FORECASTING AND WARNING MEETING REPORT, 19 JANUARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00M00244R000500040012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NeflMai lnf .tone Counc l
enr".
NIC 00484-84
20 January 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director DDiref ctortofl Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence urricer- rvr nL-N%
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 January
1. Tunisia: Prospects for Further Unrest. The community
representatives agree that e government probably has sufficient time to
meet the kinds of economic grievances that sparked the recent riots. There
was general agreement, however, that the government -- hampered by poor
leadership and leery of imposing austerity measures on the middle class --
may not move quickly enough in the near term and that we may see further
unrest in Tunisia, perhaps as early as the spring.
Two key determinants in the government's ability to deal with
future unrest are the army's attitudes and the status of President
Bourguiba. The army performed well in an internal security role and army
morale is high. We are not, however, sure the army would enjoy prolonged
police-type duties. Moreover, it is likely that senior officers will begin
to demand a larger political say if they are called on to continue a major
internal security role. Bourguiba played a key role in defusing the recent
unrest. If he dies or is incapacitated when unrest breaks out again, we
believe his absence would hinder efforts to bring it under control.
2. Iran-Ira : Developments. There are a number of new developments
a. Reports of SS-12 Scaleboard in Ira : We are inclined to
Analysts felt that the Soviets were
orts
t these re
.
p
W
unlikely to provide them to Iraq for fear of alienating Syria
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since our as warning meeting:
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and possibly harming Soviet arms relationship with Iran.
Moreover, none of these have been previously reported outside
of the Warsaw Pact.
b. Iranian Suicide Attacks on US Naval Targets: The community
et atte for such
direct attacks were not sufficiently substantiated to be' 25X1
Analysts saw little reason for Iran to want to
dibl
cre
e. directly attack the US now -- although all agreed that attacks
through surrogates will continue -- or to take action that
_ would certainly lead to the closure of the Straits of
Hormuz. Analysts felt that the Iranians are more likely to
continue with incremental responses and some analysts felt
that the reports might indicate Iranian preparations for
responding to a. US attack on Iran, which Tehran sees as
increasingly likely.
c. Iranian Exocets: Analysts agreed this report must be taken
seriously. Ine search for likely sellers to Iran is now
centered on Peru and Pakistan, although most analysts felt
that Peru was the most likely donor. There are some
indications that the whole episode may be an elaborately
arranged "sting" designed to swindle Tehran.
AUB President Kerr's
in Terrorism
d
T
.
ren
s
banon: New
3. Le assassination confirms the trend towards individual terrorist attacks on
nationals and diplomats from MNF contributing countries. MNF precautions
against suicide car bomb attacks may well have convinced the terrorist
groups -- and we believe that radical Shia backed by Iran are responsible
for the attacks -- to switch targets. Terrorists will now focus on small,
be targets. and hit
individual targets, useM~asoldiers willsilencer-equipped
and run type attacks.
One analysts suggested that the contrast between the kidnapping
last year of AUB President Dodge -- who was"subsequently released -- and
the assassination of Kerr might indicate growing differences between the
radical Shia and Syria. Some evidence suggests the radical Shia who
kidnapped Dodge had wanted to try and execute him but were apparently
prevented from doing so by Syria, which arranged his release. The
radicals, fearing Syria might do the same thing again, decided to kill Kerr
directly. Analysts agreed that there might be differences between Syria
we did not have enough convincing evidence to say
tthat
and the radicals b
s
u
su with certainty
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, 0. C 20305 NIC 02057-84
30 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 22 March 1984
1. Iran-Iraq: Update. We still anticipate a large-scale Iranian
offensive--probably centered in the Basra region--in the near term. Some
analysts raised the possibility that the reason we have not yet seen a
large scale Iranian offensive is that Tehran has shifted to a strategy
based on attrition on a grand scale. Most analysts, however, continue to
believe that the Iranian offensive is still likely and that delays can be
attributed to logistical problems.
DIA offered some comments on the state of morale among Iranian
forces, noting that there is very little reliable reporting from either
side on this crucial factor. Based on our limited reports, however, we
believe that there are clearly some problems among Iranian troops.
-- There is an increasing tendency of the irregular Bash
and Revolutionary Guard forces to surrender.
There have been some reports of Revolutionary Guard commanders
being relieved.
-- Tensions between the army and the Revolutionary Guard remain
high, and there have been reports about charges of
misappropriation of army supplies by the Revolutionary Guards
and vice versa.
Warning Notes
Although most analysts continue to believe that the Iraqis can
contain the Iranian offensive, there is concern that not enough attention
is being paid to the consequences of an Iranian success and a resulting
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Iraqi collapse. Such a development could have a major impact on US policy
in the region and could spark an Iranian effort to move against the Gulf
states and possibly Saudi Arabia.
2. PLO-Jordan-Israel: Increased Terrorism. The Israelis believe
both pro- and anti-Arafat PLO factions are trying to reestablish
infiltration infrastructure in Jordan and may be responsible for recent
large-scale terrorist attacks in Israel such as bus bombings in Ashdod and
Jerusalem. Israeli concern is growing--some Israeli officials believe that
Arafat's need to adopt a more militant posture to firm up his position in
the PLO could cause him to increase greatly efforts to infiltrate into the
West Bank and Israel proper. However, we believe that the Israelis still
see Jordan as doing all it can to stem these infiltration attempts and that
Israeli retaliation against Jordan is not likely so long as Tel Aviv holds
to this view. Most analysts believe that if the Israelis decide to
retaliate for terrorist attacks they will continue to strike at PLO targets
in Lebanon. They will retaliate against Jordan only if they become
convinced that the Jordanian government is actively abetting PLO
infiltration--something we now think highly unlikely.
Warning Items
Reports of PLO infiltration from Jordan through the Sinai to Gaza are
certain to eventually reach the Israelis and could cause major irritants in
Israeli-Egyptian relations. The Israelis have in the past complained about
Egyptian laxity in stemming infiltration into Gaza and could raise this
issue again.
While most analysts do not believe that Israeli retaliation against
Jordan is likely in the near term, some analysts believe there is
possibility of such a move particularly if a terrorist attack inside Israel
resulted in high casualties during the period leading up to the Israeli
elections.
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3. India: Growing Unrest in Pun -Jab. The two-year-old regional
disturbances in Punjab have escalated to an unprecedented level of violence
in the past two months, despite the imposition of direct rule from New
Delhi last October. Hindu-Sikh conflict as well as anti-government
activities by the dissident Sikhs have resulted in over a hundred deaths in
five weeks. Other developments have included attempted assassinations of
political leaders in Punjab and neighboring Haryana, the growing alienation
of moderate Sikhs as a result of New Delhi 's crackdown, and warnings by
Sikh leaders that they will fight to the death any effort by paramilitary
troops to enter Sikh temples and curtail their use as terrorist
sanctuaries.
New Delhi has responded by banning a key Sikh students'
organization, accusing the leader of the Sikh Akali Dal Party of sedition,
and further increasing the number of paramilitary units in Punjab--
indicating its unwillingness to countenance continuing violence.
Warning Items
We would be particularly concerned by:
Further spread of violence beyond the borders of Punjab State.
Deployment by New Delhi of the Army to curb the unrest--a last
resort for Gandhi 's government because the Army objects to
involvement in internal problems and because Sikhs comprise
about 12% of the Army. Use of the Army would signal New
Delhi's failure to handle Punjab by more conventional means, an
admission detrimental to the government in an election year.
Evidence of governmental weakness could encourage other
dissidents elsewhere to step up activities. Mobilization of
Army troops could also raise tensions with Pakistan by causing
Islamabad to believe New Delhi is mounting an attack from the
border state of Punjab.
Graham E. Fuller
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NIC 02057-84
30 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report,
NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:3cn 30 Mar. 84
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - Exec. Dir.
1 - ADDI
1 - SA/IA
1 - C/IPC Staff
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
2 - NI0/NESA
5 - NIO/W
1 - Each NIO
1 - Each Office Director
1-SRP
1 - NIC/AG
- C/OCR/NEA
- OGI/IIC/TI
- OGI/IIC/TG
- NESA/AI/D
- NESA/PG/D
- NESA/SO/D
- DDI/CRES
- CPAS/ILS
- SIGINT, Chairman,
1 - G/TWFD
1 - NPIC/PEG
2 - ICS/OHC/DIR
1 - DDI Rep, OLL
1-
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1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command
1 - Bill Eckert. a of VP
1 - DIA ATTN: DC4A 25X1
22 March
1 - State/INR/NESA
1 - DIO/NE
1 - DIA/DB-3C
1 - DIA/JSI
1 - DIA/DE-4
1 - DIA/DB-2
1 - DIA/DB-2C2
1 - DIA/JSI-5A
1 - DIA/JSI-5B
1 - DIA/JSI-3B
1 - DIA/JSI-2C
1 - OJCS MEAF Div.
1 - NSA/G-609
1 - ACSI DAMI FII
1 ONI Estimates Br.
1 AF/INER
1 - AF/INES
1 - HQ USMC CODE INTP
1 - MSC/ME
1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC
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:RET/
NIC 00484-84
20 January 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central-Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 January 1984
NIC/A/XIO/NESA:
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1-ER
1 - Exec. Dir.
1 - ADDI
1 - SA/IA
1 - C/IPC Staff
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NICs
2 - NIO/NESA
5 - NIO/W
1 - Each NIO
1 - Each Office Director
1 - SRP
1 - NIC A
1
1
1 - C/OCR/NEA.
1 - OGI/IIC/TI
1 - OGI/IIC/TG
1 - NESA/AI/D
1 - NESA/PG/D
1 - NESA/SO/D
1 - DDI/CRES
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - SIGINT, Chairman,
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
T
1 - DDI Rep. OLL
1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD
1 - NPIC/PEG
2? - ICS/OHC/DIR
1
20 Jan. 84
1 - State/INR/RNA
1 - DIO/NE
1 - DIA/DB-3C
1 - DIA/JSI
1 - DIA/DE-4
1 DIA/DB-2
1 - DIA/DB-2C2
1 - DIA/JSI-5A
1 - DIA/JSI-5B
1 - DIA/JSI-3B
1 - DIA/JSI-2C
1 - OJCS MEAF Div.
1 - NSA/G-609
1 - ACSI DAMI FII
1 - ONI Estimates Br.
1 - AF/INER
1 - AF/INES
1 - HQ USMC CODE INTP
1 - NSC/ME
1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC
1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command
1- of VP
1 - IA ATTN: DC4A
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 02496-84
24 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
_ Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 April 1984
1. Sri Lanka. CIA provided a brief overview of the current
situation on the island and gave an estimate of how we see Indian policy
towards Sri Lanka unfolding. DIA gave an overview of likely military
warning indicators on impending Indian military action and the DIA
analyst offered his views on the outcome of an Indian-Sri Lankan clash.
Analysts believe that there is little likelihood of an immediate
Indian military move, despite recent amphibious exercises and some thinly
veiled threats contained in Mrs. Ghandi's letters to President Reagan and
Prime Minister Thatcher. Instead, we believe India will employ a
combination of diplomatic pressure, sabre-rattling and semi-public
support for Tamil dissidents in Indian training camps in an effort to get
President Jayewardene to concede some form of autonomy for Sri Lankan
Tamils.
Some analysts felt that this combination of Indian pressures
might well prove counterproductive--particularly the training of Tamil
dissidents--leading Jayewardene to toughen his stand instead of
compromising, thus raising the possibility that India would have to move
militarily.
INR noted that India has for some time felt that the US is
following a policy of regional encirclement vis-a-vis India--that the
Indians in particular see the Presidential visit to China and closer ties
to Pakistan in this light--and might try to break out of this perceived
encirclement by moving against Sri Lanka. In any event, efforts by the
US to demonstrate support for Sri Lanka--particularly ship visits--would
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almost certainly raise Indian fears and could contribute to an Indian
decison to move against Sri Lanka.
Warning Indicators
DIA presented their view of how the Indians might approach an
invasion--which would probably be aimed at protecting Tamil areas in
north Sri Lanka and Indian interests around Colombo--and what we might
expect to see as preliminary signs. The DIA analyst felt that the Indian
military would "worst-case" the invasion and would seek to have
overwhelming force available. Preparations to assemble such a force
might well take 2-3 weeks and thus the number of indicators available to
-us should be large. These indicators might include: military take over
of railway, large-scale amphibious preparations and large military
movements.
A DIA analyst also offered his view that even a limited Indian
invasion of Sri Lanka might not be the walk-over that is universally
foreseen. We would certainly expect India to win, but the cost of the
victory and the subsequent occupation might well be larger than the
Indians expect.
Analysts also noted that we can expect an appeal from Sri Lanka
for US aid in the event of an Indian move and that policymakers ought to
be planning now what the US response will be.
2. S ria--Succession Struggle. CIA gave a presentation on the
current status of e succession struggle and some possible
consequences. There was general agreement that whatever the outcome we
cannot expect to see fundamental changes in Syrian policy. Specifically,
we would not expect any successor regime to cut ties with the Soviets,
abandon Syrian interests in Lebanon or enter the peace process under
conditions other than those stated by Assad. Moreover, a successor
regime might well prove to be more erratic and less adroit than Assad and
could well undertake regional adventures.
Analysts agreed that there were several ways in which the current
stalemate could be broken:
-- an accidental clash between Rifaat's supporters and their
army opponents.
-- a decision by one side to preempt and launch a surprise
attack on the other side.
-- assassination attempts by one side against the leadership of
the other. Rifaat is the most likely target of such moves.
The group also agreed that in the short term Rifaat's forces
probably have the upper hand--his forces are better positioned near and
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in Damascus, for example--but that a prolonged struggle would probably
favor his opponents in the army who could bring greater force to bear
over the long run.
Warning Indicators
CIA and DIA analysts cautioned that the beginnings of the power
struggle are likely to take place at levels where we have little
information. Analysts agreed that the Baath Party conference scheduled
for later this summer might well prove to be a significant event and
could serve to galvanize the struggle.
3. Iran--Iraq: Iranian Offensive and Leadership Problems,
o e is vn
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is now more or less permanently on hold and that we can expect little in
the way of major military moves by Iran until at least later this year.
In the meantime, we can probably expect Iran to continue to follow more
or less a strategy of attrition. DIA stressed that this analysis was
still tentative and that we needed to know more about the disposition of
some Iranian forces before we can conclusively state that the offensive
has been delayed. Most analysts agreed, however, that there is mounting
evidence that the major Iranian offensive may not take place.
INR spoke to Iranian leadership attitudes on the war, noting that
there is some evidence of discontent among the senior clerics with the
"military option" and that this may well be a factor in Tehran's failure
to launch its offensive. INR noted, for example, that the usually
hawkish Rafsanjani has been relatively quiet thus far and also cited
several diplomatic reports from Tehran reporting dissension within the
upper levels of the government. However, INR and others stressed that
Khomeini still speaks of the "final offensive" against Iraq and we have
no evidence to suggest that he has dropped his desire for the offensive.
The option of turning the war over to the Majlis for a final
decision on how to proceed was also discussed. Analysts agreed that this
was increasingly likely but that Khomeini and the senior clerics still
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had to lay out the options for the Mauls to follow in resolving the
war--as they did in turning the hostage case over to the parliament--and
could not simply pass the problem to the Maulis.
Graham E. Fuller
Warning Indicators
All analysts agreed that whatever the evidence that Iran has
abandoned plans for a major offensive, the Iranian forces in the central
and southern sectors have not been reduced and in fact may have been
reinforced. The possibility that an Iranian offensive could be launched
with little or no notice thus must still be considered. In any event,
even if the Iranian offensive is postponed, we must remain alert to the
-continuing possibility of Iraqi actions designed to raise tensions in the
Gulf through attacks on shipping or Iranian oil exporting facilities.
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NIC 02496-84
24 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 April
NICTNIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 24 Apr. 84
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - Exec. Dir.
1 - ADDI
1 - SA/IA
1 - C/IPC Staff
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
NIO/NESA
5 - NIO/W
1 - Each NIO
1 - Each Office Director
1 - SRP
1 - C/OCR/NEA
1 - OGI/IIC/TI
1 - OGI/IIC/TG
1 - NESA/AI/D
1 - NESA/PG/D
1 - NESA/SO/D
1 - DDI/CRES
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - SIGINT_ Chairman CTDtIS
1
1
1 - OSWR/PPC
1 - SOVA CSO C
1 - NPIC/PEG
2 - ICS/OHC/DIR
1 - DDI Reo, OLL
1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD
1 - State/INR/NESA
1 - DIO/NE
1 - DIA/DB-3C
1 - DIA/JSI
1 - DIA/DE-4
1 - DIA/DB-2
1 - DIA/DB-2C2
1 - DIA/JSI-5A
1 - DIA/JSI-5B
1 - DIA/JSI-3B
1 - DIA/JSI-2C
1 - OJCS MEAF Div.
1 - NSA/G-609
1 - ACSI DAMI FII
1 - ONI Estimates Br.
1 - AF/INER
1 - AF/INES
1 - HQS USMC CODE INTP
1 - NSC/ME
1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC
1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command
1 - Bill Eckert- Office of VP
1 IA ATTN:
DC4A
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The Director of central intenigem
Washi.gto., D.C. 20303
National Intelligence Council
NIC 03664-84
25 June 1984
- MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM:
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 21 June 1984
1. India-Pakistan. CIA commented on the unrest in the Punjab,
noting that the army can probably contain the violence there and that we
expect the government to speed up efforts to reduce the percentage of
Sikhs in the armed forces. We do expect Sikh terrorism to continue,
however, and community analysts anticipate an outbreak of terrorist acts
aimed at Indian targets by Sikhs abroad.
A more disturbing question--addressed by CIA and DIA--is the
Indian military movements associated with efforts to put down the unrest
in Punjab. While a number of the military moves are in line with what we
would expect given armed forces concern over the unrest, there are some
elements which appear to go beyond what would be required for stifling
domestic disturbances. Particularly noteworthy is activity in the Indian
Air Force which does not seem to be directly related to the Punjab, but
could be indicative of planning for an Indian preemptive strike against
the Pakistani nuclear program. There is concern that the Indians may be
using the unrest in Punjab to mask broader military moves in preparation
for a strike against the Pakistani program.
Analysts were quick to note, however, that there are other
signs--particularly the impending visit of the Indian army COS to the
US--that would argue against any imminent strike. Overall, the community
sense is that the probability of a preemptive Indian strike or of any
broader eruption of Pakistani-Indian hostilities remains low. ,
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failure will depend on Iraq's tactics, but we believe the Iranians will
seek to undermine Saddam Husayn through terrorism and subversion rather
than seek a negotiated end of the war.
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NIC 03662-84
25 June 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central I
Deputy Director of Ce
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warni
ntelligence
ntral Intelligence
ng Meeting Report, 21 June 1984
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NIC/A/NIO/NESA
25 June 1984
25X1
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - State/INR/NESA
1
- DDCI
1 - DIO/NE
1
- ER
1 - DIA/DB-3C
1
- Exec. Dir.
1 - DIA/JSI
1
- ADDI
1 - DIA/DE-4
1
- SA/IA
1 - DIA/DB-2
1
- C/IPC Staff
1 - DIA/DB-2C2
1
- C/NIC
1 - DIA/JSI-5A
1
- VC/NIC
1 - DIA/JSI-56
-2
NIO/NESA
1 - DIA/JSI-3B
5
- NIO/W
1 - DIA/JSI-2C
1
- Each NIO
1 - OJCS MEAF Div.
1
- Each Office Director
1 - NSA/G-609
1
- SRP
1 - ACSI DAMI FII
1
- NIC/AG
1 - ONI Estimates Br
1
-
.
1 - AF/INER
1
-
1 - AF/INES
1
- C/OCR/NEA
1 - HQS USMC CODE INTP
1
- OGI/IIC/TI
1 - NSC/ME
1
- OGI/IIC/TG
1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC
1
- NESA/AI/D
1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command
1
- NESA/PG/D
1 - Bill Eckert, Office of VP
1
- NESA/SO/D
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1
- DDI/CRES
1
- CPAS/ILS
1
- SIGINT. Chairman- SIRVES
2 - ICS/OHC/DIR
1 - DDI. Rep. 0
1-
1 - OSWR/PPC
1 - SOVA/CSD/C
1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD
1 - NPIC/PEG
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The Director of
NIC 04183-84
20 July 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
-VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report,
19 July 1984
1. Iran-Iraq. Although Iran continues to maintain a state of
preparedness for another assault against Iraq, there are continuing
indications of delay based on political decisions from Tehran. Iran's
military preparations include a readiness to cross the Shatt Al-Arab.
Given the nature of Iraqi defenses, however, and the extensive flooding
in the area, any Iranian attack would be likely to incur very high
casualties.
Discussions in Tehran probably hinge more on how and when to
launch an attack rather than whether an attack should be made.
The air war in the Gulf continues with Iraqi attacks on Iranian
shipping and Iranian measured responses.
Despite numerous reports of forthcoming diplomatic activity to
end the war, no significant steps have been taken and we doubt that
mediation will bring results. Iran may wish to use mediation offers as
a means to entice the Gulf states into pressuring Iraq to stop the air
war.
Iran has at least three options:
-- Maintain the war in a twilight zone of no peace, no war.
-- Seek a negotiated settlement in which the fall of Saddam
Husayn would be the key goal.
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-- Launch an attack against Iraq and escalate the conflict in
the Gulf.
Iran has been sobered by numerous recent events such as the
Saudi shootdown of an Iranian plane, the lack of success in Iran's land
war, Iran's failure to generate meaningful terrorism inside Iraq, and
Iraq's near conclusion of a new pipeline agreement.
It is important to remember that Iran has many long-range goals
in its struggle for dominance in the Gulf that will continue to exist
even should the war wind down.
The Community recognized that the situation is quite fluid at
the moment and we have little clear indication of Iran's probable course
of action.
2. Tunisia. The bread riots in Tunisia in January vented a
considerable amount of public dissatisfaction but the underlying causes
of dissatisfaction remain. Unemployment is high, worker remittances
from abroad are diminishing, tourism is dropping, the budget is
distributing largesse unequally through the country, and corruption
remains high. Bourguiba's ruling party, once the symbol of nationalism
and independence, is now a symbol of corruption, cronyism, and
stagnation. The rifts between the haves and the have-nots is growing.
Bourguiba himself, so long part of the solution of Tunisia's
problems, is now more the source of such problems. He is increasingly
senile, out of touch with the present situation and is blocking efforts
at major reform. He is still in charge for better or for worse and
because of his stature, is unlikely to be removed. There is no one of
sufficient standing in Tunisia to fill his shoes.
The government is devoting more time to finding scapegoats for
Tunisia's problems than to finding solutions. A recent pact between the
labor unions and the government may help to contain labor strikes in the
near term. The situation still remains potentially explosive, and
student demonstrations this fall--especially if badly handled by
security forces--could unleash further major unrest. At the moment
there is no specific immediate issue which could serve to spark trouble
in the months ahead.
The major actor in any disorders would be Islamic
fundamentalists. Libya's influence on domestic politics is decidedly
limited. The military--once a reliable instrument in quelling
disorder--cannot be counted on to serve the regime in this capacity
indefinitely.
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3. PLO. The recent Aden agreement signed between the PFLP, DFLP,
and Arafat marks a significant step in tightening the PLO's hold on
Arafat's activities. The emphasis is now on collective leadership, lack
of communication with Egypt, and discouragement of peace talks with
-Jordan. Despite these strictures, Arafat is still likely to exercise
some personal independence of action. He has survived recent struggles
and still maintains leadership. All indications are that Arafat still
wishes to avoid a major split in the PLO at all costs.
Arafat's differences with Syria are harder to bridge.
President Assail has recently met with senior Arafat lieutenants but will
not be willing to meet Arafat until they are certain he will restrict
his activities in accord with recent agreements. Syria likewise has had
limited success in winning acceptance of the Syrian controlled rebels
among Arab states.
In any case the prospects for Arafat providing King Hussein
with any meaningful mandate for negotiation with Israel is extremely
unlikely.
The PLO continues to infiltrate into Beirut. Current figures
suggest some 2,000 Palestinian fighters in the Beirut area. This time,
however, there is far greater suspicion and concern for PLO activities
among most Lebanese factions than ever before. Syria likewise does not
wish to see the PLO run uncontrolled.
If the PLO refuses to enter negotiations with Israel, with or
without Hussein, it will need some other viable policy. Since the
military option is increasingly unrealistic, a return to terrorism is a
distinct possibility. PLO politics are likely to remain loose, however,
and each of the various factions will probably continue to pursue their
own goals while avoiding a formal break in the organization.
Graham E. Fuller
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NIC 04183-84
24 July 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 July 1984
NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn
24 July 84
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - Exec. Dir.
1 - ADDI
1 - SA/IA
1 - C/IPC Staff
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
.2~ NIO/NESA
5 - NIO/W
1 - Each NIO
1 - Each Office Director
1 - SRP
1 - NIC AG
1-
1-
1 -1 ;0/wRi11LR
1 - OGI/IIC/TI
1 - OGI/IIC/TG
1 - NESA/AI/D
1 - NESA/PG/D
1 - NESA/SO/D
1 - DDI/CRES
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - SIGINT, Chairman, SIRVES
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1 - OSWR/PPC
1 - SOVA/CSD/C
1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD
1 - NPIC/PEG
1-
2 - ICS/OHC/DIR
1-
1
1 - State/INR/NESA
1 - DIO/NE
1 - DIA/DB-3C
1 - DIA/JSI
1 - DIA/DE-4
i 0.44 A" 00~
1 - DIA/DB-2C2
1 - DIA/JSI-5A
1 - DIA/JSI-5B
1 - DIA/JSI-3B
1 - DIA/JSI-2C
1 - OJCS MEAF Div.
1 - NSA/G-609
1 - ACSI DAMI FII
1 - ONI Estimates Br.
1 - AF/INER
1 - AF/INES
1 - HQS USMC CODE INTP
1 - NSC/ME
1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC
1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command
1 - Bill Eckert Office of VP
1 - DIA ATTN: DC4A 25X1
1-
1 ,OM / C' f f; ?Ei~J Ti -&4 A/
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 l 1 ~.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #04865-84
27 August 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 23 August 1984
1. India-Pakistan-Sri Lanka.
DIA presented a discussion of developments in Indo-Pak
relations designed to update the recently completed SNIE, Prospects for
Hostilities.
There are few if any new military indicators of impending
hostilities. Indeed, we have noted some Indian troop withdrawals from
the Punjab and we have seen no new activities in the Glacier. On the
Pakistani side, there is also little sense of urgency: unit commanders
have been advised to be extremely careful in the border area.
Politically, Mrs. Ghandi has toned down her rhetoric--she also
publically claimed to be unworried about the Pakistani nuclear
program--and appears to be focusing on the Sri Lanka issue and her
domestic difficulties for the near term. CIA noted that, while there
are few military indicators of impending hostilities, there were clashes
in northern Kashmir recently and that tensions remain high.
DIA also provided an overview of tensions on the Pak-Afghan
border. There have been an unusually high number of cross-border
incidents--shelling and air strikes--in August and most community
analysts believe this represents a more aggressive Soviet strategy.
Some analysts believe there is a likelihood of a small-scale Soviet
ground incursion into Pakistan in the near future.
1
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There is, however, some disagreement over the intent of the
more aggressive Soviet stance. Some analysts believe the cross-border
operations are intended to send a strong message to Pakistan to end its
support for the insurgency. Others are less inclined to see a direct
political message and maintain that the raids represent a more
aggressive military stance growing out of Soviet frustration over their
inability to end the insurgency.
Whatever the intent of the cross-border attacks, most analysts
believe the Pakistani government sees them as conveying a direct threat
from the Soviets and want the US to be more active in backing Pakistan.
Warning Notes
Analysts agreed that a key indicator of Soviet intentions would
be a cross-border attack of any sort in an area in which there is no
ongoing major military operation. To date, all the cross-border attacks
have taken place in areas where large-scale anti-insurgent operations
are in progress.
Analysts also agreed that the cross-border raids could at some
point cause Zia internal problems, particularly if casualties mount and
if large numbers of Pakistanis are killed during such operations.
Finally, analysts noted that Zia--given his firm belief that
Soviet pressure is mounting--is likely to see the US reaction to his
requests for support as a test of the strength of the US-Pakistani
relationship.
Sri Lanka
We had a brief review of the situation led by analysts from DIA
and CIA. Analysts agreed that the likelihood of Indian involvement is
low, although there appears to be some pressure on Mrs. Ghandi from
Tamil Nadu officials. Moreover, analysts agreed that despite the recent
excesses by the army, prospects for a negotiated settlement between the
government and the Tamils remain relatively good. The government's
security forces and information control have improved greatly.
Analysts agreed that the insurgents have been badly hurt by the
recent government offensive and that there is a strong possibility that
they could initiate terrorist attacks in the Sinhalese south. Analysts
agreed that there is also a possibility that US facilities and personnel
could be targeted by Tamil terrorists.
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2. Libya.
CIA led off with a brief discusson of Qadhafi's foreign and
domestic policy since the May 8 barracks attack in Tripoli. Qadhaf1,
disturbed at the apparent strength of his domestic opposition, has
sought to improve ties with regional powers, alleviate some of domestic
discontent by"backing off from some of his more onerous measures while
at the same time continuing his covert attempts to undermine Arab
moderates. Qadhafi's goals in this two-track policy appear to be:
-- getting his regional relations in order so as to focus on
the domestic dissent; and
-- projecting a moderate image that he hopes will split off
Western Europeans from the US. His recent talks with
Italian Prime Minister Andreotti are part of this strategy.
Nonetheless, Qadhafi's efforts to subvert Egypt and Sudan do
not appear to have lessened. There is mounting evidence that Libya was
responsible for the Red Sea mining and we expect subversion attempts
against the Sudan to continue, although we have no reporting of actual
planning at this time. Qadhafi's tactics show his usual concern for
carrying out acts which give him plausible denial.
Warning Note
We expect Libyan operations against dissidents in Europe and
elsewhere to intensify. There is some evidence that the recent Libyan
attempt to smuggle arms in to Hajj pilgrims in Saudi Arabia was part of
a plan to strike at Libyan dissidents in Saudi Arabia. Community
analysts also noted that Qadhafi has for some time warned that he would
take--unspecified--action if the Arabs did not pull together on
anti-Israel and anti-US activities by 1 September. While we have no
indication of any Libyan planning for this date, we believe the threat
is real.
3. Iran-Iraq.
In a brief overview of the Iran-Iraq military situation and the
Iranian domestic scene, community analysts concluded that there is
little to add to past warning reports and community analysis. There are
no significant new military indicators, and we remain convinced that
Iranian forces could launch an offensive at any time. Similarly,
despite numerous signs of dissent among the Iranian leadership over how
to prosecute the war, we see no sign that the Iranian leadership has
abandoned its goal of overthrowing Saddam Husayn or that Tehran is
prepared to explore seriously a negotiating option.
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Community analysts were informed that we plan to begin a SNIE
on succession to Khomeini shortly. INR will draft.
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NIC 04865-84
24 August 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting REport, 23 August 1984
NIC/A/NIO/NESA
24 Aug. 84
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - Exec. Dir.
1 - ADDI
1 - SA/IA
1 - C/IPC Staff
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
2 - NIO/NESA
5 - NIO/W
1 - Each NIO
1 - Each Office Director
1 - SRP
1 - NIC/AG
1-
1-
1 - C/OCR/NEA
1 - OGI/IIC/TI
1 - OGI/IIC/TG
1 - NESA/AI/D
1 - NESA/PG/D
1 - NESA/SO/D
1 - DDI/CRES
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - SIGINT, Chairman, SIRVES
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1 -'USWK/PPL
1 - SOVA/CSD/C
1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD
1 - NPIC/PEG
1-
2 - ICS/OHC/DIR
1 - DDI Ren/OLL
1-
1-
1 - State/INR/NESA
1 - DIO/NE
1 - DIA/DB-3C
1 - DIA/JSI
1 - DIA/DE-4
1 - DIA/DB-2C2
1 - DIA/JSI-5A
1 - DIA/JSI-5B
1 - DIA/JSI-3B
1 - DIA/JSI-2C
1 - OJCS MEAF Div.
1 - NSA/G-609
1 - ACSI DAMI FII
1 - ONI Estimates Br.
1 - AF/INER
1 - AF/INE1&i-
1 - HQS USMC CODE INTP
1 - NSC/ME
1 - Cmdr. P- hi-1--Dur, NSC
1 - Maj. Jack Mathis, US Central Command
1 - Bill Eckert, Office of VP
1 DIA ATTN: DC4A 25X1
1 - NWS, Room 1C925, Pentagon
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhington, D.C. 20505
NIC 05473-84
24 September 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM:
ss s an National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 20 September 1984
1. Morocco-Libya: Impact of the Union.
CIA opened the discussion by briefly describing the current
state of the union and assessing Hassan's motives for engineering the
deal.
-- The implementation of various aspects of the union is
proceeding smoothly; the first group of Libyan students will
arrive in Morocco shortly.
-- Hassan was probably motivated by a desire to end Libyan
support for the Polisario, gain a political counterweight to
Algeria, and hopes of achieving Libyan financial support.
Analysts then discussed the Libyan agreement to withdraw from
Chad. There was agreement that both the Chad and Moroccan agreements
plus signs we have seen of efforts to improve relations with other Arab
and African moderates represent a Libyan effort to drive a wedge between
these moderates and the US. Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki's--a
sophisticated and skilled diplomat--consolidation of control over Libyan
foreign affairs may also be a factor. The Libyan decision to pursue
better relations with neighbors may, in the view of some analysts,
reflect Qadhafi's concern that his domestic situation is so serious that
he needs to have good external relations in order to devote his complete
attention to internal affairs. Other analysts disagreed, however,
maintaining that Qadhafi is firmly in control and that his foreign policy
moves are simply tactical adjustments in pursuit of longstanding goals.
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Analysts were uncertain as to whether the union will end up primarily
having served Moroccan, or Libyan interests.
Warning Notes
-- Algeria is increasingly concerned by its regional isolation.
? At the same time Hassan is clearly buoyed by the merger and
may feel that he has a free hand in the Western Sahara. This
combination of Algerian concern and Moroccan aggressiveness
could lead Hassan to overplay his hand and bring about a
Moroccan-Algerian clash, particularly if Morocco decides to
extend the Berm.
-- Hassan has put his prestige on the line and has focused a
good deal of attention on the alleged financial benefits the
merger will bring to Morocco. If the Libyans fail to
deliver, there could be a domestic backlash.
2. PLO: The PNC and After.
The discussion of the PLO centered on the apparent decision to
postpone the PNC and the fortunes of the various factions in the
organization. Analysts agreed that even if the PNC were to be held at
some time in the near future, there is little likelihood that any major
policy moves or significant internal changes would result. However,
Arafat clearly wanted to hold the PNC--he and other members of his
mainstream faction had publicly committed themselves to holding the
meeting. Arafat's apparent inability to arrange a venue is bound to be
an embarrassment and serves as further indication of the erosion of his
authority. Analysts agreed that there is little chance for Arafat to
arrest this erosion despite the apparent disarray in the ranks of the
dissidents.
Warning Note
There was general agreement that we are likely to see more drift
and indecision in both the mainstream and dissident ranks and that there
is not likely to be any major policy shift for the near term. Community
analysts agreed that there is little chance of the mainstream or the
dissidents resuming international terrorism, although the possibility of
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such attacks by fringe groups like Abu Nidal and 15 May remains high.
Attacks on Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper will
probably increase, however.
3. Iran-Iraq.
DIA provided a brief overview of the military situation in the
last month's review of this subject. a
slight shift in Iraqi tactics with an increase in the scope and frequency
of air attacks on tankers and other targets in the Gulf. This is
- partially due to Baghdad's recent acquisition of new aircraft.
Warning Note
Analysts agreed that, given the Iraqi's traditional caution,
there is not likely to be a major increase in such Iraqi attacks.
Similarly, there are indications that the Iranian offensive in the Basra
area remains on hold. Analysts agreed that the general stalemate of the
last few months will continue for the near term.
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NIC-05473-84
24 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 20 September 1984
NIC/A/NIO/NESA
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - SRP
1 - NIC A
1 - Exec. Dir.
1 - ADDI
1 - SA/IA
1 - C/IPC Staff
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
_2 -NIO/NESA
5 - NIO/W
1 - Each NIO
1 - Each Office Director
1 - C/OCR/NEA
1 - OGI/IIC/TI
2-Itob/OWDIR
1 - DDI Rep/OLL
1-
- OGI/IIC/TG
1 - DDI/Registry
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - SIGINT, Chairman,
1 - NESA/PG/D
1 - NESA/SO/D
1 - DDI/CRES
- NESA/AI/D
1 - OSWR/PPC
1 - SOVA/CSD/C
1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD
1 - NPIC/PEG
SIms
24 Sept. 84
1 - State/INR/NESA
1 - DIO/NE
1 - DIA/DB-3C
1 - DIA/JSI
1 - DIA/DE-4
1 - DIA/DB-2C2
1 - DIA/JSI-5A
1 - DIA/JSI-5B
1 - DIA/JSI-3B
1 - DIA/JSI-2C
ell' Cy6e7b
I- D.,9-/j) e--