COMPARISON OF IRAN TASK FORCE PAPER WITH STATE CABLE 1379 (TEHRAN TO SECRETARY OF STATE)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
15890146
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
March 9, 2023
Document Release Date:
April 5, 2021
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2014-00454
Publication Date:
May 16, 1961
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
COMPARISON OF IRAN TASK F[15890146].pdf | 70.81 KB |
Body:
Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 C06174921
� SECRET� �
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
SUBJECT
16 May 1961
: Comparison of Iran Task Force Paper with
State Cable 1379 (Tehran to Secretary of
State)
I
Noted by DOII
163/0
1. The following comments are based on the semi-final draft
of the Iran Task Force Paper. According to the CIA member the
final version is substantially the same.
2. Ambassador Wailes cautions that the US Government should
not support Amini personally nor identify with him to any greater
extent than with any other friendly Prime Minister. He points
out that the Shah remains the focal point of power in Iran and
that Amini's staying power is unknown. The Task Force paper
goes further. It recommends that we take vigorous action to
support Amini and to impress upon the Shah that his stake in
Amini's success is greater than our own. It urges that we not
be deterred from backing Amini by the fear that he will fail
and calls the new government the best instrument in sight for
promoting evolution in Iran. However, the paper does caution
that we should act discreetly to protect Amini against under-
cutting by the Shah and states the US must maintain same
freedam of action in the event that Amini fails.
3. The cable does not consider Amini as the last chance
for the Mosadegists and the paper agrees. The paper also
states, however, that Amini may be the last hope of averting
political chaos and possible loss of Iran to the West.
4. The cable states that we should be cautious about
giving the Shah desirable but unwelcome advice. The paper
urges that we encourage the Shah to move toward a more
constitutional role,which is clearly one of the cases where a
cautious and careful approach is desirable.
5. The cable states that the US should not urge the
devolution of local government powers to local elected
assemblies because elections cannot be expected for the
foreseeable future to produce responsible representatives.
The paper agrees.
SECRET
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111
6. The cable and the paper are substantially agreed that
the US political objectives should be political, social and
economic development which will promote a strong, stable
government with popular support and ability to resist subversion.
7. The cable recommends that the US not join CENTO but that
it inform the CENTO countries the US has plans for allocating
nuclear weapons outside the yeENTO area to support CENTO in
the event of hostilities with the USSR. The paper states
that it would be militarily desirable for the US to join CENTO
but agreed that the US should not do so for political reasons.
It recommends that the US make plans to dispose military forces
in support of Iran and inform the government of Iran of these
moves.
8. The cable recommends a reduction in Iranian armed
forces from about 200,000 men to perhaps 150,000 men with an
accompanying improvement in quality. The paper concludes
that even larger military forces would be militarily desirable
but recommends only the present force level be maintained.
9. The cable states that cash grants are the only way to
insure timely receipt of new aid. The paper emphasizes the
urgency of timely aid but does not specify a method of insuring it.
10. The cable states that forty million dollars will be
required by the plan organization to complete the second plan.
The paper believes that it may be as little as twenty-five
million dollarS
11. The paper discusses US assistance for the Iranian
Third Plan. This discussion appears to be consistent with
comments in the cablelwhich do not go into any detail.
(b)(3)
',curs MARENGO s'
-Nett
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