NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 73; HONDURAS; ARMED FORCES

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• Collection: NIS
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SECRET
73 /GS /AF
Honduras
August 1973
NIATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Honduras
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the armed forces cover-
age in the General Survey dated August 1969.
A. Defense establishment 1
1. Military history 1
2. Command structure
B. Joint activities 3
1. Military nunpovver 3
2. Strength trends 4
3. Training 4
4. Military budget 5
5. Logistics 5
C Army 6
1. Organization 6
2. Strength, composition, and disposiCon 6
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Jr
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Honduras
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the armed forces cover-
age in the General Survey dated August 1969.
A. Defense establishment 1
1. Military history 1
2. Command structure
B. Joint activities 3
1. Military nunpovver 3
2. Strength trends 4
3. Training 4
4. Military budget 5
5. Logistics 5
C Army 6
1. Organization 6
2. Strength, composition, and disposiCon 6
SECRET
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li
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Pal-c
Pa (L'
3. Training 1
7
I. Organization
4. Logistics
7
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
9
ll. Coast guard
Training
9
9
E. Air force
S
4. Logistics
J
FIGURES
Pale
Pate
rig. 1 Armcd forces organization (chart)
3
rig. Strength trends (table)
4
rig. 2 Jlilitary barracks (photo)
4
rig. 4 Military budgets (table)
5
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r
firmed Forces
A. Defense establishment
The I londuran \rnwd 1--Drees are c�cr!npersed of bcih
military and police tutees. The military frees consist
of the IImidur n�
an :kri with Il).00t) men. gen(-rally
Ii"1111% ;caned, the I hmdwan i \ir Force, \cith -190 nu n
and -10 aircrah. and the Iloncluran (:oast Guard,
a hick is essentiall it paper organization kith no
appropriation in 192 and no personnel: its one boat is
nut of the dater. The police element, the Special
Sec-urity Cm-ps ((:FS), \\ith;3,000 oleo, isa purer ci\�il
police fort�(-. The basic mission of the militar\ forces is
to defend the national territory and to assist in the
maintenance of internal sec�urity.I
The 11miduran \ri n is c�apal,lr.� of fulfilling its
ntissi,nt if it is not faced \cith disorderor:ut
all -out attack. by one or more of the neighboring
countries. Onl% the three U.S. \IiIitark \ssistiIII
Program 01:11') supported inl :uttry battalions (Figure
I have sufficient training, modern scrapnns. Vclticl(-s,
and Cor11rr1llll1c�atio115 to be fall\ effectisr fur(-es. '111c
infantr\ brigade is trained but too lightly
(-quipped fur hcavy cu. t. Four battalions and zone
troops have "first line defense" roles, which includ(-
intcllig(-nL� collection, rcc�onnaissance. nncl limited
cnrttbat. (S)
The air force can support ground operations Frith
close air support. airlift, and aerial surrcilknc�e.
Sustained operations Ire not possible, however.
because of the inadequate nutintenartce and supple
sYstcrn and limiter! fuel and antrnunition reserves.
I' Ivre is no earl% \earniIli groIInd;controlled
i! :'vrception radar and no Ii; defense s\ "stem in the
countrY. (S)
The coast guard never could pr(wide mo rc� than
token assistance. It eras too siluol! in size (never more
than 50 personnel and tiro patrol boats) to patrol
coastal areas acicclrratel and it lacked sufficient
IrmaiiwnI to provide effective support to c�ontbal
operations. (S)
Thc� c�hiuf stwngths of the awned forces iIIc�III I
hardy personnel ai.d gencrally good morale. Maliv
'For c tirrent li>;urr,. we thy� .Wilihiry lrtlr�Ili;;r�nr�r� Surnnuuq.
Iniblkhc�d SvIlIkcnnnall\ L\ the 1)rG.11r Intrlligrnc�r
nu�n line! Iheir li%ing conditions improsrd upon
entering the militan �I 1'.wtor that no:n Iccounl for
t tIIrIIv r in personnel. \l I r ssI. s
inclrlc!(' olcl ;Ind I tt-r( genenus IIfIs and
cot Ilipntent. illadeyualc lransI rtaliI Ii and cnnt-
ntrtnications, hm stoc�k levcls, a "iwav depcnd(-nce on
I'weign sources fur military ntatcricl. and I poor
iIItelIigen(-e s\ stent. In addition. there is a IIitrl: rate of
iIIitcrac�y iu the ranks :.nd Iii Iulc\o�n and d(-fic�i(-nl
training program. (S)
ur 1 lnndwas, the "soc�ccr \;or ith El Salvadw in
1969 was a disllusioning experience. p ;Irticularl\ \\ith
respect to for assistance. \\�hell ho�ailities broke
nut. Ilondnrons, considering their cuuntr\ invaded.
cxlrcctcd assistance from t1w other mend ,crs orl the
Organization of Central \tnerican States (()U1� CA
\\hich has the objectivc of I,aciI' ic� scttl nu�nt of
disputes and particularl\ from the other ntcntbers crf
the Organization of \nu�rican Slates (O; \S), almost all
signatories of the Inter \nu�ric�an Treaty of Hccinroc�al
\ssislance Iiio Pacl under which they are pledged to
assist am signator\ victim of attack.: \Ithcrrrglt l'.S.
ntilitar% adviscrs had Inng been crlwhasizing internal
scc�urit\ as the more valid mission of the arnu�d forces.
the Ilonclnr:tus found th(-ntselsrs faced with armed
invasion from a mendwr of both organizations.
small am unt of help I'ronl their allies its
forthcmidng. and the O:1S slid persrladc the
SaIviIClorans to \rithclra\r \ritIIiII their o\rn frr,ntiers.
bolt Ilonduras was convinced that it had received too
little too late and that there was little safct\ in
alliances. Since that tints. the military has nearly
c!o!tblcd the size of the army and has been purchasing
amts and equipment largclr front \\'esters Europe.
Previously the Unilo�d States had supplied Honduras
almost exclusivck. princ�ipalk through grant aid, hilt
all U.S. %rtpport \vas susp -lide(l after the conflict.
(l',,0U)
1. Military history (U /OU)
'I'hc nrilitarY has necrr fought a major war but have
plaxrd an important role in Ilonduran hislorr by
providing at lead token resistance� to the sporadic
interventionist proclivities of sc�i;,hborisg states and
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because they fulfill certain formal govern rneutaI
responsibilities in their unstable country. Thrc,ugherrrt
Ilonduras' history of foreign interventions, civil wars.
revolutions, and palace intrigtc�s, soldiers hav(�
yielded great influence. I)espite much rhetoric about
democracy, the heritage of the c�uudiNo contintiec tr
be strong in Honduras.
13% law the primary lovaity of the military is to. its
guardiiiriship of the Constitution. That guardianship
is i,ssigned to the armed forces by several articles in Ill
Constitution, one of which states that the arme forces
are not to respect orders that violate the Constitution
even when they conic from their superiors. Military
leaders have not hesitated to exercise this prerogative
and have intervened when, in their view, the
President's actions contravened the Constitution or
threatened to undermine the capabilities of the armed
forces to fulfill their responsibilities.
In the 20th century, I londuras has tended to follow
the leadership of the Unite(I States. In both World
Wars I and 11, 1fonduras sided with the Allies but tarok
no active role because of its limited forces and
resources. More recently, it ?racked the United States
in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and sent it 2 33-man
contingent to the OAS's InVr�Amcricap Pc�ac�e� Force
during the crisis in the Dominican Bepthlic in 19(i5.
'rhe United States has exerted considerable
influence on the Honduran Armed Forces. Honduran
military aviation began under U.S. advisers in 193.3
Shortly after the signing of the Pact of Mutual
Assis ante with the United States in 195 -1, it general
labor strike, combined with problems generated from
local invol�errtent with exile forces seeking to
overthrow the Comrnur infiltrated Arbenz govern-
ment in Guatemala, drove Honduras to ask for
assistance. The United States promptly sent it
sl;ipntent of small arms, jeeps and larger trucks.
With Fidel Castro's seizure of power in Cuba in
1959. Cuban sponsored insurgency became an
increasing threat in Central America, and the United
States helped train and equip counterinsurgency forces
in Ilonduras. The army and the air force completed it
combined operation with Guatemalan forces in the
Montana Cerro Azu1 area along the common border
ill 1966.
A continuing prohlern exists with El Salvador
because of the quarter of it million Salvadorans and
persons of Salvadoran extraction living in Ilonduras;
some of the former are there illegally. A border
incident occurred in 1967 between the two countries,
and open hostilities, often referred to as the "soccer
'For diacritics on place manes we the list of minis nn the apron
of the Surnmary Nlap in the Country Profile chaph�r and the map
:tself.
9
%ar.' frroke out in arid- 1969. AIthont;h of short
duration �about ii days of actual c�onbat �the
hostilit;( s revealed the superiority of Salvadoran
v(plit:na�nt and the� weakucss of the logistic s\-stenrs of
both c�ormtries and convinced I londimis it was folly to
rely on treaties for protection. In due time, tile OAS
brought about a cc.;.sc f �_''e and it withdrawal of
Salvadoran .forces from Honduran territory. But the
basic problems �a poorly delineated border wi'eh
Salvadorans in large timid ors living in I londuras, and
a certain amount of cattle rustling back and forth
across the border�r nt :n unsolved, and no pe..ot
agreement has vet f>. n signed.
2. Command structure (C)
The President is the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces (Figure 1). Ile receives advice on all
matters relating to the arined forces from the Supreme
Council of National Defense composed of the Chief
of the Armed Forces. Minister of National Defense
and Public Security, Chief of' the Armed Forces
General Staff� commanders of the infantry brigade.
separate infantry battalions� and military zones.
C [it Lint of the Military Academy, and the
commanders of the coast guard, air force. and Special
Security Corps.
Under the President is the Chief of the Armed
Forces. who exercises operational control over the
various arnrny elements, the coast guard. the air force.
the Special Security Corps, and the military academy.
If(- is assisted by the Armed Forces Gener�.il Staff,
which in theory exercises administrative control over
the arrty, coast guard, air force, and civil police. In
point of fact, unit commanders usually bypass tit(-
staff by direct resort to the Chief of thc:lrmed Forces.
When the ";lief of the Armed Forces is absent, the
Chief of the Armed Forces G iwral Staff assumes Iris
duties. Under the Constitution, the (:lief of the
Arnred Forces is appointed and reproved onl by the
National Congress �an arrangement which makes
hint untstally independent of the I're: ider.t. The
Armed Forces General Staff consists entire'y of army
personnel and serves also as the army staff. It formal)
exercises staff supervision also over the coast guard and
air force, although tit(-\ have general staffs of their
own. "Thus, in effect, the other services are almost
branches of the army.
'Pile Minister of National Defense and Public
Security is cimi with procurement and supply, the
military budget, and the administration of the
military academy.
`For details. sec Foreign rider National Policies in Crnennnent
and Politics.
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PRESIDENT
Commander in Chief Supreme Council
of National Defense
i
Chief of the Minister of National
Armed Forces Armed Forces Defense and Public
General Staff Security
Chief r--
G -1 Personnel
G -2 Intelligence Military Officers
G -3 Operations Academy Advarced
G-4 Logistics School
0
1
Infantry Infantry Artillery
Brigade Battalions Battalion
I*
2 3*
4
II
12
13
FIGURE 1. Armed forces organization (C)
Engineer Central Logistic Coast Air Special
Battalion` Zone Support Guard Force` Security
Center Corps (CES)
Zone I
Zone II
Zone III
Zone IV
one
Zone VI Administration
Zone VII Receives U. S. Map Support
The Special Security Carps (Cuerpo Especial de
Seguridud �CES) is the centrally controlled national
police force. In 1968, reorganization gays the `-linister
of National Defense and Public Security operational
control over the corps except during Hines of national
emergency, when the Chief of the Armed Forces
would assume control. The emergency occasioned Isv
the "soc war" in 1969 was followed ov the corps
becoming an arrn of the Honduran Armed Forces
under the Chief of the Arnux. Forces, its provided by
Articles 46 and -19 of the Organic Law of the Armed
Forces, promulgated on 42 J tine 19
The Special Security Corps disposition is according
to political departments, not according to military
zones, although its personnel frequently work with
array zone troops. Its strength is about 1,000 men.
About one -third of the force is in the vicinity of the
capital, and the balance serves in detachments in
towns and villages. Weapons and eoluiprnent are not
standardized. IMen in traffic control in "Tegucigalpa
have .38- caliber Sti ith and Wesson revolvers, but
other personnel use a heterogeneous mixture of small
arms. Vehicles are few, old, and worn out. Fragmented
into many small unit, possessing little equipment and
transportation, and having had almost no training in
operating as units, the force would not be much of an
asset to the armed forces in a combat situation. In the
event of hostilities, it would serve its a local defense
and law enforcement agency and as an intelligence
network.
B. Joint activities (C)
1. i4lilitary manpower
As of I July 1973, Ilondunis had about 699,000
nudes aged 15 through 49, of whom about 59S( were
fit for inilitary service. The distribution by 5 -year age
groups is shown in the following tabulation:
NIAXIMU \I
TOTAL. NUMBER FIT 1011
AGE \TALES MILITARY SERVICE
15 -19 146,000 95,000
20 -24 130,000 50,000
25 -29 112,000 65,000
30 -34 99,000 60,000
35 -39 86,000 50,000
40 -44 69,000 35,000
45 -49 57,000 25,000
Total, 15 -49 699,000 410,000
The average number reaching military age (18)
ucc::adly during 197:3 -1977 is estimated to be about
30,W0. The illiteracy rate of recruits is 6W(' to 655c.
With a low personnel turnover rate for the armed
forces, there is some semblance crf a professional
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noncommissioned officer (ores. In general, (discipline
and nulrade are good, but the officers tend neither to
exercise i Ili tiativv nor to delegate it tit httrity. 111
enlisted nncII �vs I)cciitIIy those in the \IAI) bat
talions� usually receive better food and havc better
housing (Figure 2) than the\' did as civilians. 'I'll(
services afford sonu� education and some opportunities
to learnt skills that are valuable when the town return to
civiliall 1 ;v-
By law, all male citizens between 15 and 23 years of
age Lire liable for connpulsory military service. Ill
practice, few are conscripted, sinew recrnitinent needs
are almost enlirciv nu�t through voluntur\ enlisltnwnts.
'Hie torts of service vary somewhat front command trl
command, but thvy are nonnadly IS months except for
those joining siipportvd units, where l�nlistilie Its
are for 2 years. Overall, the reenlistnnwnt rate is high.
and annual personnel turnover is only about I0"i
There is no reserve scstenn as such. L(wallc all nlad(s
aged IS through 5 -1, except those serving it1 the arnned
forces or in the government, are nnennbers the
reserve. Units keep records of all discharged personnel
in order to reach therm in the event of a national
c.:.ergency. No mobilization plans exist: and. on the
basis of national resources alone. the tinned forces
could not he nnobilized nnuch beyond their current
strength. Oil the basis of existing training facilities,
cadres, and administrative nnawhinery, the Irnnc could
mobilize perhaps ')Yr or -10"i more mmil b\ M 1 1 -90
days, if it received logistic and ec�(monnic support and
additional arnns and equiptnent.
In past emergencies the gocernnt�nt -controlled
airline (S; \I IS: has been nulbilizccl as an airlift unit.
2. Strength trends
'I'll( strength of the military forces tends to mirror
events. with the coup of 196> reflected b I sizable
increase in 1965, the border troubles of 196 be
FIGURE 2. The barracks in Marcala, in Military Zone IV,
is a better habitation than most troops had when they
were civilians 1 /OU)
FIGURE 3. Strength trends (C)
Not p1�rtin(�nt.
*Estnlllishrtl in 196S.
another in 1968. and tit( "soccer \cat of 1969 h\ cwt
another in 197 1 and 191?. 'I'll(- arnned forces
themselves do not keep ineticiihms strength figures.
The apprtlxinnale strengths of the cariocs forc(�s in
selected \ears are gicwn in F igun :3.
:3. Training
There are no single -ser ic�e rnilitar sc llmds in
I lon(ItIrls except for the :(ir force s MiIitar A\ iation
School an(I \lechanic�s SCIICul.
The nnlst significant c�onnbined schooling effort is
the General Francisco Mortzan Military \c�a(1(nnc,
hiell it 1(11;11(4) al 'I'(gueii'alpa ;Ind a r(. as a
national nnilitar ac�adennc. The school `.s operated b\
the annc but trains officer candidates for both that
service and the air force. Presunmblc. the ac�adetnc
kill train cadets for the coast guard hell the\ are
nwedcd, The progr(nt consists of a :3 -ce.1r course at the
ac�a(Ienny providing sec�ondarc schooling and basic
nnilitar education, followed b\ it fourth cwur in the
(:anal Zone. \cadvi nic� standards at the acadcnn are
high. FVCII though ca(let itppliC;IIlk are c�arehilIy
screened, the attrition rate is high. and ondc about one
quarter of those starting finish. Graduates of the
progrann are cot11I1115Siotlw(d sCC(lil d lieutenant.: lhcc
then receive training pertinent to their o\cn writes.
usually either in Ilon(Inras or in the Canal %one.
In Januar 1968, the Iloi,dur:un \rined Forces
initiated courses at the nnilitar tC kdenlV for further
training of junior officers, larger to avoid the high
cost of training abroad. From the original S -week
infantry-type course in 1968, this program grew to two
-1 -111onth courses in 1969, and, on I October 1972, the
(`ffic�ers ;Vivallced School (Escuela d(� :1llicuciones
Alililures). also in 'I'eguc�igalpa and (Imder the anny.
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S EA It
AU %I 1
I... lot'
1; t'.11t 1i
l \I.
I i155
3 ,11011
100
3. IU11
I!ulo...........
3,501
100
3,911n
I!11i............
:3, 6511
350
,Ililll
1965...........
1,7011
620
5,320
1966.....
1,71111
170
::.1711
I!Ili7...........
I,5nn
.110
1,9Ili
I!IIiS...........
i),301t
.1110
till
5,N711
191 ;9..........,
5.5110
lilt)
till
6, 07(1
1!170...........
5,')1111
lilt
S6
6,070
1917 1
7,0110
lilt)
SO
7 ,570
1
111,000
1911
0
111, 190
1P73
10,100
1911
0
10,.1!
Not p1�rtin(�nt.
*Estnlllishrtl in 196S.
another in 1968. and tit( "soccer \cat of 1969 h\ cwt
another in 197 1 and 191?. 'I'll(- arnned forces
themselves do not keep ineticiihms strength figures.
The apprtlxinnale strengths of the cariocs forc(�s in
selected \ears are gicwn in F igun :3.
:3. Training
There are no single -ser ic�e rnilitar sc llmds in
I lon(ItIrls except for the :(ir force s MiIitar A\ iation
School an(I \lechanic�s SCIICul.
The nnlst significant c�onnbined schooling effort is
the General Francisco Mortzan Military \c�a(1(nnc,
hiell it 1(11;11(4) al 'I'(gueii'alpa ;Ind a r(. as a
national nnilitar ac�adennc. The school `.s operated b\
the annc but trains officer candidates for both that
service and the air force. Presunmblc. the ac�adetnc
kill train cadets for the coast guard hell the\ are
nwedcd, The progr(nt consists of a :3 -ce.1r course at the
ac�a(Ienny providing sec�ondarc schooling and basic
nnilitar education, followed b\ it fourth cwur in the
(:anal Zone. \cadvi nic� standards at the acadcnn are
high. FVCII though ca(let itppliC;IIlk are c�arehilIy
screened, the attrition rate is high. and ondc about one
quarter of those starting finish. Graduates of the
progrann are cot11I1115Siotlw(d sCC(lil d lieutenant.: lhcc
then receive training pertinent to their o\cn writes.
usually either in Ilon(Inras or in the Canal %one.
In Januar 1968, the Iloi,dur:un \rined Forces
initiated courses at the nnilitar tC kdenlV for further
training of junior officers, larger to avoid the high
cost of training abroad. From the original S -week
infantry-type course in 1968, this program grew to two
-1 -111onth courses in 1969, and, on I October 1972, the
(`ffic�ers ;Vivallced School (Escuela d(� :1llicuciones
Alililures). also in 'I'eguc�igalpa and (Imder the anny.
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begun offering platoon lhrouglt cuntpan% Ic\el
tactical 5- moW..lt courses fur licutcnanls unit captains.
U.S. military schooling, given both in the Canal
Zone and in the United Stales, is an important adjunct
of tilt- Ilondim m military school s\stc.m. ;\Iso, V.S.
military training tc;ums provide v.Humble training in
londuras for the army and the :fir force. 'I'll(- :frogv has
used cadres instructed by these tcumfs to train other
units. A small number of personnel attend schools in
other Latin \ntcric�an countries and in Iluk and
Spain.
Illiteracy is a continuing problem in the training of
enlisted persom icl, mid c�onsidvrable tints is devoted to
instruction in rcadin mid wriI ill ti.. The IIvvd for
technical training is mininr,il in the arnn and coast
guard bcc�ausc of the absence of advaliced c(l Ili pnu�nt:
the uir force has built alt a nmintenance force of about
1 -10 skillyd civilians.
Joint tminimg is seldom prit'c�liced. The arms a ;fir
force have held a (c\ joint vwrciscs over the years,
most of them c�entcred on c�ounterinsurgenc
operations. The combined operations with Guate-
m forces in 1966 and the c�lashcs N\ith F Sulvildor
in 1967 and 1969 in\ul\ed joint a rim -if ir force
operations. There are a total of about 00 jImlp
trained personnel in the armed forces, most of Ihemf
dispersed in various army units: the only p.matroop
unit is an air force platoon of '_'S mtcn.
4. Military budget
'I'll( annual budgets for the arnu�d forces and the
Special Security (:ores arc Im-pared under the
supervision of the Minister of National 1)e4ense and
Public Secclrih. These budgets are consolidated into
FIGURE 4. Defense budgets (C)
(U.S. Dollars)*
the (lefense budget anti ;fie incorpor ited ill the central
goyi�roment budget, \\hic�h is strlmlittc(1 to lfle
National (:ongress fur approval. The :ongress has the
constitutional aulhoril\ to amend all budgets. but in
pr,tc�lice the defense bodgel is approved :is submitted.
The announced nlililar\ budgets give ()ill)
frngmvntar\ information as to the allocation of funds
ern a scrvic�c basis and no information on a functional
basis. TIIc funds IIIocatvd to "r,lher nfiIitan"
incre,owd by :34 in I9; 1 and 150'1 in 1972, Ihcsc
increases probabl \%(-r(- used for the pmrelmses of
\cap ills. If, m1dition, hinds for the procurenivill of'
\capons and major itcufs of equipment hove been
pro\ided by scp ..irate appropriations administercd
outside the government budget. I'or cxuntple, at the
time of the border \%ar with El Salvador in July I969. a
spcc�ial (lefense bond issue of US87.5 million \as
floated. and the rcceil)ts were used to pmrc�has
mililar\ etluil menl. \mfual cicfcnsc budgets for
recent \curs awl their relationship to the central
go\ernnu�nl budget and CNP arc shown in Figrlrc -I.
5. Logistics
Ilondoras has little c�apabilit\ to 1)ro \i(le industrial
support for its armed forc�cs. 'There is a small but
gros\i ig industrial sector. hick processos agricultural
products and provides sums� basic consumer goods.
'I'll c cnunlr\ is .generally se sufficient in foo(l.
l'IIiforns and shoes arc fnrnishcd by the National
Tailor Shop.
The Minister of National Defense ioid Public
Sectlril\ is charged \iIIf the responsibilit\ for
procurement and suppl\. In prac�l;c�c. If(Mcycr.
logistics functions ;Ire c�arricl ()ill predominantly at
Total I 7 .21' '..121)
Defense budget as perct,nt of cen-
tral government budget........ ?.0
Defense hudget as percent of G 1'. 1.:3
!r. s l 7 .:-20 1 1 113.510 15. :3 Ili, 7 80
NOTE The proposed 11173 ventral governna�nt budget provides flit same total for the defense
hudget as the 11172 budget.
1111 Data not available,
*Concerted :it the exclimige rate of 2 lempiras t,qual VSSI.110.
*Inc�ludes Offices of Chief of the Armed Forces and Svervukr' for National! Dofense and 1'11hhe
NecuritY, pt,nsions, and other trnnsf(r Impnents.
5
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1969
19711
197
1972
Aril.'
3.085.9 10
1,322,730
1,71i3,735
i 0 lf,I100
Airforce
I, 100,000
1,350,(100
1,751.001)
_.025.(100
Coast Guard
0
10.615
70, 1i 15
till
Spt,cial Securitc Corps...........
I,90s 6SO
2, 10.S. S0
2,500. 000
2, 5011.000
(ltht�r
1.017,285
1.735. W5
2.320, 1:30
5,821.75(1
Total I 7 .21' '..121)
Defense budget as perct,nt of cen-
tral government budget........ ?.0
Defense hudget as percent of G 1'. 1.:3
!r. s l 7 .:-20 1 1 113.510 15. :3 Ili, 7 80
NOTE The proposed 11173 ventral governna�nt budget provides flit same total for the defense
hudget as the 11172 budget.
1111 Data not available,
*Concerted :it the exclimige rate of 2 lempiras t,qual VSSI.110.
*Inc�ludes Offices of Chief of the Armed Forces and Svervukr' for National! Dofense and 1'11hhe
NecuritY, pt,nsions, and other trnnsf(r Impnents.
5
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major -unit level. "There arc pctc�tic�ally no c�eti'tctl
warehouses. Storage it it(] (list r;')ution are re
sponsibilities of unit commanders. 'I'll(- shortage of
adequate storage facilities precludes the maintaining
of materiel reserves. \latericl, other than that
obtained through MAP, and supplies, such as food
and 1 generally are purchased locally by unit
commanders out of regularly budgett-d funds. The
Ministor of National I3efenSe and Public Security is
responsible for the supervision of such expenditures,
but iccolintzibility is lax, and coninimiders, who tend
to profit front the system, are averse to change. Units
generally arc res Ito nsihlc for maintaining their
materiel. Air force nrtinlenance is consistently better
than that of tit( army.
The Logistic Support Center was established in
1967 in Tegucigalpa. It receives and issues all AP
materiel, maintains stock levels, and performs most
levels of maintenance on weapons, vehicles, and
engineer and communications equipment In the
future, it is planned that this facility will develop
information on usage factors, act as it central control
point for ulf spare parts and supplies, and serve as the
central purchasing agency for the armed forces.
All military materiel is imported, primarily front the
United States, but since 1969 weapons have en
obtained front Western Eiiropc and aircraft front
several Latin American countries. Until the� outbreak
of hostilities that year, the United States had been
virtually the sole sourct� for military nratcricl. which
w.ts furnished primarily through the Military
Assistance Program. \Military aid to Honduras was
suspended as it result of this armed clash but resumed
in 1970 for training assistance only. Since the ntid-
1950's, tIte value� of United Stales equipment
deliveries to Ilonduras amounted to about UMM
million, of which US$8.2 million was grant aid.
Immediately after the avid -1969 hostilities, small
arms. .ammunition, ancf aircraft ordnance were
purchased front Belgium. In addition, France,
Portugal, and Spain provided infantry weapons,
howitzers, antmrrnition, and explosive devices. Small
arms arc believed to have been obtained front
Guatemala during or shortly after the war, and one
bomber was purchased from Costa Men, it transport
aircraft from Nicaragua, and six F -86K jet fighters
(missing vital parts) probably from Venezuela. In
1972, it C -54 was purchased from Guatamala.
C. Army
The Ilondur n Ariny is the senior and most
powerful arm of the artn d forces. Its mission is
internal security and territorial defense. 'I'll( array can
6
maintain internal securih under normal conditions
but would be unable to cope with well organized or
%\idespread disorders. The army is neither trained nor
e(leripped for sustained combat operations. (C)
The major \\eaknesses of the arny include it
shortage of innefern antes awl eeluipruenl, an
inadequate trainii g program, and it shortage of
transportation itn e communications e(tuipnent.
Because of the widespread poverty and ignorance
among the general populace, the overall quality of
arm: manpower is logy. Morale is generally good. By
Latin A.ntcric�an standards. individctal and unit
training range front good to poor. (C)
By actively working in civic action programs ill such
fields as building roads. constructing schools, and.
improving sanitation, th(� army has gained it favorable
public irna);e. (C)
1. Organization (C)
The Ilonduran Ariny is organized into an infantry
brigade. nine separate battalions (seven infantry. one
artillery, and one engineer), eight military zones, and
it Logistic Support Center Figure 1 For operational
conunanel, these snits are responsible directly to the
(thief of the Armed Corces, with staff supervision. in
theory at least, under the Arnned Forces General Staff:
in fact. the staff is regularly bypassed in favor of direct
resort to the Chief of the Anned Forces.
I'll(- eight military zones represent geographic areas
Of the country, all but two including ncre than one
political department. 'I'll( zones formerly had sizable
troop elements. f,ut these have now hee�n absorbed
into the separate battalions.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition (C)
Personnel strength. which more than doubt d its .t
result of the Salvadoran invasion in 1969. is estimated
ul 10,000, including about 600 officers, 2.000
noncommissioned officers, and 1.�400 privates.' 'I he
infantry bri- acic, the separate infantry battalions. and
the separate.artillery battalion� totaling 9.860 men
are organized, trained, and equipped for combat. The
remaining troops are assigned to the engineer
bat,I.tlion, the signal platoon or the Logistic Support
Center.
The infantry brigade, with a strength of 3,600, is
organized into four infantry battalions and one
artillery battalion and has its headquarters at Las
Tapias, just south of Tegucigalpa, in the Centrtl %ouc.
Originally established as the Presidential Ilonor
For enrn ur fit ores, we the ,\filitary Intelli; rnce Sunnnnrtt.
pul)Ikheel semi till ua 11\ by the� Dehvne Intolligenee ALencc.
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0
Guard, it has become one o llondurts* crack units.
The separ -ite infantry battalions, with stretgtIis
ranging front 180 to 830, are disposal as follows:
BATTALION
STRENGTH
ZONE
I
1st
830
Central
Las Casitas
2d
830
Central
Tamara
3d
830
Zone 1I
San Pcdro Suha
4th
180
Zone VII
La Ceiba
11th
830
Zone I
Choluteca
12th
830
Zone III,
Santa Rosa de Copan
13th
830
Zone IV
Mareala
The Ist Battalion, the 2d Battalion, the 3d
Battalion, and the Engineer Battalion are
supported units. The 600 -nian separate artillery
battalion is headquartc recd at Lepaterique, also in the
Central Zone. The 100 -man engineer battalion is the
only combat support unit. Its headquarters are located
in Siguatepeque, in the Central Zone, but, because of
the nature of its assigned task, its personnel are often
Nyidely dispersed,.
In "Zones V and VI, where none of the battalions are
stationed, there are contipuny -size units at Juticalpa
and Puerto Lcmpira, respectively, temporarily
detached from separate infantry battalions, usually
from units in the Central Zone.
The 50 -mart Logistic Support Centcr, in the
Central 'Lone, provides the only centralized logistic
support (including supple, transportation, and vehicle
maintenance) to the rnilitary units.
The infantry brigades artillery battalion is
equipped with five 120 nun and five 81 mot Spanish
mortars. The separate artillery battalion has four old
U.S. 75 -ntm howitzers, five 105 -mit t Spanish
howitzers, and five 120 -nun (probably rifled French)
mortars. The 2d and 13th Infantry Battalions have 60-
and 81 -rnm mortars organic to them. Otherwise, all
equipment is both scanty and heterogeneous.
:3. T.-aining (C)
"There are no separate service schools for army
personnel. Officers attend the military academy,
discussed in the training subsection under Joint
Activities.
Recruit training is conducted by the individual
units and is not uniform. A general shortage of
training facilit'. and qualified instructors further
handicaps training. Considerable time is devoted to
instruction in reading and writing, at a sacrifice in the
amount of time spent on training on military ad
technical subjects. 'There are plans for a central recru
battalion, as soon as funds become available, which
slimild result in considerable improvement.
U.S. Mobile 'Training Teams (MT from the
Canal 'Lone have conducted various courses in
conitimnicalions, mainleomice. military police
methods, intelligence, and counterinsurgency. An
effort bus been made to have personnel front all major
commands attend these courses.
In addition to in- country training, officers
frequently attend courses in the Unitcd States oral the
School of t1w Americas, lord Gulick. in the (:anal
Zone. Little training assistance is received from
countries other than the United States. although some
members of the array have attended military, nnedical,
engineering, and cota Ill uticattons courses in
Gt'atentala, Nlexico. most major South American
countries, and Italy and Spain.
4. Logistics'
Although the Nlinistry of National Defense and
Public� Security has responsibilit for procurement and
supply, logistical activities for the army generally are
conducted at the unit level. The ministry usuallF, is
involved only in obtaining U.S. materiel for the XIAP-
supported units. uniforms, shoes. and related items are
furnished by the National 'Tailor Shop. Fach unit
provides for its own support, including most
procurement, storage. maintenance (other than
vehicular), routine transportation, and other required
services. Most supplies, including foodstuffs and POI,
products, are procured locally through regularly
budgeted funds. 'I'll( Logistic Support Center provides
most vehicle maintenance and major transportation
for all units. but its primary responsibility is geared
toward the NIAP units. "There are small reserves of
supplies and ammunition. (C)
Prior to the July 1969 conflict with F Salvador,
Ionduran military units. \yith the exception of
the MA l' supported'' nails, had inacdcquale and
hewrogenous :yeapons and ammunition stocks �the
estimate was given that the Honduran Army had a
hour supply of ammunition. 'Tlw armed struggle with
EI Salvador graphically emphasized this weakness to
the Hondurans and has resulted in the purchase of
awns and ananrtunitiort to standardize \%capons.
replenish exhausted ammunition stocks, and enhance
the combat capabilities of the army. Purchases have
included small arms and ammunition from Belgium.
Spain, and Portugal, eight 105 -min howitzers from
Spain, and about 80 mortars (60 81 and 120 -nun)
from Prance, Spain, and Portugal. In addition,
Honduras is attempting to produce an 81 mm Brandt
mortar and claims to have three in service with the
army. (S)
'For third country acquisitions, see Forei; n Military Assistance.
published semi annually bs the Defense Intclligcnce Agency.
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Then are I I a11unuuitiun I)I� III rictiln fuc�iIitic�S in
the cuuntr\. I�:iIcII I,ultaIiun and milit ;uy zone stuns
its mcu ammunition. 'Tile three \I; \I siiImOrlcdl
battalions store their :untnttniliun in small bunkers,
and the rentuining units utilize their :irnts rooms for
.tnununiliun storage. In all cases, the safety me Tres
;unl I)II sisal wcIIril\ are two r. ((:1
The arm\ dues 1101 ha\r the to sup)Ixn't
itse in sristained military Ip)eratiuns; ill an
etnergenc\, it WMIld have to rcl\ Illwn c�is�iliMl
vehicles 10 slil)p)lenu�nl its o%\11 tl;utslwrt cap ilbilit\.
('.S. militar\ assislan(�e Flans include a bnildril) of
military vehicles to inip)rovc arm\ mobilit\. and
delisrries in 19T I included fourteen -tun trucks,
eight 5 -tun dump trucks, and t IO -ton irac�lor
trucks, at least dmibling the iit\e11tO,ies in lhuse
categories.
Vehicles range in at from nee\ to 10 \ears (dd.
Their c011diti0n panes bu) generally is good. The
milit.tr\ zones havc I)ractic.11I\ nu transport. I�:ac�11 unit
cocnntander immiallc has it p)rkiity srltidC, hm%eer,
wh'.ch he uses for 41icial drity. \t least one other
Officer in each zone has it jcel). usilally If jap allele
mamil'ac�ture, or a Japr,uu�se I)ickul) truck. that is used
hoth officially and p rivilwk. UIId ubtedI the Officers
nccixc glrrnnunl aid in purchasing these \eltic�Ies
Mid cuntindi�.� lI recciVe assisl.lnce in tnaitttai Ili tlg
t:wIll.
In the event that trucks are needed I'm any p urpu,se
in the military zones. the\ are rented or cmimu n-
deered (depending Upon the urgeuc�y of the silualionI
from local civilians. (C)
D. Coast guard (C)"
In 196 -1 the Cnitecl Stales, through MM), supplied
the Honduran \rnicdl Forces kith taw) Mark IV 10-
foot ('.S. Coast (:riard utilit\ heats. 'ITFte\ (ern
assigned to the Isl Boilt Detachment, suhorclinale to
the CII11tuaII Ivr of \IiIitiIre I IIe II. I January 196").
th(� Ist Iioat I)etICIIIIIVIIt as con crted, h\ (Ivcrec.
into the Coast ;uardl If the \rined I'Orc�cs, \xith
organizational status equal to that of the arm\ andd, air
force Its 1wrsonnel strength \as SO Iffic�ers and nten.
In December of 1968, Ine If the utility boats was
stink, and by Januar\ 192 the \rined I urc�es hec�ante
c(mvinced that it wns uneconomical to II)erale it single
boat and hail the :enut ;ring un(� hanledl Iut and
I)lac�cd un a Ilaicar. The beat is (p)crational but it
leaks. Ili 1972 the armcd forces budgeted no funds for
the c�Iast guard, its I vmminel reverted to the arm\ Ir
�Fwcttrrrtil infnnnatir,n..,�t tilt llililurt Inirlliw�nr�rStnrntutni.
I,nitliNim-d rmi nnnuall I, Iht Utftmt Intrlli>tnrt
5
left milit ire scrvicc. and I.Itc� coast gimrd is it
pilpvr furc�c. i t I t t i t \niiiiI )lis gmdti;tle its
c�Onun.riuler.
E. Air force
The 190-iiwn I Iunduran \ir I Ine is it small tac�lical
force. It is ouc ul the most effic�icnt air fu ces in
Central \tncrica, ranking second unl\ to (:u;ttcnutla
ill size and citp abilit Its sup vriorit\ over that c,f FI
Salvadw I demonstrated during the 1969 armed
cunflic�t %pith that
The missions c,l the I Imidur m fir I- I ruv ;t re
natir)naI c{,�feuse and internal scc�urils tItrough
rl'e III II.1iS';ilMY, a irlift, and cllsc stipjwrt tI ground
I'mc�c� cicnu�ilts, as ell as I)rmkion o1 traw,1mi lalion
fur l4mertimvnt officials and particil)cttiurt in c�i\ic
action p)rojcc�ts.
In it ground supp ut rule. the air furcc is cap ablc of
providing briel', cut.ccnlrated sup)Iort to gnuual
forces. I CIII)alli;it, is considered excellent. and
I)ilOt ;wcurac\ in bun and slrafin, i, clfccti\c. as
clentonstr.tted during the 1969 C( )I itll F
Sul ado;. The tac�ti ca d clemviit has it sutislac�tun
c.lpr,tbiIit\ fur furnishing ells(- air sup)p mt fur gmuncl
op eritions. and the transpwrts can fulfill ntpuirenu�nts
fur uirlIft. suI)I)I). ohscr\atiun. le;tllet (Irol)s, and
uirl,Ornc Imidsp Baker scr\icc. latrols of the coastal
area, are conducted whenever ncccss;tr\. 1St
The air force has it mo d( ,t capr,ihilit\ fur search and
rescue II)eralions and air c\,icuation, boil its
rec�onnitiss.mce cap lbilit\ is limited to isual sightings.
In addition. it Iws been thing to an atria)
photo grap)hic c�al,ahilit\. but the progress in this
resprt�c�t is dinkuu\\I. (S)
The IImidtiran \ir Duet�(- is anti ;Intutdtnisl and
I)n)h;Ibl\ %ill remain twill to any gmernmunt exeep)t
Inc it considers to be a threat to the caI)ahiIities If the
service.
I. Organization (C)
Tile ClntnIitII r of tilt \ir Force. I( I is diwc�tI
res1)IIIsihlc to the (:Iiief Of the \rmcd I'Irc�es, is
assisted b\ it vice- cmnniander and an i r Staff
Irg;utized into sections for I)ersOlIIcl. II)er,tlions,
training. nrtiIItenancr, Intl internal so cIIritv.
T ile air force IIv;I I Iuarters are it h)IICOUtlil
IIItermltiUilal \irfield (TegIIc�igallr.Il. \irc�r;Ift are
-I ssigne( to a single con)I)Isitc soIdiadron. \vhidI is
organized into l\cl sect iuns �air transport and
tactical. In addition, the air force has tmO internal
security conip)anivs and it t)araIr/ol) p)latmm.
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L 2. Strength, composition, and disposition
The I londur:ul \ir Force Ims a I)( rsouncl stn�t(gth of
about 190. inchicling ikpprosimatelc 50 officers (30 are
I)il(,ts) and 110 airmen.' In addition there are 110
cis ili :In tecl(nic�ians. 'Pile air force has at 1mrtlroop
platoon (one officer and 25 enlisted Wren) and taco
internal sectlrih c�on panics. ((:i
\s of December 1972. the aircraft imcntorC
included:
6 North American F -86K jet fighters.
34 piston- engine aircraft
1 Douglas B -26 bomber
11 Chance- Nought F -4U Corsairs
10 transports:
2 Douglas C -54's
1 Beec�hcraft C -45
T Douglas C -47's
S trainers:
4 North American T -Gs
4 North American T- O_SA's
4 utility:
2 Cessna ISO's
2 Cessna 185's
All the aircraft are basal at I'oncontin luterualional
\irficld. l'ntil the 1969 c�onflic�t ccilh El Saikador. the
oils armed aircraft sccrc G)rsairs (fivc ccith �_11-
111111 c�anuon :Intl fire N%ith .50- calib(r nuichineguns)
and tit(- 'I' 6's (.10 caliber inachinCguns, roc kets. and
bombs). \fter the 1969 conflict. IImidi r.ts aceluired
the F- 86K one B -26, one -51. and une -IT. The
B -26 and the -1 ha%c bate armed %%ith .50 c�aliber
mac�hineguns. 'I'bc C -11 seas a surplus l'.S. :tircral't
rec�eisrd au t,rant aid� and the other aircraft scerc
purchased front third countries. I'he F- ti(iK's,
probabl% obtained from \enezuCla, art in Carl\
1970 %%ithout various essential parts such as I:uulin.g
gear and inslrtunent panels, and despite almost
unremitting labor, are still inoperable. 'I'll(- B 26
bomber. purchase(1 from (:)sla Bic�a. etas scvercly
damaged in it crash landing on 16 March 19 hilt
floc again on 21 July 19 The -51 is rewrvcd for
administrative Ilights and one 17 is held for
1) residentiatI use. fieporte(IIx Ilon(IIInIs plans to
1)11 rc�base 6 i7 B's from the l'nilcd States for dcIiven
in the spring of 1075. (S)
:3. "Training (C)
.lost officers of ill( air force arc gradnales of the
General Francisco Morazzin Militan Ac�advm\. Onc�c
'P�r current Iigurv. Ni v I w .1l Ili If/ 'r/ IWc Ili "rrr( r S III II ma iy,
I)IIWisht-,l u�nti :nuntaIk I,c phi� I)clt-nst- Intl Ilit;1�mi� Agent\.
'I nr curn�ut fi(;urvs we tho Militant Inhlli rr:rr Summary.
I,nl,lishcd wmi- annnalk h\ tilt- I)PIellm Illtviki cncc Agent.,
conunissimted, the officers recckv cunll}rclu�nske�;md
\\c1l- org:ulized air force lrainiug. '111c air forces
.\lililan A\ialion School, at 'I'onc�outin International
Airfield. offers basic flight and lechnical training :nut
is capable of lnectilit', aumu:11 1)ilol training
requirements. 'Tile school ofpenItes oil a Ile.xibIc
s(�hc(lule anal has courses ranging in length fr�)m 6 to
15 mouths. OperatiGilal training, I,erhmiwd ill
s(Iti- Aroll :utd sl cc�ialized c(: urses, includes night
tactical landings, 1)ar:I(Iro1)s. co I I i I t c r i i I I I rg cues
operatious, and ps\ c�hoiogic�al \%arfore.
Prior to the Iul\ 1969 cmdlict� a kimced training
etas acquired through MAI' in the l'nitcd States, an(I
a kanced tedmic�al training at the Inter- Amcrican Air
Forces \c�adenlx, in the (::otall Zone. The Ilondimm
\ir Forc�C Mechanic" School pro it I scar course
for students..\ 25 ratan air force I,aratrool) l)latoou cc:ts
established in I969� and "mm. 01 its personnel have
received jump training outside of Ilouduras.
A fey% joint exercises hate been held with rite arm\.
mostly in counlCrittsurgCr.c ,pCrations.
4. Logistics (S)
"Pile air force is dependent upon foreign countrics
for all equipment. \%capons. an(I srlpplics. In the� past.
the l' iii tc(I States ha, been the principal source of
aircraft and supplies. Since 19 69 ho\\ecer,
dependence on the l'nited Slates has lessened. a11(1 all
aircraft and anmin11ition purchased ha\e been from
third countries.
The lot% stock Ie\cls of airborac at immition ccerc
slmrpk evident \then the air I'mcc (Iuickk depleted its
stocks of b(ftnbs :md rockets (lurimg the Jill\ 1969
c�nnflict. Bombs. rockets, and napalm rec�ei\ed front
Portugal :IiI(I lit igiunl iu 1969 an(I 197 0 replenisIIc(I
these (IeI>Icte(I stocks. 1'OI, supplies are acle(Iuate for
norm peacetinu� tweets but includc no \%ar ruserves.
"There is a simple internal supply system. labor
atirc�raft harts and equipment are p(lrchased as neede(I,
and the stock Icvcl of frc(pwiitl\ required spare parts is
barelc ade(Inatc. The IImiduran \ir For(�(� is
considered to have the hest 11MilitC11ancC of any
:enlral \nu�rican air force. Mainten::nct�, 1wrfortncd
in the air force shops at lhC 'fmic�onlin airfield, has
achieved a high in- commission rate for the air force.
'I'llC tnainlenau(ce and slippy� s\stcnt could not
support the air force in p)rolongcd operations. 'I'hc
principal logistic \tcaknesses are the complete
dependence on outside sources for materiel and the
low stock lesrls.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070012 -5