NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 95A; GUYANA; ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070011-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the Gai Survey, which is now
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per
ishabili�;�y can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, cnd
Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, That are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For sma!I countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
om:fs some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
and securtfy organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by G. ea name and
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central In'�eiligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
VAR \I \G
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 16, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
N
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

.The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment cr international body 'except by specific authorization
of the Crector of� Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so. marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidentiai
(S) Secret
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Defense Intelligence ,Agency. Research was sub
stantially completed by January 1973.
y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

may
fc a
TI%O
Av
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the armed forces cov-
erage in the General Survey dated Jul/ 1969.
A. Defense establishment 1
Assessment of Defense Force, personnel strengths,
mission, capabilities, and weaknesses. National
politics. Civic action.
1. Military history 3
British traditions and inflrience. Preparations
fcr +ndependence and shit to emphasis on
internal security. Confrontations with Vene-
zuela and Surinam.
2. Command structure 4
Chain of command. National Defense Com-
mittec. Guyana Defense Board. Joint Opera-
tions Center.
SECRET NO FOREIGN DIssLm
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

ii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6
Page
FIGURES
Page
B. Joint activities
6
4. Military budget
9
1. Military manpower
6
Budgeting process. Recent military budgets.
Fig. 1
14fanpower potential. Standards for officer and
1
5. Logistics
9
enlisted applicants. Morale and personnel
Fig. 2
Lack of domestic supply capability. Grant aid
5
turnover. Women's Army Corps. Racial com-
First contingent of the Women's Army
from United Kingdom. Functioning of logis-
Fig. 3
position and problems. Reserve system. Youth
tics system. Weapons and equipment inven-
Corps photo
Soldier explains tyre working of a fire
Corps.
tory.
6
2. Strength trends
8
C. Ground force
11
Statistical data on strength trends since inde-
8
Force organization and disposition.
Annual military budget table)
pendence.
D. Naval element
12
3. Training
8
Equipment in entory and assessment of capability.
Formal training in British Army schools and
by British personnel in Guyana. Standards and
E. Aar element
12
quality. Reserve training. Women's Army
Eq, ipment inventory. Main uses. Maintenance
Corps training.
procedures.
ii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6
FIGURES
Page
Page
Fig. 1
Official publicity release photo)
1
Fig. 5
Physical fitness training photo)
10
Fig. 2
Defense establislinient (chart)
5
Fig. 6
First contingent of the Women's Army
Fig. 3
Headquarters of the Guyana Defense
Fig. 7
Corps photo
Soldier explains tyre working of a fire
10
Force (photo)
6
arm (photo)
10
Fig. 4
Strength trends 'table)
8
Fig. 8
Annual military budget table)
11
ii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

A. Defense establ sbmcnt
(:lnana in it. I)u IIicit. ,N k IIiiltic;III nliII II
its ulilit :o.\ Imll.0 ti. ;l t 1`i IIn I i. illlin till' Iiluil of il
Inucict n:ttillnall hnd"et. ho,rl'r. it has I)I. ls!
(.11 \alla IN IIso Dore(- I I. till. Ini s II of
Rational defl'lltie. ilItCHNII scc�ilrik. :old c�i\ic� a(
Ir,uti(ularl trai Ili !I,, )utll for frontier dvc (.Iol)ulcut.
It is l'( tlliI)IWd I)riIIla"iIN fur internal ccIIrit. If
conl tcd \iIII an l'.xlcru:II Itt :Ic�k. it ct)III I)rrn
elfecti\ dcll'nso akain >t the tiI1rIII :IIIit' but unlx
s
e
t
t
t
10 T
FIGURE 1. Official publicity release titled: Members of the Guyana Defense Force line cop
for inspection (U /OU)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

delaying action against an overland invasion by the
Dutch force in Surinam or by the military forces of
Venezuela or Brazil. The Guyana Defense Force is a
new organization, formed in 1966 from personnel with
almost no significant prior military experience, and it
is still so short of officers and NCO's that any raj)id
eaoansion is difficult. It is an all- volunteer body and
has relatively high entry standards and, strong
competition among applicants. 11:1gid se=curity
screening has ensured a loyal and relialle force. The
British Army provided the initial instruction and
guidance fer the force, leaving a legacy of discipline,
realistic training. dedication to ditty, and avoidance of
political involvement, as evidenced by effective action
in crises. The national political leadership is very alert
to security threats and quick to use fore(- whenever
judged necessary for national security, neutralizing
problems before tile\- grow to unmanageable
propertions. Because of its small size, the force is easily
overextended when dispersed for defense against
external threats, and it is deficient in cross country
mobility, long -range mobile communications,
logistical support, and heavy weapons. Guyana's only
strategic problems have the border disputes..
with Surinam and Venezuela and the need to counter
Venezuelan incitement of the border population to
revolt. The Guyanese feel that the\- had to face these
problems alone Guyana has no military agreements
with other countries. Despite Guyana's membership in
the British Commonwealth of Nations and close
relations between the Guyanese and British military,
the British clearly did not want to become involved in
the border crises. The United Kingdom and the
United States provided very little in answer to pleas by
Guyanese for military equipment to expand its force.
In mid -1970, however. >oth Surinam and Venezuela
essentially agreed to accept it prolonged status quo,
thus eliminating any immediate external threat. (S)
Internally, the Guyana Defense Force, in
cooperation with the police, is capable of maintaining
order in any likely contingency. Intelligence efforts ,are
directed primarily against the possibility of violence
developing in Guyana's East Indian, community, and
the probability of.having advanced knowledge of any
significant plotting is very high. The government is
quick and heavvhanded in taking action against any
developing disorders. The Communist People's
Progressive Party (PPP) composed mainly of East
Indians �has 30 to 50 members who _have received
guerrilla warfare training in Cuba (statements of
several hundred members trained in Cuba and
Guyana for that party's Guyana Liberation Army up
to the end of 1963 are probably extremely unrealistic),
it has held classes in military tactics for its youths, and
other Fast Indian groups have 1.011 isidered preparation
for eventual guerrilla warfare. But th(- govcrameut is
aware of the individuals who have received insurgence
training and would quickly pnt therm under arrest if a
threat were developing. Although Cheddi jagan, the
leader of the PPP, has said that guerrilla warfare is
�'historically inevitable" for Gu\-ata, ltv admits
privately that the Fast Ir�dian community probable
would be beaten' in stich a conflict. 1 fe personally
lacks the background any, temperament to lead that
type of struggle, the mass of the East Indiais oppose
general violence�, and the geography is partially
infayorahle for guerrillas. The jungle would provide
only basic sustenance. the adjac�ant areas exposed to
raids are East Indian, and the African areas are solidly
African and would provide no hideouts for East
Indian guerrillas. (S)
In civic action, the Guyana Defense Force provides
support for the Guyana Yonth Corps. M ic�h gives
the civilian skills needed for tit(- development
of Guyana's interior. The defense force establishes
remote military posts, where the mililar\- support and
security encourage.., new settlements, and clears n(-\\
roads through the jungle. Its major project has hce�n
the clearing of a road over the difficult terrain from
the Brazilian frontier toward Mandia, meeting civilian
volunteers working over easier terrain outward front
\91111dia. (U /OU)
Strong British tradition has kept tilt� Guyana
Defense Farce strictly nonpolitical and under firm
civilian control. The force is not an indcpenden,t
power center and gives no promise of bec�omiw, it
major political force. Prime Minister Bunnhan.
however, has been expanding his influence o\ the
force and eventually may make it a personal political
instrument. Ife is beginning to change it in line with
his concept of a cooperative state. The use of "sir in
the Guyana Defense Force was abolished in r-icl -1971.
I.t. Col. Ulric Pilgrim was appointed Commander of
the Guyana Defense Force in 19 "r2 over several senior
officers, apparently hecanse of his open endorsement o1'
Prime Minister Burnham's political views. Lt. Col.
Pilgrim, in :un article in the force's magazine in late
1971. applied Burnham's political cliches to the fore(-,
calling for it to become a tree "people's army" under
the "socialist concept" of self -help that would make
the army and nation one entity. The force is
predominantly African by design and would be
expected to remain loyal to Burnham even if he shonnld
take drastic shortcuts in constitutional processes,
particularly if they were to prevent East Indians from
gaining control of the government. Should j;agan gain
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

power legally, the force night remain strictly
nonpolitical but would perhaps be more likely to
cooperate in a move: to oust him. And if a power
struggle were to emerge within I3unihani's ruling
party, the loyalties of the Giyana Defense Force could
be decisive. (S)
I. Military history (S)
The Guyana Defciise Force has inherited strong
British tradition in its doctrine and training. British
forces provided for the defense of British Guiana after
1803 and furnished military training for local part
time security and army reserve forces that existed in
the colony after 1878. The present military force is the
direct successor of almost a century of these local
British Army reserves. But these rest ?rues were never
involved in military combat, and the present force
probably has no personnel who have had substantial
combat experience and few who held significant
Positions when the force, as a reserve, was under close
British supervision.
The Guyana Defense Force traces its history to the
British Guiana Militia, formed in 1878. During World
War 11, in October 1942, the militia units were
incorporated into the British Guiana Battalion of the
South Caribbean Force as an element of the active
British Army providing for the security of the colony.
Only the band remained as a part of the local reserve
force. The local, force was reconstituted in 1945,
largely from the wartime personnel, as the British
Guiana Volunteer Corps, and in 1948 was renamed
the British Guiana Volunteer Force. Thereafter,
recruits came almost exclusively from civilian life. This
force was a territorial infantry battalion of 600
personnel and received I hour of training each week
and one 2 -week training period each year. Elements of
the force were called up at various times during the
serious racial disorders beginning in 1962, and the
entire force was on full -time active duty from the
declaration of an emergency on 23 April 1961 until
late 1965, supplementing the police and British troops
primarily with guard duties.
In anticipation of independence, Cheddi Jagan,
while Pro. -icier, seriously considered the formation of a
local military force. Fie had two Israeli officers spend
several months in British Guiana in 1962 developing
plan for a Nahal -type agricultural- military force of
500 men, presumably to be composed largely of East
Indians, who constitute most of the farming
population. fie obtained an appropriation from the
parliament for this army, but the Governor General
refused to sign the hill.
The Guyana Defense Force was forined in January
1966 in preparation for national independence the
following May. Its initial personnel were recruited
from the British Guiana Volunteer Force, from a
separate military -type police force known as the
Special Services Unit, and from the civil service and
the general public.
The Special Services Unit was a separate security
force recruited in Februvey 1964 as it potential nucleus
for the corning defense force. It was a racially
balanced organization directly under the Governor
General for, use in case of disorders during the-
preindependence election period. This force was
arned with rifles and was organized into two
companies. Personnel received police training,
including riot control, followed by basic infantry
training and 13 weeks of advanced training with local
British troops. Officer cadets attended the 6 -111onth
Mons Officer Cadet School and then served fora time
with British forces in Europe. The unit, however,
provided less support than anticipated for the defense
force. Sonic of its key personnel were detailed from the
police, and when given the choice of service, in about
October 1965, only :30 of the 117 members of the
Special Services Unit opted for the defense force.
The new defense force was smaller and less well
cyuipped than the original planners considered
nccc5sary, because the Guyanese Government
provided only two thirds of the pfained funds.
Nevertheless, with the United Kingdom donating its
local military materiel and providing intensive
training, the force got off to an auspicious start. Local
British forces proyidod initial training, and six British
officers and nine warrant officers and enlisted men
were loaned to Guvana to hold all key unninand and
technical positions. They were replaced by Guyanese
on a staggered hasis beginning in June 1968. The last
Britisher, Col. Ronald J. Pope, %%ho had commanded
the force with the title of Chief of Staff of the Guvana
Defense Force, turned over tLe conimancl on I
October 1968 to a Guyanese, then Col. Arthur Leslic
Price, who was given the ne\v title of Commander of
the Guyana Defense Force. Col. Pope continued to
play a major role in force operations for another half
year, however, retaining his title of Chief of Staff but
fornially serving in an advisory and staff position until
his departure on 27 March 1969 (Col. Price later was
given the title of Chief of Staff).
The British effort initially was directed toward
making the Guyana I Force primarily a
conventional military force. The government,
however, apparently pressured the force to concentrate
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

on internal security, and about tnid -1968 the emphasis
changed to devote much greater attention to that
mission.
In 1969, events caused a sudden reorientation
toward the military mission. Cattle ranchers in the
11 tt1) ununi area of southern Guyana, secretly
encouraged by Venezuela, rose in revolt and killed
local police. In response, 10 soldiers were immediately
flown by the government airline on 2 January 1969 to
the local airfield at Lethem, disembarking under
gunfire, and holding the airfield for several hours until
the equivalent of two. companies of troops Nvere flown
in. The leading rebels fled, and the troops, by good
discipline, apparently avoided any armed clashes and
quickly establiflied excellent rapport with the
population, including the Amerindians. The civilian
officials, demoralized by the rebellion, were
evacuated, and the military for a time conducted all
local government activity.
The Venezuelan border situation remained uneasy,
however, because of further attempts from Venezuela
to instigate border revolts and the concentration of
Rupununi refugees in Venezuela in possible training
camps near the Guyana border. Later, tension
developed around Ankoko Island in the northwest,
and there were some firing incidents from local
Venezuelan forces, including Venezuelan mortar fire
on it nearby Guyanese airstrip as late as February
1970. A threat also developed from Surinam during
this period. On 9 August 1969. there was a news story
of a Surinamese military base being �!stablished at the
confluence of the New River and the Courantyne
River, in it dispuied area in souti Guyana.
Alarmed, the Guyana Government ordered seizure of
the base. The defense force selected about 100
personnel, rehearsed rapid airlandings, and at dawn
on 19 August landed 40 men from two aircraft,
surprised the Surinamese force of I.5 to 20 police,
exchanged sonic fire, and forced the Surinamese to
abandon their defenses and flee without any
casualities on either side. The post, which the
Surinamese called Tjgrie, w ars renamed Camp Jaguar.
Because of the tensions, Guyana decided to expand
its two- battalion defense force to three battalions. By
dropping virtually all unit training and concentrating
on recruit training, the force succeeded in increasing
from 1,000 in 1965 to 2,000 in 1970 but, because of its
shortage of officers and NCO's, had to abandon the
idea of a third battalion and use the additional
strength to augment existing units. Later that year,
however, Guyana entered into an agreement with
Venezuela at Port -of- Spain, "Trinidad, fo both sides to
accept the status quo for 12 years, and the leaders of
Guyana and Suritnan agreed to demilitarization of the
disputed southeastern area, which (:u\ ana also viewed
as an accept it of the status yuo. This relaxation of
tensions has permitted Guyana to redeploy its military
force primarily for intrual security. :otitin Ili ng
attention is being paid to an eventual nilitary role,
however, and an intensive effort is being made to
provide� t otection for the interior, by the establish-
ment of interior military pasts, construction of roads,
and the training of youths for frontier settlement.
Command structure (S)
,'he President of' Guyana is the formal Commander
in Chief of the Guyana Defense Force, but his position
is ,.ut empty formality. The real governmental control
rests with the Prime NMinister, who theoretic:r;ly directs
the military establishment through the NMinister of
Defense (Figure 2). Prime Minister Btfnthain.
however, considers that ministry so important that he
a'Iso Moulds the portfolio of Minister of' Defense and
lakes ann active role in directing military affairs,
particularly personnel assignments and security
clearances. If(- has delegi.eed much of his day -to -day
control over the military forces to the Permanent
Secretary to the Prime NMinister and Ministry of
Defense, Oscar Henry, who fr-yuently has issued
directives that the military leaders consider poorly
thought out and not properly within his authority.
Henry still appears to dominate the activities of the
Cu una Defense Board, although some of his military
res mnsibilities, reportedly bane been transferred to a
new administrative position in the I'rinic Ministers
office �the (thief of Staff o! the Guyana Defense
Force� created in 1972 for Brigadier Price when lie
was replaced as head of the Guyana Defense Force.
The position has the title that Ire had held as head of
the force but is believed to have no direct control over
the defense force staff; no further details are available
conecroing this new position.
The Prime Minister is advised on security problems
and their political and economic implications by the
National Defense Committee. It also prepares
national emergency contingency plans. 'The commit-
tee consists of the Deputy Prime \Minister, Minister of
Home Affairs, Commander of the Guyana Defense
Force, Police Commissioner, and Attorney General
and has had the Permanent Secretary in the Prime
Ministers Office as its secretary. It probably also
includes the newly created C:lhief of Staff of the
Guyana Defense Force and presumably would include
the Minister of Defense if thai position were held by a
person other than the Primc Minister. Under it is an
intelligence committee that meets irregularly.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

PRESIDENT
J
FIGURE 2. Guyana defense establishment (C)
The 0i ana Defense Board is it corporate body
directly under the Prime Minister. concerned with the
coniniand and administration of the Goyana Defense
force. It probable is within the Ministry of Defensc.
scrving priniurily for top -level coordination and
control of defense force activities. and it nn y be the
authority cinder which administrative directives are
issued. When not engaged in military :end other
security operations, the Guyana Defense Board is
occupied with internal force matters� such its
promotions and cowlitions of scrvice. It ,ipp irenlly
nuvets regularl., and consists of the Minister of
Defense (position held by the Prime Minister).
`�iinister of Home Affairs, Attorne\ Geut�ral, the
Pcrinanent Sccrelary to the Prinz� iMinister and
,Ministry of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the 01911a
Defense I -once, and presumably the Conimander of
the Deft�nsc 1'orce.
l'nder the Minister of' Defense. command over the
inilitary forces is cxcrciscd b the Commandcr of the
(;uvanii Defense Forc( whose headquarters are in
Georgetown I` igurc The conunander is assisted by
it staff With each of its major elements dircc�tly
subordinate to hint. 'I he staff includes the GSO -2
kHanning and Administration). GSO (assistant to
;SO -2 and also responsible for intelligence). Signals
Officer. Ordnance and Stores Officer (equivident to
(luarterniaster). I ?nginecr Officer. and P:iyinaster. ;11so
directIv under the Coni hander of the Gin: :na Defense
orc�c is the defense force. cicnicnt of the Joint
Operations Center. The Joint Operations Center is a
communications and control installation combining a
defense force and a police force cicnicnt, located in
adjacent rooms to facilitate close coordination of
intelligence and control during crises. TIie two
elements are compictcly separate, but coordination
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6
National Defense
F Minister
Guyana Defense Board
Committee
I
Minister of
Chief of Staff.
Defense
Guyana Defense Force
Intelligence
Committee
Defense Force Element.
Commander. Guyana
Guyana Defense
Joint Operations Center
Defense Force
I
Force Staff
Ist Battalion
2d Battalion
Air Marine Women's
I
Wing Wing Army Corps
Engineer
Rifle
Headquarters Rifle
Support Headquarters
Company Company
Company Company
I
Company
Company
Reconnaissance
Mortar Assault Pioneer
Platoon
Platoon Platoon
FIGURE 2. Guyana defense establishment (C)
The 0i ana Defense Board is it corporate body
directly under the Prime Minister. concerned with the
coniniand and administration of the Goyana Defense
force. It probable is within the Ministry of Defensc.
scrving priniurily for top -level coordination and
control of defense force activities. and it nn y be the
authority cinder which administrative directives are
issued. When not engaged in military :end other
security operations, the Guyana Defense Board is
occupied with internal force matters� such its
promotions and cowlitions of scrvice. It ,ipp irenlly
nuvets regularl., and consists of the Minister of
Defense (position held by the Prime Minister).
`�iinister of Home Affairs, Attorne\ Geut�ral, the
Pcrinanent Sccrelary to the Prinz� iMinister and
,Ministry of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the 01911a
Defense I -once, and presumably the Conimander of
the Deft�nsc 1'orce.
l'nder the Minister of' Defense. command over the
inilitary forces is cxcrciscd b the Commandcr of the
(;uvanii Defense Forc( whose headquarters are in
Georgetown I` igurc The conunander is assisted by
it staff With each of its major elements dircc�tly
subordinate to hint. 'I he staff includes the GSO -2
kHanning and Administration). GSO (assistant to
;SO -2 and also responsible for intelligence). Signals
Officer. Ordnance and Stores Officer (equivident to
(luarterniaster). I ?nginecr Officer. and P:iyinaster. ;11so
directIv under the Coni hander of the Gin: :na Defense
orc�c is the defense force. cicnicnt of the Joint
Operations Center. The Joint Operations Center is a
communications and control installation combining a
defense force and a police force cicnicnt, located in
adjacent rooms to facilitate close coordination of
intelligence and control during crises. TIie two
elements are compictcly separate, but coordination
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

I Hf 1 Ya S-. ff1n a4.bkbhl24
R-tr 11'
FIGURE 3. Headquarters of the Guyana Defense Force
in Georgetown (U /OU)
would be assured in a niujor crisis because the defensk
force would assume control overt lie police in the joint
Operations C:cnter as %yell as in the field. Also directly
subordinate to the Commander of the Guyana
Defense Force are the separate ground, naval, and air
elements. Coordination between elements of the
Guyana Defense: Force and between defense force and
police elements is not very effective. Intelligence
support is provided to both forces by the Special
Branch of the police, but the information often does
not reach the defense force units concerned, and
lateral dissemination of infi -ition is also reported as
minimal. Coordination exercises have achieved some
improvement, but, in view of the small sire of the
military establishment and the tendency to make
decisions at the top level and to utilize task forces for
specific operations, the lack of close coordination
probably is not a serious weakness.
B. Joint activities
1. Military manpower (S)
The military manpower potential is estimated to
total 175,000 males, of whorl about 69 are
physically fit for military service. About 9,000 men
annually will reach age IS during 1172 -7(i. The
distribution of manpower by 5 -year age groups is as
follows:
6
All ,oersonnel are volunteers. Applicants for
comi issious must have the equivalent of a high school
education and must pass it rigid physical examination.
Those who qualify are then required to pass a written
examination similar to that taken by officer
candidates in the United Kingdom. lieccmmenda-
tions are made by it board of ranking officers, and the
final selection is made by the Prinu N After the
candidate completes the training requirements.
corlunissioning is presumably by the 1'resident acting
in accordance with the direction of the Prime
),linistcr. Commissions are for an indefinite period.
Officers come from the upper and middle classes:
nearly all have completed secondary school, and some
are graduates of technical schools or have attended
college.
Enlisted applicants must have a primary school
education and pass a written examination prepared
and graded by the Ministry of Education. They also
imist pass it strict physical examination. 'there are
sufficient volunteers to permit the application of rigid
standards. During the first 2 years of recruitment, 1966
and 1967. only 15 of every 500 volunteers were
accepted for regular service, and this ratio probable
still holds true. Although numbers present nci'
difficulty, the fact that enlisted men come from the
lower classes presents the continuing problem of
finding men with sufficient mechanical training; to
serve as technical specialists. Enlistment is for .3' years
of active duty followed by it 9 -year reserve
colnnnitnaent. but individuals may elect to remain on
active duty.
Service in the military has always been popular, and
morale has been high, although it suffered a
temporary slump in 1967 over suspicion' of disloyalty
following a weapons theft and in 1968 ver increased
deployment to remote posts and curtailment of leave
time as border tensions increased. Morale quickly
recovered, however, (airing the successful military
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6
TOTAL
MAXIMUM
NUMBER
KUMBER FIT FOR
ACE
OF \PALES
MILITARY SERVICE
15 -19
45,000
35,000
20 -24
38,000
29,000
25 -29
27,000
19,000
30 -34
20,000
13,000
35 -39
17,000
10,000
40 -44
15,000
8,000
4549
13,000
6,000
Total, 15 -49
175,000
120,000
6
All ,oersonnel are volunteers. Applicants for
comi issious must have the equivalent of a high school
education and must pass it rigid physical examination.
Those who qualify are then required to pass a written
examination similar to that taken by officer
candidates in the United Kingdom. lieccmmenda-
tions are made by it board of ranking officers, and the
final selection is made by the Prinu N After the
candidate completes the training requirements.
corlunissioning is presumably by the 1'resident acting
in accordance with the direction of the Prime
),linistcr. Commissions are for an indefinite period.
Officers come from the upper and middle classes:
nearly all have completed secondary school, and some
are graduates of technical schools or have attended
college.
Enlisted applicants must have a primary school
education and pass a written examination prepared
and graded by the Ministry of Education. They also
imist pass it strict physical examination. 'there are
sufficient volunteers to permit the application of rigid
standards. During the first 2 years of recruitment, 1966
and 1967. only 15 of every 500 volunteers were
accepted for regular service, and this ratio probable
still holds true. Although numbers present nci'
difficulty, the fact that enlisted men come from the
lower classes presents the continuing problem of
finding men with sufficient mechanical training; to
serve as technical specialists. Enlistment is for .3' years
of active duty followed by it 9 -year reserve
colnnnitnaent. but individuals may elect to remain on
active duty.
Service in the military has always been popular, and
morale has been high, although it suffered a
temporary slump in 1967 over suspicion' of disloyalty
following a weapons theft and in 1968 ver increased
deployment to remote posts and curtailment of leave
time as border tensions increased. Morale quickly
recovered, however, (airing the successful military
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

actions of 1969. Personnel are well disciplined and like
soldiering. Personnel turnover, howcyer, has heen
high� reportedly -10'; .,21' the original soldiers left
active svr�ice upon coal "pletion of the required :3 years
.i 1968 69, and it number of officers also have left the
service. Better qualified men, in particular, leave the
service to seek higher pit '�ing civilian employment.
Social status reflects British values and is high for
officers and low for enlisted men.
The Guyana Defense Force also includes is
Women's Army Corps element of 60 personnel,
including officers and enlistees. fart are in the regular
force, perhaps formally organized as an administrative
support company, hut, in practice, integrated into
various other units, and part in the reserve. The y are
stationed only in Georgetown and at Tin"Jil -i
International Airfield. assigned to clerical, adminisfra-
tiye, conununications, vehicle- driving, and cooking
.activities, bolt mendwrs of the corps also receive
weapons training.
1 laving an absolutely reliable force has been it
major consideration to Prime N Burnham fron
the first. The principal security threat has been viewed
as coming from the East Indians, particularly the
People's Progressive Party. although attention also has
been directed to the threat from back radicals who
might seek to overturn the government. With the
exception of personnel obtained from the Special
Services Unit (an independent security service.
discussed under IMilitary History), who were accepted
without question, all applicants have been subjected
to if background investigation by the police Special
Branch. The background investigation is c�omplcted
before officer candidates are accepted. For enlisted
men if name check alone is required before enfistnt, n
and the complete investigation is carried out
thereafter. Any suspicion that may develop cxchules
an applicant and results in the dismissal of if number
of the force, although the government is some Nyhat
more lenient toward personnel with nouaggressivc
black radical associations. The security investigation
eliminated about one- fourth of the original officer
candidates.
Racially, Africans comprised initially about ti5`i
but now perhaps nearly 90% of the force as it whole,
an even higher proportion of the NCO's, and probable
over 9Wti of the officers. Vlost of the remaining
personnel are East Indian, and there are it small
number of Amerindians, persons of Portuguese
descent, and others. When the force originally was
constituted, the British Government obtained
agreement that it would he generally balanced racially
between Africans and East Indians. But despite liP
service to this goal, it seems likely that I'rintc i\- liolister
Bentham has always desired au Afrie.ut force. IIc
initially acc�eptc�d the goal of racial balance ()illy on
condition that it would he kept secret, and carp� in
1966. following coups in Nigeria and Ghana, he
became seriously c�oncemcd about the reliability of the
forc�c. 'I'll( apparent implicatimi of East Indian
military personnel ii the� theft of it Bran gun, 1 -1
subnntc�hinegolns. and five other weapons from the
force arsenal on 25 November 196 made lit rn fit nt
more uneasy over the reliability of' force persound.
\�enezuelan iuvolycncut in the Ruptnuni uprising in
janttary 1969 and the- ensuing threat of an armed clash
with Venezrtcla caused font to abandon any pretense
of :.attempting i f racial balance, in favor of if
completely reliable force. It would have been very
difficult to achicyc' it racial balaICe in any cusc.,'I'hc
train original manpower pool, the British Guiana
Volunteer Force, was larg,ly African because its units
were located in the uaIl an are as, \\-Mich arc
predominantly African. Africans tend to be better
educated, in better physical condition. and more
aggressive. East ludians in Guyana do not meet tilt�
sank standards. The Guyana Police Force found that.
in trying to recruit i5S(' 1 ?ast Indians in order to redress
its racial imbalauc�e, it could not obtain enough
recruits without lowering the entrance examination
grade bm some 25r, it was agreed from the
beginning that there must be no question of reliability.
and membership ill th^ largely East Indian Peoples
Progressive Party meant ,automatic disqualification in
the security investigation. Thus, the initial African
predominance was accepted as unavoidable. The East
Indians have not adjusted as well as the Africans to
military life% and it mach larger proportion of them is
eliminated during the initial training period.
Nlorcover. East Indians have been promoted so slowly
that some have quit before completing their
contracted 11 -year active -duty term. But those who
remain in service. especialk- those who beconu
officers. are very able individuals.
Although racial divisions with'n the Gtn�afit
Defense Force are not as sharp as in civilian life,
friction does exist. particularly over suspected
discrimination. Some of the East Indians reportedly
have admitted that. in racial clashes in the civilian
community- they would not take up arms against
fellow East Indians.
"The reserve is divided into two groups: the first -class
reserve. of 600 personne which may be called olp by
the Commander of the Guyana Defense Force under
authority conferred by the Guyana Defense Board,
and the second -class reserve, possibly 1,000 to 1,500
N
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

personnel, which can be called up only if a national
emergency is proclaimed. The first -class reserves are
organized in tactical units and receive regular
training. They originally comprised the entire �?d
Battalion of the Guyana Defense Force. By 1967 the
battalion headquarters and hyo companies had
become part of the regular force, with the reserve
comprising additional separate companies. As it result
of subsequent security crises, the 2d Battalion has
become a annpletely active elernernl, but it is assumed
that the first -class reserve still is organized into
companies attached to the active battalions. Although
the first -class reserve is available for rapid
mobilization, it has been the practice, with f if any,
exceptions, to Ittcnnpt to have sufficient active troops
to handle emergencies. Reserve personnel who have
becn Mobilized usually have been retained on active
duty and eventually incorporated into the active force.
The second -class reserves arc average or dropout
members of the Guyana Defense I-orce who have sonne
reserve cot arnitment. They are not organized into
tactical units and probably do not receive ,any
additional m.ilit.ary training. They probable include
present and former members of the Guyana Youtln
Corps. 'fhe government is believed to view the
development of this reserve pool as an important
military asset, in view of the military aspect of the
youth program. The government has stated that its
continuing authority in demilitarized southeastern
Guyana is dependent not only on the local police
detachment but also on local individuals with military
training who, presumably, are members of the second
class reserve.
The Guyana Youth Corps is, in effect, part of the
reserve training program. Ill public statements the
government has emphasized that the Guyana Mouth
Corps is strictly civilian and is under the Minister
Without Portfolio. I lowever, the original plan was for
its trainees to be inducted into the Guyana Defense
Force reserve, and the fact that the government refuses
to reveal the strength of the Guyana Youth Corps or
the number of youths that have been trained gives
good reason to believe that the corps is an element of
the defense force. The corps consists of volunteers agcd
16 to 25 who are inducted for a 2 -year term. After an
initial :3 months of military basic training at Madewini
Camp, near Timehri International Airfield. inductees
move to Tumaturnari Camp, on the Potaro River,
where tile\ remain under military dis0pline and
participate in some military drills and occasional field
exercises but otherwise are under completely civilian
direction, learning it civilian trade and acquiring
agricultural and other skills useful for the developincut
S
of interior Gln�all.1. They also engage in roadbuilcling
and interior land development projects. The
government uses the program to encourage youths to
settle in the undeveloped interior of Guyana, but it is
not kncrxn bow successful the progr in is. It was
inaugurated for young na�u in January 1965 :old l'or
young women in 1969. 'I'unlattimari Camp has
acconlnwdations for 500 trainees, and the 1970 goal
tor the corps was 500 Inca and 50 women. 'I'll( corps
apparently totaled about 1,(100 youths by (March
1971. Prink Nlinister Burnham un 21 N1ay 1972
anounced that compulsory national service for
yo would be established before the end of 1972.
with the objecliyc of deyclopnu'nl of the hinterland
and inculcation of a sense of* national idcutitv. It is
assuuled that this expansion elf the youth program.
wllcn imPlcnlcnt1-d. also will contribute toward
expansion of the military reserve.
2. Strength trends (C)
The Guyana Defense Force increased gradually in
strength front its creation in 1966, as new personnel
were trained. until it reached about the lewd of' tfu.
British garrison (1.300) in ;968 -69. The border threat
from Venezuela in late 1969 caused a sudden jllnlp in
strength to its present 2.000. Strength trends are shown
in Figure -1.
:3. Training (C)
Gu\'ana has no military schools, ,uul almost all
formal training has been in British Aran schools.
Officer cadets attend the 5 -month course in \dons
Cadet School at Aldershot. A vcry few officers have
attended courses in British Anny specialist and brunch
schools, arld two to four annually attended the British
Jungle Warfare School ill ilalaysia during at least
196 -69. Guyana has sought to recauit trained pilots
for the Air Wing and presuniably has not provided
pilot training. A majority of the \COs also have
attended military courses in iFac United Kingdom. As
FIGURE 4. Strength trends (C)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6
GROUND
MA ItINF:
AIR
YEA II
FORCE
WING.
WING
TOTAL
19613...........
560
0
0
560
1967...........
655
0
20
675
1968...........
950
30
20
1,000
1969...........
1,240
40
20
1.300
1970..........
1,940
40
20
2.000
1971...........
1,940
40
20
2,000
1972...........
1,9.10
40
20
2,000
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

Cull exception to this British sc�hooliug, one cffic -I'
attended an intelligence course at the U,S. Arn y
tutelligence School in Fort Iiolabircl, and three officer
cadets arc attending the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point in the _lasses that Megan in 1969 and 1970.
I "h e G(yaltat Defense Force received excellent initial
training from British Arms personnel in Guyana. It
trained vyith the local British forces �a battalion of the�
1st \'Ii(l(llvsex Reginu�nt and I Jlelicopter flight of the
Royal Air Force until their departure in October
1966. "I'hc (:"vane's(' held it number of' field exercises
during 19(i. 68, S 0111 c involving the _ntire ground
clenle"t, sonic including the Air Wing. some vyith
visiting British troops and e�111PLasizing jungle warfare
and counterguerrilla operations, and solrle vyith the
Police and dirceted toward internal security. I ?yen
With the security tensions in 1969, it 5 -din jungle
c�onlbatt nlanetn-er with British troops was held in rlicl-
1969, and 16 -day jungle exercise was carried out in
December 1969 with about 80 personnel of the British
Special Air Service. Another was scheduled fur April
1970 but is believed to have heeu cancellccl bcc�ause of
tensions yyith \'enezucla, and the combined exercises
apparently have not been renewed.
Because of' the British legate, the Ctn'au ;t Defcnsc
Force has continued to maintain sattisf;ctory
standards. "Training and discipline are intensive, and
considerable stress is placed on pI,\ fitness. \luny
hours are devoted to close order drill, calisthenics.
running of obstacle courses (Figure 5), marksmanship.
and field manetvers. Recruits receive un initial.1.1
weeks of basic military training in the "Training Wing.
at Takamat, on the left hank of the Berbice River -an
excellent training area for all phases of training,
including jungle combat; rifle, machinegtnl, aucl
mortar firing; and field exercises of up to hatlulion
level. After basic training, recruits join the regular
units but conthitie to receive training, with emphasis
on jungle warfare� counterinsurgency operations.
crow control, and phvsic�al s
curit:' exercises.
"Training for reserve personnel is conducted ill the
reserve units. After an initial 5 weeks of basic training,
the men attend 12 weekend training periods each year..
culminating in a 10 -day exercise usually held in
conjunction with the regular forces. They 1) restnutbly
would not be very effective in military operations as
separate units, but the training is fairly satisfactory
and has permitted rapid incorporation of the Wren into
regular units during crises.
Members of the Women's Army Corps are given 5
weeks of' training yyhich ytlalifics them as clerks,
typists, storekeepers, radio and switchboard operators,
cooks, and drivers. In addition to such
specialized skills, they receive training in close order
drill (Figure 6), marksmaauship (Figure 7 and military
discipline.
The N7arine k1'itg also ulay well hay(- peen trained
I) the 'British. The �i0 neu originally comprising the
\9arine Wing received their initial tratiring ill small
boat operations in Trinidad in 196S, presumably from
personnel of* the Royal Navy scut spceilirtlly for that
purpose.
4. Militat�y budget (UJOU)
A,nual military budgets are prepared by the
Commander of the Gu\,ana Defense Force under the
guidance of the \linister of Finance a1d "Trade. The
defense budget is reviewed and approved by the Prime
\Minister and the Council of \linisters prior to
legislative auction. Although the National Assembly
has the e�onstitulional authority to amend all budgets.
in practice it has ativvays approved the military budget
as submitted. Annual military budgets for the period
1969 -71 aucl their relationship i(, total central
government budgets and the GNP are shown in
Figure S.
5. Logistics (S)
Guyarla's underdeveloped economy lacks the
industrial base to supply the armed forces with
military materiel. Industrial activity is liniied to the
processing of agricultural and mineral rave materials
and the production of it few basic consumer grinds.
Sir_r national independence in \-lay 1966. the
Guyana Defense Force has obtained almost all of its
arms, ammunition. vehicles, and other materiel front
the United Kingdom, primarily as grant aid.
Occasionally, small arms ammunition has peen
purchased from Belgium, an(1 it small (luantit\* of
mortars purchased from Israel in 1969.
Overall logistics planning and administration is
under the Ordnance and Stares Officer on the Guyana
Defense Force Staff. The supple :;ystcm is nldinuln-
tatre. The battalions uud the nuyall Inc] air elements
have been delegated responsibilit' for most of their
rnyn soppy functions. purchasing needed e(luipment
and supplies from budget funds made available for the
purpose. 'I'll( distribution of supplies normally is made
by the supply point system utilizing unit transport.
The supple problem has been cased Somewhat by the
establishment of farms at probably all permanent
lusts. The distribution of' supplies often is hampered
by poor roads 1 lid bad weather con clitions.
particularly (luring the rainy season. \Many dispersed
detachments can be supplied only by amphibious air,
9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

Vi
FIGURE 6. Guyana Defense
FIGURE 5. Members of the Guyana Force soldier explains the work-
Defense Force in physical fitness ing of, firearm to a female
training (U /OU) counterpart (U /OU)
FIGURE 7. Members of the first
contingent of the Women's Army
Corps on parade (U /OU)
v
10
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6
C1

FIGURE 8. Annual military budget (U /OU)
(US dollars
1969 1970 1971
Military budget......... 2,300,000 3,250,000 2,650,000
Percentage of central gov-
ernment budget....... 3.2 3.8 2.7
Percentage of GNP...... 0.97 1.3 *0.95
*Converted at the exchange rate of 2 Guyana dollars equal
US81.09.
*Preliminary estimate.
and in 1968 their stores often dwindled to only 4 days'
supple. Deliveries were dependent on the govern
ment one amphibious Grumman, so that a single
mechanical failure could easily have disrupted the
system. Barely sufficient ammunition and supplies
were provided for the task force that seized Surinam's
Tigrie airfield in 1969, and it prolongation of the
operation would have overtaxed the supple system.
Thus, the supply system is barely adequate to meat
even the services modest peacetime needs. It would be
entirely inadequate to cope with the requirements of
nationwide civil disorders or a wartime situation.
The Guyana Defense Force has maintained its
motor transport in good condition, and its weapons are
uSSUmcd also to be well maintained. Considerable
quantities of new clothing and boots, tenting, mess
gear, dry goods, and field supplies of all types had
been added to the logistical base by 1969.
The weapons are primarily light infantry weapons,
useful for jungle warfare or internal security. The four
armored cars are Land Rovers with a steel
superstructure and turret arrangement that limits
visibility to vision slits: tile\ are equipped with two-
way radios. Designed to be used primarily for
psychological purposes in quelling disorders, these
vehicles could not be used in combat because the
wheel size is such that tile\ cannot 1v equipped with
puncture -proof tires.
C. Ground force (S)
The Guyana Defense Force is organized into 2
battalions, an Air "ling, a Marine Wing, and a \VAC
clement organized an an administrative support
company but with its personnel integrated into other
units. Each battalion has it strength of about 700 men,
and each has two rifle companies. In addition, the Ist
Battalion has the Support Company consisting of the
Reconnaissance Platoon, the 81 -111m Mortar Platoon,
and the Assault Pioneer Platoon; and the 2d Battalion
has the Engineer Company. The Ist Battalion has its
headquarters at Georgetown, and the 2d Battalion at
Tinehri International Airfield. It has been the
practice to retain the Support Contpa lly at
Georgetown and to keep the Engineer Company
engaged in opening roads it tit(- interior. The rifle
companies formerly were stationed at Georgetown,
Timehri International Airfield, and at various interior
locutions, including the area of Aiil;::L:: Island ard
Bartica, or in training, and were rotated regularly. The
development of inland security threats from uprisings
and border disorders caused wide deployment of' the
force beginning in 1968, and some detachments were
as small as about 10 men. This dispersal nade the
units relatively ineffective fo military combat. This
dispersion problem has greatly improved since nlid-
1970. The Protocol of Port -of- Spain. signed in June
1970, which shelved the Venezuela Guyana border
dispute for 12 years, seems to have relaxed tensions
along that entire border urea. By agreement with
Surinam to demilitarize the disputed southeastern
urea, the lust 27 -nian military contingent was
withdrawn from that district in October 1970. leaving
its security to the police. Accordingly. it is assuned
that mail\ of the ;mull detachments have been
relocated to their parent units, and that the force is
again relatively effectively organized.
Materiel held by the Guyana Defense Force is listed
below (date of acquisition and country of origin are
1966 and the United Kingdom, respectively, unless
otherwise indicated in parenthesis):
ITF_M NO. OF ITEMS
Mortars:
81 -nun (1969; Israel)
8
2 -inch light
11
Machineguns:
.303 -cal. light, Bren I
38
1 other stolen in 1967
Submachineguns:
9 -nun Stirling
104
14 others stolen in 1967
Rifles:
.303 -cal. Rifle No. 4 Lee-Enfield)
Mk. 1
926
7.62 -7,nm SLR (1969)
1,000
Pistols:
.38 -cal
29
Armor:
Land Rover armored cars (1967)
4
Transport:
3 -ton trucks
19
1 /4 -ton trucks, Land Rover
4
1 /4 -ton trucks
36
Staff car
1
"later truck
1
Trailers
31
Radios:
HF 156
53
VHF
14
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6

St:c lrt.r
D. Naval element (C)
"The naval element, called the xlarine What. is it
force of 40 men stationed at Georgetomi. It has three
40 -foot Vosper- Thomycroft fast patrol craft (PBF).
acquired by purchase from the U.K. in 1971 --and four
45 -foot steel river patrol boats (Pl3R), received in 1968.
The river patrol boats have it maxitnutn speed of about
13 knots. E wAi is armed with a machinegun and has cr
crew of Iwo and it load capacity of 15 soldiers, or
30 at much slower speed, or one Land Hover. "These
older boats were locally built for economic reasons
at the Sprostons Shipyard and have not been
very satisfactory. They are named after dangerous
snakes� Canloudic. Labaria. and Rattler.
E. Air element (C)
The Air Wing of 20 personnel is stationed at
Timehri international Airfield. It has three STOI.
utility aircr aft two Britten- Norman Idander 10-
passenger twin- engined aircraft purchased from the
U. K. ill 1971 and one 6 passenger 11( lio Courier given
by the U '1, States to tle Guyana Police Force on :31
March 1967 and trimsferred on permanent loan to the
Air Wing in 1970 after two similar aircraft purchased
I the Cuvana Defense Force in 1967 were wrecked in
1969 and 1970. The I lelio Courier ;s equipped foi ;dr-
lo- ground communication with srjits in the field. All
aircraft are housed in a hangar a short distance from
the civilian terminal building at Timehri International
Airfield. These aircraft are of value prirnari)'y for
liaison and r-bservation. 'I'll(- government -owned
Guyana Airways Corporation provides maintenance
for the Air Wing aircraft 1111(1, with six heavy transports
(four DC Dakotas and two MICA Caribous) and
four light transports (two I)I IC -6 Twin Otters, one
Cessna 3100. and one amphibious Grumman Goose),
also provides air transport and supple. 'Three of its
aircraft �one temporarily fitted with a niachinegun
for ground support affected the 1969 aerial seizure of
the Surinamese installation at Tigrie airfield.
Places and features referred to in this chapter (u /ou)
COORDINATES
o
Ankoko Island (island)
6 4:3 61 08
13artica
6 24 5S :37
13erbice River (stream)
6 17 57 32
Courantyne River (stream)
5 57 57 06
Georgetown
6 �18 58 10
Mandia
5 1:3 59 09
New River (stream)
:3 2:3 57 36
Pcrt -of- Spain. Trinidad
10 39 (it 31
Potaro River (stream)
5 22 53 52
Rupununi District
:3 00 59 00
Takama
5 3.1 57 55
'rumatunutri
5 20 59 00
12
NO FOREIGN WSSE'Al SI :(:nt:r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070011 -6