ALLEGED USE OF UNAUTHORIZED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Documents Related to the Former Detention and Interrogation Program
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 6541723
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02400
• Publication Date: December 6, 2006

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6 December 2006
'DISPOSITION MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: goy-Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation
Techniques
CASE: 2004-7604-IG
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ISSUES UNDER INVESTIGATION:
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1. (S//NF) On May 2004, the Legal Group,
Counterterrorist Center (CTC/LGL), referred allegations to the Office
of Inspector General (OIG) that were made by detainee Mustafa
al-Hawsawi during debriefing by Interrogator The
referral attached Lotus Note detailing Hawsawi's allegations.
Hawsawi alleges that the enhanced interrogation technique (Ell)
waterboarding was used on him. Also attached to the referral letter
was a chart that listed the Agency officers who had contact with
Hawsawi in March and April 2003, and seven cables fron4)(1 and
Headquarters concerning the interrogation of Hawsawi. (b)(3) NatSecAct
2. tSt-tfifi The referral letter identified chief interrogator
and interrogator
(separated from CIA employment) as the officers who were primarily
involved in the interrogation of Hawsawi. However, the seven cables
concern the interrogation of Hawsawi by interrogators
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3. (U) The allegation, if true, could be in violation of Title 18
US Code ? 18 U.S.C. 2340A Torture.
INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS:
4. (TS/1 OIG reviewed relevant documents.
Agency policy and guidelines on the use of interrogation techniques
were reviewed. The Directorate for Operations (DO) (now known as
the National Clandestine Service (NCS)) provided cables concerning
the detention and interrogation of H wsawi at an Agency detention
and interrogation facility called Relevant Lotus Notes
concerning Hawsawi and water dousing were received from
CTC/LGL, CTC/Renditions and Detainees Group (RDG), and the
Office of Medical Services (OMS). OIG reviewed Security and
Personnel folders for nAgency personnel who had contact with
Hawsawi. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct
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5. (TS/, 'Nf) OIG conducted interviews with
Agency employees and contractors who had information concerning
the detention and interrogation of Hawsawi at
6.?(&)--On 13 July 2004, OIG reported this incident as a possible
violation of federal criminal law to Chief, Criminal
Division, US Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Virginia. Assistant
US Attorne has been continually apprised of the
progress of this investigation.
POLICY AND GUIDELINES: (b)(3) CIAAct
7. (S//NF) DO Handbook 50-
general interrogation policy:
It is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage
interrogation that involves the use of force, mental or physical
torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhuman
treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation
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8. (-T-S7LI NF) According to the Inspector General's
Special Review, the capture and initial Agency interrogation of the
high value detainees (HVDs) presented the Agency with a significant
dilemma.1 The Agency was under pressure to do everything
possible to prevent additional terrorist attacks. Agency officials
believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat
information from senior Al-Qa'ida HVDs. With the knowledge that
Al-Qa'ida personnel had been trained in the use of resistance
techniques, another challenge was to identify interrogation
techniques that Agency personnel could lawfully use to overcome the
resistance.
9. -(1TS-/ NI) The Office of General Counsel (OGC)
consulted extensively with Department of Justice (DoJ) and National
Security council (NSC) legal and policy staff in determining and
documenting the legal parameters and constraints for interrogations.
In August 2002, Dors Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided to the
Agency a legal opinion in which it determined that 10 specific EITs
would not violate the torture prohibition. The DCI on 28 January
2003 signed "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the
Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001."
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The DCI Guidelines were sent to ? tation in cable CIAAct
on January 2003, and therefore, were applicable dv-i?
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awsawi's detention at (b)(3) NatSecAct
10. (-T-S-fl (NF) The DCI Interrogation Guidelines
define "Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that
"unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other
personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible
Interrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques
consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced
Techniques." EITs require advance approval from Headquarters, as
1 (Ts/i .11.) Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
(b)(1) Activities (september 2001-October 2003) (2003-7123-IG) dated 7 May 2004.
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do standard techniques whenever feasible. The field was required to
document the use of both standard techniques and EITs.
11. (I'S/ Ng) The DCI Interrogation Guidelines
define "standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not
incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These
techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of
questioning employed by US law enforcement and military
interrogation personnel. Whenever feasible, advanced approval was
required for the use of standard techniques by an interrogation team.
In all instances, their use shall be documented in cable traffic.
12. (TS/ NF)- The DCI Interrogation Guidelines
defined EITs as "techniques that do incorporate physical or
psychological pressure beyond Standard Techniques." Headquarters
must approve the use of each specific EIT in advance. EITs may be
employed only by trained and certified interrogators for use with a
specific detainee and with appropriate medical and psychological
monitoring of the process.2
13. -(TS-/ NF) The EITs are, the attention grasp,
walling, the facial hold (insult hold), the abdominal slap, cramped
confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation
beyond 72 hours, the use of diapers for prolonged periods, the use of
harmless insects, the waterboard, and such other techniques as may
be specifically approved. The use of each EIT is subject to specific
temporal, physical, and related conditions, including a competent
evaluation of the medical and psychological state of the detainee.
? 14. -(-T-SY -NT-)-Prior approval in writing either by
written memorandum or in cable traffic from the Director CTC, with
the concurrence of the Chief, CTC Legal Group, is required for the
use of any EIT(s). In each interrogation session in which an BIT is
2 4s./ Nfr Before EITs are administered, a detainee must receive a
detailed psychological assessment and physical exam. Daily physical and
psychological evaluations are continued throughout the period of EIT use.
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employed, a contemporaneous record shall be created setting forth
the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the
identities of those present, and a citation to the required
Headquarters approval cable. This information in the form of a cable
shall be provided to Headquarters.
15. NP) Relevant to this investigation in
particular are the techniques of walling, waterboarding and water
dousing. As stated in the DCI Interrogation Guidelines above,
walling and waterboard are EITs. Prior to walling a rolled towel is
placed around the detainee's neck for support to prevent whiplash.
During the walling technique, the detainee is pulled forward and
then quickly and firmly pushed into a flexible false wall so that his
shoulder blades hit the wall.
16. tit"' NI) The application of the waterboard
technique involves binding the detainee to a bench with his feet
elevated above his head. The detainee's head is immobilized and an
interrogator places a cloth over the detainee's mouth and nose while
pouring water onto the cloth in a controlled manner. # Airflow is
restricted for 20 to 40 seconds and the technique produces the
sensation of drowning and suffocation. The waterboard is a level
two EIT that required special authorization to be used from the
Director of the Directorate of Operations (DDO) and the D/CTC.
'Nfij Water dousing was used at
ince early 2003. Water dousing involves laying a detainee
down on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to
15 minutes while the interrogator questions the detainee. The
January 2003 DCI Interrogation Guidelines did not address water
dousing as a standard or enhanced technique.3 Some interrogators
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considered water dousing a standard level technique at that time,
although several cables requesting Headquarters approval for EITs
also requested a royal for water dousin . The standard was
clarified i cabl dated June 2003, specifying that
the application of water dousing does not constitute an EIT.4 Also,
the September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines identified water dousing
as a standard technique. The Office of General Counsel "re-defined"
water dousing as an EIT in Headquarters cable sent to (b)(1)
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THE ALLEGATIONS:
18. -(6-/-41.14 In his Lotus Note to RDG and CTC/LGL (Copy
attached as an exhibit)n reported that Hawsawi described being
strapped on a rotating table made of wood with a bed of shiny metal
and his head was tilted in the down position. Hawsawi said several
bottles of water were poured on his chest so that the water ran into
his face and nose and he thought he was drowning. He said he was
put on the table many times during that interrogation period, with
multiple bottles of water each time. Hawsawi initially said (b)(3) CIAAct
masked individuals were involved. He later said there were
individuals. Hawsawi described the individual pouring the water as
tall and thin and speaking English. Hawsawi said he could no,t
identify them because they were always masked, even when walling
and questioning him.
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4 (S//N17) eports in part, "In a correction of the record,
Headquarters notes that under a controlled environment and standard
procedures for dousing, the application of dousing does not constitute an
enhanced measure, but does require detailed and timely notification of its use in
the interrogation reports, as required for other standard techniques."
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19. (TS/ / /NF) Hawsawi reportedly informed
that this waterboard session was not done during the first
interrogations when he arrived at nor did it happen at his
last series of interrogations. Hawsawi said it was "the one in the
middle" and at the same time "the men used the collar," for walling.
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(b)(1) FINDINGS:
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27. (--T-Sy-
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NF)--Hawsawi was an Al-Qa'ida
financier who reportedly
handled
the transfer of funds to the 9/11
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Sha kh
Muhammad
0
(KSM) and was
Hawsawi and
captured
KSM were
with KSM in
rendered t
Pakistan.
arch 2003,
and
incarcerated at
a detention,
debriefi
errogation
(b)(1) facility for high
value detainees.
onsisted of
an ium
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as cells, three interrogation
rooms, a staff room, a guardroom and a conditionin
room that was
used for water dousing. Hawsawi remained i
nti
(b)(1) November 2003, when he was rendered to another
location.
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28. -(-T-St- 'NTT Cables concerning the
interrogations and debriefings of Hawsawi indicate that EITs were
requested and-in turn?authorized for Hawsawi on three separate
occasions. The first time EITs were authorized was on March 2003,
when Hawsawi arrived at nd was interrogated by
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The second time was in April 2003, when
interrogated Hawsawi. The third and last time EITs were authorized
was in May 2003 when rvas at ,s,rith several newly
(b)(1)
trained interrogators in the process of being certified.
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29. (-1=971 /NF) There is no indication that the
waterboard was requested or authorized for Hawsawi during March,
April and May 2003. The waterboard, being a level two EIT, required
special authorization from the Deputy Director for Operations and
(b)(1) the D/CTC to be used.
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However, only three interrogators were certified
to use the waterboard at that time and it had been authorized for use
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on only three detainees at locations other thar (b)(1)
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30. (TS/ /-Ild-F)? When Hawsawi arrived at
or[March 2013, the personnel participating in Hawsawi's
Headquarters
conditionally approved the use of EITs by without
sending a cable requesting authorization.6 The use of the waterboard
(b)(1) or water dousing was not addressed in the cable.
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31. -ef-S4/ 44F)?Cab1es indicate that
March 2003.
initiate EITs until
did not
assisted Under
direction, the facial slap, stomach slap, forehead against the wall and
kneeling position EITs were used. Hawsawi was also given "a bath."
6
( / / /-NP4 Mar 03, cites, in part
has conditional approval to use the following
enhanced techniques with ((Al-Hawsawi))..." recalls that headquarters
issued a conditional approval without a request from an interrogator to
commence using EITs upon arrival of KSM and Hawsawi.
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and took advantage of the bath time to question Hawsawi
while the guards were bathing him. Hawsawi exhibited the expected
reactions of displeasure and discomfort with the bath.
32. -(TSI /NF) said the "bath" described in
the cable was, in practice, water dousing. He said they put a blue
tarp on the floor and laid Hawsawi down on it. They then poured
cups of water on Hawsawi. Hawsawi was uncomfortable with it but
did not yell or scream.
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33. (TS/ /-NF)?With one exception, i Messes
said the waterboar was not used on either Hawsawi or KSM during
this time. In fact, they said to their knowledge the waterboard was
never used at was the one exception.
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34. (TS/, '/NF) The other witnesses did not support
recollecti n.
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35. (TS, 'NI)- After conducting EITs on Hawsawl,
sent a cable to Headquarters with the conclusion that Hawsawi
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was not a D with a significant role in Al-Qalid departed
on arch 2003, leaving
in char :e of the interrogation of Hawsawi.
Consequently, as not authorized to use EITs. Workin with
during this period of time was subject matter expert
They said 'd not use EITs
during this period of time.
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When Hawsawi became compliant, they returned to (b)(7)(f)
debriefing sessions.
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37. (TS/ ND The second session of EITs for
Hawsawi began to develop wher
arrived in
on
March?
and March 2003, respectively. Working with
during the session were
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withholding information.7 They then established control and
initiated their interrogation process.said he used the least
coercive means, beginning with standard techniques and worked up.
cl?nented his progres(b)(1) ables (b)(3) CIAAct
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40. (-T-S71-/ /-4T4 On 4 April 2003, requested
Headquarters authorization to use EITs on Hawsawi.8 He requested
approval for the use of sleep deprivation and water dousing, and the
use of EITs facial slap, facial hold, belly slap, attention grasp, stress
positions, cramped confinement and walling. Headquarters
(b)(1)
approved the request on the same day.
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41. -(4S-1/ NF) On 6 April 2003, and
subjected Hawsawi to EITs lasting 14 non-stop hours. They
co ronted him with continuous rotational sessions of water-dousing,
walling, attention grasps, facial holds, cramped confinement and
psychological pressures .9
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7
cable ? ated 2 April 2003
8+9 cable sated 4 April 2003. It is noted that the waterboard was
neither requested nor approved.
9157"/+19- The use of EITs on Hawsawi on 6 April 2003 is documented in
cable dated 8 April 2003.
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(b)(1)
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50. ( // ) Following the 14-hour session, Hawsawi shed his
resistance and said he was willing to cooperate.10 During the first
10 (S//NT)
Apr 2003
TOP SECRET/i(b)(1) 'NOFORN//MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
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( b ) (1)
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debriefing session after EITs Hawsawi requested to speak to
Hawsawi, without prompting,reaffirmed his commitment to
cooperate and thanked nd the interrogation team for
keeping their promise to treat him properly when he decided to
cooperate.
51. (S/ /NF) unaintained a presence
during the next few sessions with debriefers to ensure that Hawsawi
did not regress before they moved on to other detainees. Debriefings
of Hawsawi continued with
eventually
and
52.157'--/-NIF) Hawsawi remained cooperative and compliant
until 7 May 2003, whei notified that Hawsawi was no
longer cooperating. This led to the third and final interrogation (b)(6)
session with Hawsawi. who had recently (b)(7)(c)
sent a cable to
Headquarters requesting authorization to use EITs on Hawsawi and
to supervis?
Headquarters denie
unti arrived t
in the use of EITs.
request and instructed him to(
b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
53. -(SH++F) When arrived onriMay 2003, he sent a cable
to Headquarters requesting approval to use EITs on Hawsawi. He
was interrogated on the same day but EITs were not used because
Headquarters did not provide approval until the following day.
While no EITs were used, gave Hawsawi "-a bath for sanitation
purposes" and commenced standing sleep deprivation.
54.