EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIA COUNTERTERRORIST INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Documents Related to the Former Detention and Interrogation Program
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 6541535
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02400

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MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Advisor
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: (TS/ 1.14F) Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist
Interrogation Techniques (b)(1)
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1. (T-81 //IV) Action Reguested: None. This memorandum responds to your
request for an independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced
interrogation techniques. There is no way to conduct such a study. What we can do, however,
if set forth below the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their
interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence.
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3. RS) /149 The Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that this
program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence.
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SUBJECT: f1-8/
Techniques
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Ng) Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation
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5. (TS/'/NF) Results CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation
techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt
terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on
al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key
reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September
2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation
techniques:
? The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks against the US Consulate and
other US interests in Pakistan was uncovered during the initial interrogations of
Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM, who
provided additional information on the Karachi plot and confirmed al-Qa'ida's
collaboration with local Pakistani extremists. KSM provided information on the
Karachi plot after we showed him "capture" photos of Ammar and Khallad, and
he confirmed al-Qa'ida's 'collaboration with local Pakistani extremists.
? The Heathrow Plot: Initial interrogations of Ammar and Khallad resulted in
information on this plot to hijack commercial airliners in Eastern Europe and fly
them into Heathrow Airport. Using the information from Khallad and Ammar, we
confrcinted KSM and uncovered details on the plot's evolution and the potential
operatives involved. Khallad admitted that he had directed Saudi leader Hazim
al-Sha'ir to begin locating pilots for the attack.
? The "Second Wave": This was a KSM plot to use East Asian operatives to crash
a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast (Los Angeles) as
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/IV) Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation
a follow-on to 9/11. We learned this during the initial interrogation of KSM and
later confirmed it through the interrogation of Hambali and Khallad.
? The Guraba Cell: We learned of this 17-member Jemaah Islamiyah cell from
Hambali, who confirmed that some of the cell's operatives were identified as
candidates to train as pilots as part of KSM's "second wave" attack against the
US.
? Issa al-Hindi: KSM first identified Issa al-Hindi as an operative he sent to the US
prior to 9/11 to case potential taraets in NYC and Washington. When shown
surveillance photos provided by HVDs confirmed al-Hindi's
identity. Al-Hindi's capture by the British resulted in the disruption of a sleeper
cell and led to the arrest of other operatives.
? Abu Talha al-Pakistani: Khallad and Ammar identified Abu Talha as the leader of
the Karachi cell and the Heathrow Plot. The combined intelligence gathered from
Khallad, Ammar, KSM, Hassan Ghul, and other HVDs resulted in Abu Talha's
recent arrest in Pakistan and the disruption of ongoing plots to target Western
interests in London.
? Hambali's Capture: During KSM's interrogation we acquired information that led
to the capture of Hambali in August 2003 and to the partial dismantling of the
Jemaah Islamiyah leadership in SE Asia. KSM first told us about Majid Khan's
role in delivering $50,0000 to Hambali operatives for an attack KSM believed was
imminent. We then confronted Khan with KSM's admission and email intercepts
confirming the money transfer and Khan's travel to Bangkok. Khan admitted he
delivered the money to an operative named "Zubair," whom we subsequently
identified and captured. Zubair's capture led to the identification and subsequent
capture of an operative named Lilie who was providing forged passports to
Hambali. Lilie identified the house in Bangkok where Hambali was hiding. When
we confronted Hambali with details of what we knew from other detainees, he
admitted that he was grooming the Gurabi cell for US operations at the behest of
KSM.
? Jafaar al-Tavvar: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting casing in
the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM
confirmed that he recruited Tayyar--who is still at large--to conduct a major
operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad
Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist
contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI.quickly publicized Tayyar's true
name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United
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SUBJECT: (T-S/ fiffriFy Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation
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are actively pursuing his capture.
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? Dirty Bomb Plot: Abu Zubaydah provided significant information on two
operatives, Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed, who planned to build and
detonate a "dirty bomb" in the Washington DC area. Zubaydah's reporting led to
the arrest of Padilla on his arrival in Chicago in May 2003 and to the identification
of Mohammad, who was already in Pakistani custody under another identity.
? Shoe Bomber: We learned from KSM and Ammar that Sajid Badat was the
operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in
December 2001.
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? Shkai. Pakistan: The interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical
intelligence showing that Shkai, Pakistan was a major Al-Qa'ida hub in the tribal
areas. Through use of during the Ghul interrogation, we
mapped out and pinpoihteffthw idericesorKev AQ leaders in Shkai. This
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