DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, 1946-2005

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• Publication Date: September 1, 2005

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STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
Journal of the America Intelligence Professional
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A Long Look Back
Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946-2005
'David S. Robarge
66
Nineteen DCIs served
through 10 changes in
president, scores of
wars,. . . a global
recession, the specter
of nuclear holocaust,
and the arrival of
international
terrorism on US
shores.
99
Dr. David S. Robarge is chief
historian of the CIA.
For nearly six decades, the direc-
tor of central intelligence (DCI)
headed the world's most impor-
tant intelligence agency and
oversaw the largest, most sophis-
ticated, and most productive set of
intelligence services ever known.
From 1946 to 2005, 19 DCIs
served through 10 changes in
president; scores of major and
minor wars, civil wars, military
incursions, and other armed con-
flicts; two energy crises; a global
recession; the specter of nuclear
holocaust and the pursuit of arms
control; the raising of the Berlin
Wall and the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain; the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction; and the
arrival of international terrorism
on the shores of America and the
war against it overseas. During
that time, the DCIs participated
in or oversaw several vital contri-
butions that intelligence made to
US national security: strategic
warning, clandestine collection,
independent analysis, overhead
reconnaissance, support to war-
fighters and peacekeepers, arms
control verification, encourage-
ment of democracy, and counter-
terrorism.
The responsibilities of the DCI
grew logarithmically after Janu-
ary 1946, when President Harry
Truman whimsically presented
the first DCI, Sidney Souers,
with a black hat, black cloak, and
wooden dagger and declared him
the "Director of Centralized
Snooping."1 At that time, the DCI
had no CIA to run, no indepen-
dent budget or personnel to
manage, no authority to collect
foreign secrets, and no power to
bring about a consensus among
agencies. Maybe that is why
Souers, when asked not long
after his appointment, "What do
you want to do?" replied, "I want
to go home."2
Then came the National Security
Act of 1947, which set forth a
description of the DCI's job:
There is a Director of Central
Intelligence who shall. . .
serve as head of the United
States intelligence commu-
nity. . . act as the principal
adviser to the President for
intelligence matters related to
the national security; and . . .
serve as head of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Two years later, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency Act laid down the
DCI's and the Agency's adminis-
trative rubrics. Over the next
several decades, the DCI would
directly manage thousands of
employees and billions of dollars,
and would have an important part
in guiding many thousands and
many billions more.
1 Christopher Andrew, For the President's
Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the
Presidency from Washington to Bush (New
York: HarperCollins, 1995), 164.
2 Tom Braden, "The Birth of the CIA,"
American Heritage 27 (February 1977): 10.
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Vol. 49, No, 3
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DCIs
"It's a Very Hard Job"
After John McCone was sworn in
as DCI in November 1961, Presi-
dent John Kennedy shook his
hand and gently warned him that
he was "now living on the bull's
eye, and I welcome you to that
spot."3 The bull's eye seems an
appropriate metaphor, consider-
ing how often DCIs were the tar-
gets of recrimination and attack.
George H. W. Bush called the job
"the best. . . in Washington," but
arguably it also was the toughest.
The DCI really did not "direct"
something called "central intelli-
gence." He was responsible for
coordinating national collection
and analysis, but he lacked the
authority to do so, faced formida-
ble competitors in other agen-
cies, and had no constituency to
support him. He had to walk the
knife's edge between politics and
politicization, and was the handy
scapegoat for intelligence mis-
steps often committed or set in
train years before. And he had to
deal with the reality that, as
Allen Dulles wrote, "Intelligence
is probably the least understood
and most misrepresented of the
professions."5
3 White House press release, "Remarks of
the President at the Swearing-In Ceremo-
nies of John McCone," 29 November 1961,
Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01676R,
box 8, folder 7. The subhead quotation is
John Deutch's, in Charles E. Lathrop, The
Literary Spy: The Ultimate Source for
Quotations on Espionage and Intelligence
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004),
118.
Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democ-
racy: The CIA in Transition (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 24.
With no political,
military, or industrial
base, the DCI was 'the
easiest man in
Washington to fire.'
9
The purpose for establishing the
position of DCI and the CIA
under law in 1947 was to help
avoid another Pearl Harbor sur-
prise by taking strategic intelli-
gence functions from the confines
of separate departments and ele-
vating them to the national level.
The DCI was to have been the
only adviser to the president with
even a chance of presenting him
with unbiased, nondepartmental
intelligence. The seemingly
straightforward phrases in the
National Security Act, however,
only gave the DCI the potential
to be a leader of the Intelligence
Community. Whether a given
DCI came close to being one was
a result of the interplay of per-
sonalities, politics, and world
events. With line authority only
over the CIA, the DCI depended
on his powers of bureaucratic
persuasion and, most vitally, his
political clout at the White House
to be heard and heeded. Richard
Helms often noted that the secre-
tary of defense was the second
most powerful person in Wash-
ington�except, perhaps for a few
first ladies�whereas the DCI
was "the easiest man in Washing-
ton to fire. I have no political,
military, or industrial base."6
Moreover, the DCI's showcase
product�national-level analy-
8 Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 5.
sis�often carried the implicit
message, "Mr. President, your
policy is not working." Presi-
dents often have unrealistic
expectations about what the
CIA's espionage and covert action
capabilities can achieve, and they
usually did not appreciate hear-
ing from their DCIs that the
world was complicated and
uncertain. No wonder R. James
Woolsey said his version of the
job's description could be written
very simply: "Not to be liked."7
DCIs in Profile
Allen Dulles once told Congress
that the CIA "should be directed
by a relatively small but elite
corps of men with a passion for
anonymity and a willingness to
stick at that particular job."8
While Dulles's advice may be
applicable to the heads of the
Agency's directorates and offices,
hardly any part of his statement
was borne out over the history of
the DCI's position. Elite, yes; but
neither small in number nor
anonymous�many were well
known in their various pursuits
when they were nominated. And
even if they were willing to stay
for the long haul, few did. In late
1945, an interdepartmental com-
mittee that was developing a
plan for a national-level intelli-
gence agency recommended that
its director be appointed for a
6 Trudi McC. Osborne, "The (Really) Quiet
American: Richard McGarrah Helms,"
The Washington Post, 20 May 1973, C2.
7 Lathrop, 117.
"The Silent Service," Time, 24 February
1967, 16.
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DCIs
66
long term, preferably not; less
than six years.9 Testifying to
Congress in early 1947 about the
proposed National Security Act,
Dulles asserted that appoint-
ment as DCI "should be some-
what comparable to appointment
to high judicial office, and Should
be equally free from interference
due to political changes."'
The reality of a DCI's tenure was
otherwise. The average time they
served was just over three years,
and only five Deis stayed at least
four. It is a tribute to the Deis
and all the intelligence profession-
"Preliminary Report of Committee
Appointed to Study War .Department
Intelligence Activities," 3 November 1945,
document 42 in Foreign Relations of the
United State, 19454950: Emergence of the
Intelligence Establishment (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1996), 102.
10 Statement to the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee, 25 April 1947, National
Security Act clipping file, folder 29, CIA
Historical Intelligence Collection,
The average time DCIs
served was just over
three years.
99
als they led under 11 administra-
tions over nearly six decades that
they were able to accomplish as
much as they did despite all the
bureaucratic disruptions.
The frequency of these "regime
changes" at the CIA must further
be considered in light of the fact
that most new Deis had next to
no time to settle in and read in.
Over half had to face foreign
policy or intelligence-related
crises within their first month.
These included: the Chinese
invasion of North Korea in 1950;
the death of Stalin in 1953; the
US military incursion into the
Dominican Republic in 1965;
France's withdrawal. from NATO
and a marked upsurge in the
Cultural Revolution in China in
1966; the Yom Kippur war and
Periods of Service of Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946-2005
YP4/5 dtItY0d
the fall of the Allende regime in
Chile in 1.973; the publication of
the leaked Pike Committee
report in 1976; the breakdown in.
the SALT H talks in 1977; a
military coup attempt in. recently
democratized Spain in 1981; the
assassination of the Lebanese
prime minister in 1987; the
official breakup of the Soviet
Union in 1991; and a deadly.
terrorist attack in Egypt in 2004.
In other instances, major events
immediately preceded the DCI's
arrival: the signing of the
Vietnam War peace accords in
1973 and the terrorist shootings
outside the CIA headquarters
compound in 1993. Soon after his
appointment in 1950, Walter
Bedell Smith said, "I expect the
worst and I am sure I won't be
disappointed."' 1 Most subsequent
Deis likewise were not. Perhaps
the best advice they could have
received from the presidents who
picked them was, "Be ready to hit
the ground running."
Who were the Deis? President
Eisenhower called the CIA "one
of the most peculiar types of
operationlsj any government can
have" and said "it probably takes
a strange kind of genius to run.
it."12 Whatever the validity of
that characterization, these are
the salient demographic facts
about the 19 Deis:'
Lathrop, .110.
=, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower the Presi-
dent (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 227.
1, Most of the following biographic data comes
from Directors and Deputy Directors of Central
Intelligence (Washington: CIA Center the the
Study of Intelligence, 1998),
4
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DCIs
� They were born in 14 different
states. Most hailed from the
Midwest (nine) and the North-
east (seven). One was born in
the Southwest, one in the West,
and one overseas.
� They attended 21 different col-
leges, universities, and
graduate or professional
schools. Eight finished college,
and ten others went on for post-
graduate degrees. One, "Bee-
tle" Smith, completed only high
school. Considering that he
ended his public service with
four stars and an ambassador-
ship, he could be called the
Horatio Alger of DCIs.
� Before their appointments, the
DCIs came from a variety of
walks of life, some from more
than one. Six were from the
military, eight had been govern-
ment officials and/or lawyers,
three had been businessmen,
and four came from politics,
academe, or journalism. All
three branches of government
were represented, as were three
of five military services.
� Two-thirds of the DCIs had
direct experience with intelli-
gence in military or civilian life
before their appointments. One
served in the OSS (William
Casey), two in the CIA (Robert
Gates and Porter Goss), and
three in both (Dulles, Helms,
and William Colby).
The DCIs' average age at the
time of their appointment was
slightly under 55. The young-
est was 43 (James Schlesinger);
the oldest was 67 (Casey).
Historians and DCIs
An inconsistency exists between
the fairly extensive bibliography
on DCIs and historians' evalua-
tion of their personal contribu-
tion to US national security.
Nearly as many biographies have
been written about DCIs as about
comparable members of the
American foreign policy commu-
nity�the secretaries of state and
defense, the presidents' national
security advisers, and the chair-
men of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
However, the 19 heads of the
largest agglomeration of secret
services in what used to be called
the Free World generally have
not been perceived as being
nearly as influential as most of
their counterparts.
Historians have regarded a num-
ber of secretaries of state and
defense�notably George Mar-
shall, Dean Acheson, John Fos-
ter Dulles, Dean Rusk, Robert
McNamara, and Henry Kiss-
inger�as major players in the
diplomatic and military develop-
ments of their times, as is at
least one national security
adviser, Kissinger. The DCIs are
another matter. Only two, Dulles
and Casey, usually are consid-
ered to have had an impact rival-
ing that of the other top foreign
policy officials in the administra-
tions in which they served. The
rest rarely get mentioned in most
foreign affairs surveys (although
Helms and Colby may come up
when the Agency's "time of trou-
bles" in the 1970s is discussed).
Even in overviews of the CIA and
the Intelligence Community, only
a handful�Hoyt Vandenberg,
Smith, Dulles, McCone, Casey,
and possibly Helms�are por-
trayed as making noteworthy
contributions to the way the US
government conducts intelli-
gence activity.
That consensus may derive from
conceptions of the proper place of
intelligence practitioners in the
foreign policy process. Intelli-
gence, the premise goes, should
be detached from policy so as to
avoid cross-corruption of either. If
intelligence services have a stake
in policy, they may skew their
analyses or become aggressive
advocates of covert action. The
Intelligence Community must
remain a source of objective
assessment and not become a
politicized instrument of the
incumbent administration. As
heads of the Community, DCIs
should be "intellocrats" who
administer specialized secret
functions, not to benefit any
departmental interests but to
advance policies set elsewhere in
the executive branch�specifi-
cally, the White House.
The DCIs reported to the
National Security Council and
truly served at the pleasure of
the president. Indeed, much of
every DCI's influence was
directly proportional to his per-
sonal relationship with the chief
executive. At the same time, and
somewhat paradoxically, after
incoming presidents began choos-
ing "their" DCIs in 1977, the non-
partisan stature of the DCI
diminished and, along with it, his
independence. The general rule
of "new president, new DCI" did
not always translate into greater
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6 6
influence. The president's
national security adviser and the
secretaries of state and defense
usually still had more access to
the Oval Office.
The situation was not much dif-
ferent at Langley. Directors came
and went, but bureaucracies
stayed. When DCIs tried to
"clean house" (Schlesinger and
Stansfield Turner) or manage
through loyalists from previous
jobs (Turner and John Deutch),
the result was administrative
disarray and low morale. For
these reasons and more, no DCI
ever had a chance to become as
autonomous as J. Edgar Hoover
at the FBI, or to be assessed as
having more than an episodic
impact on US foreign policy
achievements.
A Leadership Typology
Can DCIs, then, be regarded as
leaders, as opposed to heads of
organizations or chief adminis-
trators? Was US intelligence
noticeably different because a
certain individual served as DCI?
Did DCIs have�could they have
had�a leadership role commen-
surate with that of their counter-
parts at the Departments of
State and Defense? One way to
begin answering those questions
is through serial biography and
group analysis. In contrast to
clandestine services officers, how-
ever, DCIs have not been exam-
ined in such a fashion. They do
not fit into categories like "pru-
dent professionals" and "bold
easterners," and they lack the
sociological homogeneity needed
No DCI ever had a
chance to become as
autonomous as
J. Edgar Hoover at FBI.
9 9
to be thought of, or to think of
themselves as, a network of "old
boys" or, in William Colby's
words, "the cream of the aca-
demic and social aristocracy."
Biographers attached those
labels largely to former opera-
tors in the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices who joined the early CIA
and then stayed on�a situation
that applies to only three DCIs
(Dulles, Helms, and Colby)."
This heterogeneity does not
mean, however, that the DCIs
cannot be analyzed collectively.
At least some aspects of the
many models applied to political
and corporate leaders can be
used with the DCIs, although
empiricism or utility may suf-
fer�complex personalities and
14 See Stewart Alsop, The Center: People
and Power in Political Washington (New
York: Harper and Row, 1968); Burton
Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite
and the Origins of the CIA (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992); Rhodri
Jeffreys-Jones, "The Socio-Educational
Composition of the CIA Elite: A Statistical
Note," Journal of American Studies 19:3
(December 1985): 421-24; Robert E.
Spears, Jr., "The Bold Easterners Revis-
ited: The Myth of the CIA Elite,"in Rhodri
Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie, eds.,
North American Spies: New Revisionist
Essays (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1991), 202-17; and William Colby
and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My
Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1978), 180.
complicated situations are some-
times made less square to fit
more easily into the models'
round holes, or so many different
holes are created that compari-
sons among individuals become
too hard to draw.
A straightforward approach to
the DCIs would take into account
the institutional and political
limitations on their authority, the
objectives they were appointed to
accomplish, and the personality
traits they exhibited and mana-
gerial methods they used during
their tenures. What were the
directors told to do (mission) and
how did they go about doing it
(style)? With those questions
addressed, an evaluation of their
effectiveness can be made. How
well did the DCIs do what they
were expected to do, given their
authorities, resources, and access
(record)? What "types" of DCIs, if
any, have been most successful
(patterns)?
Using this perspective, five vari-
eties of DCIs are evident. The
first is the administrator-custo-
dian or administrator-techno-
crat, charged with implementing,
fine-tuning, or reorienting intelli-
gence activities under close direc-
tion from the White House.
Examples of this type have been
Souers, Roscoe Hillenkoetter,
William Raborn, Woolsey,
Deutch, and George Tenet. Usu-
ally appointed at a time of uncer-
tainty about the Intelligence
Community's roles and capabili-
ties (the late 1940s and the mid-
1990s), these DCIs tried to main-
tain stability in the CIA's rela-
tionships with other Community
6
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DCIs
agencies, Congress, and the pub-
lic. Their main goal was to do
better with what they already
had, and to avoid distractions
and scandals. Except for Raborn,
all of these administrators had
experience with intelligence
affairs, but they were not intelli-
gence careerists. Some had a very
low-key style, almost to the point
of acting like placeholders and
time-servers (Hillenkoetter,
Raborn). Others energetically
pursued administrative changes
designed to make the CIA and
the Community more responsive
to policymakers and better
adapted to a new political envi-
ronment (Deutch, Tenet).
The next type is the intelligence
operator�DCIs who were cur-
rent or former professional intel-
ligence officers tasked with
devising, undertaking, and over-
seeing an extensive array of
covert action, espionage, and
counterintelligence programs in
aggressive pursuit of US national
security policy. Three DCIs fit
this category: Dulles, Helms, and
Casey. The presidents they
served had no qualms about
using all of the US government's
clandestine capabilities against
America's adversaries, and they
relied on their DCIs' knowledge
of and experience with opera-
tions to help them accomplish
that end. The DCI as intelli-
gence operator may have empha-
sized different secret activities
depending on individual back-
grounds and predilections, and
the targets they worked against.
For example, Dulles and Casey
were devotees of covert action,
while Helms preferred to work
with espionage and counterintel-
ligence. Because of the promi-
nent place clandestine affairs
had in American foreign policy
when they served, this type of
DCI generally served longer by
far�seven years on average�
than any other type.
The high level of secret activity
during those long tenures recur-
rently produced operational mis-
haps, revelations of "flaps," and
other intelligence failures that
hurt the CIA's public reputation
and damaged its relations with
the White House and Congress.
The Bay of Pigs disaster under
Dulles, the ineffective covert
action in Chile under Helms, and
the Iran-Contra scandal under
Casey are prominent examples.
As journalist James Reston noted
during the Agency's dark days in
the mid-1970s, DCIs who came
up through the ranks might have
known more about what CIA
should be doing than outsiders,
"but they are not likely to be the
best men at knowing what it
should not be doing."15
Failures, indiscretions, and other
such controversies in turn have
led to the departures of those
intelligence-operator DCIs and
their replacement by manager-
reformers charged with "cleaning
up the mess" and preventing simi-
lar problems from happening
again. There have been two kinds
of manager-reformer DCIs. One is
15 Renze L. Hoeksema, "The President's
Role in Insuring Efficient, Economical, and
Responsible Intelligence Services," Presi-
dential Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2
(Spring 1978): 193.
the insider�a career intelligence
officer who used his experience at
the CIA to reorganize its bureau-
cracy and redirect its activities
during or after a time of political
controversy and lack of certitude
about its direction. Two DCIs
functioned as manager-reformer
insiders: Colby and Gates. Colby,
an operations veteran with a
career dating back to the OSS,
sought to rescue the CIA from the
political tempests of the mid-
1970s and to regain some of the
Agency's lost prestige through his
policy of controlled cooperation
with congressional investigators
and targeted termination of ques-
tionable activities. Gates, a long-
time Soviet analyst who had
worked on the NSC in two admin-
istrations and also served as dep-
uty director for intelligence,
moved the Agency into the post-
Cold War era after a period of
undynamic leadership.
The other type of manager-
reformer is the outsider, who was
chosen because of his experience
in the military, business, govern-
ment, or politics to implement a
major reorganization of the CIA
and the Intelligence Community,
or to regroup and redirect the
Agency, especially after major
operational setbacks or public
conflicts over secret activities. Six
DCIs were manager-reformer
outsiders: Vandenberg, Smith,
McCone, Schlesinger, Turner, and
Porter Goss. Collectively, they
were responsible for more major
changes at the CIA (or its prede-
cessor, the Central Intelligence
Group [CIG]) than any other cat-
egory of director. For example,
under Vandenberg, the CIG
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DCIs
acquired its own budgetary and
personnel authority, received
responsibility for collecting all
foreign intelligence (including
atomic secrets) and preparing
national intelligence analyses,
and coordinated all interdepart-
mental intelligence activities.
Smith�in response to intelli-
gence failures before the Korean
War and to infighting among
operations officers�centralized
espionage and covert actions,
analysis, and administration by
rearranging the CIA into three
directorates and creating the
Office of National Estimates. In
effect, he organized the Agency
into the shape it has today.
Schlesinger and Turner facili-
tated the departure of hundreds
of clandestine services veterans
in their quests to streamline the
Agency's bureaucracy, lower the
profile of covert action, and move
the CIA more toward analysis
and technical collection. Goss
was the only one in the group
who had previously worked at
the Agency, but he was selected
because he headed the intelli-
gence oversight committee in the
House of Representatives. Tak-
ing over during imbroglios over
collection and analytic failures
connected with the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and assessments of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, he
set about revamping the Agency's
work on international terrorism.
Most DCIs in this category were
far more concerned about achiev-
ing their objectives quickly than
about angering bureaucratic
rivals or fostering ill will among
subordinates. Largely because
they accomplished so much�or
tried to�and did not worry about
whom they antagonized along the
way, some of them were among
the most disliked or hardest to
get along with DCIs.
Finally, there are the restorers:
George Bush and William Web-
ster. Like the manager-reformer
outsiders, they became DCIs
after the Agency went through
difficult times�they succeeded
Colby and Casey, respectively�
but they were not charged with
making significant changes in
the way the CIA did business.
Instead, they used their "people
skills" and public reputations to
raise morale, repair political
damage, and burnish the
Agency's reputation. Bush, a
prominent figure in Republican
Party politics, went to Langley to
mend the CIA's relations with
Congress and use his amiability
to improve esprit de corps and
put a more benign face on the
Agency. Webster, a director of the
FBI and former federal judge,
brought a quality of rectitude to
an Agency mired in scandal and
helped raise its stature in the
Community and with the public.
Some DCIs gave early, strong sig-
nals about how they intended to
run the Agency, as when Casey
brought in Max Hugel�a street-
savvy, by-the-bootstraps busi-
nessman from Brooklyn with no
intelligence experience�to shake
up the Directorate of Operations.
Sometimes, DCIs gave smaller,
but no less telling, signs. On one
of his early trips overseas,
McCone was in a European capi-
tal when an Agency duty officer
called late at night to say that a
"FLASH /DCI EYES ONLY" cable
had just arrived. The message's
contents were so sensitive that
whoever delivered the printed
copy had to retrieve it and
destroy it. The duty officer took
the cable to McCone at the hotel
where he was staying. The DCI,
wearing a bathrobe, read the con-
tents and put the paper in his
pocket. The duty officer asked for
it back, saying he was supposed
to retrieve it for disposal.
McCone unfolded the cable, held
it up, and asked the officer to tell
him who sent it. Reading the
"From" line, the officer replied,
"Director." "Right," McCone said,
"and I'm the Director." He put the
cable back in his pocket and said
good night.16
Some DCIs were affable; some
were bland; some were blunt.
"Beetle" Smith greeted the
attendees at his first staff meet-
ing with these words: "It's inter-
esting to see all you fellows here.
It'll be even more interesting to
see how many of you are here a
few months from now."
Schlesinger informed Agency vet-
eran John McMahon and his
superior, Director of Science and
Technology Carl Duckett, at 9:30
one morning that he had just
appointed McMahon to head the
Office of Technical Service.
Thinking of the time needed for a
smooth transition, Duckett sug-
gested, "How about if he starts at
the first of the month?"
Schlesinger answered, "How
about at 10:00?"'
"3 Author's conversation with Harold
Bean, 30 October 2001.
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And the contrasts continue. Some
DCIs tried hard to be true direc-
tors of the Intelligence Commu-
nity, even though the jobs of the
DCI as Community manager and
head of the CIA historically were
competing, not complementary,
roles.18 Others chose to run the
Agency primarily and went about
their Community functions as an
aside. Some DCIs emphasized
analysis over operations and
intensely scrutinized the Direc-
torate of Intelligence's products.
Others placed operations over
analysis and reveled in war sto-
ries rather than estimates.
According to Richard Lehman, a
senior officer in the Directorate
of Intelligence, Allen Dulles "had
a habit of assessing estimates by
weight. He would heft them and
decide, without reading them,
whether or not to accept them." 19
Some directors were hard charg-
ing, strong willed, and ambi-
tious, with mandates and
agendas for change; others went
about their work in a quieter,
nonconfrontational fashion; and a
few barely left a mark. Some
DCIs tried to resolve the
Agency's "culture wars" between
the "spooks" and the scholars,
and between the so-called "pru-
dent professionals" who ran spies
17 Lathrop, 110. John McMahon, oral his-
tory interview by Fenton Babcock, 4
December 1997, 25. (Transcript in CSI
Oral History Program files.)
19 See Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of
Central Intelligence as Leaders of the US.
Intelligence Community, 1946-2005
(Washington: CIA Center for the Study of
Intelligence, 2005).
19 Richard Kovar, "Mr. Current Intelligence:
An Interview with Richard Lehman," Stud-
ies in Intelligence 43 2 (1999-2000): 27.
Some DCIs tried to
resolve the Agency's
culture wars between
the 'spooks' and the
scholars.
99
and the "cowboys" who did covert
action�but most left that inter-
nal sociology alone. Some sought
a policymaking role; others
spurned it. And while some DCIs
were inclined to convey perils
and forebodings to their custom-
ers, others were more helpful at
clarifying ambiguities and
assessing alternatives.
Out of the Shadows
One defining characteristic of the
DCIs was that they were the
most unsecret heads of any secret
agency in the world. DCIs lived
in the nebulous zone between
secrecy and democracy, clandes-
tinity and openness. They headed
the world's first publicly acknowl-
edged intelligence service. While
some countries guard the identi-
ties of their intelligence chiefs,
the DCIs were public figures,
held to account for what the CIA,
and to some extent the Commu-
nity, did and did not do. The
whole process of vetting a pro-
spective DCI was uniquely trans-
parent among intelligence
services. His confirmation hear-
ings usually were open, and more
than a few times were used for
partisan purposes and political
theater. That phenomenon is not
recent. The first controversial
confirmation was John McCone's
in 1962�the first in which any
senators voted against a DCI
nominee. After that, two other
nominations received significant
numbers of "no" votes (Colby and
Gates), and four had to be with-
drawn (Theodore Sorensen,
Gates, Michael Cams, and
Anthony Lake).20
The contrast between the two
worlds in which DCIs existed�
secret and public�fell into stark
relief from the mid-1960s to the
mid-1970s, when the relationship
between intelligence and democ-
racy in the United States under-
went a sea change. Statements
from two DCIs of that period cap-
ture the magnitude of the change.
After he was appointed DCI in
1966, Helms said, "I think there's
a tradition that the CIA is a silent
service, and it's a good one. I think
the silence ought to begin with
me."21 In 1978, Colby, looking back
on the "time of troubles" he had
recently suffered through, said
that such a "supersecretive style
of operation had. . . become
incompatible with the one I
believed essential."22
After that, pragmatic openness
became the DCIs' watchword in
dealing with their political moni-
tors. As the Cold War foreign pol-
icy consensus shattered for good,
DCIs increasingly had to contend
with all the various organs of
accountability: special commis-
sions, watchdog groups, the courts,
29 Gates was nominated twice. His name
was withdrawn during contentious hear-
ings in 1987.
21 John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise
and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1986), 614.
22 Colby, 334.
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4 4
the media, and, most importantly
of course, Congress. Later DCIs
could scarcely imagine the hal-
cyon days of their predecessors'
dealings with Capitol Hill in the
1950s, when oversight was really
overlook. It is hard today to envi-
sion what it was like in 1956, when
Senator Richard Russell, the CIA's
longtime friend and protector, said
that "If there is one agency of the
government in which we must
take some matters on faith, with-
out a constant examination of its
methods and sources, I believe this
agency is the CIA."
In those days, the DCI briefed
Congress a handful of times a year
at most and almost always left
with a figurative, if not literal,
blank check. One of the Agency's
legislative counsels, John Warner,
told of an encounter he and Dulles
had with one of the CIA subcom-
mittees in the late 1950s:
It was sort of a crowded room,
and [the subcommittee chair-
man, Representative] Clarence
Cannon greets Dulles [with]
"Oh, it's good to see you again,
Mn Secretary." He thinks it's
[Secretary of State John] Foster
Dulles, or mistakes the name; I
don't know. Dulles, he's a great
raconteur. He reminds Cannon
of this, and Cannon reminds
him of that, and they swap sto-
ries for two hours. And at the
end, [Cannon asks,] "Well, Mn
Secretary, have you got enough
money in your budget for this
year [and] the coming year?"
[Dulles replies,) 'Well, I think
we are all right, Mn Chairman.
Thank you very much." That
was the budget hearing.23
DCIs were the most
unsecret heads of any
secret agency in the
world.
9 9
The era of congressional benign
neglect ended during the period
1974-80, with the adoption of the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment
requiring a presidential finding
for covert actions; the Church
and Pike Committee investiga-
tions; the establishment of the
House and Senate permanent
oversight committees; and the
passage of the Intelligence
Accountability Act mandating
that Congress be "promptly and
fully informed" of covert actions.
After that flurry, the DCI rela-
tionship with Congress was
altered forever. For a few event-
ful years, Casey tried to stand as
the immovable object against the
irresistible force. As Robert Gates
observed, Casey "was guilty of
contempt of Congress from the
day he was sworn in."24 The trend
was soon back on track, however,
and by the year 2000, Agency
officers were briefing Congress in
some fashion an average of five
times a day, and the DCI's fre-
quent testimony on the Hill was
a headline-grabbing event.
23 John S. Warner, oral history interview
by Woodrow Kuhns, 27 September 1996,
48. (Transcript in CSI Oral History Pro-
gram files.)
24 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The
Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents
and How They Won the Cold War (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 213.
The First Customer is Always
Right
Historically, the most important
factor in the life of the DCI was
his relationship with the presi-
dent. The CIA is more of a presi-
dential organization than any
other in the US government�a
special quality that was both a
boon and a bane to the DCIs.
Presidents have their own pecu-
liar appreciation of intelligence
and their own way of dealing
with the CIA and their DCIs. We
have had presidents experienced
with intelligence, or who were
fascinated with intelligence or
with certain kinds of secret infor-
mation or operations. Other pres-
idents had little experience with
intelligence, or did not care about
it, or did not like it or the CIA. As
former Deputy Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence Richard Kerr
aptly put it, "a number of admin-
istrations. . . started with the
expectation that intelligence
could solve every problem, or
that it could not do anything
right, and then moved to the
opposite view. Then they settled
down and vacillated from one
extreme to the other."25
Presidents' relations with their
DCIs often followed a similarly
erratic course. Some began by
regarding the DCI as their senior
intelligence adviser and saw him
regularly. Occasionally that
degree of contact continued; more
often, it did not. Other presidents
preferred from the start to have
25 Richard J. Kerr and Peter Dixon Davis,
"Ronald Reagan and the President's Daily
Brief," Studies in Intelligence 41 2 (1997): 31.
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66
their national security advisers
function as their principal intelli-
gence officers. A few presidents at
least made a bow toward giving
their DCIs authority over other
Community departments, but in
most cases the Community's cen-
ter of gravity meandered between
CIA Headquarters, the Pentagon,
Foggy Bottom, and the West
Wing.
A few DCIs were close to their
presidents; some had cordial,
businesslike relationships; some
had only infrequent contact; and
some had no relationships to
speak of. From the start, DCIs
had to overcome assorted barri-
ers�physical, administrative,
psychological�in their interac-
tion with the presidents.
Lawrence "Red" White, the
Agency's longtime director of
administration, recalled the time
when Dulles told Eisenhower
about a possible location for the
headquarters building. "We're
thinking of tearing down that old
brewery [where the Kennedy
Center is now] and building it
right there.' Eisenhower went
through the roof. He said, 'You
are not going to build that build-
ing in the District of Columbia.
This town is so cluttered up now,
you can't get from one end to the
other, and you are going to get
out of town."26 Then there were
the ways presidents chose to run
their White Houses: Eisenhower
with his rigid military staff struc-
" James Hanrahan, "Soldier, Manager,
Leader: An Interview with Former Execu-
tive Director Lawrence K. 'Red' White,"
Studies in Intelligence 42 3 (1998): 8-9.
The DCI often served
at the clear displeasure
of the president.
99
ture; John Kennedy and his loose
agglomeration of ad hoc working
groups and catch-as-catch-can
meetings with advisers; Lyndon
Johnson's congressional cloak-
room approach, in which the
"real deals" were made in infor-
mal settings outside the National
Security Council; and Richard �
Nixon's notorious "Berlin Wall" of
advisers�Henry Kissinger, H. R.
Haldeman, and John Ehrli-
chman�who controlled access to
the Oval Office.
DCIs sometimes could work
around those kinds of obstacles,
most notably by changing the
look and content of the daily
briefing product�the Central
Intelligence Bulletin, the Presi-
dent's Intelligence Checklist, and
the President's Daily Brief�and
developing more flexible and
responsive methods for provid-
ing current intelligence and
answers to taskings. But even
with those improvements, DCIs
found it extremely hard to sur-
mount the psychological barriers
some presidents erected. What
was a DCI to do when Johnson
said that "the CIA is made up of
boys whose families sent them to
Princeton but wouldn't let them
into the family brokerage busi-
ness," and told Helms, "Dick, I
need a paper on Vietnam, and I'll
tell you what I want included in
it."27 Or when Nixon returned a
thick package of PDBs given to
him during the transition period
unopened, called Agency officers
"clowns," and asked, "What use
are they? They've got 40,000 peo-
ple over there reading newspa-
pers."28
The DCI often served at the clear
displeasure of the president, who
directed him to act and then
often tried to deny�not very
plausibly�that he had anything
to do with the outcome. Bill Clin-
ton remarked that cutting the
intelligence budget during peace-
time was like canceling your
health insurance when you felt
good.26 But chief executives have
not always been the best stew-
ards of the resources of the
Agency they have so often called
on to help implement�and, in
more than a few cases, salvage�
their foreign policies.
It should be noted, however, that
closeness was not an absolute
good for the DCIs or a solution to
some of these difficulties. Some
DCIs paid a cost for being too
close, or trying to be. They wore
out their welcomes, or became too
committed to the success of
covert actions, or were accused of
27 Lathrop, 174, 339.
28 John L. Helgerson, Getting to Know the
President: CIA Briefings of Presidential
Candidates, 1952-1992 (Washington: CIA
Center for the Study of Intelligence,
1995), 91; Richard Helms, with William
Hood, A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in
the Central Intelligence Agency (New
York: Random House, 2003), 410; Thomas
Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets:
Richard Helms and the CIA (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 201.
29 Lathrop, 344.
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66
politicization, or became linked
with controversial policies. It was
not an automatic benefit for the
Agency or the DCI for him to be
able to say, as William Casey did,
"You understand, I call him
Ron." 3�
Honorable Men
At the cornerstone laying cere-
mony for the Original Headquar-
ters Building in 1959, President
Eisenhower said:
In war, nothing is more impor-
tant to a commander than the
facts concerning the strength,
dispositions, and intentions of
his opponent, and the proper
interpretation of those facts. In
30 Kovar, 36.
Throughout, the DCIs
were 'honorable men,
devoted to [the
nation's] service.'
9�
peacetime, the necessary facts.
. . and their interpretation are
essential to the development of
policy to further our long-term
national security . . . . To pro-
vide information of this kind is
the task of the organization of
which you are apart. No task
could be more important."
For almost 60 years, the DCIs
carried out that task in war and
peace, in flush times and lean,
31 "Our First Line of Defense": Presidential
Reflections on US Intelligence (Washing-
ton: CIA Center for the Study of Intelli-
gence, 1996), 19.
amid accolades and scorn. No one
of their various leadership styles
insured success. Their standing
and accomplishments depended
on circumstances they could not
influence: presidential agendas,
world events, and domestic poli-
tics. On occasion, with the right
conjunction of circumstances and
personalities, DCIs reached the
inner circle of the national secu-
rity apparatus; more often, they
did not. Throughout, however,
they were�in Richard Helms's
famous phrase�"honorable men,
devoted to [the nation's] service."32
32 Richard Helms, "Global Intelligence and
the Democratic Society," speech to the
American Society of Newspaper Editors,
14 April 1971, 13, DCI Files, Job
80R01284R, box 1, folder 6.
12
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