,300
16,300
29,100
24,300
597,000
1967.......
528,500
17,000
30,6100
24,500
600,600
1968.......
534,600
18,400
32,000
25,900
610,900
1969...
548,000
19,300
32,000
27,300
626,600
1970.......
548,000
19,300
32,000
27,600
626,900
1971.......
548,000
19,300
32,000
27,600
626,900
1972
548,000
19,600
25,900
28,500
622,000
1973.......
548,000
19,600
25,900
23,500
622,000
"lot included are ROI{ Army personnel serving with U.S.
units iu Korea. The number of personnel s. assigned varies but
is generally about 10,000.
3. Train;.ig (S)
ROK military training has been supervised by U.S.
Military advisers since 1948, and training units of the
army, navy, and air force approximate those of the
U.S. services in organization and methods.
The Ministry of National Defense operates a
National Defense College, corresponding to the U.S.
National War College, for senior officers and key civil
servants. It also operates the Armed Forces Staff
College; this school is designed to prepare selected
military officers for duty in high echelons of the arrned
forces and is attended by field -grade officers from all
services. The staff college fills the gap between senior
service schools and the National Defense College.
Each of the three services has an academy for training
officers, and each sends selected officers and enlisted
men to U.S. military schools and training establish-
ments..n addition, between 1962 and 1970, selected
army and marine corps personnel received military
training in West Germany, Canada, Republic of
China, France, Italy, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Malaysia. These individuals provide a pooi from
which instructors are drawn. The armed forces
probably will continue to depend upon U.S. military
training facilities, particularly for advanced technical
training.
4. Military budget (C)
The annual military budget is prepared in the
Ministry of National Defense in coordination with the
Economic Planning Board. This budget is incorpo-
6
rated in the central government budget which is
submitted to the National Assembly for final
approval. Since 1963, the assembly has approved thy-
military budgets without major changes.
The budget for the armed forces. during the past
decade, has ranked first among major categories of
expenditures in the central government budget.
During recent gars, it averaged 2251 of the central
government budget and-1.1 of the GNP. The animal
increases in the military budget'0 1968 -72
averaged just over 28 The main wason for these
increases was the vasty improved Korean economy
and the concurrent reduction of direct budgetary
support provided by the United States. The U.S.
contribution to the South Korean defense budget was
reduced from 34% in 1968 to about 551 in 1972. South
Korean self financed military budgets, in millions of
U.S. dollars, for 1968 through 1972 are as follows:
1968 19F9 1970 1971 1972
Ministry of National
Defense budget 173.7 217.2 270.7 361.6 458.7
Military budget as per-
cent of central gov-
ernment budget 21.0 19.3 20.7 24.3 26.4
Military budget as per-
cent of GNP 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.4
NOTE Converted at the exchange rate of 373 won equal
US$1.00.
5. Logistics
South Korea has little capacity to provide industrial
support for its armed forces and, although largely
agricultural, is not self- sufficient in food. Manufactur-
ing is the most rapidly growing sector of the economy
and provides basic consurner goods, some petroleum
products, industrial chemicals, and fertilizers. Industry
also assembles some transport equipment such as
rolling stock and automobiles using imported
components. The economy is heavily dependent on
imports of crude oil and sonic refined petroleum
products. (U /OU)
Domestic output in direct support of the armed
forces is limited to small arms ammunition, uniforms,
some quartermaster -type equipment, and some
petroleum products. All other nlilitary materiel is
imported, primarily through the U.S. Military
Assistance Program (MAP), which has been the only
source of military assistance. During U.S. FY1950
through FY1972, U.S. equipment valued at
US$3,235.1 million was grant aid. In addition to
purchases in the United States, sonic radarequipment
has been obtained from Japan. (C)
The Bureau of Logistics in the Ministry of National
Defense is responsible for overall logistical support of
0
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the arncd forces. The bureau has five sections Plans.
lst Materiel Mobilization, 2d Materiel Mobilization,
Operations, and Military Installations. These sections
fornnulate logistic plans and policies for all the
services, supervise the implementation of these plans,
acquire land and supervise military construction,
procure locally produced items, and receive and
distribute material received under the U.S. Military
Assistance Program. (C)
The Depute Chiefs of Staff for Logistics of the army
and air force and the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Logistics submit their respective logistic
programs, plans, and policies to the Bureau of
Logistics through their respective service chiefs. '['It(
army has been designated the agency to procure
con>non use supplies for the entire military
establishment. (C)
6. Uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
Military personnel are authorized dress, service, and
field uniforms which are patterned after those of U.S.
armed forces. Branch of service and specialty insignia
are also similar to those of the U.S. armed forces.
Uniforms are issued in both winter and sunnier
versions, but due to the cool climate of South Korea,
winter uniforms are most generally worn. Insignia of
grade worn by officers, warrant officers, and enlisted
nuvn of the ground, naval (including marine corps),
and air forces are similar in design.
In 1972, several changes were made in the armed
forces' uniform and insignia. The principal change
was in the styling of the service uniform worn by
enlisted men of the ground and air forces. The collar
style of the uniform coat has been changed from it
closed rolled- collar to in open rolled- collar similar to
that worn by officers. A shirt and tie are included as
part of the new uniform. Another significant change
took place in the design of enlisted men's grade
insignia to include it thew configuration of stripes and
chevrons. An additional rank of sergeant major in the
ground forces, master chief petty officer in the naval
forces, and chief master sergeant in the air forces, was
established in the enlisted grade system.
Winter uniforms and insignia for officers are shown
in Figure 7, those for warrant officers and enlisted
personnel in Figure 8. Summer service uniforms of
ground and air force: officers and warrant officers are
made in the same basic style as winter uniforms. The
ground forces officers' summer service uniforms are a
lighter grey -green color, and the air force officers'
uniforms are silver -grey. Service uniforms worn by
enlisted personnel of the ground and air forces are
similar to those of officers. Summer uniforms for naval
officers, warrant officers, and master and senior chief
petty officers are khaki. The summer service uniform
"orn by naval enlisted men is the same style as that for
except that it is white in color. Marine corps
officers and enlisted men wear uniforms similar in
styling and color to those of ground forces personnel,
except that the enlisted nu'n's service uniform coat has
it stiff standing collar.
General and flag rank officers wear insignia of rank
consisting of five pointed silver stars; senior and field
grade officers, clusters of nine silver bamboo leaves;
and junior and company grade officers. silver
diamond- shaped insignia. Gold diannond- shaped
insignia are worn by warrant officers. Rank insignia
are .worn either on decoratiyc shoulderhoards with
dress uniforms, on shoulderloops of service uniforms,
or on the right collar tab of the field uniform shirt. The
blue winter service uniform with gold slc, ve stripes is
worn by naval officers and warrant officers. On the
sumnler service uniform, gold stripes are displayed on
shoulderhoards.
Enlisted nnen's ranks are indicated by colored cloth
stripes and chevrons displayed on a background which
is of the same color as that of the uniform. The
insignia colors are, crimson for ground forces on
and summer uniforms; crimson for naval and marine
corps personnel on winter, and black on summer
uniforms; and white for air force personnel on winter
and summer uniforms. Insignia are displayed on both
sleeves between the elbow and the shoulder. Enlisted
men also \%-car field insignia of metal on cloth when
wearing cold .weather clothing, fatigues, and field
ca ps.
C. Army (S)
Judged by any standards, the ROK Army is a well
trained, reasonably well -led, and moderately well
equipped organization. Its missions are to defend the
country against a North Korean attack and to preserve
internal security, which includes controlling North
Korean infiltration efforts. The First and Third ROK
Armies, which are positioned along the 150 -mile
DMZ, have been successful in their control of North
Korean infiltration attempts across the DMZ, and the
Second ROK Army, which has the responsibility for
security in the rest of the country, has also effectively
performed its security mission of suppressing
infiltration attempts by North Korea. The army has
mostly conscripted personnel. As in the other services,
morale is good and discipline is superior. Literacy is
high, and the average soldier adapts to military life
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readily, resulting in it f4ditint[ force of very high
caliber. Nell- trained and experienced officers
(-xnitribule significantly to the anny's high profewsional-
ism.
Except for certain egttipnu�nt deficiencies, army
units are combat- ready. The army can maintain
internal security and, with external logistic and air
support, stmt it unilateral attack by North Korean
forces. 1 ?yell in the event of i t combined Chinese /North
Korean invasion, ROK grotmd forces could fight a
strong delaying action provided U.S. air, naval, and
logistic support were .mailable. Although the army's
logistical system is continually improving, combat
support limitations and inadequacy of war reserves
would severely restrict its ability to support sustained
combat operations unaided.
Additional weaknesses of the army include un
inadequate number of technically trained personnel,
shortages of heavy t�uuipment, a lack of experience in
logistical operations, as well as virtually complete
dependence on outside logistical support for
maintaining the existing force structure. Army
weaknesses are expected to he corrected gradually as
the modernization program progresses.
1. Organization
The army is organized into it headquarters and three
titajor subordinate conunands �the First ROK Army,
the Second ROK Anne, and the Third ROK Arnty.
ROK Army headquarters, located at Seoul, is headed
by the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff. The
headquarters is organized along the lines of the U.S.
General Staff and consists of general, special,
administrative, and technical staffs. The general staff
consists of five deputy chiefs of staff Personnel,
Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Reserve
Affairs �and the Comptroller, who has deputy chief of
staff status. 'rhe office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel includes the Adjutant General, P,.-ovost
Marshal Gener:d. headquarters Commandant, and
sections responsible for troop information and
education, special services, and chaplains. The office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, in
addition to administration and foreign liaPon offices,
consists of two main directprates� Intelligence and
Plans and Security_ 'rhe Directorate of Intelligence is
subdivided into a Current Intelligence Office and four
divisions Collection and Operation, North Korean,
Asian, and joint. The Directorate of Plans and
Security consists of three divisions �Plans and
Management, Organization and Training, and
Security. Subordinate elements of the office of Deputy
0
Chief of Staff for Operations include sections
responsible for special arfare. tinny aviation. military
history. and civil affairs and military government. The
Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs consists of
four divisions� Personnel. Organization and 'I raining,
Logistics, and Comptroller. Subordinate to the
Comptroller are the army audit gency and the
finance office. The tec' ,oical services are subordinate
to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.
The ROK Army is organized into three army and
five corps headquarters. The First ROK Ann%.
consisting of two corps of seven divisions, artti the
"Third ROK Ann%, organized into three corps with i
divisions, and necessar% support elei..:�nts, constitute
the major coabat organization. 'I'll(- First and Third
I1OK Armies are under the� operational control of the
Eighth U.S. Arni%; the administrative chain of
cnntlnaatd is from ROK Army headquarters through
the anny headquarters to the two corps of the First
ROK Army. The three corps of the Third ROK Anuy
arc under operational control of I Corps (ROK/1's)
Group of the Eighth U.S. Army.
The Second ROK Army is at continental army
command -t organization, also under operational
control of the Eighth U.S. Army. Administrative
control is fre:m ROK Army Ileadquarten to each of
four military district commands headed by district
commanders. The principal missions of the Second
ROK Army are rear area security. administrative
supervision of the 4 military district commands into
which the rear area is subdivided, and the training of
the 10 reserve infantry divisions under its command.
The Second ROK Army also supervises all schools and
training centers. The military district commanders are
responsible for the internal security of their respective
areas, control of units located within the assigned
territory, and logistical support of units located in, or
in transit through, their area of jurisdiction.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
The strength of the ROK Army is about 548,000,
including 1,200 in the air arm. "These figures include
47,200 officers and 500,800 enlisted men. Authorized
strength is 347,470. Major formations include 18
combat divisions and 10 reserve divisions, the latter
having it permanent cadre of regular army personnel.
Authorized strength of the combat divisions is 13,200;
average actual strength is 12,600. Three ready reserve
'Fur regularly updated information, refer to the ,Military
Intelligence Sttnurairy and the Order of Rattle. Foreign Ground
Forces Republic of Koren, both published by the Defense
Intelligence Agee:y.
H
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GROUND FORCES
SERVICE UNIFORM
SERVICE UNIFORM
t
4
P
A 1
GENERAL LIEUTENANT MAJOR
GENERAL GENERAL
0 Al
COLONEL LIEUTENANT MAJOR
COLONEL
NAVAL FORCES
BRIGADIER
GENERAL CAP INSIGNIA
OFFICERS AND
WARRANT OFFICER
CAPTAIN 1ST LIEUTENANT 2D LIEUTENANT
am ak
a o
CAP INSIGNIA
ADMIRAL VICE ADMIRAL REAR ADMIRAL COMMODORE OFFICERS AND
WARRANT OFFICER
MARINE CORPS
ld d o
[m311�
CAPTAIN COMMANDER LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT U, ,TENANT ENSIGN
COMMANDER JUNIOR GRADE
CAP INSIGNIA
OFFICERS AND
WARRANT OFFICER
AIR FORCES
GENERAL LIEUTENANT
GENERAL
0 A
COLONEL LIEUTENAN.I
COLOI.EL
MAJOR
GENERAL
MAJOR
I
BRIGADIER
CAP INSIGNIA
GENERAL
OFFICERS AND
WARRANT OFFICER
I A A
CAPTAIN 1ST LIEUTENANT 2D LIEUTENANT
SERVICE UNIFORM
FIGURE 7. Officers' uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
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SERVICE UNIFORM
i
GROUND FORCES
WARRANT OFFICER
SERGEANT MASTER SERGEANT
MAJOR SERGEANT IST CLASS
SERGEANT CORPORAL PRIVATE
IST CLASS
NAVAL FORCES
9
WARRANT OFFICER
MASTER CHIEF SENIOR CHIEF
PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER
STAFF
SERGEANT
PRIVATE
1 0
CHIEF PETTY OFFICER
PETTY OFFICER IST CLASS
flit
CNP INSIGNIA
CAP INSIGNIA
MASTER AND SENIOR
CHIEF PETTY OFFICER
MARINE CORPS
I�
I
j r M CAP INSIGNIA
SERVICE UNIFORN, PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER SEAMAN SEAMAN
2D CLASS 7D CLASS APPRENTICE
AIR FORCES
WARRANT OFFICER Nw
CAP INSIGNIA
CHIEF
MASTER SERGEANT
1
STAFF
SERVICE UNIFORM SERGEANT
FIGURE 6. Warrant o
SENIOR
MASTER SERGEANT
Pq
SERGEANT
ficers and enlis
MASTER
SERGEANT
B
AIRMAN
IST CLASS
ted men's un
TECHNICAL
SERGEANT
AIRMAN
iforms and insignia (U /OU)
11
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divisions are maintained at full cadre strength �two at
3,700, one at 3,400 --and seven rear area security
divisions at 2,600 (these seven divisions lack the
weapons and equipment needed to bring them up to
full cadre strengths.
Units of the First and Third 1`1 Armies are
deployed defensively along and behind the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and occupy approximately
the northern third of the country. The First ROK
Army is deployed along the eastern half of the DMZ,
and its rear boundary varies front 50 to 80 miles below
the DM' The Third ROK Army occupies the western
half of the DMZ, and its rear boundary extends from
100 to 150 miles South of the DM'!,. In addition to the
18 infantry divisions in the First in(] 'Third ROK
Armies, major units include two armored brigades
assigned to the Third ROK Armv, and one honest
John Battalion and 22 field artillery battalions organic
to the First aril Third ROK Armies and the five corps.
The Second ROK Armv, deployed in the southern
two- thirds of the country, has 10 reserve divisions.
Five major combat units are subordinate to ROK
Army headquarters and located in the Third ROK
Army area �the air defense artillery brigade
(including two Hawk missile battalions and two
composite missile battalions), three Special Forces
brigades (airborne), and the Capital Security
Command (two military police battalions and one
provisional guard battalion). The Capital Security
Command, unlike the other two organizations, is
subordinate to ROK Army Headquarters for
administration only; it is under the direct operational
control of the Minister of National Defense.
The army's small aviation organization, which is
subordinate to the ROK Armv Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, has 358 liaison -type aircraft and
helicopters which, with pilots and supporting
personnel, are assigned to various army divisions as
aviation observation detachments. (For further details
on army aviation, see subsection C,5, below.)
3. Training
Army training and school systems are patterned
after these of the U.S. Armv, and training supervision
and guidance is furnished b the Joint U.S. Military
Advisory Group �Korea (JUSMAG �K).
Under the supervision of the U.S. Military Advisory
Groups (both JUSMAG �K and its predecessor,
KMAG), a highly effective progressive program of
individual training has been developed; it is generally
considered one of the most efficient and effective of all
ROK Army operations. Inductees are forwarded from
provincial recruiting centers to the replacement
training center at Nonsan. Upon completion of 16-
weeks basic training at the center, infantry personnel
are sent directly to units as individual replacements;
personnel earmarked for the other brauches are ser t to
branch schools, then either directly to units as
individual replacements, or to specialist schools for
additional training before being sent to units.
Specialist training courses currently taught in the
various schools and time allocations for different
subjects are substantially the same as for similar U.S.
Army service school courses.
ROK Army divisions conduct divisional schools at
which training is given to NCO's and potential NC:O's
of the divisions. Courses of instruction vary from unit
to unit, but the usual length of each course is 5 to 6
weeks. in addition, the corps conducts NCO courses of
varying lengths for nondivisional units. NCO
Specialists to fill specialized positions in service units
are trained in branch schools.
Individual training for officers is given at tlic
Korean Military Academy, basic branch schools, the
Command and General Staff School, and the
Logistical Management School.
The Korean Military Academy, located about 10
miles northeast of Seoul, provides a 4 -year course
leading to a commission as second lieutenant. Armv
officers go through their branch schools early in their
careers, including in most cases both basic and
advanced courses. The Command and General Staff
College, at Chinhae, offers to selected officers courses
patterned after those of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College; and the Logistical Manage-
ment School, in Seoul, provides advance training in
staff -level logistical administration. All of these
schools are under the command of Headquarters,
ROK Army.
At the National Defense College, selected senior
officers receive further training in high -level staff duty
for national security planning. A small group of
selected senior officers is sent each year to the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Cadres from the regular army are assigned on a full
time basis to key positions in the reserve divisions, and
the local unit and reinforcement reservists are called
up from the nearby areas for training.
Organizational training is both intensive and
comprehensive, with emphasis on combat training.
Particular stress is placed on leadership training
designed to develop competent junior officers and
noncommissioned officers. Marksmanship, night
training, and small -unit tactics are also stressed. The
training cycle features two- division tree maneuvers,
13
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33 R 641 P� 3 9 Ip6Uiamlll'.iC Dn+' x Ni 1. CaLLa �-.r:wF !,taY.:i r.a:. -::r.P ..;1...1:. a
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s
r'.
w
,1
:.,1.
e
E
FIGURE 9. ROK troops engage) in field training (U /OU)
two of which are scheduled yearly (Figures 9 and 10).
Some training problen* exist, particularly in the area
of logistical support, where supply and maintenance
procedures are weak. Service unit training lags behind
that of combat units, and the capability of
commanders below the division level to coordinate
supporting weapons and provide logistical support is
limited. In general, however, the status of training is
good, and units are considered combat ready at both
the division and corps levels. The First ROK Armv
stuff is considered capable of commanding and
controlling a field army in time of war.
4. Logistics
The logistical organization and procedures of the
ROK Army are generally patterned after. th which
were in effect in the U.S. Armv prior to I July 1962,
modified to meet local conditions and ROK Armv
capabilities.
The Deputy Chief of St for Logistics is
responsible for the logistic support of the army in
addition to providing common -use items for all three
services. The deputy chief, through the chiefs of the
technical services, controls all army logistical
installations and all technical service schools. Also
under the deputy chief is the Logistical Base
Command, which administers and coordinates the
activities of the various logistical units and
installations. Thu headquarters of the Logistical Base
Command and most of the logistical installations are
located at Pusan to take advantage of that city's port
and rail facilities. The army logistical installations in
the Pusan area include a clothing factory, machine
shop, an arsenal, and shops for rebuilding
automobiles, tires, and armament. There is also a
quartermaster depot at Yongdungp'o -dong, a
14
quartermaster reclamation and maintenance center in
Taejon, and an army aviation depot at Wonju.
The First and 'Third ROK Armies provide direct
logistical support to the combat divisions and other
forces under their command through their own system
of supply depots and other supply points. The Second
I1OK Army supports its units logistically through the
four military district commands.
Weapons and equipment are of U.S. origin and
largely World War II in design. The army is
adequately supplied with infantry weapons but is
handicapped by the limited types and obsolescence of
its artillery and signal equipment. There are
significant short ages in engineer equipment, vehicles,
maintenance facilities, and troop housing. An urgent
requirement exists for additional signal equipment.
Small arms ammunition is produced in the arsenal
near Pusan, and 10-16 rifles will soon be made at a
new plant nearby, but the army will continue to be
dependent upon U.S. MAP support for other weapons
anti equipment and for replacements and spare parts.
Except for procurement, the army is capable of
operating its supply system, and in the event of
hostilities probably could effectively support its
operations if adequate supplies were received at the
depots.
5. Army aviation
Army aviation is subordinate to the ROK Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Its organization,
mission, and training are patterned after those of its
U.S. Army counterpart. It provides reconnaissance
and liaison support for all elements of the army. Its
248 fixed wing liaison -type. aircraft (0 -1, U -6) and 110
helicopters (01 I- 23C,UH IH), with pilots and
supporting personnel, arc assigned to the various army
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FIGURE 10. ROK Army tanks crossing river during training
exercise (U /OU)

divisions us aviation observation detachments. The
helicopters are tinder operational control of the Eighth
U.S. Army.
Army aviation has an authorized personnel strength
of 1,183 and maintains an average strength of about
1,200 men, all volunteers. It is a small but well- trained
organization. Advice and training assistance is
furnished by the JUSMAG �K. The helicopters
provide an extremely limited lift capability otherwise,
army aviation has no troop transport or paradrop
capability. Some 400 competent pilots are actively
assigned to army units. A large number of airfields in
South Korea are suitable for liaison -type aircraft
operations, thus giving army aviation a highly flexible
dispersal capability.
r'
M
C
N`.
xrj
f
D. Navy (S)
The mission of the ROK Navy (ROKN) is to
conduct naval operations in support of U.N. and ROK
forces, including antisubmarine warfare (ASW),
amphibious and minesweeping operations, and the
patrolling of coastal waters. Although similar in size to
the North Korean Navy (NKN), the ROKN would be
at a tactical disadvantage to the NKN during wartime
conditions due to the NKN's submarines and guided
missile patrol boats. In general, however, the ROKN
could effectively counter the NKN, unless the NKN
was supported by third- country navies. The most
effective use of the ROKN during general hostilities
would be as a supplement to allied naval forces. The
ROKN is capable of performing its primary peacetime
role of patrolling coastal waters, primarily guarding
against the threat of North Korean infiltration by sea.
However, the navy is hampered seriously by the small
number of units available for covering the 1,500 -mile
coastline and by the age and slow speed of many of its
ships. In spite of these deficiencies, the ROKN
generally has been effective in countering this threat.
The acquisition of newer and faster patrol craft in the
near future will enhance the navy's counterinfiltration
capability. Its ASW capability is effective against
slow -to- medium speed submarines. ASW units are
able to maintain contact on evasive targets and to
conduct effective single and multiship close- search-
and- attack plans; however, ASW search effectiveness
is restricted to close -in search with conventional
shipboard equipment. The minesweeping capability
consists of 11 ships and I boat, all of which can sweep
moored mines. Nine of the ships and the boat can
make acoustic and magnetic sweeps. The minesweeper
force is large enough to keep two adjacent ports open.
Mines for any fields around Korea would have to be
prepared by U.S, forces and then be made available to
the ROKN. The number of spare parts and the
amount of general stores, pro- Asions, and fuel on hand
are inadequate for extended periods at sea. Although
ships crews are trained in methods of transfer and
replenishment at sea, insufficient logistic support ships
arc available to service the fleet. Ships lack necessary
spare parts to accomplish any except the most minor
repairs at sea.
The ROK Marine Corps, an organic but
semiautonomous part of the navy, is assigned the
mission of maintaining an amphibious force in
readiness and conducting such land operations as may
be necessary for the prosecution of a naval campaign.
Over- the -beach logistic support is lacking, however,
and protracted operations are beyond the corps
capability.
I. Organization
Modeled after the U.S. Navy, the ROK Navv is
headed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), an
admiral, who is assisted by the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations arid by Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations
for Operations, Personnel, Logistics, Intel ;igence, find
Comptroller. The technical bureaus and offices, the
naval operating forces, and the shore establishment
are nominally subordinate to the deputy CNO's but
actually are under the direct control of the Chief of
Naval Operations. The marine corps is responsible to
the CNO through the Commandant, Marine Corps.
The naval shore establishment consists of a naval
base at Chinhae and naval stations at Pusan, Inchon,
Mokp'o, Cheju, and Mukhojin -ni. The major
component of the shore establishment is the Chhin;:ae
Naval Base, which includes a shipyard, the Naval
Academy, the Naval War College, several service
schools, recruit training center, naval !iospitals, and
several fleet support facilities.
Operating forces of the fleet are organized along the
tactical and administrative lines of the U.S. Navy and
are administratively assigned to six commands
Escort and Patrol Flotilla, Amphibious Flotilla, Mine
Squadron, Service Squadron, Anti infiltration Flotilla,
and Fleet Training Group. Officially, the CNO has
only administrative command of the naval operating
forces, since operational control is exercised by the
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command,
through Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
However, in practice, operational control of the ROK
fleet has been delegated to the CNO, who exercises his
control through the Commander in Chief, ROK Fleet.
Naval headquarters in Seoul maintains administra-
tive control over the navy through a radio, teletype,
15
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patrol craft, auxiliary ships, serv craft, and
minesweepers (Figure 12), all are former U.S. ships
completed during World War 11, and their
effectiveness is limited. All naval ships operate from
Chinhae and use the other naval stations at Pusan,
Inch'ou, Mokpo, Cheju, and Mukhojin -ni as ports of
call for replenishing.
For patrol purposes, South Korean coasts are
divided into three subareas �south (including Chcju-
FIGURE 12. The ROK Navy coastal
minesweeper Samch'ok (C)
r'
and telephone conununication systen. While sonic
improvement has been made, this system is barely
adequate for operational control of the fleet and the
other operating units. Inadequate preventative and
routine maintenance of electronic equipment results in
a marginally satisfactory operating condition of
shipboard communication equipment.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
1'ersonnel of the navy number about 45,500 of
whom 25,900 are in the marine corps; of the
remaining 19,600, approximately 7,000 serve afloat.
About 2,500 ax naval officers a 2,100 are marine
officers, and the balance enlisted men.
The operating forces consist of 5 destroyers (Figure
l I 3 destroyer escorts, 41 patrol craft, 12 mine
warfare ships, 21 amphibious warfare ships, 88
amphibious warfare craft, 10 auxiliary ships, and 60
service craft. With the exception of some of the small
'Tor regularly updated information, refer to the Automated
Naval Order of Rattle, '.he Military Intelligence Summary, .end the
Naval Forces Intelligence Study. all published by the Defense
intelligence Agency.
16
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FIGURE 11. The ROK Navy destroyer Seoul, a former
U.S. Navy ship (U /OU)

(lo), cast, and west �to which surface units are
assigned, About one -third of the marine corps combat
elements are stationed on the west flank of the DMZ.
The navy has no organized reserve. Mobilization
capacity, by M-I-90 is estimated at 28,200 naval
personnel and 63,700 marines.
3. Training
The navy closely follows the training 7ctrine and
procedures of the U.S. Navy, and the overall training
program is being supervised by a U.S. Navy Advisory
Group. ROK naval training does not measure up to
U.S. standards, but steady progress is being made, and
efficiency has continually improved.
Naval personnel are being trained in their own
service schools and at Korean civilian universities, as
Well as in the. United States. The navy training ivstem
ashore consists of a recruit training center, service
schools, the Naval Academy, and the Naval War
College, all located at Chinhae. The Naval War
College provides a 36 -week command aril staff
course. Four types of training are available at the
Naval Academy �the regular 4-year course, a 13 -week
officer candidate course, a 24 -week postgraduate
school course, and it 4 -week warrant officer course.
The Naval Training Center has seven service schools
for enlisted personnel� navigation, gunnery en-
gineering, communications, electronics, administra-
tion, and the Naval Academy Preparatory School.
Recruit training covers 13 weeks and is similar to that
in the U.S. Navy.
All operational ships pursue an organized training
schedule under the direction of the Fleet Training
Group, which was established to assist the forces afloat
in developing and maintaining the highest possible
standards of training and operational readiness. This
organization offers numerous courses of varying
duration covering all phases of shipboard technical
and practical work. Navy amphibious training is
directed by the Navy Amphibious Training Unit at
Chinhae, which trains personnel in the various phases
of amphibious warfare using U.S. training manuals.
Combined exercises involving U.S. and ROK naval
forces are frequently held and have provided useful
training for the ROK Navy.
4. Logistics
The logistic support activities and organization of
the ROK Navy are patterned after its U.S. Navy
counterparts and are modified to fit Korean facilities
and capabilities. The principal support facilities are at
Chinhae, and limited support is available at Pusan
and Inch'on Naval Stations, both of which can supply
provisions and provide minor emergency repairs. The
Naval Shipyard at Chinh is capable of ac-
complishing all repairs to the present fleet provided
that materiel, virtually all of which is MAP supplied,
is in stock. Naval ship construction facilities are also
located at the Chinhae Naval Shipyard. Construction
is limited to motor gunboats, patrol boats, landing
craft, and small auxiliaries, and to the manufacture of
various items of equipment and ordnance. Construc-
tion has also been (]one at the Korean Shipbuilding
Corporation in Pusan. The drydock at Chinhae can
accommodate ships up to destroyer size, and the
Naval Supply Depot, also at Chinhae, is the principal
storage point for all materiel used by the navy. Storage
facilities are generally good.
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for
Logistics is responsible to the Chief of Naval
Operations for determining logistic programs, plans,
and policy. Under the DCNO for Logistics there are
five technical bureaus� Ships, Medicine and Surgery,
Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, and yards and
Docks. Each of these bureaus assists in the execution of
logistic functions. Responsibility for the logistic
support of the ROK Navy lies With the U.S. Navy.
Supply channels and procedures for this support are
normal U.S. Navy supply channels and procedures.
The ROK Navy is expected to supply Whatever
materiel it can. The U.S. Naval Advisory Group
stresses logistics management and supply functions
and also handles the requisitioning of materiel for the
IIOK Navy.
5. Marine corps
The ROK Marine Corps is directly responsible to
the Chief of Naval Operations. The corps has a
personnel strength of 25,900, including 2,100 officers,
and an tmorganized reserve pool of 86,000 men, for
whom 300 active -duty training billets are maintained.
The primary missions of the marine corps are to
conduct land operations essential to the prosecution of
a naval campaign, to maintain an amphibious assault
force in readiness, and to provide for the security and
defense of naval installations.
The headquarters, in Seoul, consists of the
Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and a general
staff. The general staff consists of Deputies for
Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and
Comptroller. In July 1973 it was announced that
marine corps headquarters is to be consolidated with
naval headquarters, primarily to reduce administra-
17
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tive costs. Consolidation was to be completed by the
end of 1973. Details of the new organization are not
vet known.
The marine corps is broadly divided into combat
and supporting forces. The combat units include the
1st Marine Division (minus detached units), with
headquarters at Pohang; the 2d Marine Brigade
(Provisional), at Kimp'o; the Marine Island Security
Unit deployed to provide defense for the west coast
island complex; and security forces consisting of about
1,300 men, located at Seoul and at the naval base and
stations.
The 11,000 -man 1st Marine Division is under the
operational control of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces
Korea exercised through the ROK Chief of Naval
Operations. The 2d Marine Brigade, with about 5,000
men, is under the operational control of the U.S. 1st
Corps (Group). The Marine Island Security Unit is
operationally controlled by the Commander, ROK
Fleet, and is centered around Paengnyong -do (island).
Major marine supporting units include the Marine
Corps Base and Landing Force Training Unit at
Pohang, and the Marine Corps Base at Chinhae. The
base at Chinhae includes the Supply and Main-
tenance Depot and various marine corps schools.
Support forces total about 3,100 personnel. In
addition, the corps operates 15 utility aircraft.
E. Air force (S)
The ROK Air Force is a well- trained, reasonably
modern force which supplements U.S. tactical air
units stationed in South Korea. Its missions are to
provide air defense for South Korea and to support
ROK ground and naval forces; a secondary mission is
to provide, on request of the Minister of National
Defense, forces required for preserving internal
security.
The air force is capable of providing tactical support
to ground and naval forces under Visual Flight Rules
(VFR) conditions. Two tactical fighter squadrons and
nine day- fighter squadrons are fully combat ready.
The air force is equipped with AIM 9/13 air -to -air
Sidewinder missiles and would be capable of
providing a high degree of defense support if
additional modern radar sites were added. In the event
of an attack by North Korea, the air force could not
sustain either defensive or offensive operations for
more than a short period without rapid and full -scale
aid from friendly countries. Principal weaknesses are
the lack of supersonic aircraft, a shortage of spare
parts, an ineffective aircraft control and warning
(ACW) system, and insufficient air facilities for
18
effective dispersal of units and equipment. The air
force has a small transport capability. Pilot and
instructor training programs are satisfactory, but the
large number of pilots trained yearly in excess of
actual needs has become a major problem. The
generally low level of training of air force technicians
constitutes a major weakness.
1. Organization
Organization of the air force is patterned generally
after that of the U.S. Air Force. It is headed by the
Chief of Staff, who is advised and assisted by a Vice
Chief of Staff and a Deputy Chief of Staff. The
Deputy Chief of Staff is charged with coordinating
staff operations. The headquarters staff contains five
principal directorates and seven general staff sections
and /or offices. The directorates, whose functions are
similar to those of their USAF counterparts, are:
Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Materiel, and
Comptroller. The general staff sections are:
Administration, Communicatio: s, Installations, and
Public Information; offices include the Inspector
judge Advocate and the Surgeon. Duties of the
general staff are similar to those of USAF staff
sections.
Technically, the Chief of Staff exercises only
administrative control over !lie air force, inasmuch as
operational control is formally vested in the
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command,
through the Commander, U.S. Air Forces Korea
(AFK). However, in practice, immediate operational
control has been delegated to the Chief of Staff.
Operational service and other support units are
grouped under t4 separate major commands or
organizations which report directly to air force
headquarters. These include the Combat Air
Command, the Air Defense Communications Wing,
the Air Base Operations Wing, the Air Base Group,
and the Air Materiel Depot. Training elements consist
of the Air Force Academy, the Air Command and
Staff College, the Flying Training School, the
Technical Training Wing, and the Training Aids
Squadron. Other organizations are the Air Intelligence
Squadron, Office of Special Investigation, Special
Activities Service Squadron, and the Air Force
Hospital.
The Combat Air Command (CAC), with headquar-
ters at Osan, is organized into three fighter wings (11
fighter squadrons); an air transport wing (four
squadrons); four training squadrons; one light
reconnaissance squadron; and Control and Warning
(ACW) wing.
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Air defense of South Korea is performed jointly b
the aircraft of the CAC and the AA and SAM
battalions of the army. While the operational control
of the latter units is retained b the army, all their
actions .ire coordinated at the National Air Defense
Control Center at Osan.
2. Strength, composition, and dispoFition
The air force has a personnel strength of
approximately 28,500, including 4,400 officers and
24,100 enlisted men. The total includes 750 trained
pilots. Among its 379 aircraft are 187 jet fighters (F-
861 F -5A, F -41)), 8 jet reconnaissance (RF -5A), 33
jet trainers (T -33, AT -33), 39 prop trainers (T -28, T-
41 B), 35 prop transports (C -46, C -54, C -118), 13
helicopters (UH -19, UH- 1I -0, 7 ocean surveillance (S-
2r1), 50 tactical control aircraft (0-1) and 7 other
aircraft. About 372 aircraft are assigned to operational
units of the Combat Air Command. All fighter aircraft
are capable of utilizing AIM 9/Bair-to-air Sidewinder
missiles.
Principal CAC units, type of aircraft assigned, and
their deployment are shown in Figure 13. Information
'For cur*ent and detailed information refer to the Free 11'Orld Air
Order of Battle, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
FIGURE 13. Principal Air Force units (S)
on airfields is provided in the Transportation and
"Telecommunications chapter of this General Survev.
3. Training
The ROY Air Force training system, generally
patterned after that of the U.S. Air Force, functions
well, but due to budget limitations produces marginal
results. Basic military training and basic instruction in
supply and administration are conducted under
supervision of the joint U.S. Military Advisory
Croup� Korea. The U.S. MAP also provides advanced
and applied technical instruction through on- the -job
training at USAF installations overseas and formal
instructor and specialized training in the United States
at USAF technical schools, the Air University, and
civilian colleges. Impediments to training in U.S.
installations include the inadequate backgrounds of
Korean students, the language barrier, and lack of
textual material in the Korean language. In South
Korea, poor training facilities and insufficient training
aids are additional handicaps.
The ROK Air Force Academy, located at Seoul, is
patterned after the U.S. Air Force Academy. It offers a
4 -year course leading to a B.S. degree and a
commission as second lieutenant. Since 1958, entering
UNIT
AIRCRAFT TYPE
LOCATION
1st Fighter Wing:
I05th Fighter Squadron
F 5 A /B.....................
KWANGJU
111th Fighter Squadron
F 86 F......................
KUNSAN
112th Fighter Squadron
F 86 F......................
KWANGJU
115th Fighter Squadron
F 5 A /B.....................
Do.
120th Fighter Squadron
F 5 A /B.....................
KANGNUNG
16th Training Squadron
T 33
KWANGJU
10th Fighter Wing:
101st Fighter Squadron
F 86 F......................
KIMPO
102d Fighter Squadron
F 5 A /B.....................
SUWON
103d Fighter Squadron
F 86 F......................
121st Fighter Squadron
F 86 F......................
Do.
SEOUL
189th Flying Squadron (training)
AT- 33
Do.
32d Reconnaissance Squadron............
RF- 5A
KIMPO
11th Fighter Wing:
110th Fighter Squadron
F 5 A /B.....................
TAEGU
151st Tactical Fighter Squadron..........
F- 4D
5th Air Transport Wing:
Do.
5th Air Transport Squadron
C 46
KIMHAE
6th Air Transport Squadron
C 46
KIMPO
8th Air Transport Squadron
C 54
Do.
9th Ocean Survey Squadron
S 2 A.......................
Do.
7th Air Transport Squadron
C 118 /C 54 /UH- 1N..........
Do.
33d Air Rescue Squadron
UH 1 H /UH- 19..............
Do.
12th Training Squadron
T 41 B......................
TAEJON
15th Training Squadron
T 28
36th Tactical Control Squadron............
0- 1
SACHON
SEOUL
19
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i1
classes have had 70 students. Only about 75% of the
cadets complete the course. Pilot cadets receive 40
hours cf primary training in the O -IA. About half the
graduates go into various specialized fields, such as
ciectronics, communications, and maintenance.
The ROK Air Command and Stuff College, also
located at Seoul, has three graduate courses, each of
which is patterned after i's counterpart at the U.S. Air
University �the Command and Staff Course, for
lieutenant coluilels and colonels; the Squadron Officer
Course, for captains and majors; and the Academic
Instructors Course, for lieutenants and captains.
The 12th flying training squadron stationed at
Taejon conducts primary training with T- 41B's.
Basic training is conducted at the 15th Training
Squadron at Sachon with T -28's, and transitional
training is conducted at Kwangju in T -33's. Most
students are graduates of the Air Force Academy, bui
some come from the Officer Candidate School.
Standards are high and about 50% of the students fail,
but the squadrons turn out a proficient, first -rate pilot.
All three fighter wings maintain instrument sections
which provide transition and proficiency flying for
pilots assigned.
Most of the ground training is given by the Air
Technical "Training Wing at Taejon, which also
operates the Officer Candidate School. Technical
training is largely academic, rather than practical,
because of inadequate training aids; completion of
courses in the variow schools under the wing must be
followed by training in operational units.
Because of the ROK Air Force's close association
with the USAF during and since the Korean war, the
air force has received most of its training under U.S.
auspices. The aim of U.S. training has been to produce
instructors for air force schools and supervisors for
training in the field. As the air force training
capability increases, the need for training with USAF
u-, its in the continental United States and at U.S.
installations overseas will decrease. No training is
provided for air force reserve ersonnel.
4. Logistics
Air force echelons of supply are patterned after
those of the U.S. Air Force. Primary direction and
control are furnished by the Air Materiel Staff at Air
Force Headquarters. Implementation of policy and
operations are directed and monitored by materiel
staffs at each lower echelon, depot functions are
managed by a subordinate air force command (Air
Materiel Depot). An air materiel directorate is
20
included in the Combat Air Command. There is
strong control through all echelons; however, policies
established by headquarters are sometimes misin-
terpreted or dogmatically applied by lower echelons.
The air force supply system is supported through the
Air Materiel Depot located at Taegu. A munitions war
reserve has been established and deployed to fighter
bases. Storage facilities are temporary -type military
strictures that were left behind by other nations in the
1945 period. Existing facilities are not adequate to
store and maintain required in- country stocks properly
or, in particular, to expand stockage to meet
emergency situations. A major pipeline system,
extending from Pohang to Seoul, supplies diesel, jet
fuel, and gasoline to bases and airfields in that area.
Elsewhere, jet fuel is transported in railroad tank cars
and gasoline by trucks. At major bases, most fuel is
stored in above ground tanks; at other airfields, it is in
55- gallon drums.
The air force provides its own depot, field, and
organizational maintenance for aircraft, armament,
electrical equipment, and vehicles. Aircraft main-
tenance is good, considering strenuous flying,
schedules, weak management, and the shortage of
skilled technicians and parts. Increased emphasis on
periodic and special inspections has had a favorable
impact resulting in improved aircraft reliability.
All major items of air force equipment are furnished
by the United States and are MAP supported.
Cumbersome administrative practices and poor
management have hindered development of efficient
supply and maintenance systems; storage facilities are
crowded and dilapidated. Transportation media var-y
from poor to only fair, except for air transport, which is
good. Supply levels for ordnance, spare parts, and fuel
are authorized at 60 days but, due to fund and facility
limitations, cannot be maintained.
P. Paramilitary (S)
The 49,000 -man Korean National Police (KNP),
including the Maritime Police and the Combat Police
Force, has paramilitary capabilities and in emergency
or wartime situations would move under Ministry of
National Defense control from its normal Ministry of
Home Affairs supervision. The Maritime Police,
consisting of 800 rnen and 45 patrol craft, is concerned
with coastal security and other coastguard -type
functions, The Combat Police Force, which consists of
37 companies totaling 4,800 men, is involved in the
effort to counter agent infiltration from North Korea.
d
4
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