DISCUSSION WITH STAFF AIDE TO SENATOR ROBERT BYRD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00M00244R000500050012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 10, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDPOOM00244R000500050012-8
25X1
CRE
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC #00159-85
10 January 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
Robert Vickers
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Discussion with Staff Aide to Senator Robert Byrd
1. Per arrangements made by OLL, we had a discussion with Mike Epstein
a principal aide to Senator Byrd, who has supported the Senator on SSCI
matters. The general subject was Soviet and Cuban stakes in Nicaragua; the
specific concern was what, if anything, the Soviets and Cubans would do if
the US took escalatory steps against Nicaragua, such as blockade, air
strikes, or intervention.
2. We described in general terms the ideological and strategic
interests felt by Moscow and Havana to be at stake in the Sandinista
revolution, and the sense in those capitals that the Sandinistas are
handling their challenges pretty well. We also stressed the consistent
message from both to the Sandinistas that there are limits to Soviet and
Cuban support if the Sandinistas get into direct military trouble with the
US.
3. Epstein seemed to be fishing for judgments that the Soviets would
"escalate horizontally" in response to US initiatives against Nicaragua,
especially if their own people or assets (e.g., ships) were threatened. He
was told:
We've given some thought to this, but have not done a systematic
review of all Soviet or Cuban options in response to concrete
scenarios.
I Executive Resist
V21
CL BY SIGNERS
DECL OADR
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Jtl. Kt I I
On the whole, the Soviets are likely to avoid "tit-for-tat"
responses just to save face because a) rather than undermine public
support for US actions, militant Soviet responses are likely to
galvanize such support by making it a clear East-West issue, and b)
consequential Soviet actions in areas of real superiority (e.g.,
Berlin) run the risk of an open-ended confrontation but would not
necessarily save the Sandinistas.
3. Further, Epstein was told that the dominant Community view of the
Soviets tends to see them as risk-averse regarding potential confrontations
and cold-blooded in weighing long-term wins and losses in international
power politics. Although probably a sound basis for predicting Soviet
caution in any Central American crisis, it was noted that Kremlin politics
as well as Moscow's concern about superpower reputation might inject some
cc: DDI
NIO/AL (FH)
OLL
Robert Vickers
-
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500050012-8
CONFIDENTIAL
NIO/USSR
10 January 1985
With Bob Vickers, met with Mike Epstein, aid to Senator Byrd, to
discuss Soviet and Cuban attitudes toward Nicaragua, as arranged by
OLL.
NIO and A/NIO did DCI Talking Points on Soviet reactions to Geneva,
leadership developments.
Executive Re ist
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500050012-8
MEMO 4 FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: vie arf;endent Counsel Request #14
5 May 1987
1. Attached is the material you requested from the files of the NIO/USSR
regarding a briefing he and the NIO/LA gave to.Mike Epstein of Senator Byrd's
staff on Soviet and Cuban policy toward Latin America irr January 1985 (page 10
f th
o
a equest)
2. We have no material in our files regarding the breakfast NI0/USSR
attended with a group of Senators and ressmen on 28 April 1986 on Soviet
activity in Central America. A conversation with the former NIO/USSR
indicated that he never wrote up any a 'about that particular session
(pace 5):.., ..:..';
i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500050012-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDPOOM00244ROO0500050012-8
CONFIDENTIAL
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
NIC 01465-85
15 March 1985
National Intel % .. Council
MEMORAt THE41114
4 b,
FROM:
Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Meeting with Senate Staffers
1. On 14 March 1985, I met with Christopher Manion -a -ttaff
assistant to Senator Jesse Helms, to discuss the forthcoming briefing on
19 March with the Senate Foreign Rela,Committee. I outlined In
brief the subjects we were planning;to' ess with the.Committee.
Mr. Manion asked that we. also be,prep, o address the subject;-of
Sandinista disinformation and Sandini volvement in rug
trafficking. He also mentioned that,", uld`. wide
specific' ntelligence-information o help
American clergy and other individuals more,sympathe'tict
assessment of the Sandinista regime and that provided. by
of why there is such a difference between the Intelligenc
and that I should expect to be questioned on't closely in u y
for the SSCI. He added that I should be prepared to addre on
would bean extremely important estimate in influencing-Sena
from cover to cover and was trying to determine if it had;been'influenced
in any way by policy direction. I assured him that it had'not been and
that in fact I had gone out of my way to try to ensure that it was as
objective as possible in its language and presentation.:,,, He.then
surprised me by asking if we intended to have the Key Judgments
declassified. I.told him that we would not as this:.was,not normally
done, but that the Annex had been declassifiedras 'well ;his thn
Sandinista policy statements. He mentioned that:he'thought
of the estimate and who had reviewed rdinatetl,it,at:-each step of
the way. It was obvious to me :'that7he.had read theest,imate carefully
Sandinista conso]3dation. an particu a an. do Cnow; enesis
Senator Robert .Byrd and. an ex
officio septa e%t f
Mr. Epstein wanted 'toidiscuss rthe ret tit ate n t . p `e ifol
`2. On l5 :March, `T inet with Mike n, R'ff
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP00M00244R000500050012-8
Na telligence Council
25X1
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Weshintuo D.C. 20505
NIC #00159-85
10 January 1985
MEMORANDUM I~ Ofor of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for.USSR
SUBJECT:`
Robert Vickers
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
Discussion with Staff Me;to Senator Robert Byrd
l . er arrangements :made by ;OLi discussion
a principal :aide to Senator.' Byrd, who' pported ":the. Senator. O1.
matters Mle jeneraI sUDjec l1 s ov.i obat ?f jk o , j
the.US=;~i ; scat tor against ua ,such ,as block
2.: riedesCribedin general ;terms the. ideological
and :strate
ic
,
g
interests felt"by Moscow- and Havana to be,'at~stake in the Sandinista
revolution,and the sense those capitals that the: Sandinistas are
handling, their challenges "pretty wel . We " al so stressed the consistent
message from both to the Sandinistas that there are limits toSoviet and
Cuban support if the Sandinistas get into direct military trouble with the
lie
3. Epstein seemed to be fishing for Judgments that the:
$
,
CscalatC horizon ally'" in response to US initiatives against
especially if their own people or assets (e.g.,