COMMENTS TO DRAFT IG SPECIAL REVIEW, COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM" (2003-7123-IG)"

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Documents Related to the Former Detention and Interrogation Program
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 6566541
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02400
• Publication Date: February 27, 2004

Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
?
DD0-0031-04
27 February 2
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
FROM: James L. Pavitt
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
I'S-) Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
Program" (2003-7123-IG)
1. (-6-) I would like to express my appreciation for the
efforts of the review team in dealing with this complex subject.
We recognize that CIA's detention and interrogation activities
are new, unanticipated departures for.CIA and present us with
very significant operational and legal issues. Your review will
be valuable in our continuing commitment to manage these
activities effectively and efficiently and in a manner consistent
with the law, with our authorities, and with a fundamental
respect for human values.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
-ErEeRET
(b)(3) CIAAct
80000 (b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
ur ?e'-xcri I (b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: (151- Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program"
(2003-7123-IG)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
ch Detailing the Successes of our Efforts:
(b)(5)
Nor
should the Review shy away from the conclusion that our
efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives. I would make
it clear as well that the EITs (including the water board)
have been indispensable to our sucCesses.
(b)(5)
2 8000007
TOP SECRET (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
..z
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
?
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
TUF SKIT (b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: 4,&) Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program?
(2003-7123-IG)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
JAM bt.A.M.T
3
(b)(1)
?(b)(3) NatSecAct
8000008
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
'yr aw...nzi (b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: 1-3) Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program"
(2003-7123-IG)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
Tt7P7STCRET
4
(b)(1)
?(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
8000009
,49Y/.f
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: ?64 Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program"
(2003-7123-IG)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
TO19?neRET
5
(b)(1)
7b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
8000010
fly,-
?
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: (13.) Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program?
(2003-7123-IG)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
TOP ET
6
(b)(1)
?(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
8000011
/2Y/-4
?
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: (-S-) Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program?
(2003-7123-IG)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
TeM?STCRE
7
(b)(1)
?(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
8000012
I9W-2
? Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program"
(2003-7123-IG) ?
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
?,1.,ames . Pavitt
(b)(5)
TOP SECRET
(b)(6)
8
(b)(1)
7(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
8000013
n ? k
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: CS} Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program"
(2003-7123-IG)
(b)(3) CIAAct
CTC/EXD (b)(6)
(23 February 2004).
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Inspector General
? 1 - EXDIR
2 - DDO Secretariat
? 1 - ADDO/RPP
2.- CORMS
1 - D/CTC
1 - CTC/EXDIR
1 - CTC/LGL
ET
9
(b)(1)
?(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
8000014
V/-,
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
TOP SECRET/
/110TeRt171/X1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
24 February 2004
SUBJECT: (-3-14F) Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities
(b)(1) CPS/ Information we received from detained
(b)(3)NatSecAct terrorists as a result of th lawful use of enhanced
interrogation techniques ("EITs") has almost certainly
saved countless American lives inside the United States and
abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that
without the use of such techniques, we and our allies
would suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds,
if not thousands, of casualties. Details of some of the
actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the lawful
use of EITs follow.
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
(b)(1) mai Khalid Shakyh Muhammad's information
(b)(3)NatSecAct alone has saved at least several hundred, possibly
thousands, of lives. Before the lawful use of EITs, Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad ("KSM") Al-Qa'ida's chief operational
planner and the architect of the 9/11 attacks-- refused to
cooperate. When asked about future attacks planned against
the United States, he coldly replied "Soon, you will know."
(b)(1) . In fact, soon we did know -- but only
(b)(3)NatSecAct after we initiated the lawful use Of EITs. The information.
KSM provided resulted in the discovery .of a three person
cell in the United States previously unknown to. the FBI;
the operative who was tasked to head up the follow-on ,
attack plans inside the United States; an al-Qa'ida
.explosives' smuggling plan for the United States; an al-
Qa'ida sleeper agent in New York; and multiple plots for
mass casualty operations inside the United States.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TOP SECRET, fiteniaerittrf/X1
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
g - D
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
Jnc0=L-SEGRFR/ /NorORN//X1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) - -?
ePS/
Specifically, as.a result of the
lawful
(b)(3) NatSecAct
use of EITs,
KSM
identified a truck driver who is now
serving time
in the
United States for his support to al-
Qa'ida. This
truck
driver was tasked.to procure
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
specialized machine tools in support of al-Qa'ida plans to
cut the cables of major U.S.. suspension bridges. The
associates of. this truck driver also turned out to be
dangerous extremists who discussed plans for armed attacks
against U.S. shopping malls. We identified and the FBI
approached one of these extremists who confessed,' and we
have the other under surveillance.
fft/ As a result. of the lawful use of EITs,
KSM also identified and provided critical biographic
information for an operative we had onlylknown'as Jaffar'
al-Tayyar. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Attai
a trained and skilled terrorist who was privy to al-. -
Qa.'ida's master plan for follow-on attacks inside the
United States. KSM stated that if Tayyar could Chose only
one target, it would be the New York Stock Exchange.
Acting on the new information from KSM on Jaffar's.family
in the United States, the FBI -quickly publicized Tayyar's
true name and aggressively followed up with Tayyar's family
and friends in the United States. As a result, Tayyar went
underground.
(W(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) ("seri As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
(b)(3)NatSecAct KSM also provided information on a newly recruited
operative with family inside the United States who had been
tasked to assist Tayyar and other al-Qa'ida operatives.
Because this operative's family owned a gas station in the
greater Washington metropolitan area and was relatively
untrained for more sophisticated attacks, this operative
was tasked with investigating how to blow up as many gas
stations as possible so as to kill as many Americans as
possible, incite widespread panic, and cause significant
economic damage. Because of the information we were able
lawfully to obtain from KSM, this operative is now in
custody.
(W(1) MS/ As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
(b)(3)NatSecAct KSM also i.entified a photograph of a suspicious student in
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
?
8000016
Tert'-&EC-R-ST
,NOFORN//X1
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
71,19?SteRg(b)(1) / /X1
(b)(3) NatSecAct
New York whom the FBI suspected of some involvement with
al-Qa'ida, but against whom we previously had had no
concrete information. KSM clarified that this student had
been sent back into the United States in order to continue
his university studies and to keep a low profile just
before the 9/11 attacks. The student was to prepare the
way to receive other al-Qa'ida terrorists who would soon
follow after 9/11 and who would form cells in order to
execute follow-on attacks. This student is now being held
on a material witness warrant.
(b)(1) (46-/ As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
(b)(3)NatSecAct KSM identified a mechanism by which al-Qa'ida planned to
smuggle explosives into the United States via a Pakistani
businessman and textile merchant who shipped his material
to the United States. The businessman had agreed to use
this method to help al-Qa'ida smuggle in explosives for
follow-on attacks to 9/11. The man is now in custody.
(b)(1) As to the purpose of all of these
(b)(3) NatSecAct explosives and operatives who were to be sent to the United
States following the 9/11 attacks, KSM specified that
economic damage and mass casualties were al-Qatida's goal.
The specific operations included everything from flying an
airplane into the largest building in California to setting
off bombs in subways during rush hour so as to kill the .
most people.
(b)(1) -mks./ As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
(b)(3)NatSecAct KSM also provided information on an al-Qa'ida plot for
suicide airplane attacks outside of the United States that
would have killed thousands of people in the United
Kingdom. KSM stated that he had been planning a 9/11-
style attack against Heathrow airport and other targets in
London. , In addition to targeting the airport itself, at
least one hijacked plane would target London's Canary
Wharf, an extensive skyscraper and commercial/residential
center, which KSM stated was the rough equivalent of the
World Trade Center in al-Qa'ida's view.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Of note, even after KSM reported that
al-Qa'ida was planning to.target Heathrowi.he at first
repeatedly denied there was any other target than the
airport.. Only after the repeated lawful use of EITs.did
stop lying' and. admit that the sketch of a beam labeled
(b)(1) , ?
(b)(3) NatSecAct
OZA1/4?ENCol
LILE I'LLIf/A1
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
8000017
.? ? Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
relt?sseRer''
(1)(1) /NOFORN//X1
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)i
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration
that KSM the engineer drew himself in order to show another
AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf -- like those in
the World Trade Center -- would likely melt and collapse
the building, killing all inside.
.ers/ As a result of the lawful use of EITs,.
KSM described the plot -- which called for hiiackina
aircraft where
security was considered poor and identified the leading
operatives involved in both cells that
would support the operation... We shared these critical '
leads with our liaison partners in
The plot redeived much publicity, security
was vastly and demonstrably increased in and we
continue to work intently to hunt down the members of the
cell. To date, one al-Qa'ida terrorist who was detained in
was found carrying_an_a_marent al-Qa.'ida code
mentioning countries in as well as airplane-
related terminology. We are still debriefing detainees and
following up on leads to destroy this cell, but at a'
minimum the lawful use of EIT's on KSM provided us with
critical information that alerted us to these threats and
enabled .U.S,, other. liaison authorities- to take
proactive measures which have, at a minimum, disrupted and
perhaps forestalled those attacks.
Abu Zubaydah
Abu Zubaydah -- a master al-Qa'ida
facilitator -- was similarly arrogant and uncooperative
before the lawful use of EITs. He had obfuscated,
prevaricated, and generally treated his debriefers with
contempt in the early stages. Only following the lawful
use of EITs did he develop into currently our most
cooperative detainee. While verbally continuing to
describe his hatred of the United States, Abu Zubaydah
("AZ") now helps us interpret sensitive al-Qa'ida
communications and to identify newly captured operatives.
His information is singularly unique and valuable from an
intelligence point of view, but it also has produced
concrete results that have helped saved lives. His
knowledge of al-Qa'ida lower-level facilitators, modus
(W(1 )
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TO? SEatT
AICLF-01411/X1
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
8000018
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
/?14FORNV / X1
TO"r"SteRET ,
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
operandi and safehouses, which he shared with us as a
result of the use of EITs, for example, played a key role
in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.
? (Ingl Abu Zubaydah has Commented that the*use
of EITs is what convinced him to cease his active
resistance, as Allah does not 'expect a man to bear more
than he can, and he has volunteered to counsel fellow .
detainees to 'cooperate with our interrogators in order to
avoid the use of EITs. .Subsequent to the lawful use of
EITs he. reiterated on several occasions that he would
gladly assist us with trying to convince others to '
cooperate; along these same lines, In early February 2004
AZ.stated that he continues to help us with information not
so much to help us,- but rather to help make things easier ?
for those we capture. lie-indicates.that this'As due to the
use of the EITs.
T.126/ .Indeed, when asked if it would be
possible to gain cooperation from high value detainees..
without the use of. the water board, AZ reported that were
we not to use, the water board in appropriate instances we
might not be able to gain cooperationunless we were
willing. to subject-the.detainee to some other form of 'harsh
treatment. He said that: use of *the harsh measures or the
valid threat of the use of harsh measures actually helps
brothers avoid sin: .while providing information to one's
'enemies is a tin, nonetheless Allah does not expect -
brothers to bear a burden that is too great for. them to
withstand. AZ_reported that accordingly, Islam allows
brothers to provide information without sin, if-they
believe' that they have reached the limit of their ability
to withhold that information. He observed, that some high
value detainees will have to. endure harsh treatment, even
the water board,. before providing the critical information,
while others will not need to be pushed that far. ?
Riduan "Hambali" Isomuddin
(SS/ Similarly, before the lawful use of
EITs, Riduan "Hambali" Isomuddin ("Hambali") commented only
on previous attacks, providing largely historical
information. Only after the use of EITs did he provide the
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Tel?SECRET, /Nornivq//X1
8000019
sq-1/
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
?
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
iNOFORNHX1
TriP-5E-emoxi)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
information that has enabled us to disrupt future attacks.
Prior to the lawful use of EITs, Hambali had provided
historical information on the Bali operation and other
historical matters, but continued to minimize his role in
al-Qa'ida and his association with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.
As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
Hambali provided information that identified the members of
anHal-Qeida cell in Karachi, some of whom had been
designated as the pilots for planned follow-up aircraft.
attacks' inside the. United States These operatives had ?
been previously unknown to us.. As a result of the Hardpan
reporting, they are now in custody.
elE,S/ As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
Hambali had reported that a group of hand-picked students
were to comprise the "next generation" of al-Qa'ida
managers, operators, and teachers in Southeast Asia. In
1999, Hambali had set up the so-called "al-Ghuraba" AQ/JI
cell in Karachi, designed to steep students in radical
Islamic studies and provide the opportunity for military
style training to prepare them for jihad. Some members of
the that Karachi cell were to be part of senior al-Qa'ida
leader KSM's "second wave" operation to attack the United
States using the same method as used on 11 September 2001.
(TB/ Hambali stated that he had 'planned to
review the 'students' progress at the end of 'the. semester
(presumably late 2003) and turn the more promising ones
over to al-Q4'.ida operative Abu Talha, who would in turn
oversee their placement in training facilities in Europe in
order to.carry out aircraft.operatiops against U.S.
targets.' Asa result. of. the.lawful.use of EITs 14 members
of the al-Ghuraba cell were 'detained in Karachi on 20
September 2003.
As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
Hambali also reported complementary information to that
which KSM had provided, confirming that KSM had described
California as a target and that after the 9/11 attacks KSM
had ambitions to attack the United States again by means of
commandeered aircraft. Hambali also reported that while
KSM and he were discussing suggestions by Yazid Sufaat to
bomb a monument in the United Kingdom, KSM made the point
that the plan was a goOd one, although targets in the
(b)(1) 8000020
(b)(3) NatSecAct
1WL
Imyrvnim4/At
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
TOP ET/
'/NOrnizli//X1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
United States were preferable to those in the United
Kingdom.
Nashiri
(b)(1)
Prior to the lawful use of EITs, Nashiri
(b)(3) NatSecAct
had willingly
provided
information,
(b)(1)
only about
historical matters such as defunct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
planned attacks,
his leadership role in the bombing of the
U.S.S. Cole, and the disrupted plots to sink western ships
in the Straits of Hormuz and Straits of Gibraltar. Indeed,
he appeared very willing to talk about historical matters -
- but not about ongoing, viable plans for new attacks.
(b)(1). 4Tei With regard to ongoing operations, .
(b)(3)NatSecAct specifically his operation to sink a 'ship in Port Rashid,
U.A.E., the.infomation he provided before the use of EITs
suggested that he was only in .the preliminary Stages of
planning. But as a result of the lawful-use.of EITs, he
'provided in-depth information about the, specific operatives
involved in that planned attack, as well, as information..
abouthismost-current operational-planningi-td include
ongoing operations
Saudi Arabia.
against both U.S.' and Saudi.interests in
(b)(1)
gr-Er/
AS a result of the lawful
use of EITs,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
our debrie ings then
were able to establish
that the
information he previously
had provided
(b)(1)
was not accurate.
For example,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Nashiri had provided
Only general
information
about Abu Hazim, the pilot who had been, designated to carry
out the Port Rashid operation. In contrast; as a result of
the lawful use of EITs we were able to obtain much more
detailed. information from Nashiri about Abu Hazim's role -
and responsibilities within. al-Qa'ida. We learned that Abu
Hazim was a significant player within 'this network, and one
capable of assuming' a leadership position; indeed,
subsequent repotting shows that Abu Hazim has assumed
control of:the Saudi cell and serves as al-Nashiri's
replacement.' Although Abu Hazim has not yet been captured,
largely as a.result of the Nashiri reporting we'have
ensured. that he is now a major target for apprehension, not
only in Saudi Arabia but worldwide as well.
? (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
1-rdt-'?"J'EL-Tcr,
41111-111.1.13.141/X1-
8000021
w -14
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
TOP 5(b)(1)tittIOTOR,N.//X1
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
eps/ Only as a result of the lawful use of
EITs have we obtained information from Nashiri that has
contributed to creating a clearer picture of al-Qa'ida's
Saudi cell and their efforts to attack U.S. and Saudi
targets. In addition to identifying Abu Hazim, these
Nashiri debriefings have uncovered other, major al-Qa'ida
? cell members, such as Muhsin al-Qassimi and Abu Hajir al-
b 1) Najdi, who are in involved in current operational planning
()(
(b)(3) NatSecActand who also now have been placed on
(b)(1) / As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
(b)(3) NatSecAct ? we have obtained from Nashiri a significantly greater
.understanding of the Saudi al-Qa'ida network; the details
provided by al-Nashiri have greatly assisted our efforts to
disrupt their planning, detain some of their members, and
keep the others on the run. Those, cell 'members arejlo
longer able to operate freely in. Saudi Arabia, making. it
.harder to continue ops planning 'and thereby deferring or
(b)(1) . forestalling major terrorist attacks.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
For example, as a result of the lawful
use of EITs Nashiri noted that prior to his arrest, three
individuals named Muhsin, Abu Hajir, and Abu Hazim had been
discussing possible terrorist attacks against U.S. targets
in Saudi Arabia, and had suggested they would acquire AK-
? 47 assault rifles and handguns, identify American soft
targets such as buses or vehicles that carry a large number
of Americans, and spray them with bullets to kill the
(b)(1) Americans inside.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
4-T-S4 Nashiri further stated that he had
provided a significant amount of funding to Abu Hajir and
Muhsin, and that these two'operatives were formulating
ideas about additional lethal attacks against thS.U-S.
.Embassy in Riyadh. Nashiri admitted to having tet.on two
occasions with Abu Hajir and discussed the operation to
attack the U.S. Embassy.
(Te./ Similarly, as a result of the lawful use
of EITs Nashiri provided details about Muhsin's proposal
for a terrorist attack on the headquarters of the Saudi
Arabia National Guard ("SANG"). Nashiri stated that Muhsin
believed that many Americans visit the SANG facility, and
so a well planned attack using explosives and automatic
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
8000022
4012?SZGRET/ QIUDZIORbW/X1
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
TOP?SEeRET/ rtiparam//xl
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
firearms would cause large number of both Saudi and
American casualties. Though Nashiri claimed to have
rejected the idea, he stated that he provided Muhsin with
the money to continue planning the SANG operation and had
told Muhsin to present Nashiri with a tight plan on his
ideas to successfully carry out this attack.
(b)(1) ? tins/ As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
(b)(3)NatSecAct Nashiti.sal t at an operative named Hamza al-Tabuki had
told him about an idea for attacking compounds in Saudi -
Arabia and also had admitted to a plan by Salman/Sulayman
al-Ta'ibi? to target a military ship in the Port Of Jeddah.
,Al-Taiibi also had Mentioned to. Nashiri they should take'
swimming and/or diving lessons, and proposed conducting ?
small rifle attacks against U.S. citizens on the streets of
Jeddah. Additionally, al-Teibi had offered to provide
Nashiri, and three to four operatives of. Naphiri's.
choosing; with scuba diving and underwater navigation
training in Jeddah.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
8000023
TOP SECRET
/4142sFGRINI/X1
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
?
: Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
(b)(3) NatSecAct
biessificatioamoik U Cl(/codcwordIIFGJ//D1scm:coitrols//Noti-inteineCtisi OtiaPProti14840
): Comments to Draft IG Silecial Review. ',Counterterrorism petention'anct -trite
remit-(2003-7124-1G)
?FRom
Jose A, Rodriguez,_Jr. ' ? .
Di I Counterterrorist
(b)(3) CIAAct Center
(b)(3) CIAAc
(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
3.
(b)(3) CIAAct
A(0
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
& oDDOicOS -
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
?(b)(3) CIAAct
-(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
?(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
13. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
FORM 610 use PREvious
02-01 Emote
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06566541
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 006566541
?
? , - - , ,. "l'':
'' '' ::--... i. 4.e-'4 - .t... , :;t',? . " :i: -,;:.
, . 1 "."' .....- -
''' -'1. tc,?;,?'.. ';',
,
-.:::'
s:
4 ' '..1.'in41.. " 1
,ro
' ? -
77. ? 0 . ' `.
-,
L,"DEPUTIG
:. ( b ) ( 3 ) CIAAct

?..,(b)(6)
. .
'
..,
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
i .40:Off.P0fit'ec' ?
' 0.01....1.14r.:
. ..:
'
: _ .
'''....-7sed.:*.#0.1
..,
./.?;..

,
.,..,,
..
-
- ?
idlAtibte... ?
,.
. , .
'EC'V AUDIT?
.
. .
AIG/INS
- .
DAIG / INS
5 SECT INS
4AIG/ INV
.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
DMG/WV
INV
ISEC'Y
FORM 4475 '17.
CIAAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 006566541