NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 17; ITALY; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080001-6
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CONFIDENTIAL
17 /GS /C P
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Italy
December 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCL SURVEY
CONFIDENTIAL
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
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ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country
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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS
COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspvch%v of
the subject countrx Chronology Area Brief
Summarx Map
THE SOCIETY Social Ntructwe Population
Labor Health I,ixing conditions Social
problems Religion 0 Education 0 Public m-
formation Artis.ti: expression
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evo-
lution of the� state Gme�mmental strength and
stahilih Structure and function Political dx-
namics National policies Threats to stahilih
The police Intelligence and securitN
THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economx Its
strochcre� agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and
p(mer, metals and minerals. mannfachcring and
construction Domestic trade Fvonomic policx
Mid de%clopmeFit 0 International economic rela-
tions
TRANSPORTATION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems
Strategic mohilih Railroads Highxxa%s
Inland %aterm ays Pipelines Ports Merchant
marine Civil air Airfields The telecom system
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate
Military geographic regions Strategic areas
Internal routes Approaches: land. sea, air
ARMED FORCES The defense establishment e
Joint activities Ground forces Naxal forces
Air forces Pararnilitarx
SCIENCE I.e xrl of scientific advancement Or-
ganization, planning, :end financing of research
Scientific education, manpower, and facilities a
Major research fields
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The ineomplete Miracle 1
The Shallots% Roots of Derntar c%
Tempering Unih "ith Disersih
It's Different in the Stnth
The Miracle and After
Wider Frontiers
The Weight of Inertia
Chronology 16
AreaBrief
Summary Map follou�.s 19
This Cuantry Profile was prepared for the NIS by
the Central Intelligence ,%gency. Research Ica.s stub
stardially completed by September 19;3.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The Incomplete Miracle
Postwar Italy experienced a creative flowering and a
dramatic economic boom; in fact, Italy deserves,
perhaps even more than West Germany, the word
"miracle" for what it accomplished. The dynamic
Italian people showed they could compete with
anyone on the world market, and Italian exports
penetrated every country. But since 1970 the boom has
petered out, and the future rate of economic progress is
uncertain. It remains clear, however, that Italian socie-
ty has great vitality and also serious problems. The
problems and defects that sidetracked the miracle have
a long history, and their solution will take time and
much wisdom; but, judging from their history, the
Italians will scrape through. (u /ou)
One of the most important things to realize about
Italy is that it is rich in people but poor in natural
resources. Except for extensive reserves of natural -as
and smaller reserves of oil (which were discovered only
after World War 11), the country has scanty mineral
resources. Mountains and hills cover about four- fifths
of the land; only a small fraction is fovorable for
agriculture, and sorne of this is only beginning to
be properly cultivated. One can get an idea of
Italy's material limitations by making a comparison
with France the :}I million Italians live in about
half tit^ space oc:upied by the 52 million French
People and have only about it fourth as much Rood
cropland. (u /ou,
But Italy's most important resource has always been
its people. Two thousand years ago their energy and
organizing skill spread the great Roman Empire over
North Africa, the Near Fast, and most of Europe; tnd
out of the many cultures they encountered they fused
something new, snaking Rome the center of Western
civilization. Even after the sheer mass of barbarian in-
vasions toppled the empire, Latin remained the
language of European education, and Roman civiliza-
tion its ideal; and when the German tribes settled
down and began to organize themselves in the Middle
Ages, they called themselves by the magic name,
"Roman Empire," When educated Europeans even-
tually began to write seriously in their own vernacular
as well as in Latin, their pioneer a td inspiration was
Dante Alighieri of Florence (n on;
For the Western world, Italy has been a glowing
hearth f hundreds of years: re'memberec' during the
turbulent Dark Ages as the vanished center of order
and the good life; then dazzling scholars and artists
with a burst of creativity combining old and new; and
perpetually a source of inspiration to the devout. This
sustained admiration and affection has created an Ita-
ly of its own, ever renewed by rediscover" by new
generations of travelers, students, and devotees, and
felt even by people untaught in Latin, unsympathetic
to the Roman Catholic Church, and uninterested in
art. Arcund and beyond the actual countr and people
lies the intangible Italy of the Western heritage.
(u; "o u
Today's Western culture is in no smal! part a
product of the Italian past, summed up in the ruins of
the Forum and the glories of the Florentine galleries.
The immense achievement of the Renaissance began
in the city states of nor.h Italy after they won their in-
dependence from the German Holy Roman Emperors
in the 13th century. For the next 250 years thev were
more :)r less ;elf governing, or subject only to local
tyrants. Florence led the way in literature, painting,
scu architecture, and music, and soon the
Renaissance Ud spread to ott r cities of north Italy
and Western Europe. It flourished on the new
freedom, the new prosperity, and a doulle inspiration:
the Christia! faith continued to be an active source,
while the rediscovered classics were a lively new cue.
Both proved capable of responding to everything an
artist could put into them, and to that enthusiasti age
they were not irreconcilable mode; of thouf ht, but
gave a common impulse tc artists, scholars, and the
wealthy. The many school- and patrons gave the artist
altertrati%e sours ^s of instruction and support �in
other words, freedot and prestige. (u,'ou)
The Renaissance M-in has become a byword for
self confident exploration in every field and for weds
personal interests and accomplishments. "rhe architect
Alberti, for example, was also an outstanding athlete, a
composer of music, an amateur of mathemati:s and
physics, a gifted painter, and an able writer; he once
said, "Men can do all things if they will." It was an
age when merchants and rulers like the Medicis were
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familiar with Latin and Greek literature and would
spend vast sums for ancient manuscripts as well as for
the newest works of art. The Renaissance tradition of
individualism and wide cultural interests has never
died out in Italy, and it still contributes to the quality
of life there. (u ou
The everyday Italian in the city goes to work
through a museum of architecture: ancient, medieval,
and all kinds of modern jumbled together, lived in,
worked in �the electricity, plumbing, and heating
more or less obtrusive depending on the period or cen-
tury when they were installed. The great cultural
periods arc as much a part of his life as the furniture of
a childhood home, and even to the Italian who has
given no thought to abstractions since primary school,
the implications of the Roman temples, circuses, and
country villas; of the massive medieval defenses; of the
exuberant multicolored marble elegance of the
Renaissance are present always. uiou)
The country man is no less aware of the past. Hi,
lanes are as likely as not to be the straight Homan
roads, crossing by an arched bridge over a river �only
the country wagons, still built to the Roman gage, can
use them; the modern roads go elsewhere. His church
probably has faded Romanesque frescoe-, flat and
staring, above the altar, or the baroque saints, their
robes perpetually swept by the high winds of the 17th
century. (ujou)
The very landscapes in the background of
Renaissance painting� horizons of tumultuous hills as
delicatel cultivated as gardens, which any American
in art appreciation class considers a romantic ex-
aggeration �are the landscapes the Tuscan farmer
lies among and the Tuscan commuter views from his
bus. The continuity i A)% u ou
The appreciation of heauty. focused by great
painters, is perpetually refreshed in Italy; and the peo-
ple are accustomed to b -auty and can respond to it
without self- consciousness or pos-. But the obvious
continuity has another effect man Italians have
something in common with the ordinary children of
extraordinary parents: a puzzled sense of inadequacy.
or is it loss, or have we been robbed? All that was com-
monplace in Rome and Florence is forgotten, and only
the impression of vanished power and glory remain. It
is a proud and disturbing heritage. (u ou
Italians today are proud of their not,le heritage,
but they also want to he modern, with the best cars
and neon signs and the latest fashions. Man z family
living in an 18th century walkup would trade its
priceless facade for gaod plumbing, an:: man a
builder, encountering yet another mosaic as he digs a
foundation, conceals it from the historical monuments
official, for he is understandably reluctant to idle his
construction crew and tie up his funds during months
o: vears of archaeological debate over the value of the
new find. (1""111
The Shallow Roots of Democracy (c)
With 35 changes of government since World War 11,
the Italian Government is a remarkable example of in-
stability. This becomes easier to understar d when
viewed against the backdrop of Italian histouy, for the
people have had little experience with representative
democratic government. Even after unification in
1810, relatively few Italians could vote until after
World War 11, except for the democratic a �periment
from 1919 to 1922. The government, shaped on the
British model in the mid -19th century, was created by
a few north Italians� particulariy by Garibaldi,
2
(savour, Mazzini, and the central figure, King Vittorio
Emanuel( 11 of Piedmont. There was no system of
popular local govemmeot to build on, aad little un-
derstanding or support among people to whom govern-
me nt had alavays been something one endured.
Cavour, "the Bismarck of Italian unity," forged the
peninsulas kingdoms, principalities, and Papal States
into a centralized constitutional monarc with a
king, a parliament, and a cabinet ministry responsible
to the parliament. Elections were held �among a tiny
band of male property holders. In the south the land
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c�rr ated bs special statutes, in areas %hose separteness
"a, obvious �the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, the
F� rich speaking Valle d A nta, and the partl,. Ger-
man- speaking region of Trentino -Alto Adige �and the
c�onstitutit,n simple formalized them. The partl% Slavic
region of Friuli Venezia Giulia was formed in 1963,
deia%ed 15 sears b% protracted negotiations with
l 1igoslasia about Trie,te. These five %sere all sp -_ial
eases, all far from Rome; the other 15 existed onh at
the level ,f constitutional principle, the difficult prac�-
tic�al details being endlesa% debated.
In 1968 parliament finally provided for the election
of ass in the 15 remaining regions; the
assemblies then drafted regional constitution: and
parliament ratified them, all without am great delay.
In the poorest areas, the lucrative position of capital
city :ts hotic contested, and in Calabria and Abruzzi
hitter disputes and even riots took place over its selec-
tion: in both, the regional government was finally
divided betHCen two cities.
The legal transfer of powers took place on 1 April
1972, and the regions began handling such matters as
town planning, urban and rural police, museums and
libraries, public welfare and health ae hospital
assistance, regional transportation and bus services,
and regional roads, aqueducts, and public works. On
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that date, also, 14,000 civil servants were transferred
from national -level to regional assignments. A year
later some of the legal transfer of pow -r was still in
process, and Rome still refused to transfer some
powers. For example, the regions are trying to protect
the envir.)nment and to improve land us(, but the
national government has kept control of many aspects
of those subjects.
Po.entialiy the most explosive region has been the
German- speaking area on the southern slopes below
the Brenner Pass, the South Tyrol, which Italy ac-
quired from Austria after World War I and named the
Alto Adige. After World War II it was promised
autonomy. and Rome kept that promise �but merged
the German- speaking area with thy- predominanth
Italian province of Trento to Porn. au Italian
dominated "autonomous region" (:ailed Trentino Alto
Adige The German- speaking people number about
200,M), and their predicament evokes much sym-
pathy across the border in Austria. Anti Italian
terrorist activities have been serious in the region, but
have diminished since the Decembei 1969 agreement
between Austria and Italy, which provided that Ronne
would give progressively more atrtcnomy to the Ger-
man -speaking part of the region red that the German
language would have equal status with Italian in the
public media and schools of the whole region.
The regional governments ha: e still to prove
themselves. Their proponents hale long held that, be-
ing on the scene, they would appreciate lo-al needs
more acutely and respond more quickly. If effective,
regional governments could indeed do much to dispel
the indifference, frustration, and resentment that
Italians generalh feel toward government. People
might then see their votes as a genuine way of com-
munication and action. But if the reguIr political par-
ties view them as another source of patronage rather
than as a field of endeavor, they will increase the
average Italian's alienation from his government �and
they may also increase his interest in the Communists
Already the Communists dominate the govenments of
the three "Red Belt" regions (Emilia- Romagna,
Toscana, and Umbria), and they seem determined to
be responsible and effective To the surprise of inam
observers, their constitutions did not differ greath
from those submitted by other regions, and earl'
reports indicate that the Communists are using their
hest administrative talent on the other hand. Sicily
has had regional status for a quarter centun, and its
gnernment is a thorough tangle of cor.uption, in-
yols Christian Democrats, Communists, and %lafia
alike.
Rome regards the region it goyernments with deep
suspicion, and the regions consider their budgets
(allocated from Ronne( to he Inadequate By mid -1973
the major regional activih had be en the preparation of
massive studies on regional problems and on regional
aspects of national problems. In 1972 for the first time
the Prime 'Minister started the practice of meeting with
the regional presidents each month to discuss regional
matters. There had been no official channel between
the presidents and Rome befor and dialogue has
been extrerneiv important Time will tell whether the
regional governments will be efficient or whether the
sins of the central bureaucracy Hill he duplicated in
every regional capital.
It's Different in the South (c)
The poverty of southern Italy has been the most
conspicuous national problem ever since the country
[)(-came a nation. Even a casual observer is struck by
the difference between the green north and the
south and between the hustling, building, noisy in-
dustrial cities of the north and the south's picturesque
rustic poverty The problem area is called the Mcz-
6
zogiorno. the land of the midday sun, it includes the
foot of the heart almost up to Rome and the islands of
Sicily and Sardinia� which, though different in
histon and culture from the southern part of the
peninsula, have shared its destitution.
The difference starts with the climate The north is
almost a part of central Europe, with cold wet winters
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and hot summers and reasonable rainfall all year
long �a rich land with a modern, varied agriculture.
The south is the brilliantly sunny ,'Mediterranean land,
where the summers are hot and so dry that except
where the land is irrigated only drought resistant
vegetation can survive� particu'..-ly the classical
olives, %%heat� and grapes. The pale green fields of
spring soon become arid and tawn and sometimes
they are further burned by the dry .rirorco (hot, dust
laden winds that Mow from Africa). Most stream beds
are dry in summer, making irrigation difficult even for
large landowners; big dams and government money
are needed Rain comes to the south in autumn and
winter, often as violent storms that fill dry beds with
raging torrents that erode and destrov.
The differences are historic as well as geographic.
The self- governing cities of the Middle Ages and
Renaissance, the centers of wealth and civilization,
were in the north. The south was perpetually a colony
(in the sense of being exploited): first of the Greeks;
then of the Romans, who almost o',literated its thriv-
ing culture; and when Rome fell, of Arabs, Normans,
Spaniards, and French in turn. The unprotected
peasants retreated to hilltop villages for safety from
such marauders as the Vikings and later the Harbary
pirates, and the coastal lowlands that had been the
granary of the Greek and Roman empires became
deserted marshes. Ancient drainage and irrigation
systems went out of use; neglected lowlands became
malarial and shunned, and the peasants worked the
dry slopes and highlands with effort and ingenuity,
usually for absentee landlords.
Partly as a result of this history, the people
themselves are different. Bustling, cosmopolitan
northern Italy contains most of th^ physical types of
western and central Europe; in fact, there are probably
as many blonds there as in some regions of Germany
The people of the south are more uniform, the majori-
ty being what many Americans assume to be the
Italian type �with dark hair and eyes and olive skin.
From the beginning, the unification of Italy seemed
to bring growing prosperity to the north and nothing to
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the south. The north tended to regard the south as an
exasperating millstone around its neck, while the south
envied the north and blamed Rome for the difference.
Over the years various official inquiries were made into
conditions in the south, which produced some
valuable information �but no action.
Early in the 20th century, the government in Rome,
spurred by the example of a few northern
philanthropists, began to take action. Special laws es-
tablished programs of public works, tax exemptions,
and other assistance to the south, but progress was
slow. The major public works project, the aqueduct of
Puglia, which was designed to bring water from the
mo-:ntains across to the tableland at the heel of Italy,
was 0egun in 1906 and completed only in 1938.
Mussolini launched projects for land reform, drainage,
irrigation, and resettlement in various parts of Italy,
and these were of some value to a few southern places.
Land reclamation projects lagged b:cause of endemic
malaria in the lowlands �in 1925 one out of seven
workmen draining the Maccarese marshes died of
malaria. It was not until the Allied armies arrived with
DDT in 1943 that the eclamation of the malarial
lowlands became possible.
The Safety Valve
For more than 100 years, emigration has provided a
safety valve for the population pressure in the south.
The outward flow, to manv countries besides the
Uni! States, began as a movement of about 120,000
persons a year during the latter part of the 19th cen-
turs. Bs the turn of the crntury the figure had doubled,
and IH�tween 1901 and 1914 it averaged more than
600,(00 (th 873,0(N) emigrants of 1913 were the high
point of the exodus). After World War I emigration
was restricted, partly by the receiving countries and
partly by the Fascist regime in Italy, which was in the
throes of Mussolini's colonial adventure. Much money
and en; rgv was wasted in Ethiopia. Libya, and
Somalia before the dream of settling in those areas was
abandoned. An estimated 25 -30 million people left
Italy be twee n 1861 and World War 11--yet the pop-
ulation in Italy increased by 20 million during the
same period.
Called the "hemorrhage of the Mersogiorno" by
the southern press, this outflow recommenced after
World War 11, but by 1955 it had shifted mostly
toward the northern cities of Italy, creating a new
social problem there. (To some extent this movement
to the north compensates for the high birthrate of the
south� double that of the north.) The north already
knew southerners, usually in ill -paid official jobs that
northerners disdained or did not need; cities like Milan
and Torino seemed full of Sicilian and Calabrian
policemen, postmen, anu tax collectors. But these had
been white -collar workers from middle -class southern
families. After 1955 it was the really poor, sometimes
illiterate, young peasants who swarmed to the north
for jobs in industry. By then a city like Milan had
recovered from the war; it had got its people housed
and its children in school, and had almost forgotten
about illiteracy. The intruding southerners found
themselves blamed for disease, delinquency, and
crime; discriminated against by landlords; and
referred to scornfully as "Africans." ;n many places
the municipal officals and the church seemed unable
to cope with their plight, but the Communist Party
and its labor -union affiliates set up a massive
grassroots program to help them adjust to the un-
familiar life �a policy that has paid off in votes in the
elections of the last decade.
Rehabilitation
By the end of World War If the already wretched
standards of living in the south had become worse, I
agrarian riots and peasant seizures of land
demonstrated the mood of the southerners, and it had
becx)me apparent to the government at Rome that
something must really be done. Between 1947 and
1957 at least 340 laws affecting the south were passed i
by national and regional (on Sicily and Sardinia)
parliaments, and many more have been passed since
then. The mos' important was the establishment in 3
March 1950 of the Cassa per it Mezzogiomo (Fund for j
the South), designed to be the chief instrument of
government policy for the rehabilitation of the south.
The Cassa has not replaced the existing government
agencies, which have continued their normal activities
in the area, but it has specialized in a massive program
for economic development and has allocated billions
of dollars for land reclamation, land reform, irrigation,
and industrialization. In most parts of the south the
land reform program operated with relative honesty
and efficiency (Sicily being the outstanding excep-
tion), and the Cassa did not become the gigantic pork
barrel that its opponents had predicted.
Vast areas sometimes miles square �were the
hereditary property of dukes and counts and others,
who probably lived in Rome and who seldom, if ever,
s isited ttieir holding. Some had a sentimental feeling
for the ancestr:.) land, but few had any practical in-
terest beyond the revenues. Most owners wanted ex-
penses kept to a ;ninimum, and were not interested in
land improvement and modernization of agriculture.
Drastic land reform seemed a logical step in dealing
with the south's farm problems; unemployed war
veterans wanted land or jobs, and in some places
squatters were already settling o -n neglected lands of,
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absentee owners. Regional agencies of the Cassa took
over large estates and subdivided them. In some cases
they pai� for the land at the value the owner had
declared in his last tax statement, a price that amused
the reformers more than it did the landowners. Since
1930 about 700,000 hectares (2,700 square miles) have
been distributed to about 100,010 peasant families.
Much more has been involved than redistribution,
however: land has been reclaimed from waste and
marsh eroded slopes have been planted to trees or
other vegetation roads, water mains, sewers, irrigation
systems, and powerplants have been built,
cooperatives organized, and social services established.
Tl.e most spectacular changes occurred where the
land could be irrigated. A tract planted in tree crops
(oranges, peaches, pears, or apricots) or in tobacco or
market gardens can easily return 10 times as much as
the old wheat and olives. In the irrigated plains small
new houses, each on its own land (generally 4 or 5 hec-
tares), line the new roads, where cars and motorbikes
and small tractors outnumber donke carts.
Not all areas have flourished; the coat south of
Crotone, for example, still produces little except
meager crops of wheat. The poor gray soils, sticky and
unworkable in winter, parched and dusty in summer,
could not be irrigated, and one out of three of the new-
ly install, -d farmers gave up after 2 or 3 years.
On the island of Sardinia the land reform gave inixed
results. About 63,((X) hectares were expropriated.
divided, and turned over to 3,906 families who were
moved from overcrowded villages to new
government built farmhouses. Mistakes were
numerous: some land was unsuitable, some farms too
small, and some settlers totalIv unsuited to the life;
hundreds of houses were abandoned. Some settlers
thrived, however, especially the "Tunisians" (farmers
of Sicilian descent expelled from Tunisia). Resourceful
and skilled at fruit farming, they were assigned after
1962 to some of the abandoned reform- farms. There
they planted orchards, irrigated them from wells they
sank themselves, and created profitable, well -kept
farms with splendidly decorated farmhouses. Some
neighbors are following their example, but others still
live at the subsistence level, raising a little wheat,
olives, and forage for a few sh.ep and goats.
Sicily had its own land reform law, and reform has
not been effective. Much of its budget has gone to pa
the 3,000 employees, whose efforts endowed Sicily
with several thousand isolated farmsteads (generally a
house on a few hectares of rocky infertile upland that
could not support a family), most of which have
remained uninhabited. Rural poverty there is still the
most severe in Italy. In the interior the people still live
in peasant cities �some contain as many as 40,000
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people �and commode daily to their scattered patches
of earth on food or by mule. bicycle, or motorbike.
In the south as a whole, the Cassa has stimulated in-
dustr and several important new industrial zones
have 'been created. The most important are the
Bari- Brindisi- Lecce- Taranto zone in Puglia and the
coastal strip of Catania- Augusta Siracusa in eastern
Sicily. Taranto has one of the largest and most modern
steel mills in Italy; Lecce has the largest factory in
Europe for earthmoving equipment, and Bari has an
oii refinery and other new' plants. The Sicilian coastal
strip has beco)rne a major center of oil refining and
petrochemical industries. A number of new factories,
including the giant Alfa -Romeo automobi;e plant,
have been built in the Naples area, which always had
some factories.
In some cases the building of factories in the south
has backfired. The initial demand for low skilled con
struction worker was often followed by layoffs and staff-
ing at a reduced level by skilled workers and engineers
from elsewhere in Italy. The construction workers,
many of whom had shifted over from farming, either
joined the rolls of the unemployed or found some sort
of low -paid work. Critics of the Cassa have enjoyed
referring to the new factories as "cathedrals in the
dese�rt," but most government planners still consider
that industrialization is the best way to make use of the
excess labor of the south.
From 1950 to 1970 the per capita income of
southerners rose from U20 to $800 per year, but their
position relative to the northerners remained roughly
the saone. Nevertheless, keeping in step with the north
during those %cars was no mean achievement. Accord
ing to official estimates, the actual number of jobs in
the south dropped, primarily because the number of
people working on the land diminished by half, while
all of the new' industries added less than 200,000 new
jobs. Poverty has been reduced, but unemployment is
still a problem. Around Naples, for example, there are
usually about 100,000 unemployed out of a total pop-
ulation of 1.7 million, and 15,000 more jobs must be
found each year just to keep the unemployment figure
,table.
During the 1970's the rate of government spending
in the south increase. A law passed in 1971
i,.uthorized the Cassa to spend 812.5 billion over the
next 5 years, as much ononey as it had during the
previous 20 years. State -owned holding companies,
which are responsible for around half of Italy's in-
dustrial investment, now must locate 80 of their new
investment in the south. The system of incentives for
attracting new industry has been everhauled, and the
gove rnment hopes to attract a bread range of industry,
both labor intensive and capital intensive.
Life in Italy has changed trcm. ndously since the
country emerged from the years of fascism and war.
The "economic miracle" has almost erased the
memory of the poverty crime, and runaway inflation
of the early postwar years, when the main problem was
to ward off starvation. The economic problems then
were like those of an underdeveloped country, with
one important difference� though industrially
backward, Italy was culturally advanced and had a
labor force of high potential waiting to be used
The 19. and 1190% were the years that transformed
Ital. 'I'loc annual growth in manufacturing w es in
10
most years the highest in western Europe. and Italian
automobiles, industrial machinery, typewriters,
appliances, chemica,s, and clothing ^ere exported all
over the world. An enormous amount of building took
place, and superhighways were extended from one end
of the peninsula to the other. For the first time in this
c�enturv, unemployment ceased to be a major problem.
The sharp edge of poverty was blunted, and people
began to buy things that once seemed remote luxuries.
The whole feeling of Italian life changed, and even its
social structure appeared to become more fluid. The
growing industrialization brought southerners to the
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a
r
The
Miracle ad After (c)
a
1 rte Vf
S
Life in Italy has changed trcm. ndously since the
country emerged from the years of fascism and war.
The "economic miracle" has almost erased the
memory of the poverty crime, and runaway inflation
of the early postwar years, when the main problem was
to ward off starvation. The economic problems then
were like those of an underdeveloped country, with
one important difference� though industrially
backward, Italy was culturally advanced and had a
labor force of high potential waiting to be used
The 19. and 1190% were the years that transformed
Ital. 'I'loc annual growth in manufacturing w es in
10
most years the highest in western Europe. and Italian
automobiles, industrial machinery, typewriters,
appliances, chemica,s, and clothing ^ere exported all
over the world. An enormous amount of building took
place, and superhighways were extended from one end
of the peninsula to the other. For the first time in this
c�enturv, unemployment ceased to be a major problem.
The sharp edge of poverty was blunted, and people
began to buy things that once seemed remote luxuries.
The whole feeling of Italian life changed, and even its
social structure appeared to become more fluid. The
growing industrialization brought southerners to the
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25X1

Since then work stoppages have been endemic, and
a grumbling war of attrition between unions and
employers has limited output. Labor trouble on such a
scale damages confidence, and investment has
dropped. The result has been a low growth rate that
made the political and economic situation more un-
stable and enhanced the polarization of the right and
left. The metalworkers settlement in early 1973 was
reached after months of negotiation and a loss of about
200 million man-hours-10 times more than strikes
have caused in West Germany in the last dozen years.
In the meantime, by 1972, nervous Italians had carried
abroad nearly $5 billion in lire, rather than investing it
in Italy.
Italy now has become the world champion for
strikes, to the extent that newspapers try to provide
daily schedules showing who is striking where. Thus
forewarned, a person may be able to cash a check
before the bank employees go on strike, or get a train
ticket to Milan if the airlines are going to strike. If the
post office is striking he must send an urgent package
by other means, and if employees of a government
ministi v are not answering the phone today, there is no
point in dialing. Strikes are supplemented by
absenteeism, whirh has generally averaged about 10%
in Italian industry since 1969. Under the Workers'
Charter, adopted by the government in 1970,
employers are not permitted to check directly on
claims of sickness.
Wildcat strikes and production -line sabotage in-
spired by the radical left have accentuated basic dis-
agreements on strategy and tactics and have frustrated
the hopes of many union leaders to unify the labor
movement. In order to achieve better control and con-
certed action, the union leaders had planned to unite
the three great labor unions in 1972, but their
profound differences made it impossible; instead a
loose "umbrella" confederation covering the 7.2
million workers was established.
Fewer people are at work in Italy than there were a
decade or two ago, and Italy's tabor force has shrunk
to the point that now 35% of the population support
the rest�the lowest such proportion in all the in-
dustrialized countries. This figure would be nearer the
normal, however, if it included the 1.5 to 2 million
Italians who live and work in other European coun-
tries. Thev contribute modestly to the economy by
sending money home to their families; such remit-
tances to Italy by workers and emigrants now average
about s1 billion a year.
Since 1969 the economic miracle has been almost
forgotten. Higher costs and the squeeze on profits have
slowed economic growth, and the real growth in GNP
during 1971 was the lowest in more than 20 years.
Although the recession bottomed out in 1971, the
economy has been slow in regaining momentum, and
unemployment was still high in the first half of 1973.
Italian labor is no longer so productive or so cheap as it
was, and new factories are blossoming in many coun-
tries, such as Singapore, South Korea, Spain, and
Taiwan, where labor costs are lower. Olivetti now
produces all of its portable typewriters in Spain, and its
European market for calculators is being rapidly un-
dercut by cheaper Japanese models. Fiat, on the other
hand, continues to do well in the European market,
providing 20% of the automobiles and 30% of the
earthmovers, and Fiat automobiles are being produced
in factories around the world, including several in
Communist countries.
A good many Italians have seen Italy's future as a
puzzle that might be solved through becoming part of
the broader future of Europe. They have pressed for
economic and political integration within the Euro-
pean Communities (and the more members the
better). The economic miracie of Italy did not become
full blown until after they joined the Common Market
in 1957, and their enlarged European market enabled
the leading Italian manufacturers to expand and, in
some cases, to overtake their rivals to the north. Since
1969 the chronic labor troubles have made it harder for
Italian industry to compete; Italy has be L: me the
weakest member of the Common Market, and the
need for labor peace has become obvious to all except
the radical left minorities in the unions.
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25X1

routine rather than with conviction. Most of the con-
cern ha% centered on the usual worry about radio
activity and the harm that the base might do to the
tourist trade of Sardinia.
The popularity of the United States is a factor to
consider in Italian politics. The people's liking for and
trust in America has been a major resource for Italian
politicians of the center and moderate right, who could
win support by associating themselves with U.S.
policies. Si:ce the late IW. 's the reporting on the war
in Vietnam has made that association seem less
desirable; on the other hand, a survey of Italian public
opinion in 1972 showed extremely favorable reactions
to President Nixon's initiatives for better relations with
Peking and Moscow. In response to the question:
"What country of the world is trying hardest to
achieve peace the United States was far in the lead,
being cited by 36
Italians have for the most part become inter-
nationalists. Informed opinion strongly supports Euro-
pean integration, which appeals to Ihith Catholic and
Socialist traditions. Even the leaders of the Italian
Communist Party have swung around to acceptance of
Italian membership in the European Communities
(EC) and have worked to rally leftist groups of Eastern
and Western Europe behind a policy of recognizing
the EC's reality and strength. Italy also belongs to a
number of international organizations: the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the International Monetary Fund, and the United
Nations. Soviet vetoes kept Italy Hitler's ally in
World War 11 �out of the United Nations until 1955,
but since then Italy has been a full and active member.
In 1972 the Foreign Ministry announced Italy's desire
for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council,
claiming that it would help reduce the disparity
between the nuclear and non nuclear powers.
The old pursuit of international status has not en-
tirely disappeared. In part, Italian diplomacy reflects a
preoccupation with making an impression and win-
ning respect and, in part, a natural desire to be in-
formed and consulted, to be on the inside. The govern-
ment particularly resents the formation of councils in
NATO or on Middle Eastern affairs that include the
United Kingdom and France but exclude Italy.
Italy consistently supported the British efforts to join
the Common Market, and after British entry into the
EC in 197L' the two nations united in advocating a
more effective policy of assistance to the EC's own
backward regions. As the country with most to gain
from such a policy, Italy had long sounded this theme
with little success, and in the United Kingdom it has
apparently gained an important ally. In spite of
bilateral alignments of this sort, however, Italy will
probably continue in the forefront of those advocating
more rapid progress toward European political union.
Italy's strong bias toward union is accompanied by a
remarkable lack of interest in what is going o,i in
Brussels, the European capital. Italian newspapers, ex-
cept for a few in the industrial north, print very little
about official activities or decisions there. Even the
Italian respresentatives to meetings at Brussels seem to
share this attitude; Signor Beniamino Olivi, who has
been Spokesman (press officer) of the Commission at
Brussels for more than a decade, has said, "It is
notorious in Brussels that the Italians are the ones who
know least about the questions being discussed." Italy
has frequently failed to honor her obligations to the
Common Market, and has been summoned before the
Court of justice more times than any other nation. The
relative political importance of Common Market af-
fairs in Italy is shown by the action of Signor Malfatti,
who in 1972 resigned the position of President of the
Commission to be a back -bench Deputy in Rome
position more important for his political career than
the highest executive post in Brussels.
Italy is the weakest bureaucratic link in the Com-
mon Market, and observers suspect that the country
may miss out on many future benefits, such as aid to
the south, simply by failing to meet ordinary ad-
ministrative deadlines. This has happened in the past,
as Signor Olivi has pointed out: "One of the great,
historic mistakes made by Italy in the last decade was
that of underestimating the fact that the Common
Agricultural Policy, to have beneficial effcctL, requires
immediate administrative processes in its implemen-
tation." As these were neglected, "Italian participa-
tion in the EEC's agricultural policy can be dr cribed
as an accounting disaster."
C
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0
IC
LJ
No country in Europe has changed more swiftly and
more radically than Italy has since World War 11.
Twently years ago a factory worker from Milan who
went to southern Italy on his honeymoon could not
understand either the dialect or the customs and felt
more a stranger there than he would have in France or
Switzerland. Since then Italy has become v mobile
society, mixing people, habits, and dialects in a vast
and tumultuous flow; and as important as the new
mobilitv has beer Television, which has taught almost
everyone the same language. Century -old differences
are being rubbed away; but a profit- and -loss account
of this vastly changed Italy �with 12 million cars on
its roads and 11 million television sets in its houses,
with disrupted cities and with some of the most
polluted urban air and foulest rivers to be found
anvw`uere on earth �would he hard to audit.
Wi'h the rapid Chang- has come an awareness of in-
ertial forces hindering efficient functioning of the
society, and there is a growing tendency to blame the
government bureaucracy for the troubles of Italy. But
the real blame lies beyond the bureaucracy, which
only reflects the Italian conception of government by
personal favor. Many civil servants owe their first
lovalty to an influential friend, and favors are
reciprocal. This is the basis of the enormous sub
political underworld known as the sottogoverno. The
system as a whole satisfies nobody, but each hart of it
is advantageous to some individual or group. Attempts
at reform come into conflict with deeply entrenched
interests determined to preserve their particular status
(1uo.
Inertia, too, sometimes seems a major characteristic
of Italy's ancient, crowded, poorly equipped and in-
adequately staffed universities. Geared since the T3th
century to turn out an intellectual elite �in the fields
of philosophy, law, literature, history, and
religion �they cannot much longer satisfy the in-
creasing demands of a technologically based economy.
The government has proposed a number of reforms to
do away with the weakness of the higher educational
system, but their passage would not by itself insure
rapid and dramatic improvement. Even if enough
money were spent, the physical expansion of
educational facilities will require decades, and the en-
crusted academic hierarchies �the professors �con-
tinue to fight any change that would diminish their
privileged status.
Italy's constiutiou is one of the most advanced and
liberal in the world �but it exists somewhat apart from
everyday life. Many laws and regulati )ns that would
embody its principles have never been implemented,
and instead the Italian citizen continues to live under
restrictive laws and regulations, from Mussolini and
before, that have never been rescinded. The Italian
way is to get around the laws, and the law enforcers are
usually willing to help or pretend not to have noticed
so long as the person concerned does not claim any
legal rights. Individual citizens are not entitled
appeal to the Constitutional Court which rules on 'he
constitutionality of laws.
As a whole, and thanks to the intelligence and good
nature of the peoplr, the organization of Italian life
works; but many tarts, particularly the public ad-
ministration and the edTcational institutions, do not
work well. The pessimistic observer is likely to wonder
if, as the problems of the society become more com-
plex, where will ever be enough determination, wisdom,
and public spirit particularly in Rome �to make it
work much better. How to transform the Italians'
method of governing themselves into an effective
vehicle for change is it critical question today.
0
15
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Chronology (u /ou)
1300 U')50
Hemus,:uo�e verb 1n vu .-states 41f r ,rthern Irdy: it set,
up for flit- n(tdern age the )(teal of the noun talented ma u.
scntbolized 11 the matchless Leonardo da \'invi. Gnat
artt,uc :lard intelleetu:u outpouring starting Kith the IIth
venture preeunnrs I;nttto archit vet sculptor, painter an(I
I'm rareIt humanist writer, ;uoi ssentially culminating with
Da rnvi. Michaelarigelo painter, architect, poet lalestrina
vontposer. and Machi:nr111 pohli-al philosopher
1550- 1795
\\tth the conquest of the flourt,hing rite- sL'atr, of the north
I,. the Ilody Homan Empire and Prance, all Ital) hrought
under foreign do tit inatton. \onetheless, rultit rc flower*
renarkabh tit 17th and IStIt centuries.
1796 11411
Napoleonic armies bring Ital under vontrol 41f Frenvh
Empire. and arious enlightened reforms are introduced.
espectall) ut law and goI administration.
If41 IV- 181h
Italy rnainII, under .\ustri:ut dorttinittion niter (',Ingress of
Norma reimposes rule of the old ra�gintcs. .\h ogatiou of
liberal Napoleonic reforms it( ontpanu�d h allusive repression
sharks frt.vor,/,on, ttto, titocentent for Italian liberation, reform,
and national unificalion
1KIK -1870
He)olm of 1144 falls throughout Italy', hilt e,tnhlish ^s
I'trdnim tcs,� leadership of the R, ""'I?"u nth, KIrlgfl unl of
Ital proclaimed at Torino tit I+uii. tit lX70, Hone was I irial]%
seized font the Pupae) and made the national (-:t1),'al.
1871 -191
Kingdom of Italy' ehntaeterized by continued neelert of the
nnpoccrl.hed south. inabtlit) to de(elop it eiahlr t-conoutic
base, failure to bring hulk of population into national hfc
In 1XXWs only ahout 10 of adult males eligible to vote a,
co lit pan�d to 25 in the I toted Kingdom and nearle I of)
in France: in 1911 half of population still illnvrarh�. In 1111
period, over 1 ,0(I,I)01) Italians nearly ore-fifth of no�:ut
population) ernigrate, prinvipally to North and South
tit eriva. bec:utse of Italy's serious1 lagging eeononnc
development
Ix92 -1x93
fears of widespread gorrtrna1rnt corruption It ighliKhted I I
11aitk of Ho lit sc:ut (Ili l. tit which the hank directoo 'Ton longo,
Issued millions tit dup11vaI hit it notes but won it vglnttal to
court niter incolvntg numerous editors it it officials in,�luding
even Prime \Minister (:iolitti, Tonlongo's acquittal greatly
offends public opinion.
Ixy6
Effort to conquer Ell limpia Italy's most ambitious u11
116entore ands in disaster at \dowa will. 7,111111 killed oat 4-f
the 10,0041-milt Italum force.
16
1915
May
Italy deelares war on Austria Hungary and German), its
former allies, having announeed its neutrality in August 1411
and subsequent) bargained with both sides for territorial
gains: 11 etio11 pnhliel) justified in terms of Ital 's sarro
vo+.wnn or national self interest.
1917
October December
Italy suffers disastrous defeat at ('aporetto, losing 31111,000
prisoners and another 31111,0011 (1vserters: AitsIro- Germ :ut
forces ad)anee to Piave Hi%vr.
1919
June October
BY peace treaties of Itersaille> .(nd Saint- Germain hill.\ it(--
quires South 'I'crol with 250,00%; ethnic Germnns', Istria,
Trieste, Gomm. and part of the Dalmatian Coast about
11,000 square miles with a population of 1.600,1100 Itaah'
also gets share of German war reparations and heeones
ntetnber of 1�: \ecuti)e Council of the League of Nations.
Roth government and public opinion dissatisfied with such
"spoils" front a war in which ;60.000 were killed and 417,000
wounded.
November
Pint national election with universal manhood suffrago:
Socialists secure largest number of legislative se:us.
1922
October
March on Home i2S (lctober b) tit(- Fascists and hegin-
tting of 21 -)ear dictatorship: Mussolini forms ca hi net of
Fascists and Nationalists
1921
June
Murder of in luential Socialist Depute Gtaronm Matteotti
h) the Fasetsts.
1929
February
Mussolini signs the Lateran fact %,tit the Papacy on II
February, creating \:mean (tit.\ as an independent state
Concordat regulates activities of the Honnan (':ttholie ('hurvh
in Italy' and government pays the 11411) See large indemnity.
1931
1 nity -of -act ton pnct het wren t-\ilod Sorinlists and l'ont-
nutrusts.
1935 -1 936
0clober -May
Italy conquers and :urtn\es Fthotpia, despily economic
wuu�tions imposed h) League of \:lions
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X
1937
November- December
Italy joins German- Japanese anti- Comintern pact; w�ith
draw�s from the League of Nations on 11 December.
1940
June
Italy declares war on France and the Vnited Kingdom on
10 .tune.
1943
July
Mussolini ousted following Allied invasion of Italy; Radoglio
heads first post Fascist government.
1914
Jane
Rome lihera,ed by the Allies; Socialists and Communists
reaffirm 14-34 unity -of- action pact.
1945
May
World War 11 ends in Europe.
December
Christian Democrat De Gasppri ,succeeds Parri as Prime
Minister and holds office until 1!1.o)&
1946
June
Popular referendum votes to end monarchy; Constituent
Assembly elected to write new constitution establishing a
republic.
1947
February
Peace treaty is signed with Allies and Soviet bloc; Saragat's
group splits away from Socialist Party in protest against
Communist domination and forms Social Democratic Party;
Communists and Socialists ousted from cabinet.
December
Constitution approved by Parliament.
1948
April
National elections: Christian Democrats win parliamentary
majority.
1953
June
National elections Christian Dem
majority. ocrats lose parliamentary 1967
July
First 5 -year 11966 70) plan for national economic develop-
ment becomes law.
1954
October
Allied Military Governmert ends.
1955
October
Italy joins United Nation
1957
January
Socialists end unity -of- action pact with Communists.
February
Italy ratifies European Economic Community (EEC) treaty
1960
April
Christian Democrats form neo- Fascist- supported govern-
ment.
July
Cabinet overthrown b popular anti- Fascist demonstrations.
1962
February
Fanfani government initiates opening to the left (cooperation
with the Socialists).
1963
Jane
Government crisis, following Christian Democratic and
Socialist losses. Communists gain in April national elections.
December
Coalition government former! under Christian Democratic
Prime Minister Aldo Moro, including Socialist ministers for
first time since 1947.
1964
December
Social Democratic Saragat elected President.
1965
March
Cabinet reshuffle. Moro continues as Prime Minister, Pietro
Nenni as Vice Prime Minister, Fanfani becomes Foreign
Minister.
1966
February
Christian Democratic Social Democratic- Socia list- Republi-
can coalition with Moro as Prime Minister sworn in on
24 February.
October
Social Democratic and Socialist Parties reunified on 30
October.
1968
May
National parliamentary elections of 19 and 20 May result in
significant Socialist losses and temporary withdrawal of
S Wi'Jists from coalition.
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I 0 TO IL- rII I MA, 5e
June
\finonty Christian Democratic government of Giovanni
Leone sworn in on 28 .tune.
December
Christian socialist Republican coalition with
Mariann Rumor as Prime \linister sworn in on 13
December.
1969
February
Italian Communist Party 12th Congress maintains censure
of soviet intervention ;n Czechoslovakia.
March
Communists included among delegates sent to session of
European ('onamunities parliament.
July
New split in socialist Party, partly over attitude toward
('ornrnunists, results in fall of Rumor government.
August
\linority Christian Democratic government formed under
Rumor on b August, after efforts to reconstitute center -left
government fail.
1970
March
\larinno Rumor hecotnes Prime Minister on 21, \larch and
i forms coalition government of Christian Democrats, So
Isis. and Republicans.
July
Prime \linister Rumor resigns on ti July.
August
I- ;n:ilio ('olon:ho beeowes Prinu� \1inister nn ti \ugust :uu!
forms coalition government of ('hristinn Democrats, sorual-
ists, social Dernocnats. and Republicans.
November
Italy recognizes the People's Republic of ('iaina.
1971
October
Parliament passes Mezzogiorno Development Rill, allotting
funds for development of industry in the south.
IK
December
Giovanni Leone, it moderate Christian Democrat, succeeds
Giuseppe saragat as President, after the longest presidentia'
election in the histor of the republic.
1972
January
Prime \linister Colomho resigns on IFi ,lanuary after it split
in the coalition government.
February
Giulio Andreotti becomes Priam Minister on Is rebrtuary and
Christian Demoeraus form a caretaker government.
April
Transfer of national civil servants .o regional level gives 15
ordenarc regions it share of administrative authority.
May
Early parliamentary elections held ft r first time in the history
of the postwar republic. The most notable change is an in-
erease in support for the extnmte r.ght.
June
Centrist coalition government formed under Andreniti in-
cludes Christian Democrats, social Democrats, and Liherai
with support in Parliament from Republican�. "Phis coalition
returned the Liberals to the government for the first time
since 1957.
1973
March
Itch� estahhshes relations with North Vietnam.
June
('hnsti:u. Democrats in national Imrtc congress call for
revival of center -left eoalition: Andreotti resigns as Prime
\linister on 12 .tune.
July
Mariano Rumor becomes Prime Minister for the fourth time
on Y Jul and forms center -le i coalition government of
('hristian Dennur;us, socialists, social Democrats, and
Republir,ams. Government issues emerkeney decree I:nv to
comhat inflation.
August
1s a member of t he ('onference of the ('otentitte'e on Disarnaa-
n:ent. Italy participates in talks preparatory' to the European
security Conference r, Geneva.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080001 -6

Co-'r mf:N %1
0
0
It
Area Brief
LAND (UlOU):
Size: I Ifi,31M1 sq. rai.
Use: 50 rultiyated. 17 Ineadow and pasture, 21 forest,
3 unused but potentially produrtne, 9 waste or urban
1970
Land boundaries: I,0:5s mi.
WATER (U1OU):
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 11 n. mi. fishing, 12
a. vii.
Coastline: 3,105 mi.
PEOPLE (UIOU):
Population: 51,:58x,000 )estin"ated df jurr population as of
1 .tali 197:3; density 168 persons per square mile; 52"., lice
in cousin nines of 20,000 or more inhabitants
Ethnic divisions: Over 99 Italian, with Small German
French and Slovene- Italian communities
Language: Over 99" speak Italian as native tongue; Ger"aan-
speaking communit in Bolzano Province is largest minority;
Sri dl Slovene- speaking group in Friuli Venezia Giulia Region;
small hat significant French speaking minority in Valle
WAosta Region
Religion: Over 9!0., nominally Roman Catholic: Protestants.
about 300,0001 .Iews, approximatelY 111,000
L iteracy: 9.5" of the population age 6 and over t 11172
e..timatel
Labor force: 18,831,11011 (January 197:3; 16% agriculture,
12% industrrv, 38% other' 1 unemployed: underemploy-
ment, particularly in southern Italy, remains widespread,
estimated (mid 197'21 2311,000 temporary emigrants working
abroad: 1.5 million Italians employer) 0i other Western
European countries
Organized labor: Approxirnntely 30"-, of the labor force 1971
GOVERNMENT (UlOU):
Republic, hivrmivral Parliament, ;ahinet responsibl.� to
Parliament
I niversal suffrage: multiparty pohteal vstrm
nstable governing coalitions
21) regions, 91 provinces; centralh' appointor) prefects
('nnrnunist party memhership, ahont 1 5 million
\Iwnher of 1 .N. and GATT 114131), and 1\11-'. and of
011:('U, NATO, EEC E('S( and El RA \I
ECONOMV (UlOU):
GNP: $118.13 billion !1972). $2,I14x per capita; 63.6 voo-
suinption. 211.9"� investment. 13.7 '4, government, net foreign
balance 1.8 (1971 provisional); 1972 growth rate 3.2
11163 votastant prices (converted at 581.5 lira I'S$I
Agriculture: Important producer of fruils and vegetables;
main crops ..seals, potatoes, olives; !IS"., self sufficient:
food shortages fats, meal, fish, and eggs; calorie intake,
3,11111 calories per capita (197111
Fishing: ('ateh 391,211) metric tons V71 $196. 58x,Ooo in
landings 191111); exports $22 million 11!172), imports %12x
mullion .1972,; converted at .ixl.3 lira I S$I
Maje! industries: \lachinery and transportation equipment,
iron and steel, chemicals, fond prmessing, textiles
Shortages: Coal. fuels, minerals
Crude steel: I6.7 million metric tons produced 1972 30.s
kilograms per capita
Electric power: :37 �nillion kw. capacity' .1972); 12,s hdlio
kw. -hr. produced 11972), 2,:362 krl. -hr. per Galata
Exports: '=18.13 hillion (f.o.b.. 1972: converted at :5x1.5 lira
S$U; principal items: machinery and transport equipment,
textiles, footwear, foodstuffs, chemicals
Imports: $19.3 hillion (e.i.f., 1972: converted at 551.5 lira
1'S$I principal items: machinery and transport equipment;
foodstuffs, ferrous and nonferrous metals. wool, cotton,
petroleum
Major trade partners: i 197'21 22"" West Germ:,ny. 9 U.S.,
15" France, V 1'.K.,' 1% Belgium- Luxenthourg. 5".,
Netherlands, :3"'" Switzerland: 1:5 EC; 12 I {P'1'.1; sh oo
USSR and Communist countries of Eastern Europe
Aid:
Economic U.S., $3,986.6 million (FV46 :'2), $22.:3 million
authorized F,'72; 113H1), $39x+ million authorized through
FV72, none since FV65; International Finance Corpora-
tion, $1 million authorized through FV72, none since FY60
\lilitary U.S., ?,179..5 million )FY16 72), 162 million
authorized in FV6S (Export- Import Hank ereditsi, none
since 11168
Monetary conversio.v rate: ('onrnercia' and finnneiul lira
floating; value on :30 \larch 1973: 1 eomouscial lira
I SS0.1696; 1 financial lira l S$0.1 20
Fiscal year: Calendar Year
COMMUNICATIONS (C):
Railroads: 12,688 route miles. 10,11115 route miles f1 !1111
standard gage, 1,927 electrified: 9:5 narrow gage) owned by
Italian Government. 2,68:3 route miles 11,392 standard gage,
696 electrified; 1,2111 narrow gage, 3x7 electrified� owned by
municipalities or private companies
Highways: 179,000 miles. Auloxtradc :3,111x1, state highways
25,750, provincial highways :57,IM10, communal highways
93,2:511. 159,M0 miles concrete, hitunten, or stone hlock:
15,:5110 miles gravel and crushed stone; 1,:51x1 miles earth roads
Inland waterways: 1,:538 miles navigable: 702 miles are
rivers, 5211 are canals, :307 me lake routes
Pipelines: 1,100 miles crude oil, 91x1 miles refined pei oleum
Prod" 's, 6,000 miles natural gas lines
Ports: Ili major and 22 significant minor poris
Merchant marine: 1119 ships of 1,001 g,r.t and over, totaling
7,11117,582 g.r.t. or 11,2511,2115 d.w.t
Civil air: 1:38 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 150 usable: 80 have pernuruvtt- surface nmways; 2
have runwnys over 12.(ilxl feet. 25 have runw'ays 8,000 11,999
feet, 17 have rum 1,000 7,999 feet. 711 sites, I I seaplane
stalions
Telecommunications: Modern, efficient s%�stcm; almost 111.8
mill �,,n telephone.., 1'2.11 million radio, 10.85 million T%
reeeiyers; 86 A%1, 5511 F \I, 8.5:5 '1' stations; 11 coaxial, 11
submarine cables; 3 communication satellite ground stations
19
x
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080001 -6

Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u.ou)
('noN nl \1Tl:M I '1�IX nI \tii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080001 -6
o I
a /E
1
It
Abruzzi ladmin
42 1:,
1:3 4.5
Ga1IPrm d,�1 AppPnnom h1 r, n,l
11 113
11 I I
Adda (arm
4 5 ON
9 .53
Garlghano "rIrm
41 1:3
13 i5
P-t,. l �nil�
11 :'n
12 17
Agrigrntn
37 27
1:3 30
GPIs..
:37 nl
14 I5
f to dl IId I�
1., 21,
1_
AiRIP, Fwltz.rland.
44i 19
ti SN
GPnue..
71 25
57
Porto dl N.Ixu�n, �J,r
1', _u
12 211
.w
Ajarrio, Cora
41 55
N 44
G,�nn enova. Golfo dl
11 In
SI
I'orir, I:.nh;11111
li 11
I_' I I
Alberobello
40 47
17 Ifi
G j nm
11 311
9 111
1'11.1 h,rn�.
111 ',u
I
Al- nandna
44 54
N 37
1 I .Kn �I rr ,I
I
44 21
5;
I'nn .nu.
,'1 1 2
-'4
Alfon.inr....
44 311
II 03
G.-no, 1 Iazza Print qtr It to
41 21
:11
I'o�nx n,
in t
11 2
Alghero..
40 3:3
N 19
GProla %uava
15 112
:,7
1 1;
1 1 11
Altamura.
40 19
113 :3:3
Goon Taurn
3% 2n
15 :rl
I'�nrn v.;1 pr,,,
In t',
I', 14
Anrona .pror'..
1:3 :3:3
13 II)
Golfo Aranrl rr xla'
II kill
9 a7
I',nnloll
m 1'I
11 n;
Ancona.
43 :3N
13 :311
Goriz(. pr or
4.5 :15
1:1 :{u
1'r.t..
I 1i
I
Anzln..
11 27
12 :37
(tonzin
7 :r 5 7
Ia 3
1'r,'d:u z
11 P.
I I t
Aorta 1 prm
45 Ifi
7 25
Gritv--Ilon.
4I 111
11'1
I'oklha �Idnu,,
11 1:.
11,
Aorta
15 11
7 21)
Gro. -to pr or'
12 Sn
I I 1I I
Had. dl
11 P-
Apennmt�x mix..
13 00
13 (NI
Guldonla
41 111
12 15
Iiaitu :l
0.
I
Aprtha..
41 36
11 39
Imp,�na pro,
43 I
7 17
It a nna
11
I; I_
Arcola..
41 117
9 S1
Imprn.
13 I3
lit I
H .b' :Jahn' r
t. In
1,. o.
Arno Ixlrml
43 41
III 17
IngolMtadl, N'rMt G -roam
Iri
I I 20
It. Kiln, ill Cnlah
t un
I:, a�
Aronn
45 Ili
N :34
Innxbrurk.:\uxtna
1; Ir,
I I 11
Arquat.
11 11
F :I
Ionian F('.
19 IN)
14 INI
1 {11111II1
11 III
1; it
All It P0'rnn
12 51
13 :37
IMrlle�
11i 11
I'.'
I {Il allx I'n� I:1
11 '�I
1"
Ani.gn
15 ,2
11 :30
1
AMti Iprrrrl_
14 5.1
N 111
kola
46 26
1) 111
H...lul I,r",
11
I 1.�
Axti..
44 51
X 12
Ixpra...
1:1 19
47
It1 I'l Lau I'all1 ...I
11
12
Auguxta..
37 1:1
15 1:3
Ivrea
15 2%
7
H u.
11 :,1
I
Aveili Iprnr
41) 5
I5 09
Klagenfurt, Awiria
to :3
I1 I
li �,'tu 1alb,rt �n.
11
I n,.
AvPllino.
to 51
14 47
I.a,rrhntrella
15 19
It IN
It �Irn�d nl I'ul n.
1,. nl
1_'
Averlta
40 5N
14 12
Lag. dl Brarrlal 1�A,
11 417
11 I I
HI.1 1K^ I'
C.
11 ,u
Bardonerrhix
45 115
li 12
Lago dl Como ilakrl
R: 00
9 17
Fn blind In
11 1
1 1 M
Hari.......
41 (IS
Ifi :,I
Lsgo di Garda /lakrl..
I5 lu
lu 7I
Fx hloonr,.11�
I:. 21
11
Harletta
41 19
Ifi 17
Lngo d'IMrn 1,,k,
1:1 Ia
lu 07
FxlPr n.,
It- 11
11 1;
B"il -ta radmtn l...
40 30
Ifi :30
I Lago Maggwre lakr
1:1
.i9
Faluggnl
13 I1
1,11
Hatll
11 37
11 5N
La Miliddalena
39 ()1)
!1 111
Fnl \ni
11 :I..
In Ir.
Bellinzona, Switzerland
Ili 12
it (11
Lannal'h. \II -Irl:1
Ili Ili
1 :1 .'1
1 ,all 13�Illf
1' 21
11 I,.
Benki'm o
41 nN
14 1:,
I II I g1
12 22
1:1
.1'�111,.
1, 1.
I: 1
Bergamo
45 11
9 1:3
Litrino
II 1
I I :11
x.11 I,I..rt;n. n I rr ll 1:111
111 ',0
1 l
Bergamo I pror l
45 .ill
it 4 N
L. .;I�Ia
11 117
9 '111
Silo 01�11111111 H1,1 ..nd..
11 12
1 11
HPrtllnlrn
4,r1 14
9 Ill
Lit F1X�roi pr or
It I I
11 12
Still Wi ll, x:111 \I.rll...
I:1
I
Hwearl.
11 21
15 11
Latina pror'
11 27
I:t �I,,
F.no dr HnrK "11.11
1
Hivlo d'.1url Mina I rr On l
I." 15
1:3 :39
LNIJna
11 2
12 I_
sm'la ikla� it'.
111 0l
Bologna
11 29
11 20
1�lo '"din-
12 INI
12 30
..l nlrgua n.lmnl
In un
Hning�Ia I(Ir/Ir�
14 2N
I I 213
I,P ('aMPnr
13
11,
Fardon:1 III
111 1111
1 IMI
Bologna ('rot ral, tr xln'
14 :ill
11 21
LPrrr
lu 23
1 II
In 14
;1
Bolzano Ip"o
ill 1:1
11 :31)
1
13
I\ 111
\H..:Irl I "1
111 III
1 1111
Halznno
IK ;I
II
I,rrrO
1:, I1
9 13
xl..nn i
I1 I
I,.
Bnrgo Pla".
11 29
12 52
Llgnnn admtn'
11 :311
111
Ful ono
11 I;