LUNCHEON MEETING WITH MR. RESTON OF THE NEW YORK TIMES - DCI RESIDENCE - 26 SEPTEMBER 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 16102693
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: July 11, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2022
• Case Number: F-2015-01188
• Publication Date: September 26, 1963

Approved for Release: 2022/08/08 C06246227
26 September 1963 �44,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD -- distribution
SUBJECT: Luncheon meeting with Mr. Reston of the New York Times -
DCI residence - 26 September 1963
1. Discussed briefly our appraisal of Halberstam's objectivity,
as outlined in the attached. Reston realizes there is reason for some
prejudice on the part of Halberstam; stated that Halberstam and
Sheehan were obviously the best-established permanent correspondents
and therefore naturally the leaders in Saigon press corps. Furthermore,
he did not think his reporting was as slanted as some claim.
2. Discussed in some detail the attacks on CIA as evidenced
by the Ted Lewis article of September 19th and the Max Freedman
article-of September 23rd, and others. Reston felt the attacks were
obviously planted; was of the opinion they came from State, probably
a great deal of it from Harriman who is both emotional and talkative,
but did not feel there was much we could do about it; nor did he feel any
particular damage was done. He made the point that the American
public generally are against any kind of secrecy; that they look upon
CIA as an organization of intrigue and that the Washington press corps
feel the Kennedy administration operates on the basis of prejudices
and special interests rather than principles, and this lays them open
to suspicion of intrigue, hence CIA is an obvious victim. All in all )
Reston felt the situation not as bad as it has been in the past and
I shouldn't worry too much about it.
3. He said that stories of the Freedman type had not been planted
with the New York Times to his knowledge; however spokesmen
for the State Department had definitely confirmed the Halberstam
article that CIA supported Nhuts secret police that raided the
pagodas and this was done by the Department prior to the publishing
of the article. Reston was very surprised at the true facts relating
to this situation.
There was a brief discussion of why the feeling has suddenly
flared up. Reston recognized that certain elements in the government
had moved precipitously in late August and wondered whether CIA
had supported this move or been informed in advance. He recognized
that our reserved position and warning to go slow might cause pain
to some of those who wished to rush ahead.
There was no discussion of operational details, position of
individuals, coordination or lack of coordination, etc.
'
Approved for Release: 2022/08/08 C06246227
Approved for Release: 2022/08/08 C06246227
Richardson's impression is that large part, perhaps most
of U.S. civil mission personnel are strongly and emotionally against
Diem administration. Civilian personnel, including Richardson,
who believe we can still win this war despite adverse factors, are
in distinct minority. On the other hand, would be inclined to think
that most U.S. military leadership in Saigon and in countryside
definitely feel we can progress with war. There are, of course,
exceptions among the military.
Since 8 May and especially since 21 August, there has been
large increase in intensity of American emotional reaction to local
scene and in tendency to reach final and sweeping conclusion now.
U.S. press representatives resident here were bitterly
anti-administration. Halberstam dominates resident U.S. press
community. He made up his mind quite some time ago that war
could not be won with Diem, Diem had to go, and that any Ameri-
can who did not agree with Halberstam was either a fool or un-
witting traitor to his country. Halberstam and Sheehan live to-
gether, have identity of views and emotions, and fully exchange
their information and leads with each other. Impression is also
that Halberstam and Sheehan attempt to indoctrinate and dominate
incoming U.S. reporters. Situation is difficult enough to justify
adverse reporting and am not ascribing such reporting solely to
influence of one or two men. They merely constitute at least one
small part of problem.
In some ways we seem to have reached point in official
American community that, if you think we can win with present
government, you are simply not running in right direction with
the majority. There is continual leakage from official sources
to press, especially to Halberstam and to Sheehan. Realize pres-
sures may be so strong in U.S. and abroad that time for decision
making might be limited. However, if this is not compellingly the
case, continue to suggest that we attempt obtain time for further
development of situation here and for more deliberate process of
analysis and formulation of action recommendations.
Approved for Release: 2022/08/08 C06246227
Approved for Release: 2022/08/08 C06246227
4. With reference to a press representative, Reston thought
it was better to have someone who is fully familiar with the Agency
and who either had, or could inspire, the confidence of the Washington
press corps rather than bring in a stranger from the press corps who
would require years of indoctrination to really learn the agency. He
spoke most favorably of Burding and volunteered his name; I did not
raise it. He also spoke highly of Nils Lennartsen. He thought,
however, we should search in our own house.
Attachment
JAM/mfb
c61f:
Approved for Release: 2022/08/08 C06246227