THE GUATEMALAN INSURGENCY: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 15773485
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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983

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Directorate of et
Intelligence NOFOR ONTRACT-
ORCON
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n �f-r,
The Guatemalan Insur enc
Near-Term Prospects
AN Intelligence Assessment
---StrefeL
ALA 83-10136
September 1983
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Directorate of cret
Intelligence NO -NOCONTRACT-
ORCON
The Guatemalan Insur enc
Near-Term Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared byt Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. Middle America�Caribbean
Division, ALA,
---Seent....
ALA 83-10136
September 1983
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 12 August 1983
was used in this report.
The Guatemalan Insui7encv:
Near-Term Prospects
Guatemala's radical left insurgents have been set back both politically and
militarily over the past year by the more effective military counterinsur-
gency tactics of the recently deposed government of President Efrain Rios
Montt. The trend of growing insurgent strength and activity that was
evident from 1979 to early 1982 has been reversed, and we believe the ex-
treme left will be contained and unable to improve its military position
substantially over the near term. The continued factional instability under
new head of state Mejia is likely to reduce armed forces effectiveness
temporarily but probably will not immediately jeopardize the counterinsur-
gency gains of the past year. Indeed, we expect Mejia for political and
morale reasons to step up operations against the guerrillas soon and to try
to score some quick successes.
Since March 1982 the armed forces have cut insurgent strength from over
3,000 to something between 2,000 and 2,500. They have forced the
insurgents into a reactive and defensive posture by expanding the deploy-
ment of small military units, forming large civilian self-defense forces, and
emphasizing psychological operations. The insurgents' urgent need to
regroup and the low level of activity they are currently capable of
supporting render them unable to take advantage of the recent coup and in-
stability within the armed forces enough to alter the existing balance of
power.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the insurgent threat can be eliminated
during the next year. We expect, in fact, a gradual increase in small-scale
guerrilla activity. The 2,000 to 2,500 armed combatants, while lacking the
resources or unity to launch a broad offensive, are capable of increased hit-
and-run ambushes, economic sabotage, and urban terrorism. In our
opinion, they will have some isolated successes in demoralizing the military
and undermining the legitimacy of the government by emphasizing such
operations.
We expect the insurgents to make some headway�against formidable
odds�toward their longer term goals of recruiting and training full-time
cadre and rebuilding support networks in local communities. They may
also make some progress�under pressure from Havana�toward improv-
ing unity among their various organizations. The existence of civilian
defense forces in over 800 villages, however, will make it more difficult for
the insurgents to recruit supporters, and longstanding leadership animos-
ities and ideological differences will continue to hinder efforts to unify.
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Therefore, we do not believe that the guerrillas can resume their dramatic
growth of the 1979-82 period or submerge their factional and personal
rivalries enough to establish an effective joint politicomilitary command.
The radical left probably will benefit from continued foreign support,
particularly from Cuba, and from the unsanctioned use of Mexican and
Belizean territory. The guerrillas' access to foreign territory�particularly
the Mexican border area�for the transit of arms and cadre, safehaven,
and recuperation may increase in importance as the Army exerts pressure
on their remaining strongholds in Guatemala.
We continue to believe that there are several contingencies from which the
weakened insurgency could benefit. These include potential changes in
nonmilitary and external variables such as the continued political instabil-
ity of the new Mejia government, a renewal of indiscriminate violence by
the Army or strong-arm squads, or an even deeper economic decline this
year than is expected. In the near term, however, we believe that only the
establishment of an extreme left government in El Salvador�which would
provide Guatemalan guerrillas with staging bases, arms, and other sup-
port�could provide a sufficient catalyst to shift the momentum in
Guatemala back to the guerrillas' favor.
For its part, the military may not be able to press fully its current
advantage against an already weakened insurgency. While the armed
forces under Mejia probably will sustain their counterinsurgency strategy
in the near term, in our opinion the military will not be able to augment its
programs significantly�particularly civic action�without substantial for-
eign economic and military assistance. The deteriorating economy will
impede expansion of civic action and development projects critical to
securing local support, as well as blunt prospects for acquiring necessary
military equipment. The nationalistic Mejia government is trying to
improve relations with the United States and wants to obtain US military
assistance, but it is unlikely to favor any aid offers that entail conditions�
such as those pertaining to human rights�that it perceives as infringe-
ments of its national sovereignty.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments iii
Introduction 1
* The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Strength 1
The Insurgent Buildup of 1979-82 1
Insurgent Reversals of 1982 2
Present Range of Guerrilla Activity 2
Dimensions of the Remaining Insurgent Threat 2
Manpower Problems and Combat Posture 2
Equipment Shortages 6
Foreign Support 6
Inability To Unify 8
Increasing Reliance on Foreign Territory 8
Insurgent Strategy 8
Military Tactics 9
Political Strategy 10
Prospects 11
Implications for the United States 11
Appendixes
A.
The Government's Counterinsurgency Strategy 15
B.
The Guatemalan Extreme Left 19
C.
Insurgent Use of Foreign Territory 23
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Major Areas of Guerrilla Activity
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)
Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA)
FAR/ORPA
All areas of guerrilla activity are not shown
Guerrilla control is confined to relatively
small areas and is not shown.
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The Guatemalan Insur
Near-Term Prospects
Introduction
On 23 March 1983, the recently deposed Guatemalan
Government of President Rios Montt announced an
"amnesty of reconciliation" and lifted a state of siege
imposed nine months earlier to underscore its pro-
nouncement that the insurgents had been defeated.
That declaration, despite the severe setbacks suffered
by the insurgents during 1982, was politically moti-
vated and obviously premature. The guerrillas remain
a potent�if presently disorganized�force dedicated
to continued combat. With assistance from their
foreign allies, the various radical left organizations
are regrouping and coordinating their plans for re-
gaining the political and military momentum they
sustained until 1982. Nonetheless, despite the contin-
ued instability under the new Mejia government, we
do not expect the major counterinsurgency gains of
the past year to be jeopardized in the near term.
This paper reviews the strengths and weaknesses of
the guerrillas after their repeated setbacks of the last
year. It analyzes the prospects for renewed growth in
the insurgent ranks and for improved unity among the
various guerrilla factions. The paper highlights the
potential for insurgent gains�both military and polit-
ical�over the next year in view of the revolutionaries'
near-term strategy and present capabilities. Finally,
the implications for the United States of the probable
course of the insurgency are considered.
The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Strength
The Insurgent Buildup of 1979-82
The 20-year-old Marxist insurgency in Guatemala
steadily intensified from 1979 to early 1982 as the
guerrillas increased their ranks of full-time combat-
ants from less than 1,000 to a peak of approximately
1
3,000.' Aided by the military's resort to indiscrimi-
nate repression during those years, and a rigid socio-
economic structure that essentially ignored the
country's large impoverished Indian population, the
insurgents were having increasing success recruiting
supporters. They also benefited from an increasing
commitment of financial and material assistance from
Cuba, which had been encouraged by the 1979 Sandi-
nista victory in Nicaragua and the gains of the
insurgents in El Salvador
The momentum of the guerrilla war was shifting, in
our opinion, to the insurgents' favor by early 1982.
the
insurgents had established control over large areas of
territory in the Western Highlands along the Mexican
border and had developed an extensive network of
permanent camps and supply routes. After years of
prodding by Havana, the four insurgent organizations
announced in Cuba in January 1982 that they had
formed a unity front to represent them. A steady
growth of guerrilla attacks culminated that same
month when a large insurgent force, supported by the
local villagers, virtually overran a small Army garri-
son. Symptomatic of the deteriorating situation at the
time, deaths related to political violence�including
government-guerrilla clashes as well as unofficial and
government death-squad activity�had increased
from about 80 in January 1979 to 538 in January
1982, according to US Embassy reports.
their number is now in the 2,000 to 2,500 range, a figure that
matches credibly with the type and territorial extent of their
operations. The lowering of our early 1982 insurgent strength
estimate of 3,000 mainly reflects guerrilla casualties and !1efections
over the last year
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Insurgent Reversals of 1982
The growing loss of legitimacy of the government
because of the violence and the fear among many
officers that the military was losing the war were
partly responsible for a coup led by junior officers in
March 1982, which installed President Rios Montt in
power. The armed forces cut insurgent strength to
something between 2,000 and 2,500 and forced the
insurgents into a reactive and defensive position by
shifting almost immediately to a more multifaceted
counterinsurgency program.2 The antiguerrilla cam-
paign incorporated both military operations and civic
action; its three major components were an expanded
deployment of small military units, the formation of
large civilian paramilitary forces, and heavy emphasis
on psychological operations.
In late 1982 the
guerrillas moved into tactical retreat after sustaining
serious losses to both their full-time cadre and part-
time militia. They were forced to flee from territory
that had formed their strongholds just one year
before. Abandoning many camps in the face of Army
operations, the guerrillas lost substantial amounts of
supplies and arms. Moreover, many villages that
previously were sympathetic to the insurgents and
supported them with supplies and safehaven`were co-
opted by the government through the civilian defense
program.
Present Range of Guerrilla Activity
In our judgment, the insurgents are less prepared now
for decisive confrontations with the military than they
were 18 months ago. The destruction of their support
networks and the capture of substantial amounts of
their equipment have worsened their supply and orga-
nizational problems, thus hindering their capability
for major military initiatives. During the first three
months of 1983, they were able to maintain only a
minimal level of military operations, while concentrat-
ing on regrouping and plotting strategy.
Fighting remains sporadic, and engagements general-
ly are of short duration. We know of no sizable
attacks involving more than 100 insurgents during
See appendix A for a detifled account of thrlovernment's
counterinsurgency strategy.
1983, nor any instance of prolonged heavy fighting.
Indeed, a coordinated offensive
carried out.
was never
Although fighting is still light and infrequent com-
pared with late 1981 and early 1982, as of April the
number of guerrilla attacks has begun to pick up,
generally involving well-planned ambushes of small
patrols and military convoys and resulting in substan-
tial Army casualties. Concurrently, economic sabo-
tage and urban terrorism have risen. There are indica-
tions that, for the first time, in one area two insurgent
groups are effectively combining forces and coordinat-
ing attacks. An attack in mid-May on a military zone
headquarters also suggests that the guerrillas may be
ready to step up the number and boldness of their
assaults.
Dimensions of the Remaining Insurgent Threat
Despite their setbacks, the insurgent factions have
assets that make it unlikely that they can be eliminat-
ed in the short term. These include a significant
number of well-trained cadre, committed and experi-
enced leaders, foreign allies, and access to safehaven
in bordering nations. Aided by very difficult Guate-
malan terrain, the guerrillas continue to wield control
over some remote areas, particularly along the Mexi-
can border. They also benefit from a deep distrust and
fear of the military still existing in some communities.
Manpower Problems and Combat Posture
insurgent
losses over the last year have been heavy.
2
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The Guatemalan Extreme Left a
The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union
(URNG)
The URNG, established in Havana in 1982, is the
official politicomilitary umbrella organization of the
four Guatemalan insurgent groups. Despite Cuban
pressure for unity, the URNG has failed to become a
joint command of all insurgent forces in Guatemala
and remains little more than a propaganda front.
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Leader: Ricardo Ramirez de Leon
Strength: 800 to 1,000
Largest of the insurgent groups, the EGP is a hard-
line Marxist-Leninist organization that began armed
activities in 1975. Under Ramirez, a veteran Cuban-
trained guerrilla leader, the EGP has kept the closest
relations with Cuba of all Guatemalan guerrilla
groups. Operating mainly in the predominately Indi-
an northwest Highlands Departments of Huehuete-
nango, El Quiche, and Alta Verapaz, the EGP has
recruited more Indians than the other guerrilla
groups.
Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms
(ORPA)
Leader: Rodrigo Asturias
Strength: 700 to 800
Although led by the Cuban-trained Marxist Asturias,
the fast-growing ORPA is less ideologically rigid
than either the EGP or FAR. Asturias also has been
the most resistant to Cuba's unification efforts and
rivals the EGP's Ramirez as Guatemala's supreme
insurgent commander. ORPA forces are concentrated
in the Departments of San Marcos, Solo/a, and
Chimaltenango on the southern slopes on the Western
Highlands.
See appendix B for a detailed discussion of the extreme left
groups
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)
Leader: Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia
Strength: 400
The oldest of the insurgent organizations, dating
from 1962, the FAR is a small but highly effective
guerrilla force. Soto is a Cuban-trained leader who
enjoys good relations with Havana. The FAR also
has resisted unification efforts in the past, but may
now be cooperating with the ORPA. The FAR oper-
(b)(1)
ales principally in the Department of Peten in north- (top)
ern Guatemala, but has recently also moved into the
Western Highlands. (b)(3)
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT D)
(Dissidents)
Leader: Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar
Strength: 200
A moribund offshoot of the Orthodox Communist
party, the PGT1D broke away in 1978 to join the
armed revolution. The PGT/D rarely has been en-
gaged in combat, although its leaders recently ap-
pealed to Havana and the other URNG members for
arms and financial assistance. if this is not forthcom-
ing, we judge that the PGTID may be absorbed either
by its parent Communist party or by one of the larger
insurgent groups.
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT 10)
(Orthodox Communist party)
Leader: Ricardo Rosales Roman
Strength: 300 to 400
A Moscow-line Communist party, the PGTIO has not
yet formally adopted the concept of armed revolution,
and, although invited to join the URNG, it is not a
member of the guerrilla alliance. Party leader Ro-
sales has long resisted engaging the party in military
operations,
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
3
(b)(3)
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A well-armed Guerrilla Army of the Poor unit in typical jungle
terrain of Guatemala's Northwest Highlands
nwe believe the military's estimate of over 400
guerrilla regulars killed during the last nine months of
1982 to be only slightly inflated. Moreover, we believe
combat losses during 1983 and defections during the
April-May amnesty period have further depleted in-
surgent ranks.
The guerrilla organizations are being weakened par-
ticularly by the loss�either through combat or defec-
tion�of substantial numbers of part-time militia and
support personnel. The military uses local civilian
defense forces, numbering close to 350,000 members
according to official Guatemalan military documents,
to patrol the immediate environs of their villages, thus
reducing the ability of insurgent sympathizers to
assist the guerrillas. Moreover, the increased military
presence in remote hamlets, decreased repression,
benefits from civic action programs and amnesty
periods all provide incentives for guerrilla supporters
who are not ideologically committed to change their
allegiance.
The guerrillas initially sought to counter the threat
posed by the civilian militias to their support base by
attempting to intimidate the peasants with direct
attacks. This, however, only served to strengthen the
rapport between the poorly armed civilian units and
the military. The guerrillas, with the exception of one
group, now are trying to avoid clashes with the
civilian patrols. Another insurgent reaction to growing
loss of local support is the evacuation of sympathizers,
at times entire villages, to remote areas. In many of
these cases, however, the insurgents have not been
able to provide food and health care for their support-
ers, according to US Embassy sources, and many of
these villagers have left the insurgent camps to seek
assistance from the military.
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A civilian defense unit drilling
with wooden rifles. Most of the
civilian patrols are ill equipped,
often with only a few shotgun,
and machetes as weapons.
A well-armed civilian defense
force patrolling an area of
heavy guerrilla activity in
Western Highlands. Most civil-
ian units are not so well
equipped.
Recruitment of new combatants probably will be
more difficult than in the past. The guerrillas still
meet indifference and even hostility in many commu-
nities even though they have been proselytizing in
some areas for 10 years or more. Two radical leaders
recently admitted that
there is no mass support for the insurgent organiza-
tions among workers, students, women, and farmers
in Guatemala. The existence of civilian defense forces
5
in over 800 villages makes it even more difficult for
the insurgents to approach potential recruits
(b)(3)
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Even so, the 2,000 to 2,500 full-time insurgent com-
batants remain a formidable force capable of destruc-
tive hit-and-run raids, economic sabotage, and urban
terrorism designed to demoralize the military and
undermine government legitimacy. During such ac-
tions they are occasionally augmented by part-time
militia members, although support from these irregu-
lar forces is more often confined to supplies, safe-
haven, and information on the military's operations.
We believe the current scale of activity and the
guerrillas' decision to retrench are consistent with the
firmly held view of their Cuban-trained insurgent
leaders that they are waging a "protracted popular
war." The long-term strategy underlying such a
war�and behind the ambush and sabotage guerrilla
tactics�is slowly to bleed the strength and will of the
government forces.
Eauinment Shortages
Army's equal in firepower and training. They carry
an assortment of modern arms including mortars,
grenade launchers, mines, machineguns, and assault
rifles, sometimes US-made M-16s. These weapons,
along with the additional benefits of terrain and
element of surprise, often give these elite guerrilla
units the upper hand in engagements of their choos-
ing
while some insurgent units are formidable, many
are experiencing shortages of ammunition, weapons,
food, medicines, and other supplies. Insurgent activity
last winter, according to a guerrilla press release, was
specifically designed to capture weapons, and action
plans over the coming months are predicated on
capturing additional weaponry. These shortages sug-
gest that external resupply is sporadic and internal
distribution uneven.
In addition, the military is having greater success
disrupting guerrilla internal support networks
Foreign Support
The guerrillas' most advanced weaponry is provided
by their foreign allies, particularly Cuba, Nicaragua,
and Vietnam. Their inventory consists of a variety of
US-made equipment, including some captured in
Vietnam by Communist forces.'
dozens of insurgent camps, safehouses, and sup-
ply caches have been uncovered. One recently discov-
ered cache, observed by the US defense attache, held
22 US-manufactured M-16 rifles along with enough
other weapons to arm 40 to 50 guerrillas.
The continuing success against
insurgent support networks reflects an improved intel-
ligence capability stemming from information provid-
ed by civil defense patrols, captured guerrillas, and
guerrilla defectors.
Still, the regular guerrilla combatants are well trained
and well equipped. Several Guatemalan Army officers
have noted that some insurgent units they face are the
"Seer.<
'Several US-made AR-15 and M-16 rifles captured by the Guate-
malan military have been traced to US equipment shipped to
Vietnam. The guerrillas also obtain some advanced weapons from
black market dealers and captured Guatemalan military material,
but we do not have information on the percentage obtained from
the various sources. The standard issue assault rifle of the Guate-
malan military, however, is the Israeli-made Galil; the AR-15s and
M-16s in the guerrilla inventory are clearly not captured in battle.
6
(b)(1
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1?),(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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The Cubans are also heavily involved in training
Guatemalan insurgents
at least 300 persons, representing
all of the extreme left groups, received military
training and political indoctrination in Cuba during
1982. Havana is pressuring the guerrillas for even
more trainees this year; the orthodox Communist
Party�which has not formally adopted the armed
struggle�in particular is being prodded to step up its
military training, and 18 members of a dissident
faction of the Party have already completed training
in Cuba this year
7
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Soviet Union, its allies, and other radical coun-
tries also assist the extreme left with arms, training,
and money.
' We do not consider the orthodox Guatemalan Communist Party
(PGT/O) to be an insurgent group since it has not adopted the
concept of armed revolution or actively participated in guerrilla
warfare. Nevertheless, the Party does engage in terrorist activi- (b)(1)
ties�bombings, kidnapings, and assassinations�as well as politica(b)(3)
and propaganda efforts to undermine the government. It also is
sending some of its members abroad for military training in
preparation for the possibility of a more active military role in the
future
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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The East Germans provide military and politi-
cal training as well as financial aid, particularly to the
Communist Party
Increasing Reliance on Foreign Territory
They also continue to
utilize long-established routes through Mexico, as
well as Belize and Honduras, for infiltrating arms,
supplies, and combatants returning from training into
Guatemala
Inability To Unify
The various guerrilla groups have not been able to
effect significant political or military cooperation at
either the tactical or national command levels, despite
heavy Cuban pressure to unify since at least 1979.6
Under Havana's tutelage, the four groups active in
the armed revolution finally did manage to form a
loose umbrella organization, the Guatemalan Nation-
al Revolutionary Union (URNG), in early 1982. Even
so, personal leadership animosities and factional rival-
ries persisted through 1982, and the unity organiza-
tion remained little more than a propaganda front.
Only in rare cases where groups of isolated insurgents
lost contact with their own organizational leadership
did the evidence suggest a willingness to take part in
joint military undertakings
The Rebel
Armed Forces (FAR) and Revolutionary Organization
of the People in Arms (ORPA), for example, have
combined forces in one area and are.carrying out joint
attacks. Nevertheless, there is still little indication
that the largest insurgent group, the Guerrilla Army
of the Poor (EGP), is cooperating with the others. Nor
do the insurgent groups seem to have progressed
toward a unified political-military command similar
to the Unified Revolutionary Directorate in El Salva-
dor.
See appendix B for details of the political dynamics of the four
guerrilla organizations, as well as the orthodox, Moscow-line
Communist Party, which has not formally joined the armed
struggle
The Honduran Army reported that it killed several
Guatemalan guerrillas this summer in a clash on
Honduran territory and removed a large group of
suspected guerrillas from a refugee camp near the
Guatemalan border.
Although the insurgents find ready safehaven in
Mexico, we have no reliable evidence that they main-
tain fixed bases on Mexican territory.' Nor is there
evidence that the Mexican Government provides ma-
terial support to the guerrillas or officially condones
their logistics-related activities there. Nevertheless,
the insurgents long have benefited from the historical-
ly low level of patrolling in isolated border areas by
the Mexican military and the use of a fairly extensive
political support network there, including their politi-
cal front headquarters in Mexico City
Insurgent Strategy
We believe that over the next year the significant
losses of the Guatemalan left�in both men and
material�will force insurgent leaders to focus more
For a more detailed discussion and evidence of the insurgent use of
foreign territory, see appendix C.
' The insurgents probably recognize that the establishment of
permanent bases in Mexico would spur a response from Mexico
City, probably in the form of a strengthened military presence in
the border area. Various reports already show a heightened Mexi-
can Government concern with border problems stemming from the
increased influx of refugees, insurgent activity, and incursions by
armed Guatemalan groups
Mexico is improving its monitoring of the border and is
preparing to increase patrolling in some areas. Although these
measures probably will not impede insurgent activity in Mexican
territory in the near term, the guerrillas eventually may find such
use more restricted
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---Stegets,
on political work and reorganization of their forces
than on military action. We see indications that,
caught off guard last year by the military's rapid shift
from indiscriminate violence and repression to a more
multifaceted counterinsurgency program, the guerril-
las are preparing to adjust their strategy accordingly.
The two guerrilla groups least damaged by last year's
counterinsurgency campaign, the Organization of the
People in Arms and the Rebel Armed Forces, are
reorganizing into larger units,
Both groups, but
particularly ORPA, have carried out several success-
ful ambushes in recent months against small Army
patrols
the government now is competing for the loyalty
of the peasantry, and they can no longer rely upon the
assistance nor even neutrality of the population in
many areas where they formerly operated freely.
Nevertheless, the Army also expects that guerrilla
leaders will, primarily for political reasons, gradually
increase military action in the near term as a neces-
sary step to improve their combatants' morale, to
enhance their recruitment prospects, and to reassert
their status as a serious challenger to governmental
authority.
Military Tactics
Insurgent military plans for the next several months,
include capturing needed arms and ammuni-
tion, increasing hit-and-run ambushes of military
patrols, expanding the war territorially, weakening
the economy by attacking public facilities and busi-
nesses, and stepping up urban terrorism. These ac-
tions are designed to stretch the Army's already thin
manpower and logistic capacity, to exact large num-
bers of government casualties while minimizing their
own, and to demoralize troops by demonstrating the
military's inability to respond quickly with reinforce-
ments. Over time, attacks on small patrols and patrol
bases, as well as stepped-up urban terrorism, probably
are intended to force the Army to abandon its aggres-
sive small-unit tactics in favor of moving troops back
into the larger garrisons and employing large-force
sweep operations. The guerrillas, in our opinion, will
continue avoiding conventional confrontations with
Army units that would further deplete their ranks.
9
As a result,
the military is using, at least temporarily, large-unit
sweep operations in the southwest where ORPA re-
mains entrenched. These minimize Army casualties
and succeed in destroying insurgent camps and dis-
rupting supply lines, but they are easily avoided by
the insurgents themselves.
The radicals have already begun terrorist activity in
the city of Guatemala
Urban bombings, killings, kid-
napings, and other violence maintain the insurgents'
high profile at minimal expense, damage the popula-
tion's faith in the ability of the government to provide
security, and dissuade foreign investors and tourists.
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During
May the radical left�most likely the orthodox Com-
munist party�took credit for the assassinations of
three businessmen.
Political Strategy
We believe the guerrillas' fundamental political strat-
egy is to increase their legitimacy and acceptability
among the populace while damaging those of the
military.
Their
ability to accomplish these goals will depend on the
degree of success they have in breaking down the
growing cooperation between the peasantry and the
government. These plans indicate insurgent leaders
recognize that, over the longer term, the Army's
psychological operations, civic action, and formation
of civilian defense forces threaten the guerrillas sur-
vival as much as their military losses
All of the insurgent organizations apparently view the
civilian defense forces as the greatest obstacle to their
recruitment and freedom to operate, and they are
reacting in various ways. For example, the Guerrilla
Army of the Poor �
has been hurt most by the loss of its
extensive civilian support networks�is continuing to
attack these ill-equipped civilian defense force patrols
and to kill patrol leaders to demonstrate that the
military cannot protect their villages. EGP propagan-
da documents found by the Army threaten villages
that form self-defense forces
they intend to target Army units stationed in
villages that also have civilian defense units to illus-
trate that the Army is their enemy, not the people,
and that the villagers cannot rely on military protec-
tion.
The guerrillas intend to supplement the psychological
impact of their military operations with more inten-
sive propaganda directed primarily at the military
rank and file, national police, and civilian defense
forces. the insurgents
believe that government soldiers have low morale and
are susceptible to dissension and defections. The
guerrillas also hope to portray themselves more effec-
tively as Guatemala's "true nationalists" by condemn-
ing the military and the private sector as US puppets
not concerned with the welfare of the people
We believe that the much-heralded "political open-
ing" initiated last March�which General Mejia vows
to sustain�also is viewed by insurgent leaders as a
long-term threat. The radical left hopes to discredit
the political liberalization, while at the same time
exploiting it by expanding ties to and control over
legitimate groups.
puern11a leaders probably also hope that
The ORPA and the FAR, on the other hand, had
traditionally relied upon small, well-trained units and
not developed grassroots support and irregular forces
in the style of the EGP. Now, with the civilian defense
forces in place, both guerrilla groups are trying to
form "local resistance groups,"
strikes and demonstrations provoke the government to
take repressive measures of the type that catalyzed
the rapid growth of insurgent ranks from 1979
through early 1982.
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ThtirgeL
Prospects
We see little chance that the government will be faced
with a serious threat of a radical left victory during
the next year. The guerrillas are likely to experience
greater difficulties in replacing manpower losses and
more obstacles to gaining domestic support than they
have in the past. Even if they obtain increased support
from foreign allies, the insurgents will be hard pressed
to retain their established territorial strongholds or to
sustain military operations over an extended period.
We believe that in the near term only a leftist
takeover in El Salvador�which would provide Guate-
malan guerrillas with munitions, staging areas, and
financial support�could provide a sufficient impetus
to shift the momentum in Guatemala back to the
guerrillas' favor.
Nevertheless, we believe the military is unlikely to
eradicate the insurgents during the next year. More-
over, progress against the insurgency probably will be
slow in the next several months as the guerrillas�
after several months of regrouping and planning
reemerge from their tactical retreat with better orga-
nization and an improved strategy to counter the
Army's initiatives. The Army's mobility and logistic
weaknesses�stemming from a lack of aircraft, the
large amount of territory it must cover, the insur-
gents' ability to find safehaven in neighboring coun-
tries, and continuing support for the guerrillas in some
communities militate against their rapid elimina-
tion.
Although we do not believe that in the near term the
insurgents can reverse the balance of power and the
momentum now favoring the government, we expect
them to be able gradually to increase the number and
impact of their attacks on Army units. With a
minimum of effort, they also can increase urban
terrorism, assassinations, and sabotage of economical-
ly important targets. The insurgents are unlikely,
however, to engage in prolonged confrontations with
the military or force the military to abandon its
successful small-unit orientation.
The insurgent groups may be able to offset their
manpower losses over the next year with new recruits
by exploiting the declining economy and rising unem-
ployment, the continuing fear of the military in some
11
communities, and the minimal government presence
in others. The widespread establishment of pro-
government civilian defense forces, however, coupled
with continuing guerrilla losses of men and equipment
in combat probably will preclude any dramatic
growth in numbers such as the insurgents enjoyed
from 1979 through early 1982.
Finally, under pressure from Havana, guerrilla
leaders are likely to attain some measure of unity, but
we expect that in the near term increased cooperation
will mainly benefit the insurgent propaganda effort.
While they may have some success in discrediting the
Guatemalan Government internationally, we believe
that factional rivalries and persistent personal animos-
ities among leaders probably will forestall successful
integration of the insurgent groups or the establish-
ment of an effective joint military command.
Implications for the United States
The United States has had little political and econom-
ic leverage on Guatemalan governments since 1977,
when military assistance was suspended because of
human rights considerations. We judge that US influ-
ence can be substantially increased only with a re-
sumption of such assistance. Guatemala's counterin-
surgency success of the past year was accomplished
without significant foreign support, however, and has
strengthened the nationalistic attitudes of the govern-
ment. An already extreme nationalist mentality has
been further reinforced by continuing international
censure in the face of what we believe has been the
government's earnest effort to improve human rights
conditions.
Guatemala's failure to take advantage of the United
States' offer last January of $6.4 million in sales of
military equipment�due more to the government's
nationalist posture than its foreign exchange short-
age underscores the difficulty of increasing ties to
the Guatemalan Government. Many officers view the
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Nonmilitary Factors Affecting the Insurgency
We believe a number of nonmilitary and external
factors will have an impact on the ultimate fate of the
Guatemalan insurgency. Over the next few months,
the political stability of the government, the level of
repression, economic conditions, and the situation in
El Salvador could affect the capabilities of the
contending forces. Collectively, the variables compli-
cate projecting future trends.
Government Stability
Factional rivalries in the military persist, jeopardiz-
ing the survival of the new Mejia government. Mejia
has promised to satisfy two of the military's goals�
holding early elections and obtaining US military
assistance�but both may be difficult to attain.
Moreover, while the new chief of state is acceptable to
most senior commanders as an interim leader, he
lacks a strong constituency in the armed forces: Thus,
we expect political instability to continue and Mejia
to avoid substantial policy changes that could foster
opposition to his government.
The ouster of Rios Montt and continued instability
under Mejia probably will be disruptive to military
discipline and temporarily reduce the armed forces
combat effectiveness. The government crisis, however,
probably will not immediately jeopardize recent
counterinsurgency innovations such as the civil de-
fense forces, psychological operations, and civic ac-
tion. These programs are increasingly being accepted
and employed by field commanders. Although the
insurgents are likely to increase armed attacks and
propaganda to exploit the unsettled political climate,
we do not believe the counterinsurgency effort will be
substantially affected in the near term. If anything,
we expect Mejia to step up military operations
against the insurgents soon to refocus the Army's
attention on its military mission and to unify the
armed forces by scoring some quick counterinsur-
gency successes.
Levels of Repression
New organizations representing peasants, Indians, or
workers are emerging, spurred by recent laws restor-
ing political activity and encouraging participation by
these previously excluded sectors. The new groups
will find it difficult, however, to emerge and prosper
in a setting where vested interests want to conserve
the status quo. Whether or not the newly mobilized
groups are actually influenced by the radical left,
they will be seen to be so by the ultrarightists in
Guatemalan society. The habitual response of this
element is assassination of political rivals. Renewed
indiscriminate violence would quickly take a toll on
government legitimacy and increase the pool of poten-
tial insurgent recruits.
Economic Conditions
An important factor in the government's counterin-
surgency success has been the gradually increasing
support from the civilian population, particularly
that of the Indians in the Western Highlands war
zone. Maintenance of that support, however, will be
contingent on effective military protection and follow-
through on promised developmental assistance and
social services. This may be difficult to accomplish
because worsening economic conditions have forced
the government to implement austerity measures.
Contraction of the economy this year will raise an
already high unemployment rate and jeopardize the
government's ability to direct more resources toward
the impoverished conflict zones. Cutbacks in these
programs and higher unemployment could spur popu-
lar disillusionment and add to the ranks of potential
insurgents.
Leftist Takeover in El Salvador
The course of the conflict in El Salvador is a critical
variable, which will affect the final outcome of the
Guatemalan insurgency. We believe a leftist govern-
ment in El Salvador would provide the Guatemalan
guerrillas with unimpeded use of Salvadoran territo-
ry for safehaven and for staging attacks. A radical
left Salvadoran government probably also would be a
new major source of arms and other supplies. Finally,
Cuba and Nicaragua�emboldened by a guerrilla
victory in El Salvador�probably would not hesitate
to expand their assistance to the radical left in
Guatemala.
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--SeeceL
The Army�which has many
Indians in its ranks�partici-
pates in indigenous festivities
and increasingly is trying to
identify with Indian cultural
traditions.
United States as an unreliable ally, and a "go it
alone" attitude is prevalent among them. Other offi-
cers, however, resent former President Rios Montt's
anti-US rhetoric and recognize the potential impor-
tance of the United States to their counterinsurgency
campaign as a supplier of both military equipment
and economic assistance. Mejia is trying to improve
relations with the United States by supporting US
policy in Central America, and he has already re-
quested�through informal channels thus far�a re-
sumption of US military assistance.
Insurgent gains, if any, over the next year will be
determined, however, as much by the government's
ability to maintain its multifaceted counterinsurgency
approach as by the left's own capabilities and strate-
gy. While we believe the military can sustain its
counterinsurgency programs at existing levels, the
Army may not be able to exploit fully its current
advantage. In our opinion the military will not be able
to upgrade its civilian defense force and civic action
programs substantially without significant foreign
economic and military assistance. The Army has been
able to arm only a few of the newly formed civilian
defense force units, while the civic action program is
constrained by a lack of materiel and the military's
limited air supply capability. The Mejia government
13
is searching for economic assistance, as well as pursu-
ing the purchase of helicopters, spare parts for its
aircraft, and rifles for the civilian paramilitary units.
It is unlikely, however, that the Guatemalan Govern-
ment will be amenable to aid offers from international
donors that entail conditions�such as those on
human rights�that it perceives as infringements on
its national sovereignty.
'Smr.eL,
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Appendix A
The Government's Counterinsurgency
Strategy
Since early 1982 the Guatemalan armed forces have
developed a multifaceted counterinsurgency cam-
paign incorporating both military operations and civic
action. The three major components of the strategy
are an expanded deployment of small military units,
the formation of large civilian paramilitary forces,
and heavy emphasis on psychological operations. Re-
pression is still used selectively, but is no longer a
standard counterinsurgency tactic.
Armed Forces
The military has focused on saturating insurgent-held
areas with government forces, both regular Army
units and paramilitary groups. An increase in man-
power by approximately 5,400 last summer raised the
Army's strength to about 24,000 and has enabled it to
expand its effective area of control.' The military also
redeployed large units from major city garrisons and
established five task forces in the midst of strongholds
held by the approximately 2,000 to 2,500 insurgents.
Concurrently, small Army detachments and patrol
bases�at company and platoon size�have been
placed in as many villages and isolated hamlets as
manpower and logistics permit.
The armed forces underwent a fundamental reorgani-
zation this spring that further broadened their pres-
ence nationwide. The number of military zones has
been dramatically increased from 9 to 22, each with a
minimum of one battalion, and all security forces,
including the civilian defense forces and national
police, are being placed under the direct control of the
zone commander. The changes are likely to improve
tactical command and control and reaction time, as
well as enhance the military's ability to direct civic
action projects and control political mobilization.
� This assessment is based on information reported by the US
Embassy and the in Guatemala over the last
year and a half. Specific sources are cited where appropriate.
� The 24,000 figure does not include the 9,000- to 10,000-man
National Police Force, 3,000-member Mobile Military Police
Force, and the 2,000 Treasury Policemen. These units also engage
in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations, such as bor-
der arms interdiction house-to-house searches, roadblocks, and
safehouse raids
This extensive dispersement of forces is designed to
overcome weaknesses in mobility stemming from the
lack of aircraft and the difficult and extensive terrain
to be covered (five times the area of El Salvador). It
permits aggressive patrolling in areas of insurgent
activity and reduces some logistic, communications,
and planning problems associated with large-force
sweep operations. The Army has largely abandoned
use of such sweeps, which forced the guerrillas to
vacate an area but only until the military operation
concluded. The Army now generally restricts sweeps
to guerrilla-entrenched areas where it needs to locate
and destroy insurgent camps before it can safely
establish small-unit patrol bases.
The military's expanded presence in remote areas also
has political and psychological benefits. In many cases
it represents for some villages the first show of
authority by the central government in months, if not
years. It serves to deny insurgent control over an area
by default. In many instances the insurgents have
assassinated local officials�mayors, military com-
missioners, and national police�to demonstrate their
de facto control of the area. Thus, the presence of
troops, particularly as they become involved in pro-
grams bringing social services to the area, helps to
restore legitimacy to the government.
Civilian Defense Forces
The organization of local civilian defense forces has
been perhaps the single most important counterinsur-
gency development. These militias, now numbering
350,000 participants nationwide, patrol the immedi-
ate environs of their villages and provide a standoff
capability or warning function against insurgent at-
tacks. Although these forces are generally poorly
equipped, their presence frees the Army from the
need for static defense, permitting it to seek contact
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with insurgents in more rugged terrain. The civil
defense forces also provide intelligence on guerrilla
movements and on the locations of insurgent arms and
supply caches.
The formation of civilian defense forces in over 800
villages is hindering the insurgents' ability to develop
local support. Members of these forces are being
employed in various projects to improve living stand-
ards in their villages. These tangible benefits, however
minimal, provide incentive for nonideologically com-
mitted insurgent supporters to change their alle-
giance. Moreover, the insurgent tactic of attacking
these forces to discourage their cooperation with the
government has, in fact, placed the civilian defense
units in an adversary relationship with the guerrillas
and has helped to cement their bonds with the Army.
Civic Action and Psychological Operations
The third major component of the military's strategy
is an increased emphasis on Army involvement in
civic action programs. The high visibility of military
personnel in providing food and health care and in
restoring roads, homes, and schools is enabling the
Army gradually to change its image and garner local
support. The Army helps refugees to return to their
villages and uses local radio to urge the return of
others who fled fearing government repression or who
were forcibly evacuated by the guerrillas
Although a number of villagers have benefited mate-
rially from government civic action, the programs
thus far probably have had as much of a psychological
impact as a tangible one. The growing perception that
the Army is willing to protect and assist the populace,
even in areas where it cannot yet do so, makes the
local inhabitants more amenable to cooperating with
the military. Nevertheless, expansion of civic action
projects is severely constrained by Guatemala's dete-
riorating economy and the military's logistic prob-
lems. Moreover, the success of the program in increas-
ing local support for the government has depended
largely on the widely varying skill and commitment of
individual area commanders.
Effective psychological tactics being employed by the
Army include two amnesties for the guerrillas, the
first in June 1982 and the second from 23 March
through the end of May 1983. The second, called the
--Seecet,_
amnesty of reconciliation, was particularly effective,
coming after nine months of heavy insurgent losses
and the reported demoralization of many guerrilla
regulars. Guatemalan Defense Minister Mejia an-
nounced that 1,410 people had taken advantage of the
amnesty with some 626 of them turning in weapons.
Some officers reportedly follow a policy of amnesty
for guerrillas at any time and use local inhabitants to
ensure that this policy is common knowledge in their
region.
The Army also returns former insurgent supporters,
and even some captured cadre, to their home villages
to show potential guerrilla defectors that they will not
be killed if they turn themselves in. Although the
government figures cited above probably include civil-
ians who merely sympathized with the guerrillas, the
military has successfully used some defectors for
propaganda purposes by holding highly publicized
"change of loyalty" celebrations welcoming them
back to the community. There have been a few
instances of returning insurgent defectors being
abused by local inhabitants who have suffered from
guerrilla attacks, but the wider military presence
should help curb such incidents.
The Army is effectively countering the insurgents'
domestic propaganda effort and proselytizing among
Guatemala's Indians. The military has many Indians
in its enlisted ranks and is trying to identify with
Indian cultural traditions by taking part in local
indigenous festivities and by stressing the Indians'
important role in Guatemalan society. The military
also is emphasizing nationalism, while portraying
guerrillas as dupes of a Communist ideology imported
from abroad. Nationalist themes are apparently well
received by the peasantry, and they contrast sharply
with the insurgents' negative focus on class dispari-
ties, ethnic and racial discrimination, and violence.
Officers at the local level are being instructed to
employ nationalist themes with civilians.
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Repression
The military has not totally forsworn repression as a
counterinsurgency tool. Although it is virtually impos-
sible to sort out reports of human rights violations, we
believe that the Army in the past used extreme force
and brutality in selected areas where insurgent control
and support for the guerrillas from the population did
not initially permit the military to establish a presence
and institute its new programs. This tactic, apparently
utilized mostly along the Mexican border, has de-
clined since last summer. Many peasants apparently
recognized that the guerrillas could not protect them
and that they had the choice of accepting the govern-
ment's amnesty and benefits from civic action pro-
grams or remaining in the armed opposition
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Appendix B
The Guatemalan Extreme Left
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG)
The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union
(URNG) was established in January 1982 in Havana
as the official politicomilitary umbrella organization
of the Guatemalan insurgent groups. Designed to
emulate the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the URNG has failed
to establish joint control over all insurgent forces in
Guatemala
It remains
little more than a propaganda front, and decisions on
military actions remain in the domain of the individ-
ual leaders
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
It also was decided to invite the
Moscow-line orthodox Communist Party (PGT/O) to
join the alliance. Although two of the groups have
been coordinating their military attacks to a greater
degree since the meetings, there has been no apparent
movement toward the establishment of a joint politi-
cal-military revolutionary command.
Active Insurgent Groups
The Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), headed by
Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, is the largest insurgent
group in the URNG with approximately 800 to 1,000
full-time combatants and a significant number of
sympathizers in its territorial strongholds. Ramirez,
an ex-member of both the Guatemalan Communist
Party (PGT/O) and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR),
is a veteran guerrilla leader and a hardline Marxist-
Leninist. He was trained in Cuba in the early 1960s
and subsequently spent several years there
19
The EGP split from the FAR during the early 1970s
and began military activity of its own in 1975 after
several years of building its support among the peas-
antry and establishing local irregular forces in sympa-
thetic villages. More than the other guerrilla groups,
the EGP actively recruits among Guatemala's large
population of impoverished Indians; probably more
than half of its regulars are Indians. EGP activity is
centered in the largely Indian Northwestern High-
lands, particularly in the Departments of Huehueten-
ango and El Quiche, which border Mexico.
In early 1982, the EGP virtually overran a small
military garrison�the first such success of any of the
insurgent groups�and
was in de facto control of much of remote Huehuete-
nango Department. In response, the Rios Montt gov-
ernment concentrated its heaviest counterinsurgency
effort against EGP strongholds during the remainder
of 1982. The Army's aggressive tactics and the estab-
lishment of the civilian defense forces,
has severely disrupt-
ed the EGP's base of support and ability to rely upon
the population for supplies and safehaven. EGP forces
are now disorganized, although they have carried out
several attacks on the ill-equipped civilian defense
forces in recent months
The Revolutionary Organization of the People in
Arms (ORPA), led by Rodrigo Asturias, is the second-
largest guerrilla group with an estimated 700 to 800
combatants. Asturias, also an ex-member of the
Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT/O), has been
involved in insurgent activity in Guatemala since the
early 1960s,
A Cuban-trained Marxist-Leninist himself, he
"t�far.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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leads an organization that is less ideologically rigid
than either the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) or
the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR).
he ORPA leader-
ship split from the FAR in 1971 but did not initiate
military attacks until 1979. While its ranks have
grown rapidly, ORPA does not emphasize building
extensive local support networks or creating a part-
time militia like the EGP. Rather, it has concentrated
on training and equipping cadre, and, according to a
US Embassy source, is anxious to step up the pace of
military action against government forces. The ORPA
forces are concentrated on the southern slopes of the
Western Highlands, with its headquarters and strong-
hold in San Marcos Department on the Mexican
border.
the ORPA has carried out the most damaging attacks
against Army units so far this year. The organization
has traditionally been the most resistant URNG
member to efforts at unification. Asturias, who would
like to be the unquestioned leader of the Guatemalan
revolution, now may be more willing to cooperate
increasingly with the smaller Rebel Armed Forces. By
doing so, he may feel that his organization can
supplant the EGP, which has been weakened the most
by the military, as the preeminent insurgent
organization.
The Rebel Armed Forces(FAR), headed by Jorge
Ismael Soto Garcia, is a small, but highly trained and
effective combat force of approximately 400. Soto, an
inflexible Marxist-Leninist, has led the FAR since the
late 1960s. He is Cuban trained and enjoys good
relations with Havana. A strong advocate of military
action, Soto may be the only insurgent leader who
permanently remains in Guatemala to lead his com-
batants.
The FAR is the oldest insurgent group, dating from
1962 when it initiated the armed struggle with an
alliance of dissident military officers and Communist
Party (PGT/O) members. It was the major guerrilla
organization involved in the heavy fighting of the late
1960s but was decimated by the counterinsurgency
campaign of that period. The FAR reemerged in 1977
and now operates principally in the remote expansive
Peten Department in northern Guatemala. Although
it focuses more on military strikes than building
popular support, the minimal official government
presence in much of the Peten has enabled the FAR
to develop an excellent intelligence and supply net-
work in the area
The FAR has suffered less than the EGP from the
Army's offensive. The government has not yet focused
its counterinsurgency campaign against it, because
FAR activities take place in a sparsely populated and
economically unimportant area. Partly for this reason,
the FAR has undertaken some successful ambushes of
small military patrols this year. FAR leaders histori-
cally have resisted unification efforts but, in one area,
are coordinating military actions now with the
ORPA. In the past, the FAR feared domination of the
guerrilla movement by the EGP and does not have
good relations with it.
The Guatemalan Communist Party/Dissident
Faction (PGT/D), led by veteran Communist Jose
Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, is the newest insurgent
group and smallest member of the URNG. Cardoza
broke away from the orthodox party (PGT/O) in 1978
to form the dissident wing when the party refused to
adopt armed revolution. He has unsuccessfully at-
tempted to provide leadership for the faction from
Mexico City, however,
the membership has
dwindled to fewer than 200. The PGT/D probably
can rely upon far fewer than that for military action,
however, and has rarely engaged security forces in
fighting
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We believe the PGT/D's precarious
organizational status may force it to reunify with its
mother organization or be absorbed by one or another
of the other guerrilla groups.
The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT/O)
The party, led by Ricardo Rosales Roman, is an
orthodox Moscow-line Communist party that has not
yet openly adopted the armed revolution as a means to
obtain power and is not a member of the insurgent
alliance (URNG). Although the PGT/O may have up
to 1,000 supporters, it probably has at most 300 to
400 active members, mostly in the unionized labor
sector.
The insurgent groups have invited the PGT/O to join
the URNG, apparently believing that party leaders
have organizational skills and ties to legitimate politi-
cal and labor organizations in Guatemala that they
need. Rosales Roman may accept in the belief that he
can gain considerable political influence in an insur-
gent alliance weakened by the military's continuing
counterinsurgency successes. The PGT/O's assassina-
tion of three businessmen in early summer may signal
its readiness to take up arms. Nevertheless, Rosales
Roman long has opposed military action and probably
views the severe guerrilla losses of the past year as
vindication of his course, which emphasizes thorough
political indoctrination of workers, students, and peas-
ants in preparation for a popular uprising. In either
case, the incorporation of the PGT/O into the insur-
gent umbrella organization, in our opinion, would not
add significantly to the insurgents' military capabili-
ties or level of activity
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Appendix C
Insurgent Use of Foreign Territory
Access to foreign territory is essential to the guerrillas
for safehaven, arms infiltration, resupply, and head-
quarters for their international propaganda efforts.
We believe that the poorly patrolled border areas of
Mexico, Belize, and Honduras are increasingly being
utilized by the insurgents, particularly for sanctuary.
Mexico
The three largest insurgent groups have their own
logistic networks in Mexico, and the Guatemalan
Communist Party,
has also establishe
tus this year.
Although we know of no permanent guerrilla military
bases in Mexican territory
guerrillas cross the border for rest and recuperation.
They are
probably also using some remote areas as temporary
staging areas. A source that US Embassy officials in
Guatemala consider objective and reliable reported
that villagers in one border area said guerrilla units
routinely make incursions from Mexico and raid their
villages and farms for food and supplies
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
We believe that the guerrillas also utilize
the refugee camps for propaganda purposes by pass-
ing stories of Guatemalan Army human rights viola-
tions to camp visitors.'�
Mexico City also serves as headquarters for three
insurgent political front groups, which solicit political
and financial support from international donors and
issue propaganda against the Guatemalan Govern-
ment. The guerrilla fronts are led by well-known
political exiles associated with moderately leftist, but
democratic, groups who lend the insurgents legitima-
cy. Most deny any direct connection to the insurgents,
and none of the front groups can speak for or take
action on behalf of all the insurgent organizations.
The Guatemalan Commission on Human Rights, for
example, which reportly is controlled by the Revolu-
tionary Organization of People in Arms, played an
active role in the so-called People's Tribunal held in
This is not to say that all accusations of Army abuses by the
refugees are unfounded. We believe that, in the past, extreme
repression was the norm in some areas and that isolated cases of
human rights abuses still occur (see appendix B). Nor do we wish to
imply that the refugee camps are utilized as insurgent bases
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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Spain this year, which condemned the Guatemalan
Government's human rights record. A second group,
the Guatemalan Patriotic Unity Committee (CGUP),
was set up by
the Guatemalan insurgent umbrella organization
(URNG) to act as its broad political front, although
its success in that role thus far has been minimal.
Belize
Belizean territory also is utilized for insurgent safe-
haven and the infiltration of supplies.
uba ships military equip-
ment to southern Belize where Guatemalan insurgents
take delivery.
Honduras
Honduran territory is used by the insurgents
for the transit of arms and
supplies from Nicaragua. The border area also may
be utilized,
for safehaven and as a staging area for
attacks against Guatemalan targets. The Honduran
military reported that it killed several Guatemalan
guerrillas this summer and captured others in two
firefights.
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