NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 15455993
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: February 27, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: June 29, 1990

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Contents
USSR: Vilnius Puts Ball in Moscow's Court 1
: Accord With East Germany on Troop Support
Germanys: Unification Advances on Berlin 3
South Africa: Planned Strike Threatens New Violence 4
Zaire: Troubled Prospects at Thirty 5
Notes
Romania: Prime Minister Cutting Independent Swath 7
Honduras: Strike Threatens Reforms 8
Albania: Balkan Diplomatic Offensive 8
In Brief 9
Special Analyses USSR: Scorecard for the CPSU Congress 10
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USSR: Vilnius Puts Ball in Moscow's Court
The Lithuanian legislature's announcement yesterday of a moratorium
on the republic's independence declaration will probably be enough to
open talks with Moscow; haw ar President Gorbachev will 110 in those
negotiations remains unclear.
By a 69-to-35 vote, the legislature adopted the plan put forward
by President Landsbergis that calls for a 100-day, extendable
moratorium to begin when talks with Moscow open. Moscow did not
immediately react officially. According to TASS, Lithuanian Prime
Minister Prunskiene on Thursday said Gorbachev had told her and
Landsbergis that Moscow would open talks "immediately following"
the declaration of a temporary moratorium and would lift its
blockade "that same evening."
The plan specifies that the moratorium becomes invalid if talks break
off or if the legislature cannot function, an apparent safeguard against
the imposition of direct rule by Moscow. Lithuanian leaders have
stressed that the moratorium does not jnvalidate the renublie's
independence declaration of 11 March.
Comment: The declaration appears to meet Moscow's requirements
to open talks. Gorbachev may, however, balk at the moratorium's
contingency on talks or raise cosmetic objections. Any such action
would strengthen the arguments of Lithuanians who believe the
center cannot be trusted and might, if accompanied by threats, lead
the legislature to rescind the moratorium offer. The two sides
probably will try to start at least preliminary talks as soon as
possible--Lithuania to hasten the lifting of the blockade and Moscow
to get things under way before the Western economic summit opens
in Houston on 9 July. Gorbachev also will hope to use the Lithuanian
concession at the Soviet party congress against traditionalist elements
who have been arguing that his policies are leading to a breakup of
the union.
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�
USSR: Accord Accord With East Germany on Troop Support
East Berlin, with Bonn's coaching, has settled some key short-term
financial issues related to the Soviet military presence in East Germany;
Bonn continues to hold out prospects for economic benefits to encourage
Soviet acquiescence to a unified Germany in IVATO�butAloscowis_
playing for more than economic benefits.
East Berlin has agreed to pay Moscow $740 million for the rest of
this year as a subsidy for Soviet troops stationed in East Germany,
according to press reports; the West Germans originally indicated
they would pay significantly less. East Germany will let Soviet troops
stationed there exchange ostmarks they now hold for deutsche marks
at a 2-to-I rate, a compromise between the 1-to-1 rate the Soviets
wanted and the 3-to-I rate for foreigners.
Comment: Chancellor Kohl probably believes the agreement
will cushion Soviet hardline criticism of President Gorbachev's
acceptance of German unification and strengthen his own hand when
he visits Moscow on 15-16 July. The deal reportedly covers only this
year, and Bonn probably could renege if the Soviets are inflexible on
NATO membership or on a timelabi
The West Germans almost certainly are closely guiding East Berlin on
security issues to ensure that the East Germans do not compromise
Kohl's aims. Bonn probably is especially on guard against any East
German tendency to equate the presence of Soviet and NATO troons
in Germany.
Moscow welcomes the stopgap financial agreement because, without
it, the Soviets would have had to begin paying some of the costs of
garrisoning in scarce hard currency when the German economic and
monetary union is implemented tomorrow. But Moscow wants more
than economic sweeteners. It probably interprets Bonn's acceptance
of financial arrangements before Germany's alliance status is resolved
as justification of its hard line on security issues. The Soviets may
believe the deal confirms Bonn is so eager to avoid confrontation that
it will continue to take the lead in pressing for an accommodation of
Soviet concerns at the NATO summit in London next week. Moscow
probably is quite comfortable with East Berlin as a negotiating partner
and undoubtedly views its own proposal that unified Germany adhere
to the legal obligations of both German states as a safeguard. \
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Honecker Facing Charges for Border Violence
East Germany's acting state prosecutor, Guenter Seidel, yesterday
announced he has brought murder charges against ousted Communist
leader Erich Honecker for authorizing the use of deadly force against
would-be escapees seeking to cross the intra-German border. At the
Berlin Wall�built when Honecker was chief of internal security�at
least 77 people were kilted and another 113 wounded trying to escape
to the West between 1961 and 1989, according to a West Berlin
human rights group.
The emotionalism of an election year may mean authorities will be
forced to put Honecker on trial or expel him from the country. They
probably will make further arrests of Communist-era leaders, border
guards, and secret police officials.
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GERMANYS; Unification Advances on Berlin
The momentum of German unification is increasingly impinging on
Four-Power rights and may soon formally raise the issue of whether
to transfer the capital to Berlin.
The two Germanys today will sign an agreement�it takes effect
tomorrow�to eliminate border controls between them and in Berlin.
he Soviets this week agreed to discuss an
Allied plan to open the air corridors to Berlin to non-Allied aircraft
for the first time and to let the two Germanys participate in Berlin's
air-safety system
West Berlin's leaders have publicly criticized Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze's call last week to withdraw all Allied troops from
Berlin within six months of an all-German election. Bonn reportedly
believes East Germany will press for a commitment in the second
unification treaty to have Berlin replace Bonn as the capital of a
united Germany.
Comment: Eliminating border controls in Berlin will fuel German
moves to unify the city's government and to end Four-Power
occupation as rapidly as possible. Bonn almost certainly hopes
Moscow's agreement to include the two Germanys in the Berlin air
regime is a sign the Soviets will give up all their Four-Power rights
by yearend. Moscow hopes its proposal to lift Four-Power rights in
Berlin alone will induce the Germans to accept other aspects of its
proposals, including confirmation of Four-Power rights in German
as a whole for a transition period
Chancellor Kohl favors having Berlin as the capital but probably
will resist making an early commitment. He will not move most
government functions until Soviet troops leave East Germany but
may raise the issue when an all-German legislature convenes, most
likely next January. Berlin's leaders may insist that Allied troops
remain in Berlin as long as Soviet troops are on East German
territory, risking the impression that Allied and Soviet troops are
in Germany on the same basis.
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Pretoria Facing Other Labor Problems
In addition to the planned strike on Monday, several other issues
cloud labor relations in South Africa:
� Black unions are angry that the recent legislative session failed
to enact new labor legislation proposed by leading black labor
federations and a white employers' group to replace a law
black workers reject as antiunion. But by agreeing to form a
committee of business, labor, and government to discuss
changes in the law, de Klerk appears to have forestalled a
threatened nationwide strike over the issue.
� Gold prices approaching four-year lows have put well over
100,000 jobs at risk in high-cost mines. More than 1,000
mineworkers, mostly black, have been laid off this month.
� The National Union of Mineworkers since last month has
been engaged in a wage dispute with gold and coal mine
employers that may lead to a damaging miners' strike this
year.
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(b)(3)
NatSecAct
SOUTH AFRICA: AFRICA: Planned Strike Threatens New Violence
A call by the ANC and its allies for a nationwide strike Monday to
undermine Zulu Chief Buthelezi threatens to spark a significant
increase in violence between black supporters of the ANC and Buthelezi's
Inkatha group. (b)(3)
NatSecAct
The strike ostensibly is aimed at pressing Pretoria to lift the state
of emergency in Natal Province and to disband KwaZulu homeland
police controlled by Buthelezi. Announced several weeks ago by the
powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the
boycott will kick off a weeklong campaign of anti-Buthelezi marches
and rallies. The ANC leadership only endorsed the strike on
Thursday.
Comment: Supporters of the ANC coalition and Buthelezi's lnkatha
group over the past three years have fought each other bitterly for
the backing of blacks in Natal. The government will try to protect
commuters from boycotters, contain black-on-black violence, and
minimize the damage to talks with the black opposition. Nonetheless,
President de Klerk will strongly denounce the ANC coalition's role
in organizing the showdown if violence occurs, particularly because
Buthelezi remains popular among whites. (b)(3)
NatSecAct
ANC support for the campaign, which will occur while Nelson
Mandela is still overseas, seems tentative. Most ANC leaders
probably doubt the protest will lead to a disbanding of the KwaZulu
. police, and they surely believe it is likely to work against ANC goals
of quelling unrest in Natal and ending the state of emergency there.
The protest might backfire, winning Buthelezi greater domestic and
foreign support.
Some black activists allied with the ANC apparently are trying
to defuse the situation by portraying the strike as antigovernment.
Buthelezi's rhetoric, however, has been inflammatory, painting the
campaign as an attack against all of South Africa's 8 million Zulus,
not just Inkatha's 1.6 million members.
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(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
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Strike Activity, June 1990
',Contra i African Alepubtic
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IStudent unrest and
doctors' strike
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ZAIRE: Troubled Prospects at Thirty
President Mobutu marks the 30th anniversary of Zaire's independence
from Belgium today beset by domestic woes and growing international
isolation, but he seems determined to maintain control through
manipulation, defiance, and cosmetic reforms.
he legislature this
month adopted constitutional amendments limiting the number of
parties to three and confirming the President's control of the
government and security forces;
Politically motivated off-budget
spending has already pushed the deficit over $80 million,'
Government offers of bonus payments have failed to quell a rash of
strikes over wages, including some by railworkers and miners in the
politically volatile, economically vital Shaba Region. The railworkers
reportedly want to close the state-owned copper and cobalt mines,
which account for two-thirds of Zaire's annual export earnings, about
Bilateral donors are freezing or cutting back aid; the collapse of the
IMF-sponsored economic adjustment program has made Kinshasa
ineligible for Paris Club debt relief, The World Bank slashed its loan
commitments this year from $500 million to $50-60 million.
Comment: Mobutu probably hopes to get by with only cosmetic
reforms. Likely cuts in aid from Belgium, his main benefactor, may
lead him to suspend all foreign debt payments; Kinshasa has fallen
$100 million behind in debt service this year. Mobutu may try to turn
to Paris, but France almost certainly has no interest in a large-scale
commitment to Zaire, Estrangement from his West European backers
probably will lead him to press for increased US aid. If he deems that
support inadequate, he may expel some US diplomats or reduce US
access to Zairian facilities,
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IN
ROMANIA: Prime Prime Minister Cutting Independent Swath
Prime Minister Roman this week outlined the new government's
plans for speeding the transition to a market economy. He warned of
collapse if drastic measures are not taken to curb wage demands and
raise productivity while acknowledging the reforms will be disruptive
and might lead to layoffs. Bucharest has already begun to streamline
economic ministries, reimpose customs duties, crack down on black
marketeers, and talk about resuming food exports. Meanwhile, the
Culture Minister publicly suggested this week that President Iliescu
needs good advisers to prevent him from overreacting as he did when
he called the miners to Bucharest for vigilante activity, two weeks ago.
(C NF)
Comment: Roman's calls for market reform differ sharply from
Iliescu's go-slow approach and may be part of an effort to distance
himself from the President. Roman's plans for reform, as well as his
naming of a relatively untainted cabinet, probably are also intended
to repair the damage the miners' rampage did to Romania's image
in the West. Roman will have trouble implementing radical market
reforms, especially if they require inefficient state enterprises to lay
off workers, the ruling National Salvation Front's key constituency.
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New Honduran Economic Program Well Under Way
Tegucigalpa's significant progress on its economic reform program
has led to new agreements with the IMF, the World Bank, and several
bilateral lenders. Achievements so far include:
� An unofficial but sharp devaluation of the currency has
established more realistic prices for imports and exports but
also has contributed to inflation.
�Significantly greater increase in revenues than in spending in
the budget for this year.
� Increased interest rate ceilings to encourage savings.
�Simplified and reduced import tariffs, including the closure of
loopholes for influential business and military interests.
Still to come are lifting of controls on agricultural prices, higher
utility Drices. and Privatization of 10 public enternrispc thic veal-
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HONDURAS: Strike Threatens Reforms
A gradually increasing strike the nation's largest trade federation
began on Thursday threatens the economic program of President
Callejas. The 60,000-member federation controls most public-sector
unions, including petroleum and port workers. It claims to be
supporting strikes by banana and state health workers over wage and
privatization issues. Callejas is trying to mediate in the
workers' strike and is consulting with federation leaders
Comment: The federation could cripple the economy, particularly
if petroleum workers join the strike and cause shortages of gasoline
and other petroleum products. Callejas, who last month met several
of the federation's demands in return for its support of his economic
program, probably will offer additional concessions on recent austerity
measures. The federation's calls for wage increases, however, are likely
to face strong opposition from officials who fear similar demands from
public workers will jeopardize budget reductions that are critical to
accords with international lenders. If he fails to reach an agreement
with the federation and believes his reform agenda is in jeopardy,
Callejas may declare the strike illegal and try to suppress it by force.
ALBANIA: Balkan Diplomatic Offensive
President Ramiz Alia yesterday said he will go to Bulgaria soon; it
will be his first official trip outside Albania since he became President
five years ago. Premier Adil Carcani has just returned from a
successful visit to Turkey.
Comment: Tirane is seeking closer ties to Bulgaria and Turkey at
a time when tensions over cross-border ethnic issues are growing
in the Balkan region. Alia probably views Sofia as a useful ally in
case relations with Yugoslavia deteriorate further over Belgrade's
treatment of ethnic Albanians. Similarly, Ankara would be a natural
counterweight to what Tirane sees as Greece flexing its muscles over
its minority in southern Albania. Alia's visit to Sofia also may help
Albania formalize an agreement to establish diplomatic relations with
the Soviets. In the past, Bulgaria has served as an intermediary for
communications with the USSR.
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In Brief
Europe
�Romanian legislature approved new government Thursday.
streamlined Cabinet structure to help rebuild economy ... most
ministers in midforties, hold technical, professional degrees
only two have direct ties to Ceausescu regime.
�Polish police yesterday broke up three-day farmers' protest
in Warsaw. ... protesters held Agriculture Minister hostage.
demanded guaranteed minimum crop prices ... Lech Walesa
to mediate; his intentions, role unclear./
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Congress Flashpoints
While it makes some ideological concessions to the traditionalists, the revised draft CPSU
platform is much more reformist than the document adopted at the Central Committee
plenum in February. The revised bylaws that set out the party's organizational structures and
procedures, however, take a more traditionalist stand.
� Vanguard role. The bylaws maintain the position of safeguarding the party's
preeminence in the political system, but reference to its vanguard role was dropped in
the revised platform. Reformers will push for removal of the term from the bylaws as
well and will support wording similar to that of the platform, which upholds the
party's right to rule in competition and cooperation with other parties. Traditionalists
will probably push for reference to the vanguard role in both documents.
� Democratic centralism. The platform resolutely rejects the traditional view of
democratic centralism�the demand that all party members and bodies obey
decisions made at the top�and defends internal party democracy instead. The
bylaws, however, clearly uphold democratic centralism as the core of party
� discipline�a principle traditionalist Ligachev vows will remain.
�Factions. Both the platform and the bylaws strengthen the minority's right to redress
and allow groups to form around alternative policy proposals so long as they do not
establish their own organizational structure and discipline. The ban on factions
remains.
�Nomenklatura. The platform renounces the nomenklatura appointment system
through which the party filled all key positions in the country from a list of loyal
candidates.
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Special Analysis
USSR: Scorecard for the CPSU Congress
Pitched battles at the 28th Party Congress opening Monday are likely
over the CPSU platform and bylaws that make critical concessions to
democratic reformers, over the substantial leadership changes that will
accompany the creation of new party structures, and over General
Secretary Gorbachev's stewardship of the party.
Despite Gorbachev's last-minute consideration of postponing the
congress to regroup his supporters against traditionalists, the Central
Committee plenum yesterday gave the official go-ahead. Although
TASS described the plenum as benevolent, it signaled the coming
showdown by calling on the Politburo to oversee revisions of
Gorbachev's opening speech. Moreover, in contrast to the unanimity
that normally characterizes Central Committee votes, an unspecified
number of members voted against the draft speech
Traditionalists, who appear to be the largest group among the 4,700
delegates, are likely to challenge some of the platform's reformist
planks, defend the need for a strong party role in policymaking, and
flag the dangers of a market economy. Gorbachev is likely to
command the support of a sizable group of moderates who will
emphasize the need for flexibility that would free them from
doctrinal taboos in solving the USSR's problems. Representatives
of the Democratic Platform are certain to press for the immediate
transfer of power to state institutions and a rapid transition to a
market economy
Although the DP will be only a small minority, the strong showing
of Boris Yel'tsin's ally Lobov in the recent race for the Russian
party leadership suggests other delegates will support them. Some
Gorbachev allies have suggested that the fear of a traditionalist
victory is compelling moderates and democratic reformers to rally
around Gorbachev.
Proposed Reorganization of Leadership
Gorbachev may be willing to make general programmatic concessions
to the hardliners that will not tie his hands if he can fill key posts with
loyal allies. Proposed changes in the party's leadership structure,
however, ensure a struggle. Although Gorbachev apparently intends
to take the new post of party chairman�one of the two posts
replacing the General Secretary�the new position of first secretary,
who would manage party operations, is likely to be hotly contested.
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"IrtrSreret�
According to a Gorbachev ally, there is support for Interior Minister
Bakatin, whom moderates reportedly favored for the Russian
republic's top party and state posts
The struggle for influence in other party organs also is likely to be
intense. The Politburo is slated to be replaced by a larger Presidium
made up of all republic party chiefs and others elected by the Central
Committee. The Secretariat, run by the first secretary, may become
more important as its members will be heads of Central Committee
commissions who apparently will have decisionmakina authority in
their spheres.
Substantial personnel changes in these bodies and the Central
Committee are certain; some sources expect an almost total turnover.
There appears to be an effort to separate party and state jobs, and
several reports suggest Gorbachev's closest allies Aleksandr Yakovlev
and Eduard Shevardnadze may leave their party posts for this reason.
Unless their departures were accompanied by those of key
traditionalists, their absence would weaken Gorbachev's party
position.
Politburo members Vorotnikov and Slyun'kov are not delegates
to the congress and thus cannot be elected to top party posts, and
Politburo member Zaykov recently said he will not run for reelection.
If Yegor Ligachev remains in the party hierarchy, he almost certainly
will continue to challenge Gorbachev's plans for the party.
Charting the Outcome
Gorbachev's ability to steer the increasingly divided party on a
centrist course will depend in large part on the extent to which the
majority of delegates fear the consequences of retreating to unpopular
traditionalist positions and feel bound by party discipline to follow
his lead. If Gorbachev can exploit these sentiments, he stands a good
chance of achieving a positive program for change. If the traditionalists
are able to roll back significant reforms in the platform, take the first
secretary position, and lock up a solid majority in the new leadership
bodies, they will have scored a decisive victory; many democratic
reformers, who claim as much as 40 percent of the party, almost
certainly would bolt to form their own party in response.
The winner of this battle is not likely to restore the party's
credibility or reverse its declining fortunes. Even if Gorbachev
prevails, the course he is pron7tine is unlikely to stem erosion of the
party's power in the long term.
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