THE RENDITION AND DETENTION OF GERMAN CITIZEN KHALID AL-MASRI

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Documents Related to the Former Detention and Interrogation Program
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 6541725
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02400
• Publication Date: July 16, 2007

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Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
.(SitilF) THE RENDITION AND DETENTION OF
GERMAN CITIZEN KHALID AL-MASRI
(2004-7601-IG)
16 July 2007
John L. Helgerson
Inspector General
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Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations
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Special Agent
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 1
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES 2
SUMMARY 2
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 7
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(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecActINDINGS
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AL-MASRI
11
11
12
DETAIN KHALID
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17
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FURTHER EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AL-MASRI
21
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RENDITION OF AL-MASRI
24
ALEC STATION PLANS TO RENDER AL-MASRI
24
CIA's AUTHORITY TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN
25
CTC 'S JUSTIFICATION FOR RENDERING AL-MASRI
26
THE STANDARD REQUIRED BY THE MON
27
(b)(1)i
(b)(3) NatSecAct CIA's DETENTION OF AL-MASRI AND TRANSFER
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EFFORTS TO DETERMINE AL-MASRI'S
COIVNECTIONS
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CONCERNS RAISED BY 35
DISAGREEMENTS DELAY RELEASE OF AL-MASRI 38
IMPLEMENTATION OF REPATRIATION PLAN 41
NOTIFYING CONGRESS 42
CIA's TREATMENT OF AL-MASR1 42
EPILOGUE 50
COMMENTS BY INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN AL-MASRI'S RENDITION AND
DETENTION 51
ALEC STATION MANAGERS 51
CTC MANAGERS
CTC LEGAL ADVISERS
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL MANAGERS
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60
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DFFICERS 74
OFFICERS 78
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CONSULTATIONS WITH DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS
CONCLUSIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS 91
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APPENDIX A
CABLE, DICTC APPROVAL FOR THE RENDITION OF KHALID AL-MASRI
TO US CUSTODY
APPENDIX
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REPORTED CLAIM OFA PRIOR EXPLANATION FOR
CONCURRENCE ON THE KHALID AL-MASRI RENDITION CABLE
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS STAFF
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(S/INT) THE RENDITION AND DETENTION OF
GERMAN CITIZEN KHALID AL-MASRI
(2004-76014G)
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16 July 2007
INTRODUCTION
1. /
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAcItlemorandum of Notification (MON)
On 17 September 2001, the President
signed a
One of the key
weapons in the war on terror was the MON authorization for CIA to
"undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose
a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and
interests or who are planning terrorist activities."
(b)(1) 2. (S-H-N,F) In May 2004, the CIA Office of Inspector General
(b)(3) NatSecActmG)? received information that a naturalized German citizen of
Lebanese descent, Khalid al-Masri, had been rendered from
(b)(1) by CIA and detained because he was wrongfully
_
(b)(3) NatSecActieved to be an al-Qa'ida terrorist traveling on a false German
I passport.' Based on this allegation, OIG initiated an investigation into
the circumstances surrounding al-Masri's rendition and detention. In
late August 2004, the Inspector General (IC) reported this issue to the
Ithen Acting Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as a "particularly
serious problem" within the meaning of Section 17 of the CIA Act.
1 (S//NF) In a subsequent debriefing session with CIA officers on 11 February 2004, al-Masri
advised that his full name was Khalid 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Masri. This Report refers to him as
a I- Masri
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PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
3. (U//rett:30) OIG reviewed operational files, CIA cables,
memorandums, e-mail messages, photographs, medical reports, and
other documents and materials related to the matter under
investigation, interviews were conducted with current and
former employees of CIA, and some employees were interviewed
more than once.
SUMMARY (b)(1
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4. (S//NF) On
detained Khalid al-Masri, a German citizen,
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Officers in CIA's CounterTerrorism Center
(b)(1) (CTC) were determined to hold on to him, however, and decided
(b)(3) NatSecAct almost immediately to render him into US custody.2 On January
2004, the Agency issued a cable that provided the approval of the
2 (U/ ) During this investigation, the name of the Counterterrorist Center was modified
to the CounterTerrorism Center (CTC). The Directorate of Operations (DO) became known as the
National Clandestine Service (NCS) on 12 October 2005. This Report will use the DO whenever
referring to what would now be called NCS.
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Director of CTC to render al-Masri and cited the justification for doing
January 2004, al-Masri was transferred to
where he was held until the end of May 2004.
6. (57tiNiF) The al-Masri operation was characterized by a
number of missteps from the beginning that were compounded by
subsequent failures of both legal and management oversight. CIA
did not have al-Masri's German passport examined by Agency
(b)(1) experts until early March 2004, when it was found to be genuine. By
(b)(3) NatSecAct7f anuary 2004, before he was rendered, CIA knew that al-Masri was
not questioned al-Masri in English,
which he spoke only poorly, making the issue of his responses to
(b)(1) miestions problematic.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct insisting that they knew he was "bad."
When they subsequently questioned him in
they quickly concluded that he was not a terrorist.
Most importantly, the purported connections to the al-Qa'ida
operative in Sudan, which served as the underpinning for the
rendition, were tenuous, circumstantial, and produced no further
incriminating information. Nonetheless, the two Agency officers
primarily involved in al-Masri's rendition justified their commitment
to his continued detention, despite the diminishing rationale, by
(
7. (-T-S/ /rflt, The Agency's grounds for capturing
and detaining al-Ma sri did not meet the standard specified in the
Presidential MON of 17 September 2001. According to the MON, the
individual in question "must pose a continuing, serious threat of
violence or death to U.S. persons and interests" or must be "planning
terrorist activities." The Agency never documented or established
grounds for concluding that al-Masri posed such a threat.
Furthermore, the language used in the cable of justification did not
meet the standard specified by the MON. The cable claimed only that
al-Masri might know key information that could lead to the capture of
other al-Qa'ida operatives. Virtually all of the Agency lawyers
interviewed by OIG for this investigation confirmed that possessing
such knowledge would not constitute sufficient grounds for rendition.
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8. (S/ /NF) Although raised concerns in early
February 2004 that al-Masri should be released because there was a
lack of compelling intelligence information to detain him, CTC
disagreed and al-Masri remained in detention. It was not until mid-
March 2004 that CTC determined the Agency did not have sufficient
grounds to continue holding al-Masri. Agency officers then struggled
for more than two months with the problem of how to return him to
Germany. Bureaucratic differences accounted for some of this delay.
Another obstacle was the desire on the part of senior Agency
managers, from the up to the DCI, to
accomplish al-Masri's repatriation without notifying or damaging
relations with the German Government. In the end, al-Masri was
released, and the German Government was notified at the direction of
the US National Security Advisor.
9. (-Si-4W) As a result of Agency inaction, for over two months
after the Agency had determined that there was no justification for his
detention, al-Masri continued to be held. Al-Masri was not given any
information about the status of his case until the week before he was
returned to Germany in late May 2004. During this time, according to
the report of an Agency psychologist, al-Masri appeared desperate and
depressed and prone to thoughts of suicide. Al-Masri conducted at least
one hunger strike during his detention and lost 50 pounds.
10. (S/ /NF) OTC's investigation found no evidence that al-Masri
was subjected to physical abuse while in CIA custody. The
investigation also found that al-Masri's rendition was conducted
consistent with Agency protocols. During his confinement in CIA
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct custody, al-Masri was isolated from contact with his family. He was
held in a small cell with some clothing, bedding, and a bucket
for his waste, and provided with adequate medical attention. Al-Masri
ended his hunger strike when faced with the possibility of being force-
fed.
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11. (S/ /NF) Al-Masri's rendition and prolonged detention
logically raises questions about the system the Agency created to
conduct and oversee its rendition and detention process. The lack of
rigor in justifying action against an individual suspected of terrorist
connections; the lack of understanding of the legal requirements of
detention and rendition; the lack of guidance provided to officers
making critical operational decisions with significant international
implications; and the lack of management oversight suggest that a
review of the Agency's rendition and detention processes should be
undertaken.
12. (ilv+) This Report concludes that there was an
insufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri and the Agency's
prolonged detention of al-Masri was unjustified. His rendition and
(b)(1) 1-ng detention resulted from a series of breakdowns in tradecraft,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
? process, management, and oversight. CTC and failed
to take responsible steps to verify al-Masri's identity. ALEC Station
exaggerated the nature of the data it possessed linking al-Masri to
terrorism.3 After the decision had been made to repatriate al-Masri,
(b)(1) implementation was marked by delay and bureaucratic infighting.
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13. (FS/,
'41-F) The Report also concludes that
advisers failed to provide adequate legal
review and oversight of the al-Masri case. They failed to ensure that
one of the most sensitive activities ever undertaken by CIA?the
capture, detention, and rendition of individuals?was conducted in
accordance with the terms of the Presidential covert action authority.4
Finally, the Report finds that the Agency did not inform Congress of
the mistaken rendition of al-Masri until after his repatriation and
after the German Government had been informed. The Agency has
3 MI CTC's Usarna Bin Ladin Station, also known as ALEC Station, was a virtual station located
in the Headquarters area. Throughout this Report it will be referred to as ALEC Station.
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never informed Congress that CIA had failed to meet the standard
required by the Presidential covert action authority to justify
al-Masri's capture and detention.
14. (u//rertte) This matter was referred to the Department of
Justice (DoJ) for prosecutive merit. Subsequently, the US Attorney
for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA) reported, by letter, that his
office declined to pursue federal prosecution in this matter.
15. (57'--/-14) This Report recommends that the Associate
Deputy Director of CIA (ADD/CIA) direct that those officers
involved in capture, detention, and rendition operations be made
aware of the legal threshold for doing so. The Report also
recommends that the Director of CIA convene an Agency
Accountability Board to review the performance of three individuals
regarding their actions in the capture, detention, and rendition of
Khalid al-Masri.
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CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
Khalid al-Masri, a naturalized German citizen of Lebanese descent, was
detained
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CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (continued)
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an 2004:
Jan 2004:
Jan 2004:
Jan 2004:
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rendition to
approved al-Masri's
detention facility, under CIA authorities as set forth
3f the 17 September 2001 Presidential Memorandum of
Notification (MON).
(b)(1)
AI-Masri was taken into CIA custody and transported fror(b)(3) NatSecAct
aboard an Agency aircraft.
Al-Masri arrived at
and was processed into detention,
officers conducted a custodial interview of al-Masri, and he
continued his claim that he was innocent of any terrorist affiliation.
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CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (continued)
Feb 2004:
Feb 2004:
Feb 2004:
Feb 2004:
Feb 2004:
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Feb 2004:
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Feb 2004:
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Mar 2004:
Mid-Mar 2004:
CTC officers
ALEC Station requested that
al-Masri's personal effects
de-briefed al-Masri.
forward to Headquarters
advised ALEC Station/CTC Headquarters there was a lack of
compelling intelligence information to warrant.al-Masri's continued
detention as a terrorist. requested ALEC Station/CTC
Headquarters concurrence to release al-Masri.
ALEC Station replied tc reminding them that al-Masri was
being detained because they "could not resolve the issue of his terrorist
affiliation ALEC Station suggested additional areas of
questioning.
officer and a Headquarters-based CTC officer interviewed
al-Masri, but al-Masri steadfastly denied any terrorist affiliation.
reported to ALEC Station/CTC Headquarters that it had
forwarded al-Masri's personal effects, as requested
ebruary 2004.
Agency records confirm that CTC Headquarters received
pouch sent by with al-Masri's personal effects.
A CTC officer, who had interviewed al-Masri located al-Masri's
passport and other personal effects inside an unopened box on the desk of
ALEC Station officer
The officer delivered al-Masri's
passport to experts of the CIA who
promptly determined that al-IVIasri's German passport was geni(b)(1)
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? ALEC Station reported the results
CIA determined that it had no basis to justify the continued detention of
al-Masri.
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CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (continued)
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May 2004:
Mid-May 2004:
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CTC Headquarters reported to the field that there was no longer a
justification to continue to detain al-Masri under MON authorities. Agency
components continued to disagree about the exit strategy.
A Headquarters meeting that involved senior CIA officials and managers,
including then DCI George Tenet, met to discuss the al-Masri matter.
(b)(5)
Shortly after the May 2004 meeting of senior CIA officials, DCI Tenet
reportedly informed then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and
then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice of the al-Masri situation.
Both indicated that al-Masri should be repatriated quickly, and the German
Government should be briefed.
n\ilay 2004: ALEC Station sent a five-oave ca le to the field reporting that CTC
completed esearch on al-Masri but did not find any
information linking him or his customers with known terrorist individuals or
organizations.
A follow-up meeting of senior Agency officers held on
the optimal date to start al-Masri's release operation was
that the situation Would be briefed to appropriate Natio
officials. Headquarters advised the field and instructed
could inform al-Masri to help mitigate his frustration and a
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May 2004: ?
May 2004:
May 2004:
2 June 2004:
6 Dec 2005:
12 May 2006:
.24 July 2006:
2 Mar 2007:
30 May 2007:
ay 2004 decided
May 2004, and
uncil
nger.
Al-Masri was released and clandestinely returned to Germany
The US Ambassador to Germany and
informed German Interior Minister Otto Schily of the al-Masri situation.
CIA sent a Congressional Notification to the Congressional Intelligence
Committees advising about al-Masri's detention.
Al-Masri filed a civil lawsuit in US District Court against former DCI Tenet,
and the owners of three aviation companies.
A US District Court judge dismissed al-Masri's lawsuit citing national
security grounds.
Al-Masri filed an appellate brief of the US District Court's ruling with the US
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia.
A panel of the US Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
al-Masri's lawsuit by the US District Court.
Al-Masri petitioned the US Supreme Court to review his case.
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DETAIN KHALID AL-MASRI
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FURTHER EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AL-MASRI
40. (S/ /NF) During early January 2004, Headquarters and
several CIA field stations participated in additional efforts to
determine who al-Masri was and the nature of the threat he posed.
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42. (6-ttICIT3 Responses to the requests for information came
back to Headquarters rapidly.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct RENDITION OF AL-MASRI
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ALEC STATION PLANS TO RENDER AL-MASRI
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'-ou RDG to discuss how to take custody of al-Masri
planned to meet with otficers from CTC's Renditions and Detainee
(S/ /NF) In an e-mail o January 2004, ALEC Station
indicated that ALEC Station personnel
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I.
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51. (S Oi January 2004, in a cable originated by
to ALEC Station outlined three
possible outcomes regarding al-Masri. The first was that, if al-Masri
were identifiable with
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If he was not
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but was nonetheless
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct Finally, if al-Masn was not identifiable with
but nevertheless appeared
Ito have links to al-Qalida and his
demeanor during recent debriefings"), he could be deemed a force
I protection threat." In that case, he could be turned over to the US
military and could be questioned further by the Agency. On January
(b)(1) 2004, suggested to Headquarters that al-Masr46 )
1
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(b)(1) 52. (Si/N ) Bflanuary 2004, however, ALEC Station had
(b)(3) NatSecActdecided it did not want to transfer al-Masri to the US military.
I Explaining its reasons in a cable to ALEC Station
argued that the military would have to brief its chain-of-command,
which might expose the involvement of Such a
Imove could complicate matters if it was decided to transfer al-Masri
or move him to an undisclosed location because the
IUS military would register al-Masri and notify the Red Cross of his
detention. ALEC Station added that, until al-Masri's identity was
I established and "his role within al-Qa'ida identified/confirmed," the
US military would have no grounds on which to detain him and "he
could be a free man within hours . .
(b)(1) CIA's AUTHORITY TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN
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53. (TS7 /NF) Since 17 September 2001, CIA
efforts in the US global war on terrorism have been operating under
authorities of a Presidential MON. The MON, signed by President
George W. Bush on 17 September 2001, authorized the DCI, acting
I.
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through the CIA, to undertake various activities against international
terrorists and terrorist entities. According tc(b)(i ) of the
MON: (b)(3) NatSecAct
The DCI acting through the CIA may undertake operations
? designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing,
serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or
who are planning terrorist activities.
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Agency officers carry out these clandestine activities,
known as rendition operations. The MON is the legal authority for
CTC's capture, rendition, detention, and interrogation program.
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CTC's JUSTIFICATION FOR RENDERING AL-MASRI (b)(3) NatSecAct
54. (SI /NF) ALEC Station provided both authorization and
(b)(1) justification for the rendition and detention of al-Masri on January
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(b)(3) NatSecAct 2004, in a cable ALEC "D/CTC Approval for the Rendition of
Khalid al-Masri to US Custody." In pertinent part, the cable reports:
Since his detention
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1 we
believe al-Masri knows key information that could assist in the
capture of other al-Qa'ida operatives that pose a serious threat of
violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be
planning terrorist activities. [Emphasis added.] [See Appendix A
for full text of cable.]
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55. csy The cable specified that D/CTC had authorized
the rendition of al-Masri into CIA custody for onward transfer to
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Al-Masri was to be detained at
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according to ALEC Station:
We will continue efforts to verily his true identity and continue
debriefing him re his links to known al-Qa'ida operatives and
obtaining from al-Masri his knowledge regarding future planned
attacks.
THE STANDARD REQUIRED BY THE MON
56. (157, iiiirtr) The attorneys in CTC were
conversant on the legal authorities and standards connected with the
17 September 2001 MON. They routinely briefed new personnel into
the security compartment and provided guidance orally, in e-mails,
?
(b)(1) and in cables. One particular cable, ori inated by a CTC attorney and
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ent broadly to CTC elements and to in April 2003 was
entitled, "Guidance on Scope of Capture and Detention Authorities."
This cable provided a. review of the scope of the authority and the
standards applicable to such operations. It specified that CIA:
Was authorized to undertake capture/detain operations only
against those individuals whose actions pose a continuing, serious
threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are
planning terrorist activities. As a result, there must be an
articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a specific
person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a
"continuing serious threat" of violence or death to US persons or
interests or that the person is planning a terrorist activity.
57. (7T-S/ /ticlf) The cable provided examples of
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situations that met the MON authority, and then noted:
The nature of our capture and detain authorities under the CT
Memorandum of Notification is unprecedented, hut even so, the
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