NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 33; IRAN; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070040-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 40
• Content Type: REPORTS

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NATIONAL INTl11lO WE StlEM FMICATON5
the bosh unit of the NO to the iYomwio! Srwvt7, whith iy now
published in a bowed th0pw hmme to that oopits of $toter Pet f
bhobilir ton be updom on an kkty W basis:. these tb*W. �C
prow, The SNWY, oolsopmeolo usitd f bluets the Itorto". t?Ni sort Ge00.
tophy, tonspo lotion tend t Ant%4 fotft% S ci&xv. and
I,t1eNiNence and Secwirr, pto0 We lk ptwm t It 4 4 to*wvr sonic thopws,
pottitsrlotlr Science and Mtlelli me and Ste,, oy, Ow oto nor peHinent to
an cow mfr are produced watt r+efr, Fwt low tole wins ftquititlN only
ntininlol Nis 1eohttanr, the G*W"W Sutwrr corerrW Alan be board into
one .olwe
Supoententittg the Cene+of Sryrwry ii the NS low r"Mce foe
book, o too* telooft e P- 6itorioe oho: nuoNr wpdoto at sw.
NsaftW 41010 fowtd in the Sut"r. An edioion of Ow fortbook
on ow ecommy. the drfetne fomes� and ohe inwigente
Allhough door l sectno+a on "w/ oopics wont port of the NIS
PrW onl, W"AMtion Of these settions has been prowd out. Thole pt*.
riousfr Produced wM caMow oo be n oiloble os WV at the nlojot
Portion of the study is catsidete41 .old.
A quotoetlr Irs+tirg of oll oeoi o* NS waft is publi %@d on the ln�erlroty
Of A.Oaobk NIS rrbkof oft which is oho bowed +to ohe toncvttem
do. deed Foctlwolk. The 1nMe awyr lists aN NO wfth by oleo mane and
1wnlbet artd incbdes clOnA cation and dot* of iss it thus fociltotes the
ordetinN of NO uvwh as weN Os th& MOW cotologoW and utilbtotion.
1 c'issenwwtion. mod -ri0 copies Of NIS unas, Of srpotore
ch0pters 01 1.'* Gant �ol Swroo con be obtoowd d rec*fr or thtouo
16o+iW ch0nnels han the C*oWW InteMjenctr Agency.
the 0ener01 Su"tr A prepared IQ* the HIS blr the Ce+otoI I nwfogwo
A9encr Ond the O haw lntA9e0 lt0 AVftT under d+t genetol direction
Of the NIS Calrt~, It it t*wjw�04 edited. published, and deism+�
noted by t'.tie Cootie WoNigence Agency.
M 4 *4 r.aW-4 o"o 'MO `1 'Ebb MI 4% q.W qft vowM 'w tiMMw
"..ww..r w w �w' w r 4wo .Am.w� .4 M1MM w Wrw
t �f Mf*k4WMt tai t L9 vvt.xT tt.4t t 4t p
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WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
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of the Director of Central Intelligence :n accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
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the National Intelligence Survey.
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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by January 1973.
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,/YA"
CoNTENIS
TjJa G. IN Srilr. 4 .r.t.. t.. J, 1 to.. .tq t
1. Irtl.. I 1 ,.1 j t1 lrl. or :1, .,,.1 .1
1. Intntclurtirnt i
I tegt.t. f nj I. ttt ..:r. r.l,,.`. 1, a. r
lu ja..ttr t... al.tl.rlla
H. Slnjefure aml futtr i/ntitic 111 the C/nwtttt ml
I. C1111tal t;n t nlnit n!
1 h. 1,11 .1. w trjah. 1f. i, t.. 1 7 "fir:
t trhahAilr+.h .trvl e�.� �.f ..1.
.1. I %vt loth 4� Ilr.un 11
t 1. /aa s 1%�N. fa 1 11. 0. J. a r
1'.,Ijair. t. j. 9 .a if. I. fa.t sr t�n..
r -g.1314 11
dolt, .tt. 3 1r
ajva.att.et:llr .4 l 1. +tM
m 7t1.T
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P age
3 1'v+mltnr,i ptactics
rite+ 4*40i#4 In -In ctttlwill. srilitAlte. call.
rlwi(.w t r+whtt 1 04 rin tion%.
n. x,dltmA polkie�
I. Ilwtiomtk- prlk'y
1`��I �kt-tttrinrrl fly Will. olnr%%ion with
rrrnrrrlr.ir atwl �w il tlNwlrtn /.Iticit, rinlwwlied
in 11 1+�'-111 Woolf- W%oltllson. details of r(�fonn
IiK.jt,ldl- if-. hplons IAINI ir'llwlll.
3 Ffmiril"I itrillt,
ptitr ipf. it a %wilion of political, ec�c.-
p.+nr .rrwl. i.r .nitrr ratcnt, nidit.ity iri(1e-
prt�l�'��r. lul4ocr Icrlwrrn Fail and West;
trlaw Ndh I `S It r Ifew till will) West,
r4sr call% I pirtw cntusthm with w(urity
o/ 11rni4n (.IiI arwl volt lee%tetn Iran. %trained
trlalirwra Mdll It.pt� junitNil in Arah- L.iach
m4lir t. trlatirw+ with Afghani %tan, nrkey.
rxtoun. fopi. CvxTo. a %i -imwinxmt of
trlatwo" %atil the (:1 atlenipts to c %pand
Mrl)r,rtwr� -A s il o INnahgtxYl and We%tern-
.wirwlnl tr+lnitle%.
13
1 4
Page
:3. IN-fense policy 29
Stwti MI intrrc� %t taken I,v Shah; concern with
1 011( and s(nithwe%terli Irvl; 111(mopoly
of U.S. arms ended; CF;A'1'O; army civic
action ptogtait.
F. Threat% to government stability 30
1. 1)iscy)ntent anti dissidenev 1 30
Tight rein on political activity; opposition of
Communists and 11(.11- Coniouuiist nationalists;
seeds of discontent in landless agricultura!
workers and in educated middle class; tribes;
religious establishment.
1- 2. Subversion 31
a. Communist subversion 31
Neutralization of Tudch Party; history of
ly c�onmunisni in Iran; Sovict occupation of
Azarbaijan; assassination attempt against
Shah; internal disagreements; party or-
ganization; party line; Soviet diplomacy;
party financing.
b. Stude
33
21
Recruiting ground for antigoveinment or-
ganizations; demonstrations; Confederation
of Iranian Students.
21
:3. insurgency
34
Non- Commmnist insurgency, including the
Kurds, i and Qashqai; Communist
3 insurgency, including the Tudch Party Revo-
2 i hitiunary Organization and the Marxist
Leninist Tufan Organization.
F. Maintenance of internal security
34
1. Security forces
35
2'- Strength, organization, and responsihilitics of
the gendarmerie and the police.
2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities
37
Ample supply of legal weapons; SAVAK; role
.,n(1 effectiveness of the gendarmerie and
police; impurtance of reform programs.
G. Suggestions for further reading
38
Chronology
40
FIGURES
Page Page
Pitt I 'fla- Shah 1 p/10(o) 14 Fig. 4 Seat distribution in parliament (cliart) 19
Fig 2 Tilt- Empttm% (photo) 15 Fig. 5 Refugee camp (hlioto) 2g
Fitt I 1'.111y ;j-pn-a�nt.ation in Majlis (rt)ort) 19 Fig. 6 Internal security organization (cliart) 35
T
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LEGISLATIVE
Minister Chief, Supreme
Of PRIME Commander's
Court Staff,
MINISTER Armed Forces
ASSEMBLY SENATE
or (Half of
Prime Minister's Office
Mailis membership
Plan and Budget
appointed
Organization
by Shah)
National Intelligence
Municipal Municipalities Governors
Security Organization
CABINET
State Deputy Prime Minister for
Development and Economic Affairs
State Deputy Prime Minister for
Parliamentary Affairs
Justice
Ministries for:
Agriculture Information
Natural Resources Interior
Cooperatives Labor Social Affairs
Rural Affairs Post, Telegraph
Culture Arts Telephone
Economy Roads Communi-
Education cations
Finance Science and Higher
Foreign Affairs Education
Health War
Housing Develcpment Water Power
Minister of State and Secretary General of
State Organization for Administration and
Employment Affairs
2 Other Ministers of State
Interior
Provincial
Governors General
Councils
Province or Ostan
District
I
Governors
Councils
District o. Shahres'on
Municipal Municipalities Governors
Councils
or Shchrdari Subdistrict or Bakhsh
I
I
Administrators
I
County or Dehestan
Village
Headman, Town and Village
Councils
o. Deh
JUDICIAL
SUPREMF COURT
A
Common Lc;.
Special
Courts
Courts
(Civil and
(Religious P.
Criminal)
Military)'
I
I
I
Provincial
I
I
High Courts
I
I
I
District
I
District
Courts
Religious
Courts
I
I
I
Justices of
Lower
the
Courts
Peace
T
I
Houses of
Justice and
Arbitration
Councils
KEY
Control
Election
Cunstitutional
Responsibility
Representation
Administration
Supervision
Appeal
`Courts martial under commanding _fficer
E L E C T O R A T E in each military district.
"Administrative control uncertain.
Structure of government
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EXECUTIVE

Government and Politics
A. Introduction (S)
Iran, a constitutional monarchy, has undergone
rapid social and economic change and a reorienta-
tion in foreign policy in the past decade, but at the
same time it has maintained a high degree of po-
litical stability. The ruling monarch, the Shahanshah
King of Kings) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, has
developed from an indecisive youth at the time
of his assumption of the throne in 1941 into a strong,
determined, self- confide_it ruler. He is driven by
the dream of guiding his country into the modern
industrialized world in his own lifetime, and to
that end he has undertaken a widescale reform
program, labeled the White Revolution. With his
country strengthened by domestic stability and
economic gains, the Shah has loosened his post
World War II dependence on the United States
for economic and military assistance and has under-
taken a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, once
his archenemy. He has retained his basically West-
ern orientation but is generally seeking recognition
for Ira:i as a strong, independent force in inter-
national affairs.
The Shah is the second member of the Pahlavi
dynasty founded by his father, who seized power
in 1921 and was crowned Shahanshah in 1925. In
1906 and 1907, a primarily middle- class, nationalist
revolutionary movement forced the then ruling
Shah to accept a constitutional form of government.
The Fundamental Laws (or constitution) enacted
in those 2 years, together with subsequent amend-
ments, provided for a bicameral parliament to which
a Prime Minister and Cabinet approved by the
Shah were responsible. Neither of the Pahlavi Shahs
felt it necessary to abolish this system �which has
proved flexible enough to be considered useful
even in a time of rapid social change �and in prac-
tice they have continued to wield decisive influence
over the entire governmental structure.
The Shah believes that Iran must undergo
orderly social and economic modernization if it
is to retain its present stability and avoid the vio-
knee and revolution which have plagued much of
the Middle East. The Shah is interested both in
preserving his own throne and in the progress and
prosperity of his people. Since 1961, therefore, he
has been introducing fundamental reforms aimed
at building a modern society and increasing the
popularity of his regime. The program inJudes
land reform, literacy and health improvements, na-
tionalization of natural resources, modernization of
higher education, and increased rights for women.
Social reform has been accompanied by great ef-
forts to modernize agriculture and speed the indus-
trialization of the countr with the help of revenues
from the Western oil consortium which produces
and sells most of Iran's crude oil.
The Shah believes that social reform and eco-
nomic progress must precede the development of
democratic political institutions. Political parties
and elections, therefore, e.re maintained primarily
as window dressing and as vehicles for advocating
the Shah's program, rather than as a means for
the expression of the public will. The Shah has
said that as the people become better educated
and illiteracy is eradicated, the people will "under-
stand and endorse the ideas of other political
parties." The parties, meanwhile, will have become
defenders of the national interest as a whole rather
than of narrow individual interests. In the mean-
time, he claims, Iran must continue to be ruled
with a firm hand.
There is no effective vehicle in Iran for the ex-
pression of basic opposition to the regime or its
programs, nor is there any valid method of meas-
uring political opinion or the level of political so-
phistication. The Tudeli Communist) Party has
been rendered impotent because of rigid control
by the security forces and the confusion created
by the Iranian- Soviet rapprochement. However,
outbreaks of violence over the past 2 years �bomb-
ings, attacks on police, and bank robberies to obtain
funds� indicate the presence of antiregime groups
whose procise training and direction are unclear.
Nationalist opposition groups are also closely con-
1
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trolled and have found olany of their pt,grams
absorbed ivtu fill. Shah'% �'hit(� Iie% 'flit i(fit N611%.
students Auld intellectuals, U'rtnerl� impl:lvilh'(� in
their opposition to flit- monarchy. ha%(� oplo tut
the status and material rewittils n %olting froth
participatiotl in the establishment. Although the
depth of popular loyalty to the Shall cannot 114�
measured, it is very likely that the reforuA program
has improved his image and that of 1h(. go%enm.ent
generally. The grew �st dau.ger to security pnlhaF)ir
lies in tile almost tot I reliance of the g overt fill tlhd
structure on one naan -the Shah. Althot'gtl till�
constitution nu%r pt, ides fot as orderly sitev( ssion,
the Shah's death could produce a 1�; riod of se% ere
instability.
Proud of Iran's domestic seal. city :u141 ecollontic
progress and freed of his f� �rinur financial autd
psychological de pendcnce oil �he United Stakes.
the Shah has launched as more aggressive and in-
dependent foreign policy. The most important facet
of this new policy is as normalization of political arici
economic relations with the Soviet Cnion, which by
early 1973 had extended over USS900 million in eco-
nomic and military credits to Iran on highly favor-
able terms. The Shah remains skeptical of the
U.S.S.R.'s intentions and was upset by the April
1972 treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Iraq which
lac: felt would give Iracf a freer hand in is anti
Iranian activities. However, he apparenth� believes
that the advantages of normalization outweigh Noe
dangers.
Since 1965 the Shah's major foreign policy pre-
occupation has been the security of the Persian
Gulf and southwestern Iran. He is convinced that
radical Arab elements, especially Iraqi, are at-
tempting to undermine Iranian authority in :he
area and to foment subversion in the province of
Khuzestan.' He also fears a further breakup of
Pakistan( resulting in possible attempts to unify the
Baluchi people in that country and in Iran. The
Shah has undertaken an extensive program to -if-
large and modernize Iran's air force and navy and
is attempting to improve relations with the moderate
Arab states and the sheiklidoms of the Persian Gulf.
Although lie would like to cooperate with the mod-
erate Arabs in maintaining stability in the area, the.
Shah has let it be known that Iran intends to play
the dominant role in the Persian Gulf.
Despite his more active and independent foreign
policy, the Shah remains basically pro Western in
For diacritics on place names see r!;, list of names on
the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile
chapter and the map itself.
2
outl(,1,k fold sill t1�gatok 1114� ('31iff -11 Stal1i i
e14rs1 sl ally. It:ln cil ill ifs rix-mlw AShilt s� n
if s(,nealfaf ntenthmiasfi(ally ill tiff ('dotal
treat% f ltgatli/alit'll i CEN1 a (11�It lisi%e alli,oxr
it 1a/ ulc-Im Iiog 1 cltkey, I'aki. tan. at14) fit,. t tla( d
kiln. +(tool, surd it potullasl�s looml of if aqhisfiY a10-11
olilit Ify 4"1111ipllivill Iwill Ihr Ullif1 Mello s. 'I 11(�
tetlo% of tlxt.e plitcllit".s at th Stull'% (Iislool(
the 11uMetil flit cTf1fMtlinul ovet to %enno -w a1141
tt a tlilturl` :and eNent of Iranian (lftllrol m the
o f illdimm :ate irtitarit� in his tl�l:ltinn% %%ifh till
Owl- I Still"- 11111 ili( (nitll(k tot llx f -S. pt( seAx
in Iran renla,n. ,(,1tl.
ii. Structure and functioning of the go-. em.
nfent
L Centra; government (C)
7 he voliNtifutior of Itan is a nnp�,so�c1 of fl1�
F111)(aunt�ntal i,aw of ltAM. tl14� Soiygoh -it 11�nt.,i
hcmdantental Law of 15KC. allot sa11selfnen! anivild-
nu�llts. Since 1907, :he lannfiflltion hit!. ixrn
amended (rill four thou%. It hits pt1%1.11 ill tihle
itlld illlpreeist� (�n(ngh to tefilitl ifs It.ef111114�.. ell AI
as Irian has emerit(A into a rapidly (Imulopitrtt Auld
nlodernizint; start(�. At the same lime. .onu� pn%i�
sions of the constitution, such :l. the n�gltin�oent
that all legislation Ix� snhnlitted for approval t,
as committee of five theologiaall% attd that 111 ie. lx�
provided for political and pr(-.. triad.- suctio never
to have been .lnplenlentvit. The 1.rlun-
Ciated ill the constitution are ill Ill my Cake% fell,-
pered ht- lilt- phritse "exc-pt as otherwi.e pn%itled
by law" or some %ariatimi of this phrase. The (mgt�
11-11 intent was to prevent capricious and h�r:nmt:al
acts by the monarch anon to insure that all%� hillita-
lions on the constitutional provNions would Ix- im-
posed by the parliament.
The government is defined as a constitutional
monarchy, the powers of which are limited by a
bicameral ler,islature. The formal powe,s of parka-
naent closely resemble those of a European h ;gis-
lature, but in practice the separation of executive,
lc�gislaive, and judicial powers called for in flit-
constitution has not been maintained, and the
executive branch has almost always dominated the
other two. The dominant position of the Iranian
executive results from a strong authoritarian tra-
dition in Iran along with intense loyatlty to and
awc of the monarchy, it also results from the lack
of cooperation and discipline among the intensely
individualistic Iranians, who do little to contest
the executive branch.
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F srts litatth AINI k� se�I $of g'ArtmtN1111 i� 41400110-
ruled In- Shalt. -%lodtamtltad 11C N4 4 Pahlat i. A�-
s11ming ftenso -t in IA-f l aftet hi� fafhe t, lirira Sluff
1 wais /ortc+lwl to elsilicale foollonring fhe
Iltitish Atl 4 n iM inr asiogr 1111( Itatt dating Nogld
Nett I1, the itte".c4`tlt Shalt wa� fort atam- %cars an
anc���ttaitl al ittscs4 k�at11t. The outfit n( 106 ctt ttnd e n7-t ho I n�' n tte h'1 n111Mttl canlc� in th (a tls�
ItW4. 4611 1'tiolve %finisllt Malulls" tl lors:teleyi
1..041 his Natienl::) Fnmi flatly 1.1111 aike�sl eto a -atn:
paistn e( %kilent attti�iltitish Astitaliogl. Sitxi- IIN�
ratl- 1410%. hens,m the Shah Ilas tic�s-rloiN -11 into
a clgl(h11 c1tnfN�tc�nl m�atar�h Celt is 11111� in
t +glttcI /d hi� ihtdww anti his g o n rnlmo-tot. Ile i�
krNrssn fort Iris eirtailrd know�Ietilgr o! ltanian affair-
al rs ct) Icvcl and felt his Ability too Iomnnlate and
ratty enll fr olicim s aitho challenge 1104�
"Molut /f 11 x� Shah i ehia 1!111;. n(tet 20
years of note, synllolite d the Shah's pnlitie al e.nning
of age anti hi� pride in Iran's pt +rgrrs� +nxh -t his
mole�. Th-- rlallotate ci- lebrallan in 0"'th �t M,
the 2..`" year� of the Iranian tit, trhr w hut104 r
t6igrt -41 to ewnf hmitc iN- strt�rlgth of Ill nNntatc�l.r
MINI to annise na tional 1 -wide.
11. /_trrtdirr� hranfb
M Shah is the c hie( of stale awl head of the
c- xrctlhsr branch Of the Iranian -rlt. Tfw
Flimiamt�tt1a1 i.aw -s are ambigit as in delmi1w his
ors crall pow w his h arc� a� de ft1indent on the
forrce if his fo1-ivauhly a� om the- splvif off file
comtitutktn. He .lotrs noI vole by dii,iter tttht. 6c
catlstilaticgt tlr(ittes h it, se.tri As a fnost "44tH
fi41c�tt i as a iMIlle 01R) Ic tit� prople to the per.
UM a( the King" 'Nmerth -h-v%. the Shah ttnnnalh�
use% his l !n defining Anti infc�rfn�lWA hit
pr.w rn.
As anximir i in IsN_;, the. c4x1�tittifiem jtisrs tit�
:Yrncn to "Ili� lniplial Nlait -%I% beta sluff 1'.41114%1
and his male t!c�r:.- txlanl�." TIN'. eldr.t U301 horns n(
-4 Prnian m isthi -t too a P411las i Shah is allhnllahcall
lhe hrtr�appare�111- It a Shalt has 101 WWI. be- mar
a,1*0111 an 6�ir�Apparrllt. �nhirtl to Ihr apfxlnal
a( tit,� 14flis. the knrrr hells". ac ftirliam. -M. The-
atfit;nal IW7 law gase the tight to the throne in
perpt�tuit} to the Valalr dytl tsty l s. h it' h preceded
G'... rahlasis i- lout the 1 4:2 atnt�ndmrnt ,121411 that
nn tnemher 4.1 the Qtjar family cocild !e� appointed
as heir apparent or recent. The Shah's half
Irothrn ths�rrinn� an- hirligihle fur the thr4ott�.
since their masher was a Qata
in I%T the Shah. who now has two sans- took
strpo too insurr an orderly transfer of pawer in the
rsetll that he 4"nlld die 104�Mte the Crown Princl
r!`ac'iN s 1104� into- of 20 on 31 00olx�t I9M). At the
~hall's 1111114 -s1.:: (;en.sfifoetll Asse�tnlly a:1s elected
in Allitit�t il Nllich appraved it volmlitotional
afte"fN;nr prtsiefitnt that fhe� Finpn -ss Nle ther of
1104� Co,wil irt:exr shall immedialck. asm1 me the
testetlri� ettrk -ss the Shah has prey ioms apirlinh�d
another pem"s mt rege�t11. The regetlt is to form
a c,0411x�il of tegetwy cyrmllnecl of the Prime Min
htet. the 111�446 of the two hnnic�s of parliament,
IIN- (11ief )ttstiiti�
(If the Suprettle Colirt, and four
"ktNssk�dge�al lr lirtscms sell s1nell in the affairs
of tit� stale." This camic! a ads the regent
in 1114� fiuxticnls of the namart�11% until the heir.
apparrilt tc�ache -s the age of 20. l file pres
c.m.tifotienlal pn nisiems, file 'lallis wa% to select
a. n-ito net afoot tIN� death of
ON. Shah. 'i'lik cYfllld
has k-it to a pr (Ni of leatletiess grrre-ttnnent anel
Illiglt h:tse orft�IN--11 ihr is ir to disnlpti.r nlane�u-
srtinst (..r fxosltiom. The I c+oiltinmis top
ftrnicl.� that the Shah mar anxiint a !etnt> miry
regetx.% e4nitx it whet lie h alsetll train the
Conn.
to ---:n pra dicr t he Shah has oftc-t1 follin%jd.
i-at many yr:.rs, the Shah a mna to rnn-
�ich -r file appritilml -Ill of :o n -stmt Iwf m. his
(featb l"ttatily INN anse he feared scolse- cpn-fit
political matx- %leering a-nld thteatetl his control ot
#�sell his life- The tk�ci�ient to make- IIN� necrssan
e+nrslitatiolul ame-txlme�tlf in low, a:I� a further
incli4 �411e113 of the- Shills gnmilig "wlf- 4�omfie4
and of his faith in 11N. M }alf+ Ilxl ability of Em.
prr%% Farah. who i� "flat. capa anti dt -eply
infete in the S11ah's re(nnn pnmr..m. Never�
fit�k�ss, the Stub', applrinittient of the Enoprev% as
retitcmt arcs an mite nation in a coilillm whet(. wem -11
are. iu�f 114- ginning to gain cvlu,cl %x:ial anti politi-
c al rights.
714� Shah i� 1Nfh titnlar head of st tc and sn.
ptrtttr brad of Iht� ru �tuhsr Iranth of 11x� gor.
o�tnni,�t1t. ;1. st in the F undiunental Lams.
"Thee c�xc�cntiso� Pm%4 r h n�sc -ni'd to the Shah. that
h to %A% nice lass atxl eletr1 c-s %hull lx- a arrietl ont
M� fix� ttlini�te�rs state official in the august
name co( iii. imit�riai %141 -%ty in such manner as
the Lea- 4k�firx-�." TN- Shah i_.. howe et. sit�cifiealk
(need 1r( pt�rsonal rt�sitlnnihih1% (or fix- actions of
hK nitntstets anti eith mrvotire braoxh edfic�ials.
It h the mini�te -n oho air rivni .ible for all mat-
ten fo looth chamlrt�n of ittrliamc -nt. 111os flu- Shah
h m ithrr rk�eted by the ist-ople nor rmnonsihle to
parliam mit. which h ele�ctni by the PNIple.
3
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The Is4m.4.1s of film- ~hall, as %1�064-11 itiesl in tllm�
Sulrytle tlelltatr 1'llmlanitWrlal I.aa of PO C, imhtde
the� right h aloptoillt alool dislni%s all m illimuts aloof
t thrt h4.a414 of gtrsrttntxhrt agetxie�s; to cerlfct all
military ranks, 414Mr-t:llimm, and trlhet lrtotooitatt flit-
in ltatiamettf; Lo
iss11e� dt�t�ms�s and ettlt�ts for 111w entotir m�tt 411 all
la%v% It1t tw/t to himfet fit th�lay errftmrtm�t f of tllm�
law. to tcomnholld all the militat% totct�%, to Appoint
tint- of IIN� r +NtittlN�tshil rof the rlppet 61414. lot
iarliaroveld i lilt- ?nitrate 1. to call IIN� itrttharm�trt
info 41tc�4,ial se- %04.111 4 t to the �hr 4-itlwt fit 10-1111
6111-w% under %pN�6al vita nmstatit to d4- 4-fate vt ar
arxf atltx-lnd4. lvmv, aoo1 1A rrcQtrliale to alit�% aith
ft%rt�istn ttatitns %%hich it Ntoodd iK" it1 tile� into�m�st
of the %ute and the imsi to keep %oxt1 liv
ifttr4, of .111 artlt�ininso lomm -f! in 1949. the Slwh
has the poact to dissof.e eillNrt tot hmth chartthe�ts
of Patlianie -nt ill t Rtl%�t its Will tie�%%" elux titoom Ali
otlx�r attxaxlm4.nt. Pxsu�al ill 141.iA. ga%4. i N- Shah
fix acklilitmal istn%et 411 t.- vic"%%itrg all fitlarxial 14.gis-
latior pav4A by fire Maljlis and st- rxlinq it hark
flit n�c�olnsidrtalitrlr it it (If" 1144 it's A�I No. .1i penal.
The Malli� mAy just %11th hills mvr 16� Shall'%
ohle�t-timis hr a Ihm,��fttoltths %oric of all ntrtnlrt-ts
pm�se�ttt.
%loharn mad pieta Sh .1h nminfaim t1140i-tngh c.rn�
it.r1 o%vt rm�mlst�rs of the ruxulire Itatxh 4f qt n.-
4-ninN-nt. Tho�orrticalIv. the M :jh. chewrgr% each
lrr.rm� Slinh14.r by infotma) Ioalkrf Aml ha. it% 4hoitr
altpnnt�d fly the Shah. In pr .14#X4.�, he mto trolly
%t�lo orx� of his fn1%tt,f frtt�tool% is 1' "w Nbuisft-t
and 4.t4.t a %ihNtg 1111111etoo 4. onrt Iltt� priltic
Minhte�t'% vivoct� of C'a1o;m -t nN�m1NQC, All tarlth<
dalm 1116# idyl wet %1th the Shah'% aplinn.d.
%rithirt Iho%t� itNltuh. I N� latihxh� all,mcd Iht-
1 Nlilli%tt�t in his WhA tit,rn 401 .1 (..1l /im�t t14.-
ilm�ntl% ov dir .1tNlm111t of i split tl oiniml in Ir .1n
at the firth�. IIN� tw o m +n� of f stri4n affairs. the
1111n1loo�r of tnntid.tnt� ttxloihisit tt�a.1rd tort Just
%t-t%i. aloof fi ll- S11416 a%%o -nI tot O N� rrhandil
aloof Iwfuti a1 .&mI0it41% of 014' rN�%r pr inN� Sfini%trr
himst�If. Thc� Shah is itmulh� p.1Witt11ady tiow �ord
in the (Imistimliorl of tilt� Nlini%ft�r of 1,1,'at. tltt� Alin�
istes ill F:c%,:Nnny. Ilse� %littsh�r of lrtfrtior 1 ahtt
control% iIN� gt ndatnNTi4. Alul Issolitt� 1. mml 1114� Alin.
i%14-r cif Fcott igio Affalts. The Hanoi% of 411 catrtli-
daft�a arc %uhinill"I to fho� M.116. N hich ftiritt.1lly
.1ppril-w% till� 114-A >;41 ve rlnN'111. hil.lit -Alien 14 a
rn%al dt�c�nw ftmmll% .#Ititotintitrlt the rN %r gn%rnr�
ttN�nf c.ontp -t4�, 1 6. pt%x.�%%. Uncirr ffir icool%11ft1tiotn.
4
the� Caloiln�t minist4.rs atr indiridualk :111d vol.
le�a li%rl rusltron�ihle� ter parliattN�nt; in practice they
art #11114 1tNOte din a th responsible to the Shall.
Tllm" Shaft also has conttolling, infloetrc�t- in the
legislative hralx�h 44 gort-rnnrent. H is inf lut-nee� is
ettrtrtle d (hrenlgh the feorce 14 his pur%om ilih� mid
fllm� NO that, in pmadive, candidates for 1mrlia-
1 se�ah nilest me rt mills his approval before
their nan can ix� enten�e) ear the electoral roNs.
Tllm S11plift-mentaty 1`1111dameutal Law of iW7
s?i %t�% irim fist� right to feornn#lair legislation and to
pre%e�nt it to parliament for passage into law, AI-
thmigh thin pri ision is st�ldottl Mild, iegislation
is tam�h ltmliloneil and almost tte% vimoed with
tN1f tacit appro%-al of the Shah. Furthermore, the
Shahs %ignatlrrt- is nrcrssary on ;1111 it-gislatire aet
64me it can be� poll into (.ffect, and his own atti-
hoolt� tent and ;t hill alfc;4s the intlotrrtance attached
141 it al ool the slit -rd %%ilh which it is intplt-mented.
F11tth4.ttmort�, the Shah's infloenc�e extends, di-
to-t tl%- or indiret th. into mrnt gost�rnme�nt trgani-
ratiotn and 11tlitivalh� itnlxttt:wt groups. i lc has
restolar mcf- unit,% not 41111- %rill) all Cahirn�t min-
ister. a1141 IIN� brad% of the Senate and Mailis, hilt
%rich the 114..uls of all the sm itrity forces in the
4411111##), imfilding the chick of the arined ftrrces
flic lrlllteti.11 0lard. the National intelligence and
S,s 1tiiv thg.miiatio i 5AVAK the gendarnu�ric.
anti the loolicr fort~�, and also with the chairman
e:( tht� .1tional Iranian Oil Compam�, less rt-gu-
Lilly. 111� also wri provinc�i.11 administrators. num-
Imt% tit 1114. M.ljlis and 54.natc. and officials bolo%%�
list Iloilo islurml h %t-1 in go%4 agencies and
tninisttit In addition. the Sh .1h gives audiences to
inlp41e�nti.11 c14.rg%m4.n. bazaar murc�h,41rts. Libor
lt�.1t14.1s. itll.d tt-lon�setetatire s, and the press. The
Sh.1h is that% alrlu to take %olindings about acti%�itics
.11141 attifudt�% 111 gtretlrtnet.t .111d sex�ieh� and to
111.11,4. lots p ol.64�% and %rishcs kilowil and his in-
1111�nt4. felt at .oil h�%el%.
Thr Simb 1% .1% Med by a Nlinistcr of Court. who
1% 11401 .1 nlm�rtdx�t of the Callinct blot who holcis
minoteti.d rank. The dlltics of this minister include
admimstr.11iIll of the Shah'% pst�tsott.rl hooschold and
the proteltt0! a-mi.itt�tl %rith flit- ve rt. The \fin
Wrt trf Cmirt is .d%%.1s a 1N�r%onal friend of the
rolVal lalutlr He mid hi% subordinates have reach�
rctt-ss to fort� Shah and are often used to bring
informatism t, and from flit- r41%al famil�. He tends
In hurld 41p a (ert,iu amrnmt of prestis:v hcc�ause
of his ckn4�n4�%% to 11w Shah ;urd hi% ability to ar-
t .1ng4. aptlttoontawnl% for 1 w r -wits outside gmrrnnlent.
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The Cabinet in early 1973 consisted of the Prime
Minister, two Deputy Prime, Ministers (who also
serve as ministers of state), three additional min-
isters of state, and is other ministers.` The Supple
mentary Fundamental Law of 1907 restricts the
privilege of holding a Cabinet post to fuslilll
Iranians, and It burs the soils, brothers, and paternal
uncles of the reigning Shah from holding such
office. Another constitutional provision forbids
Cabinet ministers from holding other offices. This
restriction is presumably the basis for the general
practice of not drawing Illinisters from aniong 1pr'm-
bers of parliament. Those few who have been
named to the Cabinet gave tip their parliamentary
seats. Little else is said about alinisterial qualifica-
tions. The Shah may dismiss any or all of the min-
isters, as may the parliament.
The Fundamental Law of 1906 provides for min-
isters to attend sessions of the Majlis and to take
part in debate concerning proposed legislation and
the administration of the law. The ministers are
collectively and individually responsible to 'both
chambers of the parliament and must appear before
these chambers whenever summoned to explain
their actions. According to the Supplementary
Fundamental Law of 1907, when the Nlajlis or
Senate, by a full majority, declares itself dissatisfied
with either the whole Cabinet or one minister, the
Cabinet or minister shlA be considered dismissed.
When parliament is in session, it is co111111o11
practice for a new Cabinet to present its proposed
legislative program to parliament for approval. It
has also become common practice for parliament
periodically to question ministers and other high
ranking officials of the government. If the person
who began the interrogation is not satisfied with
an official's answer, it is possible for the entire.
Senate or Majlis to censure the official or have
him removed from office. Between 1941 and 1951
several Cabinet ministers were ousted in this
manner. Since then, although the questioning may
be sharp at times, a motion of censure has become
quite unlikely unless the Shah engineers it.
There is no tradition in Iran of having direct
lines of responsibility from the Prime Minister to
the ministries, and ministers are more likely to con
`For current listing of key government officials consult
Chiefs of Statc and Cabinet Members of Foreign Go+:ern-
ments, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
cider themselves answerahle to the Shah than to
the Prime N- linister. The discipline which a Prime
Minister can exert depends upon his personal in-
fluence and, more importantly, the extent to which
the Shah will back him up. The Prime Minister
play reshuffle: the Cabinet to discipline or reward
Cabinet members, but these actions must, of course,
be cleared with the Shah. In extreme cases, the
Prime Minister can discipline his ministers through
the threat of dismissal. Oil occasion, Prime Min-
isters have used their influence with members of
the parliament to have that body chastise refrac-
tory ministers.
�ich Cabinet minister draws up legislation on
et .�nt or proposed activities in his own ministry,
and the legislation is coordinated at Cabinet ineet-
ings. It has become common practice for the Prime
Minister to approve or reject the bills proposed by
ministers for presentation to parliament, and Cabi-
net Illec tions are thus often the scene of bitter
internlinisterial conflict. If the Shah is personally
interested in expediting a project, of enurse, the
coordination process is much smoother.
The Minister of Interior supervises all provincial
and local administrators, who in turn administer
and control elections. He also controls both the
police and gendarmerie. As an important key to
internal politics and security, lie is frequently
consulted by the Shah. The Foreign Affairs \fin
istcr's position is distinctly subordinate because the
Shah is greatly interested in and generally fornitl-
lates foreign policy, often conducting major nego-
tiations himself. The plain responsibility of the.
Ministry of justice is the promulgation and adinin-
istration of the civil, penal, and commercial legal
codes of Iran. The 'N- linister of justice recom-
mends and the Shah appoints judges throughout
the country, except those presiding over the lowest
level of locally elected courts.
The Minister of War is primarily concerned with
administrative, personnel, and fiscal matters and
represents the military before the Majlis. The Shah,
as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, ex-
ercises operational control of the services directly
or through the Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff.
The Shah is greatly interested in military policy,
deployment, and equipment and plays a personal
role in many aspects of military affairs�particu-
larly in negotiations involving the acquisition of
new equipment.
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The Ministry of Finance, through its work with
the national budget, has influence over almost all
other departments of the: government. The Prime
'\linister sometimes holds the post of Minister of
Finance himself. The ministry collects taxes and
keeps track of all governmental revenues. It also
administers certain government -owned enterprises,
such as the tea and sugar monopolies, the Caspian
Sea Fisheries, and national oanks. The ministry uses
the arrled forces to collect taxes in recalcitrant tribal
areas when necessary.
Rapid economic and social development is of
major importance to the Shah, and five of the
seven new cabinet -level posts created since 1967
reflect this emphasis, i.e., the Minister of Agri-
culture and National Resources, the Minister of
Science and Higher Education, the Minister of
Cooperatives and Rural Affairs, the Deputy Prime
Ministry for Development and Economic Affairs,
and the Minister of State for the Plan and Budget
Organization. Overall responsibility for planning
and monitoring economic development programs
and for formulating a national budget rests with
the Plan and Budge, Organization, a formerly in-
dependent agency called Plan Organization) sub-
ordinate since 1959 to the Prime Minister's office.
It will operate under the direction of a newly
formed Economic Council, composed of the Prime
Minister, the -Ministers of Finance, Labor and So-
cial Affairs, Cooperatives and Rural Affairs, Agri-
culture and Natural Resources, and Economy, a
Minister of State, and the Governor of the Central
Bank. Th council is responsible for ensuring the
general objectives of development plans and super-
vising the preparation of the national budget.
Another special agency which formally comes
under the direct supervision of the Prime Min-
ister's office but whose director reports almost daily
to the Shah, is that of the National Intellitrencc
and Security Organization (SAVAK This agency
is in charge of collecting information on activities
which might endanger naticnal security both at
home and abroad, and it also performs covert
action operations.
Most routine activities of the ministries are
supervised by undersecretaries and directors gen-
eral, men of lesser rank than Cabinet ministers.
A few high -level career civil servants remain in
each ministry during changes in government to
lend continuity, but changes in personnel at the
Cabinet level often result in changes in many im-
portant offices throughout the ministry.
The Iranian civil service, composed of' approxi-
mately 415,000 employees in 1972, has been over-
staffed, grossly inefficient, and plagued by nepo-
tism and corruption. A new Civil Service Code,
hammered out in June 1966, attempts to cope with
this situation by introducing a standard grade and
payment system� sinlflar to that of the U.S. Civil
Service requiring entrance examinations, limiting
the alllotlllt of extra "allowances" which any em-
ployee may receive, and reducing the number of
employee categories. To implement the law, a State
Organization for Administration and Employment
Affairs (SORE) has been established, and the
Secretary General of the SOAE has Cabinet status
as Minister of State. Organizing an efficient, honest,
standardized civil service is expected to take years,
however, partly because of resistance by govern-
ment employees to reform and because of a lack
of clear administrative records.
One of the most serious problems in the entire
executive branch of government is the tendency
among all personnel, including Cabinet ministers,
to tell the Shah what he would like to hear. To
some extent this problem is being lessened as the
civil service arid the Cabinet are infused with
better trained technicians and fewer old -line poli-
ticians and first family members, but it still hampers
efficient planning and execution of policy.
b. fative branch
Iran theoretically has an independent legislative
branch, but parliament is in practice dominated
both in form and substance by the Shah. Candi-
dates for parliament are always cleared either by
the Shah or by his security officials, and the elec-
tions themselves are sometimes engineered to in-
sure election of favored candidates. Although there
are sometimes sharp debates in parliament, there
is never criticism of the Shah, and bills which he
supports are inevitably passed. The quality of
Iranian legislators has improved considerably, as
old -Iine politicians have been replaced by better
educated representatives. Nevertheless, parliament,
at least in rclation to issues important to the Shah,
can still be called it rubberstamp.
The Iranian parliament is bicameral, consisting
of a lower house (illajlis- e- sllotcr(iye- illelli �the
National Consultative Assembly) and an upper
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house (Sena- Senate). The� M ajlis is by far the
more impottant of the two. This house comis1% of
26S deputies ele�v tell by direct pilmilar note� frrne
regiuna) e�011%titfef -116 s 41141 tedigious nfinotities for
4 -year terms, all of which v%pire� %ininflanewtltly.
The present 2 \I ;tjlis %%as elected in )nly 1941 I.
The house can facet and iN -gist work 411 legislation
as sewn as hyo- thirds of the mpr�sentatiyes have
assenthled in Tehran. At least one more th.rn half
of the deputies present in the city al ally time
is requir�d for a ynorfon. A simple majotitr rate
of those present is Sufficient to decide any is-me.
The Fundanfental Laws provide that the \Iajlis.
must he called into session at least otuy a resit.
but this provision has ixrtl igno A oat mca� ion.
The wide authority granted file \lajli% in tilt�
Ffmdamental 1-my of 19116 reflects the mcdomin ;mt
politi-cal issues of that little: the arbilratr rule of
the Shah and particfeiatly his uncontrolled (erl.ign
horrovying which had :ankntpte�4) 11x� e41entty phis
authority inclfeth�s apptova) of all Im tn-e e�� +ar*4
for flit- strengthening of the gmurntaetlt and king
(lott). flit� regulation of state affairs, and the Cliff.
Mihtioll of tttinistries 1 i.e.. approv:d of Citl inet
nominees 1. A%idv front such gl.tll.tal pr0%i%i14tl%. 1114�
subject given the ttlosl alluntioll in life ton%tile-
tion is that of finance. (H it told of IT attic le% ton
cerniait the� allthorit of file \Lajlis. %4-v4-tt (14-.1) -.%fill
matters imlxrtant to the tation's o-conona%, inelod-
ing levying tax. -s. dra%ying felt the 1td;l.t, seili11g
state properties. gt.mling colnnx�rt i.tl tonecs%iom.
obtaining loser s for the stale, and finatu ing and
constnlc�ting national railways ant) te;ad%. The \f.afli%
retains sole w%p onsibility for luming till the na-
tional budget and for 414-aling %%fill other stale
financial mallets. Thi% ;mthorit% is in pr.Klitc fe%ta-
ally limited to p.as%ing oft lelit i4-s pr pm-41 .11141
infplcnf4-nted by the uxecfeliye br.111411.
The Fundamental I.aw of I'X16 pto%ideh th.1t ses-
sions of the \i ;ajlis IN� illicit to dw public .anti to
journalists. There is a (omfitotio:.al pro%i %ion !for
holding secret meeting%, lids the \1.1111% 4.111v1et pw.
legislation in seurct. A hill m.1y lx� pre- .enitil to tilt-
\iajlis in olt�n session and %ofell %t itiftefl 414.11.111..
The \Iajlis aplxints hlrlctiollal committers In de-
bate various pit -tes of legislation prior to flit- di%-
viission by the hill Innn4-. The -re are motaliy 29 to
31) sue�h e�omrnitlel.%, ifK-111ding at 1e�41%t 4 ftle to handle
the legislatiotl prepared by 4'.kh tf the ntim%tri1.%
in the Cabin4-t, in addition b wwral �others for
Specific tylx�s of bills
The most lxaetful individual in the fajlis is the
slwaker. %1141 is clt�cte�d by Ilie etetir� hotlse at the
first formal nnvuling of e:1c11 session. lie r4�c�orciles
MA" Mail" a .1tuttitlur differences on a givetl piece
of legWiltien. hell% to teconcile differences be-
tv*4o�c�t1 Senate and \Iajlis versions of the same bill,
Mid wont% the b:41lols ill the e *4fajlis to determiuc
*4%11ethet it hill has passed cr (:tile(*.. fie sees the
shah regfel:ttly wllt�ta 1athatlr�nt is in sessi:m.
I'al.nty three assettlblies have been elected Iy
the (t;mian lx,ple since the first \Iajlis wa% elected
fit 1116. "i he lxarr given to the Shah in 19.19 to
dissolve� eithct or iNOth houses of parlivneot has
I cell o%ed UM(e against the \Iajlis. its 19.1.1 and 1961.
life Fefndatnenta) 1wr of 1906 provided for an
1111N�t 111111%. of parliament. or senat1.. This house
%%.a% not (alled into living anti) 1950, however. 1l.-
o.t1se of file opinositintl of the \Iajlis and then otth�
.11 the urging off the Sl ail. The \Iajlis feared that
.1 Senate *4%4111141 ix� tonflxsed of the old -line elite
a:11i a %trong sfeplxrt for the monarchy. This
pnv "d to iN� the� rase from 1931 to 1953 when, in
if %tri!c0c iwt%%cvn Ptime \Iini%tcr \losadeq and
the shall, \I4ra41cy tentteelled the \Iajh% while the
se�tat4- altllrnt iu%atiahly %uplxorted the Shah. The
sl. -11.11e is o f1tn1vn1.(l of N) metnhers. all of whom
are a1ps,intI'll hr the Shah and :311 are 4-14 -ctr d by
dilco f 1NpoLat %fife�. la tontta%t to till. \Iajlis, half
oil IN111� the' aplfintUd an41 elected Senator% 11111st he
Irvine Tehran. and the rest from the 4 roviiiecs. The
t4 nn of vat 11 So ndlot i% �1 %eats.
"i he� F1eN1,11uet11.11 I'aw %l.ates that the regulations
of flit Sf�n to trn1%t he approved by the \Iajlis. Nit
Ill Imu tic. the Senate has lot�en all4m ed to reg+llate
it% imll intettt.d ptfcedures. 'i'he i'rumdent of the
so like- fit,- Slx�.akct of the Mailis. ox t tlpic�s an
11111wortmit lenitirn h+ the %irmtere of patliament;
hv�. 1s4v. wo, the Shah llt tioxlucally, helps to recon-
e 111. differcnlccs I"'Muen till- h%o houses, and Counts
file %otl�% in the S4-11.114%
'I he Scn.lte's .41116)rity tht�or4-tic.dly extends to all
tnalt4rr% %%fifth %an, IN- to- mi41ete�d In. the Mai ex-
c opt thow rrlamiv. to f omoit 4 AclllaNy, however.
the- se�nal4- 1% nnlch le.% illffiu�ntia) than flit- \Iajlis.
It 11%11.111% p.1S %e s levi%lalton, mare oplickly and with
I4-%% (lobate theto the lo*4%4-r home. Miring its hrit�f
111%14r%. the S4�11.114- ha% IN-en di%mi %ed duct. times
ill 1462. 1 and liKil.
Actttthug fi� thf� Ftood- o11enl.al Liu%. prolosed
14-gi%1atin11 tea% N. drafted 111 ahcr how-c of par
11.lmm11t, by an% one of the Ministries of the execu-
7
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tive branch, or by the Shah. i\ -lost legislation is in
practice drafted by the executive branch, and the
legislature's function is approval or disapproval.
NVheu the bill is passed by both houses, it goes to
the Shah for his signature and is passed to the
Prime 1\'linister for enforcement. In case the Senate
an-.1 fail to agree on the disposal of a bill
after it has been sent twice from one chamber to
the other, the bill is submitted to a joint commit
tee made tip of an equal number of representa-
tives from each house. While this committee is
meeting, the Speaker of the Majlis and the Presi-
dent of the Senate hold informal discussions. Usu-
ally, a compromise is reached. If not, the problem
is presented to the Shah for his consideration. If
the Shah approves the decision made by the Nfajlis,
the bill is put into effect. If he sides Nvith the Sen-
ate, or takes no stand, the entire issue is dropped
for at least 6 months, after which time it may be
reintroduced.
The constitution makes no provision for judicial
review of legislation other than to say that a com-
.nittee of five theologians will pass on the Iavv's
adherence to Islamic tenets. There is no known
occasion, howcver, in Nvhicli such a committee has
been convened, although some of the legislation in
connection with the Shah's reform program has
been opposed by many religious leaders.
2. Provincial and local government (U /OU)
Iran has had a strongly centralized system of
government in which local and provincial officials
remain largely dependent on Tehran for decision
making and financial assistance. This system was in-
herited from Reza Shah, who found that tight cen-
tral control was necessary to unify the loosely
organized domains of preceding Qajar dynasty.
In the 1960:s, however, the present Shah undertook
a program to improve the quality of provincial and
local governments, to decentralize administration,
and to provide for more popular participation at
the local level. The process has been slow, however,
and in 1970 the Shah called for increased efforts
to speed up the creation of local institutions in
the interests of decentralization. Political, economic,
and educational conditions have continued to ham-
per local development, however, and control by the
central government, appointed governors, and min-
istries predominates. It probably will be many years
before Tehran will delegate substantial decision-
0
making powers to local or provincial authorities,
although this most likely would increase the effi-
ciency of the government.
a. Prurinc�ial
Iran is divided into 14 provinces (ostans), each
under the direction of it governor general (ostandar),
and nine independent governorates (farnwndari
kol) under a principal governor (farnwndar). The
independent governorates are somewhat smaller in
area than the provinces, but their administrative
heads have all the powers granted to the governors
general of the provinces. The provinces, many of
which represent historic divisions of Iran, are: Cen-
tral (Tehran), Gilan, Mazandaran, Azarbaijan -e
Sharqi East Azarbaijan Azarbaijan -e Garbi
NVcst Azarbaijan Kermanshahan, Khuzestan,
Fars, Kerman, Khorasan, Esfahan, Baluchestan va
Sistan, Kordestan, and Ja: ayer va Banader -e Khalij -e
Fars va Darya -ye `Oman Ports and Islands of the
Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, or the Coastal
Province). The independent governorates are:
Bakhtiari va Chahar Maliall, Boyer Ahmadi -ye
Sardsir va Koliki uyeh, Semnan, Hamadan, Lorestan,
Ilam va Poshtkuh, Yazd, Zanjan, and Bushehr.
Changes in administrative divisions are made from
time to time by the central government in response
to economic and social developments.
Each province and independent governorate is
subdivided into districts (.shuhrestans), also ad-
ministered by governor (known as a farmandar).
In rural areas, each district is divided into subdis-
tricts (or baklislis) administered by bakhshdars;
and each subdistrict, into groups of villages, or
counties (dehestans), administered by dehdars.
Each group of villages is finally broken down into
individual village units administered by headmen
(katkhoda). In 1970 there were 151 shahrestans,
459 bakhshs, and 1,543 deliestans. Within the dis-
tricts, any locality with more than 5,000 inhabitants
is qualified to become a municipality (shahrdari),
governed by a mayor (shalirdar) and, i,N some cases,
by a municipal council. In 1970, there were 444
shalirdaris.
The governors general and the principal gov-
ernors report directly to the Minister of .Interior
in Tehran and are usually selected b)' the Shah him-
self. They are the executive officers of the provinces
and are wholly responsible for the management of
subordinate counties, the affairs of which they must
inspect. The degree to which a governor general
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can control his province depends primarily on his
personal prestige, energy, and relationship with
the Shah. This control is blurred by the fact that
other officials possess the same advantages, since
"lost ministries and some independent agencies
have a field service i the province and, normally,
the department heads in Tehran exercise direct con-
trol over subordinate field units.
The district governor is appointed by imperial
decree, after having been recommended either by
the governor general of the province or by the
Minister of Interior. He is responsible for imple-
menting the directives of the governor ,general, who
in turn receives instructions from the Minister of
the Interior.
As part of the Shah's plan to upgrade: provincial
government, the Ministry of Interior announced in
Jul 1972 changes of posts of 75 farmandars in the
largest local government personnel shift in 10 years.
Promotions were given to 32 haklis�lidars �"lost of
them university graduates �who replaced older,
less trained officials.
b. Local
Although the Fundamental Laws required that
popularly elected councils on the provincial and
district level have some control over their own af-
fairs, this provision was long ignored. In October
1962 a laNv was passed providing for provincial
councils, to be formed by one member from each
Of the lower councils within the province. No action
appears to have been taken until 1970, when coun-
cils were established for each of Iran's 151 districts
and most of the 14 provinces. The district councils
were elected by a combination of direct elections
(in district capitals) and indirect elections (in the
rural areas of each district). The provincial coun-
cils were all elected indirectly by the district coun-
cils of a given province.
The elections were marked by widespread apathy
stemming from doubt in the efficacy of the new
councils, an inadequate job of educating the people
by the government, and the problems inherent in
conducting election:, in a still largely illiterate so-
ciety with no tradition of popular participation in
government. Local elections in October 1972 held
no surprises and resulted in a landslide victory for
the governing party.
In municipal ities without elected councils, the
mayor is appointed by a special division in the
Ministry of Interior after recommendation by the
governor general. When municipal councils have
been chosen, the appointed mayors will be re-
placed by shalurdars elected by the new councils.
All other local officials will still be appointed in
Tehran.
Provincial, district, and municipal councils are
to have limited authority in matters involving de-
velopni nt projects, health, education, all(] munici-
pal affairs. They will have the right to inquire into
and supervise the spending of revenues and will
be authorized to levy certain taxes for limited use.
]Decisions taken by these councils, however, will
be subject to veto by the governors general and
Ministry of Interior officials and will depend on
the latter for their implementation.
Most administrators of smaller units, from sub
districts to villages, are selected by the ''Iinister
Of Interior; however, in villages where land reform
pleasures have taken effect, some administrators
are chosen by their peers. Since land reform was
instituted in 1962, numerous cooperative societies
have been formed on the village level and have
involved peasants �many of whom now are small
landhol:lers �in the decisiorimaking process. In
1963, Tehran issued a decree calling for the estab-
lishnleut of elected village councils, over 3,000 of
Which comicils have since been chosen. These coun-
cils are responsible for maintaining close coopera-
tion with the directors of the village agricultural
cou]herativcs and for planning and implementing
local social and economic projects.
The elected municipal and village councils are
a part of the Shah's effort to improve and decen-
tralize the government and to achieve greater public
participation in it. Teleran is also attemptin to in-
crease the number and quality of officials at the
local level. Efforts are being made to involve local
and provincial officials in the preparation of the
national budget so that local needs can be esti-
mated more accurately. The Interior Minister has
initiated recruitment and training programs to im-
prove the quality Of district, municipality, and
subdistrict appointees. i\lost of the emphasis thus
far has been on improving efficiency rather than
on decentralization, and the NN hole process is
moving very gradually.
I Judicial system (U /OU)
Although the constitution prescribes the separa-
tion of powers among executive, legislative, and
judicial arms, the government traditionally has not
E
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separated tilt- executive and judicial branches, auul
the latter remains subordinate to tilt- former. The
Shah and the government, through the Prince \lin-
ister and Minister of Justice, appoint judges on all
levels of the court system and appoint, dismiss,
and assign the Public prosecution staff. Further-
more, the Supreme Court has no independent alt
thority to review the constitutionality of latws or
issues; it operates merely as the highest appellate
Court i11 the land.
The judicial system� although better administered
than in the past, still suffers from manipulation�
favoritism, corruption, and miscarriages of justice.
Tilt- low salaries of judges make them vulnerable
to bribery, and there is it tendency in the judicial
establishment to prote �t families :and friends in
making decisions. Lack of competency is a nothi-t
problem, for few lawyers open I ;tw hooks after
graduation from school. Finally, and probably most
undermining. the government sometimes refuses
to be bound by its own laws. The public is assarc
that when the government decides upon a course
of action, legal harriers "all easily. Lack of confi-
dence ill the judicial system has caused Iranians
to avoid recourse to it if possible; if forced to list-
it, they summon all the influence their family has
or can afford to obtain it favorable decision.
At the close of the 19tH century Iran had two
bodies of law: tilt- sharia, or religious law, and the
secular law, known as the urf. 1 s, were admin-
istered, respectively, by the Islamic clergy and
tile Shah :s government. Neither system was stand
arclized or codified in the modern sense, actin juris-
diction was vague. Starting with the constitutional
movement of 1906 and culminating ill the legal
reforms under Reza Shah, the authority and func-
tions of the religious courts were redmed, and all
administration of law was brought under the central
government.
Gradually, civil codes replaced tilt- religious ones,
and European lays codes sycre freely drawn upoii
and adapted to Islamic principles. Marriage :ltd
family laws were in secular form hilt followcc) the
theme of tilt- old Islamic sharia pritiviples; religious
branches were retained in some courts to deal with
matters of personal status. 11% 1970. however. the
remaining religious courts and branches :old all
other courts were clearly organized under the \lim-
istry of justice, and all courts of every kind anti
level �.verc� obligated to hand dowrt verdicts ill
compliance� with the established codes of 1�t\%..
10
Courts are n;t c�onstitutiooall� booed by ally dc-
c�recs (if they c�cntral or prciyrttcial governm ew that
are contrary to existing law. 'I'll(- jury system is
licit used exc�cpt in cases cif lxlitic�al crimes or in-
fractions of tilt pros lacy. ill these it is ronstiht-
tionally re(luired, but this provi%ion sucim to hart-
been ignored.
'I'll(- court system is diyidt-d into five train lcycls.
At the lowest ate local collrh duc by tilt- pcciplc
in rural and ttrhan areas. In 19,2. there wort- ntun�
than �1,(XX) stick courts, called home% af justiu-
khans�- ye -ensaf serving sonny KIM yillatzw. ;md
hamlets with ;(N) more plaimed. There also sse�n�
132 arbitration c�o.mvils (Arraye- daracri cicett-d
in urbaut areas. witi 0 mon- underway. "these
ch-ewd local ctimrts� called for in the Shah's While
Revolution� mvert� established to bring the judicial
system c�los�r to the lx�ople. to lessen tha� rwnic�ism
of iraniam toward tilt- c�entrh. and tat inc�rcase
public participation in govii -m u�nt. Appa runtl the
courts are very l>,q,ular, since tiles have t-as�r)
tilt- work load of other cobras anti have given the
pul,liu easier ac�c�cm to jmticc ss ith a ntinitnunt of
formality arn) im cast. Thu homes of jtstive haws
handled more than it half million erwil and pt�n.tl
cases and the c�ootx�ils of arbitration altno.t as half
million mom�.
Arbitration c�uuucils comi t of a chairman, two
primary mum1 cr ant(] tan alternate mf-mlx�rs.
They arc eh�c�ted by the emimiunity front a list
of 31) candidates who haw bt�c�n sen�enrd by it
contciittec whom. ntcnthcrship usoaII%. includes a
\iinistry of justiec� official and officials of the
Iranian polim and security scrvic�cs. The \lini%trw
of Jnstiev aplNint% one adviser to offer legal advice
to the votiti �il and to assore tilt- legality of tilt-
Cottnc�il's dec�i%iom. 'I'll(- adviser is alo entpowt-n�d
to reject dcc�isions det- u�d inromi%tcnt with irmian
juri%imidt-mv and to tratmfvr the cases to tilt- rcgu-
I:ar courts. "l he councils arc emilawen�d to inwe.ti-
gate and adjudicate minor 6%i) disputes -mil cona-
plaints, such as traffic avvidt�nts auul ItnIlc�rtw
damage. whose s.�ttlentent thx�s not inyolwt- nton�
than 141%10.(KK) alpow I"SS1321, as swell as minor
offenses and misdemeanom whose Iwimlty dtx�s
licit exceed2 months' imprisonment or it f inc of
more thaua 111%1.2(11) S15.y(1).
The houses of justice arc similar in mature to
the arbitrattiom comicil%, hot there is nr. legal ad-
%iser from thy� \linistry of justice to int -mve rulitiv%.
Mendx�r% of the homes are chosen by the villagers
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for their honest%� and good reputation, and, although
III(. houses ;tre fa.r less Sophisticated than the arbi-
tration councils. they have been quite effective.
Most of the cases before houses of justice involve
disputes bet\veen villagers over water rights, tres-
Passing, and damage to crops clue to negligence.
The remainder are of a more personal natllre,
usually involving domestic disputes. Houses of
justice are authorized to exan,ioe all claims not
exceeding 1110AX) ($53). If all pal-ties agr (,c, tile\,
may hear claims ii1olying movable� property valcd
Ill) to 11ls20AX) S266 The houses of justice are
authorized to fine persons onl\, up to Ii1200 $2.66
The next level of the court s consists of
minor courts. whos judges are roughly equivalent
to justices of the peace. and small municipal courts.
They have jurisdiction over civil cases involving
suits 11p to Iils50,000 $664 and petty offenses
P,Illishable be find or up to 2 months' imprison-
ment. Minor courts are presided over by a single
magistrate.
Next in the hierarchy of courts are the district
courts. loc�atecl in larger towns, \yhich hear cases
from areas composed of one more counties. )is-
tric�t courts, consisting of a juclg(., a proscc�tlting
attorney. and acs examining magistrate, have juris-
diction in the first instance over major nliscle-
meanors. punishable by fine of 11 da vs' to :3 years'
imprisomncnt. and civil cases involving more than
lils5010 0 $664 1 11cy also rcview cases appeale(l
from the minor courts.
Next in order are the provincial high courts,
whic�11 are located in the provincial capitals and
CoMist of two brvtc�hes. civil and criminal. '1�11c
vigil branch, composed of two or three panels of
iclges, investigates appeals from all lower courts.
The c�rininal branch has authority in the first ill
stauc�e over all offenses class( as crimes, which
are punishable by from 2 years' solitary ccnlfir,
nu�nt to eMec�ution; its various panels consist of
either three or five judges.
The highest court of the land, of ��hick tiler(.
,nay c�onstitationally only be one, is th(, Supreme
Court. Located in Tehran, the court has the highest
appellate jurisdiction. It resembles in certain Ways
both the Supreme Court of the United States and
the dissimilar Court of Cassation of the I. re,lei,
but is not exac�tl� like either of them,
,1111011 it is sometimes referred to as the Court
of cassation. Th(, Supreme Court of gran has au-
thority in hc first instance in tile� trial of Cabille
ministers. In addition, it adjudicates disputes as
to th(, relative compete nec and jurisclic Pion of civil
and military courts in solnc cases. It has 11 branches,
or sections, of Four justices each. The president of
the first section is tilt� Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. 'I'll( Attonwv G(,ticral, appointed by the
Shah on nomination of the Milllster of Justice, *s
chid' Public Prosect,tor and is attached to the
Supreme Court.
Iran also has special courts with limited juris-
diction, the most important of wilic}1 are the mili-
tary tribunals. 7 11`1 ever martial law is declared in
au,y area, the Ministry of War can establish military
tribunals which have the po\ver to assume respon-
sihility for any or all cases 'outtalk' brought before
the rc,(rular courts. There are two 1(,ycls of* military
courts, the second of which sit as an appellate
bode to the first. No appeal cal, he made from the
second military tribunal c :ecept to the Supreme
Court �and to this body only with the express
permission of talc Shah, a permission seldom given.
Usually the Judge Advocate General in charge
of all military courts decides to assuage respon-
sibility only for cases am olving yiolcnce, public
order, subyersioll, and the press laws; matters such
as credit eases, land litigation, and family affairs
are left to the civil court syste m. Durutg a period of
martial htm. military authorities pray slake arrests
without Charges. enter houses without search war
rallts, suppress the press, prohibit public meetings,
and Impose a curfew.
In addition to their authority during periods of
martial law, permanent military tribunals are re-
sponsible for trying all military Personnel for
c�rimcs committed while on duty. Military tribunals
also have authority it, the cases of all political
cringes and infractions of the press 1a\\ Des�)itc
the fact that the Fundamental Laws provide for the
presence of a jury when such cases are heard. these
cas ^s not tried by jury and they seldom reach
the civilian courts.
The Civil Servants Tribunal has scycral branches
throughout Tehran and the provinces. It has respon-
sibility for bringing to trial all cases of graft or
corruption involving government civil servants up
to the level of monsters. Anyone c�onvictccl by these
courts of a major cringe can appeal to the Supreme
Court. If at Cabinet minister is accused of a crime
in connection with his respotlsibilitics as a member
of the government. the Supreme Court serves as
it court of first instance.
11
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There are two disciplinary tribunals for those in
the legal profession. One called the Ifigh Judicial
Council �is for complaints brought against judges.
The other is for complaints against actions taken by
lawyers in their official capacities. Each of these
tribunals consists of a single court in Tehran, anci
there is no appeal.
To become a judge or a public prosecutor, a Iran
must be a graduate of either of the faculties of law,
political science, or theology at the University of
Tehran. The Ministry of Justice makes the final
decision �often on political grounds �as to -whether
an individual applicant is recommended to the
Shah for appointment.
For each branch of the court system there is at
least one public prosecutor or assistant public
prosecutor. These men are appointed by the \fin
istry of Justice and have considerable powers in the
court systen.l. It is to the office of the public prose-
cutor that anyone wishing to initiate litigation must
come to have his caw assigned to it particular court.
Crimes against the state may be brought to the
attention of the public prosecutor by the police or
may be independently brought to court by the
prosecutor's office itself. Prior to trial, the pblic
prosecutor's office has authority to order arrests,
isque search warrants to the pohce, establish hail,
and order the detention of defendants without hail.
Public prosecutors have the additional responsibility
of observing how laws are functioning am. of re-
porting any defects to the Ministry of Jus, cc, which
has the authority to draft new laws or to submit
old ones to the parliament for reconsideration.
The Iranian penal code draws heavily oil the
French Penal Code of 1801 �both for its under
lying principles and for its structure. In accord with
the French system, offenses are classified in groups
can the basis of code; however, the Iranian code
establishes four instead of three types of violations.
The most serious offense is the felony, conviction
for which lay result in death. Other penalties for
the offense are imprisonment or exile for it specified
time or for life as well as loss of civi rights. 1 he
middle categories include serious misdemeanors
and minor misdemeanors the French code has
only a single category of misdemeanors). Included
in the former category, as in the French code, are
offenses such as robbery and arson. Penalties for
these misdemeanors are imprisonment of over 1
month or a heavy fine. Minor misdemeanors are
punished by imprisonment of over 1 week or it fine.
The least serious offense, the infraction, includes
12
vagrancy, cruelty to animals, and traffic violations,
all of .which are punishable by small fines or by
prison terms of less than it week.
Alternat �s to imprisonment, as specified in the
penal code, are exile or obligatory domicile in a
specified location under police supervision. The
courts rarely order such punishment.
Accommodations to Islamic law and society are
most notable in the subsection of the code -which
deals with crimes against morality. Article 1 ex-
empts it man from punishment if he kills his wife
for adultery, and it punishes him with only 6
months' imprisonment if he kills his daughter or
sister under similar circumstances. No such license
is allowed the women in the reverse situation, al-
though a drive for equal legal rights for women is
gaining momentum. Elsewhere. the code takes cog
nizance of the Iranian patriarchal society and of
the Muslim tradif:_n of sanctuary; if relatives of a
criminal assist him, they are exempt from punish-
ment, but all others harboring such an individual
may be pmished by prison terms ranging from 1
month to it year.
Violations of criminal ]a\\ are charged and tried
in accordar_Le with it system adopted largely from
tha! of France. A warrant is supposedly necessary
before in arrest can be made, but exceptions are
numerous. 'fhc. accused is theoretically protected
by the requirements that he must be brought before
a magistrate within 24 hours following arrest and
that he has the right to be repre by counsel.
Trials are not by jury� despite the provision in
the Fundamental Laws for the presence of it jury
in trials involving political offenses and ])reaches of
the press laws and t1w verdict is reached by the
court itself. Trials are public except in cases deemed
to jeopardize morality or state security. During a
trial, the prosecution and the defense are given
equal opportunity to present their sides. If the de-
fendant is not present, he may he judged in absen-
tia, on the basis of the arguments of the prosecu-
tion alone. Appeals from the decision of the court
may be made within 12 clays by either the defense
or the prosecution. As stated above, justice in Iran
is not always dispensed in strict accordance with
the legal code, and a defendant's wealth and politi-
cal influence �or lack of it �tend to affect the
mane, r in .which he is treated.
Outside of the national legal system is a unique
legal structure, called the Hamayanakan, which
deals with personal states laws, including marriage
and divorce, of the Armenian community.
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C. Political dynamics (S)
The Shah is at the pinnacle of political power
in Iran; it is lie who determines the direction
and content of policy, the nature of political ac-
tivity, and the conduct of elections. Below the
Shah is a coterie of Cabinet officers, high level
civil servants, political party leaders, military
officers, and first family nietnbers whose political
power is directly related to their influence with
and access to the Shah. Since these persons have
no independent pow; r base and are dependent on
the Shah for their positions, their individual status
and nienibership in the group at this level fluctuate
with the Shah's attitudes and wishes. At the next
level is a larger group of middle and lower grade
civil servants, local government officials, nicni-
bers of the reform program corps, and religious
leaders �all of whom are expected to serve more
or less as the Shah's political agents in the field.
The great mass of Iranians, both rural and urban,
have no direct influence on the political situation
ai.d are generally apathetic. When they do feel
strongly about all issue, however, their attitudes
arc, in practice, informally passed along to higher
political authorities and can, in fact, affect policy.
This upward channeling of opinions is facilitaed
by a unique Iranian institution, the clou;relt, or
circle. It is comnion for educated Iranians to meet
periodically in sniall gatherings of trusted friends
and family members where information can be
exchanged and opinions expressed with relative
candor. Overlapping membership insures that key
attitudes are disseminated and conveyed to people
of influence and authority. Thus, although Iran's
government is authoritarian, it is far from oblivious
to rumblings from below and in fact on most issues
demonstrates a remarkable sensitivity. Iran's large
and heterogeneous bureaucracy is anotiwr vehicle
for making known and obtaining political ;md per-
sonal wants, a lth ough it is not always responsive
and may alter facts. As advisers to the Shah are
prone to adjust informa to advance their own
interests, the data on which he bases his decisions
are not always accurate.
Political life in Iran has always been charac-
terized either by a strong, authoritarian central
government or by fragmented despotic power units,
similar to the war lordships of pre- Coniniunist
China. The necessity for strong government can
be explained in part by the intense, individualism
of Iranians, who tend to be motivated solely by
self- interest and who give allegiance: to self, `anvil,
religion, and tribe before government and nation.
Both politics and government have traditionally
centerers around personal contacts, influence, and
the force of personality rather than institutions or
political parties. For a decade, however, the Shah
has been building modern economic and social
institutions and encouraging these whose positions
are based on ability rather than on whoni they
know, Thus, traditional and modern ford -s can be
sees, at every level of political power in Iran, and
they are forced by the Shah to work together.
With the passage of time, and progress in ini-
plenienting the reforni program, doubts have
lessened among nationalist intellectuals as to the
government's sincerity in its desire to transform
society. Despite consistent pressure from the top
to inculcate a sense of urgency, sonic progranis
have lagged in exer.tition; of primary importance.
hou-ever, is the fact that none has failed. It wolild
be difficult for political opposition of whatever
origin to enunciate a comprehensive, integrated
program more clearly in the national interest and
substantially different from that of tilt� Shah.
The economic and technical changes takiig place
in Iran have made the country a more cohesive
whole;, there is a greater sense of participation and
more national consciousness aniong the people than
at any time in the past. At the sanic tinie, the
Iranian political system is seriously weakened be-
cause it still ultimately depends on one man the
Shah. Moreover, the economic, social, and admin-
istrative modernization that has taken place has
done little to create solid political institutions, and
Iranians have not vet been allowed to exercise
decisionni aking in the political arena.
Political dissenters, at home and abroad, among
Iranian students and opposition factions or indi-
viduals describe the government as excessively
authoritarian and paternalistic. The Shah has not
permitted the development of political parties
such as exist in Western democracies, firmly be-
lieving that social and economic stability must
be achieved first. ha effect, the Shah views po-
litical activity as u.c nicans by which his pro-
grain for modernizing Iran will be advertised and
carried out. The only permissible political ac-
tivity, therefore, is conducted by those who accept
the validity of the Shah's program.
It can be assumed that the rapid change and
increased mobility within Iranian society since 1961
have had an inipact on tilt� political attitudes of the
13
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people. but the absence of open caulpai(rniny auuf
elections nntkes the extent or direction of such
c�halwe impossible to determine. It is also ilnpos-
sible to detcrulinc whether or slut thy.� people�
would support or reject the c�c of the
Shill's prograuls should tllc� Shah dic. Tllc 1� :111press
is desi;;nated recent if the Shah dies before the
Crnwn Prince reaches the age of 20. Almost cer-
taillIv. the nlilitillw would step in it', first to sup-
port hc�r "ov c�rnnlent, but beyond that ahuost uIy-
thill" c�cndd happen.
1. Political forces
(I ..S /111 /t
'I'll(- Shah took the throne in 1941 aid for many
years was controlled by, rather than the nlaniptl-
lator of, the political forces in ban. Ile labored
under the shado'.1 of' his a,,res >i c, donlilwcrin'r
self -made father, Reza Shah. Ile was intimidated
by his Cabinct ulirlisters and failik and scented
('ncralh too selasitlc ,aid introspective to be all
effcctive miler. A nun1, ,�r of factors ha\e c�ontrib-
litcd to the Shah's dtlrin. the past 10 years
into it strop,, confident monarch F i"nrc I 'I'Ilcsc
are the success of" his third luarria.re with the birth
of two till[](. heirs and Iran's pro(I�ess under his
1.4
0
dcveloplticnt programs. Probably most important
is his desire to provc hinlscll a LVcat leader in his
Own right, coupled with his awarcncss� finely
attuucd by sc\ narroW escapes front ussassina-
rioi- -that he is mortal alld that his time is liinitcd.
Ilc is c11�krn by the� collvic�tion that Only he caul
pull Iran into the 20th ccntury and that tuodc.
zation nntst be acconlpil.0wd ill his lifc�tinlc.
In recent yca: the Shah has scored all inlln�cs-
sk chain of successes. %t home he has clot down
or isolated potential ri\�atls, staked out his claini
to be at royal revolutionary, and in the process
has established his suprcillacy beyond question.
Ile' has presided o\�cr remarkably rapid economic
developnlccct, attributable ill part to his ability to
squeeze enormous additional funds from Xestern
oil c�ol"pauics. Oil the forcitrn front as well, the
Shah has built an ilnatrc of indc�pcndcucc. Ile (]('ills
ith the (-rr(.at I "')welts with assurance. and insists
that his U.S. ally' should �ivc (r1cat wei(f11t to his
apprcc�iation of rci.ionnf problcrns. In short, the
Shut has bcconm it suprcnlely self confident fignrc�
with ouch to be proud of'. He is intelligent and
personable, if sonic tillles rllerc�uriltl. is fluent in
1� :u!'lish and F rcuc�h, a11d has a taste for sports, art,
a.nd literature. Much of the Shah's education dealt
with military affairs, ill which he is still decply
interested and in which he considers himself an
expert.
The Shah bclic\ that in order to rcalizc his
,gals and to prescr\�c his Own position he nrltst
firilik gasp the reins of power and insure that
no other persoi or (,rronp can build tip an indc-
perldetlt power base. With the firm support of_ the
ncilitary and sccurit\ forces. he has succ�ceded. The
Shah's r(.fornl progran1� undoubtedly motivated
in large part In. a (rcm:ille concern for his courl-
try �caul also be Seen as un astute� effort to holster
a lld broadell his political support. He has adroitly
used the traditional leVerS of poster While buildinU
Iuodcrn cc�ouonlic and social skills and institutions.
He lilts suc�cessfnlly rlrllffled both ultranationalists
and traditionalists and, in 111ally instances, has
brou-ht thellt into paarticipation in the reform
pro(rranl.
'I'hc Shah who was 53 years of ate in Oc-
tober 192) is still at times rlood', introspcctiv
auld hyperscusitive. His ego lilts been inflated b
cc�ononlic successes at honk a b his growing
stature in international affairs, and he seems to
be takirl on sonic characteristics of at prototypical
dictator. He has surrounded himself with toady
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FIGURE 1. Shahanshah Mohammad Reza Shah
Pahlavi (U %Olt)

)�e5- 1111,.11 Who have begun to insnlatc Rini from
affairs outside the paiacc vv ;111s. f Ic is also cvhenu h
cc.: etous of his pxvver :.nd show�% no sign of reliu-
(plishin,g eve11 tilt- most trivial cf his prerogatives
:though the Shah remains well read and well
infornu�d about cve11ts in which he i% most intcr-
1,�sted, the give ;old -take of decisiononaking in hall
is almost nonexistartt, with the Shah c�olrslvlot�ntl%
staking decisions in it vac�urt111. This has led in-
crcasiogly to the settling of important matters by
last- minute decrees based sole\%� on enlotiooalisnl.
h. Palace eliqcu�
1'he Sh ;th is surroulcl by it enteric of politici:ons.
fancily, ntilitary officers, and others who are po-
litical forces ooh� to the des'rce to which thev
ha -c access to and influence with hint. 'I he court
considered at one time to he the center of
licelttiottsin�SS and deprav_ih�, of (T eruption ;111(1 in-
fluence peddling. but the Sh;th has tightened Ili%
control. and the court's role has dincinisht�c1. lic-
cause their position dclu-nds on the will of tilt
Shah, most nnenlhers of this group tc nd to he
sycophantic in their devotion to his prograi n%.
\evcrtheicss. it is probably ooh� M this level that
there ore indepencleut thinkers who a1 %c have acc�es%
to the Shah. Nlinist,�r of Court Asadollah .\lane. for
e.xaolple, seems to he able to speak rel ;ttivcic
frank\.� to the Shah. The Shah probable clepcil(k
o1, this coterie to provide facts. figures. ;ot( l Slip
port rather than to engage in any decision11laking.
vw Shah's immediate fanih� has not always
been an asset to hill) and has been kept ill setui-
obscurity. The Queen Mother. once ;1111 inveterate
intriguer, is novv seldom heard front, and the Shah's
half brothers, reported in the past to be potential
c�ontendcrs for the throne. now appear in public
only to open sports events, present trophies. or offi-
ciate at c�eretnonies too inc�onse(ptential for the
Shah's personal attention. Princess Ashraf. the
Shah's twin sister. was !or years the central figure
in uearh� all the scandal c�nunec�ted %%dill the court.
flcr intervention on behalf of her p:u;uuoors %vas
notorious, and it \v ;is widely rtuoored that she was
involved in stntt.g,gling (11 .She has become more
discreet, however, and is even nodcrtaking u�nni-
diplolnatic missions for her brother.
Other members of the Paitlavi family and of the
relatively large Oajar f ;uttily retain social infht-
enec�, hot they have an (wer diminishing influence
in political life. Access to c�onrt personalities is still
considered important, however, to inst11e socc�es% in
business and political aetivitics. 'lilt� Shall. on his
%idc. relies on sonic 10 people to provide Ilion direct
act ;-s% to nn :tjor interest groups. 'Ihc�sc� advisers itl-
elodc 1� :111prc%% Fill 1'1 incess :\shrill; \I,ulochehr
F(lbai. ehairnna n of the \at1(mal Irani :un Oil Coo1-
p�on y and Ili% depot) Iic�r.a FalLth; Gener:d Ayadi.
Ow S1:th'% personal pIl sic�i :ol. Sh:u�il I:ncuui, a
sc�uutor ant; old time� politic�i;ul; Prinu� Minister
Iw ev'da; \rdc%hir %itlivdi, former loreign nnini%tcr.
:c�ocral Iloscin Farc1n1 %t; and Mini%tct� of Court
\\.till. Tlwy do not %cork a% �t tc:u11; several. in
Iac�t. art� rivals, a Situation that tilt Shah prolnibly
eneooragc%.
I�:nnpre%s Farith Figure 2 Ina% been by all ac�-
coun1% .o irtfloeoce for good, wid. of all t1e c�onrt
person;tlitie%. %Ile probably has Ibc most inflncoc�c
on the� Shall. Sit(- i% intelligent and cosnnopolit:ul in
ccoticuk ;owl appears to take he r ;tcSition sc�ri- rush�.
Shc� ha% been active and eflective in prcntctiug
%nci.d i� ir% aod. n>nlikc maul%' others connected %v it11
Ill( co11rt. %he ha% never b �n touched by Scandal.
'1111� I:Il)pre%% i% of c�on%iderable Social ;utd political
.t %i%tancc� to the Shah. She appears with Lin at
c,trioc% Ittnction% and hits cvt�o Ioade provincial
tours by Ilerself. a tank which is unusual for i t
vc )MMI in Into. 11W il)lage slit proiec�ts �that of a
be,ultihll :ltd talented vvontau devoted to her f:onily
.111d to good %corks is especially n%eful ill Iran.
'I'll(- cnitorc had Locked before :un� %11th "lady
FIGURE 2. The Empress Farah Diba (U /OU)
15
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bountiful" tradition, and the attractive I:ntpress pro
vides a basicall uscfol model of the modern Iranian
wont :ut.
Of more political significance are the Prime \fin-
ister, other members of the Cabinet, high -level civil
servants, and political party leaders. Th: -se arc the
people -.vho arc educated, who discuss programs
and policy with the Shah, who present many of the
Shahs programs to the coontrv. who are reslxm-
sibIv for executing the programs, and who joust
with each other for favor in the Shah's eyes. The
nature of this group changed during the IWO*s; its
members are no longer chosen primarily on the
basis of membership in one of Iran's first families
but on technical and inteilechtal skills and the
ability to get things done. Wealthy landlords and
high religious figures have also faded as significant
elements of this group primarily because of their
opposition to parts of the refo.,n program. \fany of
their children, however. remain prominent.) Cor-
ruption is still a problem in Iran� but there is a
growing sense of public service ;utcl dedication to
progress.
Iligh- ranking military and security officials can
also be included in the Shahs immediate coterie,
partly because he still depends upon them to pre-
serve his thnru�. Although the Shah's economic
and adininistrativv reform program theoretically
threatens the sertior military officers, who have
vested interest in the states quo, they appear to he
complt�tel� loyal to the Shah. This loyalty appears
to ex,vad down into the ranks of middle and j, .Jor
grade officers, who are constantly screened for signs
of political opposition. The Shah also relieve on the
National Intelligence ;ue) Security Organization
(SAVAK) not only to design strategy for neutraliz-
ing the oppmsition but to organize political support
for the government.
c�. Middle da-.4%
The next level of political life in Iran includes
those who are more aware of and invoked in poli-
tics than the masses but who are not important
month to have frequent access to the Shah. This
group includes local and provincial government
employees; most of the Majlis representatives; num-
bers of the reform program's health. Literacy, and
Development Corps; loyal members of the clergy;
and lower and middle grade civil servants.
Although members of this group do not move in
the higher circles of society or government, thev
16
are of great importance to the Shalt because they
serve, in effect, as his eyes and cars atnotig the
people. it is they who actually carry out many
aspects of the reform program, who make up the
membership of the political parties, an(I who cam-
paign for office. The Shah must ttec�essarily depend
oil their to explain, advertise, and advocate his pro
grams and to give him virtually his only informa-
tion regarding attitudes among the people as a
whole.
The transitl'on from traditional to modern society
is perhaps most apparent at this level of political
life. Local officials and many lower level civil serv-
ants in Tchran are not highly cchtcatcd and tend
to do things in the old way through personal con-
tacts, knowing the right people, and favoring their
families and friends. They are gradually being re-
placed, however, by younger, better educated
Iranians who have been specifically trained for
their jobs and are learning to operate through or-
ganizations and bureaucratic channels. This is cer-
tainly true of most members of the reform program
corps who have been scattered throughout the
country. The newer group of government and
Health, Literacy, and Development Corps mem-
bers are bringing a new sense of urgency to the
reform program. Many of them are people who
would normally oppose the Shah as a dictator but
who are pragmatic enough to join the bandwagon.
The group could cause problems, however, should
the momentum of social and economic change
falter.
The ulamu, or Shia clergy, once exercised con-
siderable infhrcnce over town, village, and rural
life in their role as religious leaders, teachers, and
healers. Thew are beginning to lose this influence,
however, as the people turn to government as a
source of leadership. They have also lost it great
deal of the infhtenc�e they once had in the political
hierarchy because of their opposition to land re-
form, women s rights, and liberalized divorce: laws.
Among the peasants, the clergy probably retain
considerable influence on social and spiritual
matters, but they are carefully discotuagcd from
participating in political activity unless it is in
support of the government.
"Though formal pressure groups are relatively
rare in Iran, the most effective ones�such as the
Chamber of Commerce, the Bar Association, the
secondary school teachers, and several smaller
groups of professionals �arc composed essentially
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of Middle class and professional personnel. TIMore
traditional pressure groups are the merchants' and
craftsmen's guilds, which have a long history and
which represent independent middle and IoNver
class businessmen and artisans. Nlost lobbying is
still conducted in the traditional way by contract-
ing friends or acquaintances in power, informally
and personally, father than through all organization.
d. Lower class
The great masses of Iranians �the peasants, the
tribesmen, and the urban lower class remain a
political enigma. Certainly it can be said that the
rural masses are no longer cut off from events in
the rest of the country, since even the most remote
village has its transistor radios, and health and
literacy corpslllcll are found in many small rural
villages whose previous contact with the govern-
ment was confined to police and tax collectors.
Land reforms in the rural areas and dhe growing
economy and expanded services in the cities appear
to be making a dent in the traditional apathy and
cynicism of the Iranian masses. A new mood of
progress and even some new trust in government
beyond the traditional 'loyalty to the Shah himself)
may slowly be replacing the usual fatalism.
Most of the lower class particularly the peas-
ants� seemed to be a conservative, relatively inert
element in Iranian political life. The Shah's popu-
larity with this class is probably higher than at any
time in the past, and the people generally seemed
grateful for the new services provided by the gov-
ernment, but they were not all active force in de-
manding change. Despite improvements in their
economic and social status and their growing aware-
ness of government as a force for change, most
Iranian peasants seem to be apolitical. N`'llether
modernization will create a sense of organized po-
litical consciousness or produce active pressure for
programs and benefits is problematical. It has never
happened before in Iran �but then neither have the
social and economic changes now sweeping the
country.
c. Political opposition
The Shah faces no viable political opposition.
The left has been rendered impotent since the
declaration of the Shah's White Revolution and
its ambitious reform program and by the fact that
political oppositionists are carefully monitored by
the security forces. At the same time, many con-
servative elements, once ardent supporters of the
Shall, have been disaffected by his reform program.
Members of the religious hierarchy, in particular,
view elements of the program �such as land re-
form and women's rights �as striking at their power
and interests. The government's continuing pres-
sure against religious dissidents, combined with
rewards for faithful mullahs, has severely weakened
the religious opposition, which has not been suc-
cessful in fomenting political opposition since the
slid- 1960's. The conservative opposition suffers
from the same disorganization -,nd disunity that
characterizes the left. The gov, tactics,
i, ge then with the conservatives' inability to agrea
on a program or leader, prevent the conservatives
from being serious contenders in the political arena.
2. Political groupings
Political parties, which first made their appear-
ance after the constitutional revolution of 1905 -11,
still do not play a major role in political life. Candi-
dates for elective office and for offices within the
parties themselves are carefully screened, and the
Shah has said that no organization can exist in
the country unless it is in line with the revolution.
Tlna Shah apparently believes that only when the
entire population is literate and has a stake in
preserving the status quo can political parties be
allowed to suggest policies and campaign freely.
Then, lie believes, parties will operate in the na-
tional interest, rattler than for narrow personal ad-
vantage. IIe undoubtedly fears that the free opera-
tion of parties would endanger his throne and his
program, but he also recognizes that Iranian indi-
vidualism makes responsible organized political
activity difficult. Ile has, in fact, attributed Iranian
stability to the lack of freewheeling political parties.
The limitations placed on the activities of po-
litical parties make it difficult for them to recruit
active, enthusiastic members. The middle and upper
classes and the urban workers �tile major source
of political party membership in many countries
tend to be cynical about or disinterested in political
parties. Those who are interested in running for
office must associate themselves with a party, and
the rank and -file membership of the parties there-
fore consists largely of opportunistic members of
the professions or businessmen who see some ad-
vantage in associating themselves with Shah -ap-
proved political activities. An opposition party has
even more difficulty recruiting members and main-
taining morale than a progovernlnent one.
17
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During the last years of the Qajar dynasty from
about 1900 to 1925, secret political groups de-
veloped to oppose the despotism of the Qajar Shahs,
to oppose foreign influence in Iran, and to estab-
lish contacts with Iranian political groups abroad.
The Qajars were forced by a revolutionary move-
ment to permit parliamentary institutions in 1906.
The first Majlis, elected in that year, was divided
into a conservative majority, represented by the
pro- Soviet Moderate Socialists, and a radical mi-
nority, represented by the revolutionary, pro- Britisli
Popular Democrats. These groups were not stable,
and they developed neither a broad popular foIlow-
ing nor proper electoral m achinery.
After a brief experience with parliamentary gov-
crnment, the sessions of the \Iajiis were interrupted
by foreign intervention and World War I. It was
not untie the 1920's that the Majlis )net regularly.
For most of the succeeding period until September
1941, Reza Shall suppressed the formation of ally
parliamentary groupings as well as any political
party outside the Majlis. The occupation of Iran
by the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. during
World War II and the abdication of Reza Shah
in 1941 brought about the reappearance of political
parties. For tile most part these represented cliques
of influential politicians or occupational and re-
gional groupings, but some were ideologically and
class oriented. As political activity during the oc-
cupation focused on Soviet and British competition
for influence, on a conflict between the Shah and
the aristocracy, and oil a conservative- con-
flict, political parties cause to reflect these dif-
ferences.
Strong party activity first began in late 1949,
when 1\'lohanlmad Mosadeq, a nationalist parlia-
mentarian who had attracted a large: following in
the Majlis, allowed himself to be placed at the head
of a coalition of parties called the National Front.
T il e l]lost important parties iI] the Nat ional Front
were the Iran Party, the Toilers Party, and the
Third Force Party. The Iran Party had been or-
ganized in 19 by a group of engineers under
Allahyar Salch. Strongly nationalistic and favoring
social, economic, and administrative reform and
a restriction on the Shah's powers, this small, loosely
organized party was vocal enough to be included
in the Cabinet at the tittle of the short -lived coali-
tion with the Communist Tudeh Party in 1946. The
socialist Toilers Party, organized in 1951, attempted
to compete with the Tudeh on ideological grounds.
111:
It was than comprised of two elements: a prag-
matic coalition of supporters of philosopher-poli-
tician i\'lazaffer Baghai in Kerman and in the
Tehran bazaar; and the younger intellectuals who
were followers of Khalil Maleki, a socialist who
had abandoned the Tudeh. In 1952, l'lalcki split
Nvith Baghai and established the pro- l'losadeq Third
Force Party, also socialist oriented. Since Mosadeq
neglected these coalition parties and their leaders
after he became Prime i\4inister in April 1951, his
own somewhat disorganized personal followers
gradually bcga)i to think of themselves as represent-
ing the National Front, now to be distinguished t.i
some extent front its component parties. After the
pro Shah coup against Mosadeq ill August 1953, the
nexv Iranian government forced the National Front
nndcrground, but it continues to exist to a limited
dcgrcc. The I�an Party the Toilers Party, and the
Third Force Party disappeared almost completely
from the scene. Mosadeq died quietly, almost
unnotiec�'., in 1967.
Between 1953 and 1957, almost no legal party
activity took place. In 1957, however, the Shah, on
the assumption that a two party system would en-
hance the appearance of democracy in Iran, ordered
two of his close supporters to establish and lead a
progovernment political party, called the Melliyun
(Nationalist) Party, and an official opposition
party, called the 'lardonl People's) Party. Depu-
ties of the Majlis then in session were encouraged
to declare for one or the other of these parties.
Many deputies did declare party allegiance, but the
number declaring for each party fluctuated con-
tinually, and membership did not remain constant.
Together with a number of independents, the par
llanlent members of these parties contested the
abortive elections of 1960 and 1961.
New national elections were held in September
1963, despite declining efforts by the Tudeh and
the National Front groups to obstruct them. The
National Union, composed of political groupings
pledged to support the Shah's reform program, was
supported by a large majority vote. Prominent in
the coalition %vas the group called the Progres-
sive Center, led by Hasan Ali Mansur.
The National Union, including the Progressive
Center, and the Mehyun Party declined and dis-
appeared as separate entities, and the function of
majority or government, party was assumed by the
Iran Novin (Ne \v Iran) Par v Hasan -Ali 'allslll'
had organized the party in December 1963, and by
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March 1964, it held a strong, reform oriental ma-
jority in the \iajlis, Mansur was assassinated by a
fanatic member of the reactionary Devotees of
Islam in January 1965. His brother -in -law, A1nir
Abbas Ilovcycla, who was Minister of Finance, was
then called upon by the Shah to be Primc Minister
and became leader of the Iran Novin Patty. In the
election held in August 1967, the Iran Novin in-
creased its majority, with the renlaincler divided
among the Mardom and the Pan -Iran party.
The years 1965 to 1972 saw chances for the de-
velopment of it 9vintine two -party system lessen
with the increasing strength of Iran Novin and the
emasculation of Iran's other parties. In 1970, the
Pan- Iranists dealt themselves a mortal blow \with
their opposition to the government's decision to give
tip a long standing claim to Bahrain. The party's
unexpected c ensure motion in the Majlis resulted
in the dissolving of two Pan -Iran controlled intinic-
ipal councils and the prohibition of Pan -Iran par-
ticipation in the September 1970 elections. In the
national elections of 1971, Iran Novin captured 230
of the 268 Majlis scats, Mardom, 37, and one for
the new Iranian Party (Figure 3). In the Senate,
28 of the elected members are of the Iran Novin
Party and two of the Mardom Figure 4). The
Marl Party suffered a severe setback in Jul�
1972 when Ali Nagi Kani, secretary general of the
party, resigned just six weeks before the elections,
apparently as a result of the Shah's unhappiness
over the freeswinging campaign he was conduct-
ing. The lran Novin Party won these elections
handily.
MAJLIS"
(Lower House) P
IRAN NOVIN
(New Iran) Party
230
TOTAL Mardom Party
268 Seats 37
Iranian Party 1
"All parties are progorernment. Chart does not
indicate right, left, or center political orientation.
FIGURE 3. Party representation in the Majlis,
1972 (U /OU)
SENATE'
5th 611,
11967- 1971-75)
IRAN NOVIN (New Iran)
27 (93%)
28 (93%)
MARDOM
2 (3.596)
2 (7%)
INDEPENDENT
1
(Progoverrtment;
One halt of the 60 Senate seats are appointed by the Shoh arnl shoo
no prsrty ufhlruhon The other hvlf ore elected
PAN IRAN 5 (2%),
(Revived 1967;
disbanded 1970)
IRAN-AN PARTY 1 (0.496)
(formed January 1971) j
INDEPENDENT 1 28 (1490) 1
TOTAL 198" 217�� 268
�*2 oddrhonol seats for Bohram �ere never fdkd Bohm,, n no longer
clamed by /-an
FIGURE 4. Distribution of parliamentary seats in the
last three elections (U /GU)
u. Iran Novin Party
The Iran Novin (New Iran) Party, which is the
most powerful leg .-d party in Iran, had its origins in
a 39- member cluh �the Progressive Center �which
Masan -Ali Mansur, an economist. established carp
in 1961 when he was secretary general of Iran's
now dissolved High Economic Council. I'll(- club
was formed w10h the purpose of drawing up and
recommending to parliament it program for mod-
ernizing the country. Members of the club ranked
among the country's intelligentsia and held high
positions in the government. By 1962, the centers
membership had expanded to 200. Mansur at that
time claimed that the center had no intention of
entering politics. The center continued to mature
until June 1963, when the Shah appointed it as his
own personal bureaa for economic and social
studies. Working in committees, the center members
19
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MAJLIS
21 st Majlis 22d MojGt 23d Majlis
(1963 -671 11967-71) (1971-75)
IRAN NOVIN (New Iron)
1140 (70%) 1 183 (84%) (86%)I
(Progoverrtment;
New Iran formed 1963)
i
MARDOM
1 30 (14.5%) I 28 (13%) 37113.6%)
(Loyal opposition
formed 1957)
I
PAN IRAN 5 (2%),
(Revived 1967;
disbanded 1970)
IRAN-AN PARTY 1 (0.496)
(formed January 1971) j
INDEPENDENT 1 28 (1490) 1
TOTAL 198" 217�� 268
�*2 oddrhonol seats for Bohram �ere never fdkd Bohm,, n no longer
clamed by /-an
FIGURE 4. Distribution of parliamentary seats in the
last three elections (U /GU)
u. Iran Novin Party
The Iran Novin (New Iran) Party, which is the
most powerful leg .-d party in Iran, had its origins in
a 39- member cluh �the Progressive Center �which
Masan -Ali Mansur, an economist. established carp
in 1961 when he was secretary general of Iran's
now dissolved High Economic Council. I'll(- club
was formed w10h the purpose of drawing up and
recommending to parliament it program for mod-
ernizing the country. Members of the club ranked
among the country's intelligentsia and held high
positions in the government. By 1962, the centers
membership had expanded to 200. Mansur at that
time claimed that the center had no intention of
entering politics. The center continued to mature
until June 1963, when the Shah appointed it as his
own personal bureaa for economic and social
studies. Working in committees, the center members
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studied the country's problems and prepared a 17-
principle program for what they described as the
renovation of Iran. This was praised by the Shah,
since the center's principles were consistent with
the Shah's own reform program.
The Progressive Center openly entered the po-
litical arena in July 1963, when Mansur announced
that his party, now grown to 300 members, would
campaign in the forthcoming national elections.
Mansur planned to send center candidates to par-
liament in sufficient numbers to assure support for
the Shah's reornl program. In the September 1963
elections, the center won 140 of the seats,
which then numbered 200. Shortly afterward
sur �who had been made Prime Nlinister �an-
nounced that the center would henceforth be called
the Iran Novin Party.
The party has produced a 34 -point manifesto
.which declares that all Iranians should have equal
personal and social rights and are entitled to edu-
cation and public health facilities. It recognizes the
family as the foundation of society and emphasizes
freedom of speech and of the press. It asserts that
there should be free access to courts of law for all
individuals and protection against unemployment
and accidents. It advocates retirement benefits and
old age peilsions.
The Iran Novin Party's statement of party prin-
ciples advocates private ownership and private
economic activities encouraged and guided by the
government. It argues for decentralization and ad-
ministrative reforms and for the need to marshal
manpo for the maximum use of national re-
sources. It favors the expansion of labor unions,
the factory worker's profit sharing scheme, and
taxes based on the principle of social justice. It
states that adllustinents should be made in the dis-
tribution of wealth according to the country's eco-
nomic and social conditions. It supports regional
development, especially the improvement of eco-
nomic and social conditions in the villages and the
maximum use of cultivable lands through agrarian
reform,
The Iran Novin Party claims to have over I mil-
lion members -an undoubtedly exaggerated figure.
At the party's first congress, held in May 1967,
the Political Bureau was formally approved as the
highest governing organ in the party. In late 1972
the Political Bureau had 10 members, including
the Prinie Minister, the secretary general, party
leaders in both houses of parliament, and the chair-
man of the party's Central Council. Before the
W�C
establishment of the Political Bureau, the Execu-
tive Committee of the Central Council rain the
party. The Central Council was increased to 500
members in 1971 and the Board of Directorate
to 961. Both act as rubberstanlps for thc, Political
Bureau. The large and unwieldy Central Council
does little more than select the Executive Com-
mittee.
The Iran Novin Party has made active efforts
to improve its organization at the provincial and
local levels. The party has branches in many
cities and towns throughout Iran. These provincial
branches are governed by a directing body con-
sisting of four members who sit on the party's
16- member provincial committee. In Tehran, the
party has taken steps to set lip some 130 party
cells (hotcze), each having approximately 20 incin-
bers who are required to meet together with a
party official at least once a week to discuss the
party's programs, plans, and problems.
The local and provincial bodies are represented
on the national level through the Iran Novin
Party Con,ress. A congress is supposed to con-
vene every 4 years, the first in NIay 1967. The
second congress of the party was held in Tehran
in May 1971, in which some 3,000 party members
took part, representing 150 party committees, party
parliamentary factions, and other affiliated units.
The development of a strong party organization
at the local level is theoretically intended to pro-
vide a channel through which local interests can
be cominunicated to the highest party level. In
fact, however, the chain of command is used most
often to convey the wishes of the Shah and the
party leadership to the local bodies. The party is
more nearly a national organization than ever
before, but its lack of independence and its reputa-
tion as a mouthpiece of the government have
prevented the development of real public support.
h.11ardont Part/
The Mardom Party, which also suffered from
the pall cast by the rigged elections of 1961, was
revived in modest form in 1964 with the encourage-
ment of the Shall, who was anxious to have a
respectable opposition party. 13y 1965, the party
was attempting to fulfill an opposition function by
criticising tactics of the majority party and occa-
sional.'y by arguing against government legislation.
Nevertheless, the party remains essentially in ad-
junct of the establishment. Party leader Ali Na(Ii
hani resigned only 6 weeks before nationwide city
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and provincial council elections. Kani had spear-
headed an unusually active cainpaign attacking the
policies of the Iran Novin Party. Kani's aggressive
tactics irritated the conservative faction of his
party, and the press has speculated that these con-
servatives forced the secretary general to step down.
The Mardom Party had been the object of increas-
ing criticism from the Shah, who prefers a more
leisurely development of the loyal opposition, and
the royal court may have had a hand in Kani's
downfall. Kani's resignation will probably cause
the Mardom Party to lose its recently acquired
vitality.
The Nlardom Party has great difficulty in main-
taining the morale of its membership and in recruit-
ing new members. Ambitious young Iranians either
find membership in a permanent opposition group
useless or are frustrated by the group's "me- tooism."
Party members are periodically heartened by
rumors �such as those circulated before the par-
liamentary elections of August 1967 �that the Shah
plans to increase the size of Mardom representa-
tion in parliament. When the Mardom Party came
out of the 1967 elections with fewer representatives
than ever, it went into doldrums, from which it
has not emerged. In 1969 the party lad 28 mem-
bers in the NIajlis and two in the Senate; in 1971
it .von 37 lower house seats, but in an expanded
Majlis, and its percentage share remained about
the same. Nevertheless, the Shah is determined
to maintain the appearance of a two -party systern
in Iran and is not likely to allow the Mardoin Party
to disappear entirely.
The Mardom Party claims over 200,000 mem-
bers, but this figure seems greatly exaggerated.
The High Council of the party, composed of about
133 members in 1967, is elected by the party na-
tional congress and studies and approves party
policies and programs which are usually submitted
by the Central Committee. The Central Committee
is the real locus of power in the organization.
Composed of 15 members, the Central Committee
formulates and executes policy after pro forma
review by the High Council. The party has not
created a local or provincial network comparable
in any way to that of the Iran Novin Party, partly
explaining the beatings it takes at the polls.
c. Iraiiinri Party
The small Iranian Party began functioning in
January 1971, after the demise of the Pan Iran
Party. Dr. Fazollah Sadr, a Majlis deputy and
former deputy leader of the Pan- iranists, is the
new organization's secretary general. The Iranian
Party appears to have picked tip the fallen super-
patriotic mantle of the Pan Iran Party but is
moderating the stridently reactionary rhetoric of
the Pan Iranists. The new party captured one seac
in the 1971 elections.
3. Electoral laws and practices
Elections in Iran are aimed at improving the
democratic image of the government and at giv-
ing the people a sense of participation in the
governing process rather than at allowing the free
expression of the people's will. The electoral process
is firmly controlled by the government though
more subtly since 1961. Control is achieved through
the weeding out of undesirable candidates and
through sometimes blatant manipulation at the polls.
Consequently, elections are viewed by most of the
population with apathy and, in more politically
aware circles, with cynicism. Despite active "get
out the vote" campaigns, many Iranians do not
exercise the right to vote, as it is a foregone con-
clusion that the government party will win a sub-
stantial majority.
Iran's Fundamental Laws provide for two types
of elective bodies, the national parliament and the
provincial, district, and municipal councils. Three
sets of electoral laws, however, are in effect; in
addition to laws governing elections to parliament
and to municipal councils, an apparently unimple-
mented set of laws governs provincial and district
council elections. Many of the provisions in each
set of laws are similar.
To vote in any election in Iran, one must be
an Iranian citizen of at least 20 years of age who
has resided in his electoral district for at least 6
months; in the case of Senatorial elections, a voter
must be at least 25 yeirt cif age. Among those barred
from voting are insane persons, foreign nationals,
criminals and political convicts, regular members
of the armed forces, and police and gendarnieric
officials who reside in the area over which they
have authority. Women were enfranchised by
decree in Nfarch 1963 and voted for the first time
in national elections held that same year.
To be eligible for candidacy in any Iranian elec-
tion, one must be all Iranian national of at least
30 years of age and literate in the Persian language;
in the case of Majlis candidates, one cannot be
over 70 years old. Barred from running for office
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are persons who are ineligible to vote, the ,:ons,
brothers, and paternal uncles of the Shah, gov-
ernors general, judges, finance agents, magistrates,
prosecutors general, Cabinet ministers, and all other
heads of government departments. Lesser govern-
ment officials can become candidates but must
resign their appointive offices if they are elected.
In order to become a candidate for the Majlis
or the Senate, most candidates must also be Mus-
lims. Exceptions are one Jew, two Armenians, one
Assyrian, and one Zoroastrian, who represent re-
ligious minority groups in the Majlis. To run for
the Senate one must be over 40 years old and
must have had experience as a Cabinet minister,
ambassador, governor general, state prosecutor gen-
eral, deputy in the Majlis for at least 3 terms, judge
for 20 years, senior army officer, or university pro-
fessor for 20 years. One may also qualify if he is
a landlord or merchant who pays all annual tax
of at least R1s500,000 (about USS0,660) or is a
lawyer with long experience. Candidates for parlia-
mentary seats need not have resided in a specific
constituency for a given period of time, although
it is necessary for a Candidate to be well-known
to his constituency. In order to become a candi-
date for a municipal council, one must have re-
sided for at least 3 years in the district from which
he seeks election.
INIembers of the Majlis, members of the Senate,
and members of municipal and village councils
are elected by direct elections. '!he procedure by
which all Iranian elections arc conducted is the
same. Voting is supervised by the Ministry of In-
terior througiu its provincial representatives. SAVAK
also maintains an active surveillance over the whole
procedure. Representatives of national government
ministries, the governors general of provinces, the
governors of districts and subdistricts, and the
mayors of cities and towns appoint committees
which arrange for the popular election of election
supervisory councils. These councils, with the help
of the local gendarmerie and city police, oversee
the general popular voting. It is also provided in all
electoral laws of Iran that the supervisory councils
may be dissolved or may have their composition
changed by Ministry of Interior officia'.., if the
councils prove to h�aidicap the smooth progress
of the elections.
The supervisory councils and ministry officials
share the responsibility for announcing to the voters
the date, time, and place of voting, the names of
22
the c:uulidates, the qualifications for voting, and
tic manner in which it voter must prove hicscif
qualified to vote. Voters must register and obtaic
an electoral card prior to election clay. The men-
bers of the supervisory council in�e preseet in the
polling places duriig election clay to check the
identity and electoral cards of all voters, wituess
their balloting, and mark the electoral card as the
voter leaves the poll. Supervisory council nembers
who count the votes after closing the polls are
authorized to discard those ballots which are illeg-
ible or improperly filled out.
The number of deputies is proportional to the
population, one deputy for every 100,(x)0. In the
last 10 years the cie.ber of deputies has increased
from 200 to 263.
Complaints against the nvner in which t,lt,c-
tions are carried out must be sent to the appropriate
supervisory council, which, ?n the case of national
parliamentary elections, investigates the complaints
itself. In the case of ncuuicipal elections, a special
committee appointed by tlut, mayor or district gov-
ernment investigates complaints oil behalf of the
supervisory council. 'There is no further recourse
for those who object, except to send their com-
plaints to the newly elected parliament or mu-
nicipal council itself. In the past, riots protesting
election rigging have been common, espcei illy in
Tchran and other important cities. ;wring the ra-
tional elections in August 1960, protests over rigging
forced suspension of the elections. Following m w
elections in January 1961, a series of public olenr-
onstratlons led the Shah to dissolve the Majlis in
May and rule by decree for nearly 2 years.
Majlis and Senate elections before 1963 fre-
quently lasted for several weeks and sometimes for
months because of the practice of allowing the
Ministry of Interior officials in each electoral dis-
trict to select different dates for elections. Voting
now takes place on the same clay all over the
country.
In the August 1967 parliamentary elections about
3.5 million votes were cast for members of the
Majlis, and the Senate and for representatives to
the National Constituent Assembly, which amended
the constitution provisions relating to succession
to the throne.
The last parliamentary elections in July 1971
product a voter turnout cAinrated by Iranian
officials at nearly 5 million. This is probably some-
what inflated. I'he next elections should occur in
the summer of 1975.
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D. National policies
1. Domestic policy (C)
The direction and content of Iran's domestic
policy are determined by the Shah. Since 1961,
the Shah has bcconiv increasingly obsessed with
the social and economic modernization of his coun-
try. The tmbodinlvnt of his drive toward moderni-
zation is the White Revolution, a program ulti-
mateh' including 12 points: land reform; electoral
reform; the Literacy Corps; the sale of govern
nient factories; nationalization of forests; profit
sharing, the Health Corps; the Development and
Extension Corps; the village court system; admin-
istrative and educational reform; regional develop-
ment; and nationalization of water resources. The
Shah is proud Of the accomplishments of his pro
grani, but with each new step he seems even more
anxious to speed up Iran's development. The re-
form program has changed the iniage of the Shah
in most circles from one of a rea ctionary tyrant
to omc� of a progressive monarch. Reform has also
taken the steam out of opposition movements and
has brought tile government closer than ever before
to the Iranian peasant.
The core of the Shah's program is land reform,
which he regards as the key to further economic
de�vclopment and a wider base of political support.
The first phase of the land reform program was
enacted into law in January 1961, and it required
the largest landowners to turn over to the govern-
ment all their landholdings except for one rural
village and its associated lands. The government
then distributed ownership of the land to the peas-
ants working it. The former landlords are being
conipensatcd with shares in government -owned
factories or with government bonds paid over a
15 -year period. Peasants who acquired land are
paying the government for it, also over a 15 -year
period. Since the landlord traditionally supplied
seeds, draft animals, water, and tools to the peas-
ants, the government has begun to establish co-
operative societies to insure that the peasants are
not without these supplies and that they have sonic
authority in each locality to guide them and pro-
mote inodern agricultural practices. In February
1965, the government launched the second phase,
under which landlords were told they could retain
only it certain acreage �the amount varying ac-
cording to location and fertility �and were required
to turn the remainder over to the government for
10,4ribu6) n to additional peasants.
In late 1971, the Shah announced that his land
reform program was completed. The government
reported in mid -1969 that the distribution phase
h ad been completed in 54,183 villages or hamlets,
Nvith approxim 7,800 uncompleted. The legal
settlement involved some 2.4 million farmers
about two- thircls cf the agricultural labor force. It
is not clear how many peasants still own their
land �some apparently sold it back to the land
lords�or what other complications have arisen in
the distribution phase. Productivity apparently has
not suffered, perhaps in large part because of favor-
able weather conditions. The final phase of land
reform inv olved the expansion of rural cooperatives
and increasing productivity, and was begun in jan-
uary 1966. In 1972, the government claimed that
almost 9,000 rural cooperatives had been estab-
lished, with a total membership of 1.55 million. In
1968, the government established the Agricultural
Development Fund of Iran to promote the develop
me,it of large scale, efficient agricultural organiza-
tions as a supplement to small farms. By early 1972,
27 farm corporations with 9,170 shareholders were
operating in rural areas. In a further move to boost
productivity private investment in agriculture has
been exempt from taxation until 1980. The exemp-
tion applies only to those farms using modern tech-
niques and thus favors the large agro- industrial
units. The Plan and Budget Organization has al-
lotted $35.5 million for rural development for
1972 -73.
As the land reform program unfolded, the Shah
found that the illiteracy of the peasants was a major
obstacle to their understanding and enjoying the
full benefits of the scheme. To remedy this, he ini-
tiated the Literacy Corps in December 1962. This
corps is composed of army conscripts who have
graduated from secondary school or a university
and who perform their military service by teaching
peasants to read and write. The program is con-
sidered the most successful of the. Shah's develop-
ment concepts. By early 1971 over 71,000 military
conscripts had served as literacy corpsmen in
Iranian villages and had taught more than 2 million
Iranians. Before the inception of the corps, only
8% of the rural population had received any edu-
cation, but by 1967 the percentage was 20% and
was continuing to rise. In a move aimed primarily
at urban illiteracy, the government in 1969 pro-
posed that each literate Iranian be required to
spend several hours a week teaching anti- illiteracy
courses for 6 months or to teach one illiterate to
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read and write. The alternative would be to pay the
price for the education of one illiterate� approxi-
mately $144. There is no recent information o,: the
progress of this program.
Because the literacy corpsmen originally were
spending much of their time in health and economic
development activities, a Health Corps was formed
in 1964 and a Development Corps in 1965 to relieve
them of these subordinate burdens. The Health
Corps consists of physicians, dentists, pharmacists,
and medical assistants who are military conscripts
and who are assigned to work in close cooperation
with village councils to improve health and hygiene
through lectures, films, practical demonstrations,
and treatment. In 1971 about 2,500 were serving in
the corps. Although the Health Corps probably is
not as effective as permanently staffed medical
facilities in the villages, it has represented a sig-
nificant step forward for Iran.
The Development and Extension Corps num-
bered about 6,000 persons in 1971. The corpsmen
are also military conscripts who go out into villages
to teach modern agricultural techniques and help
establish cooperatives. They are thus closely related
to the land reform program.
In an atempt to involve the urban worker in the
reform program, the government in January 1963
initiated an industrial profit sharing scheme in
which workers were to obtain up to a 2070 share
in the profits of their factories Employers under
the plan were required to sign collective agree-
ments with worker representatives aimed at en-
couraging productivity, cutting costs, and reduc-
ing ,vaste so that part of any increase in profits
could be passed on to the workers in the form of
income. The program has been criticized as having
very limited success with the workers. A sampling
of about o,, Third of the agreements signed indi-
cated that the average bonus accruing to individual
workers was only approximately $32.00 per year
far short of the 20`/o allowed by law. A Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs official said at that time
that his ministry tried to be responsive to worker
complaints but carefully geared its policies to avoid
discouraging management. Part of the problem is
the reluctance of corporations to reveal their true
profit picture.
To increase public, as well as foreign, confidence
in the government and to try to keep funds flowing
into the programs rather than into the pockets of
the administrators, the Shah in 1961 inaugurated
an anticorruption, campaign. High civilian and mili-
24
tar; officials, including some who were thought of
as friends of the Shah, were ;piled and charged
with corruption in office. Although most were ac-
quitted after lengthy court proceedings, the exer-
cise served to warn officials throughout the hier-
archy that tae Shah was serious about stamping out
blatant misuse of government funds and materials.
However, in recent years there has been a new up-
surge of accusations of corrupt practices among
high officials but no renewal of the anticorruption
campaign.
The demands on the government created by all
the new programs initiated in the last 10 years
produced clear evidence of the inefficiency of the
government bureaucracy at all levels. Although
steps had been taken by many ministries to stream-
line their procedures in hopes of pleasing the Shah,
it was not until late 1967 that administrative re-
form was officially declared a tenet of the White
Revolution. In 1968, the Shah reintroduced an Im-
perial Inspectorate to hear and act on public com-
plaints against the bureaucracy. In addition, com-
mittees have been set up in the ministries to oversee
administrative reform, and inspection teams have
been dispatched to the provinces to study admin-
istrative procedures there and to hear public com-
plaints. Despite some public cynicism and the
resistance of the entrenched civil servants, slow
progress is being made both in improving admin-
istrative procedures and in recruiting more highly
qualified bureaucrats.
In 1967, reform of higher education was added
to the development program, and yearly education
conferences have been held ever since. A separate
:Ministry of Science and Higher Education was
established aimed at improving higher education,
promoting more independent research, and turning
out greater numbers of vocational and technical
personnel to help in implementing other facets
of the reform program. In 1968, the government
announced the beginning of a thorough overhaul
of the university system and began by replacing
all university chancellors. In 1971, the government
turned its attention to elementary and secondary
school teachers. About $6 million was allotted to
provide bonuses, promotions, advanced training,
and housing.
To reduce the manipulation of elections on the
local level and to enable the peasants to make their
votes more effective, reforms in voting procedures
were initiated in 1963, involving registration and
the use of vote rg cards.
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Further steps toward equal rights for %women
were taken in 1967 through passage of the Family
Protection Law. Under the law, unilateral di:oree
action by husbands is no longer possible, and
women may initiate divorce proceedings. The law
also provides for the protection of any children
involved in a divorce action. A man must now
gain court approval before he can forbid his wife
to seek outside employment. If the first wife does
not agree to her husband's second marriage, she
may use it as grounds for divorce.
As the Shale's re form prograw became an ac-
cepted part of national policy and moved into the
"nuts -and- bolts" phase of implementation, some of
the initial zeal was lost. Nevertheless, steady prog-
ress has been made in many phases of the program.
At the very least, the program has probably im-
proved the attitude of the rural populraion toward
the government and increased the popularity of
the Shall. Soule opposition to the program still
exists particularly in the conservative religious
community �but it is largely silent. In the case
of the Family Protection Law of 1967, the original
bill has been modified to avoid pressing social
reform more quickly than the public is willing to
accept. Some features of the program, oil the other
hand, tend to generate pressure for additional
change. In general, an attitude of progress and hope
for the future seems to be pervading even pre-
viously isolated villages �an attitude that '.):tides
well for the regime only if progress continues.
2. Foreign policy (S)
For much of its history Iran has been under the
predominant influence of foreign powers. An im-
portant principle of the Shah's policy and one which
he inherited from his father, Reza Shah, has been
to rid Iran of this influence and to assert the coun-
try's political, economic and to some extent military
independence. In terms of international politics this
has meant maintaining more of a balance between
East and West. While remaining committed to the
West, the Shah has allowed the development of con-
tacts with the Soviet Union and East Europe and
has established relations with Communist China
and Albania. While looking to the West for aid,
he has fostered economic relations with the Com-
munist bloc. While relying for external security
of the United States and on the CENTO alliance,
lie has bought some military equipment front the
Soviet Union. His fear of Soviet military aggres-
sion has been displaced to it large extent by his
belief that radical Arab forces particularly those
in Iraq �have designs on the Persian Gulf and
on the oil -rich Iranian province of Khuzestan. The
Shah deubts that the United States would defend
him in case of it regional conflict not involving a
Communist nation, and he is determined to line
up other sources of support and supply in the Com-
munist world in Western Europc, among the mtod-
erate Arab states, and in South Asia.
Iranian Sovict relations began to improve in Sep-
tember 1962, when N' seow accepted t. Shah's
piedge not to permit the establishment of foreign
missile bases on Iranian soil and shelved its policy
of open diplomatic and propaganda pressure to
overthroxv his regime. The real turning point, ho%y-
cvcr, came in 1966, %vlicn, after the Shah's visit
to Moscow, the U.S.S.R. agreed to extend it credit
equal to $289 million toward building a long- sought
steel mill and related projects. Part of the credit is
being used to build a machine manufacturing plant
and to construct a pipeline to carry Iranian natural
gas to the U.S.S.I1 as payment for this and subse-
quent credits; deliveries of natural gas began in
late 1970. Soviet economic dice has thus become it
major factor in Iranian economic development.
Plans were outlined in late 1969 for longer term
cooperation in oil, gas inc.] other industries over
the next 12 -15 years, and there are more than 1,500
Sovict economic experts in Iran. Soviet and East
.10pean aid commitments total over 81 billion,
compared with a total Western commitment of
nearly $2 bill ion. Thcre have been signs, however,
of Iranian dissatisfaction with industrial projects
established under Soviet and East European credits
and in some cases, such as the Soviet -built engineer-
ing factory, the Iranians are seeking alternative
participation by Western industry. In future barter
deals the Iranians nlay be inclined to look for Com-
munist bloc goods in preference: to projects.
Iranian- Soviet trade has also developed. I3y 1969
the SovisA Union had already become the largest
importer of Iranian exports other than oil. Iranian
imports from the Soviet Union have increased
markedly in recent years, and mutual trade will
almost certainly continue to grow �a 5 -year trade
agreement was signed in 1970 �with the stimulus
of aid projects and the flow of Iranian natural gas
exports.
The first arms contracts with the Soviet Union
were concluded in 1967 and comprised ground-
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force equipment such as antiaircraft guns, armored
personnel carriers, and other vehicles. In 1969 the
Iranian Army ordered a large quantity of 130 -nun
field guns, for which special training is also being
provided. Soviet military credits extended to date
total about $325 million and are being repaid in
natural gas, which has been flared in the past. This
easy form of payment, along with the fact that in-
terest rates run as low as 2.5%, will probably en-
courage further Iranian purchases, though not of
major items such as airplanes and tanks, which
would lead to an unacceptable level of Soviet in-
fluence within L:.e armed forces. The expansion of
economic ties with the Soviet Union has also had
political benefits. It has to some extent appeased
the neutralist and xenophobic sentiments of some
Iranians who believed that their country was overly
committed to the West, and the policy is believed
to be well received by most other Iranians as well.
Nevertheless, the S' is aware that the rap-
prochement involves a Soviet effort to gain in-
fluence in Iran and that the U.S.S.R. is basically
opposed to his monarchy. He often mentions that
the Communist propaganda beamed by clandestine
radio stations outside Iran continues to criticize
his regime and serves as the real measure of Soviet
friendship. The numerous Soviet advisers and tech-
nicians in Iran with various economic and military
projects are closely watched by Iranian security and
intelligence forces, and the number of students sent
by Iran to Communist countries for training has
been strictly limited. The Shah is also concerned
over Soviet involvement with the radical Arab states
and over the possibility of Soviet incursions into
the Persian Gulf region. In essence, lie is attempt-
ing to gain the economic and political benefits of
association with the U.S.S.R., while continuing to
strive against increased Soviet influence in his
region.
Iran has signed two treaties with the U.S.S.R.:
those of 1921 and of 1927. Under the Irano- Soviet
Treaty of Friendship of 26 February 1921, the Rus-
sian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic reserved the
right of armed intervention if Russian counterrevo-
lutionaries or a third power attempted to use
Iranian territory for military operations against it.
In the 1 October 1927 'Treaty of Guarantee and
Neutrality, the U.S.S.R. and Ira: agreed that neither
would enter into any alliance directed against the
security and independence of the other. Iran con-
siders that these two treaties have been abi ogated
by Soviet actions in Iran during and after World
26
War I1, but the U.S.S.R. has issued periodic re-
minders that it regards them as still valid.
Notwithstanding his detente Nvith the Soviet
Union, the Shah is in no doubt that Iran's natural
and most vital alignment is with the West. Reve-
nues from the oil consortium of major Western oil
companies constitute the main part of Iran's in-
come in foreign exchange, the West supplies all
major items of military equipment and the training
for its armed forces, and the support of the United
States and of the CENTO alliance is a major deter-
rent to a possible Communist threat to Iranian ter-
ritorial integrity.
Iran's relationship with the United States, like
that with the U.S.S.R., has also undergone a subtle
change since 1965. Constantly rising Iranian oil
revenues, improving agricultural output, the ex-
panding economy, and the availability of outside
credits have all served to reduce Iran's economic
and psychological dependence on the United States.
Although the Shah still regards the United States
as his country's best friend, the self- confidence he
has gained domestically has encouraged him to seek
a broader role for himself and his country. The U.S.
economic aid program in Iran ended by mutual
agreement in November 1967, brit Iran continues to
purchase most of its sophisticated military equip-
ment in the United States, and the Export Import
Bank underwrites some private U.S, investment.
The United States concluded a bilateral defense
agreement in March 1959 with each of the diddle
East members of CENTO, including Iran. The
agreement, which is specifically tied to the 1957
Joint Congressional Resolution to Promote Peace
and Stability in the I4iddle East the Eisenhower
Doctrine), says that the U.S. Government, in ac-
cordance with the U.S. Constitution, will take "such
appropriate action, including the use of armed
forces, as may be mutually agreed upon" in the
case of Communist aggression against Iran.
In the period 1946 -71, the United States provided
almost $2.6 billion in government loans and credits.
The Military Assistance Program totaled $1.1 bil-
lion, of which $504 million ,vere loans advanced
$141 million has been repaid), and additional mili-
tary aid has been extended. Military credit sales
to Iran of $140 million and $200 million have been
authorized for FY72 and FY73. Total U.S. private
direct investment in Iran is estimated at about $600
million (including petroleum). There are more than
2,000 official Americans in Iran, including depend-
ents, and more than 10,000 private Americans.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070040 -4

Since 1965 the Shah's major foreign policy pre-
occupation has been the security of the Persian
Gulf and southwestern Iran, The Shah is convinced
that radical Arab elements arc attempting to under-
mine Iranian authority in the gulf and to foment
subversion in the Province of Khuzestan, which
has a large number of ethnic Arabs. The British
withdrawal of its military forces from the Persian
Gulf at the end of 1971 focused the Shah's concern
on that area even more sharply. in F tovember, im-
mediately after the British withdrawal, Iranian
forces moved into the islands of Abu Musa (Jazireh-
ye Abu Musa� Persian) and the 'I anbs (jazireh -ye
Tonbe Bozorg� Persian). Abu 'Musa was divided
between Iran and Sharjah by prior agreement with
the Sheikh of Sharjah. The two Tunbs, however,
were seized outright, and the Arab inhabitants were
expelled; the Sheikh of Ras a] Khaimah had refused
to come to any prior understanding w� .th the Shah.
The Shah's assertive policy in the gulf has brought
him increasingly into confrontation with Iraq. Since
Iraq's 1958 revolution, relations between Tehran
and Baghdad have ranged from cool to openly hos-
tile. Irhn has supplied arms, money, and transit
rights to the dissident Iraqi Kurds led by Mustafa
Barzani and has looked for other ways to shake the
government in Baghdad. In turn, Iraq has appar-
ently permitted raids into Iran by pro -Iraqi Kurds
and dissident Iranian Kurds resident in Iraq. Iraq
also has reportedly assisted members of the Khuze-
stan Liberation Front, which is composed of dis-
sident Iranian Arabs who want to liberate that
province. Another longstanding problem between
the two countries involves the division of the waters
of the Shatt al Arab, the river which separates Iran
and Iraq in the south. Iran has long chafed under
the terms of the 1937 treaty, which, except for two
places upstream, sets the boundary on the Iranian
bank at low water, and Iran has repeatedly sought
to have the treaty renegotiated. The issue .vas re-
vived again in 1969, when Iraq sought to enforce
its rights in the river, and Iran responded by re-
nouncing the treaty and staging a massive military
buildup along the shore. The Iranian show of force
was designed not only to force a new treaty but
probably to serve notice that Iran has the will and
the power to play the major role in the area.
Relations between the two countries were severely
strained (luring the latter part of 1971 and early
1972 with the large -scale expulsions of Iranian resi-
dents from Iraq (Figure 5). From November to
January, some 60,000 Iranians were sent across the
])order. Iranians reacted with restraint, however,
and began a vigorous repatriation program for the
refugees.
Iran is not directly concerned in the Arab Israeli
confrontation, in which the Shah's position has been
one of fence sitting. Until fairly recently the Shah
tended to regard the continuing conflict as being
to bran's advantage. Ile felt that by occupying the
Arabs in the west, the conflict gave Iran a freer
hand to pursue its interests in the Persian Gnlf.
With the establishment in the late 1950's of offices
(diplomatic missions in all but n