COVER ACTION POLICY APPROVAL AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00M00244R000500080005-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 19, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 19, 1985
4.17
NSC/ICS-400030
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination
Procedures (TS)
The President has approved the attached National Security
Decision Directive on Covert Action Policy Approval and
Coordination Procedures. (TS)
Because security is indispensable to the successful conduct of
covert action undertaken in support of US national security,
the NSDD directs that exceptional care be taken to ensure that
covert action policies and the review and approval process for
them remain secure. To support this objective, the NSDD
directs that a separate, specially compartmented control and
access system for all covert action policy matters be
established. All information concerning covert action policy
(i.e., Presidential Findings, Memoranda of Notification, and
related correspondence), as distinct from operational aspects,
shall be protected by this compartment, known as "VEIL." (TS)
The Senior Director of Intelligence Programs, National Security
Council Staff, is designated as administrator for this control
system. Each NSPG member is requested to designate a senior
member of his component as the sole focal point for all matters
related to covert action for both the National Security
Planning Group and Planning and Coordination Group. ..Procedures
for the VEIL control system are attached and should be
incorporated into existing security procedures as a means to
more effectively protect covert action information. (TS)
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Your personal assistance in ensuring the strict limitation of
knowledge of covert action information is vital to the success
of our national security policies. (S)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
? (ii?
Robert C. McFarlane
Attachments (2)
1. National Security Decision
Directive
2. Procedures for Safeguarding
Covert Action Policy Information
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TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
January 18, 1985
National. Sectaity Decittion
Dixective Numbex 159
/VC/ICS-400030
SENSITIVE
COVERT ACTION POLICY APPROVAL
AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES (TS)
The US faces a variety of threats to its national security
interests as well as opportunities to advance those interests.
Among these threats are the overt and covert efforts of hostile
powers to influence and control international organizations,
governments, and certain non-governmental groups throughout the
world. In particular the Soviet Bloc and terrorist organizations
continue to intervene in the internal affairs of both democratic
and non-democratic countries and to use any means considered
effective to achieve their ends. These include covert political
action and propaganda and paramilitary and intelligence support
programs to assist their allies and damage their opponents,
including actions to subvert democratic elections, organize and
support coups d'etats, terrorism, insurgencies, and spread
disinformation designed to discredit the US and its allies.
(TS)
While the US will not make use of most of the techniques
employed by our adversaries, we must be prepared to counter
such efforts and to assist our allies and friends in resisting
these threats. The US requires a range of national security
tools to protect and advance its interests. When the President
determines that it is appropriate, he must have at his disposal
appropriate means to assist allies and friends and to influence
the actions of foreign countries, including the means to affect
behavior both when the US wishes to acknowledge its role, and
to do this covertly when the revelation of US sponsorship,
support, or assistance would adversely affect US interests.
These tools include overt and covert diplomatic information
channels, political action, and covert action including para-
military and intelligence support programs. (TS)
To ensure that all means are considered and utilized effec-
tively to serve policy purposes, there is a need to review
fully and integrate covert with overt activities. Covert
action must be consistent with and supportive of national
policy and must be placed appropriately within a national
security policy framework. Covert action must never be used as
a substitute for policy. The National Security Council must
coordinate all of the instruments of US national security, and
the President must decide which purposes can best be accom-
plished by covert action. (TS)
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Moreover, while the Constitution and the National Security Act
of 1947 sanction the use of covert action, subsequent
authorizations impose special reporting requirements. Covert
activities, therefore, require special review and control
mechanisms. At the same time, exceptional care must also be
taken to ensure that while there may be overt manifestations of
covert action, the decision and review process, as well as the
specific intelligence means and techniques that are used
covertly always remain secure. (TS)
Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this NSDD is to establish procedures for the
planning, approval, and coordination of covert action (intelli-
gence "special activities" under Executive Order 12333) and for
the review and evaluation of these activities in order to
ensure that they continuously derive from and support US
national security objectives and are integrated fully into
overall US policy. Knowledge of covert action policies,
decisions, and programs shall be strictly limited to the
absolute minimum number of senior officials and their immediate
staff focal points. To the extent possible, knowledge of
policies, deliberations, and programs; knowledge of operations;
and knowledge of supporting information or activities will be
strictly compartmented from each other. (TS)
In support of these objectives and this process, the following
procedures and responsibilities are established:
Approval Procedures for Intelligence
1. Presidential Findings. The President shall approve
all covert action Findings in writing. Under Section 662 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, all covert
actions undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency must be
authorized by a Presidential Finding that each such operation
is important to US national security. E.O. 12333 and this
Directive establish that covert actions (intelligence "special
activities") undertaken by components other than CIA also
require a presidential Finding. Each covert action is also
considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity
under Section 501 of the National Security Act and is subject
to certain Congressional reporting procedures. The
Congressional reporting procedures for significant intelligence
activities apply to all agencies of the intelligences,community.
Findings shall remain valid until formally cancelled. (TS)
2. In accordance with Executive Order 12333, the Central
Intelligence Agency shall conduct covert actions unless the
President specifically designates another agency of the govern-
ment. When the provision of substantial support by one govern-
ment component to another is essential to the conduct of a
covert action, indication of the extent and nature of that
support shall be included as part of the Finding or Memorandum
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of Notification. However, the provision of routine support in
the form of personnel, funds, equipment, supplies, transporta-
tion, training, logistics, and facilities by Government compo-
nents other than CIA to support a covert action shall not in
itself be considered a separate covert action by the supplying
agency. (TS)
3. Memorandum of Notification (MON). The MON is the
means by which CIA or other designated components seek approval
for a substantial change or modification in the means of
implementation, resource level, other change in assets or level
of activity, or when there has been a significant change in the
operational conditions or risks associated with a covert action
program. The President shall approve all such modifications to
existing covert action Findings. All such changes must be
within the scope of authorities granted by an existing
Presidential Finding. MONs shall not be used to exceed the -
limits authorized in the Finding or to modify objectives,
targets, or add foreign states, organizations, or individuals
of countries other than those authorized in the Finding. The
MON shall also be used to request cancellation or suspension of
a Finding for which action has been completed, which has been
bypassed by events, or which, for other reasons, should be
cancelled. (TS)
National Security Planning Group (NSPG).
The National Security Planning Group, as a committee of the
National Security Council, shall provide a recommendation to
the President on each proposed covert action or proposed
modification to an ongoing covert action. (TS)
1. For consideration of covert action, the NSPG shall
consist of the following members:
The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Counsellor to the President
The Director of Central Intelligence
Chief of Staff to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Attorney General and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget, and others as appropriate, shall attend
NSPG meetings for covert action consideration. (C)
2. The NSPG is the component of the National Security
Council authorized to establish, review, evaluate, provide
guidance for and direction to the conduct of covert action anbititt.a,
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ensure coordination of covert action with other instruments of
US national security policy. Proposed Findings and Memoranda
of Notification shall be sent in writing to the President via
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
together with the recommendation of the NSPG including dissents
of any member on the recommendations. (TS)
3. The NSPG shall periodically review policy for the
conduct of covert actions, evaluate covert action programs and
operations for adequacy and efficacy and recommend the assign-
ment of resources. The NSPG shall review the funding for
covert actions to be included in the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program and the programs of other US Government
components and report to the President on the adequacy of US
covert action programs and capabilities. (TS)
4. The NSPG annually shall review all current covert
action programs and seek the President's concurrence in the
continuation of each program. (TS)
5. The Senior Director for Intelligence Programs,
National Security Council Staff, shall act as recorder of
written minutes at NSPG meetings, prepare papers for and
maintain records of NSPG meetings and administer the special
access security compartment protecting covert action policies.
(C)
Planning and Coordination Group (PCG)
A senior level Planning and Coordination Group (PCG) is estab-
lished to review covert action proposals and implementation for
the purpose of ensuring their effectiveness and their
integration with other aspects of US national security policy.
The PCG replaces all ad hoc interagency groups for this
purpose. The PCG shall consist of a representative of the
Office of the Vice President, the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
the Deputy Director of CIA for Operations, the Assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and be chaired by the
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. Representatives of other departments and agencies may
be invited to attend on a case-by-case basis. In carrying out
its responsibilities, the PCG shall:
1. Ensure that covert action programs are coordinated
with related US Government national security actioneso that
they are mutually supportive. (TS)
2. Review each proposed covert action Finding or pro-
posed modification to an ongoing covert action to ensure that
such activities support US policies and make recommendations on
each proposed covert action to the NSPG, including the dissent,
if any, of PCG members. (TS) 07(w. LetwAot-#447) 440,41.5
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3. Provide continuing review and evaluation of ongoing
covert actions to ensure they meet policy objectives and ensure
preparation of an annual review for submission to the NSPG.
(TS)
4. Review the nature of the threat or opportunity to be
addressed by each proposed covert action, including US
interests, objectives and plans (political, economic, military,
etc.), resources available, legal considerations, Congressional
and legislative requirements, public and media issues, and
security requirements. (TS)
5. Identify situations and areas in which covert action
should be used to support policies to meet threats to US
national security or which present opportunities to advance US
interests. (TS)
6. Develop and coordinate Congressional briefing,
legislative and, if appropriate, public affairs strategies for
covert action programs. (TS)
7. Recommend and coordinate operational security and
cover strategies which will enhance the likelihood of success-
ful execution of covert actions. (TS)
Coordination Procedures
1. Unless otherwise authorized, all proposed Findings
and Memoranda of Notification shall be prepared by the compo-
nent selected by the President to perform the covert action
for staffing and deliberation by the PCG and the NSPG. Other
components of the US Government shall participate in the
drafting of proposed Findings and Memoranda of Notification
when they provide substantial support essential to the conduct
of covert action by another component. (TS)
2. Draft Findings and MONs shall be submitted to the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for
further circulation to PCG and NSPG principals via the desig-
nated staff focal points. (TS)
3.. At the direction of the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Senior Director of Intelli-
gence Programs, National Security Council Staff, shall distri-
bute, via the designated staff focal points, draft copies of
proposed Findings and MONs. (C)
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4. The PCG shall meet to review each proposed Finding
and MON and shall provide its comments and recommendations and
the comments and recommendations of individual members, includ-
ing dissents when appropriate, through the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs to the DCI for prepara-
tion of Findings and MONs to be forwarded to the NSPG for final
consideration. When substantive changes to a iyiosed Finding
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or MON are recommended by the PCG, the revised draft Finding or
MON shall be circulated to the PCG members prior to NSPG
consideration. (TS)
5. The NSPG shall review all Findings and MONs and shall
transmit them together with any additional comments,
recommendations or dissents, via the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs to the President for approval.
Concurrence on MONs may be via a signed memorandum in lieu of a
formal NSPG meeting unless any NSPG member requests a formal
meeting. (TS)
6. Normally a minimum of four working days shall be
available to PCG and NSPG members for processing Findings and
MONs at each level prior to meetings or votes. (S)
7. The Senior Director of Intelligence Programs,
National Security Council, shall make available a copy of the
final proposed Finding to the Attorney General, and the Direc-
tor, Office of Management and Budget for legal and budgetary
review at least three full days before NSPG deliberation. (TS)
8. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be pre-
pared to brief the final proposed Finding to the Attorney
General; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; or
other NSPG members at least three full days prior to the NSPG
meeting. (TS)
9. NSPG members shall be notified in writing by the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of the
President's decision on all Findings and MONs. (TS)
10. The original approved Finding and MON shall be
retained for record purposes by the Senior Director of Intelli-
gence Programs, NSC Staff. A record copy shall be provided to
the Director of Central Intelligence or to other components
undertaking a covert action. No other copies of approved
Findings or MONs are authorized. (TS)
Congressional Notification Procedures
.1. Section 501 of the National Security Act requires the
DCI and the heads of all other components of the US Government
involved in intelligence activities to keep the Intelligence
Committees of the Congress fully and currently informed of all
si4ffificant-Wfticipata-intelligence activities incTtding
covert action. The Director of Central Intelligence has
primary responsibility for reporting covert actions to the
Congress. Representatives of other components shall report
jointly with the.Director of Central Intelligence to the
Congressional Intelligence Committees in those instances when
that component is conducting a covert action or when the NSPG
deems it appropriate. (TS) 01,440 9 0443
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2. Advisory. In accordance with procedures agreed to
with the Congress, the DCI shall provide the Congress with a
briefing on each Finding and MON after they have been approved.
by the President. This briefing shall consist of an "advisory"
which shall be provided to the PCG and NSPG with each proposed
Finding and MON. This advisory, undated and unsigned, shall
describe the Finding or MON, the scope of each, and those
additional elements required by the agreed Congressional
reporting procedures. Since the Congressional reporting
procedures permit oral notification, no _paper other than_the
aglyi_q_c_Ty_1411_11 be provided to_the_Congress. It is intended i
that this advisory reprice the scope paper and MON as the
instrument of Congressional notification. (TS)
Security Procedures
1. Security is indispensable to the successful conduct .
of covert action. Therefore, security requirements and
administration are major elements in the development of covert
action policy. The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs shall establish a separate, specially
compartmented control and access system at the Top Secret
classification level for all policy matters concerning covert
action. Each NSPG member shall ensure that access to informa-
tion on US covert action policies shall be restricted to the
absolute minimum number of persons possible. (TS)
2. Each NSPG member shall designate one senior member of
his component as the sole focal point for all matters related
to covert action for both the PCG and the NSPG. Each focal
point shall strictly adhere to the special access security
compartment procedures regarding covert action policies to be
promulgated under separate cover. In accordance with these
procedures, each focal point shall develop implementing
procedures for ensuring strict limitation of knowledge and for
separating knowledge of covert action policy from operational
or support information and knowledge within other elements of
his component. (TS)
3. NSPG members shall ensure that the absolute minimum
number. of documents and files necessary for handling each
covert action are created or maintained. (S)
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PROCEDURES FOR SAFEGUARDING COVERT ACTION POLICY INFORMATION
All information concerning covert action policies and review
and approval procedures (i.e., Presidential Findings and
Memoranda of Notifications and related correspondence) shall be
protected under a separate, specially compartmented control and
access system identified by the unclassified codeword "VEIL."
VEIL information is restricted to members of the National
Security Planning Group (NSPG) and Planning and Coordination
Group (PCG); designated focal points; and an absolute minimum -
number of supporting personnel whose major responsibilities
involve the review, evaluation, development, and/or
implementation of covert action policies and operations.
Access to VEIL information shall be on a "MUST NEED-TO-KNOW"
basis and does not automatically entitle an individual, who has
knowledge of a specific covert action or a particular aspect of
a covert action, to have access to the entire body of VEIL
information.
Designated focal points are responsible for ensuring strict
limitation of knowledge and, to the extent possible, for
separating knowledge of covert action policies from operational
or support information and knowledge within his component.
Additionally, he shall be responsible, within his component,
for receiving and accounting for all VEIL material; conducting
indoctrination briefings and maintaining a record of all
personnel with authorized access; secure handling; storage; and
transmission of VEIL information from his component.
All VEIL information will be copy numbered. Reproduction of
Presidential Findings and Memoranda of Notification is not
authorized.
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