SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE VOLUME I-KEY JUDGEMENTS AND SUMMARY

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1982
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Sear
t
Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I-Key Judgments and Summary
NIE 11-13-82
13 October 1982
Cony 3 7
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N I E 11-13-82
SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Volume I-Key Judgments and Summary
Information a vailahh as of 1:3 October IS)H'_ as
used in the preparation nI this I'stinwte
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
I'l Ifl O 11:.\\I) S( :OI'h;_ .............................................................................._ ......... I
I. I actors Atiectin, FutiIre Soviet Ballistic A1issile llefcns(?s ....................... i
\liIitars I)octrinc and strrtep .................................................................. 7
Soy iet \li\I I'rot,runs I IistoricaI 1'erspccti ........................................... i
\liIitar Factors ............... ........ ..... ........ ........................................... ....... S
Political Fa(.t rrs .... .... ..... ............ .............. ..... .........._.................................. 9)
(:apalrilitics of SOvicl Systems fur Ballistic Missile I)cfensc ...................... 1(1
The \loscos~ Ss slcnr ..... ............................................................................ I O
\c\c .\I?,\I s,stcnts ............ .... ................. ........ ....................................... I(1
sill-face-to-Air Missile s\stcnts ................................................................. 1-1
(:apaltilitics for :A B\1 I)cplm nonts ........................................................... 16
l Rt~radcd B\1 IVI cnscs at \loscmv...... ............................................. 16
Options for I) ploVntonts Be}andTreat ~ I.imits .................................... 16
Radars for Baltic \lanat,ctinnt Support ................................................ It)
I'ulcnlial IM I)cplm areal Rates .......... ..... ............................ .............. 22
Indications of Postulated :AB\v1 l)cplo~ mcnts ............................. ...... ....... 22
I'e-ununric Factors ..... .... ......... ..................... ....................................... ........ 2-1
11 I'rospt(.ts for Directed-l :ncrtr) AV'capons ......................_..........._..........._.. 21
I . t r S~stcnts..... __ ............................................................................... 26
(:ronn(I I~asc(1.._ _ ................................................................................... 26
'_(i
Space-Basc(I......... . ...............................................................................
P:oticlc Beam A\ capons. .._.... _ ......................._......._............._. 26
(:round-I isc(I_....__ ............................._............_............_..._......... 26
space-Bascd....... .._ . .... .... .................................................................. 26
I I (I iIitics of So~ict Ballistic Alissilc I)efnscs....... _.............. _....... .._. 27,
l Ir, radcd \Itscos~ I)rfcnscs \\ ithin hrcaty Limits....... .... .... ............... 27
Iuidcd I)cfcusos at \lox?o5v ...................... _..._...... ............. ...... ....... .. 21
\\ idcsprcad \li\l I)clcnsc .................................................................... 27
\ I nlurc So~icl \B\I I)cplosntcnls....... .._ ............ ...._................. .......... . 2S
Its jsions to the _AB\I I rcats ................ ....... ...__ ........ ........ ......... ..._. 211i
I S \\ ithdrncal Front the hreat\ ..........29
Sositt \hrocalinn of the'I?rcaly .... ........ .._.............. ............ ......... 29
kit l n(rrtainli(-s . ............. )2
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PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This l;stinutte responcls to a rectucst of the President's Special
\ssistanl Ior \ational Security Affairs for a comprehensive assessment
b~ the IntehIIg4cIwe onrmturily on Soviet antiballistic missile (;11M)
defense. It has been prepared for use by the administration ill
considcrittg strategic arnms limitation policies, in planning I S strategic
force pro rarnts, ancf ill review ing the ABNI Treaty. It is intended to pr-o-
ide our best utsvvers to the followiug questions relevant to I S polic\
;ltd planning decisions:
\\ hat are the obiectivcs of Soviet programs for ballistic missile
clelense''
\\ hat are the estimated technical characteristics and perform-
ance of present and future Soviet ballistic missile defense
vv stems and supporting radars
\\ hat potential do the Soviets have to devltr~ ballistic missile
defenses beyond the limits of the :A13'\l Treaty during the next
IO wars or S()"
\\ hat is the likelihood that the Soviets ill leplo~ ballistic
missile defenses in excess of 't'reaty limits
\\ Itile the I:stinurte highlights factors bearing on the effectiveness
of Soviet ballistic missile defenses it does not analyze ill array detail the
decree of protection that future :AB\l deployments would afford the
t SSIi. A\e have not performed the analyses of the capabilities of Soviet
\I;\I svstenms in a III tilt iple-engagenrernl scenario. The great cotnplexity
and severe time constraints inherent in ballistic missile defense opera-
tions result in our having nraior uncertainties in any prediction of h()\\ ell a Soviet AI3\1 sy stein vv mild function. ;Any assessment of Soviet
BM effectiveness 'v ill be an aggregation of the results of technical
utalv ses of expected component perfornutnce using assumptions about
the characteristics of a ballistic missile attack, about some nuclear
~~capon effects, and about the phenomena associated with ballistic
missiles reentering the atnlospherc.
Given the gaps in inlornration and our analytical uncertainties,
there are ttndcrstandably many differing conclusions and opinions
about the technical characteristics of Soviet ABNI systems and compo-
tents and supporting radars and about their capabilities to perform all
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the functions essential to ballistic missile defense. Some of these
differences concern capabilities on vN hich the success or failure of a
future Soy jet ballistic missile defense ~~ ould depend. We are not likely
to he able to resolve nlan~ of these issues vX ithin the next several years.
\lorcmcr, vve I lave difficulty assigning probabilities to alternative
interpretations of the evidence. Now ever, the consectuellces of Soviet
acquisition of a ballistic missile defense, despite uncertainties about its
cffectivmess, are so serious that even a low probability of, such an
achlevelllellt is cause for concern.
\olllnlc II of this l''stinulte. the :Anallsis, treats Soviet ballistic
missile defense programs in the detail required by staff planners and
analysts responsible for policy studies and Military assessments. Its
emphasis is on completeness rather than brevity. The important
findings of the Fstinultc on the prospects for future Soviet ballistic
nlissilc defense are summarized in volume 1.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
-1'IN' So )\ iets are ul)grading their antiballistic missile (:ABNI) dkplo~ -
incnls at \loscom and are activek crngaged in :ABNI research and
dcv (IoPnicnt Programs. The a\ a11 11)1(, c~ idence does not indicate with
aiiv ccrtai11ty vv Nether the Sov icts our narking Pr(Parations for dePlo~-
nicnls ln' oud the limits of tic Treaty-100 :AI3\1 launchers at \Ios-
c~m hul it does shoe they are steadily ini)rming their ability to
c~crcisc options for dcflM merit of \\ idespread ballistic missile defenses
in the 19SOs. I f t he 'I'rcal~ vv ere ahrogatcd In either the 1, sited States or
the l SSN. vve believe tie Sovlicts would undertake rapidly Paced :W\I
(1cp1m merits to strcrnglhern their defenses at \Ioscmw and cover key
targets ill the western ISSN, and to ('Acrid Protection to key targets east
of tlic I rats. Such vw iced)read defenses could be in Place by the late
I9SPs or (ark I990s.
Since the negotiation of the : 1 \1 TreatV in 1972, most of the
trends in strategic forces have hecn favorable to the L'SS1R. '1'hc Soviets
probably consider that tiny are much better able to Prosecute a nuclear
wa th,ni lhc~ ~~cre in 19;'?. lo reduce damage to the ISSR irr
accord,uncc vv ith their doctrine curd strategy for nuclear vvar. the Soviets
,ire continuing to Iniprme the counterforce capabilities and survivahil-
itv of their offcnsivc forces, to strengthen their air defenses and
antisuhnuiriuc \\a-fare forces. and to esPaurd their passive defenses. In
this conlcyt, vvc hclicvc that an assessment by the Soviets of (lie
correlation of strategic forces would indicate that the continuing
ulncrahility of the ISSN to ballistic missile attack is a deficicucy they
\\ ()111(1 vv ant to redncc.
\\ c iudgc that in ev,(1uatirng the technical Performance of the \U\1
svstcnis lhcv (0111(1 deploy. the Soviets Probably would riot have high
confidence in h()\\ vvcII these systems would perform against it largc-
scalc_ inidcgradcd ( S missile attack, especially ill the late I9SOs h\
impnov cd t S forces. I lovv cv er, the SOv lets vv orrld Probably v ievv their
I)illistic missile defenses as having considerable valve in reducing the
impact of a ( 1cgra1cd I S retaliatory attack if the ISSN succeeded in
(arrviti out a well-coordinated. cffectivc initial strike.AIso, widespread
tiov ict defenses. ev cu if IS cv aluatit Is indicated tlny could be
()(1(1(MW I)v ;ui at lacking force. would complicate I S attack Planning
and crcatc inaior miccrtaiulit's about the potential effcctiv mess of a I S
I i ke.
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Another view is that the Soviets. ill a widesprcad dcplov mcnt,
would deploy sufficient mimbers of :\13\I s stcinrs to enhance thcir-
confidcncc in the survival of high-value targets, cvcn in the event of a
fall-scale I'S attack.'
If certain features which vv e have assumed for a new advanced
surface-to-air missile (S:1\1) srstcm. the S.A-\-12. arc realized, its
potential contrihutiori to ballistic missile defenses would be of growing
concern as it becomes wwidelV deplo\ ed in the I. SSR and Eastern 1';urope
in the 111](1-to-late 19SOs. 11'hilc we do not believe the S:1-:) and S:A-10
S:1\1 sstems are suitable for :k13\1 use as currciitly configured, the
Soviets could, with an unrestricted modification and testing program,
probable conduct an overt upgrade of these systems that WW ould provide
a potentially important supplement to an :1I3\1 defense. 'T'here is an
alternative view that the S:A-5 and S:\-10 vti ithout and upgrading ma\
be capable of operating ill a limited .AI3\1 role, and that
upgrade to improve potential .113\1 capabilities could he nc'r-
formed
.\ decision 1)~ the Soviets on whether to deploy a wwidespread :A13\1
s~ stem would be based prinrarilyr on the answer to a crucial (Iuestion:
whether the t SSR will face a sufficiently threatening strategic situation
ill the late I OSOs and beyond. for which an c.ypanded :113'11 defensc
based on their systems novw ill testing and he eloprncnt would make a
significant difference. If' their answer is es, then thaw would prohabls
make the cormrritnrents ncccssars~ to deploy such defenses despite the
economic and political costs. Since their answer probahl~ will not be
clear-cut. o ther irportaI I t factors would bias their decision toward
nondcploymerit:
-'I'}hc 1 SSR's two-track approach-arms control and a militan-v
buildup--to further its strategic goals has achieved limits on l'S
delivery vehicles and constrained t S defenses, while permitting
expansion of Soviet offensive forces. There are no indications
that the t SS11 is becoming dissatisfied with this approach.
- hider the Treats the t'SSR has :113\1 dcfcnscs to protect critical
targets in the Moscow area while the ('sited States has no
similar capability.
- 'l he Soviets apparently see the 'treats as hawing slowed t S .,\13\1
research arid development. while they mowed ahead with their
ow Ii.
Thc? holder of this I in is flu, I)in'elor, Defense Inte^llijenee? Agcnr u
Thu holder of this rii a is the I)irn?tor. I)efensr? Infelli,eenes' a,enr'r/
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On balance. \\c believe there is a fairly low, but rievertiitless
nific:tut chance (about IO to :3O percent) that the Soviets will abrogate
the 'I waty and deploy :AIMS in csccss of Treaty limits in tll(, 1980s. We
believe thcv worrl(1 see the military advantages of the defenses they
('o111(1 (1(11)1oy as being outvveighcd by the disadvantages cited above,
especially of energizing the united States and perhaps its Allies into a
rapid and sustained grow th in o crall military capabilities, both conven-
tional ,and uuclcar, that conl(1 lead to all erosion in the 1990s of Soviet
grins achieved in thi( I9; Os and 19SOs.
\n aItcrnati' e v ievv notes that Sov ict benefits from the Treaty .
under c111-rent and proie(t(d conditions, far outvv sigh the potential gains
In )III abro(ation..As a result, the likelihood of abrogation is considered
to be v (ry lo vv (10 percent or less) in the I 9HOs unless current conditions
change "Ill staI ItialI\. This vicvW cautions. II()vvever, that the Soviets IIavc
a nrotiv,itioni to deploy a WW idespread A13'v1 sy stem to fill the serious gap
in their defcrises. and there is a higher probability of such a deployment
in the 199O s. vloreover, they have the capability to corrrpletc such a de-
pIoy anent in only a IOWW years.;
Another ievv holds that the crucial question for Soviet leaders is
helhcr deploy merit of :Alv1s is requrired to attain Soviet strategic
obiecliAccording to this view the follo\virig factors should be given
~~rcaler ~~ eight ill fudging St net rnrotivations for deployment of a
idespread AIM defense. Soviet doctrinal requirements for daulage-
lirnitinC capability have always provided the rniotivation to deploy
\[;\1s both at \loscow and elsewhere. yow. as a result of advances by
the l SSl ill :AIM technology, the I'SSR's counterforce advantage over
the nutted States, and I S plans to deploy survivable and hard-target-
c,(p;tble ballistic missiles, the Soy icts llla no longer dcern it necessary to
restrain then selves I'roru further :AI \1 deployment. They have taken
t scntially all the steps necessary to prepare for a decision to deploy and
h;tvc denronslrated confidence in their current AI \1 technology by
deploy ing the nevv Al yl system at 1\Iosco~~. 't'he Soviets nray be
('vpeclcd to accompany ally widespread \B\1 deployments with an
active-measures campaign to nuaniptilate Western attitudes and actions
and to inhibit energizing the t sited States and its Allies into sustaining
;r rapid grow Of ill military capabilities. The holder of this view believes
it is riot possible vw ith current intelligence data to evaluate and (luantify
it If coal iderice the cvicut to vv hick variouls factors would influence the
ti0v jets to abaurdon or retain the ,\ 11\1 Treaty. i1m ever, given the
preparations the Soviets have made and the fact that the motivations
I'll, -/I r I Iel of thi, ra a i., thr A,Oi tart ('hief of Staff for IntcHigence Department of the Army.
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discussed above strongly influence Soviet decisions, the main text may
have understated the prospect for widespread A131M1 deployment.
A widespread Soviet
1 e ep oyment b, the late 19SOs or early 1990s would give the USSR
all important initial advantage over the United States in this area. We
have major uncertainties about how well a Soviet ABNI system would
function, and the degree of protection that future A13M deployments
would afford the I SSR. Despite our uncertainties about its potential
effectiveness, such a deployment would have an important effect on the
perceptions, arid perhaps the reality, of the US-Soviet strategic nuclear
relationship..lccording to an alternative view, the Soviet Union will not
have the capability in this decade to deploy A13\I defenses which would
significantly affect the US-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship.'
The holder of this rice is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
The holder of this ride is the 1)irector, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
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SUMMARY
I 'I'111 soviets' antiballistic missile (,AB\1) programs
onld ('11,1111( 111(111 to have deplos ed by the late I9S0s
to carl\ 1990" w idespread' ballistic missile defenses
Thal would last an important cffcct on the percep-
tions and perhaps tlic reality of the I. S-Soviet strategic
nuclear rt'lalionsllip. o Cher nt(ans envisioned by the
Soy icts for n?dncing potential damage to the ISSN
I roIII hullistit missiles- not assessed in this T:slinutte-
inclnde SOS iet connlerfor(e strikes o11 cnettts ballistic
I I IiaiIt s and facilities for their control. attacks on
hallistic missile ;lihntarilles bs Sovi(1 it fit isubillari If(,
willlarc , AS\\) forces, hardening and mobility of
Soy icl nlilitarv forces, and passive defense nieasttres.
\\c beliese the Soviets regard AB\1 as it critical
clclu(Int in their future capability to reduce damage
front a I S hallistic missile attack.
The mailable cvidcncc does not indicate with
it Ii ('('I taints w wt1I(r the Soviets arc making prepara-
tions for AI3\1 dcploytI I el its heyond the limits of the
\B\I 'Treaty, but it (foes .show that. through their AB\1
dcs(lopnl(nt and deployment programs, lie Soviets
.if(, steadily itltproving their ahilit\ to exercise options
for widespread hallistic ntissile defenses. In making
any decision to deploy AB\Is in excess of Treaty
Iimits. we believe Soviet leaders would give first
consideration to the net cffcct of AB\1 deploslncnts on
their capability to perform the missions called for by
soviet straterv. taking into account likely 1. 5 strategic
offensive and defensive force deploy nwilts. They
world also consider other factors such as the overall
military, political, and economic implications of revis-
ing, abrogating. or withdrawing front the A13\1 't'reaty.
1. FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE SOVIET
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES
Military Doctrine and Strategy
The Soviets present military doctrine and strate-
t(y emphasize offensive operations to neutralizt' or
It v%ulepn'ad delclnc, i^ ill(. western t SSlt or nationwide, sruUld
he one del>I,,ycil to united key military. Ica( I ccsht1), and military
industrial I,ug1'is VIituu dl we ('1111)105 the (inns "55 idespread.. and
11.11 ionw idc. in the Icst, it should he noted Ihat Zany arias of lesser
i 11115 1tame mwht not he llndcc(ed he AI3\I coscragc
eliminate I5 nuclear forces and reject mutual vulnera-
bility as it desirable or pern anent basis for the IS-
Soviet strategic relationship.'I'he Soviets prefer superi-
or capabilities to fight and ovin a nuclear war with the
United States, and have been working to improve their
chances of' prevailing in such a conflict.
4. We have no reason to expect any major after-
ations in Soviet doctrine and strategy during the I950s
and beyond. It is likely that in the future the Soviets
will of necessity he unable to rely as heavily on
offensive forces to destroy IS strategic nuclear deliv-
ery means. 'T'hey are clearly aware that IS strategic
force modernization programs will make more diffi-
cult and less certain the future effectiveness of coun-
terforce strikes by the USSR. At the same time, the
Soviets are continuing to take measures to reduce the
vulnerability of their own strategic offensive forces as
they recognize that fixed-base weapons are becoming
increasingly vulnerable. Then will not view these
trends as requiring then( to reduce the offensive,
counterforce orientation of their strategy in favor of
sonic assured level of stirs ivabilits , as would he im-
plied by it defense-dominated strategy. Rather, they
will sec the situation as placing a greater burden on
active and passive defenses to achieve their strategic
objectives.
5. (;hanges in the future capabilities of Soviet stra-
tegic defenses could have a greater effect on the US-
Soviet strategic relationship than at any time in the
past, particularly if there were major reductions in
offensive missiles of the two sides under a new arms
agreement. Thus, from the standpoint of, the objectives
called for by their doctrine and strategy, the Soviets
may have greater incentives in the 1980s and 1990s to
acquire a credible ballistic missile defense.
Soviet ABM Programs-Historical Perspective
6. The Soviets apparently formalized programs for
defenses against ballistic missiles early in the 1950s,
but our understanding of some of these early programs
is quite limited and subject to interpretation. Since the
1950s, they have devoted considerable resources to
ballistic missile defense and have started deployment
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of AI3M systems before developmental testing was
completed. There are differing assessments about
whether the history of Soviet A13M research, develop-
ment, and deployments indicates two distinct overall
programs-one for defenses at Moscow and another
for a widespread defense-or whether the Soviets have
been pursuing a single program with several potential
applications. The question of whether they have been
pursuing a single or dual ABM program has little
bearing on key issues of the technical performance and
effectiveness of the ABM systems and components
under development and the USSR's capabilities to
deploy them. According to one view, however, the
continuation of two programs in parallel is indicative
of Soviet commitment to ABM and implies the Soviets
may intend to deploy defenses beyond Moscow.2
Military Factors
7. The Soviets negotiated the SALT I agreements to
achieve political and military objectives that they
believed could not be attained by unconstrained devel-
opment and deployment of strategic weapons. Front
their perspective in 1972, the Soviets expected the
AIIM Treaty to enhance their counterforce capabilities
by inhibiting the United States from deploying an
extensive ballistic missile defense of Minuteman, At
the same time, they probably assessed that their own
AIM systems then under development would be
unable to protect critical targets from US missile
attacks at least through the 1970s. They hoped to
continue their own ARM development programs while
inducing the United States to slow down. A key issue is
how the Soviets now assess the effect of a continuation
of the AI3M Treaty limitations on the present and
future relationship of US and Soviet military power.
8. Since the negotiation of the ABNI Treaty, most of
the trends in strategic forces have been favorable to
the USSR. The Soviets probably consider that they are
much better able to prosecute a nuclear war than they
were in 1972. To reduce damage to the USSR in
accordance with their doctrine and strategy for nucle-
ar war, the Soviets are continuing to improve the
counterforce capabilities and survivability of their
offensive forces, to strengthen their air defenses arid
antisubmarine warfare forces, and to expand their
The holders of this view' are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army.
passive defenses. In this context, we believe that a
Soviet assessment of the correlation of strategic forces
would indicate that the continuing vulnerability of the
USSR to ballistic missile attack is an obvious deficiency
that should be redressed; however, various political
and economic factors as well as military requirements
would figure in any Soviet decision to deploy ARMS in
excess of the Treaty limits.
9. There is an additional view that to appreciate the
military factors affecting Soviet attitudes toward ABMs
one should consider the totality of the Soviets' commit-
ment to a strategic war-fighting capability, as exempli-
fied by their continued reliance on the damage-limit-
ing forces and measures cited in the preceding
paragraph. Their doctrinal requirement for victory in a
nuclear war dictates acquisition of all military forces
needed to achieve that objective, including ABMs.`
10. Developments in military technology in the
1980s that could increase the Soviets' incentive for
extensive deployment of ballistic missile defenses in
the 1990s include advances in ABM technology that
resulted in a significant increase in system effective-
ness and development of survivable radars that could
contribute to a hard-point ABM defense of ICBM
fields. Other technical advances by the United States,
however, such as the development of maneuvering
reentry vehicles (MaRVs)-evader MaRVs suitable for
use against hard targets-could reduce Soviet incen-
tives to undertake widespread deployment of ABM
systems now being developed.
11. An additional view holds that US countermeas-
ures provide additional incentives for the Soviets to
improve the capabilities of their ABM systems; howev-
er, prospects for US countermeasures would have little
effect on Soviet incentives for undertaking widespread
ABM deployments.'
12. Their increasing vulnerability to a ballistic mis-
sile attack could influence the Soviets to expand their
ARM programs, The growing size and sophistication of
French, British, and Chinese ballistic missiles, and the
deployment of Pershing 11 would be taken into ac-
count by the Soviets. Most important, of course, the US
The holders of this anew are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Depart-
ment of the Army.
' The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
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\1\ and Trident programs mould, later in the' 1980s,
confront the Soviets 5sith much intproscd hard-target
threats.
Political Factors
t A decision on 55 hclher to deploy a widespread
\B\I ssslcnt y0111(1 he made by the tot) Sosict leader-
.hip, based prirttarily oil ntilitar) rather than political
or l'cononuc factors. 'I'hc crucial (Iucstion for the
Sosil't Il'adl'rs is (5hclhcr the ( SSB st ill face a c)ualita-
Iiscls (liffr'rl'nl and slifficicnlly thicatetting strategic
sit11alio11 in the late 19s1)s and bcyutid, for 55hich lhc)
551)111(1 pcrccisc that a 55ide"prcad AB\1 s)Slem 551)111(1
make a significant dif(l'rence. If their ans5cr is )l's,
then the So5icls 5501114 probable stake the connnit-
nu'nls necessary to dcpluy such a ,,)stem and would
act(mip;11ts the deploy tnent \\ flit a propaganda blitz to
ntinitniil' spurt lout political losses. 'I'hc anssor, ho55-
l'sl'r. probably Still not be clear-cal to Sosict Icadcrs
mud important factors would bias their decision toward
nondl'plo5,ncut.
11W primary Factor is the continued effectiscncss
of the uu'thod the 1, SSB dc5clopcd ill the cark
1971k to further its strategic goals. Ill essence, this
utclhod has bec11 a two-track approach calling
for anus control and a Sosict military buildup.
I)11rinc till' 197 s the 1, SSB achicscd If fit its on
tIa' number of IS dl'lisl'ry sehicles through the
S \1. 'I' process, constained US defenses through
till' A\I 'I'rcaly. and ga5e priority to building
up its ors it of fl'nsisl' tutees. 'hltis t5sn-hack ap-
proacli stoked 55l'1I ill the I9,Os0and there are
no indications that the I SSB is becoming (iissatis-
Iil'(1 vs it If it.
\ ('(,old factor is till' adsanlage the I SSI1
c111rl'n11v l'11i0)5 by 5irtlic of the :ABM defenses
to protect critical tarct'ts in the Moscow area.
(,\(,n though these defenses sill remain limited
under till' A11A1 treaty. III contrast, the United
Stales has nu similar capability. Also the So5icts
appa culls sec till' 'hrcaty as has inc slowed US
\li\1 research mitt dl'Sl'loptttt'ttt. \5hile they
mused ahead \s itls their o55n. 'I'hcs would not
Iigit I (urge these advaIItzwl's and risk stintulat -
Ing l S \ l1\i dcSClOIitnl'nt and dcplo) nu'nt
ii a'rai1)s.
\ third lactor is till' significant resonrcl' connnit-
nit'nl fur such a s\ stem, 55 Itich would ha5c to be
weighed in the resource-constrained environ-
ment of the 1980s. Allocation of these resources
to ABM would probably affect some other mili-
tary programs, rather than simply add to the
annual growth that has gone into defense
spending.
- A fourth factor is the absence of strong leader-
ship at the center. There is already a lack of clear
direction under the Brezhnev regime. The re-
building of lwNN Power and personal relationships
In the aftermath of Brezhnev's departure are not
circumstances conducive to making the tough
decision to initiate a ssidcspread ABM deploy-
ment within at least the' next several years. Therc
is 1(11 alternative viers that by the time critical
decisions Wonld have to he made on ABM de-
p1oyment-111)1 eypccted before the 1990s, ac-
cording to this view--the succession process is
likely to be complete. It is unlikely, therefore,
that the absence of strong leadership will hear
significantly Oil Soviet ABM programs in the near
term.'
- The effects of a positive ABM decision on the
relationship 55ith the United States Mid Western
Europe would he counted on the negative side,
but if the Soviets felt compelled to deploy a
ssidesprcad :ABM ss stem, this factor would prob-
ably not hold theta hack. The leadership would
assume' that the West would attempt to adjust to
the fact that the USSR was developing Stthstanlial
ABM defenses, but the Sosicts would stress the
defensive nature of the system and try to use
Western public opinion to constrain the freedom
of action of Western i4overimicnt.s.
I I ,\n alternative 5iess stresses that the crucial
question for Sosict leaders is ss helper deployment of
an attire AIM defense is required to attain Soviet
strategic objects('S. Ill addressing this question, the
Soviets ssould consider the vahtc of such deployment
in the context of the totality of their strategic military
posture, 55hich includes a broad range of damage-
limiting forces and tactics. 'I'll(, factors that arc listed
abase \\mild also certainly affect Sosict judgment, but
not necessarily toward the negative:
While the Sosicls ha5e ('5or) justification for
being satisfied ssith their two-track approach of
'I'Ite holdrr of this ric'v is flu, Assistant ('hirf of Staff for
111trlligc?nec, 1)cpartntnt of tilt' .1r'm1
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arms control and military buildup, there are
factors that may convince them that this ap-
proach with regard to ABMs has served out most
of its useful life. These include the present level
of' the Soviets' ABM technology, their current
I( BN1 counterforce advantage. and the planned
t'S deployment of survivable hard-target-capable
strategic ballistic missiles.
- While the A13NI defense equation is one-sided in
the Soviet favor, it is riot clear that the Soviets
believe that further ABM deployments would
precipitate US offensive or defensive deploy-
ments substantial enough to offset the benefits of
their own A13\1 deployments. The Soviets would
undoubtedly undertake active measures to ma-
nipulate Western opinion and lessen such US
reactions.
- This view points out that consistency and conti-
nuity of party control of military doctrine and
derived programs have been a hallmark of Soviet
military development and deployment. The de-
ployment of widespread AI3M defenses, a funda-
mental doctrinal requirement, involves decisions
over such an extended period of time that it is
unlikely to be affected by leadership changes.
The Soviets could assess the increase in their
overall strategic strength that could result from
such a deployment as adding significantly to
their influence in Western Europe.'
Capabilities of Soviet Systems for Ballistic Missile
Defense
15. The Soviets' assessment of the capability of the
AB.\1 systems and components they are developing is a
key factor bearing on their policies and programs for
ballistic missile defense. We do riot know how they
assess these capabilities. In our own assessments, there
are uncertainties and differences of view among intelli-
gence agencies about some of the capabilities of individ-
ual Soviet A13M systems and the potential of some Soviet
surface-to-air missiles (SAyls) to perform in an ABM
role. We have been unable to assess in any detail the
degree of protection from ballistic missile attack that the
Soviets could achieve by deployment of the ARM
systems and components they have under development.
The holder of this ten is the Director, Defense Intelligence
IkcncU.
The Moscow System
16. The present ballistic missile defenses at Moscow
consist of four sites with aboveground launchers and
engagement radars, and the large radars-designated
Dog House and Cat House-to provide target acquisi-
tion and tracking data. (See figure 1.) These defenses-
now being upgraded-could provide only a limited,
single-layer defense; that is, they could intercept bal-
listic missile reentry vehicles (RVs) only outside the
atmosphere. These defenses probably could counter a
small attack riot accompanied by penetration aids such
as chaff and decoys. Attempting to counter a larger
number of attacking RVs, however, would rapidly
exhaust the available interceptors.
New ABM Systems
17. We believe that the upgraded defenses at Mos-
cow air(] any additional ballistic missile defenses the
Soviets may deploy in the 1980s will incorporate
components currently under development. Of these,
the upgraded defenses at Moscow will apparently
include a new large fixed engagement radar which
may have capabilities for search and target acquisi-
tion; silo launchers; a high-acceleration, short-range
interceptor; and a modified version of the exoatrnos-
pheric interceptor deployed with the original defenses
at Moscow. The rapidly deployable system the Soviets
are developing-a site for which could be deployed in
months rather than years-would consist of transport-
able engagement radars, aboveground launchers, and
either a long-range interceptor or a high-acceleration,
short-range interceptor or both.
18. There are major uncertainties and gaps in infor-
mation about key performance parameters of the com-
ponents of ABM systems the Soviets are developing and
deploying. Agencies differ in their analyses and in
engineering judgments about these key parameters and,
as a result, reach different conclusions about the capa-
bilities of Soviet systems to intercept US ballistic missile
reentry vehicles. These capabilities would vary, de-
pending on various factors-for example, whether tar-
get acquisition and tracking data (handover data) were
provided to the ARM launch site from a remotely
located radar providing battle management support.
19. The characteristics of Soviet ARM components
that have the greatest impact on assessments of their
effectiveness, based on evidence of test activity, in-
clude the search and target discriminiation capabilities
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Figure 1
The Moscow Antiballistic Missile System
Kubinka 0 ABM training facility
Dog House radar
Venyukovski
'Cat
House
radar
MOSCOW
1)
Operational ABM launch
complex
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of engagement radars, the target-handling capabilities
of all radars, and, if MaUVs are deployed, the maneu-
verability of Soviet interceptors. Our estimates of the
capabilities of the upgraded A13M defenses the Soviets
are deploying at Moscow and rapidly deployable
systems available to the Soviets are shown in table 1.
Intelligence Community agencies' differing judg-
ments, shown in the table, about the potential capabili-
ties of the rapidly deployable A13M system are based
primarily on their assessments of the performance of
its target-tracking engagement radar-designated the
Flat 'Twin. The table shows A13M system capabilities
for one-on-one intercepts of current types of 1.15 ICBM
and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) RVs
not accompanied by penetration aids. (One-on-one
intercept capabilities do not account for the effects of
multiple interceptors being used against multiple RVs.)
20. Agency estimates in the table show that, with
handover data, these ABM systems could intercept all
currently deployed types of (IS 1(13M all(] SI.BM RVs
not accompanied by penetration aids, with the excep-
data, these systems according to one assessment would
have virtually no practical capability to intercept
I( :BM and SLUM BVs with a single Flat Twin radar.
I'lierefore, for autonomous intercepts, many
Flat 'T'win engagement radars world be needed at
each defense site or in a defended region for defense
against multiple RVs arriving simultaneously from
different directions and for defense against MaRVs.'
According to another assessment, a single Flat Twin
radar would have the capability for autonomous oper-
ation over a useful threat sector. All-azimuth coverage
is not required at all defended regions under a number
of, operational conditions. Where extended-azimuth
coverage is desired, multiple radars could be assigned
adjoining angular sectors. This view judges that one
' The holder of this view is the Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
" The holder of this view is the Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
radar could handle more than the I( ]3M corridor for a
defended region and that several radars could cover
the entire potential strategic ballistic missile threat
region.'
22. For defense against reentry vehicles accompa-
the, estimated limitations in
penetration aids, chaff, and decoys25X1
one25X1
the
performance of Soviet A13M systems make it highly
unlikely that current systems deployed or under devel-
opment would be able to discriminate RVs 25X1
25X1
Another assessment is that25X1
available Soviet discrimination techniguesF-25X1
25X1
make it possible that current25X1
Soviet ABM systems deployed or under development
could defeat those penetration aids.'' An additional
view notes that, while such discrimination techniques
may be available, it is not clear the Soviets are using
them. In any event, they would be useful only against
2.5X1
All ages-25X1
cies agree that the capabilities demonstrated by a new
large Soviet radar under development, if incorporated
into operational systems, would enhance discrimina-
tion performance.
23. Ihe capabilities of Soviet ABM systems against
evader-type maneuvering reentry vehicles 25X1
9FX1
would depend on the specific characteristics25X1
o the reentry vehicles and accompanying penetration
aids. Achievement of a good-quality defense would 25X1
require multiple interceptors for each MaHV. In addi-
tion, even with handover data, multiple Flat Twin
radars would be required at a site to be able to defend
against two or more MaI1Vs arriving simultaneously,
since their trajectories could prevent a single Flat
Twin from tracking more than one of them.
The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army.
"' The holder of this view is the Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
" The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army.
" The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
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2-3. Taking these differing estimates into account,
we helievc it is unlikely that the most critical perform-
ance parameters of Soviet ABNI components will all be
at the more threatening or less threatening end of the
range of our present uncertainty about them. In any
case, incremental improvements in the characteristics
ol' Soviet A13\1 components under development, as
well as new and follow-on components, are expected
to make Soviet AI3M systems more capable in the late
1980s and beyond. Thus, the likely technical capabili-
ties of Soviet ABN1 s~sterns which could be deployed
appear to be sufficient to inject significant uncertainty
into an' US calculations of the effects of any planned
ballistic missile attack.
Surface-to-Air Missile Systems
25. Our assessments of the capabilities of Soviet
surface-to-air missiles to intercept strategic ballistic
missile RVs are summarized in table I . The only Soviet
SAM", that any agency believes could potentially he
used in this role are: the SA-5, a widely deployed SAM
first introduced in the mitt-1960s: the SA-10, which
first became operational in 1980; and the SA-X- 12, an
adsauced tactical SAM still under development.
26. SA-5 and SA-10. We do not believe the current-
ly deployed SA-5 and SA-10 systems are suitable for
use in ballistic missile defense. The Soviets are not
likely to hate developed these SAM systems with an
ABM mission in mind, nor have they overtly conduct-
ed the upgrade program required to give these SAMs a
significant A131\1 capability. We do not believe that the
Soviets could covertIy upgrade the SA-5 or SA-10
s\ steers to achieve more than marginal capabilities to
intercept strategic ballistic missile reentry veldcAes
27. An alternative analysis concludes that the SA-5
and the SA-10 ma' have a limited ABM role. Accord-
ing to this view, the SA-5 ssas intended as a dual
system
With hand over c ata the SA-5
system should be capable of providing a limited
regional defense against RVs not accompanied by
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penetration aids. According to this view, the SA-5,
used in conjunction with a dedicated ARM system,
could handle some RVs, thereby releasing the dedicat-
ed ARM system to defend against more difficult
targets. This view also stresses the significant similar-
ities between the SA-10 and the SA-X-12, a system
with demonstrated antitactical ballistic missile
(ATBM) capabilities, and believed to have the poten-
tial to intercept some ICBM and SLI3M RVs as well.
Because of these similarities, it is possible that the SA-
10 also has antiballistic missile design features. The
potential capabilities of the SA-10 are sufficient for it
to be used in a preferential defense of small target
areas. In addition upgrade to
improve potential ARM capabilities could be per-
28. We believe that in the absence of the ARM
Treaty restrictions, and with an unrestricted modifica-
tion and testing program, the Soviets could upgrade
the capabilities of these systems to intercept certain
strategic ballistic missile RVs. Such an upgrade, even if
it provided much less capability than a dedicated
ABM system, could be an important supplement to a
ballistic missile defense-for example, a self-defense
capability, a point defense against ballistic missiles
launched from China or Europe, or possibly against
SL13M RVs.
29. SA-X-12. We believe the SA-X-12, an advanced
tactical surface-to-air missile system, will have both
antiaircraft and antitactical ballistic missile capabili-
ties. (See figure 2.) The system has two interceptors,
one of which has higher acceleration, speed, and range
than the other.1
The SA-X-12 system could be ready for
deployment in the next year or so with the lower
performance interceptor and somewhat later using the
higher performance interceptor.
30. Available evidence suggests that the SA-X-12 is
intended for use by Soviet ground forces. However, a
system with antitactical ballistic missile defense capa-
bilities could have many of the features one would
expect to see designed into an ABM system. Making a
" The holder of this vieu, is the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
2.5X1
25X1
95X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Figure 2
SA-X-12 System Components
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number of assumptions about design features the
system could have we
conclude that the SA-\-12 with the higher accelera-
tion interceptor could have the capability to intercept
all current types of US IC13%1 and SLBM RVs except
As shoes in table 1, fit(-
SA-X-12 could have a significant autonomous capabili-
t' to defend a small area against US ICBM and SLRM
R\ s. There is an alternative view that there are
insufficient data to characterize the capabilities of the
SA-\-12 against strategic ballistic missiles as "signifi-
cant." On the basis of less generous assumptions about
the system's design features, its capability would be
marginal.''
Capabilities for ABM Deployments
Upgraded ABM Defenses at Moscow
31. The Soviets are in the process of upgrading and
expanding the ballistic missile defenses at Moscow,
thus far within the limits of the ARM Treaty (see
figures :3 and -I):
"IThc upgraded defenses at Nloscosv include silo
launchers for a high-acceleration missile to con-
duct intercepts within the atmosphere and for a
long-range missile to conduct intercepts outside
the atmosphere. As long as the ABM Treaty
remains in effect the Soviets will deploy the
nuuinnun number--100 launchers-at Moscow.
\Vhilc we are not certain of all the components
that will make up the upgraded defenses, the two
large radars providing battle management sup-
port (Dog House and Cat House) will probably
remain part of, the Moscow defenses.
A new large phased-arra' radar is under con-
struction near Pushkino north of Moscow, which
will provide 360-degree coverage and is probably
intended to control A13%1 engagements. We are
unable to judge whether the Pushkino radar will
have the capability for search and target acquisi-
tion. If it does, we believe it would be more
likely to have short-range rather than long-range
search and target acquisition capabilities. If it
were to have long-range search and target acqui-
sition capabilities, the Pushkino radar would
The holders of this view are the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the :fir Force, and the Director of
Naval Intelligernce, Department of the .Vary.
close existing gaps in radar coverage by the Dog
House and Cat House and could provide target25X1
acquisition and tracking data for expanded ARM
deployment in the western USSR. If' it were to
have short-range search and target acquisition
capabilities, it would be able to provide battlc25X1
management support for defenses at Moscow,
reducing the need for the (:at House and Dog
Ilouse radars.
Options for Deployments Beyond Treaty Limits
32. We have postulated four options for Soviet
AI3NI deployments which represent an expansion be-
yond ABM Treaty limits of the upgraded defenses now
being deployed at Moscow, with increasing numbers
of ARM launchers for defense of areas beyond Mos-
cow. For the three options that postulate a widespread
defense, we have assumed a rapidly deployable system
using components the Soviets are developing, consist-
ing of radars for target tracking and missile guidance,
aboveground launchers, a long-range interceptor, and
a high-acceleration interceptor like the US Sprint. (See
figure 5.) These components woudd provide the Soviets
a two-layer defense-that is, a defense permitting
intercepts outside and inside the atmosphere. The
deployment options we have postulated are:
- Option 1: A 500-launcher defense at Moscow.
Option IA: A 500-launcher defense at Moscow
and 900 aboveground launchers in the western
USSR.
- Option 2: A 500-launcher defense at Moscow and
1,500 aboveground launchers throughout the
USSR.
- Option 3: A 500-launcher defense at Moscow and
3,000 aboveground launchers throughout the
1ISSI1.111
'~ We emphasize that our four options were created for illustrative
purposes only; in any actual deployment the size, target coverage,
and mix of interceptors and supporting radars could be different
from those we have assumed. Thus, variations in these factors can be
made for use in US defense analyses. The numbers of launchers in
each option represent different levels of effort, and are not based
upon assumed Soviet requirements to defend against a particular US
attack or to provide a given level of defense of key targets at
Moscow or beyond In our options we have assumed ABMs would be
deployed to achieve coverage of military and nonmilitary targets of
high value to the Soviets. The Soviets might choose a deployment
pattern that would maximize the defense of specific types of
targets-for example, heavy ICBM silos.
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Figure 3
Present Status of Upgraded Ballistic Missile Defenses at Moscow
Kimry
Phased-array Pushkino
radar
ABM training
Kubinka
*-facility
I Chekhov
Cat House radar
Dog House radar
r}r~ Voskresensk
Aleksin
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ABM support
facility -
Operational Galosh launchers
(above ground)
Silos under construction
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Figure 5
Potential Elements of a Rapidly Deployable ABM System
I I,ii I iii I ngaecnicnt ItalIJr
Lung-Range Interceptor
III (ani9lcr high-\ccclcration Intcrechtor
Radars for Battle Management Support
:i:l \ntottg the factors affecting the pace of Soviet
dcpIosancnts are the requirements for radars provid-
ing battle n allaventcnt support, about vv hich there are
unteitai lit it's and differences of vices. While agencies
disagrcc about tltc autonomous capabilities of the
,tpidly deployable :ABy1 system we have assttnied,
Ihcrc is agreement that the :Ul\I systems associated
\cith the lour deploynu'nt options would operate most
rtlcclivcly using handoser data from large long-range
scamp and target acquisition radars. -I'll(, Soviets have
a number of large phased-array radars that, to vary tug
dcgrccs. could pros idc ballistic missile early warning,
attack ;tssessntcnl, and battle management support
data. 'I hose radars include the two radars at Moscow-
1)(t, I louse and (:at I lonsc and radars oil the periph-
cr) of the Soviet tnion--l5 older Ilen Ilouse radars
;tnd l i\(, new radars operational or under construction.
'p'hew Iivc nevv radars will have better capabilities
than the Hen House. The estimated azimuthal cover-
age of these large radars, as well as the 1'ushkino radar,
is shown in figure 6.
34. All agencies agree that the large phased-array
radars on the periphery of the USS11 have the techni-
cal potential to provide target-tracking data for sup-
port of a widespread A13M system, but agencies
disagree about their suitability-their location and
vulnerability-for a battle management support role.
Agencies differ about whether the Soviets would de-
ploy a widespread ABM system that relied on these
radars for battle management support, or instead
would require, to assure the s' stem's effectiveness, a
network of other radars in the interior of the [USSR-
prohibited by the ABy1 'Treaty-that have not yet
been observed to be tinder construction.
35. One view holds that the ABM defenses that the
Soviets could deplo} which relied on the peripheral
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Figure 6
Estimated Azimuthal Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection and Tracking Radars
New phased-array radars under construction
Hen House radars
Dog House and Cat House radars
Pushkino radar
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6nda',ys'r~p,pe s
n& _ -vac aut,.,,,.,! e
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radars for battle nr.utagcm(,nt support could he (tuick-
IN and casil\ o\ercolin It\ the foiled States because of
tiii nlurrabilil> of the radars to attack. Therefor(, the
Ii cc I i,iIs arc nnlikck candidates for the key de-
nnt'ot, up oil cv hi(I1 a ccid(spread AR\1 defense would
d(p(I
I'll( f(nc.urd 1(tti(us ()i the peripheral radars
:toil ih(ir present limited defenses make than
stoic stowable l( destruction by hallistic tins
(II as aircraft Intl cruise missiles. Rada rs
II llle interior vcould not he vuhterablc to the
stint( degree. 'I'h( pt'riplteral radars do not fill
the rsistitic gaps in tattle nla Utag(is(itt coverage
an(I only look ()ntvsaid, staking them "tlnerablc
to blind side attacks by ballistic missiles, regard-
I(" (d the number of \R\is deployed to defend
lb(nt.
Because (I their tote operating ft c(Ioencies they
are (\tr(nt(ly susceptible t( ) cle(t.r( )ntaglet ic (f-
I((ts isu(II is bla(,kout) (f nuclear bursts
c arh(ads det(oatec es ( )n( tie range
(f (I(f'I Is( 's could render su(II a radar useless for
In order to he p( )t(nlialIy (II(ctivI' atatiIIst cur-
r(nt I S ballistic missiles. a widespread \R\1
I(lrlo~ nu it beyond lbe western I SSR 5could
r((tuio' a to tork of (our or five new radars. AV'e
assent( the u(sc radars scald pr(cide,3NO degree
o~ (r;tcc :aid vv (ul( I Ix? located in the Iliter i(r
xch'ic tin's ssould It( , less colserabl( t( ) at lack.
inalI\ \c( assuot( tIt( n(cc radars cc(uld ( )I ter ate
al ;t higher frc(tu(ncy which vv()old stake them
I(ss sss(cittibl( to nuclear vveap()ns effects ,
;ii An(Ih(r viiv( h(Ids that lh(- large peripheral
rad.us- including the older. less capable Ilea Ilouse
uad.ns_ arc suitable for Itr0vidinc battle tuauac(m(nt
Sul lent tea ~id(sprcad AID\1 d( Itl(yntent.
iscn the oust likely sc?eoarits, it is tuilikcly that
riiist' missiles Of .111italt \\ wild suppress these
t,,t(lars in lints to lot cctut precision tracking of
attiikitti sttit(gic missiles, In addition, radars
located on the periphery would be no more
vulnerable than those in the interior to suppres-
sion attacks using ballistic missiles. Likely in-
creases in the ballistic missile defense of the
peripheral radars in the course of a widespread
A13\1 deployment would improve their protec-
tion from blind-side attacks.
- All radars are susceptible to electromagnetic
effects of nuclear bursts, but rendering these
radars ineffective by such rneatis would he a
significant operational undertaking.
- Moreover, radars on the periphery sou c )e
unaffected by nuclear bursts in the interior.
Similarly, nuclear bursts associated with defense
of the peripheral radars would not blind A13\1
engagen1el I t radars in the interior."
37. If. for whatever reasons, the Soviets decided to
deploy ABM defenses in cmcess of 'T'reaty limits, sc
believe the circumstances surrounding such a decision
would call for deployments to be in place as rapidly as
possible. "i'o this end. see believe the Soviets would
make use of the large radars operational or under
construction, including those on the periphery of the
t'SSR, for battle inanagentent support. We believe the
Soviets would provide some active defenses for the
peripheral radars and would make evolutionary im-
prov(ntents in these radars. In addition, they would
Itr(hahl~ construct new radars in the interior to
improve battle management support. 'I'he large I)og
Hoes( and (;at House radars near \loseow could
provide battle management support for AR\1 deploy-
ntents throughout much of the Western USSR, as in
Option IA. Such a s\ stein, in order to h( viable, would
probably require additional battle management sup-
port front the Pushkin( radar (pro), ided it had long-
range search and target ac(tuisiti(n capabilities), from
a m,\\ search radar (possibly at \1(s(,ovv ), and from the
large peripheral radars. 'T'here is an alternative view
that while not precluding Soviet deployment of addi-
tional ac(tuisition radars for redttndancv, possibly even
I ht li / I o , rl thin tit n to rt tht I)ttmtrl i)Ii,,I,n' for inti'lli
nt (tritrtol luttlh,ltru( 11xriii iuii! Ihr 1)trc,lor, Blowout ol
lntt/IH trur aml lit it a?, 11, 1)ipurlnlifit if "tats
I'll(, hol(irrs of this t O n are thr I)ire( tor. I)tJcuist i itcllw'tur
i stir, aril( ill(, .Assistant ('hit'f of Staff for Irtt(?lligr'ri c. 1)rpart-
nu'nt of flit Army.
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large numbers with less sophistication than the periph-
eral radars-holds that at present there is no basis in
evidence for such an eventuality."
Potential ABM Deployment Rates
38. In assessing Soviet capabilities for ABM deploy-
ments we have also considered requirements for sup-
porting command, control, and communications net-
works, for production of nuclear materials and
warheads, and for manpower and troop training. We
believe that these would not be pacing factors in the
rate of deployment. Launch site construction and
AIM component production, however, probably
would be. "There are uncertainties and differences of
view, as explained in volume II, about the effect of
these factors on the rate at which the Soviets could
deploy silo and aboveground ABM launch sites. As a
result of these differences, as well as differences about
the requirements for battle management support ra-
dars, we have postulated three forces with differing
deployment rates for each of the deployment options
described in paragraph 32. In all three forces, deploy-
ment of the expanded defenses at Moscow is paced by
the rate of silo construction. A 500-launcher defense at
Moscow could be completed several years sooner if
aboveground launchers were used instead of silos. All
three force postulations assume, for the purposes of the
Estimate, a high-priority program in which the Soviets
should implement the necessary production and de-
ployment initiatives during 1982 (or, in this supposi-
tion, already have taken such initiatives) and that the
deployments in excess of ABM Treaty limits, tinder
this assumption, svoald begin about 1985.? (The likeli-
hood of, such deployments is addressed later.) The
three force postulations arc:
- Force A, which is paced by the construction
schedule for engagement radar production,
launch site deployment, and, for widespread
deployments beyond the western USSR, deploy-
ment of a netssork of large nesv radars.
Force B, which is paced by the rate of engage-
ment radar production and launch site deploy-
The holders of this oieu, are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army.
? For purposes of this Estimate, we have arbitrarily chosen 1982
as the date for implementing the necessary production and deploy-
ment initiatives. If the Soviets have already made a deployment
decision, the sustained peak A13\1 deployment rates we have
projected could he achieved a year or two earlier.
ments and for which we assume that the radars
operational or tinder construction will provide
the requisite battle management support.
- Force C, which is based on the same assumptions
as Force B, except that it is paced by the rate of
launch site construction art(] not by the rate of
engagement radar production. It also assumes a
mix of silo and aboveground launchers at
Moscow.
39. These three forces for each of the deployment
options are shown in figure 7. As a result of our
assumptions more significance should be attached to
the pace of deployments we have postulated rather
than to their ultimate size and composition. Under the
various force postulations, significant Soviet ABM de-
ployments could be operational by the late 1980s or
early 1990s, as shown in table 2, assuming that the
Soviets made the decision to initi:,te thrm this year.
its about pac- 25X1
ing factors, the dates of completion of the deployments
could vary.
Indications of Postulated ABM Deployments
40
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Figure 7
Potential Soviet Deployments Beyond ABM Treaty Limits"
() l,cr.um11,11 ;1 [1 [1c11 cr,
Option I"
9b 98 2000
0 1982 84
Option 2
Option 3
tn,
3.00
IIfI[I
3,(100
,111,
"(Hi ,11o launcher, :II Mlr,covc
I.1II0 ahovCt_'rOUnd launcher, nationv+idc
1,500
111111
2,000
I ,lul
I.~()O
1 .111111
0110 Iii l,lmmenl J,-11011 In HSI. nn launcher dcplu~menl,
--id I Ivan limn. Iinlll I`ly' Doc, not IIpic,ew i utPlncnt. Ihout the
'IA, liho, d 11h, 1 I`In\mi it, 11- 111
Porte A
Paced he cneapcnlent r.Idur pru1ual0n uul launch ,i11 .Ind lergc
ralar 1011 It 1 ueti0n
1,\ ~ III I,n011 ii I Jilrlnr II AIIIVr,~+ .ould hi' COnTpIclel I-eell )tun --_ I orcc li
-,m, ! it 11-1-1nunl I 111T 1 II ?1I1 11.11. Pitch lii Talc of cng:Ipcmcnt Tatar pmduclion Ind launch file
canal UCiio11
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PurC1 (
PeCCd he GAC oI Iua11i11 tilt 10mirllliIMI, ^1ILI11CI mie 0t ti]o ant
I110-around l oanihcrI At AI000-
500 silo launchers at Moscow
900 uhoneground launchers in c es(crn USSR
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000
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Pates of Completion
for Postulated Soviet ABM Deployments
5(10-lannclit, r defense at Aloscosc (Option W'
1,400-launcher defrost for kes targets in ssestcrn
I SSR (Option I k)
2.000-1auncher defense for kes targets natiormide
(Option 2)
:1,50(1launcher defense lot kes targets natiomcide
(Option :i)
1989-91
1990-92
ForCC (,
1988
There is an alt eraatire ride that Force C would be implausible because the postulated deployment
rates mould seriously Compete with the Soviets' alnlit y to carry out other military programs. The holder of
this rieu is the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the :fir Force.
h :A 500-launcher defense at Moscow could be completed several years sooner if aboscgronud launchers
sloe used instead of silos.
1 : i hhe (51inutled I O-S c a procurement an(I operal-
ItIC costs of a ss idespread. 2.18)0-launcher AIM de-
fcnsc (Option_') ('wild amount to sonic 25 percent of
strategic defense cslu-nditttres and about 13 percent of
,pending on all Soy ict strategic forces. I)urins 1
the cstimated costs of a I(1(1-launcher defense under
I reaIs limits ssould antoiutl to ahont 5 percent of
strategic defense costs and a little user 2 percent of tltc
"pending on all strategic forces, similar to the propor-
tion of spending for AR\Is in the I)7t)s.1
Thcrc an ronsidcraIIc nor-cItaintI(, in the cost -estutiating
ii t I u n l , (51 : r p e l I ( ( I t o S I , 5 ( ' t unlit i0 pt ot-'I '1111,
44. While there arc differing vies s abort the ecrr25X1
nomic implications of a ssidespread Soviet A13\1 de-
plo5,nertt out other military programs and on lli(,
Sosiet cc(mom) , sse beliese that. if Soviet leaders
concluded that such a program ssas nccessars, eco-
nomic considerations ssonld riot deter theot Iron25X1
pursuing it. It should he noted, boss ever, that the
circumstances under sshich the Sosiets ss (mld eu1har125X1
on such a deploy menl should prohaldv involve in-
creased efforts in a number of other militarN programs
h, the USSR (and the 1 sited States). These programs
and the cost of the ssidespread AIM dell((5ment
ssould farther strain an alreads strained Soviet
((.10 olll5.
II. PROSPECTS FOR DIRECTED-ENERGY
WEAPONS
-15. The Soviets' assessment of Iheir prospects for
developing operationally practical directed energy
sseapons for hallistic missile defense could affect their
decision about AR\1 deploy meats in excess of 't'reats
limits. 'hhe ( SSR has been ssorking on ntilitar) appli-
cations of directed-energy technology as long as and
more extensisel\ than the Foiled States. 'hhe Soviets
have the expertise. matiposser. and resources to devel-
op those directe(-cnerg) sscap(n and nrilitar~ support
,,)stems that prose to be feasible. Directed-energy
s) stems for ballistic missile defense, if they prose to be
feasible and practical. ssould most likely he used in
coujunelioll ssith consenlional :AR\1 systems and sup-
porting radars, at least initially
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16. Of the types of directed-energy technology with
potential application to ballistic missile defense, evi-
dence is strongest that the Soviets arc pursuing devel-
opment of high-energy laser AI3M weapons. We be-
lieve that the Soviets have a program to develop laser
weapons for ballistic missile defense, although its full
scope, concept of weapon operation, and status are not
clear. 'T'here are limited indications that the Soviets
have performed research to investigate the feasibility
of' particle beam weapons (I'13WN').
Laser Systems
Ground-Based
47. There are many unknowns concerning the feasi-
bility and practicality of ground-based laser weapons
for ballistic missile defense. We do not know, for
example, how the Soviets would handle the problem of
heavy cloud cover prevalent in many areas of the
USSR containing facilities the Soviets would want to
protect. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the
magnitude of the Soviet effort. It would be consistent
with Soviet philosophy and practices to deploy a
weapon system even if its capability were limited
under some conditions. There are large uncertainties
in any estimate of when a Soviet laser weapon could
be available. We expect that the high-energy laser
facility at the test range will be used during the 1980s
for testing the feasibility of ballistic missile defense
applications. If feasibility is demonstrated, our judg-
ment is that a prototype ground-based laser weapon
for ballistic missile defense would then have to be built
and would not begin testing until the earls 1990s. An
initial operational capability (10(:) probably Nvould riot
occur until after the year 2000. An alternative view
holds that, if tests from this facility prove successful in
engaging ballistic missile RV's, the Soviets would not
have to construct a new prototype weapon, and there-
fore a deployed ground-based laser wcapon system for
ballistic missile defense could reach IOC by the early-
to-middle 1990s.= 2
Space-Based
45. While space-based weapons for ballistic missile
defense are probably feasible from a technical stand-
point, such weapons require significant technological
"? The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
advances iii large-aperture mirrors and in pointing and
tracking accuracies. They would also require very
large space boosters having perhaps 10 times the
capacity of those now in use. We expect the Soviets to
have such boosters in the late 1980s. In view of the
technological requirements, we do not expect them to
have a prototype space-based laser weapon .system
until after 1990 or an operational system until after
the year 2000.
Particle Beam Weapons
Ground-Based
49. Soviet particle beam weapon (P13W) technology
and related efforts have reached a level suitable for
conducting experimental research on the feasibility of
several applications, including ground-based ballistic
missile defense. We doubt that the Soviets are yet
capable of building PBWs, or that they are close to
solutions for the technical problems involved. We
believe Soviet development of any prototype ground-
based 113W, if feasible, would be at least 10 to 15 years
in tire future.
Space-Based
50. Space-based I BWs would not be encumbered
by the atmospheric propagation effects of ground-
based PBWs and therefore appear more feasible; the
issue is one of developing an operationally practical
system. The Soviets have a research program on at
least some of the aspects of space-based 1'I3Ws. These
weapons would be quite different from the ground-
based PI3Ws; the particle energy and current require-
ments would be much lower and the systems require-
ments would be far less stressing. Nevertheless, the
technical requirements for such a system, such as
extremely precise pointing and tracking, are severe,
and it is unlikely that the Soviets could develop a
prototype space-based particle beam weapon to de-
stroy hard targets like missile HV's before the end of
the century. According to one view, systems intended
to disrupt the electronics of ballistic missiles, requiring
significantly less power, could probably be developed
and deployed in the 1990s.2
" The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army.
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III. CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSES
Upgraded Moscow Defenses Within Treaty Limits
51 The projected upgrade of the defenses at Mos-
('ow w it I, 1110 um launchers--tile ] reat~ limit-will
pros ill(' the Soviets with a much more reliable, two-
laver eapabilih to defend critical targets at Moscow'
against an attack b\ sonic tens of current hpes of US
li\ s and against increasingly sophisticated third-coun-
irv missiles. bike the present ,\steni, the long-range,
c~oaUncrspheric interceptors in the upgraded defenses
could intercept IR\s targeted against areas well beyond
Moscow ' In a large-scale attack, the projected 100
lllerceplots would quickly be exhausted, but they
11iighl be effective ill preferentially defending selected
targets in the Aloscovv area. such as national command
and control facilities. The Soviets nuts close existing
}:aps in coverage of radars providing battle nianage-
ii cot support of the Moscow system, either by con-
structing a new radar or radars if the Pushkino radar
does 111)1 have a long-range search and target acquisi-
tion capabilih or, according to one assessment, possi-
bls I,s rob ills ()It till large peripheral radars to
pros ide battle management support'-,
Expanded Defenses at Moscow
5' l' is upgrade to the dcfeuses at Moscow is
cvpccled to prrn ill(. the Soviets with a foundation for
evpanding their defenses. With a firepower level of
annul .it)t) interceptors (Option 1), the Soviets could
make hardened targets around Moscow, especially.
('((111111111(1 blinkers, less vulnerable to a substantial I'S
force of attacking IiVs. The leakage likely to result
rnnl such an attack w oul(I cause severe damage to
most (d fill. aboveground, uifiardened facilities and to
some of Lill hardened target facilities as well. Against a
snl;lller scale attack, a defense like Option I would
\\ I, hrlirvr thr upgraded lefenses at \loscinv are intended to
rolrrt largrts in the ALiscow area Sinnilarls. the expanded 5(10-
I, unrlier drfelur 11 \losernv inducted in Illy four deploSment
optums N Ili( 11 \%r puslulatrd ssas envisioned for defense of targets in
ill,- area of \lo.roN I lnwes 'r, CSttalnnospherie interceptors
I;oio, Ird Ironn silos at \tosross could intercept l S I( T\1 and S1,13\I
li\. l,Ii t'trd , IV,, areas a fits hundred kilometers distant. 'Pile
limner of lrlrmr aiIorded targets hryond \loscosv world, of course,
lrprnd nn thr nHi nclto r of inlerreptnrs available and whether
prnrln,ltittn tids tscw used hs the attacking toter
Ihe holder n/ t1m rieu is llu' i)ireeior, i)eJense Inl('llig('llco,
1::rri, u
allow the Soviets to spread their interceptor coverage
to a larger number of targets over a larger area. The
effectiveness of such a defense against attack by third
countries, such as China, would be considerable.
Widespread ABM Defense
53. If the Soviets were to deploy an ABM defense
involving_ as many as 1,400 to 3,500 launchers, as in
Options 1A, 2, and 3, assuming the deployed systems
were reasonably effective, the potential effect on the
US strategic missile force would be substantial. A US
first strike in the face of such a heavy defense would
be degraded, perhaps to a significant degree. A US
second strike would be degraded even more, because
the lower number and rate of HV arrivals in most
areas would result in lower leakage rates for the
defense.
54. The actual effectiveness of such a defense
would depend, not only on the performance of the
deployed ABM systems, but also on the vulnerabilities
of key elements of the network and the potential of an
attacking force to exploit them. We have not analyzed
these problems in detail. For example, in addition to
protecting the key targets, considerable numbers of
interceptors would have to be allocated for protection
of the radars providing battle management support.
Hundreds of RV's might be required for a direct attack
On all these radars for the attacker to have high
confidence of their destruction. An attack to open
selected corridors would require considerably fewer
RVs to give the attacker high confidence in neutraliz-
ing the targeted radar
peck an attack with only a few HVs per radar would
diminish a Soviet planners confidence in the perform-
ance and survivability of the radars. Planning and
execution of an attack to destroy or neutralize these
radars would be more difficult under conditions in
which the United States rode out an initial Soviet
strike, because of the reduced number of surviving US
weapons and the potentially degraded US capability to
execute a coordinated attack.
55. We have not quantitatively assessed, and are
uncertain about, the potential ability of a widespread
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\13 1 system to reduce )sera II damage and to protect
kes military functions. It would l ;robahly he store
effective against SLAM's than against ICBAI.s, if ade-
quate coverage of SLBM approaches were provided by
battle ntanagentenl support radars. IS courntermcas-
on-es such as decoys, chaff. and maneuvering BV's
of an
could
113\1 systeiii, even if' l S evaluations indicated it
be ose'rcontc by an attacking force, would
complicate t'S attack planning and create major un-
certainties for US plauncrs about the potential effec-
tiwt'ness of a US strike. Additionally, according to one
iew, any evaluation of the effects of a widespread
\B\I defense to reduce damage should consider the
potential AIM capabilities of the SA-5 and SA-10
systems, which could further complicate US attack
planning.";
56. 11' the capabilities of the SA-X-12 noted in table
I are realized, its potential contribution to ballistic
missile defenses would be of growing concern as it
becomes swidely deployed in the ISSR and Eastern
F,iirope in the mid-to-late 1980s.
57. 'l'ucre are a number of' situations involving
AIM 'T'reaty revisions, abrogation, or withdrawal initi-
ated by the l nited States or the USSR which could
result in Soviet deployment of ABMs beyond current
Treaty limits. At present, the Soviets apparently value
the AIM 'T'reaty for both political and military rea-
sons: they are probably concerned about a major US
comillitnu'nl to ballistic missile defense. We do not
foresee a Soviet initiative to revise, abrogate, or with
draw from the ABM 'Treaty within the next several
scars. 'l'hc Soviets do not need to revise the ABM
Treats limits to support what we believe to be their
near-term objectives-the currently observed modern-
ization of the Moscow ballistic missile defenses. There
are considerable uncertainties about NOW situation
swill prevail beyond about the mid-1980s. There is an
alternative view that. while noting that the upgrade to
'fi Thu holder of this I'ieu, is the Director, Defense Intelligence
'genus
the defenses at Moscow is currently consistent with the
limits of the ABM 'T'reaty. holds that the evidence is
insufficient to judge whether or not the Soviets have
near-term objectives to deploy beyond the Treaty'
limits.
Revisions to the ABM Treaty
58. 'T'he l nited States is considering ICBM basing
options which include A13%1 defenses that could re-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
quire revision of the A13M Treaty. Any US defense of 25X1
NIX which the Soviets view as viable would cause a
basic reevaluation of their offensive and defensive
strategies. The Soviets' response would depend on a
number of factors, including the size of' the additional
defenses contemplated by the United States. They
would be resistant to a US initiative to defend MX;
should the Unilcd States insist oil Treaty modifica-
tions, the Soviets might flatly refuse, thus forcing the
United States to withdraw from the 't'reaty to defend
MX. Nevertheless, should the Soviets agree to such a
I. S-proposed modification, it is unclear to us what
concessions they would try to extract in a revised
'T'reaty-whether their ABM program objectives
would he to increase deployments at Moscow, along
the lines of Option I, to defend ICBMs, or to establish
ABM deployment areas elsewhere ill the Soviet Union.
At a minimum the Soviets probably would make other
adjustments ill their strategic forces, such as increasing
their offensive system deployments and giving them
better capabilities to penetrate US ABM defenses:
- We have not specifically examined a deployment
option for I(;BM defense alone, but the systems
the Soviets could deploy in the mid-to-late 1980s
could be used to provide a degree of I( BM
defense, such as a defense of their heavy I(;13Ms.
The advantage of providing a better defense for
important targets in the Moscow area-intended,
for example, to defend against Chinese attacks-
could be offset by the disadvantage of allowing
the United States comparable numbers of ABMs
for defense of ICBMs. We would be concerned,
however, that the expanded ABM production
and deployments that such expansion would
require, probably including radars at Moscow to
The holder of this mete is the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
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close gips in battle utauagt'uu'nt cowl,ragc' smnlcl
put the Sowicts in ml intprowod position to cxtelld
Ihcir dcfcnsl,s hcyond \ioscosw.
\\ l, doubt that the Sov icls thcntsclwcs would initiate
1( ,\ i>lotl of the 'I'rraty in order to deplm
Icnscs ,u noted ;thowc
US Withdrawal From the Treaty
59 11 the hulled Shills will, to wilhtlraw Irons the
\It\1 Pleats. sic helicsc that the Soviets swoukl in-
i'rc;tsc their hallistic? missile dcployntcnts and improwt?
Ihcir i ipahilitit s to penetrate a I S defense. AV'hilc
c:nions lot iii might potentially constrain Soviet XIM
dcplosntcols, swl, hclicso that, ender the conditions
ih;tt ssould he likoly to attcod t S withdrawal, the
ties icts' d:unawc-limiting ohicctises would almost cor-
tainls lead thou to rapidly deploy a swidcsprcad AIM
s strut on the scale of Option 21, for completion in the
calls 1990s. is noted hclsw. "They might not innrtcdi-
trls hrgin such a widespread dcployntcttt alter till,
l S ss ilhdraswal_ hilt rather would ospaod the Moscow
dclcnsl,s while assossine I S intentions and their oswii
options
Soviet Abrogation of the Treaty
off \\ hilt ;ill aocncios agree that tilt' Sowiols art' not
likcls to abrogate or ss ilhdrasw from the AR\1 'I reaty
\\ 101111 till, nest lswo stars or so, there art' allornalive
s lust s isoc paragraphs 62 to (it) about the chances that
tlil,s ssoold do set altos that time and about the large
radars lot battle nt;utagl,nunt support. 't'hese alterna-
tis c s icsws arc hascd in part on dil lot ito assessments of
Ihr potential rifoctiwcncss of the \R\l defenses the
Sos it is l,onld Base by the late I9SOs to early 1990s. All
agl,nrirs agree. however, that, if the Soviets abrogated
the \It\1 I i(aty, they would deploy a swidesprcad
\It\1 dcicnsr in till, sscstcrn I SSR, by the Lite 19S0s
to curls 1991ts, and most agcncios agree the defenses
ss,ndd ho evtcnded cast of the I rats. To explain their
actions mid stimuli/c short-brut political losses the
S usicts sso111(1 claim that the Felted States swas about
to ahrogatr or that, hecausc of I S offensive and
dl,lensis0 lorcc actions, the I SSH was forced to act.
ICI A\ r hellos that it till, Soyicts decided to ahro-
;alr or to it ilhdrasw bout the 'Treaty at any tilt'
during the nest I l) years, their docision would he hasod
on the intention to initiate deployment of a swidl,-
sprca