WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 16202179
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01252
• Publication Date: January 19, 1968

Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
lercret,
4g
19 January 1968
No. 0003/68
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
L) IVI.
The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research,.
and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requir-
ing more comprehensive treatment and therefore published sep-
arately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.
WARNING
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information af-
fecting the national security of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as
mended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
LS-Trrft-F-T,
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Now'
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 18 January 1968)
Far East
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 1
VIETNAM 3
Enemy aggressiveness has continued to increase during
the first weeks of the year. The government in Sai-
gon settled the electrical workers strike, but its
heavy-handed tactics created widespread popular re-
sentment. Hanoi, meanwhile, is trying to maintain
the political initiative by stressing the favorable
impact of its latest gesture on talks with the US.
CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK CLAIMS VICTORY IN TALKS WITH US
Prince Sihanouk is taking a moderate line in the
wake of his talks with Ambassador Bowles, but his
determination to take meaningful steps toward limit-
ing Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodian territory
is far from certain.
COMMUNISTS STEP UP MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists, maintaining pressure on government
forces in northern Laos, have captured Nam Bac in
the most significant success of their current dry-
season offensive.
FACTIONAL SPLITS DEEPEN IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The factional fighting taking place throughout China
continues to be ignored in Peking broadcasts but many
provincial radio stations have begun to carry shrill
denunciations of unnamed "chieftains" who are foment-
ing the disorders.
SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA REACT TO BRITISH WITHDRAWAL PLAN
Singapore and Malaysia are seriously concerned over
the economic and military implications of Britain's
accelerated withdrawal plans.
5
7
10
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
410
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 11
HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET CONSULTATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny took an unusual
although not unprecedented trip to Eastern Europe
this week, visiting Warsaw and East Berlin; the
presence of all three top leaders is evidence of
the trip's importance.
PARTY PURGE UNDER WAY IN YUGOSLAVIA
The dismissal of 400 Belgrade city party members
was the first step by supporters of Tito's reform
program to eliminate their opponents in the party
before its ninth congress convenes next December.
US AND USSR REACH AGREEMENT ON NPT TEXT
The new text--a result of 11th-hour US-Soviet nego-
tiations and compromises--has been placed before
the disarmament conference that reconvened in Gen-
eva this week.
Middle East - Africa
12
13
14
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15
MAKARIOS SEEMS TO MODERATE STANCE ON CYPRUS DISPUTE
The Cypriot President advised Greek Cypriots that
enosis is unrealistic at present, and made concilia-
tory references toward the Turkish minority, but
this may only be an attempt to strengthen his role
in any future settlement.
GREEK REGIME TROUBLED BY DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PROBLEMS
Extremists within the junta are pressing Premier
Papadopoulos for a less moderate attitude toward the
exiled King and for a diplomatic confrontation with
the country's allies over their failure to recognize
the regime.
ISRAEL TO REVAMP ITS NAVY
Because of a longer coastline and the sinking of the
Eilat, Israeli defense officials are reshaping naval
strategy around two new submarines, amphibious land-
ing craft, and missile-equipped patrol craft.
16
17
19
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
N.,001
ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE CONTINUES
No progress has been made in negotiating Arab-Israeli
differences, and exchanges of fire continue along
the Israeli-Jordanian border.
IMPROVED PROSPECT FOR MODERATION IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)
Last week's cabinet shake-up was a significant gain
for relatively moderate President Massamba, but there
probably will be no early reduction in the govern-
ment's strident anti-Americanism or in the large Com-
munist presence.
19
21
CONGO (KINSHASA) BREAKS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH RWANDA 22
Although Congolese motives in breaking diplomatic
relations with Rwanda remain unclear, the action may
be a subtle attempt by Mobutu to disengage his regime
from the problem of the mercenaries interned in
Rwanda.
POLITICAL UNREST RISING IN ZANZIBAR
Economic stagnation and political tension are in-
creasing after four years of Communist aid and advice
and Zanzibari mismanagement.
Western Hemisphere
23
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA CONTINUES AT HIGH LEVEL
Despite the apparent friction between the two coun-
tries, the USSR's military aid to Cuba has continued
at the increased rate that began in the fall of 1966.
HAVANA CULTURAL CONGRESS CLOSES
The conference delegates endorsed all anti-US resolu-
tions and applauded Fidel Castro's bitter attack on
"US imperialism."
26
26
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
161:proved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
-Tiret!-R4LT_
ECUADOREAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FINALLY IGNITES
The campaign for presidential elections on 2 June
has been thrown into turmoil by ex-president Carlos
Julio Arosemena's announcement that he supports the
man he ousted from the presidency in 1961, Jose
Maria Velasco.
GUYANA-SURINAM BORDER TROUBLES FLARE UP
The sudden rekindling of an old dispute is disrupting
the usually tranquil relations between Guyana and
Surinam.
INCREASED VIOLENCE BREAKS OUT IN GUATEMALA
Two US military officers were killed and two were
wounded in an outbreak of Communist terrorism on 16
January that has caused the Guatemalan Government to
declare a 30-day "state of alarm."
Page iv
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
FAR EAST
Hanoi's latest statement on talks with the
US continues to dominate the political stage.
North Vietnamese propaganda claims that Foreign
Minister Trinh's statement of 30 December has
become the "focus of world public opinion."
Hanoi is trying to sustain the momentum of this
political offensive by insisting that the ball is
now in Washington's court and pointing out that
the US so far has not responded to Trinh's ges-
ture.
In Saigon, President Thieu has attempted to
counter Hanoi's move and to reassure South Vietnam-
ese who have shown growing uneasiness over the
possibility of unilateral US peace initiatives.
In a major speech on 15 January, Thieu attempted
to gain greater leverage on US decisions by in-
sisting that South Vietnam should have the "cen-
tral role" in any peace moves. Thieu also re-
affirmed the right to pursue Communist forces if
they continue to use staging areas in Cambodia.
Sihanouk, meanwhile, has tried to represent
his talks with Ambassador Bowles as an "enormous
success" over "US hawks" advocating hot pursuit
into Cambodia. He has emphasized the US pledge
in the communique to do everything possible to
avoid "acts of aggression" against Cambodia and
has criticized Washington's move to set the record
straight on the issue of hot pursuit. Although
the Cambodians sent a formal request to the Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC) that it strengthen
its surveillance of the border, Sihanouk appears
to have no illusions about the prospect of more
effective ICC operations.
Laotian Communist forces achieved their most
significant success in the current dry-season
fighting with the capture of the important govern-
ment base at Nam Bac. Although this is a severe
setback to government efforts to expand control
in northern Laos, there are no signs that this ac-
tion foreshadows a general Communist offensive.
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
THAILAND
TonlA
Sop
DAD
PHU PUN:
GULF OF
� SIAM
N.
� NORTH
VIETNAM
Rt. 9
Demilitarized Zone
G TRI
Hue
eQUASH NAM
C AMB OD1
PHNO
PENH
Bu Dop
Special Forces,.
Camp ././
ire Loc NiiTh
Support
Base
Burt Ar
Capltd.
HIN/.
LONG
\
EN
IANG
Zone
MEN
MIEN
PHONG\ 7 LONG
likt L3
< ---,.
PHONG
DINH
'CFILIONG
'
AN
XUYEN
BAC
NH
L
an Tho
-SATO
IC N I-10A
VINH
S.
BA XUYEN
IV CORPS
j-P-1741.10G
TUY
TH
1 CORPS
QUANG TIN
�
QUANG
NGAI
KONT
Kontum�
_
Pletku.
Itt.EtKu
DAR LAC
ng Ngat
3/NI-I DI
PHU
BON
, *Ban Me
Thuot
HO,
\
-.3UANG DUC
\ l'I'VEN
IA
Da Lat. RANH
L"JC cININH'�,��7
�--)'C'HUANr
LAM GONG
�")
THUAN
Nhon
11 CORPS
BINH
TLIY
III CORPS
�)r0A
c\N
SOUTH VIETNAM
100
MILES
693 -6
CI
Zrri=41.prr,
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Ng." -grel+g-T_
VIETNAM
Military Situation
In South Vietnam
The tempo of Communist mil-
itary activity in South Vietnam
has increased markedly in the
first weeks of 1968. The ac-
tivity, moreover, has been wide-
spread, with heavy pressure
against both South Vietnamese
and US units. This pressure has
included mortar and rocket at-
tacks--often followed by ground
assaults--and increased ambushes
of patrols and convoys.
The increased enemy aggres-
siveness is also reflected in
key statistical indicators.
Enemy personnel losses reportedly
reached nearly 5,100 during
the first two weeks of this
year--a sharp increase over the
1,700-man weekly average for
1967. The number of attacks
in the first weeks is already
higher than any monthly total
in nearly two years, with nine
battalion-size Communist as-
saults having occurred so far.
Some of the heaviest fight-
ing occurred in Quang Tri Prov-
ince last weekend when a US Ma-
rine convoy was ambushed while
traveling along Route 9. Ameri-
can casualties totaled 89 in the
can casualties totaled 89 in the
ensuing five-hour battle.
Early in the week, main
force subordinates of the Commu-
nist B-3 Front in the highlands
of II Corps staged two ambushes
against US supply convoys. In
addition, both B-3 Front elements
and local force Viet Cong units
launched numerous small-scale
attacks.
In South Vietnam's III
Corps, there appears to be a dis-
tinct chronological pattern in
the enemy's current winter-spring
campaign. The major attacks--
against Loc Ninh, Bu Dop, and
fire-support base Burt--have oc-
curred at approximately one-
month intervals. If this pat-
tern continues, coordinated at-
tacks--spearheaded by elements
of the Viet Cong 5th, 9th, or
North Vietnamese 7th divisions--
could occur before the Tet holi-
day that begins in late January.
Hanoi Maintains
Political Initiative
The North Vietnamese seem
determined to keep their "will
talk" statement in the news and
to maintain the impression that
"Tch--t-R.V.Z
Page 3
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
-S"TrAtik44-1.
they have taken a significant
initiative in trying to bring
about negotiations with the US.
On 16 January, Mai Van Bo, the
DRV representative in Paris and
and one of Hanoi's most authori-
tative spokesmen, attempted to
heighten world interest in the
statement by commenting on the
timing of talks as well as their
possible substance. He said
negotiations could start "after
a suitable time" and indicated
that both the level of talks
and the agenda were negotiable.
Although Hanoi officials have
taken this line in private con-
versations in the past, this is
the first time they have dis-
cussed it in public. Bo's phrase-
ology, however, still carefully
preserves considerable flexibility
for Hanoi in deciding on the
actual timing and substance of
any contacts.
Political Problems
In Saigon
On 15 January the govern-
ment succeeded in wiring together
a temporary settlement of the
five-day-old electrical workers'
strike, but not before its tac-
tics had sparked widespread re-
sentment from labor and criti-
cism from informed Vietnamese.
The government at first resisted
the demands of the workers, ar-
rested some of their leaders,
and applied pressure for a re-
turn to work. Walkouts by sym-
pathetic workers in other fields,
however, raised the threat of
an extensive economic paralysis
in Saigon and elsewhere, forcing
the government to accede at least
partially to demands for a pay
increase. All workers returned
to their jobs on 17 January.
The six arrested leaders have
since been released, but there
is some possibility that at
Least one will still have to
face trial by a military court.
Although the settlement will
probably damp down labor agita-
tion temporarily, the govern-
ment's inept handling of the
dispute impaired popular con-
fidence in the regime. Some ele-
ments of organized labor may
now become more willing to make
common cause with Buddhists,
students, and other disaffected
groups in pressing grievances
against the government.
Meanwhile, criticism of the
government's do-nothing attitude
toward the country's critical
problems has continued. So far,
however, President Thieu appears
unmoved.
Part of Thieu's difficulties
spring from his continuing poor
relations with Vice President
Ky, but he is also clearly
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Near' SreREI New
unwilling to tangle with entrenched
military circles unless or un-
til he feels strong enough to
outmaneuver potential enemies.
For his part, Ky continues to
disparage Thieu and to predict
that the government will have
to turn increasingly to himself
for direction.
In an effort to strengthen
his image and to dispel a grow-
ing uneasiness in Saigon that
his government may be pressured
into an unfavorable compromise
with the Communists, President
Thieu delivered a hard-hitting
speech on 15 January reiterating
his previous insistence that Sai-
gon be a primary party in any
negotiations with Hanoi. He also
rejected any coalition with the
National Liberation Front. Argu-
ing forcefully that South Vietnam
was a victim of North Vietnamese
aggression, he declared that if
Hanoi continued to reject reason-
able proposals for a settlement
of the war, military pressure
should be increased.
Meanwhile, the government
appears to have scored a victory
in the National Assembly, with
the election on 17 January of
Nguyen Ba Luong as the chairman
of the Lower House. Luong's
election appears to represent
the first successful cooperative
effort by that body's progov-
ernment Democratic Bloc, of which
he is the nominal head, and the
predominantly Catholic Independ-
ence Bloc.
CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK CLAIMS VICTORY IN TALKS WITH US
Cambodian Chief of State
Sihanouk was clearly pleased with
the cordial atmosphere and the
outcome of last week's discus-
sions with Ambassador Bowles.
His public statements por-
traying the talks as an impor-
tant victory for Cambodia are
designed to support his boasts
that his diplomatic skills would
keep the war from spreading to
Cambodia and are therefore in
part designed for his domestic
audience. Sihanouk apparently
also believes, however, that
the talks not only served their
primary purpose of forestalling
any immediate move across the
Cambodian border by allied
forces, but also provided some
important political advantages
for Phnom Penh.
Page 5
WEEKLY SUMMARY
SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
6pproved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
757teit-EZ,_
Sihanouk moved with alacrity,
for example, in claiming pub-
licly that the US had renounced
the right of "hot pursuit" in
the talks. He then quickly con-
demned Washington's effort to
set the record straight as double-
dealing. Sihanouk also attempted
to exploit statements in the
joint communique that the US had
no "intention to violate Cam-
bodian territory" and will do
"everything possible" to avoid
"acts of aggression" if the US
takes action against Communist
troops in Cambodia. Therefore,
without specifically disavowing
them, he has now largely blunted
the impact of his earlier public
statements that Cambodia would
not oppose US military activi-
ties in certain "isolated" bor-
der areas.
Sihanouk's concessions to
the US, at least as far as the
public record goes, do not ap-
pear to depart significantly
from previously established po-
sitions. Cambodia has again
formally asked the International
Control Commission (ICC) to
strengthen its supervisory func-
tions in Cambodia, but since
Phnom Penh has made similar re-
quests in the past, Sihanouk is
under no illusion about the pros-
pects for an effective ICC in
the face of Soviet opposition.
Sihanouk did go somewhat further
than he has in the past in ad-
mitting that the Communists use
Cambodian territory, but he did
so only by implication. At any
rate, he undoubtedly viewed this
as a small price to pay for the
"assurances" he received from
Ambassador Bowles.
Sihanouk's public statement
that Cambodia would be willing
to send its troops or the ICC
to areas where the US has infor-
mation on Communist activity is
a significant departure from
his past refusal to cooperate
directly with the US in any way
on the sanctuary problem. It
is not clear whether Sihanouk
will carry through, however, and
the joint communique-did not in-
clude this provision.
Sihanouk apparently views
the Phnom Penh talks as more
than a device to deal with an
immediate problem. His efforts
to get a satisfactory border dec-
laration from the US in return
for the re-establishment of dip-
lomatic relations may not only
reflect a desire to sign up the
only important power that has
not yet done so, but also a
genuine effort to explore the
possibility of improving rela-
tions with the US. Phnom Penh
expressed its willingness in
the joint communiqudeto partici-
pate in further meetings with
the US.
Sihanouk apparently has not
changed his estimate that the
Communists will ultimately pre-
vail in South Vietnam, but he
has not lost sight of the short-
term advantages of an opening to
the west. His disparaging refer-
ences to Hanoi and Peking over
the past week indicate once again
that he draws little comfort
from their "support" in meeting
Cambodia's principal objective
of keeping the war from its ter-
ritory.
Page 6
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
7irt*E42
COMMUNISTS STEP UP MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists are maintain-
ing pressure on government forces
in north Laos. The capture of
Nam Bac is the most significant
success in their current dry-
season offensive.
The collapse of this impor-
tant government position culmi-
nated a ten-month Communist cam-
paign to reoccupy an area they
had controlled for nearly ten
years before losing it in August
1966. The local commander ordered
evacuation of the defense perim-
eter in the face of well-coordi-
nated enemy thrusts. The govern-
ment is now attempting to rally
its forces along a new defensive
line 20 miles to the south. There
are no reports as yet of casual-
ties resulting from the engage-
ment.
The Communists also have
shelled the Luang Prabang Air-
field, 60 miles south of Nam Bac,
probably hoping to forestall air
support for the beleagured govern-
ment forces to the north. The
Communists have continued to har-
ass this important staging base,
but there is no indication that
they intend to enlarge their ef-
forts and attack the town itself.
The loss of Nam Bac is more
a reflection of the lack of deci-
sive leadership within the Royal
Army than an indication that the
Communists have embarked on a
larger offensive role in Laos.
Although the defeat is a severe
blow to government plans to ex-
pand its control in the area, it
will not, by itself, greatly alter
the strategic situation in north-
ern Laos.
The debacle may have a
longer range effect on the hard-
won confidence and increased
capability that the armed forces
have acquired in recent years.
In addition, the loss of Nam Bac
will almost certainly have some
political repercussions in Vien-
tiane. This may precipitate a
new round of political maneuver-
ing within the army's top command,
since commander in chief General
Ouan Rathikoun was closely asso-
ciated with the Nam Bac operation.
BURMA
Nam Baca
Luang
�Prabang
LAOS
Vlen lane
THAILAND
Bangkok
69350 1-68 CIA Statutila Miles
CHINA
-100* togia441.�
NORTH VIETNAM
noP
CAMBODIA
2r
EOLITH
VIETNAM
Page 7
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
46pproved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
The most unique aspect of
the current enemy military push
in northern Laos was the unprece-
dented aerial attack carried out
by four North Vietnamese light
transport aircraft (AN-2s) on
12 January against the important
government outpost at Phou Pha
Thi, close to the North Vietnam-
ese border.
Phou Pha Thi has long been
a thorn in the side of the Com-
munists because it provides an
advanced staging base for
friendly guerrilla operations
The base is on a high
plateau, and would be a difficult
target for a ground assault.
Two of the North Vietnamese air-
craft were downed in the raid,
however, while negligible damage
was done to the base. It is thus
likely that Hanoi may conclude
that the use of such slow, vul-
nerable planes in an attack role
is not worth the expenditure of
men and machines.
FACTIONAL SPLITS DEEPEN IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Although the factional fight-
ing taking place throughout China
continues to be ignored by Peking
propaganda media, provincial
radio stations have begun to
broadcast shrill denunciations
of factional "chieftains" who
are said to be fomenting the dis-
order and to be engaging in other
"criminal" activities. Nowhere
are opposition leaders identified,
but the description of them makes
it clear that they are at the
head of powerful, militant "revo-
lutionary" organizations.
The charges leveled against
these militant Maoists are simi-
lar in each province, suggesting
that the effort to discredit them
is coordinated. Presumably, a
major aim of these broadcasts is
to put pressure on Peking to stop
equivocating, give unqualified
support to local leaders, and re-
pudiate the radicals. Thus far,
however, leaders in Peking--ap-
parently sharply divided--have
been unwilling to do this. There
are no signs, either, that pro-
vincial leaders are following
through on their broadcast threats
to "smash" their opponents if
they do not mend their ways.
The nationally prominent
Shanghai newspaper, Wen Hui Pao,
has been especially outspoken�In
�
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
'44,0e Tyrol
-grtii-gT�
its denunciation of "factional-
ism." The fact that the head of
the Shanghai Revolutionary Com-
mittee concurrently holds a
senior position in Peking lends
authority to the Shanghai media.
Although Wen Hui Pao promoted the
Cultural Revolution during its
early phases, in recent months
it has been a strong proponent
of a moderate line on rebuilding
the party apparatus and restor-
ing political stability.
On 10 January, Wen Hui Pao
and two other Shanghai�Papers
jointly published a detailed
account of "civil wars" said to
be currently sweeping Kiangsu,
Chekiang, and Anhwei provinces.
The chief instigators were said
to be former party officials who
now call themselves "veteran
revolutionaries," a description
implying that they are regarded
as turncoats who have joined
the ultraleftists to save them-
selves. The account admitted
that these opposition leaders
have had considerable success in
recruiting and arming followers,
and said they had made an un-
successful bid to "occupy" south-
ern Kiangsu and take over the
Shanghai-Nanking railroad.
On 12 January, Wen Hui Pao
published a hard-hitting editorial
listing the "ten big crimes of
factionalism." Unlike complaints
broadcast by other provinces,
this made no reference to local
conditions and gave the impres-
sion it was dealing with a naticin-
wide problem. At several points,
Wen Hui Pao indicated it was de-
nouncing leaders who currently
hold responsible positions. It
said that one "crime" of "fac-
tionalists" is to be affable and
agreeable in public, while engag-
ing in "vicious backstabbing"
in private.
This is probably a fair de-
scription of the situation in Pe-
king, where top leaders often ap-
pear together in public, seem-
ingly in accord. There are re-
current rumors in Peking, how-
ever, of a falling out between
the militant leaders Lin Piao
and Chen Po-ta, and of rivalry
between Premier Chou En-lai and
the radical Kang Sheng.
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
06pproved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA REACT TO BRITISH WITHDRAWAL PLAN
Singapore and Malaysia, sup-
ported by Australia and New
Zealand, have reacted sharply to
Britain's decision to withdraw
all its military forces from
Southeast Asia by the end of 1971.
Singapore has been particu-
larly outspoken in its opposi-
tion to the accelerated with-
drawal plan, charging British
perfidy and, in desperation, even
threatening economic reprisals.
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew flew
to London in an unsuccessful,
last-minute effort to delay the
withdrawal until 1973, the mini-
mum time he believes is required
for Singapore to make the neces-
sary adjustments.
Lee's alarm is prompted both
by the economic impact of the
UK withdrawal and its security
implications for Singapore. The
British military facilities on
the island account for an esti-
mated 20 percent of the national
income and employ about 40,000
workers. Moreover, Lee recognizes
that financial resources needed
for industrial development will
have to be diverted to meet added
defense requirements. Singapore
officials reportedly foresee a
rapid build-up of Singapore's
armed forces, now restricted to
a 3,500-man army and several
paramilitary organizations, and
the development of a limited air
and naval capability.
Malaysian leaders privately
expressed keen dismay and disap-
pointment with London, but have
made restrained public statements
and chided Lee for his emotional
response, which they regard as an
exercise in futility. The UK de-
cision is viewed as a virtual ab-
rogation of the Anglo-Malayan Mu-
tual Security Agreement of 1957;
the Malaysians are especially up-
set at being left without signifi-
cant air and sea defenses. They
are also concerned at the impact
of British withdrawal on their
ability to contain Communist sub-
version, particularly in rural
East Malaysia, where the Peking-
oriented Sarawak Communist Organi-
zation is active among the local
Chinese population. Although the
withdrawal will create some un-
employment, the economic impact
will be much less severe than in
neighboring Singapore.
Leaders of Australia and New
Zealand gave strong moral support
to Lee but declined to join in a
representation to London and ap-
peared resigned to the revised
British timetable. They agree
with Lee and Malaysian Prime Min-
ister Rahman that the longer term
security of Malaysia and Singa-
pore requires some regional de-
fensive agreement among the four
countries. Neither Canberra nor
Wellington, however, is prepared
to increase substantially its de-
fense commitment in the area. For
the present, both countries will
probably maintain their limited
military presence and will re-
luctantly make some small augmen-
tations after the British pull
out.
(b)(3)
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
'iwowe "SIMeRILT
EUROPE
The USSR's three ranking leaders last week flew
first to Warsaw and then to East Berlin for talks
with their Polish and East German counterparts. The
visits clearly were more than routine. The leaders
of the three Communist states undoubtedly had the
recent political changes in Czechoslovakia much in
mind. The Russians may also have wanted to recon-
noiter the situation within the Polish leadership
itself, which has lately been the subject of specu-
lation in the Warsaw rumor market.
The Soviet leaders, now back in Moscow, will be
preparing for a meeting of the party central commit-
tee, reportedly scheduled to begin on 25 January.
Reactions in Eastern Europe to the political
changes in Prague have been guarded. The East Ger-
man press has been curt to the point of rudeness,
probably reflecting concern at high levels. Bul-
garian media have not dwelled on Prague's new divi-
sion of responsibility between the top party and
government posts, Zhivkov being one of the two re-
maining Eastern European leaders who hold both.
Yugoslav commentary has had an "I told you so"
flavor, and the Rumanians seem to recognize that
their endorsement at this time would not be benefi-
cial.
The US and the USSR reached agreement on a new
draft of a nonproliferation treaty in time for the
reopening this week of the disarmament conference in
Geneva.
The heavy budget cuts that Prime Minister Wilson
announced to Parliament fell hardest on defense
spending, but did not spare such sacred socialist
programs as free medical prescriptions, education,
and housing. With a time lag in their impact and
without more restraints on consumer spending, even
these Draconian measures may not be enough to solve
Britain's balance of payments problem.
Page 11
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
4pproved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172631
7Tm-R-gx_
HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET CONSULTATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Pod-
gorny took an unusual although
not unprecedented trip to Eastern
Europe this week, visiting both
Warsaw and East Berlin. That all
three top leaders made the trip
is evidence of its importance.
The visits fit a pattern of
close consultations between the
three northernmost Communist
states on European developments
of special interest to them. In
this instance, it was most prob-
ably related to the potential
impact of the political changes
in Czechoslovakia. The East Ger-
mans in particular would De anx-
ious lest these changes lead to
better relations between Czecho-
slovakia and West Germany. The
changes in Prague could also have
made Moscow uneasy about Warsaw,
where there has been a spate of
rumors of a possible shake-up in
Lhe offing.
Relations with Bonn almost
certainly figured in the consul-
tations in each capital. Soviet
charges earlier this month of
the Federal Republic's encroach-
ments in West Berlin may have
been a related development in-
tended to reassure the East Ger-
mans and Poles that Moscow was
protecting their interests vis-
a-vis Bonn. Moscow's views on
the alleged FRG encroachments in
West Berlin may have been re-
iterated on 18 January when West
Berlin's mayor met in East Ber-
lin with the Soviet ambassador
to East Germany.
There were tenuous indica-
tions that the Soviet leaders
postponed other business in order
to make the trip. In any event,
the fact that the three top men
decided to go together left the
impression that, whatever the
Soviets learned and whatever ad-
vice they dispensed, they be-
lieved it expedient to have each
member of the troika equally en-
gaged.
(b)(3)
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
law
*NW
PARTY PURGE UNDER WAY IN YUGOSLAVIA
The dismissal of 400 Bel-
grade city party members was the
first step by supporters of Tito's
reform program to eliminate their
opponents in the party before its
ninth congress convenes next De-
cember.
These expulsions, announced
by the Belgrade press on 13 Janu-
ary, and others that will follow,
are intended to rid the party
organization of conservative ex-
partisans and minor bureaucrats
who have opposed political and
economic reforms. President
Tito's call for a cleansing of
the party in a television inter-
view on 29 December seems to have
been the signal for action.
The regime's leaders appar-
ently intend to replace those
ousted with younger, more liber-
ally inclined party members.
These changes, along with a
planned reorganization of the
local party bodies will enable
the regime to pack both the re-
public and national party con-
gresses later this year with sup-
porters of its reforms.
The purge was begun in Ser-
bia because of the turmoil in the
party there since vice president
Rankovic was removed in 1966.
His political demise left the
large conservative wing of the
party leaderless, but his sup-
porters have been able by their
inaction to obstruct progress on
the reforms. The result has been
a widening gap between the top
Serbian officials and the rank
and file, with growing apathy
and confusion.
In an attempt to reverse
this trend, the regime has taken
the unprecedented step of appoint-
ing a Montenegrin, Veljko Vlahovic,
to head the Belgrade city party
organization. The regime expects
Vlahovic, a member of the party's
policy-making presidium, to pro-
vide the firm direction that has
been lacking since Rankovic's
fall:
The purge, which probably
will be gradual and without many
arrests, will aggravate Yugo-
slavia's difficult nationality
problem. With the liberals al-
ready in control in the republics
of Croatia, Slovenia, and Mace-
donia, Serbia is the major re-
maining arena of conservative-
liberal factionalism. Many Ser-
bian party members fear their
careers will be damaged and Ser-
bia's economic interests and
national influence harmed.
Some extreme liberals may
also be purged. This would fit
in with Tito's penchant for bal-
ancing between the two party ex-
tremes. Tito will be careful to
keep the purge under control and
the party responsive to his lead-
ership, however, and any major
changes in its leading bodies--
the presidium and the executive
and central committees--probably
will await the December congress.
_
(b)(3)
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
44kkproved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
-317.1E-R4j:
US AND USSR REACH AGREEMENT ON NPT TEXT
The US and USSR, after 11th--
hour negotiations in Geneva,
placed a nonproliferation treaty
text before the disarmament con-
ference that reconvened there
this week. Agreement on the
draft came after Moscow accepted
the US version of Article III--
on safeguards--the main sticking
point and a provision left blank
in earlier drafts. The Soviets
had previously insisted, against
US wishes, that Article III
should provide for the applica-
tion of only International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards to nonnuclear states.
If the Soviets had held to this
position, an arrangement that
would allow IAEA to work out a
mutually acceptable safeguards
system with EURATOM would have
been ruled out.
The joint draft represents
several other US-Soviet compro-
mises, including agreement reached
this week on provisions cover-
ing the duration of the treaty
(25 years, after which a confer-
ence will decide its future) and
the method for amending it (by
a majority of its signers, which
must include those who have nu-
clear weapons now and countries
represented on the IAEA board of
governors at the time of amend-
ment). Additional concessions
probably will be sought by some
of the nonnuclear states at
Geneva, but a majority of the
delegates at the conference is
expected to approve submission
of the document to the UN Gen-
eral Assembly in March.
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
vms#4
--ST641.-ELF
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Some problems in the area were reduced to peace-
ful political maneuvering for influence on future
policy, but elsewhere new tensions appeared and the
Arab-Israeli dispute continued to be volatile.
Extremists within the Greek junta are pressing
Premier Papadopoulos to adopt a less conciliatory
attitude toward the exiled King and toward certain
domestic issues, and they are growing impatient with
the failure of their NATO allies to grant diplomatic
recognition to the regime.
Cypriot President Makarios assumed a new, more
moderate posture toward a settlement with the is-
land's Turkish minority, but the move may be only an
attempt to strengthen his role in any future initi-
atives on the problem which the US and others are
considering.
Kinshasa's break in relations with neighboring
Rwanda may have been a ploy by President Mobutu to
extricate himself from his insistence that Rwanda
return the white mercenaries to the Congo for trial.
This could open the way to get them out of Africa
and back to Europe.
Arab-Israeli negotiations remain stymied on the
issue of direct talks between the belligerents, and
recently increased terrorism may well lead to further
Israeli retaliation against Jordan.
In Iraq, student demonstrations at the University
of Baghdad broke out again, reportedly causing some
deaths. General discontent has been growing in the
country since the Arab-Israeli war because of the gov-
ernment's attitudes. The prime minister tried to
placate the students by announcing that some of their
demands had been met and others were being studied;
no students were under detention.
A coup rumor in Ceylon, which was started by
the opposition party, set off a chain of events that
have seriously strained the never-ideal relations be-
tween Prime Minister Senanayake and his invaluable as-
sociate, Minister of State Javewardene.
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
,0Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
A-mm
-TM-4422_
MAKARIOS SEEMS TO MODERATE STANCE ON CYPRUS DISPUTE
President Makarios' sudden
decision to stand for re-election
next month brought with it a
departure from his public stance
on the Cyprus problem. In addi-
tion to seeking a new mandate
from the Greek Cypriot commu-
nity, the President seemed to
be advising them that enosis--
union with Greece--is unreal-
istic at present, although still
a desirable objective.
In apparently conciliatory
gestures toward the Turkish
minority on the island, he re-
ferred for the first time to
the "Turkish community" rather
than to the "Cypriot minority"
and spoke of new guarantees for
it. He also seemed to be open-
ing the door for possible direct
talks between the leaders of
the island's two ethnic commu-
nities.
Reaction from Ankara and
the Turkish Cypriots so far has
been mild. Both express some
concern over the question of
elections, but neither presum-
ably will object strongly if
voting is administered under the
present constitution which pre-
scribes separate communal elec-
tions. This appears to be Ma-
karios' intention.
Although his action can be
interpreted as a step toward
eventual resolution of the prob-
lem, Makarios' motives are un-
clear. Aware that the UN, the
US, and others are considering
new initiatives, he probably
is trying to strengthen his
role in any settlement.
Meanwhile, the withdrawal
of the Greek "illegal" troops
has continued. Another 2,200
troops departed on 16 January,
bringing the total withdrawn
to about 7,000--still consider-
ably below the 12,000 that
Ankara insists were on the
island.
(b)(3)
Page 16
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
iftepr
GREEK REGIME TROUBLED BY DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PROBLEMS
Premier Papadopoulos appears
to be under increasing pressure
from junta extremists because of
his "conciliatory" attitude to-
ward King Constantine and what
some of them see as his "fawning"
for Western support. Papadopou-
los views the intrajunta strug-
gle with concern, but is confi-
dent that he can put down the
younger officers either by mak-
ing those who want to stay in
their ministerial posts resign
their commissions, or by return-
ing them to powerless positions
in the military.
King Constantine 's abortive
countercoup last December and
his subsequent departure from
Greece are still troubling the
junta's already cool relations
with the country's allies. The
King's absence complicates rec-
ognition of a government whose
head of state is in exile. The
junta is obviously sensitive to
this situation, but so far has
avoided a diplomatic confronta-
tion over the question. Some re-
ports, however, state that
Papadopoulos may be forced to
adopt a more "independent" stance
if relations with Greece's
friends are not formalized soon.
Most of the criticism appears
to be focused on the US.
King Constantine's future
still is very much in doubt. The
junta apparently wants him to
stay in exile at least until af-
ter the planned referendum on the
new constitution. Regime spokes-
men indicate that the referendum
will be held by 15 September 1968.
No definite date has been an-
nounced yet for possible general
elections.
The draft constitution as
it now stands shows little basic
change from the 1952 version,
which was suspended after the
coup in April 1967. The King's
power is downgraded somewhat, a
new constitutional court has
been proposed, and freedom of the
press, assembly, association, and
other civil rights are more
strictly defined. The power of
the executive was not strength-
ened to the degree expected by
some observers. Members of the
government presently are comment-
ing on the draft.
Andreas Papandreou, the re-
gime's most prominent detainee
before his release on Christmas
eve, is now in Europe. The junta
did not oppose his departure
from Greece, probably hoping to
undercut foreign criticism of
his detention.
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
�LTL�444.1:/
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
%IF
f
NAVAL DEPLOYMENT
t
0 0
Craft
Craft
-
Naval base
Naval facility
Inventory
Israeli
Arab
Area occupied by Israel
6 Destroyers
13 Submarines
5 Patrol Escorts
8 Guided Missile Patrol Boats
12 Past Guided Missile Patrol Boats
22-27 Torpedo Patrol Boats
5 Fast Patrol Boats
12 Submarine. Chasers
6 Fleet Minesweepers
2 Medium. Minesweepers
5 Auxiliaries
10 Service Craft
7 Utility Landing Craft
UNITED
50
immiiimposomommim
Nautical Miles
CAIRO
Said,
CYPRUS
15 Torpedo Patrol
6 Guided Missile Patrol Boats
2 Submarine Chasers
2 Small Patrol Craft
2 Fleet Minesweepers
1 Destroyer
5 Submarines
1 Patrol Escort
1 Submarine Chaser
6 Torpedo Patrol Boats
2 Mechanized Landing Craft
6 Utility Landing Craft
1 Utility Boat
Elicit position
,21 October 1967 /Gaza
4; -1
1.1&
V/GAZA STRIP
At Mina at Bayda
Latakia
LEBANON
{1./BEiRUT
�DAMASCUS
r
7"- - -
Haifa
r \
=TLJ
t
t Tel Aviv-
t Yafo
As 'clod A"'�-� Jerusalem
Al Qantara
Th 1 Icy
\fA�Ve
Adabiya Port Taufiq
Al Arish
ISRAEL 1
Tor edo Patrol Boats
echanizedLanslg 'CDR
Hurghada
Ellat
SYRIA
*AMMAN
JORDAN
Aqaba
SAUDI ARABIA
-
Sharm ash-Sliaykh
ATV ,SEA
IRAQ
12 Torpedo Patr_ol Bpats
3 Submarine Chasers
�4� River Gunboats
7 Service Craft
(b)(3)
69322 1-68 CIA
-Sreft-E-T_
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 003172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Nair/
"s'refkLya.:
ISRAEL TO REVAMP ITS NAVY
Israeli defense officials
are rethinking Israel's naval
strategy in the light of the
longer coastline seized in the
June war and the sinking of the
destroyer Eilat. Israel's pres-
ent inventory of ships is poorly
suited to patrol the areas now
requiring defense against Arab
infiltrators and to counter the
threat of coast bombardment.
The sinking of the Eilat,
the fleet flagship, by Egyptian
Komar-class guided missile patrol
boats demonstrated the Israeli
Navy's inappropriate equipment
and inferior capabilities.
Israel already has received
one of the six or seven patrol
boats being built in France.
These boats are being armed with
the Israeli-developed Gabriel
surface-to-surface missile hav-
ing a range of up to 20 kilo-
meters.
rhey are about 150 feet
long, have a cruising range of
1,300 kilometers, and a top
speed claimed to be 45 knots.
They carry a crew of 20. Addi-
tional armament includes two 21-
inch torpedo tubes and 40-mm.
antiaircraft guns.
The Israeli patrol boat does
not appear to be as formidable a
weapon system as the Soviet Komar-
Styx system. On the other hand,
the Israelis have demonstrated
that through training and tactics
they can obtain maximum effective-
ness from their equipment, and
this system will enhance their
capabilities.
By the spring of 1968, Is-
raeli naval strength will center
around two T-class submarines
recently acquired from the UK,
a nucleus of modern amphibious
landing craft, and the new mis-
sile-equipped patrol craft.
ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE CONTINUES
No progress has been made
in negotiating Arab-Israeli dif-
ferences, and exchanges of fire
continue along the Israeli-Jor-
danian border.
Arab leaders are
more deeply depressed
absence of "progress"
becoming
over the
in nego-
tiation of Arab-Israeli issues.
UN special representative Gun-
nar Jarring so far has listened
to each side state its maximum
positions, but has offered no
proposals of his own. This is
especially frustrating to the
Arabs, who continue to maintain
that direct talks are impossible
-greft_UT._
Page
19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
S
and hope to work through Jarring.
The Israelis, on the other hand,
contend that direct talks are
the key to peace.
The Arabs still assert that
Israel's withdrawal from the oc-
cupied territory is the essential
issue, but they now may be will-
ing to modify their insistence
that a complete withdrawal take
precedence over other questions.
The Jordanians may suggest to
Jarring that if the Israelis
would withdraw from the West
Bank, Jordan would agree to main-
tain the area as a demilitarized
zone until final agreements are
reached. Israel, however, almost
certainly would reject such a
proposal.
Meanwhile, exchanges of fire
continue between Israeli and Jor-
danian forces along the cease-fire
line. Eventually the Israelis
probably will feel compelled to
undertake reprisal raids. Each
side claims that the other began
any particular exchange, but the
Israelis may have initiated at
least some of the recent exchanges
in reprisal for the spate of ter-
rorist infiltrations into the
West Bank and Israel proper. In
an exchange on 8 January, the Is-
raelis demonstrated again that
they will escalate to the use of
aircraft when they cannot hit
their targets with artillery.
In addition, terrorists are
operating at a rate of more than
one strike per day. The terror-
ists' target area evidently now
includes southern Israel. Since
the new year began, there have
been a number of incidents south
of the Dead Sea--the most seri-
ous on 13 January when an oil
tank near the Israeli port of
Eilat was set afire.
On 15 January, the Israelis
brought the border situation to
the attention of the UN Security
Council. They are presumably
building a record to justify
counteraction.
7gErN44:1:
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
-STC-Rgi
IMPROVED PROSPECT FOR MODERATION IN CONGO (BRAllAVILLE)
Last week's cabinet shake-up
in Brazzaville was a significant
gain for relatively moderate Pres-
ident Massamba-Debat, who has
worked with growing force and
determination to keep the Congo
on a course acceptable to France,
the country's largest aid donor.
Massamba's accelerated drive
against extremism has been evi-
dent since last April, when he
publicly ridiculed demands for
nationalization of the economy.
He has since urged the people to
accept hard work and discipline
in place of the class struggle
demanded by the extremist press.
Last July, he was able to head
off a party congress he could
not control and also replaced the
extremist who headed the party's
youth organization.
The most important change
in the cabinet was the ouster of
Prime Minister Noumazalay, who
came to power in May 1966 during
a period of extremist ascendancy.
His departure and the assumption
of his functions by Massamba is
a blow to those elements of the
Congo's confused political struc-
ture that have clamored for in-
stant socialism. Another major
change was the replacement of
Agriculture Minister Da Costa
once thought to be a moderate
but recently reported to be a ma-
jor figure among the extremists.
The five new cabinet mem-
bers appear to be either per-
sonal supporters of Massamba and
his pro-French policies or tech-
nicians. Lt. Poignet, now in
charge of the Defense Minis-
try under Massamba's aegis, has
been rated as a capable officer
and a strong francophile. His
appointment could signal an en-
hanced status for the regular mil-
itary forces at the expense of
the heretofore favored paramili-
tary groups that are dominated
by the country's most extremist
elements.
The changes probably do not
portend an early moderation of
the radical regime's strident
anti-Americanism. The new in-
terior minister, Michel Bindi,
a relative of Massamba,
was personally re-
sponsible for a series of inci-
dents in 1965 that involved har-
assment of US officials and led
to the closure of the US Embassy.
In addition, there is no reason
to believe that the changes will
result in any early reduction of
the large Communist presence in
Brazzaville, although the influ-
ence of the Chinese, who had close
contacts with Noumazalay, may
decline somewhat.
The reaction of the extrem-
ists, who still predominate in
the political bureau of the
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
gitim
ANIFFINIC,
regime's single party, may take
any number of forms, including
direct attempts to oust Massamba.
Massamba took the initiative this
week, however, by publicly de-
nouncing radical youth elements
and "power hungry" administrators
and politicians who he said
wanted to overthrow his govern-
ment.
CONGO (KINSHASA) BREAKS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH RWANDA
The reasoning behind Kin-
shasa's decision last week to
break diplomatic relations with
Rwanda remains unclear. Mobutu
may have acted to rid himself
G
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
0 HILES 100
Er r
-9
69329 1-68
UGANDA
of responsibility for the Euro-
pean mercenaries who have been
in Rwanda since early November
and thus give Rwanda the free-
dom to repatriate them.
The first hints that Mobutu
was backing down from his demand
that the mercenaries be extra-
dited to the Congo were heard
in early January. There were
rumors
Mobutu was weary of the mercenary
problem and was anxious to find
a face-saving way out. These
rumors were confirmed when, on
9 January, Mobutu said to the US
ambassador that he was recommend-
ing to the head of the OAU spe-
cial subcommittee on mercenaries
that most of the mercenaries be
permitted to depart for Europe.
This conciliatory mood was
not reflected in the government's
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Nwor,' SEC-R-E.T_
public pronouncements, which sud-
denly became sharply condemnatory
of Rwanda. Mobutu, however, seems
more interested in disengaging
himself from the controversy be-
hind a screen of vituperation
than in actually punishing Rwanda.
For instance, he said that the
Congo refused to recognize Rwanda's
existence and that the mercen-
aries are no longer a Congolese
problem. This broad hint--which
Rwanda may eventually pick up--
suggests that if Rwanda acts
unilaterally to repatriate the
mercenaries, the Congo will not
interfere.
Good relations between the
Congo and Rwanda in the past have
been advantageous to both coun-
tries, but they can manage in-
dependently. Each country can
harass the other in minor ways
that could make life more diffi-
cult for those living in the
border area. The Congolese,
for example, could shut off the
electricity for the Rwandan
village of Cyangugu. In retal-
iation, Rwanda could deny the
Congolese town of Goma access
to potable water and electricity.
Additionally, there are many
Rwandan Tutsi exiles in refugee
camps on the Congolese side of
the border. If Congolese au-
thorities were to grant permis-
sion, these refugee groups could
cause some border scuffles,
although their military threat
to Rwanda is marginal.
POLITICAL UNREST RISING IN ZANZIBAR
The Zanzibar region of Tan-
zania faces economic stagnation
and unprecedented political un-
rest following four years of Com-
munist aid and economic advice.
If the situation continues to
deteriorate, the mainland Tan-
zanian Government may have to
intervene more strongly than it
has in the past.
The main causes of public
grievance are long queues at food
shops, rising prices despite gov-
ernment controls, and acute short-
ages of sugar, flour, meat, and
tea. Unrest has been further
stimulated in rural areas by
heavy-handed implementation of
land distribution, resettlement,
and forced-labor schemes.
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
e-Ruz
Zanzibaris increasingly
blame the island's president,
Abeid Karume, for the chaotic
state of retail trade and rising
unemployment. The state shops,
which replaced those confiscated
from Asian traders, offer no
credit and have not brought lower
prices as promised. The state
corporation that controls all
import trade has lost a million
dollars in the past three years
through corruption and gross mis-
management. Since 1 December
when Zanzibar reluctantly joined
the East African Community, dis-
agreement over import procedures
has kept the custom house closed,
with piles of goods awaiting
clearance.
The regime's efforts to
make scapegoats out of Asian
merchants and corrupt officials
are no longer effective, and
sub rosa criticism has taken an
increasingly political turn.
The ruling Revolutionary Coun-
cil (REVCO), which has never
sought a formal mandate, now
is facing demands for elections.
Karume has reacted to this
dissidence by tightening secu-
rity and railing about "plotters"
who are sabotaging the economy.
For the first time, his sus-
picions are clearly directed
against Africans rather than
Arabs and Asians on the island.
Although arbitrary arrests and
dismissals from government posts
have fanned rumors of a conspir-
acy to overthrow the regime, it
seems more probable that the cur-
rent chaos will produce either a
shift in the balance of power
within REVCO or direct interven-
tion by Tanzanian President
Nyerere.
Heretofore, army support and
Karume's popularity with the Af-
ricans have enabled him to bal-
ance the various factions within
REVCO. His grip is obviously
slipping, however, and last
month he had a falling out with
the army commander over a divi-
sion of the spoils. Although
virtually every REVCO member is
in the pay of one or more Commu-
nist countries, any internal
power shift would probably bene-
fit the Chinese. Over the past
year, their influence has con-
tinued to grow at the expense
of the East Germans and Soviets.
The mainland government has
been gradually asserting more
control over recalcitrant Zanzi-
bar's foreign relations and mil-
tary forces, but Nyerere always
has been reluctant to intervene
in the island's internal affairs.
He is becoming increasingly
critical of Karume's leadership,
however, and the island popula-
tion, in a marked reversal of
attitude toward the union, is
looking to Nyerere for a solu-
tion.
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Political campaigning is beginning to take
the spotlight in some of the seven Latin American
countries holding national elections this year.
In Panama's bitter presidential contest,
government-backed candidate David Samudio has
begun a mud-slinging propaganda campaign to por-
tray his opponent, Arnulfo Arias, as racist and
totalitarian. So far, Arias' statements have been
more moderate than Samudio's.
In Ecuador, the surprising reconciliation be-
tween ex-presidents Jose Maria Velasco and
Carlos Julio Arosemena has raised talk of an
anti-Velasco alliance behind conservative-backed
ex-president Camilo Ponce. Lack of strong politi-
cal organizations will tend to make the election
a personal confrontation between the country's
traditional strong men, Velasco and Ponce.
The legislative election campaign in El
Salvador officially opened amid a flurry of coali-
tion rumors.
Continuing diplomatic maneuvering in the
three-way race for secretary general of the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS) has not im-
proved the prospects for a solution of the im-
passe. The polemical speech of Panamanian candi-
date Ritter before the council on 8 January may
have undermined his chances and somewhat enhanced
those of the Venezuelan contender. Support for
the Ecuadorean, Gala Plaza, appears far short of
the needed majority.
Because of the nationalistic resentments
arising from the embittered campaign, it is ques-
tionable whether any of the three present contend-
ers could cultivate the strong support necessary
for effective leadership. Furthermore, the elec-
tion of yet another South American to the post
could create frustrations in Central America,
Panama, and Mexico that might a
within the OAS.
Page 25
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 003172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Am,
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA CONTINUES AT HIGH LEVEL
Despite the apparent fric-
tion between the two countries,
the USSR's military aid to Cuba
has continued at the increased
rate that began in the fall of
1966. The equipment has enabled
Cuba to modernize and expand its
military inventories as well as
to replace worn out and destroyed
materiel. It has not, however,
provided Cuba with an offensive
capability.
Two Soviet freighters, the
Khimik Zelinskij and the Fred-
erick Zhilio Kyuri, which re-
cently arrived in Cuba, appear
to be carrying military cargoes.
These would be the first in 1968
and would bring to 30 the number
of military deliveries since
September 1966.
This equipment is being de-
livered under an arms agreement
probably concluded in the spring
of 1966 that apparently covered
anticipated Cuban armed forces
needs into the late 1960s.
Just before the Cuban mis-
sile crisis of October, 1962,
massive shipments of Soviet mili-
tary equipment--some 250,000
tons aboard 125 ships--arrived
in Cuba. These deliveries in-
cluded the bomber aircraft and
offensive missiles that were re-
moved when Soviet forces with-
drew. They also included large
stocks of spare parts, mainte-
nance equipment, and ammunition
that were used to meet Cuban
needs up to late 1966. From
January 1963 through mid-Septem-
ber 1966 small amounts of addi-
tional military equipment were
delivered.
Since the departure of their
military forces from Cuba in 1963,
the Soviets have maintained an
estimated 2,000 military advisers,
technicians, and maintenance per-
sonnel in Cuba.
HAVANA CULTURAL CONGRESS CLOSES
The
Cuban hosts stage-man-
world, were entertained in the
aged
last
week's Cultural
Con-
best Cuban tradition and prob-
gress
in
Havana with the
smooth-
ably left the island with new
ness
of a well-tooled publicity
admiration for the achievements
machine.
The "intellectuals,"
of the Cuban revolution.
who gathered from around
the
/ Nr
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
(b
(b
T`
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
vmpl*
As expected, the delegates
adopted all Cuban-sponsored reso-
lutions. Some disagreement was
voiced by less militant delegates
on the applicability of "armed
struggle" to the liberation of
artistic and creative work in
the underdeveloped world. The
Cuban line prevailed, however,
and "an armed revolutionary proc-
ess which meets the exploiter's
violence with the revolutionary
action of the exploited" was en-
dorsed as the only method to
achieve true "national libera-
tion."
Ernesto "Che" Guevara was
cited as the personification of
revolutionary leadership in the
nonliberated nations." Intel-
lectuals were asked to turn down
invitations and scholarships of-
fered by "imperialist agencies."
Scientists were requested to ab-
stain from participation in re-
search aimed at "imperialist
genocide." All mass communica-
tions media were urged to con--
demn "US aggression" and to de-
nounce the US economic and cul-
tural blockade of Cuba.
Castro underscored the con-
ference resolutions during his
closing speech. He bitterly
compared the "Yankee imperial-
ist policy" with the "acts of
barbarity of the Nazis." He
expressed special annoyance
with the US economic denial pro-
gram, and said that the US is
"sabotaging" Cuban efforts to
make trade deals in Western
Europe. He also launched a
rather lengthy personal attack
on Secretary Rusk, calling him
an "imperialist gray eminence."
Responding to Bolivia's
well-publicized "offer" to ex-
change Regis Debray for Huber
Matos, a high-ranking Cuban
political prisoner, Castro said
that Debray, because of his
courage and spirit, would never
agree to such an exchange.
Castro's reluctance to accept
the "offer," however, may re-
sult from a personal belief that
Debray, by his conduct after
being captured, may have been
partly responsible for Guevara's
death and the guerrillas' an-
nihilation. Consequently, his
offer to trade 100 Cuban polit-
ical prisoners for Guevara's
corpse--which Bolivia has already
rejected--suggests that Castro
prefers to let Debray stay in
a Bolivian jail.
Finally, returning to his
theme of last summer, Castro made
some stinging remarks about Com-
munists who are lacking in revo-
lutionary vigor. He implied
that Marxism as a revolutionary
doctrine needs to be revamped
and "conduct itself like a revo-
lutionary force; not like a pseudo-
revolutionary church." Undoubt-
edly referring to the pro-Moscow
parties in Latin America, Castro
said that those not supporting
the doctrine of "armed struggle"
are in the "rear guard in the
struggle against imberialiqm."
(b)(3)
Page 28 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
No? yore
ECUADOREAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FINALLY IGNITES
The campaign for presiden-
tial elections on 2 June has been
thrown into turmoil by ex-presi-
dent Carlos Julio Arosemena's an-
nouncement that he supports the
man he ousted from the presidency
in 1961, Jose Maria Velasco.
Velasco, who completed only
one of his four previous presi-
dential terms, is generally con-
sidered a sure winner if he runs.
So far, however, he has stayed in
voluntary political exile in Ar-
gentina and insisted that he must
have commitments of support from
groups outside his own political
movement before announcing his
candidacy.
The new coalition will
greatly influence party conven-
tions to be held in the next few
weeks to choose presidential
candidates. Some observers be-
lieve that Velasco could be de-
feated only if liberal groups
were to support former president
Camilo Ponce, the candidate of
the Social Christian and Conserv-
ative parties. This will be
difficult to achieve, however.
The Ecuadorean military has
been wary of political activity
since the overthrow of the 1963-
1966 junta. It had seemed re-
signed to Velasco's return to
the presidency, but the deal
with Arosemena, who has cam-
paigned vindictively against
the armed forces since his
ouster by them in 1963, may
cause military leaders to recon-
sider. There is conjecture in
Guayaquil that the military
might stage a coup to retain
Interim President Otto Arose-
mena in office.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Page 29
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
%weiTLis
GUYANA-SURINAM BORDER TROUBLES FLARE UP
Provocative statements by
Surinam's Minister-President
Johan Pengel regarding his coun-
try's long-standing boundary
dispute with Guyana are increas-
ing tension between the two coun-
tries.
A 1916 agreement states that
the boundary should be the Cou-
rantyne River, but the river's
exact location was never estab-
lished in the jungle area south
of its confluence with the New
River.
The issue had been quies-
cent for some time but it flared
VENEZUELA
69334 1-68
Area claimed by
VENEZUELA
BRAZIL
Page 30
up again last month when the
Guyanese police removed from
"Guyanese territory" five Suri-
namers who were conducting hydro-
graphic studies of the disputed
New River. The ouster came shortly
after Pengel's recent diplomatic
visit to Caracas, which may have
looked to Guyana like a demonstra-
tion of support for Venezuela's
claims to a large part of Guy-
anese territory. Guyana may have
wanted to underscore its claims
of "established presence" in the
area, but probably had no inten-
tion of touching off another time-
consuming and politically sensi-
tive boundary problem.
isputes
� GEORGETOWN
GUYANA
'men
0 150
MIL ES
15"EfAZILE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
PARAMARIBO
SURINAM
FRENCH
GUIANA
Area claimed by
NETHERLANDS
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Niue'
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Ntme
Pengel's reaction was vigor-
ous. He stated that "the Dutch
will guarantee the integrity of
Surinam's territory, and, if
necessary, armed force will have
to be used." On 12 January, he
quietly sent a small group of
civilian workers back to the
disputed area. He also announced
that all Guyanese would have to
leave Surinam "within a period
to be set by the government,"
and that he would ask for volun-
teers with military training,
presumably to go to the disputed
area.
Publicly, the Guyanese have
responded with moderation, but
they have decided to increase
air surveillance over the area.
As soon as possible, they plan
to send in supplies and a platoon
of the Guyana Defense Force to
augment the detachment of 14
police and 24 soldiers already
there.
Two members of Surinam's
leftist revolutionary party ar-
rived in Georgetown to consult
with Guyana's pro-Communist
opposition leader Cheddi Jagan
on the border issue. Jagan
would probably like to exploit
the issue by suggesting that the
government is not acting strongly
enough to protect Guyana's in-
terests. He does not want to
antagonize Surinam's left, how-
ever, and therefore has fallen
in with Burnham's call for dip-
lomatic talks to resolve the
problem. The Surinam leftists
are hoping to involve the Tr-
Continental Conference organi-
zation in Cuba, and reportedly
have requested that it convene
a meeting of the political and
economic committee to discuss
the issue.
Despite their hard words,
the Surinamers have left room
for diplomatic maneuvering, and
no major military action is
likely. The Dutch blame Guyana
for the initial escalation but
want the dispute settled peace-
fully, preferably by direct nego-
tiations between Surinam and
Guyana. The Dutch forces in
Surinam have been instructed to
stay clear of the dispute and,
except for provoking a scuffle
at the border, little can be
done by the Surinamers. The
British officers who lead the
Guyanese are also unlikely to get
involved.
Page 31 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
RET
INCREASED VIOLENCE BREAKS OUT IN GUATEMALA
An outbreak of Communist
terrorism on 16 January has caused
the Guatemalan Government to de-
clare a 30-day "state of alarm."
The commander of the US mil-
itary group and the chief of the
navy section were killed and two
other members of the group were
wounded in one attack. Elsewhere
in the city, Communist terrorists
attacked the homes of two high-
ranking Guatemalan officers in
charge of the government's clan-
destine anti-Communist terrorist
squads, and a rightist politician,
Manuel Villacorta Vielmann.
The Communist Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR) have claimed respon-
sibility for the murder of the
two US officials and has said
that the shooting was to avenge
murders by clandestine right-wing
organizations. Their leaflet
reiterates the FAR propaganda
thesis that "Yankee imperialists"
are the real enemy and that the
US military are the intellectual
authors of the Guatemalan Govern-
ment's counterinsurgency effort.
Members of the military mission
as well as other US Embassy per-
sonnel have been threatened and
followed by Communist terrorists
in the past, and in February 1965
the chief of the US Army mission
was fired on.
Minister of Defense Colonel
Arriaga has personally taken over
the investigation of the attack
on US officers. Arriaga plans
to react forcibly and in kind to
the Communist terror.
Although security offi-
cials have voiced confidence in
their ability to maintain order,
there is a distinct danger that
the desire for vengeance on
both sides will result in in-
creased violence.
Page 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Nov' vgail
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633
Nuil�v
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03172633