SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM, HONOLULU - 6 MAY 1963

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16386050
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RIPPUB
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U
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6
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July 31, 2024
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June 25, 2024
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F-2014-01314
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May 8, 1963
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Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 8 MAY 1963 MEM *mum fr 14.mm of Central listaWoo= Deputy Director (Plans) .Secretary of Volume and-maceoa Vietaanti itiftelatal 4Wgy 1963 tAIMMAIIX The conference reviewed the �Curtest situationI Vietnam end projected Likely Intern developments. It was noted that moo of the build-up of American essinbmce had been completed and that a number of budgeters point toward a turning of the thin against the VietiCeng. 'General Harkins ex4;tregsal the belief that the military phase al the ineurpncy would have Its back broken within asoduer year. Ambassador Netting tsarina. en the increated xenophobia of the OVhi and its Oren to reduce the 'political itowt of Amerlesa advisors. Howe co r e behoved that taut= Is no major crisis at hand and these temporary problems can be solved with tact and patience. The strategic hatolet program to pmeediag with great effective - wee. The $ecretary of DetitZES directed that planning be initiated ao that Americans can be 'withdrawn from dime* fighting roles as soon as Vietnamese can be trained, and to roaditile CNN tere4410 as soon as the insurgency declines, in order to avoid the economic burden of large forces which would require continuing taro scale U.L aid. North Vietnam vendors were disclutsted and to some truest disputed between Admiral Felt and General Wheeler, but the matter was left that the Army's plea would- be further staffed threttlit the JCS before a decision was *ought on It and that Is the meantime CIA operations shoulAt continuo end expand as much as pastas. I. Getteral Harkins .preeented a &tailed run &Arm of the entensive step* which lutd been taken by the U.S. to strengthen the Vitri and Its forces. A review of tho indiratore such as Inside= rates, VC &factors. etc.. all show a considerable strengthetdas of the OVN. The strategic hamlet and provincial pacification programs are proceeding in an excelled manner, except for sums weeknesses to IV Corps. The LeoiCatabcalla border was viewed as a cantina* problem which would have to be met by hot', regular and paramilitary forces. General tiarkina* conclusion was that it Is Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 2 esseattal to keep the pressure' relax with those first indtmtless of SUCCOBO. 11 this is dmis, he indicated that clear indiratteas of victory would appear is about a year. 2. Ambassador bioittvg commented that In recent we there is less of as razootrpare of trust and confidence between the OW tmd the U.S. 146610 the situation Is by no mums critical. ft Is clear that GVN ceeidsuce is victory has twee increased sod that it is aware of the toilette hrossitt by Americas advisors and assismuce. It hes. hosvver. Weenie \ setnewitat restive wider the U.S. advisory efforts for the following reasons: Vietnamese seasithe witiosalleas. long a characteristic of the loelte- E A resolution to be independent of whatthey envision the uncortststtes of U.S. policy. In this regard the Mansfield report With its invited *mentos of Americen widtdmwal from &adman Asia caused constdemble tmpact. The U.S. position In Leos has ids* contribumid to this belie thst U.S. *ley Iseacettele, e. The =Wilt* impact et advisory effort at sit levels has sharply consumed the M. Detrisim these /Palms. Ambassatbr Mling *Atm* that the GV141wu continue the present programs provided we display tact :told patiesce. The problem Is dtiefly,at the pruvincial level where many Arnerir.en .advlsors surround the Dorms province chief, and their own eloctiveuess frequently dominates his dectsleas. The ertticioto is addressed at both shillala and military advisors, bet dose Viatt apply to military advisors With military =tut. Is the civilian sector sows elements to the Racal Affairs Division of VS-014 believe that a men agreement to ascot an advisory rather duns a contrellIng role is the dispensing of the .cotmterissargenty fund Waal to MI owned) will cause the program to fail since U.S. .toilueace will be redact& Ambassador litelting and the Embassy believe that the program will teeth= (as it already has ha groat pert without U.S. control) subotigh it is true that the MS. Whistles .may be titareewhat reduced, The &coat-ay of Dame accepted the Ambanatutotott judgment and commanted that In no =wry in the *aid do Amato= tonual the diebusement of tattigeneutt funds. .Atntaseada .Witing commented that political Inaltuttorte us Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 3 dovoloPileil to s erte etiontet eleettintais NalOnal 6,-CtanniC Comm% Foreign investmest law, ere.) oatt that Digo Dish Mu has dearly become a more powerful political flora in the cowry. Amboosether Minns said be continues to press the Goverment to brim soo-Communist volition prism= to rapid trial and incomes reparesontstine is the cabinet hy the uneettles groups. A briefing on seefoggreonetnic .pretee$0 ewe by Mr. Ste*. Director of USAID, Salgto. fie moused the toodlest *orb of the Rani �-,Antdre Divielon bt prelbecial level activities,. primarily in support of the efts** hamlet :progrms. Mr. Urea pointed sot the critical -problems 'which will arias in the future as a result of the projected lbw billion piastre atteetal deficit (6% ot GM, which can only podoce: inflation. On the other heed, direct U.S. suppixtt of the -pisetare wunkt be .probibitively orporenve, would also have AU islWalitteilary tiffeeto stoce there are not enough commodities or prod:scam with* the country to- absorb ittio,4putatiiyut plattres� end would he rejected by the Ui. Congress. The only solution thus would ha to cut -boat the .arered forces In PT 1666 in order to rtnthice Owdefitch. Another way to avoid -ottch sdef&oft would be GTh reletteXtee to atiPPeri countotiostuleacy projects to the *wee we believe so:essary .to make the program a success in the tociroecenorate Mid, -There was SOW! debate between Ambassador Nutting tad Mr. *tar. Aototatit Aftlialstrator of MD for FE, over whether an emergency hood int& be made avail** to the .Umbeersy to Provide direct piastre support, in cane inflation threatened. Mr. janow reiterated the obetocies to such ott operation; Axaboommitor ttleabg pointed sat that the Wig is vending* it rote *deb Use reduced its dollar reserve far below the level the 11.S. bad accepted as apprePrthte in the Staley-Ono Report in mid 1961. The Secretary of rettailit requested the Alubsseeder to advise WrOonstoge if the OVN. altotd4 he& to Pet back Ito eouoteriztotrgetacy expenditure*. 4. With reaps= to forces, MACY presented projections which essentially left raptor forces at the current levels for Me yeare., reduced oomeuttat paramintary forces in PT I-966 sad eliminated traugular forces at the end ,of the insurgency. The Secretary isketiturted that the toil force level contemplated was tor too high for a country of 13 tuttlion to reatotain over an extended period and erephasized the necessity to hrbajg down the forces in order to avoid a coottating economic drain such as lE!ratit has required of the U.S. lie Mined as a goal that the MA, 0room be reduced from its current projected 158 mates (which MACY nays only eatisites current eapoolitures and to which it has added a ropiest for $0 kodd minion Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 tor 'Investmezt and tom improvement) to approximately SO *OW= for PT dS en the essamptios that the itesurpney is brought under control. The Seeretsry also empbssined throughout the notatiog the desirebility of removing U.S. personnel from combat positions a. g., helicopter air strike pilots, etc., mining Vietnamese to replace them sod if uocaseary leaving the otetproont is Vietnamese hands. Ho basted that this matter be studied for huptementatiort as sees as feasible without hurtles the emisterinsurgesoy effort. ba elle discussion the illgthedil of control of air attacks and sir strikes were reviewed is detail and tt was decided that these strike* should continue with the controls 4310,4134 In force. The Secretary insisted else that a plan be produomi to =dice U.S. forces by IWO this coining Decorator. 3. The problem of relations between the GVN mid the U.S. press were reviewed. This continuing problem will be worked on- in the field and in Washiegtes, primarily by tritoil to aiito thtt U.S. Prom bettsr OCC044 to the news stories is the *tea. 6. In a restricted session opentioes I A** Vietnam were discattsed. This baps with a briefing by. CRWPAC officer 40 OMAN 33062 for the overt ersploymest_of U.S. tones against Wrdi Vietnam. In this plan an ortessive target review has been conducted *ad plats have been worked out by PACPLT, PAW sad 'MAC. During this &sonatas reform= was mak to a list of about six targets that the Secntakry of bad appeready relayed to the President. These hail been pot tow getter by JCS and were primarily concerned with air strikes for possible applicationis C4124007154 with the recent dtfiladties in Lass. 7, The CPAC officer then gave 4 briefing on the Dopartment of Army study of possible operations in North Vietnam, inspired by General Wheeler's report. The CINCIIAG officer potato:4 eta that the operational concept required coven tether than even operations. CINCPAC =sweats were than the *wantons were opproshretely the name t we being conducted by clA. if* ids* pointed out that the plea the zee of combat air and that ositfi miser targets were esateinpiated, so that there was some question whether the plan wield ofrotItivolY *tor the DAV. In stuontory he urged that CIA he given a chalice to apply its Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 Flail Old its now assets hetet limiting dm t3, $. military in the covert baniness General 'Wheeler met 014;04146nt tte, this prosoaration of the Oepartment of Amy study. Ns somtaftted that It was necessary to We the *true& offintaive esaiset lio Chi Mbilt rather than meats on the defensive. He stated he hod talked to Mr. McCene and Coven= ilerrinwas and betli agreed with the objective and with the iluirability of eternising the problem to determine the feasiblitty of * .pregmn.b this exemination he stated It had been iisurminesi that an overt waggon 'would eat be feasible. tio CIA resouces reduced their potential. lie thee believed it essentlect _tary operations under the guise_ noThtuattiotec dettpied_sot to Istrite but ter platc_ejk_yettearti_gpo�iiiplan coatatepstatad that CM upend its '3 wallstetal operation*" but that MACtraged ouzIzo ASSISS In this evtproarattiIn the asme way it carrently tellinet OVN wets went Ts South Vietnam/ Ile, also commented that a joint Uncoamtional 'Shuteye Ins ora weuld be l'etahltatiad to 409:1410110 maim*/ and CIALeporations. lie stoned that the mow aro wordy $ study and preaenteaftil to the *acid Grow end freakiest .14:dotedy naturally depended upea Calt/Atra comae:Hs and viftwitft Mallessesitur beibleved be 40111d get 'President Diesics awe� tel. The -Secretary commented that 010 Jel but tot yet accepted the study and that it should be staffed tartmei JCS tor lather review and consideration. .A4mire1 Veit thee en* pressed his disagreement .w.lth General Viedeler'a position nod agate emphasized that taA has the capability* that ,MACit Shesid not be engaged 411 *overt operations in North Vietnam and that CIA ahead be allowed le testiest in ha present activity. a. Mr. Richardeon then presented a review et the Salem ,Station program. Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696 1 M. Colby ladle Mai tboi matter would be further onnsidered tViashingtoll *Ad OM We woad keeP solvistd of toty needs. Comment:, it to bettered that we 3o,r4 voted any further Department etDefense assistance than that presentiy scheduled end that the limits ea our capabilities In 1963 ere primarily Vietnamese rather dust Amoricao. l'hte men WM be reviewed, however* sad a memersedure pre* red stustesristles the situation for the Eirmer psethly to use in oustects with the Secretary of Defense /84 4. Co2by E. a...A.,tonCe*T chief, pa. i gest zw rtfors� cot DDel Distribution: Original and 1 - Addressee 1 - DDCI 2 - DDP � 1 - ADDP 1 - CFE 1 - 1 FE/VNC Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06223696