CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 15730603
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2022
• Case Number: F-2019-01230
• Publication Date: June 19, 1954

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19 June 1954
Copy No.
80
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
11 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:: eh/ea_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
.L J.
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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1. Cambodia plans appeal to UN (page 3).
2. Burma willing to serve on Indochina armistice commission (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
3. Khrushchev possibly identified with hard foreign policy line (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Developing threats to Hanoi and Haiphong reported (page 5).
5. French officers doubt Haiphong beachhead could be held (page 5).
6. President Sukarno cites Communist support on Dutch New Guinea
problem (page 7).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Johnston sees Arabs more co-operative on Jordan River develop-
ment plan (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
8. Anti-Communist forces reported invading Guatemala (page 8).
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GENERAL
1. Cambodia plans appeal to UN:
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The acting foreign minister of Cambodia
told the American charg�n Phnom Penh
on 17 June that his government considered
the Geneva conference "dead;' and will
iddress an appeal to the Security Council. The appeal will denounce
Viet Minh aggression and request that a peace observation commission
be sent to Cambodia.
Comment: The Cambodian government was
on the point of appealing to the UN following the Viet Minh incursion
into northeastern Cambodia last April, but deferred this appeal pend-
ing the outcome of the Geneva conference. The king is known to be
planning an ambitious publicity program for directing world attention
and sympathy to Cambodia's problem. He plans to visit numerous
Western and neutral nations, where he has a good chance of gaining
support.
2. Burma willing to serve on Indochina armistice commission:
Premier .Nu has informed Foreign Secretary
Eden that Burma would agree to serve on an
Indochina armistice commission comprised
of the Colombo powers if requested to do so
by the Geneva powers and if the terms of reference were satisfactory,
according to the British ambassador in Rangoon.
The ambassador says Acting Foreign Minister
Kyaw Nyein also indicated his government's willingness to join a com-
mission composed of three Colombo powers and one European and one
Communist government, provided the same conditions were met. Nyein
further implied that Burma favors separating the problem of Laos and
Cambodia from that of Vietnam.
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Comment: Burma in the past has con-
sistently avoided becoming involved in conflicts of interest between
the two "power blocs." Its present willingness to do so indicates the
serious concern with which it views the deteriorating Western posi-
tion in Indochina.
SOVIET UNION
3. Khrushchev possibly identified with hard foreign policy line:
The text of an apparently extemporaneous
speech given by party secretary Khrush-
chev at a 15 June mass rally in Prague
was substantially altered before being
rebroadcast by the Czech home service.
As originally delivered and broadcast,
the portion of the speech devoted to
foreign affairs was reminiscent more of the strident notes of Stalin-
ist propaganda than of most current Soviet pronouncements. The
revised version was substantially calmer in tone, and the inflam-
matory passages were rewritten or omitted entirely.
This harsh line; which Khrushchev has
now twice taken when apparently speaking extemporaneously, may
reflect his actual thinking. T:his would reinforce Ambassador Bohlen's
earlier speculation that Khrushchev appears to take a more radical
and extreme position on both international and domestic problems than
does Malenkov.
The changes in the speech, which certainly
would not have been made without specific orders from Moscow or
Khrushchev himself; suggest that, despite his earlier departure from
the official line, Khrushchev is either unwilling or unable to main-
tain this extreme position.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Developing threats to Hanoi and Haiphong reported:
The French anticipate attacks shortly on
the Hung Yen-Ke Sat route in the Tonkin
delta by three Viet Minh battalions, the
American army attach�n Saigon reports
(see map, p. 6). He comments that this
route, frequently sabotaged in the past,
runs through areas heavily infiltrated by
enemy troops, and the anticipated attacks
could be the first step in the isolation of
Hung Yen. The loss of Hung Yen would be a crippling blow to the
defense of the southern delta and would greatly increase the vul-
nerability of the Hanoi-Haiphong areas,
possible enemy plans for an attack in the Hai Duong
area, about 15 miles east of Ke Sat, where bridges across the
Thai Binh River constitute the most vulnerable link in the Hanoi-
Haiphong supply route. Enemy antiaircraft defenses there, indi-
cated by a French pilot's report of 37mm antiaircraft fire, suggests
preparations in anticipation of French air action.
5. French officers doubt Haiphong beachhead could be held
points up the low morale
of the French officer corps. The officers
generally believe that the Tonkin delta
cannot be held in the event of even a small-
scale attack without reinforcements of two
or three divisions from France. These,
they feel, will not be sent. French forces
pro .a. y wou e orced to withdraw to a small perimeter around
Haiphong, in which case virtually all Vietnamese troops would desert.
They further believe the Haiphong beachhead could be held for only a
limited period.
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Meanwhile, according to the American army
attach�n Saigon, altered French defense plans for the Tonkin delta
now call for French units to remain in the southern delta area, in-
stead of giving the Vietnamese army responsibility in this sector. The
attach�omments that the French apparently wish to avoid a major re-
organization while the enemy has a strong capability for attack, and
that the decision may also have been motivated by French doubt that
Vietnamese troops could hold the southern delta area.
6. President Sukarno cites Communist support on Dutch New Guinea
problem:
President Sukarno told Ambassador Cumming
on 15 June that he and other Indonesian leaders
realized the threat that Communist control of
Indochina would pose. The president added,
however, that the Indonesian people saw only that the United States
would not support their claim to Dutch New Guinea. He also referred
very pointedly to Moscow's and Peiping's support of the Indonesian
claim and the favorable impression this stand might have in Asian
eyes.
Comment: President Sukarno has been
unable to win any significant support among Asian neutrals for his
country's claim to Dutch New Guinea.
The chief of Sukarno's secretariat recently
told Cumming that the president has lately tempered his criticism of
the Communists and goes out of his way to see fellow travelers from
abroad. He believed that by refraining from attacks on Sukarno, the
Communists had succeeded in weakening the president's "mental
defenses against the Communist infiltrators."
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Johnston sees Arabs more co-operative on Jordan River develop-
ment plan:
Eric johnston, special ambassador to the
Middle East, reports his discussions with
an Arab committee in Cairo indicate
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encouraging prospects of obtaining Arab co-operation in the
unified development of the Jordan River valley. He says that
the Egyptians provided effective, sympathetic and constructive
leadership.
Tentative understanding was reached on
such vital points as allocation of water and its storage in the Yarmuk
River valley. The Arabs appear strongly opposed to the use of any
Jordan River water outside the Jordan watershed--as is contemplated
by Israel. The Arabs also oppose UN participation in the protect
until an effective agreement has been reached under the aegis of
the United States,
Comment: The political atmosphere has
been more favorable for the current discussions than when Johnston
unsuccessfully broached the subject last October. Nevertheless,
there remain such important obstacles as: (a) the unsettled Israeli-
Syrian dispute over Israel's diversionary canal on the Jordan; (b)
continuing political paralysis in Syria; and (c) general Arab opposi-
tion to co-operation with Israel.
These obstacles might make Arab-Israeli
co-operation impossible or restrict the implementation of any "agree-
ment in principle" to separate projects which could be integrated at
some distant date.
LATIN AMERICA
8. Anti-Communist forces reported invading Guatemala:
Guatemalan
anti-Communist forces under Carlos
Castillo Armas in Honduras were moving
against Guatemala.
The commandant of Guatemala's Second
Military Zone, which borders Honduras.
n e chiefo e armed forces
that a reconnaissance party of his troops TTis maintaining contact
with the enemy." He asked for additional men and weapons.
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Comment Castillo Armas, who has
become the symbol of anti-Mnmunist resistance to the Arbenz
regime,
1He appears to be acting independ-
ently of the top officers long close to Arbenz who are now reliably
reported threatening to oust the president if he refuses to reverse
his pro-Communist policies. The unknown degree of support for
Castillo Armas among active army officers would appear to be a
crucial factor.
Meanwhile, Arbenz is reported refusing
to make any concessions to the army. He may be relying on re-
peated promises by the Communists to mobilize their followers in
defense of his regime.
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