REPORT OF THE OIG-PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIA-NYPD RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 16325659
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2023
• Case Number: F-2016-01298

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Executive Summary
Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into
the CIA-NYPD Relationship
I. (U) Scope and Background
1. (U// 0) Scope of the Inquiry. On 29 August 2011,
the Inspector General (IG) directed that the Investigations
Staff (INV) of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct
a preliminary inquiry into allegations of inappropriate CIA
involvement in the activities of the New York City Police
Department (NYPD), as reported in an Associated Press story.
On 31 August 2011, the Acting Director CIA requested OIG
expeditiously review CIA support to, and involvement with, NYPD.
Based upon this request, OIG assembled a team of seven
investigators, an Attorney, and a Research Assistant to conduct
a preliminary inquiry of the CIA-NYPD relationship, including
the NYPD Intelligence Division (NYPD-ID), to determine whether.
CIA actions violated Executive Order (E0) 12333. the National
Security Act of 1947, and/or
Law and Policy Governing the Conduct of Intelligence
Activities. OIG reviewed many thousands of records from its own
holdings or provided to OIG by Agency components, consisting of
cables, e-mails, official correspondence, Congressional briefing
notes, personnel and security files, and Agency biographies. Over
the course of its inquiry, OIG interviewed 33 individuals, some of
them more than once, at various locations within the United States
and overseas. (Exhibit)
2. (U//F ) Background. According to the witnesses we
interviewed, before the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attack
on the US, specifically the City of New York, the NYPD-ID was
focused on VIP personal protection and criminal intelligence
collection related principally to gang, narcotics activities, and
organized crime. After 9/1.1, the ID dramatically expanded its
focus on counterterrorism. In January 2002, NYPD Commissioner
Raymond Kelly appointed David Cohen, a retired CIA Senior
Intelligence Service (SIS) officer who had been working in the
private sector in New York City, to be the Deputy Commissioner of
Intelligence. Over several years, Cohen expanded the size of
NYPD-ID and established several division initiatives directed at
thwarting terrorist activities. As of the date of this Report,
Cohen continues to serve as the Deputy Commissioner of
Intelligence.
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(U) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
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II
�DOI.
requests
federal,
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In early 2002, senior CIA management received
for increased Intelligence Community (IC) support from
state, and local law enforcement, to include the NYPD.
A Concept of Operations (CONOP) �was developed by senior Agency
officers in April 2002 for a temporary duty assignment (TDY) of
a seasoned Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyst to New York
City for a six to nine month period under Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) authorities.1 The officer's task was to
improve analytic information-handling capabilities of law
enforcement entities in the States of New York and New Jersey.
On or about 4 June 2002, DI careerist
eventually become a
was selected and began what would
prolonged temporary duty assignment (TDY)
as a DCI Representative until
March 2004. operated under then-DCI authorities, and
held no official position with NITO. met with federal,
state, and local law enforcement .officials and assessed their
needs for analytic counterterrorism (CT) assistance. His assigned
goal was to help various local atithorities develop strategies for
improving their CT analysis. (b)(3)
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4. assignment to New
about March 2004. He returned to the Agency
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York City ended 1:(
,(b)(1)
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he was contacted(b)(7)(d)
b Commissioner Kelly and offered a full-time position with NYPD.
was interested and he requested Leave Without Pay (LWOP)
from the Agency so he could accept the NYPD offer. In addition,
an Outside Activity Request explaining his intent to work for
NYPD was submitted electronically on his behalf. In August 2004,
the Agency approved
and
LWOP and Outside Activity Request,
began employment as an (b)(3)
with NYPD, Although (b)(3) �
LWOP was initially approved for just a year, Agency
recca-ssnow he received annual approval for continued LWOP
through his resignation from CIAAn May 2009. A review of Agency
records found no information that was advised, either
prior to or during the LWOP period, eoppy prohibitions pertaining
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The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was
crea e. statute in 2005 as the President's principal intelligence advisor
and manager of the national intelligence community. Before the creation of
the ODNI, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as both the head
of the intelligence community and the head of the CIA. DCI Tenet directed
to New York City in 2002 under his DCI authorities as manager of
the intelligence community.
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(U) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
Relationship
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to EO 12333, the National Security Act, or
OIG he did not receive briefings on the law enforcement
restrictions .(b)(3)
5. During the peribd he .was in LWOP,
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not consider himself an Agency officer and believed he had
limitations" as far as what he could or could not do.
old
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FBI conducted background investigation in 2006 so he (b)(3)
could maintain a security clearance while serving in.NYPD.
ilthough not a sworn law enforcement officer, performed
the functions of a full-time civilian U (b)(3)
during the LWOP period.' Consequently, participated
in all activities of his position and rank to include supervision ODP)
and direction of ALL NYPD investigations, operations, and
surveillance activities directed at US persons and non-US persons.
According to CIA's Office of General Counsel (OGC), the "law
enforcement proviso" of the National Security Act, which prohibits
the Agency as an institution from exercising police or law
enforcement or internal security functions, generally does not
apply to the activities of an employee on LWOP, as long as the
individual was acting in a personal capacity and not subject to
CIA direction. OIG found no evidence indicating that while 03A
was on LWOP, he was acting on behalf of the Agency.
Following resignation from the Agency , he 030)
continued his employment with NYPD, (b)(3)
(LW) (U
.(b)(3) 6.
NYPD Detective Trained at CIA
Assistant Commissioner Cohen, in coordination
with Commissioner Kelly, requested that an experienced NYPD-ID
detective receive Agency operational training to enhance the
canahility of NYPD-ID CT efforts.- Agency management
Headquarters concurred. An NYPD detective was
detailed to the Agency from October 2008 through Novembe(b)-(1)09
to attend the (b)(3)
The detective, failed to
successfully complete : (b)(1) subseque(b)(3) r"� returned to NYPD-ID
)
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4 ,
advised by NYPD there were a number of NYPD
at the time; and others were also civilians.
2 (U) OIG was
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in November 2009. The proposal to train the detective received
extensive review from senior Agerley management, to include the
Associate Deputy Director, Director of the National Clandestine
Service (NCS), and the Senior Deputy General Counsel, b
being approved in accordance with (b)(3) requirements.
was the only NYPD officer afforded such training.
IV.
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7. On 9Aiigust 2007,
a full-time permanent Janalyst to support
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was drawn-up
request(WO)
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NYPD-ID
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(b)(1)___________________
(b)(3) to provide direct support to NYPD.
In this newly created
position, provided direct analytic support to NYPD-ID.
The MOA documentea that (13)(3) would identify potential foreign
leads of interest to CIA;
he would remain under CIA authorities
and bound by Agency restrictions throughout his assignment; and
Although the MOA was not
signed until informed OIG that
management advised him to ignorelany information that was
unrelated to foreign intelligence (Fl). (b)(3) � an experienced
analyst, told OIG he was knowledgeable about the prohibitions as
an Agency officer working alongside domestic law enforcement.
He stated he did not engage in any law enforcement or otherwise
prohibited activities, to include improper collection regarding
US persons, while he served in this position.
ODA
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8. told OIG that during the first two
months of his assignment, he received daily PDF files containing
NYPD-ID investigative reports, known as DD-5s, that he believed
were unfiltered (e.g., the reports had not been pre-screened to
remove potential non-Fl related information). However, most of
these reports dealt with criminal activity and were not of
potential Fl value. claimed that after two months his (b)(3)
presumed unfiltered access was removed and he was dependent upon
NYPD analysts to provide him with filtered, hard copy DD-5 reports
of Fl value, estimated he received somewhere between 0 to (b)(3)
12 reports each day, and that approximately once every two months,
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-,,�.
However, others interviewed by OIG, including a former NYPD-ODA0)
analyst and now staff officer with NCS, maintained that no one,
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including had unrestricted or unfiltered access to DD-5
reports, except NYPD-ID analysts, and Cohen.
analyst
an experienced
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was chosen to replar!P,
and she began her assignment (b)(1)
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However, unlike (b)(3nshe engages
exclusively in training NYPD analysts in analytic tradecraft.
Although an experienced officer Viho claimed she was aware of the
limitations when working with local law enforcement had (b)(3)
not signed an MOA at the time she was interviewed by OIG
During the course of the OIG inquiry, DDCIA
Morell was briefed by OIG ab^111- the findings thus far, and
subsequently he directed tha (b)(3)
z..1,__, ,imanagement ensure the MOA for
information
V.
was signed. As of the date of this report, OIG has no
this has been finalized.
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(b)(3) 10. According to accounts of senior Agen(b)(i)
officers, Cohen contacted Deputy Director Morell for a (b)(3)
"replacement for " DID)(3):or/NCS John D. Bennett
subsequently selected senior manager
for assianment. to NYPD hut not as a remlacement
7ecently served as Chief
an
(b)(1) and was looking for a
new assignment. (b)(3) NYPD4position was defined by Cohen as
executive development or and not to fill (b)(3) role
as an says he initially was not
intere(b)(1 ---- in tne NYPD position nut aecided to meet with Kelly and
)
Cohen
(b)(3) was interested in
what he learned tram Kelly and Cohen, and he eventually decided 00)
accept the NYPD executive develo'omi) position.
an
MOA was drawn u (b)()si ned, an (b)(3) began his assignment to
New York on as a Special Representative to NYPD. The
MOA defined ("1) role: he would be co-located with NYPD-ID
but remain al.L rency officer,.operating under CIA authorities, and
would be limited by restrictions applicable to Agency activities.
aould not have any law enforcement authorities, and he
would not exercise 1(b)(1)Iforcement, police, or internal security
powers. OGC briefed(b)(3) on the law-enforcement-related (b)(1)
limitations of his assignment. (b)(3)
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In actaition,
responsibilities
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11.
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no ti co
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The MOA enumerated the justification for
assignment as mutually beneficial to the Agency and
NYPD.
regarding
his bounds. He said
to help NYPD improve
and specifically the
:old OIG he understood the legal limitations
his authorities and said he was careful not to overstep
he spent considerable time and effort trying
its volatile relationship with the local FBI
FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force.
12. (U//F 0) During the course of its inquiry, OIG
received information from current and former senior Agency
officials who expressed concern that his position with NYPD had
placed the Agency in the middle of a contentious relationship
between the FBI and NYPD.
VI. (U) Conclusions
13. (U// 0) OIG's preliminary inquiry found no
information or evidence that Agency officers engaged or
participated in any activities that violated EO 12333 or the
National Security Act of 1947. Specifically, OIG found no
evidence indicating that Agency officers conducted intelligence
activities directed at the purely domestic activities of US
persons in violation of EO 12333 or that Agency officers, while
engaged in the performance of CIA duties, exercised any law
enforcement, police, or internal security powers in violation of
the National Security Act of 1947. EO 12333 and Agency
regulations authorize the Agency to provide assistance to local
law enforcement entities in certain circumstances provided that
necessary approvals have been obtained.
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14. OIG's inquiry identified a potential
issue that may have occurred from about February. to April 2008,
with regard to certain collection activities within the US.
A previous officer assigned to NYPD-ID believed he
temporarily received/had access to particular "unfiltered"
NYPD-ID reports. OIG, on 8 Novetber 2011, reported this potential
violation to the Intelligence Oversight Board, as required
by EO 12333.
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15. (U//F 0) Agency staff officers provided direct
assistance to NYPD, initially to-identify ways to improve IC
support to, and information sharing with, law enforcement,
followed by efforts to develop the analytical expertise of NYPD-ID
in dealing with counterterrorism,issues of local concern. Since
2002, CIA has assigned a total of. four officers to provide direct
assistance to NYPD.
16. (U// UO) The Agency provided these officers with
varying degrees o't. management and legal oversight and guidance
during their respective assignments. The personnel assigned to
assist NYPD had different functions and different levels of
understanding of their respective role as an Agency staff employee
assigned to work with NYPD. OIG's inquiry found inconsistent
administrative documentation and levels of review regarding LWOP
approvals, MOAs, information-sharing arrangements, and Outside
Activity Requests. With respect.to each Agency officer assigned
to NYPD, the inquiry identified, albeit at various intervals and
degrees, consultation with OGC, as required by when the
Agency provides generalized training to state or local law
enforcement.
� I
17. (U//F 0) OIG's preliminary inquiry found that issues
raised in 2008 with respect to the appropriateness of providing
specialized operational training to an NYPD detective received
extensive review and assessment by Agency personnel, including OGC
attorneys. Agency senior management, including the Associate
Deputy Director, Director of the NCS, and the Senior Deputy
General Counsel subsequently approved this training, and the NYPD
detective was temporarily (1-1-Ailprl tn tH TP1101, and attended a
portion of the Agency's before returning
to NYPD. (W(1)
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18. OIG determined that the assignment of to
placed the Agency more prominently in the middle
relationship between the FBI and the NYPD
regarding NYPD's efforts to combat terrorism. In OIG interviews,
several current ancODX1)nner senior-level officers expressed
concerns with (b)(3)E ssignment and role as a senior Agency
manager working directly with the NYPD.
NYPD
of a
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(U) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
Relationship
Exhibit *
Individuals Interviewed for OIG Preliminary Inquiry
on the CIA-NYPD Relationship
* Exhibit is classified SECRET/
Executive Summary
if separated from
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