CORE POSITIONS OF PARTIES TO THE PALESTINIAN DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00T02041R000100100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1981
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
0, 0
to the est
n Dispute
Core Positions - Parties
Special National bnteltigence estimate ,
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CORE POSITIONS OF PARTIES
TO THE PALESTINIAN DISPUTE
Information available as of 22 December 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE
The likelihood that the Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian auton-
omy will fail to produce an agreement acceptable to both the Israelis
and the Palestinians has sparked a renewed search for a negotiating
framework with greater prospects. A continuing stalemate could further
radicalize the Palestinians, alienate Arab moderates' from the United
States, and give the Soviets new opportunities to expand their influence
in the Middle East. Moreover, a renewal of intense Palestinian-Israeli
hostilities, particularly in Lebanon, could possibly lead to a Syrian-
Israeli confrontation threatening regional stability and bring about
direct US and Soviet involvement to control the situation.
This Estimate seeks to examine the fundamental positions and
concerns of the key parties on the Palestinian issue, to highlight areas
that might be susceptible to negotiation, and to assess the implications
for the region and the West.
' The term "moderates" as used in this Estimate includes Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the smaller Persian
Gulf states, Egypt, and Morocco.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ i
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 3
Background ............................................................................................................. 3
Positions of the Key Players ................................................................................... 3
The Israelis .......................................................................................................... 3
The PLO .............................................................................................................. 7
West Bank/Gaza Palestinians ............................................................................ 8
The Arab Position ............................................................................................... 9
Jordan .................................................................................................................. 10
Syria ..................................................................................................................... 10
Saudi Arabia ........................................................................................................ 12
Egypt ................................................................................................................... 12
Radical States ...................................................................................................... 13
The View From Moscow ........................................................................................ 13
The UN and EC Roles ............................................................................................ 14
Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 15
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The aims of the present Israeli Government and those of the
mainline Palestinian leadership and most Arab states are for the most
part not reconcilable. The ultimate status of Jerusalem is the most
emotionally charged issue between Israel and the Arab states. Neither
side is prepared to give up its claim to sovereignty over East Jerusalem.
The Begin government aims ultimately to incorporate the West
Bank into pre-1967 Israel, and to seek and utilize pliable Palestinian
leadership to administer Arab areas within the framework of Israeli
sovereignty. Israel's opposition Labor Party favors a territorial compro-
mise with Jordan that includes relinquishing substantial portions of the
West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli populace increasingly favors Begin's
policies.
The mainline PLO, under Yasir Arafat, has as its basic require-
ment the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West
Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. We believe that Arafat would agree
in return to recognize Israel's right to exist and could probably enforce
the discipline necessary to obtain acceptance of this within the PLO.
We judge that he would also agree to a prescribed process leading to
more formal recognition as required by negotiations.
The Syrians want to be a principal, party to any negotiations. They
would accept Arafat's terms for a settlement provided he agreed to
include peculiarly Syrian issues regarding return of the Golan. Assad
may insist, moreover, that Israel rescind its decision on 14 December to
apply Israeli law to the Golan before negotiations get under way. If ex-
cluded from the negotiating process, the Syrians would sabotage a
PLO-sanctioned settlement.
Libya and rejectionist Palestinian organizations would not accept a
settlement based on the mainline PLO's minimum conditions and
would try to sabotage it. In our judgment, they would not succeed.
Moderate Arab states-Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt-all sup-
port some form of Palestinian self-determination. The Saudis are closest
to the mainline PLO conception. Jordan would prefer sovereignty in a
confederal arrangement. Egypt would accept any solution acceptable to
the Palestinians and Israel. All of these governments assume pressure
from regional states would limit to some degree the freedom of action of
any future independent Palestinian state.
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A continuing stalemate would, over time, be likely to lead to a
radical shift in Palestinian leadership or attitudes and inspire renewed
terrorism outside Israel, a further hardening of the Syrian position
toward Israel and its Christian allies in Lebanon, and a greater
willingness on the part of some currently moderate Arab states to adopt
positions contrary to Western interests and policies.'
The Soviets hope that their strong support for the PLO will get
them to the Arab-Israeli negotiating table, signifying international
recognition of their "legitimate role" in the Middle East. Short of a
settlement that increases their influence in the region-such as the
creation of a Palestinian state dependent on Moscow-the Soviets do not
necessarily want to see a solution to the Palestinian problem because
they benefit from the tensions it generates. Moscow does not possess the
leverage either to obstruct a settlement the principal parties agree to or
to convince the more hardline Arabs to accept a settlement that does not
meet their objectives.
2 A minority view holds that the Arab position has historically become more, rather than less, flexible,
in spite of the continuing stalemate on Palestine. Intelligence Community representatives judge that a
threshold has been reached and that Arab positions cannot be expected to moderate further without a
change in Israeli policies on territorial compromise.
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DISCUSSION
Background
1. The keys to achieving a resolution of the Arab-
Israeli dispute lie in resolving the Palestinian issue and
securing Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist.
These issues are likely to be at the heart of all future
discussions concerning Middle East peace talks once
the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai is completed in April
1982. The Palestinians, of course, are the subject of the
Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks. Beyond that, both
Jordan and Syria consider the Palestinian problem
much more an integral part of their own negotiating
stance toward Israel than did President Sadat. They
will not settle their own differences with Israel without
a simultaneous resolution of this question. This stance
is vigorously supported by most Arab countries, in-
cluding Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf
states.
2. The 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war and the formation
of the state of Israel were accompanied by a mass
flight of Palestinian Arabs. Roughly half of Palestine's
1.4 million Arabs-three-quarters of the Arab resi-
dents of what became Israel-fled their homes, could
not return, and became refugees. A congress of these
refugees met in East Jerusalem in May 1964 and
formally established the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation. In February 1969 the strongest PLO group was
Fatah and its leader, Yasir Arafat, was elected PLO
chairman.
3. A clear trend in the past 12 years has been the
increased identification of Palestinians throughout the
Middle East with the PLO as the institutional expres-
sion of Palestinian nationalism. The organization now
enjoys widespread support in the West Bank, Gaza,
and the Palestinian diaspora. In part the PLO has won
this. support by default-whether or not they admire
the PLO leadership or agree with its tactics, most
Palestinians see no alternative to the organization as
the political vehicle for achieving their aspirations.
4. The PLO has also benefited from the decision of
the Arab states at the Rabat summit in 1974 to
recognize it as the sole legitimate group speaking for
the Palestinians and to give it full membership in the
Arab League. It gained additional international ac-
ceptance when the United Nations General Assembly
in November 1974 granted the organization official
observer status.
5. There are about 4 million Palestinians. The
largest concentration of them outside Israel and the
occupied territories is in Jordan. (See figure 1.) Al-
though they do not regard Jordan as the Palestinian
state, many Palestinians are now Jordanian citizens
and their integration into Jordanian society is extreme-
ly advanced.
6. The situation is different in most other Arab
states. Syria and Iraq discourage their Palestinians
from seeking citizenship, arguing that they do not
want to contribute to the "liquidation" of the Palestin-
ian problem. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia do grant
citizenship to Palestinians-and other foreigners-but
on a very limited basis; they fear the large and possibly
destabilizing concentrations of Palestinians in their
societies and watch them closely for signs of trouble.
Positions of the Key Players
7. In Israel there is broad agreement among nearly
all political parties and within the general public that
there can be no total withdrawal to the pre-June 1967
borders and no negotiating with the PLO. Even if the
PLO were to modify its charter to recognize Israel and
to renounce terrorism, much of the Israeli public and
influential hardliners in the ruling Likud, the opposi-
tion Labor Party, and the National Religious Party-
Israel's three major political combinations-would still
oppose negotiations with the PLO out of concern that
they would lead inevitably to establishment of a
revanchist Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
8. Public opinion polls in recent years demonstrate
a steady hardening of Israeli attitudes, with a clear
majority now favoring some form of permanent Israeli
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Figure 1
Estimated Distribution of Palestinian Population
Atlantic
Ocean
a
~1" Cyprus.-/-
50,00
Iraq
Lebanon
editerranean Sea
400,00
Isr e J rdan
1,700 00 1'000,000
16,
bya Egypt
0-15,000 50,000-60,000
Sa
Ara
J
120,
Red
Sea
a
.had
Sudan
100
Ethiopia
Central African
Republic
Zaire uganaa Kenya
control over most of the West Bank as well as the
Golan Heights. Knesset approval on 14 December of
the government's decision to apply Israeli law to the
Golan has encountered widespread approval in Israel.
Israelis attach little emotional and historical impor-
tance to the Gaza Strip, but nearly all believe Israel
must retain it indefinitely because of its key strategic
location between Israel and Egyptian-controlled Sinai
and its large Palestinian population. (See figure 2.)
9. Most Israeli parties adamantly reject any com-
pensation for those Palestinians who fled in the 1948
and 1967 wars unless reciprocal compensation for Jews
who le ft Arab countries is offered. Both Labor and
Likud probably would, however, agree to the return of
a limited number of refugees to the West Bank and
Gaza as part of a final peace agreement.
10. Deep-seated distrust of Israel's Arab citizens-
including growing concern about subversive coopera-
tion by them with West Bank and Gaza Palestinians-
has reinforced the commitment of Likud and Labor to
Boundary rep re sentat,on is
not necessar,ly aulho,,tat,ve
their different strategies. Likud aims by its aggressive
settlements and hardline security policies to discourage
Palestinian political activism, preempt terrorist oper-
ations, and intimidate Israeli Arabs. Labor, on the
other hand, aims by turning over the heavily Arab-
populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan
to rid Israel of the long-term political, demographic,
and moral dilemmas posed by continued control over
more than 1 million West Bank and Gaza Arabs. It
hopes this would over the long run make Israeli Arabs
also less susceptible to PLO irredentist propaganda
and the Palestinians less willing to make irredentist
claims.
11. The final status of Jerusalem is the most sensi-
tive peace negotiation issue in Israel. (See figure 3.) All
Jewish Israelis have a deep attachment to the city
because of its place in their religious tradition and
history. An overwhelming percentage of Israelis reject
sharing sovereignty over the city with the Arabs. It is
the only area of the West Bank that has been formally
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Morocco
250 e
Algeria
5,000-12,000
400,000-1,700,000
120,000-320,000
40,000-120,000
Under 20,000
Syria
Kuwait
70,000-320,000
Pens+nn
1Gult
Yemen
tsdent
100-
Indian
Ocean
Qatar
000-20,000
udi
bia
000
Yemen
ts....l
1005,
25X1
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Figure 2
Israel and Occupied Territories
'Akko
Haifa .
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Mandate for Palestine
(British, 1922-48)
0 20 40 Kilometers
Gulf of 20 40 Statute Miles
Aqaba
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(Israeli-occupied
Sinai until
26 April 1982)
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Figure 3
Jerusalem and Vicinity
military
installation
Atarot
ArRamm
T
West Bank (Israeli oocupMd
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Bayt JAIa .14 ~wwani~ ,
Church of ~? t. -`
the Na ity
Bait Sabor
-- - Jerusalem city limit unilaterally
expanded by Israel. 28 June 1967:
a,Mos, -,, e Ma'ale l N.
'A sa
. t C A1.. m;m
~,.. W,est Bank
..
No Man'e"Land,
l l~.n
Israeli-developed area across
the Armistice Line
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authontatiun.
to Jericho
(21 kin)
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annexed by Israel. Neither Likud nor Labor would be
likely to offer more than expanded municipal decen-
tralization designed to accord greater autonomy to the
Arab population and to preserve Arab control over
Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites.
12. Prime Minister Begin aims ultimately to incor-
porate the West Bank into pre-1967 Israel. He and
many members of his government believe that this
territory-the heartland of the Biblical Land of Isra-
el-must never again be alienated. They also regard
control over the area as vital to assure the security of
Israel's densely populated central coastal plain. Begin
and his Likud colleagues insist.that the Camp David
accords, reached in 1978, represent the only accept-
able negotiating framework because they provide Isra-
el the best chance eventually to assert sovereignty over
the West Bank. By their interpretation, the Camp
David agreements provide for no more than severely
circumscribed Palestinian self-rule, while leaving Isra-
el in control of all sovereignty-related matters-land
and water resources, settlement activity, and security.
13. To preempt a rival claim to sovereignty, Begin
has consistently rejected West Bank partition negotia-
tions with Jordan. He believes, moreover, that this
would inevitably lead to a pro-Soviet Palestinian state
controlled by the PLO. Begin and other Likud leaders
repeatedly have drawn attention to the Palestinian
demographic majority in Jordan in hopes of strength-
ening Likud's longstanding argument that Jordan-
rather than the West Bank-is the Palestinians' "natu-
ral" homeland. It is only in the context of talks with
Jordan that the Likud might consider an Israeli with-
drawal from limited areas of the West Bank and Gaza.
Foreign Minister Shamir indicated recently that Israel
ultimately might negotiate over the western border of
a Palestinian state in Jordan, but probably is referring
only to minor border adjustments.
14. While Labor remains more flexible in its ap-
proach to negotiation than Likud, it is no less insistent
on de jure recognition of Israel's right to exist, guaran-
tees for Israel's security, and continued control over a
unified Jerusalem. Labor has long favored a West
Bank/Gaza territorial compromise with Jordan, al-
though presumably it would insist on treaty safeguards
to prevent Jordan from later handing over territory to
the Palestinians. Labor's 1981 election platform
pledges to honor the Camp David agreements, but
only as an interim stage in negotiations to reach a final
peace with Jordan based on a territorial partition and
in the framework of a "Jordanian-Palestinian state."
Labor would seek a negotiated agreement giving Israel
permanent control over the Jordan Valley, the Etzion
settlement bloc south of Bethlehem, greater Jerusalem,
and the southern Gaza Strip. Jewish settlement activity
would continue in these areas. Many party leaders
probably would prove willing to abandon Jewish
settlements in areas retroceded to Jordan, if popular
sentiment would permit it.
15. The Labor Party prefers separate, direct negoti-
ations with Jordan and Syria but would probably also
accept a Geneva-style conference that included the
Soviets. It fears, however, that such a conclave would
produce a stalemate similar to the abortive Geneva
Conference of December 1973 and complicate US-
Israeli bilateral relations. In any case, Labor's negotiat-
ing flexibility would be severely constrained if-as is
likely-it had to gain the participation of Israel's
religious parties to form a governing coalition.
16. The current PLO leadership under Yasir Arafat
has given a number of indications that it is prepared to
move toward a negotiated settlement with Israel.
Although the PLO continues publicly to espouse the
establishment of a Palestinian state in all of Palestine,
we believe it would be willing to settle for less. The
minimum PLO demands appear to be:
- Self-determination for the Palestinians and estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank,
Gaza, and East Jerusalem.
- Recognition of the right to return for Palestinian
refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars and the
payment of compensation to those who choose
not to return.
Arafat has privately indicated that, in return, he is
prepared to recognize Israel's right to exist. We believe
he could probably enforce the discipline necessary to
obtain acceptance of this within the PLO. We judge
he would also agree to a process leading to more
formal recognition.
17. Arafat and some of his closest associates have
indicated that they might be willing to negotiate
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restrictions on their demands. For example, once the
abstract "right of return" was agreed upon, they could
probably accept strict limits on the numbers of Pales-
tinians who would be allowed to return or to demand
compensation. Some PLO leaders also have suggested
that they could accept a confederation with Jordan if
such a union were portrayed as being between two
independent states. Arafat has acknowledged, more-
over, that the PLO would accept a transitional ar-
rangement-preferably a UN-sponsored mandate-
before the establishment of an independent state.
18. The PLO has consistently opposed the Camp
David process and successfully urged and intimidated
West Bankers to induce them to stay out of the
autonomy talks because Arafat believes that the proc-
ess is designed specifically to circumvent ultimate
Palestinian sovereignty and to keep him out of peace
negotiations. Arafat, moreover, is not prepared to
accept Jordanian participation in negotiations as envis-
aged in the Camp David framework.
19. There is significant opposition to these main-
stream Palestinian demands from radicals within the
PLO (see table). This opposition would be significantly
enhanced in the event of Arafat's death or incapacita-
tion. The radicals insist that the goals set out in the
PLO's charter of 1968 and subsequent resolutions
issued by various groups-chiefly the establishment of
a democratic, secular state in all of pre-1948 Palestine
and the use of "armed struggle" to reach this goal-
must not be compromised. Although all radical groups
within the PLO now subscribe to the Palestine Nation-
al Council resolutions of 1977, which endorse the
creation of a Palestinian state on territories occupied
by Israel in 1967, the radicals maintain that this state
should serve as a base for continued military oper-
ations against Israel aimed at destroying the Jewish
state.
20. Although a substantial majority of Palestinians
support Arafat's relatively moderate position, the radi-
cals could probably veto any attempt to reach a
negotiated settlement with Israel as long as they retain
the substantial backing of Syria. Moreover, Syria-by
virtue of its military presence in Lebanon, where
much of the PLO infrastructure is located, and its
control over the main PLO supply routes-is also in a
very strong position to prevent Arafat from engaging
in unilateral negotiations that do not have the blessing
of Syrian President Assad.
West Bank/Gaza Palestinians
21. The political leadership of the West Bank and
Gaza is in broad agreement with the goals of the PLO
moderates who are prepared to accept a Palestinian
state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem and
eventually to recognize Israel. For the West Bankers
and Gazans, however, the priority concern is to end
the Israeli occupation as quickly as possible. They are,
therefore, prepared to be more flexible than the PLO
in the tactics used to achieve statehood. Most acknowl-
edge that an arrangement for the occupied territories
involving strong links to Jordan, at least initially, might
be the only feasible way to bring about Israeli with-
drawal. Only a handful of the West Bank's conserva-
tive clans traditionally close to Amman, however, are
prepared to opt for a permanent confederation with
Jordan.
22. Neither is full recognition of Israel a stumbling-
block for most West Bankers and Gazans. Unlike the
PLO leadership, they are prepared to concede this
now and to proceed in the negotiations from there.
The PLO radicals' goal of a Palestinian state in place
of Israel is considered unrealistic by all but a small
number of West Bankers and Gazans, primarily
students.
23. The PLO's use of violence to intimidate Arabs
on the West Bank is a major constraint on the area's
leadership. Therefore, despite their flexibility on issues
such as recognition of Israel, the mayors and notables
have little room for maneuver and would not accept a
settlement rejected by the PLO, although some could
be tempted if it contained firm guarantees of self-
determination and Israeli withdrawal.
24. West Bankers and Gazans.at all levels share the
PLO's rejection of the Camp David process as a cover
for permanent Israeli occupation and eventual annex-
ation. Israeli annexation of the Golan can only confirm
this belief. They also concur in the PLO's refusal to
accept a settlement that does not provide for some
form of Arab control over East Jerusalem. Some area
leaders, however, admit privately that an agreement
providing, for joint administration of the city may be
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Groups Within the Palestine Liberation Organization
Favoring negotiated settlement:
Fatah (independent)
Vacillating:
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
(controlled by Iraq)
Democratic Front for the
Nayif Hawatmah
1,200-1,500
Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP) (independent Marxist)
Saiqa (controlled by Syria)
Issam Qadi
2,000-4,000
Rejecting negotiated settlement:
Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) (independent Marxist)
Popular Front for the
George Habbash
Ahmad Jibril
300-500
Liberation of Palestine/
General Command (PFLP/GC)
(radical, close to Syria)
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)
Samir Ghushi
About 200
(radical, close to Syria)
Front for the Liberation of
Taalat Yaqub
About 200
Palestine (FLP) (radical,
close to Syria)
Leadership Structure
Palestine National Council (PNC)
Serves as PLO's legislative body. Has some 290 members.
Palestine Central Council
Theoretically runs the PLO when PNC not in session. Has 55 members.
Executive Committee
In reality the PLO's highest authority. Has 15 members:
Yasir Arafat, chairman (Fatah)
Faruq Qaddumi(Fatah)
Mahmud Abbas (Fatah)
Yasir Abd Rabbu (DFLP)
Abd al-Rahim Ahmad (ALF)
Talal Naii (PFLP/GC)
Ahmad Yamani (PFLP)
Muhammad Khalifa (Saiqa)
Political and Military Departments
Hamid Abu Sittah (independent)
Muhammad Zuhdi Nashashibi (independent)
Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar (independent)
Ahmad Sidqi al-Daiani (independent)
Jamal Surani (independent)
Hanna Nasir (independent)
Salah Dabbagh (independent)
possible. Most West Bankers, like the PLO, insist that
eventual dismantlement of existing Israeli settlements
must be part of a comprehensive treaty.
The Arab Position
25. The public position of most Arab leaders is
probably more hardline than what they are likely to
accept in a final peace settlement. Apart from a few
extremist Arab states such as Libya and perhaps Iraq,
the leaders of most other Arab states privately agree
that the only viable solution is a settlement that
includes ultimate Israeli withdrawal from all territory
occupied in 1967, with minor border adjustments, and
self-determination for the Palestinians, coupled with
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realistic security agreements and some form of Arab
recognition of Israel.
26. The Arabs agree that the PLO must play a role
in the negotiations leading to a final settlement. They
view this condition-which was endorsed by all Arab
states at the 1974 Rabat summit-as crucial and would
agree to modify it only if the PLO consented. The
absence of provisions for a PLO role is a major reason
for Arab rejection of the Camp David process.
27. The Arabs would reject any settlement that
stops short of giving the Palestinians self-determina-
tion and the right to establish a separate state. Pro-
posals offering them self-rule or autonomy under
permanent Israeli control find no support in the Arab
world, although many Arab states would be likely to
accept the idea that even a Palestinian entity or
homeland must have long-term limitations on its
sovereignty by being linked to Jordan. There is unani-
mous agreement that any final settlement must pro-
vide for either Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem
or the internationalization of the entire city.
28. Despite the widespread Arab criticism of the
Camp David process, the moderate Arab states see the
Israeli-Egyptian treaty process as a model for the
ultimate settlement of the remaining territorial dis-
putes. Just as Israel agreed to a phased- withdrawal
from the Sinai in return for recognition and firm
security guarantees, so the Arabs maintain that the
remaining territories-the West Bank, Gaza, the
Golan, and East Jerusalem-should be evacuated in
return for recognition and internationally guaranteed
security arrangements. The moderates are prepared to
leave the ultimate disposition of Israeli settlements in
the occupied territories to negotiations among Israel,
Syria, and whatever form of Palestinian entity
emerges on the West Bank.
Jordan
29. King Hussein seeks a settlement that meets
minimum Palestinian demands-self-determination
and ultimate Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank,
Gaza, and East Jerusalem-but does not permit the
emergence of a radical Palestinian state. Hussein
believes his interests would be best protected by a
settlement that provides for close ties between Jordan
and whatever Palestinian entity emerges from the
negotiating process. He would prefer a solution giving
Amman direct control over a West Bank/Gazan en-
tity's foreign and defense affairs but is probably
prepared to settle for an agreement that gives him
influence over its policy. He also hopes that his ties to
influential sections of the West Bank leadership will
enable him to exert influence there and block radical
Palestinian subversion.
30. Hussein opposes the Camp David process in
part because he believes it will not meet minimum
Palestinian demands. The King is also concerned that
the United States and Israel could collaborate on a
negotiating strategy based on Defense Minister
Sharon's view envisioning Jordan as the Palestinian
state. He is particularly apprehensive about growing
Palestinian political frustrations due to the negotiating
stalemate because he fears this could lead to domestic
instability in Jordan, where nearly 60 percent of the
population is of Palestinian origin. Hussein insists that
any final settlement be endorsed by all major Arab
parties-he has for this reason always preferred a
unified Arab negotiating delegation-so that blame for
the inevitable concessions to Israel be shared by all
Arabs. Jordan's military weakness vis-a-vis its neigh-
bors, dependence on Arab financial aid, and vulner-
ability to subversion require that the King remain
close to the Arab consensus on peace negotiating issues.
31. The Jordanians will accept minor, mutual terri-
torial modifications in the pre-1967 borders in the
context of. a final peace agreement. Senior Jordanian
officials have occasionally hinted that they might be
willing to accept Israeli grants of economic privileges
to a Palestinian entity-for example, port privileges at
Haifa-in exchange for minor territorial concessions.
32. The Jordanian position on Jerusalem is firm.
The King, who remains deeply concerned about
charges that he failed to defend the. city adequately
during the 1967 war, insists that any final settlement
must return East Jerusalem to Arab control. He has
indicated, however, that if this were to occur Jerusa-
lem could remain a united city. .
Syria
33. Despite its hardline rhetoric, Syria is willing
under appropriate circumstances to reach a negotiatec
settlement with Israel. President Assad is under little
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pressure to do so, however. He almost certainly views
Israel's recent de facto annexation of the Golan
Heights as a nullification of UN Resolution 338, which
incorporates UN Resolution 242 and is the basis of the
Golan disengagement agreement. Assad's position on
peace negotiations will harden-he may insist that
Israel rescind its annexation law before negotiations
can begin-and he will be even more skeptical of the
US commitment to pursue a comprehensive peace
settlement.
34. The virtual annexation of the Golan Heights
disregards an internationally recognized boundary that
was drawn by Britian and France in accordance with
the Franco-British agreement of 1920 that established
a French mandate over Syria, including the Golan.
The 1947 partition plan also regarded the Golan as
Syrian territory. Israel has never made a historical
claim of sovereignty over Golan except for minor
disputed areas along the 1949 armistice line that
closely parallels the boundary drawn unilaterally by
the European powers after World War I.
35. Assad views the Camp David framework as an
attempt to divide the Arab world and advance US and
Israeli security interests in the region at Arab expense.
He will have nothing to do with the autonomy talks.
36. Assad's minimum negotiating objectives are to
nullify the Israeli annexation move, and obtain Israeli
agreement to the restoration of Syrian sovereignty in
the occupied Golan Heights and acknowledgment of a
Syrian role in a solution of the Palestinian problem
that satisfies a majority among the PLO. He is deter-
mined to retain a veto over any PLO participation in
negotiations that do not also include Syria or address
the Golan issue.
37. The Syrians are adamant about Israeli acknowl-
edgment of Syrian sovereignty in the Golan Heights
and the removal of all Israeli settlements there. They
have not, however, ruled out the possibility of very
minor but reciprocal border adjustments. Adjustments
might be made in the northern triborder area where
Israel, Syria, and Lebanon now meet, or in the three
demilitarized zones established by the 1949 armistice
accord.
38. The Syrians have said that, if Israel acknowl-
edged Syria's sovereignty in the Golan, they would
accept UN peacekeeping forces and demilitarization
on both sides of the border. They would also accept a
phased withdrawal that conceivably could leave some
Israeli forces on the western rim of the Golan for some
time.
39. Assad views peace with Israel as a passive
coexistence of two basically separate communities. He
would prefer to sign a treaty and then ignore Israel
completely. Although he now rejects the concept of
normalizing relations with Israel, he probably realizes
that he will have to concede-albeit grudgingly-
diplomatic recognition and some steps toward normal-
ization.
40. For Syria, negotiations on the Golan issue can-
not be separated from the Palestinian problem. The
former is the sine qua non of Syrian foreign policy and
Syria will use any and all levers over the PLO,
including assassination, to ensure that its interests are
fully protected. Assad believes his leverage over the
Palestinians constitutes his principal bargaining chip in
any future negotiations with Israel. Moreover, he will
not. accept a peace settlement that fails to address
Palestinian rights because he cannot afford to ignore
the interests of the 650,000 Palestinians living in Syria
and neighboring Lebanon.
41. Assad has never revealed his ideas on solving the
Palestinian problem, claiming the Palestinians bear
this responsibility. He has endorsed the Palestinians'
right to self-determination, including independence,
but he probably is not firmly committed to the
concept of an independent Palestinian state. If strains
in Syrian-Jordanian relations were to ease, Assad might
accept a political link between the West Bank and
Amman.
42. Syria would probably accept any settlement of
the Jerusalem question agreeable to the Saudis and
most Palestinians. A member of Syria's minority
Alawite sect, Assad will want the orthodox Sunni
Saudis to approve any agreement in order to avoid
criticism from Syria's Sunni majority.
43. Procedural aspects of the negotiating process
are an important part of Syria's core position. The
Syrians want a broader framework than Camp David,
ideally an international conference under UN aus-
pices. In response to Israel's decision on the Golan,
Assad may reject UN Resolution 242 as an adequate
basis for peace negotiations. Participants would in-
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clude Syria, the PLO, Jordan, Israel, and the United
States. To counterbalance US influence in this forum,
the Syrians insist the Soviet Union be included. They
want comprehensive negotiations through issue-orient-
ed committees to avoid separate negotiations through
bilateral committees. They also want the PLO to be an
equal party in negotiations, presumably to assume the
primary responsibility for making concessions on the
West Bank.
Saudi Arabia
44. The Saudis believe the unresolved Palestinian
problem poses a direct threat to their security, that this
issue fuels Arab radicalism, gives the Soviets oppor-
tunities to expand their influence in the region, and
drives a wedge between the United States and moder-
ate pro-Western Arab governments. The Camp David
process in their view has only made matters worse.
They are convinced that no agreement will gain
legitimacy in Arab eyes and defuse the conflict be-
tween Arabs and Israelis unless the PLO is brought
into the peace process and endorses the final results.
45. Their preferred approach would be for the
PLO and Israel to recognize each other and engage in
direct negotiations. At. the same time, they want to
deny Moscow an opportunity to exploit negotiations
for its own purposes. The Saudis do not necessarily
oppose other approaches to negotiations, such as allow-
ing the Jordanians to negotiate for the PLO-if the
latter agrees-for the return of the occupied territor-
ies; they simply believe these offer less chance of
success.
46. The Saudis believe the PLO will be induced to
make concessions to Israel only if Israel and the United
States in turn are prepared to acknowledge the Pales-
tinians' right to self-determination, including the. set-
ting up of their own state. The Saudis believe that a
Palestinian state, dominated by the PLO and especial-
ly under Fatah leadership, would be very susceptible
not only to Israeli and Jordanian pressure but also to
Saudi financial leverage, thus diminishing the poten-
tial of Soviet influence.
47. Nevertheless, the Saudis are not wedded to the
idea of an independent state and would acquiesce if
Arafat were. prepared to compromise on this issue or
on others, such as the question of Israeli settlements,
the stationing of Israeli troops for a time in the West
Bank and Gaza, or confederal ties between Jordan and
a Palestinian entity. They might even be willing to use
their influence with the PLO to promote compromises
on some issues.
48. As guardians of the Muslim holy places in
Mecca and Medina, the Saudis reserve a special
interest in the status of Jerusalem-the third holiest
site in Islam. Saudi leaders are more concerned about
the future of Jerusalem than other Arabs and are likely
to be particularly inflexible on this issue. As a practical
matter, however, if a compromise over Jerusalem. were
the only thing standing in the way of the comprehen-
sive peace settlement they badly want, the Saudis
would be more flexible. What they cannot accept is
Israeli sovereignty over the Islamic holy sites. Some
variation of joint Arab-Israeli sovereignty over the city
that allowed Jerusalem to remain united might be
palatable. The late King Faysal also indicated in 1974
that he could accept the internationalization of the
city.
49. Although the Saudis have adamantly refused to
play a direct role in negotiations with Israel, they have
already signaled their readiness to work with the
United States to achieve the settlement they seek.
They see their peace initiative as providing a possible
bridge between the Camp David process and a new
broader negotiating framework, as a way of keeping
the Soviets out, and bringing the PLO into the negoti-
ating process. Should they attempt to overcome their
recent setback at the Fez summit, this will present the
United States with both new opportunities and prob-
lems in trying to move the peace process forward and
maintain good relations with both Israel and Saudi
Arabia.
Egypt
50. Egypt's key objective in the Arab-Israeli dispute
since the 1967 war has been to recover the Sinai
Peninsula. Cairo now sees that goal within reach and is
beginning to focus on its next objective-ending the
isolation of Egypt caused by Arab rejection of the
Camp David process.
51. To regain its standing in the Arab world after
Israel's final withdrawal from Sinai next April, Egypt
will continue its active role in seeking a resolution of
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the Palestinian problem. Significant domestic political
constituencies, including the powerful Islamic funda-
mentalist sentiments, will also influence Egyptian
leaders to maintain their involvement in the Arab-
Israeli dispute.
52. The Egyptians are prepared to be flexible in the
negotiations, however, and would probably endorse
any solution, including one on East Jerusalem, accept-
able to the moderate Arab states led by Saudi Arabia
and the mainstream of the PLO led by Arafat. They
have cautiously endorsed the Saudi peace plan.
53. Cairo would prefer the creation of a fully
autonomous entity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as
envisioned in the Camp David agreements-that is,
one linked to Jordan and not dominated by the PLO.
Arab East Jerusalem would be under the jurisdiction
of a self-governing authority. The Egyptians believe
that, to entice the Palestinians into the negotiating
process, the self-governing authority must have sub-
stantial control over land and water rights, legislative
powers, and an effective veto over Israeli settlement
activity. Palestinian rights should be substantially
limited only in foreign and military affairs.
54. Aware of but not persuaded by Israel's ideologi-
cal and security reasons for attempting to retain
control of the West Bank, Cairo has long favored using
the relatively small and less controversial Gaza Strip-
occupied by Egypt from 1948 to 1967-as a test case
for implementing an autonomy agreement.
55. Egypt believes that after a transitional period
the Palestinian entity should be linked with Jordan
probably in some form of confederation. President
Moubarek, like the late Anwar Sadat, does not want a
fully independent PLO-dominated state in the West
Bank because, unlike the Saudis, he fears such an
entity would be pro-Soviet and a threat to regional
stability. The Egyptians also oppose creation of a
PLO-dominated state to replace Israel.
Radical States
56. Almost alone, Libya and South Yemen continue
to support the rejectionist position, demanding the
destruction of Israel and the expulsion of all Jews who
arrived in Palestine after 1917. These states are closest
to the radical Palestinian groups and support their
demands for a democratic, secular state in all of
Palestine. The rejectionist position is probably not
subject to negotiation. Iraq, however, would be likely
to go along with a solution that satisfied the minimum
conditions of the PLO and an Arab consensus, includ-
ing Syria. The rejectionists have little leverage with the
major actors on the Palestinian question and would not
be in a position to thwart any agreement with Israel
supported by Arafat, the moderate Arabs, and Syria.
Nevertheless, they would seek to undermine an agree-
ment with terrorist activity, and the rejectionist states
would probably continue to train and fund extremist
Palestinians.
The View From Moscow
57. The Soviets approach the Palestinian question
primarily from the perspective of how it affects the
US-Soviet rivalry for influence in the Middle East.
They have adopted the Palestinian cause because they
see it as a prime vehicle for eroding US influence and
ensuring their own position in the region. They also
manipulate the issue to erode US international influ-
ence, win support for their policies in the Muslim
world, influence the behavior of Third World actors,
and enhance their position in international forums.
Moreover, the Soviets hope that strong support for the
PLO will get them a seat at the Arab-Israeli negotiat-
ing table, signifying international recognition of the
USSR's "legitimate role" in the Middle East.
58. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union does not neces-
sarily want to see a full solution to the Palestinian
problem. Moscow benefits from its prolongation be-
cause the tensions it generates between the United
States and most of the Arab states constitute a major
obstacle to improvement in US-Arab relations. Region-
al tensions also promote Arab dependence on Soviet
backing. At the same time, however, Moscow is not
intent on blocking any and every settlement. For one
thing, the Soviets realize that, if all sides came to an
agreement, they would not have the leverage to
obstruct it. For another, they probably think that any
Palestinian state would be a continual source of Arab-
Israeli and intra-Arab friction and would be at least
partly dependent on the USSR for support.
59. By design, the Soviet Union's position on the
specifics of a Palestinian settlement remains somewhat
ambiguous. This is due to Moscow's interest in main-
taining maximum flexibility and avoiding criticism
from one or another of its Arab allies.
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60. The basic Soviet position is that an independent
Palestinian state should be established alongside,
rather than as a replacement for, the present state of
Israel. This position is incorporated in the longstanding
Soviet proposal for an international conference on the
Middle East with PLO participation, tabled again by
President Brezhnev this past February. It calls for:
- Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories seized
in 1967.
- Recognition of the "inalienable rights" of the
Palestinians to create their own state.
- Guarantees of the security and sovereignty of all
states in the region, including Israel.
61. The Soviets' view of any settlement plan de-
pends not so much on its substance but on its origins,
its patrons, and the position their Arab clients, espe-
cially Syria, adopt toward it. The USSR's public stance
is more balanced than that of its Arab allies and, if it
could obtain a major role in the peace negotiations, it
would probably make some attempt to persuade them
to moderate their position. But just as Moscow would
not be able to block a settlement all sides agreed to,
neither does it possess the leverage to convince the
more hardline Arabs to accept an agreement that does
not meet their objectives.
The UN and EC Roles
62. Most Israelis view the United Nations and the
European Community with deep suspicion and oppose
UN or EC participation in peace negotiations. UN
agreement to accord the PLO observer status in 1974
and repeated Arab successes in the General Assembly
and other UN bodies in passing harshly worded resolu-
tions calling for total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-
June 1967 borders have reinforced the Israelis' convic-
tion, that the UN is incapable of acting impartially.
The Israelis, moreover, vividly recall UN Secretary
General U Thant's quick agreement to President
Nasir's request in May 1967 to remove UN observer
forces from the Sinai-an action that hastened the Six-
Day War the following month.
63. The Israelis are convinced that the EC, because
of its member states' dependence on Arab oil, is
increasingly biased in favor of the Arab position on
peace negotiation issues. EC attempts to link participa-
tion in the Sinai peacekeeping force to the Venice
Declaration and support among some member states
for the Saudi peace proposal have reinforced this
conviction.
64. Nevertheless, Israeli leaders would welcome UN
and EC endorsement of a final peace settlement and
the participation of member states in monitoring
demilitarized zones and other military aspects of the
treaty arrangements. Israel would aim to gain interna-
tional legitimacy for the peace arrangement and there-
by to strengthen the long-term prospects that the Arab
signatories would abide by their treaty commitments.
65. The Arabs generally favor UN and EC partici-
pation in negotiations in the belief that this will give
them greater leverage with the United States to move
it closer to the Arab position and perhaps recognize the
PLO, while at the same time bringing greater pressure
on Israel to be more flexible. Some moderate Arabs,
such as Jordan, also see the Europeans as potentially
useful in getting the PLO to move toward recognition
of Israel, something the Arab moderates realize is
crucial to an overall settlement but are reluctant to do
themselves.
66. The Arabs see the UN General Assembly as
providing a useful platform for gaining international
legitimacy for Arab positions and for reinforcing the
PLO's claim to be the sole, legitimate representative of
the Palestinian people. Arab moderates also see the
UN Security Council as offering a useful forum for
bringing the PLO into the peace process. They believe
that an amendment of UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 242 recognizing Palestinian political rights could
enable the PLO publicly to accept the resolution and
thereby meet US conditions for opening a dialogue
with the PLO. Most Arabs agree that some form of
transitional arrangement will be necessary to oversee
Israeli withdrawals and believe the UN best suited to
monitor this process.
67. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) is the UN agency responsible for aid to
needy Palestinian refugees. Over 1.6 million Palestin-
ians in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Israeli-
occupied territories are registered UNRWA refugees,
to whom UNRWA provides rations, social services,
jobs, and educational opportunities. Almost 650,000
live in UNRWA camps. Most Palestinians consider
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UNRWA's records as the main authority through
which they can establish their Palestinian identity and
document their right to return to their former homes
or receive compensation under a peace settlement.
Conclusions
68. Israel will press ahead with the autonomy talks,
although Prime Minister Begin apparently has decided
not to set any deadline for concluding a limited
Palestinian autonomy agreement, following fruitless
negotiating sessions this fall in Tel Aviv and Cairo. He
previously had sought to secure a minimal agreement
on the size and administrative functions of a future
autonomy council before his leverage with Egypt
decreases following Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai
next April. After returning the Sinai, Israel will be
even more sensitive about security issues and signs that
its Camp David partners are backing away from the
agreement. Therefore, Begin will continue to insist
that Egypt and the United States accept his interpreta-
tion of the Camp David concept of autonomy. Begin
hopes that, by assuring continuing US support, he can
continue to deflect growing West European and Arab
pressures for an alternative negotiating framework,
such as the Saudi peace proposals.
69. Defense Minister Sharon-whom Begin has
charged with primary responsibility for strengthening
Israel's control over the West Bank-is likely to redou-
ble his efforts to foster a pliable alternative West Bank
Palestinian leadership willing to accept the autonomy
framework. To this end, he will continue to boost West
Bank village associations. Association leaders, generally
employees of the Israeli military government, are in a
position to deny funding for projects not sponsored by
their organization. The Israelis also have begun to
allow on a selective basis the return of relatively
moderate West Bank leaders deported in previous
years. This action has stirred local Palestinian fears
that the Israelis may be preparing to run an alternative
slate in a new round of municipal elections in hopes of
unseating the current group of pro-PLO mayors and
councilmen.
70. Arab moderates will intensify their efforts in
the months ahead to get the United States to move
away from Camp David and the autonomy process
and open a dialogue with the PLO. They are likely to
postpone a major campaign on this issue until after
April 1982, however, so as not to jeopardize Israeli
withdrawal from the Sinai and maximize their chances
of weaning Egypt away from Camp David. Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Persian Gulf states-
already concerned about Palestinian-sponsored unrest
growing out of a continued stalemate-will increase
their warnings to the United States that progress on
issues of bilateral concern-such as strategic coopera-
tion against the Soviet threat to the region-cannot
take place unless the Palestinian issue is confronted in
a framework more acceptable to the Palestinians.
They will urge Washington to consider alternative
approaches, such as a return to the Geneva Conference
or a new international conference. Despite their mis-
givings about Soviet intentions in the area, many of the
moderates will argue that Moscow should be included
in any new approach.
71. After withdrawal from Sinai in April, Israel's
leverage with Egypt will decline significantly. If there
has been no progress in the autonomy negotiations, the
Egyptians will look for a supplementary negotiating
process. They have already expressed interest in the
Saudi peace plan and the European initiative as
possible options.
72. The Egyptians are convinced that progress on
the Palestinian issue is an essential prerequisite for
building a viable anti-Soviet consensus in the Arab
world. However, they are unlikely to link cooperation
with the United States on strategic issues directly to
Washington's role in the peace process. The Egyptians
may be less forthcoming on strategic issues if they
believe US policy on Arab-Israeli matters damages
their efforts to improve their ties with the other Arabs
or greatly increases the risk of domestic instability.
73. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is likely to
endure in spite of growing Arab pressure for an
alternative to Camp David. Few Egyptians are eager
for a renewed state of belligerency with Israel, and
Egypt's military is well aware of its inferiority to that
of Israel. The Egyptians will probably adhere to the
military protocols of the peace treaty and avoid any
action that might in their view give Israel an excuse to
reoccupy the Sinai Peninsula.
74. The Egyptian-Israeli normalization process,
however, is more likely to become strained. There has
never been broad support in Egypt for close relations
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with Israel, and President Moubarek may choose to
allow normalization to wither if there is no progress on
the Palestinian issue after next April.
75. If the Israelis unilaterally impose "administra-
tive" autonomy in the occupied territories, Moubarek
might downgrade diplomatic ties with Israel while
adhering to the military disengagement protocols of
the peace treaty. Egypt's efforts to improve its ties
with the other Arabs probably will also put additional
strains in the relationship with Israel.
76. A continued reliance by the United States on
the Camp David autonomy framework is likely to lead
to growing pressure from PLO extremists on Arafat to
abandon his diplomatic campaign and return to a
more confrontational approach. While he may be able
to resist calls for a return to extensive international
terrorism-which he views as counterproductive at
this time-he would at a minimum try to deflect
internal pressure from the extremists by expanding
PLO attacks on Israel and in the- occupied territories.
77. Periodic unrest on the West Bank is also likely
to continue. Those few West Bankers willing to associ-
ate themselves with the autonomy talks will be
marked for assassination by the PLO. Protests against
Israeli settlements will increase, as will tensions be-
tween Arabs and militant Jewish settlers.
78. A continued stalemate on the Palestinian issue
also troubles Arab moderates because they believe this
will eventually spark unrest in countries with large
Palestinian populations. These concerns are greatest in
Jordan, where nearly 60 percent of the population is of
Palestinian origin, and Kuwait, where about 20 per-
cent of the population are Palestinians.
79. King Hussein fears that a continued stalemate
could threaten Hashemite rule. Although Jordan's
Palestinian majority has been relatively quiescent in
recent years, Hussein realizes that the Palestinians will
eventually endanger Jordan's internal stability by
seeking political power commensurate with their num-
bers. He also fears it could lead to greatly expanded
PLO efforts to launch attacks into Israel from Jordan.
Amman could not completely contain such efforts. If
such a campaign were successful, the Israelis would be
likely to launch retaliatory attacks against targets in
Jordan, leading to a rapid escalation of tensions
throughout the region. A continuing stalemate would
probably lead to pressure from hardline Arabs-
particularly Syria-on Jordan to allow the PLO to
expand its military presence on the East Bank. Hussein
would almost certainly resist such pressures, leading to
further deterioration in Jordan's relations with the
PLO, Damascus, and perhaps other Arab states. Stale-
mate would also complicate his relations with the
United States.
80. Syria will continue to oppose the autonomy
talks and seek to maintain Arab opposition to the
Camp David framework. At a minimum, Assad will
keep pressure on Arafat and Jordan to preclude a
unilateral Palestinian peace initiative and to impede a
common Jordanian-PLO negotiating stance. He may
also periodically increase tensions in Lebanon to main-
tain leverage on the Palestinians and to convince the
other Arabs and the United States that they must take
Syria's vital interests into account.
81. If Assad felt he was losing leverage on the
Palestinian question, his likely courses of action would
be moves toward destabilizing Lebanon, menacing
military moves toward Jordan, or use of Palestinian
splinter groups for terrorism to embarrass Arafat or for
subversion in Jordan. Assad is less likely to provoke
clashes with Israel in the Golan because they would
almost certainly escalate quickly into major hostilities.
82. An essential ingredient for an internal political
settlement in Lebanon is a resolution of the Palestinian
issue. The presence of about 400,000 Palestinians
(mostly Muslims) in Lebanon has upset the precarious
communal balance there, further weakened the cen-
tral government, and drawn Lebanon more deeply
into the Arab-Israeli conflict. Contrary to Lebanese
Government desires, Lebanon is the one country
where the PLO has substantial freedom of movement.
The Palestinians have, in fact, carved out an area in
south-central Lebanon where they have established
major military camps, depots, and training areas for
the bulk of their 15,000 to 20,000 armed personnel in
Lebanon. The PLO will resist any efforts to circum-
scribe its ability to operate freely against Israel from
Lebanon in the absence of a peace settlement, and
oppose any internal Lebanese solution that limits its
freedom.
83. The Saudis probably are unsure how to proceed
now that their peace initiative has encountered stiff
Syrian-led opposition. They may adopt a much less
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activist policy and again look to others to take the lead
toward seeking a solution of the Arab-Israeli issue.
They will expect the United States to keep an open
mind about their peace initiative. They had hoped to
gain eventual US support for their plan. They are
hardly likely to press for US consideration before they
gain the elusive consensus they sought at Fez. Instead,
they are likely to bide their time until after Egypt
regains the Sinai in hopes of enlisting Egyptian cooper-
ation for a renewed effort to expand the negotiating
framework.
84. Should US-Saudi relations become strained as a
result of differences over the negotiating process, the
Saudis could be expected to adopt a cooler attitude
toward political and strategic cooperation with the
United States in the region and over time to reassess
their refusal thus far to deal with Moscow. The Saudis
would see this as necessary to protect their domestic
position and relations with other Arabs, which they
regard as even more vital to their security than good
relations with the United States. They would be
unlikely, however, to use their oil or financial leverage
in a heavyhanded fashion against the United States,
which they realize would not serve their long-term
interests.
85. Any stalemate on the Palestinian dispute would
create fertile ground for the USSR to increase its
influence in the Middle East. Any radicalization of the
PLO and frustration of Damascus would incline them
to look even more toward Moscow for military and
political support. Moscow would stand to benefit from
Egypt's abandonment of the Camp David process.
Even if Soviet-Egyptian relations remained cool, the
USSR would gain assurance that the United States
would not be able to build upon the Camp David
accords and continue to ignore Soviet interests.
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1. This document was disseminated by the National Foreign Assessment Center. This copy
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need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following
officials within their respective departments:
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force
f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps
g. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Intelligence Analysis, for the Depart-
ment of Energy
h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the
Treasury
k. The Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment for any other Department or
Agency
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the National Foreign Assessment Center.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed
or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is Unclassified.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/27: CIA-RDPOOT02041 R000100100001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/27: CIA-RDPOOT02041 R000100100001-4
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/27: CIA-RDPOOT02041 R000100100001-4