NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 14; POLAND; COUNTRY PROFILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070027-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R0002000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per-
ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are p- oduced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the Generai Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
and security organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
cicssified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defenss Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by low.
CLASSIFIED BY 019611. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
5B (1), (2), DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of Notional Security Council intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no ribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

I_1,,:16IT M (1161:110 :1 File N 11 111 ISIIIyLIy1:ilIlhY1lhI1HIIIY4F&I
GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS
COUNTRY PROFILE I rltcgwivi3 Ixn%lxv 1we r-r
ltic a1111)w amllaq a ChnrrnAmy a ATr.l frid
Suinmsry Mal)
THE SOMM S Klal i.r:Kilrhr Fgw1allnn
J.rbor l l rAdi Op imWitLum Smiwl
lin IlrllX11M FdLL4NJG m QUllllr li TM-
nr .aginia a Artitlic C1[Ntttion
Cl1Vli;l;NMENT AND POLITICS Potltical ntis-
IU401r of Ilr sWl! C�C+ctllwrntaf slnrttXl? arK1
ttablllly 5ti uctuic end r ur>11un is MilFral dy.
ni i rules ,ti uI irmal puli6o Threats to slublllty
A Tits FAil.V r1tIC111Rc -ti {r 91111 sMartl} (ruun-
trnrllrs.'0rm awl counterimurgrney "imtrlll tics
311E ECO,` 0h1Y Appral "l crr I lk- rmlltt I is
sl uuiu rr� s,rirulturr, 101 rnsr'nl q'. Pur UDJ
jonwer. iisrul and mineral, matttfucl a nd
c rnil rudlup a 1 }nnsrsllc I ride cajmmnlc pnilr}'
anti dr Clhprllrnl a lulertullau l rrnrKrnlc rr
tiurp
TWN SPO RTATIGN AND
TELECON"EUNICATIOtiS Apq w1wI tie s r-
rrru 54ratcX3t nurl>iIJI} Ralliwds 111j;6x .&%s
FAind A4lcrw qi Prlx'll iki Pori M er-
cha nl mi rine Ovil air Allf trlilt L ow Irlc�
crrrn stem
MILITARY CEOGH"JIY TcrpXruplry and cll-
P031C Millt -If Rt r. plAr 1rXlurr. SI otrxir
a lolcrnal mules Appcq r fi rs: Wid. wa,
air
ARMED FOAC�S 'Elie drIvine *sS4l rllsllmcnl
Irrlht actititlm G nrttf rd Gorr, Naval frowns
Air fermi J'arxmll l to ry
SCIIr+NIM lac %vl lit xlralific Awamwntrnt Ur�
PatiaNuo. FI:, rinlnX, a nd rirranr.aX err rr5 iT01
~Chilli t4lututirrrl, n1ar11xo% 9rd radlilin
t1 ulor rrseauji Arid
U TELI.ICENCY. AN SECURITY Slout ure al
rrrgartizutiorts corwrewil. milli Interval wrurily aiul
rurrtig Iu1r111Xnccr, thrk InIMtnilrilHlcs, pru rr56-
14nllal ta runic. Intl 1ntrrr1Plall43mfillft %J jW0jl.
worsixatiurs, rundrupw c#rc 1Ji cve% 9nd nlrllWrd
ar rviAl� tit "0i srrvirr Sli>R, .oil lit krF
trfrlciah
it.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

I_1�:t6IT MIl1a]:4 :W* 111: 1bI-5N W01] WIN 11 I1Z QIy Lfl:bIIYIIfDIY:;
Poland
The I rrtpcmtive of Nstional Revival I
11' ltI'IFnn
a NIA"Intion, M -Swl I iilrition, and
71 1ec'emU16 Lz"r
Qc4rW'sN,-w Drxl
rhr Yr.J M Abend
arOAolm 20
Aera Baer 25
5um=rY AIap JWOU-1 M
Th is Cam"(1 Pmfilr was prenarrd fax ter NIS by
the Crr lml W.Akmrr Agrr V. Resft ch Lot rub�
stars f
Sth r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

t f
.Mr
LA
f
t
a
'j 'J
!,x,Y
f/ r y {7 i
yet
ll
S
i
t wo
hFtt`
of
r ti{ 'Y'.
-t k
T L
Y
�iaf,

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
The Imperative of National Revival
When Edward Gierek took over leadership of the
Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) from Wladslaw
Gomulka on 20 Decer.iber 1970, the violent workers'
demonstrations which had erupted in several of
Poland's coastal cities during the preceding week
were threatening to spread to Warsaw itself. Although
the immediate cause of the disorders had been
Gomulka's ill -timed action in raising food (mainly
meat) and fuel prices on the eve of Poland's traditional
Christmas feast, the crisis had been brewing for years.
The dramatic circumstances surrounding Gomulka's
return to power in 1956 had generated exaggerated ex-
pectations about his intentions with regard to liberal
domestic reforms and the exercise of Polish sovereignty
alike. By the early 1960's, his seeming retreat on both
fronts had badly tarnished his popular image.
Thereafter, a sort of sickness characterized by
cynicism and apathy on the part of the general pop-
ulation and by increased factionalism and oppor-
tunism within the ruling Communist elite settled in
on Polish society. (C)
There had been plenty of danger signals: troubles
with intellectuals and students, discipline and morale
problems in the military establishment, more and more
pilfering and malingering in the factories, and mount-
ing evidence of tensior. between the younger and
older members of PUWP. Only a combination of
Soviet political support, fortuitom circumstances
(including the sobering lessons of the Warsaw Pact in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia), and a compromise with im-
patient "young Turk" elements in the party enabled
Gomulka to survive a challenge to his leadership
mounted by factional rivals in th,a spring and summer
months of 1968. Yet even this close call did not result
in any great change in Gomulka's internal policies or
priorities. Preoccupied with foreign affairs and in-
sulated from the realities of the Polish scene by a small
clique of like- minded associates, he continued to
neglect his country's domestic problems. (C)
By mid -1970, the period of respite that Gomulka
had won less than 2 years earlier was simply running
out. The economy, suffering from mismanagement
and the zigzag course of halfhearted reforms, was in
serious trouble. Worse yet, the regime was woefully out
of touch with the mood of the population. Finally per-
suaded of the need for more forceful and consistent ac-
tion on the economic front, Gomulka pressed forward
with a belt tightening program involving, among
other things, a planned increase in unemployment, a
complex and controversial revision of the exist-
ing wage /bonus system, and a marked alteration of
established domestic consumption patterns through
selective price adjustments. These measures hit
Poland's factory workers and their families the hardest.
And in December, the unexpected explosion of the ac-
cumulated economic and social grievances nourished
by a relatively prosperous and skilled segment of the
ideologically favored industrial proletariat finally and
irreparably exposed the bankruptcy of Comulka's
domestic policies. (C)
Demoralized by incessant factional infighting and
by 14 years of Gomulka's cramped and autocratic style
of rule, the existing PUWP leadership was ill- prepared
to deal with the new crisis. At Gomulka's direction, it
attempted to put down the protest demonstrations by
force. This only made matter worse, and it soon
became evident to the members of Warsaw's inner
councils that Gomulka's harsh response had cost him
Moscow's confidence and support. But by the time
that those PUWP leaders who favored greater restraint
had managed to oust him and his principal lieuten-
ants, impromptu strike committees had gained con-
trol of a number of factories and shipyards, dozens of
people had been killed in clashes between the workers
and the security forces, and well over 1,000 more had
been injured. In Gierek's own assessment, Poland stood
at the brink of civil war. (S)
With Soviet intervention as the possible price of
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
failure, Gierek was confronted with a number of for-
midable tasks. First of all, he had to defuse the ex-
plosive situation on the coast and gain control over the
cumbersome PUWP and government bureaucracies.
Eq important, he had to inaugurate a new but
ideologically acceptable style of rule which would
restore popular confidence in the regime, appeal to
patriotic sentiment, and engage the cooperation and
support of the largest possible part of the population in
efforts to revive Poland's sagging economy. He was
faced, in effect, with the need to foster a genuine
national revival without altering the basic fea'rrres of
Poland's existing Communist system or releasing the
spontaneous pressures for societal change which had
doomed the Dubcek experiment in Czechoslovakia.
Finally, although the Soviet Union and Poland's other
Warsaw Pact allies had been quick to endorse his
regime, he had to insure that they would go along with
his domestic innovations and continue to provide him
with both political and economic support. (C)
Fortunately for Gierek, there were some aspects of
tht situation in December 1970 which worked to his
advantage� including the widespread reputation as a
tough, competent, and fair administrator he had
earned during his 13 -year tenure as PUWP chieftan in
Katowice province (the core of the Silesian industrial
area). For one thing, although the dissident workers
laid most of their grievances at the party's door,
2
Poland's socialist system as such was not under direct
attack. Nor had the demonstrations taken on an anti
Soviet coloration. Moreover, open agitation was
pretty well limited to the urban working class and,
even more narrowly, to the skilled workers who felt
they had the most to lose from Gomulka's heavy
handed economic policies. Despite growing uncer-
tainty about Gomulka's ultimate intentions with re-
spect to collectivization, the peasants were quiet.
Whether out of caution or out of pique over the failure
of the workers to come to their support in protesting
political and cultural repression in 1968, so were the
students and intellectuals. Although clearly sympa-
thetic to the workers, the powerful Roman Catholic
Church kept its peace excapt to counsel nonviolence.
On a more general plane, still fresh memories of the
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia operatd
both to temper the behavior of the Polish population
and to incline Warsaw's allies toward cooperation
with Gomulka's successor in hopes of avoiding the
need for a rapeat performance. (Cl
Even so, popular skepticism and impatience, the
critical state of the economy, and Moscow's ever present
shadow all imposed severe restrictions on Gierek's
freedom of maneuver. Hence his success in meeting
most of his initial objectives before he had completed a
full year in office attests to his considerable political
and administrative skills. Indeed, things did not go too
well at first, and Gierek was soon confronted with a
second albeit nonviolent �round of strikes. But by
mid February, he had persuaded Moscow to provide
him with the financial assistance and added measure
of political support he needed to stabilize Poland's
domestic scene. Thus he w.is able to roll back
Gomulka's aggravating price increases and to initiate a
carefully phased series of personnel changes designed
to remove incompetents and potential -opponents from
positions where ',hey could hinder his plans. (C)
By mid -1971, Gierek had greatly strengthened his
control over the principal mechanisms of political
power, an his cautiously implemented program of
domestic rc!newal �with its emphasis on constructive
dialogue, patriotism, material well being,, and social
reform �had won him a period of grace -n the eyes of
most Poles. His improved position enabled Gierek to
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
extend his housecleaning campaign to the lower
echelons of the party and government and to advance
the scheduled date for the 6th PUWP Congress a full
year to December 1971. And when that carefully
prepared meeting was convened, he used it both to
effect further key personnel changes and to enshrine
the basic features of his political and economic policies
in the new PUWP program. (C)
In many ways 1972 was an even more encouraging
year for the Poles. Their country emerged from the 6th
PUWP Congress and from the governmental elections
a few months later with the youngest and best
educated leadership of any Warsaw Pact nation. Com-
prised largely of individuals who began their political
or professional careers in the postwar period, Gierek's
new team shared his pragmatism, his commitment to a
new relationship between the rulers and the ruled, and
his concern for popular welfare. Moreover, by year's
end Gierek could cite an impressive array of actions
and accomplishments to substantiate his claim that
Poland was not "on the right road" and to show that
his policies were indeed serving his declared objectives
of promoting domestic prosperity and of making
Poiand "count in the world." Among other things, in-
reases in agricultural rr:oduction, real wages, and in-
"ustrial productivity had exceeded initial forecasts. In
the field of foreign affairs, Poland had not only clearly
regained its leading position among Moscow's partners
it Eastern Ewmpe, but had succeeded in forging
promising new political and economic links to the
West as well. (C)
Despite the fact that Gierek has won most of his in-
itial battles, however, final victory in his struggle to
revive the Polish nation is still far away. As un-
derscored by the rejection of his proposed new labor
code by the trade union congress held in November
1972, he is still very much on probation as far as most
of Poland's workers are concerned. Their continued
support seems likely to depend on further tangible im-
provements� social, political, and, particularly,
material �in their way of life. Yet Gierek's ability to
deliver may be limited by a number of factors, not the
least of which is his seemingly rather conservative posi-
tion on the need for major institutional reforms within
Poland's existing economic system. (S)
Indeed, the key to Cierek's ultimate success or
failure probably lies in the economic field. The Polish
people know that he is no liberal and that his prograins
promise no miracles. At the same time, however, pan
of the bargain he has offered them rests on the promise
that hard work and dedication will be suitably re-
warded. Hence, failure to maintain a steady and rela-
tively substantial rate of economic progress would
greatly complicate Gierek's efforts to achieve a deli-
cate balance between seemingly contradictory objec-
tives �for example, popular mobilization and dis-
cipline versus a freer internal atmosphere; Pb Tty
supremacy versus a democratized and decentralized
governmental system; and strong, responsible one -man
management versus increased worker participation in
the deebionwaking process. (S)
Thus, while Gierek has entered into his third year in
office in a rather favorable position, the situation
which he maces is still too complex �and his long range
plans as yet too vag!ie.y defined �to permit any confi-
dent judgment as to jest how smooth or rocky
Poland's new path to socialism may turn out to be. But
it is possible to review the internal and external fac-
tors� including the influence of history and
geography �which affect Gierek's options, to assess his
specific moves and policies in the light of the problems
he inherited from the Gomulka era, and to identify
areas of possible future difficulty. (S)
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
The Polish Nation (u /ou)
Poland was born in A.D. 966 when Mieszko I, the
first known ruler of the native Piast dynasty, united the
Slavic tribes living in the Vistula and Oder river basins
between the Carpathian Mountains and the Baltic
Sea, adopted Christianity, and placed his principality
under the protection of the Papacy. A purported later
copy of the instrument by which Mieszko performed
the latter act indicates that the boundaries of his do-
main closely approximated those of present -day
Poland. The validity of this document has been
challenged, but it makes little difference. Piast control
over the territory described therein was soon firmly es-
tablished by Mieszko's son, Boleslaw I "the Brave
4
who succeeded his father in A.D. 992 and who had
himself crowned as Poland's first king 33 years later.
Poland's geographic location astride the flat plains
of the north central European corridor has resulted in
an almost uninterrupted struggle for national identity
and territorial integrity in the face of real or threatened
domination by neighboring powers. No other Euro-
pean country has known such contrasts in its fortunes.
There have been times of grandeur when Poland ras
the largest and most populous state in Europe west of
Russia. And there have been times �in the late 18th
century and again in 1939 �when a strong Germany
and a strong Russia have joined forces to erase Poland
from the map (in the first instance, for 123 years).
Their turbulent history, in turn, has been the main
determinant of the characteristics and attitudes of the
Polish people. Centuries of adversity and of externally
encouraged rivalry between members of their native
nobility have made ti Poles tough, individualistic,
resistant to change, and disrespectful of authority.
Above all, however, their long struggle for national
survival has imbued the Poles with a fierce and unique
form of patriotism, one in which Poland's Roman
Catholic Church is seen as the essence of all that is
Polish and as the principal guardian of the nation's
interests.
The roots of this identification between Roman
Catholicism and the nation extend back to Mieszko's
action in making Poland an eastern outpost of the
church. Later, during the Middle Ages, Polish forces
fighting under the sign of the cross stemmed the ad-
vance of the Turks and Tartars into Europe on several
occasions. But the bond was really sealed in 1655 when
a Polish victory over superior Swedish forces at
Czestochowa was attributed to the miraculous in-
tervention of a holy painting, the so- called Black
Madonna. The grateful Polish monarch proclaimed
the Madonna as Queen of Poland (an appointment
that has been renewed annually in colorful religious
ceremonies ever since). In the years that followed, the
aggressive actions of a Lutheran Prussia and an
Orthodox Russia further tempered the link between
Polish patriotism and the Roman Catholic Church.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
r

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Then, in 1795, when all that was left of Poland was
divided up and occupied by the Germans, Russians,
and Austrians, the Polish church survived intact and
became the chief unifying force contributing to the
rebirth of the nation in the wake of World War I.
Although societal change generated by moderniza-
tion and industrialization added a new dimension to
the problems faced by the leaders of the Polish state
which emerged in 1918, the traditional factors of
geographic location and national character continued
to play a key role in shaping the country's fortunes and
course. The nationalism which was later to find such
heroic expression during World War II contributed to
the mounting of a successful military campaign
against a strife -torn Russia in the early 1920's.
However satisfying to the Poles, this action resulted in
the inclusion of sizable new �and potentially dis-
sident� minorities within their country's eastern fron-
tiers and laid the basis for the collaboration between
Moscow and an equally irredentist and expansionist
Berlin which brought devastation and dismemberment
to Poland in 1939. At the same time, the Polish pop-
ulation proved to be, in the words of one Western
observer, "charmingly impossible to govern." Interwar
Polish politics were characterized by a succession of
weak parliamentary coalitions which finally gave
way �in 1926 �to semidictatorial government, first
under Marshal Piisudski and later under a collection of
military leaders called the "colonels regime."
World War II greatly altered the face of Poland.
Above and beyond its bitter IPgacy of material destruc-
tion, it resulted in boundary shifts by which Poland
lost nearly 69,000 square miles to the Soviet Union in
the east and gained about 40,000 square miles from
Germany in the west. The effective wartime exter-
mination of Poland's sizable Jewish minority by the
Germans and the massive transfers of people which ac-
companied the postwar border adjustments produced
an ethnically and religiously homogenous population
about 98% Polish and 95% Roman Catholic. Full
sovereignty remained a thing of the past as German oc-
cupation gave way to Soviet domination.. The Marxist
regime imposed upon the country by Moscow soon
completed the destruction of old social patterns and of
the prewar political and economic elite which had
been begun under Nazi rule.
But despite radical changes in class distinctions and
relationships, the fundamental attitudes and character
of the Polish people remained as before. Polish indiv-
ualism and resistance to imposed authority proved
impervious to efforts to imbue the population with
a new and ideologically determined set of values. If
anything, the cumulative effect of all the traumatic
changes in Poland's internal and external cir-
cumstances was to reinforce the linkage between Polish
nationalism and the Roman Catholic faith. Hence
Gierek, just as his predecessors, must cope with the fact
that his countrymen are just about the most unnatural
Communists in the world.
In its present configuration, Poland is a rectangular
country slightly larger than Ohio, Indiana, and Ken-
tucky combined. Its population at the end of 1972 was
estimated at a little over 33 million. With its southern
boundary at approximately the same latitude as the
U.S. Canadian border west of the Great 'Lakes, it lies
in a transitional weather zone between the continental
extremes of the U.S.S.R. and the milder marine
climate of northwestern Europe. Thus despite the
moderating influence of the Baltic Sea, bitter cold
winters and long summer hot spells are not uncom-
mon.
The Baltic Sea forms the portion of Poland's
northern frontier. The s.Andy and low -lying Polish
coastline -305 miles Fong �is bereft of good natural
harbors, but hooks of land enclosing shallow lagoons
and bays have permitted the development of major
ports at Szczecin (Stettin), Gdynia, and Gdansk. To
the south and southwest, the Carpathian and Sudeten
mountain ranges� separated by the strategically im-
portant 20 -mile wide lowland area known as the
Moravian Gate �form a natural boundary with
Czechoslovakia and provide the Poles with a year
round resort area. Most of Poland is flat or gently roll-
ing, however, and its flanks remain as vulnerable as
ever to overland attack. In the west, its border with the
German Democratic Republic generally follows the
course of the Oder and Neisse rivers. On the opposite
side of the country, the Polish- Soviet frontier is
anchored on segments of the Bug and San rivers, but
much of it was drawn with little regard for natural
terrain features.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
4 a
Poland can be divided into three main geographic
regions crossing the country in roughly parallel zones
from east to west. Since geography has played a
prominent �if indirect �role in shaping the attitudes
and character of Poland's colorful and ofttimes
hotheaded people, it is somewhat of a paradox that
most of the country owes its surface features to the
southward invasions of the Scandinavian ice sheet
which began to creep across the North European Plain
about i million years ago. At its point of greatest ad-
vance, this ice sheet covered nearly three quarters of
present -day Poland. With each retreat, the great
glaciers left a thick blanket of clays, sands, ar-d
gravels �known as drift� spread over the land, even-
tually completely obliterating the preglacial land-
scape. At the end of the Ice Age, huge rivers, swollen
by melt water from the ice sheet, flowed westward
across the middle of Poland creating wide, marshy
valleys which are still traceable today and which have
facilitated the construction of canals linking Poland's
present river systems.
The plains region which makes up the northern
two- thirds of Poland bears the strongest traces of this
6
glacial period. It is an area of generally poor soils, of
many lakes and marshes, and of a number of roughly
parallel east -wept ridges of glacial drift called
moraines �which in some cases reach more than 650
feet in height. Much of the land is employed for
agriculture and forestry, but transport and com-
munications are easy, and a number of cities (par-
ticularly Warsaw, Poznan, and the major Baltic ports)
have important industrial centers.
This vast region, from which Poland ("land of
fields derived its name, rises southward into a much
narrower central belt consisting of low hills and
tablelands of the type found in Upper Silesia. A part of
the mir;eral -rich contact zone between the North
European Plain and the European uplands, this area is
the ecor,9mic backbone of modem Poland. Its well
dra:. ed loamy soils (the product of fine, windblown
deposiN from the face of the Scandinavian ice sheet)
are the most ferti;n in Poland and each year produce
substantial tonnages of sugar beets, rye, and potatoes.
The region's mineral resources include bituminous coal
(Silesia's coalfields are among the most important in
Europe with reserves exceeded only by those of West
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Germany's Ruhr Basin), lignite, sulfur, capper, iron,
lead, and zinc. Benefiting, from its natural wealth and
central location, Katowice province (Silesia) has
become the industrial heart of Poland as well as on.^ of
the country's most densely populated areas.
'arther to the south, the rolling hills of Poland's cen-
tral geographic zone give way to the Carpathian and
Sudeten mountain ranges: peaks and ridges thrown up
in ages past by the northward thrust of the Alpine -fold
mountains against the unyielding rock of the Bohe-
mian Massif and the deeply buried Polish Platform.
Elevations here range from about 1,000 feet above sea
level in the Moravian Gate area to 8,200 feet in the
loftiest part of the Carpathian system. A small mining
area �the Lower Silesian coalfield �is located in the
Sudeten mountains, and minor deposits of oil and
natural gas have been found in the Carpathians.
Tourism, however, is ccrrently the most significant
economic activity in the area, with its principal center
in the attractive environs of Zakopane. As a whole, the
region is relatively backward by Polish standards, but
its forests and, particularly, its hydroelectric potential
offer promise for the future. The Oder and the Vistula,
which together with their many tributaries drain
almost all of Poland, both rise in this mountainous
border zone and course northward across the country's
east -west geographic divisions to empty into the Baltic.
Stalinization, De- Stalinization, and The Gomulka Legacy (s)
Poland's postwar internal evolution� political and
economic �has gone through a number of distinct
phases roughly paralleling changes in the general
character of Soviet -East European relations. Transi-
tion from one to another of these periods has generally
been marked by varying degrees of violence. In part,
this has been due to the character and attitudes of the
volatile Polish people. But the basic causes lie
elsewhere, in the dismal history of the prewar Polish
Communist party, in the stifling influence of the
Soviet Union, and in the inability of Poland's leaders
to shed their ideological blinders and to adopt a flexi-
ble approach to the new problems and requirements
generated by marked changes in the internal and ex-
ternal environment.
The foundations of Poland's postwar political order
were laid in 1944 when the advancing Soviet Red
Army set about the systematic dissolution of the
political and military centers then controlled by the
non Communist underground and the London -based
Polish Government in exile. To take their place, the
Soviets established a single Communist controlled
body, the Committee of National Liberation, in
Lublin, granting it recognition in January 1945 as the
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Provisional Government of Poland. Six months later,
following the Yalta agreements and the broadening of
the Lublin group to include four non Communist
Poles from abroad, Moscow's creation was recognized
by the major Western powers as Poland's legitimate
government.
With the negotiation of this hurdle, Poland had
moved well into the first phase of its postwar evolu-
tion, that of the suppression of democratic forces and
the consolidation of Communist (local and Soviet)
power. These processes were hindered, however, by
the fact that Poland's Communists were woefully ill
prepared to assume control of their war -torn country.
Among other things, they were few in numbers, weak
in organization, and generally unpopular. During the
interwar years, their small party had been paralyzed
by factional struggles, police penetration, and
repeated purges. In 1938 it had been dissolved
altogether on Stalin's orders. Although the party had
been resurrected in 1942, wartime conditions had
delayed progress toward filling out its ranks and
rebuilding its domestic organizational base. And
neither its new name, the Polish Workers Party, nor the
minor role it ultimately came to play in the anti -Nazi
resistance movement had served to alter the
decades -cld conviction of most Poles that their coun-
try's Communist party was antinational and therefore
an alien organization.
Popular prejudices notwithstanding, however, the
Polish party had never been entirely immune to the
nationalist virus. Thus one effect of World War II was
to create a basic division within its ranks between the
so -caled native Communists �those individuals,
typified by the Party's First Secretary, Wladyslaw
Gomulka, whose roots were firmly in Poland and who
had spent the war years in their homeland �and the
emigrees (popularly known first as the Stalinists and
then, as times changed, simply as the Moscovites who
had returned home from varying periods of exile in the
Soviet Union in the baggage of the Red Army. Both
groups were agreed on the necessity of active
collaboration with Soviet advisers, military units, and
secret police during the consolidation period, but the
emigrees were understandably far more prepared than
the Gomulkaites to subordinate purely Polish interests
to those of the Soviet Union.
As time passed, Gomulka hecame increasingly un-
easy about the Kremlin's hegemonic ambitions in
Eastern Europe and its insistence on slavish adherence
to the Soviet model. He was firmly in favor of main-
taining the closest possible ties with the Soviet Union,
but he wished to see the partnership develop on a more
equal basis. By 1948, his outspoken objections to the
supranational character of Stalin's newly established
Cominform organization, his refusal to inaugurate a
program of forced agricultural collectivization, and his
criticism of the insufficiently national orientation of
Poland's prewar Communist party had placed him on
a collision course with the Stalinists.
It was an unequal contest. Gomulka may have en-
joyed the sympathy of the bulk of the party rank and
file, but he did not have control of the party
machinery, and, more important, he had incurred
Stalin's wrath. Yet even after he was forced to resign
his job as party chief in September 1948, he refused to
renounce his basic views. In 1949 he was stripped of his
remaining party and government posts. In 1951 he was
placed under strict house arrest and disappeared from
public view. However, memories of his stubborn
defense of his position lingered on. The Polish people
compared Gomulka to his Stalinist successors, and in
time the legend grew that he had been a truely
"liberal" and "nationalist" leader.
Gomulka's fall from power and the "merger" of
Poland's Communist (Workers) and Socialist parties
which gave birth to the PU WP a few weeks later
marked the end of the consolidation period. With
Soviet help, Warsaw had broken the back of all organ-
ized political and paramilitary opposition. Most of Po-
land's prewar political parties had been disbanded and
their leaders converted, jailed, or forced into exile. The
two non Communist parties still in existence, the
United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party, were
mere appendages of the PU WP. The voice of the
Roman Catholic Church, while not stilled, had at
least been somewhat muted. The ouster of Gomulka
and his associates had cleansed the party of its own
potential troublemakers. Its new leadership, headed
by Boleslaw Bierut, was unquestioningly loyal to
Moscow.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
The next phase in Poland's postwar evolution �its
Stalinis era �was more or less coterminous with the 7-
year period of Bierut's rule. It was a time of forced
draft industrialization, of energetic but largely ineffec-
tive efforts to collectivize Polish agriculture, of police
terror, and of total subservience to the Soviet Union.
The Warsaw regime's repressive policies and the de-
gree of control which Moscow exercised over Poland's
internal affairs deeply alienated the bulk of the Polish
population. Passive resistance to the party's dictates
became widespread. For their part, however, Poland's
top leaders were wedded to the Stalinist system, and
when this began to break down under the pressures for
change released by the Soviet dictators death in
early 1953, a factional struggle developed between
conservative and reform minded forces in the PUWP
which finally reached its climax 3 years later.
1956 was quite a year for the Poles. In February,
Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Soviet Com-
munist Party Congress set the stage for the first round
of de- Stalinization in Eastern Europc as well as in the
Soviet Union. The convenient death of Boleslaw Bierut
a few weeks later removed one potentially formidable
obstacle to domestic reforms in Poland. In late June,
just before the outbreak of rioting in Poznan convinced
Bierut's successor, Edward Ochab, of the urgency of
such reforms, President Tito of Yugoslavia secured the
Soviet Party's first official endorsement of the concept
of separate roads to socialism. For a moment it
appeared that the Soviets had given a green light to
their allies to emulate some of the more innovative
features of the Yugoslav experiment. But Khrushchev
hastened to dispell this illusion. Laying the blame for
the Poznan riots on the old bogey of imperialist
provocation, he held fast to the view that radical
political and economic reforms were neither needed
nor permissible within the Soviet empire. And he
made it clear that the Kremlin still regarded Titoism as
a particularly dangerous form of heresy.
Under these circ�st -noes, Gomulka �who had
been released from detention in 1954� became the
man of the hour in Poland. Not only was he an ad-
vocate of a uniquely Polish path to socialism who had
stood up to the Soviets in the past, but F alone among
Poland's more prominent Marxists enjoyed a public
image favorable enough to bridge the gulf that had
developed between the regime and the general popula-
tion. Courted by the reformists (both liberal and
moderate) as a seemingly ideal champion in their
struggle with the still well entrenched Stalinist faction,
Gomulka was quietly readmitted "alto the party in
August. Thereafter, pressures for change mounted both
within and outside the party as a steady decline of the
effective power of the security apparatus opened the
way for a virtual flood of liberal proposals and com-
mentary in the Polish press.
Poland's internal crisis reached its climax on 19 Oc-
tober. Benefiting from Ochab's support and growing
popular enthusiasm for their cause, the re'ormists had
made steady gains, and it was no secret that they
hoped to use the PUWP Central Committee Plenum
which was convened on that date to elect Gomulka as
Party First Secretary and to adopt his political lir.:;. An
attempted coup by the beleaguered Stalinist faction
was thwarted on the very eve of the plenum. Then, as
9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Soviet forces such as these on maneuver were :xar at hand during
Polands Internal crisis in 1956

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
the meeting opened, Moscow intervened. Soviet forces
began to mass along Poland's borders and those Red
Army units already on Polish soil moved out of their
garrisons toward Warsaw. A star studded Soviet
delegation headed by Khrushchev himself flew to the
Polish capital uninvited in order to assess the situation
and, if need be, to bully the Poles ir_to submission.
Ochab thereupon adjourned the PUWP plenum and,
together with Gomulka (who had been hastily coopted
into the Central Committee on the news of
Khrushchev's arrival) and a number of other senior
Polish leaders, entered into a stormy negotiating ses-
sion with the Soviets which lasted into the early
morning hours of 20 October.
In the end, the Poles not only persuaded
Khrushchev that Gomulka's accession to power would
strengthen Polish socialism (and that, on the other
hand, any attempt to block his election as First
Secretary would have very bloody consequences) but
also succeeded in hammering out the basis for a new
and healthier relationship beh een Warsaw and
Moscow. The Soviet delegation departed for home as
hastily as it had arrived. The PUWP plenum resumed
its work, and on 21 October Gomulka was confirmed
in office as party chief. The events of the preceding
week had made him a national hero. His countrymen
were prepared to believe that such a man could do no
wrong, and Poland entered the third phase of its
postwar development on a great wave of popular
enthusiasm.
For a time it seemed that Gomulka might live up to
popular expectations. He halted the forced collec-
tivization of agriculture and allowed those peasants
who wished to withdraw their land from established
collectives to do so. Rejecting the rigidly hostile stance
of the old Bierut regime, he negotiated a mut, Oly
acceptable, if somewhat uneasy, accommodation
Poland's powerful Roman Catholic Church. Despite
the tense atmosphere which prevailed in Eastern
Europe in the wake of the Soviet suppression of the
Hungarian revolt, he successft,Ily defended and con-
solidated his country's newly expanded autonomy in
tIte conduct of its domestic and foreign affairs. These
were no mean achievements, and they endured to
become an important and positive part of the legacy
10
which Gomulka bequeathed to Gierek in 1970.
But the process of accommodation with Moscow in-
volved many compromises, and, in any event,
Gomulka's views on the proper lines of Poland's future
evolution were far different than those of most of his
countrymen. The people hoped that he would
democratize and rationalize Poland's political and
economic institutions and that he would lead them
into ever greater independence from Moscow.
Gomulka, on the other hand, wished only to correct
those Stalinist distortions which had derailed Poland's
existing socialist system and which had reduced his
country to the demeaning status of a Soviet satellite.
Gomulka was, in fact, in a very uncomsortable posi-
tion during his first few months in office. The chain of
developments which culminated in his return to power
had left the PUWP in total disarray and had released
spontaneous forces for change which had pushed him
much fiirther in the direction of radical reforms than
he wanted to go. Though he had, of necessity, dealt
with his Stalinist opponents forcefully and quickly, he
was convinced that if Soviet hostility to the Polish ex-
periment were to be overcome and the disaster of
Hungary avoided, the more tenacious and more
destabilizing liberal elements in Poland's post- October
internal environment would have to be sup-
pressed �and the control of the party over all aspects
of national life reasserted �as soon as possible. He set
about this task with characteristic determination and
thus planted the seeds of popular distrust and dis-
illusionment which were to bear such bitter fruit less
than 14 years later.
The consequences of Gomulka's retreat from
liberalism might have been less serious had it not
become a self feeding process or had Gomulka found it
in himself to be more responsive to changing internal
and external conditions once he had consolidated his
domestic position. As it was, Gomulka became in-
creasingly preoccupied with the task of maintaining a
delicate factional balance within the PUWP and
governmental hierarchies and therefore tended to
neglect his country's other internal problems. When
this resulted in outbreaks of popular dissatisfaction, he
responded by incorporating increasing numbers of
hardliners into his regime to control the population
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
rather than by trying to identify and remedy the un-
derlying grievances. Hence the cycle would repeat
itself, with the population becoming increasingly
alienated and the top echelons of the regime in-
creasingly hostile to criticism and resistant to change at
each turn.
Unlike his peers in Romania and Hungary,
Gomulka made no attempt to exploit Khrushchev's
second round of de- Stalinization or the bourgeoning
Sino Soviet dispute to his country's domestic or inter-
national advantage. By 1967, his unimaginative
policies had resulted in a miasma of political repres-
sion, economic stagnation, stifling bureaucratization,
and moral corruption. In June of that ;year, Israel's vic-
tory over Moscow's unpopular Arab clients and the
subsequent campaign against "Zionist" element in
the ruling parties of Eastern Europe opened the way
for a virtual revolt of the frustrated younger generation
of PUWP functionaries against the Gomulka
leadership. Focusing their attack on Comulka's
suddenly vulnerable Jewish supporters in the party and
governmental bureaucracies, some of these tough,
young, and relatively nationalistic officials rallied to
the hardline PUWP faction headed by security chief
Mieczyslaw I.4eczar. Others, equally tough but
generally more sophisticated and more concerned with
seeking practical remedies for Poland's mounting
social and economic problems, clustered about Gierek.
As indicated earlier, a number of factors eventually
combined to enable Gomulka to turn back this
challenge and to reimpose a semblance of stability un-
der his leadership at the 5th PUWP Congress in Oc-
tober 1968. But once this had been accomplished, he
once again allowed his attention to be diverted from
his country's domestic problems. This time, the object
of his concern was Bonn. In 1967, Gomulka's dismay
over Romania's action in establishing diplomatic
relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and
his abiding fear that Moscow �then still the sole
guarantor of Poland's western frontier �might some-
day reach an accommodation with Bonn at Warsaw's
expense had prompted him to sign a number of new
"solidarity" agreements with his East European allies
that had effectively tied his own hands in dealing with
the West Germans. He had quickly recognized his mis-
take, but his initial efforts to jettison the burden of this
multilateral approach had been interrupted by Po-
land's party crisis. Now, Gomulka was determined to
lose no more time. With Moscow's approval and the
active encouragement of the newly coopted young
Turk elements in his regime, he labored to secure a
negotiated settlement of the issues particularly the
emotion -laden question of the Oder Neisse fron-
tier �which had long impeded the development of
normal political and economic relations between
Poland and the Federal Republ3:: of Germany and, to a
lesser degree, between Poland and all of the NATO
powers. These negotiations ware protracted, and
Gomulka's continued neglect of problems closer to
home ultimately resulted in his downfall. But the long
awaited Polish -West German agreement was finally
signed on 7 December 1970. It was the last �but by
no means the least si =nificant� positive element to be
included in the Gomulka legacy.
11
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Glerek's New Deal (s)
Gierek's accession to power was not greeted with
much popular acclaim. It was generally agreed that he
had done a good job at Katowice, but the restless
Polish nation �wiser and more skeptical than in
1956 �was unwilling to accept any new leader at face
value. Moreover, the party machine he now com-
manded was held in deep contempt. Thus Gierek had
to prove himself anew. He began by reversing the
Gomulka regime's condemnation of the December dis-
orders, declaring them to have been �by and
large �the expression of legitimate working -class
grievances. Attributing the conditions which gave rise
to these grievances to the erroneous practices of his
predecessor, he promised to introduce a more
democratic style of leadership to improve the party's
contact and cooperation with all elements of the Pop-
ulation, to insure a freer flow of information, to raise
living standards, to correct existing distortions in
economic policy, and to provide the average Pole with
greater opportunity. for direct participation in the
political and economic decisionmaking processes.
12
Suiting action to words, Gierek moved swiftly to
allay the immediate grievances of Poland's angry
workers. He granted a substantial increase in wages
and allowances to low income families. He first
shelved and then discarded Gomulka's controversial
incentive pay plan. He rolled back the December
price increases and froze food prices through 1972
(since extended through 1974). With the help of a
$100 million loan from the U.S.S.R. he was able to
substantially increase the supply of meat available to
consumers. He traveied from factory to factory, talk-
ing directly with the workers in order to hear their
complaints, to tell them of what was being done to
improve their lot, and to explain why lie couldn't do
more. Although he resisted demands for the introduc-
tion of Yugoslav -style workers selfmanagement, he
gave the workers substantially increased representa-
tion in high party and trade union organs. In addition,
he undertook to draft a new and more equitable labor
code, but this project has turned out to be a bit more
sticky than he anticipated.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Poland's private peasants (whose 3 million farms
occupy 83% of the country's arable land) were not
forgotten in the press of efforts to satisfy their urban
cousins. Recognizing that he could not assure ade-
quate supplies of food in the future unless he won the
confidence of the peasantry and induced it to produce
more, Gierek promptly increased the procurement
prices for slaughter livestock and directed the nation's
well- equipped state farms to provid -C a wide variety of
assistance to their small private competitors. He also
abolished state control over sales of coal to farmers.
Furthermore, the hated compubory deliveries of farm
products to the state were abolished and replaced with
a contract system that gives the peasants a fairer return
for their labor and considerable leeway in determining
just what to produce. Land taxes were altered in such a
way as to facilitate the expansion of private holdings.
Poland's health insurance program was extended to
cover most of the previously ineligible private farmers
and their families. Lest some fears and suspicions re-
main about the future direction of his farm policies,
Gierek publicly pledged that private ownership of
most land would continue. And he backed up his
words with legislation that granted many peasants
clear title to land they had been tilling but which
previously had been considered to be state property.
Although important in themselves, these specific
(and carefully limited) concessions to workers and
peasants have reprr. ;sented only one side of Gierek's
overall program for revitalizin the Polish nation. Like
all his other moves to improve the internal political
and economic climate and to bridge the gap between
the party and the public, they have been keyed to his
basic pledge to introduce a new style of leadership �a
conveniently ambiguous commitment which un-
derscores hL determination to eliminate the errors of
the Gomulka era without raising undue hopes for
radical change.
In keeping with this approach, Gierek has tried ha
to convince his countrymen that Poland's new
leadership is more open and communicative, more
responsive to well- direct criticism, and sincerely
desirous of staying in touch with the needs and
aspirations of all the citizenry. Thus the precedent es-
tablished by Gierek's early factory visits has been
maintained. Party and government leaders h;ive held
innumerable meetings with workers and other groups
throughout the country. High ranking officials have
submitted to critical interviews on radio and television,
in some instances responding to questions sub-
mitted �both in advance and during the broad
cast�by their listening audience. A new post of
government spokesman has b:en created to publicize
and explain the activities of the cabinet. The results of
the meetings of the party Politburo and Central Com-
mittee, now held more frequently than during the
Gomulka era, are regularly publicized. The
appearance of frank and mildly provocative articles is
now tolerated, and in some cases encouraged, in the
public press. A few previously banned journalists have
been permitted to reappear in print. And far from
silencing the more outspoken critics of Poland's social
and economic ills, Gierek has coopted a number of
them into the establishment.
Underlying this emphasis on a more open �but still
disciplined society is Gierek's acceptance of the basic
concept, first articulated by Kadar in H..ngary, that
"all those who are not against us are with us." Not
only has he ostentatiously appointed nonparty people
to a number of responsible positions previously held by
party stalwarts, but he has repeatedly pledged to
eliminate discriminatory distinctions based on an in-
dividual's class background or religious beliefs. More
important, Gierek has followed through on his early
promise to try to normalize church -state
relations relations which had never progressed
beyond the stage of an uneasy truce during the
Gomulka era and which still bore the scars of a period
of renewed confrontation in the mid- 1960's. A meeting
of Prime Minister Jaroszewicz and Cardinal
Wyszynski, Primate of Poland, in March 1971 �the
first such church -state "summit conference" in 8
years� marked the beginning of an ongoing high -level
dialogue between churc'- and government officials.
The Jaroszewicz- Wyszynski encounter was followed by
the opening of direct talks between the Gierek regime
and the Vatican and by the enactment of legislation
giving 'Life Polish church legal title to ecclesiastical
property in the former Cerman territories. Another
cause of friction was removed in early 1972 when War-
saw abolished regulations requiring the church to keep
a full inventory of its property for tax purposes.
13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Gierek has combined his conciliatory approach to
"believers" and other nonparty elements with a broad
but cautiously implemented campaign to engage
Polish patriotism in support of his policies. This dis-
tinctive aspect of his renewal strategy was highlighted
by the decision to rebuild the ancient royal castle in
Warsaw and by the substitution of the centuries -old
,rational seal �the Polish eagle �for the previously
ominipresent portraits of party and government
leaders in official buildings throughout the country. It
has also been reflected in unprecedented public praise
of the past patriotic exploits of individual religious
leaders and in the muting of ideological themes during
Poland's national day celebration.
Gierek's new style of leadership has also been evi-
dent in the changes �both cosmetic and substan-
tive �that he has effected in Poland's political in-
14
stitutions. On one hand, it has resulted in a concerted
campaign to upgrade the technical competence of the
government bureaucracy as well as in a radical
streamlining of Poland's rural administrative structure.
On the other hand, it has dictated a number of modest
moves designed to breathe some life into Poland's
moribund organs of "socialist democracy." Thus
Gierek has sought to encourage debate in the Seim
(parliament) and its commissions. He has made some
gestures toward Poland's non Marxist political par-
ties �the United Peasant Party and the Democratic
Party�as well as toward various other organized in-
terest groups by soliciting their advice on matters of in-
terest to their members. He has rejuvenated the
leadership of Poland's political umbrella organization,
the National Unity Front, and has made it more
representative of the full spectrum of the front's
membership. In addition, he has promised his coun-
trymen a new constitution.
The party, like the government, has been given a
new face and a whole new team of leaders. Gierek has
not only staffed its upper echelons with younger and
more competent officials, but he has quietly purged
some 100,000 rank and -file members from its rolls. In
keeping with the spirit of the times, he has stressed
collegial leadership and restoration of "democratic"
practices. Breaking with Gomulka's methods, he has
regularly convened full meetings of the Politburo and
has often invited nonparty specialists to attend. And
although he has emphasized party discipline and
moved firmly against old factional alliances, he has
encouraged construct sve debate, a freer flow of infor-
mation and suggestions from below, and the delega-
tion of sufficient authority to lower echelons to per-
mit resphiiiun of most local problems without refer-
ence o Warsaw.
Giei ek's approach to the democratization and
decentralization of die PU WP has been under-
standably cautious. He is very much determined to
preserve the "leading role" of the party�both his posi-
tion at home and his acceptability to Moscow depend
upon his doing so. He has, in fact, declared his inten-
tion to anchor party primacy in constitutional law.
But, although Gierek is no more willing than Gomulka
to countenance reforms which could weaken the party,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
his ideas on how the organization should carry out its
functions are far different from those of his
predecessor. This too has had a marked effect on
Poland's internal climate.
In general terms, Gierek has sought to lower the
party's profile, not only vis -a -vis the people, but also
in relation to the government. He believes that the
party should formulate general policy guidelines
(drawing heavily on nonparty expertise), monitor and
mobilize, persuade and pressure. Without prejudice
to the PUWrs ultimate power to intervene, the practi-
cal implementation, of basic policy should be left to
the appropriate governmental bodies and mass organ-
izations. Increased efficiency is one consideration, but
by divorcing the party from the day -to -day manage-
ment of Poland's political and economic affairs,
Gierek evidently also hopes to cushion it against
future crises in public confidence.
In the economic field, Gierek has had to contend
with structural problems resulting from under- invest-
ment in food processing, the construction industry,
transport and communication, and agriculture.
Moreover, Gomulka's policies had caused Poland to
drag its feet in introducing technological change and
improvements in management and planning. By
rights, Poland �with its relatively ample natural
resources, with nearly half of its total land area under
cultivation, and with its consistently high overall level
of investment� should have been one of the most
prosperous countries in the Soviet bloc. Yet after a
quarter century of Communist rule, its per capita GNP
was only $1,650, about on a par with Bulgaria and
Hungary but far lower than the levels that had been
achieved in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or the
U. S. S. R.
Thus Warsaw has had to pursue its quest for greater
efficiency and increased production on a number of
fronts. Hand in hand with his efforts to win the
cooperation of the peasantry, Gierek has sought to en-
courage the growth of private services and of
state licensed but otherwise relatively independent
private or cooperative enterprises. He greatly inten-
sified the drive to acquire Western technology in
to restructure and modernize Polish industry. He has
come up with a new program for improving the system
of planning and management which prescribes greater
responsibility to the enterprises but also the strength-
ening of central control. in addition, he has made
some effort to streamline Poland's cumbersome eco-
nomic bureaucracy.
Nevertheless, Gierek's approach to institutional
change has been cautious. No economic reforms of the
scale introduced in Hungary in 1968 are presently in
sight. For the tune being, at least, Gierek hopes simply
to "energize" the existing system, and thus his most
striking departure from Gomulka's economic policies
has been to cast aside their orthodox emphasis on heavy
industry in favor of a more balanced �and more con-
sumer- oriented approach to economic development.
A change in procedure as well as in priorities has been
involved here. Reversing previous practice, targets for
increases in average real wages, consumption, and
employment are now established at the outset of the
planning cycle. In theory, at least, these figures are
then used in working out all other indices of the plan,
including, for example, production targets and es-
timated investment outlays.
The draft 1971 -75 economic plan which Gomulka
had prepared quite naturally had to be scrapped. A
substitute, embodying Gierek's new approach, was de-
veloped during 1971 by a commission of experts headed
by Politburo member Jan Szydlak and was formally
approved by the parliament in 1972. Its goals with
respect to improving the economic and social lot of the
average Pole are ambitious. Real wages are to rise by
18% while working hours are to be reduced. In contrast
to Gomulka's willingness to countenance a high jobless
rate, full employment is to be sought �a goal which
will require the creation of some 1.8 million new
positions for young people entering the job market. A
comprehensive review and reform of the educational
system is scheduled. The variety and quality of con-
sumer goods are to be improved, in part through im-
ports. A substantial number of inexpensive personal
automobiles are to be produced and marketed. Over 1
million new dwelling units are to be constructed. If,
however, Gierek is to fulfill his pledge that every Polish
family will have its own suitable place to live by 1990,
about 6 million more dwellings will have to be com-
pleted during the next three 5 -year planning periods.
15
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
The construction. industry itself is scheduled for major
modernization. Agricultural investment has been ac-
corded a higher priority. Social services are to be in-
creased, and new hospitals and health centers are to be
provided for both urban and rural areas.
Gierek's innovation in the foreign policy field have
been less dramatic, largely because the situation he in-
herited there was basically satisfactory. Even though
Gomulka ultimately failed to take full advantage of
his achievements, he had forged an acceptable new
relationship with Moscow, won Poland the place of
first among equals �behind the Soviet Union �in
Warsaw Pact councils, and pioneered in establishing
useful contacts and cooperation with the West. While
he had gradually entered into a bitter feud with East
Germany's �'alter. Ulbricht, he had been largely
successful in overcoming the chill in Warsaw's
relations with Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, and
Budapest that had resulted from the Warsaw Pact in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia (and from Hungary's only
half hearted participation therein). Finally, his
hard -won agreement with West Germany in December
1970 had laid old fears about the Oder Neisse frontier
to rest and had substantially increased Poland's room
for maneuver.
For Gierek, who shares Gomulka's conviction that
Warsaw's and Moscow's basic interests now generally
coincide and that Polish policy must rest on active
membership in the Foviet Union's alliance system,
there was little that needed to be done except to build
upon his predecessor's work, resolve Warsaw's
differences with Pankow, and give Poland's foreign
policy a slightly more assertive and indetxindent cast.
The relatively relaxed atmosphere in both halves of
Europe which has resulted from Mosww's drive
toward detente with the West �and Walter Ulbricht's
timely retirement �have been of great help to Gierek
here. Relying heavily on summit diplomacy, he has
restored Poland to its former position of special grace
within the Warsaw Pact and has developed especially
close bilateral ties with East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. He has nursed Warsaw's warming
16
relationship with Bonn through the ratification of the
Polish -West German agreement and the establishment
of formal diplomatic relations. As part of hie effort to
stake out a larger role for Poland in European and
East -West affairs, he has hosted Presidents Nixon and
Tito in Warsaw and has traveled to Paris himself.
Speaking as a man who has spent more than 20 years
of his life in France and Belgium, he has appealed to
people of Polish birth or parentage everywhere �par-
ticularly in the United States where the Polish Com-
munity is several miliion strong �to support the
renovation of Poland with their talents as well .as with
their money. And although he has voiced hip, disap-
proval of Romania's ostentatiously ivdependent
behavior, he allowed the notion advanced by a leading
Polish commentator that the "role of the middle
powers" (read: Poland) "increases proportionately to
the progress of detente in East -West relations" to pass
unchallenged.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

I_1� 16IT M M161:4 111 7111- 5N wo] WIN 11 IrZ QIr 1�Lr1' /:bhIrYrIrh1'DIrY:;
The Years Mead (a)
Ck-trk h taking Wand d"m a new roati Ihol,
bftvu%e of nrceWty as much as his owe pfog atir In-
clinttluM, L-` hm Irk latxely undrftnrJ. HK policies
6vo mmlled In a marked Impravemrnt in tho
rnaterlol W of runt Pvkt and to th domeslie pditktl
tii mate m ucll, &�xuse of thb, he has ge:ncd s cc ii-
1111emble nreasute of support Crown a ikeplioi
lwopltia people he has proenlserd rot only to li-Ld but
to consult.
Nvveitht6f, Clerel?s ctM1( w41h the paprla inn Is
not 11MIM51 Yl, and tha ultimto slabililyof Irks reshno
la lI!` y to deed con his irwinlaleing Iha morwotum
of his trfotms. On ibis qurstion, Puf lsh pubtle i >plrrlon
sterns iq br dlsa+Icd into Ihrro ramps: Ae f imt
Vt4m the lamest segment of Iho populatl m
belkrec ihai Gkfrk w 01 lake elfmive s(eps to anum
'xMilnurd Imprutrumnt of 11M silusth n. A wand
Imp also hat trust In Clark's loadrnhip, but foch
That he is unlikely to wccrcd in view of Shit swrlrwt
obdacks in his pith. A dcltd '=toup simply has no con
f ickiltr: in Clerelt and beiimrs that. nitro he hos wn-
solidatVd his Pont,, he will rctirt 10 IIir mltsrt IUM
sod fnrrllo of the iattr Gonrulka perfod, Allhouo the
Ix vlalvwn may ha -ve sine shINJ sanewhal In
ClrieWs favor. a .iw% ry oondurtrd by Wntem
rrwoft `ten in 14(++.1971 Indicalal that 39% of the ptj-
utxtion-tupp+uini the {int V$ew, 25% t he ircond. and
UN I hr thctd wil t oungrr lw,*e displaying con.
Adrtahle rwme ewficfmvc to Clack thou tWrrldrm
For I#r. time lit -ink� thew d4ftgent ittrtrit in pvbtir
17
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
opinion present no problem for Gierek. He has, in fact,
given measured encouragement to "creative unrest"
and "constructive dissatisfaction" as needed catalysts
for change. Yet populsr expectations in this era of
slackening East -West tensions almost certainly exceed
the regime's ability to fulfill them. There will be many
Poles, even among those who now have faith in
Gierek's good intentions, who will be inclined to view
any slowdown in his course as an abandonment of his
entire program. And aw: consequent shirking of effort
or open demonstrations of protest could make this a
self fulfilling prophecy.
Gierek himself may recognize the need for con-
tinuing change. For one thing, his present efforts to
imbue his countrymen with a Germanic work ethic
may not suffice to overcome the remaining short-
coming in Poland's existing economic mechanism. But
he will have to contend with forces of inertia �born,
ironically, of his initial successes� within the PUWP,
with still powerful vested interests in the political and
economic bureaucracy who feel that passive resistance
to Gierek's reforms will permit them to outlast even
this latest threat to their sinecures, and last, but not
least, with Moscow.
Indeed, the future direction of the Polish experiment
will unquestionably continue to depend heavily on the
mood of the Kremlin. Gierek's success in restoring
18
domestic order and his care not to maneuver very far
from Moscow's position on basic foreign policy issues
have won him the respect and the unqualified public
endorsement of the top Soviet leaders. Even so, he has
shown great caution in assessing the limits of Soviet
tolerance of economic and political change �and ap-
parently with good cause. The Soviets are reported to
have warned Gierek directly and through trusted in-
termediaries�of their displeasure with certain of his
moves. Their concern has apparently centered on his
agricultural and religious policies as well as on his per-
sonnel changes.
There is nothing to suggest that the Soviets are at
present really alarmed �much less that they might be
considering some dramatic move to bring Gierek to
heel. Nevertheless, the Kremlin's persistent ideological
orthodoxy gives heart to like minded bureaucrats in
Poland and generally complicates the Warsaw
regime's task in trying to maintain the momentum of
its reforms. Thus it would appear that Gierek will long
have to continue to display considerable firmness and
skill in dealing with the Soviet leadership in order to
prevent its unimaginative views from frustrating his ef-
forts to improve the material lot of his countrymen or
fron otherwise suffocating his campaign to rejuvenate
the Polish nation.
The Palace of culture in Warsaw. Stalin's ift to Poland, this towe
ing building serves as a constant reminder o)'the Kremlin's influem
on Polish affairs.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

>M r6
M y J
S
4S'' Y �N� y. a, 7: 41 .j'1y
i. V h-' p e Z 9v
1
L
Y
r o
IF r r
l *4'p
V
z
s
e:.
A
rw .rte i
APW.44 ;x

(_1,,:160 :1 M161:,:1 /_d:,1111i QillyflyI:1IIIIIXIIIIIH111YAW
Chronol (urou)
ww* MI"AL4 tamum wtvto Poi" trllt* W04110. or
d -eUers of tar pW4*M lltto yAttd aadaq IMpt+
Mu tkpwly, and piares I IAM oNdar 0* protettum of U*
P�Wy �lbw t04KMkMA19 Ir &EkmJ r.ladva+hlp Irlvcro
ft6A iWale �a4 t&* rt*co%a L'scWt Chou..
lea
W kwwWa wog K 1, aow+trd U hNr 1h; of tt+ Pi4d
4 14a,.il ]soak rJ# fmq 0ddk.% 6sm 11*tm In Ihs
hsi w b.lep. in MR rLat, and Irv, r4M*M+tN to
Carfr41410a rounta:n,. bo1. kv A 1%61.h usnau a prriod of
alffaal dirfaipw, rn4 4K-01* 61 U%T100t IN1a p1dkr1p4j4ft
t =11
Itl=
'ilwr lint PwIl"a 01 kaNJ; *be" +m"Renn to Yalta
t.liltorr t, kwt to rrwnlF L. hv*+% Nora Autow.
im
%todtl toewckoliM wMpWW a 3 AV pra*lawi foa
to"" Manatt 04ewJ pw llt.fw%t, 1sdFrial auta7OMY.
nttd Whh&l .baiu3ec of +rf4ait.
1"A
facrt lwts"M datlw w oppMratA of 1742 e*"quitlocl
NNJ P'rW& AAW Awda WA& is ",end pUUtloe 4 rbdrd
4 thaw too Seem; remawdrr of r b6wd btmpim N Pupgrd
matt rf Arw,ia
17"!9
Ur+alaltoe of area of pe4mJ br 7'4 L[JIMWgti Wk6b
ars jUa �d aMb lbt help of 'Tecl}rafp 1:44tr; taftae o<
Gird AWC x1Lk71 rp. xm
I la-un
Wcwhd ""rival aced vvNwal haaioe taA;Re ptt bade
Xlbp lwJW" 1 and cmLa Or M 00 firmt; rwpj1 W.M
c6*6 wcrd: F41MIR tr CIM jwlke. NNW rnmrgr t r.
frrMdeled Alter K'WtM 10 wbd Sltsdmril)F d KIW%Ow
to fore�t.1 :0 1 SiT; Jew ptaxelctr4 is woken Depw an
sllaurd to Ne f q 1
n"
Japeha. QrAnd Aat 4 L46LMmL4 ampta CHtitiaaltr
awe Ieroened tA&*1aa 11, KJN of polnpd +lbr 11im nkkr
NO Ibr J4rt*ltaNLrM1 dlk- Y: Po+rq 4sd LitbtaoM Uhmslw
f�adillal uaiol, 017t dd4t*llp{ Tet.t"k KAirkr tit c;_-� m "W
lip 1110.
I M-1 to
twLkN ,tea a! tke 110t ls+r as,le, tw 4411:r,t god I
po.erlol b tgal-s'e tttrat Ewrtw, %adrbind cithla tr aatkr
Ihnx SW --4 R aster% tk KnAew. *Jdrh b1cbrell4 a
W.tj4r Y.tttrtpt4L center ay Est*, hQ'V$4 iL rrbvl.r.blp,
W. nJ for time, of Ih� Ibeformuloa
ISTJ -1 M
Arn d pLlaeJ*@ MiAXw" is rhara[IrrLwd by yleRey
tlrsbtu st Inletook evhcsloq dr1a11 twtfait Ybr t.leh Kpvde0.
ward Rrwd upeagt 144 fotelpM Ioter.esUarq ea-wibA po-bor
d 1},r 1,AJl V%Vy, tbR 414M IJ90rWowly erodcu
rvlsi pesrr ad Pbbod'r 96bsBt7 to krA Ymtr.taal
Muaca aced Ort hndpr R13PAL Nt I Ay
1:43
NUNJ Cyrimlr j"III1 ksJ� Catbohit: pstrlatar y priunA
apliut Rrorins llu2siaq eootrul.
_`!1
!atrial Tea 1`IwasAN leads latJie 1Ntltgw.A MGM
NpmAt Apmiaw ra3r�
170th
T44J prrtttloa by p"b" HUMLw. "4 AvMr1w rridu is
t dimppmn4m of dw J a" MAte.
IMAIa
araad vorhf a( W34p*W is CCMC ,7 br Kwpdrna bMt
tilt bwd ky Iltb ebapwrta of Wraw: 1
awlosh caps pokAd bbekw ltuadaa COPLItol la
tie+Nle.
1
llp4W< arp mM Rrtrtaa rttir Ia141RUy aurrwfAl; te
Fd" rhWM@ CW ?lfroiaq b b4t FVFClt to ewe4941ly
svpprrrrrd 01 RuloeQ%.r M 'Akfd.
I"111-11640
All�m;ta at fw1bAr 0WW44 Is 1twkL&dotalatt*1 as rw
lbre quaallrrl.
Two 3ton o! jv.rtilA *sdLm arLlntt R,1iA" mit P%4- is
defrat
1.011
eytbr.4 4 W.011d liar I lash& t'4pt4n4 a WWM bat4014ki
16W pv1A Fobs I.a OPPOOF4 rsrbtb,
1117
14wj
Pr.4kak Weadtaw ti ibwsq r43or trltliotl W If.drprbdeat
YMlz
�r. Y ..r d i r''` a4 �1�' 7 1 r !?S J. r art!
IF `'l }y'fx�Ye,:`:- z ".I�'.4ai .,,,ra. ,t .,a !'+'�4t '`)i.'S' y t a 1 -L !z*. t
J ta ae i
TR,:. 'per Sys -'rqn bl, q y
let 1
J w
win
'i
s r
Q T
t'.
7 MAY -SO4
X IL
9 L Y FZf'L "s fi7 tt
IJ 30
G'-
h
a 1t 11 1t
N.1ry rc.
Si i7 It tt
Ty.1.
1302
11 }I
7a a.
NV) oI r/7
121t ,I b
Ttni
Sj It
71 is
V
['I.twb...
31 JI 11
Itr.0 li.
tk 11 71 S4
Two..
v if
I: M
[Y.u.S�..
b M f. JI
N6 -4....
Sa r 11 16
!'Nl�.
SO 31
It SI
v
l
1) 10 1.%
10 JI 11
6IWl..r.....i
31:1
11 AT
H M 1/.I
Ni.�i../Lr1..4
:O to It 34
wwrw..dr, fiN Cl-, (-,f
Crya,sAw�.._....
7B M l0 W
11.161. N M�k�11...
R 71 31 sl
J1.tr1
1
al ,t
17.1
Il.wit. [:as.j (1�i(1.
H N 11 IS
Flm..
31 A 11
W�
31 IF
71 b
Lk14.�,..
111: f373
11.4". (-NI
�JK 1..
17 i7 71 Ai
Wi [w./.T
.f,
17a
11 u
Ilua. [tnewl..
If It 371e
Slwui..r6V, 4w6.1�..1M r7tr1.
11 list
11'fwdw.
1231
.2 41
R�0r1A1.
:1 -4
to U 1. H
A, r 14.
If 7t 7A 00
Mfu.�..
17.).
1173
'.i
l R.W r.
LMo.'.
1 271 's'
MJ,t�1ir.
b 51 H,rl
I
li.[ Ik,u�, I:Y11kM�.�)
It J. 11 k
N"_ Iwwr
42-1 II Is
.1wMv
33 at
H 04
ilk. 41 4tlro.j rwr.wt.
3114 V m
S:.�. Ilan. 1�w X.Xrl.
5a 41 IID w
1S.L 1t..N...li
sj s7
71 14
1314,f.
A. 1 t1 7s
N.q *4....
31 11 1t t1
-,_b. IIM.M1.1..
41 01
17 of
1] swwwl,
31 If It 1]
Ns,a..
l0 b 1: 7i
1'.t.l R..a...
sa
N l0
L-11 r.aa}.
SS 11 11 7.
nor I+p�rf...
11 L� it A
Yn4rw..
It
Ii 1:
tr.11.M. IwN Wfp+.Y
u 91 It 11
IIM.14,01 lwl 6,fw.�3 (n.17r..
7 37 71 03
7.1.1.M....
IN SL
l0 S.
!'I..Lr. i1.3114�we3.
SI w H at
f.bliy ILI 1N-" (..1271
11 $7 11 it
Lr�t�wii, 7r.kry 141.1.
41 4t
In W
tLyat.
1111 No tt
lllp�w
311 1. 71
Arj...
!t so
P
Is w
Not).,.
S, at to it
.,a
s It L. 11
7..W.4..
q_rlr.�r
02 1J 73 x
Saul}.,
Ll IS K Z�
716
S. 11 I. N
q�.
>9 w It 3i
JNr�1W./...r.]
1! I{
loom
lliluru. K.IVI r.s..1
34 a7 q
tt ,4 Lw1.Lw,
sl be 71 t.
AI.t�s K...:Inwdl..
U 1.
110.1.
fl N 1L 0t
ly,.ut. L'u11r7.1N4.
Is 111 1 17
L.tw.[W..
3114
14 av
d
t:ur.w
13 31 17 36
[Mm.,.r R. k,rtnJ.11.
'J a 71 :1
It
a :1 La
tH., II[,rr,IJ 1wk.Mt1
M A7 S, It
Y 11.4 tklr...
4 N.
It 77
7�
I:rdt(n Pat-4,441
LS 11 11 I.
ik.�!L
53 d 1, t
Va
1
I]r�y.+.
17 71 H M
tSU,r.�..
1t N 11 73
11nA1�k ,rr rpt
31 4V 11 3a
1-"-
St W Y it
$ol�pod wk11.l.11
nft }.J
si M ?t 11
CM.
31 w t. 41
n,.d�t iI AXN
U 11 14 14
AL..
7! 17 71 a7
t46.w.
M N
13 4%
K
Ilti)le
41 17 7'� a'
A..141
St st :1 7
N.1w..
u
S. or
7''�
[G }�.w
77 A 11
j-M. 71}1wrJ.aS.
Si 7. H 41
h
w ANN
17 js
f fye7
31 L A W
rlwo
1133 H /i
n l dr.w.
Ll u
It 1r
31 3t 11 11
",It
Dl i, A 33
V' N
1, 7i
t7 S{
Il.oli, Nkn.j. 4,�P"
st U t4 to
U L I f u
K�.:rlal llT.trf..
1t d{
1 1
Il.trr...l.rYr0drklAn..t.r N.s.rv.tl.L
Ibtlwke
it 7a Itl At
U�M1��,
11 l
a
IS ti
.2
1111 /krpNl {Ba ll
L! 17 II q
I1N_. rr11
14 71 It 11
rW,d..
111!
It 30
Ilrl.�w
l0 11 n 31
ILwrrur
:0 14 11 37
I or-
13 M
If $1
MIY1v1lmy
hJnrt
511. tI is
141
17 u ,t S.
N
31 17
11 It
l..l�
n
t1 71
rvaL+r, f.'rwLw1�.vtsa
S0 02 Ii x
1...1.
31 31
If I,
Yolrr.0lr,
lrl.e�4
31 it 19 N
N4,.ii
11.7 A 31
In.Ox Awk..
1a 1.
It ba
M
Ir9tr!
1,M.:11W9
3Na.11.
f1 ,S :t
At u .I t.
T.ttu.. l.n.tw,
r�,,,4
tb it H 11
to U R 17
Slulrft.
14p1 N.t� Ll
N Itt
31 11
Isar
71
MOlff pat'
F} SwG.
17m 31 a7
r.L.,4. 1Sr4.
41 71 :1 A.
tl.h.s..wr
.11
H03
d41.Ir'
Kitpwd. 1'24AN
11 .1 ;a 1n
4d..7
SI u n AN
11.111.
12 n
m it
ItAVt11N
Ka.ti....IR IL.Im Uw.f.
kla 3!
k�r Lln
7101 lI IJ
[ML-
SI It
IS 11
O>A[N
..nw a7MJlA.
K.wr.
10 I{ 11 Ai
It *41
11 al R IS
1UL
31 H
It 13
I:.q.'. LS P. It
LI R a7 N
ON,
31 73 31 w
1:11w.0
St 31 16 u
11
KYL�
30 N+ q 1
A. Is I1 K
lr!�.w
Mr� �L. 7112 r,-"
SI QS n Il
al 44 I, Os
IaLfl.Xln.r.
itrw..w:1wN�s.
17 71
1a M
,t >a
71 t1
K.q..jjL e.RJtM
1, 71 Z�
Nall+
31 >0 ]h 1{
AIp1C
SI :i
IS tt
qS
Aorlri
�J A ft to
Neel.
:4 L 1. 71
Xrild.1.
33 Q
IJ 30
d
IC,1..ut
K..r
3t 11 SL Sl
i! Il t. S{
a..�..
KfwN.
11 at IS st
M Al m
Vwrard.
17
s[ 17
76 7,
4.
Slim L?A0a060
Iipfrll.
3 7 11 30
Wk.rl
>J Il 71 sa
FlN�..
SI 31
la 34
44
44 19 t1 [1
L&h3r.l.fJ
:11 11 71 11
N'arr,..l,.r..f.�.
LJ 11
Sa
w
N.
30 1 it 1
1 :8.,.1 1 7ia ,an..y
at It II It
W-01-t,
>7 11
S.
w r
Kn11�
AN 's I. 3S
S.....
47 73 Ik
.',rt.. ticr.t6.�Ir�
31 rr.
I{ 31
j
IinkN.
x 3f S1 11
Tyd r+M.
t0 al 31 17
7wn.
SI n
IS 71
Kwl.._
El tie I7 +A
..us�
1711 10 W
1�t_t.
$102
H 14
Nip
4a 11 :I It
l _1
31 w OR IN
N,lai it to
I
Canual In1eKjanoo Ag" For Off dol Uso only
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9

i
1
i
I
i
Railroad
D ivided
Road
Airfield
Major port
CV V CU I M KCLCHZ:i C: ZU Ulf/ UtS'1 ti: L.: 114� KUI-'U'1 �UU l U l MUUUZUUU tf UUZ I �:J
n
J:ochdw
vX+4 ran� PUS= Q
gize'
wowirt
yx arsaw
i' ti/ (Wersiewap
ulnr} laih t
Si st
52-
F "ft4n
a
e- t x p o;
i c �Y Z9t
WieprZ
r f v Xl 'q k J t tbd>' e r j Ra� :k r i,.
eunska Krrna
s Pabta c fv i
n l Ster a
f 0.
y I. Mot R
3 r Trybunals n r Koval'
wx
AL I. Z t n if bl
tom,
a karYysk
a) a Radomsko Sta chowtce
A, az in k
ik J` y y c r Kra �nik
ride 1;'e a. twiglokrzys s,a as
gsto o .r
Opblblsw. a 3: J c ech6w l w
arrows
Gory vViercie
166
akow "I r !.,c E �tom
A ,r
sus y+t'K Y ([glee Zg1.. Ch
50.
chY y e;
4 Rybnik c j ti uta t Tarn
t3, a,y na a ins Bgplifl!a rkt' r LrvO
G as
y s.
Gorlice Klow
n K.vnira 'A,
Nina
Czechoslovakia
The U.S. Government does not recognize as final the de facto western
1 Limit of Polish administration. Names end the r.Presentation of some
.18 18 other boundaries are not necessarily authoritative.
Only
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Hungary
U. S. I S. R.
The United States Governmem has not recognized the I
incorporaion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the 2d
22 Soviet Union.
i
1
Circle'
MI
Mr'
F4'
G r
r,
r
L
1

fill xL -ff MT lff
Land Utilization
Urbanized or industrialized area
Forest
AGRICULTURE
Q Oats, potatoes, livestock
Rye, potatoes, livestock
Wheat, sugar beets, livestock
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Otla=sat8w:.' Awlptokrtyskl?
Petroleum pipeline Iron ore WBIIIfZy6 Opel 1 awlarCla Slaleira casts
Q Hard coal Lead and zinc KATONICE Marta iaraobrtq r
AREA Nala YhMe
Brown coal Rtaua
Industry
INDUSTRIAL CENTERS
Circles and segments indicate relative importance
Mining, iron and steel, nonferrous metallurgy
Machine building (including transportation
and electrical equipment, metalworking,
specialized machinery)
Food processing
Chemicals (including basic chemicals, petroleum
refining, fertilizers,artificlal fibers, synthetic
rubber, pharmaceuticals)
Light industry (textiles, clothing, woodworking, paper)
J
k
_L
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070027 -9
Otla=sat8w:.' Awlptokrtyskl?
Petroleum pipeline Iron ore WBIIIfZy6 Opel 1 awlarCla Slaleira casts
Q Hard coal Lead and zinc KATONICE Marta iaraobrtq r
AREA Nala YhMe
Brown coal Rtaua
Industry
INDUSTRIAL CENTERS
Circles and segments indicate relative importance
Mining, iron and steel, nonferrous metallurgy
Machine building (including transportation
and electrical equipment, metalworking,
specialized machinery)
Food processing
Chemicals (including basic chemicals, petroleum
refining, fertilizers,artificlal fibers, synthetic
rubber, pharmaceuticals)
Light industry (textiles, clothing, woodworking, paper)