NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 15264939
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: February 27, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: June 23, 1990

pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
u
� L.; t
11111 If
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
lap-Seeret---
CPAS N1D 90-1463X
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
� i pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
.
�' u,j I I
Warning Notice
Niitional Security
Information
ilissemination Control
Ahbretigliuns
This Document Not To Be Reproduced
Intellisence Sources or Methods Involved
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
NOFORN tNEI Not releasable to foreign nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC)
MORIN (PRI Caution�proprietary information involved
ORCON (0C)
WN
This page is Colitiernirtl.
Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
Dissemination and extraction of information
controlled by originator
WNINTEL�Intelligence sources or methods involved
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
"1
u 1 s1-1
,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Contents
Notes
In Brief
Special Analyses
South Africa: Mandela's Visit to Washington 14
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
--Ton-Secricr-
23 June 1990
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
-Ton Sccrcrt�
pproved for Release. 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
German Reactions to Shevardnadze's Proposals
NORk
�Tep-Seeret-
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
USSR: Outlining a Transitional Period for Germany
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
23 June 1990
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
USSR: Russian Party Chief Elected
2 23 June 1990
NR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
YUGOSLAVIA: Centrifugal Centrifugal Forces Increasingly Evident
�Top-Seerat-
3 23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
NR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
�Ten-Seeret�
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
European Reaction to the Suspension
�Tep-Secrer
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
NIP
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
PALESTINIANS: Anti-US Anti-US Rhetoric Escalating NR
--T-op-Secrer-
4 23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
ov
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
, I-1
""/ t_ 1
roved for Release. 2017/07/13 C05301377
4141.0
PAKISTAN: Preparing for Chinese SRBM
CHINA-PAKISTAN: Trainer Aircraft Problems Persist
5
Zee-Secret'
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
1�
. 1_�_1 JL 0
4ep-Sr
(b)(3) NatSecAct
IRAQ-ARGENTINA: Reviving Condor Missile Project
YEMEN: Tensions Rising in Unified Military
6
�TorSeeret-
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
NR
NR
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
--TarSrerin
23 June June 1990
Algeria
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
ALGERIA: Supporters Demand Ex-President's Return
LIBYA: US Oil Company Claims May Go to Arbitration
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Inp-Seefet-
7 23 June 1990
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Soviet Aid to Afghanistan, Pro and Con
�TeD-Seeret-
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
n 1-1,�;
u 1 u
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
T-en,Saogat�
USSR: Defending Continued Aid to Afghanistan
(b)(3) NatSecAct
WEST GERMANY: Calming the Europeans on GEMU
8
(b)(3) NatSecAct
23 June 1990
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
-T-etrgarrer
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
�T-ep-Seefet� (b)(3) NatSecAct
23 June 1990
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
Ls C
roved for Release. 2017/07/13 C05301377
1\1
USSR: More 1-64 Tanks Moved East of Urals
USSR: Oil Ministers Heading to "Private" Sector
9
23 Julie 1990
,(b)(3) NatSecAct
NR
NR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
' PP
roved for Release. 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
23 June June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
roved for Release. 2017/07/13 C05301377
Tau SCLILL
In Brief
(b)(3) NatSecAct
USSR
Africa
Americas
South Asia
10
continued
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
11,p Secivt
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Zalman Shoval: Ambassador-Candidate to the US
Tho Svuret
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
Middle East
East Asia
Europe
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
TotrSeeeet-
(b)(3) NatSecAct
11
-147p-Seefat,--
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Strong Economy Strengthens Quebec's Position
(b)(3) NatSecAct
23 June 1990
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
La 3
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
Special Analysis
12
Tob &LA C
continued
nntrirSeeret-
23 June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
t_i 1
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
13
Top
21 June 1990'
(b)(3) NatSecAct
NR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
"TyrSemi�
South Africa
Mandela on the Move
Mandela has become increasingly comfortable in asserting
himself since his release from nearly three decades in
isolation. He still defers to the collective leadership of the
ANC and remains attentive to the sensitivities of those who
have struggled to break the white monopoly on power during
his absence. Nonetheless, the notable lack of high-ranking
ANC officials accompanying Mandela in the US suggests he
enjoys greater decisionmaking independence and the
executive leadership's trust. On the other hand, the small,
largely working-level delegation may be unable to prepare
him properly to address diverse audiences or to respond to
unexpected issues.
Mandela is handling well both the stresses and the
opportunities of the fanfare surrounding him. He remains
unembittered toward those who imprisoned him, focusing on
the task at hand rather than dwelling on the past. Mandela
reacted with calm indifference to recent press allegations that
the CIA had been involved in his arrest in 1962. In meetings
with political leaders he is scrupulously polite, listens
attentively, acknowledges mutual constraints, and responds
to the give and take of negotiations with humor and finesse.
Mandela favors consensus decisionmaking and is unlikely to
make political promises without soliciting advice from
colleagues.
-eineedeatleinY9FOR
TuirSenzet_
327105 5.90
23 June 1990 (b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct --Tup-Secrei-
Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA; Mandela's Visit to Washington
ANC patriarch Nelson Mandela views Washington as the most
influential external actor in southern Africa and is seeking continued
pressure on Pretoria. At home, he must rally his diverse, multiracial
supporters for negotiations with the government; he undoubtedly believes
his trip abroad will enhance his credentials and bring moral support and
money. 4G-A119-
Mandela and other senior ANC leaders are committed to negotiations
to end apartheid and have worked closely with Pretoria behind the
scenes. For example, they have cooperated on freeing political
prisoners and handling refugee affairs
Mandela has sought to reassure audiences he envisions peaceful
change leading to a new South Africa that:
� Respects both majority and minority interests.
�Protects private property while redressing the inequities of
apartheid.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
�Encourages private enterprise and foreign investment.1�444-
Leading the ANC Through New Challenges
Mandela must guide the ANC through an unprecedented era of overt
negotiation and political organization that will put a premium on
alliance building. The ANC is the most popular political force in
South Africa, but it faces rival antiapartheid groups and restive
factions within its own ranks.-(C--NF-)-
Some hardline members of the ANC, other black opposition groups,
and township youths are convinced that international sanctions and
militant domestic protests have forced President de Klerk to the
negotiating table, They believe white resolve
is weakening and want to increase pressure until Pretoria agrees to
an interim government and a constitutional assembly elected on a
nonracial basis. These elements are also unwilling to bury grudges
with Zulu leader Buthelezi, whom ANC sympathizers regard as a
government collaborator and an instigator of the anti-ANC violence
in Natal./e9-
Mandela is also challenged to control the ANC's externally based
military wing, which has resisted talks with Pretoria and has not
always obeyed the political leadership. He undoubtedly wants to
enhance the ANC's capability to wage an armed struggle should talks
with Pretoria collapse, but he does not want unauthorized attacks
to disrupt talks or to make it seem the group is not committed to
a peaceful settlement. 4C--N-Ft
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
continued
(b)(3) NatSecAct
14 23 June 1990
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
I s
"1 t__
App
roved for Release. 7/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
-ThIrSteret�
Alleged Plot To Kill Mandela and de Klerk
South African police are playing down press allegations that radical rightwing groups have
plotted to assassinate Mandela and de Klerk, I
The police detained 1-1 men for questioning but
reportedly have freed them. Police personnel now view the story as sensationalism and
believe the source may have been trying to push extremists to violence,
The allegations stem from a liberal Afrikaans-language weekly, which carried an interview
with a former police security agent who infiltrated radical rightwing groups and revealed an
alleged plot to kill Mandela on his return home next month. De Klerk and five other Cabinet
ministers also were named as targets. A countrywide campaign of sabotage, arson, and
terrorism allegedly was planned.
Tape recordings of discussions with members of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement and the
Conservative Party and documentary evidence were cited to support the claims. A killer was
reportedly lined up to assassinate Mandela, and weapons allegedly were smuggled into the
country.
As de Klerk and Mandela pursue negotiations, rising rightwing fears of
black domination and a growing sense of betrayal almost certainly will intensify calls for
action in white suprenricist and neofascist groups.
Rumors of plots against Mandela and de Klerk have persisted ever since de Klerk released
Mandela from jail in February and initiated major reforms, and they cannot be discounted in
the current environment. The assassination of Mandela would have the most serious
implications. De Klerk's most likely successor, Finance Minister Du Plessis, supports his
reformist policies. The black opposition without Mandela, however, would be hard pressed
to resolve the differences among competing groups and to find a moderate leader who
commands the same respect at home and abroad. A Mandela assassination would spark
widespread violence among township youths, almost certainly delaying or even stopping the
talks.
Of more immediate concern, Mandela's leadership might be threatened by health problems.
A grueling schedule on his tour�particularly in the US�has repeatedly been cut back to
allow him to rest. Although illness would not have as devastating an effect as an
assassination, it would present many of the same problems to the apartheid opposition and
to negotiations with the government.
lop-Secret
N&PORN
(b)(3) NatSecAct
23 June June 1990
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
,
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
pproved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377
(b)(3) NatSecAct
uji
Seeking Support Abroad
Internationally, Mandela is campaigning to maintain diplomatic
pressure on Pretoria and to raise funds. He believes continued
pressure is necessary to achieve more tangible results in dismantling
apartheid. By persuading the international community to keep
sanctions in place, Mandela probably hopes to show his militant
supporters he can be an effective leader and a tough negotiator with
Pretoria. He is also trying to win the confidence of the ANC's military
wing by finding new sources of materiel to supplement reduced aid
from Eastern Europe and the USSR. (C NF)
Outlook
The ANC probably will make little progress reconciling the often
contradictory demands of its constituency until after its national
conference in December, when delegates elected from each region will
vote for a new executive body. Until then, the ANC will lack a formal
platform and will vacillate between moderate and hardline rhetoric.
Even while the group labors to find its voice, it most likely will retain
the largest following. Nonetheless, Mandela must proceed cautiously
toward negotiations with both Buthelezi and Pretoria or risk losing
some black support to antiapartheid rivals or Communist Party allies.
Mandela sees the US as a potentially vital donor of humanitarian,
financial, and technical aid the ANC needs to prepare for
negotiations, to recruit and train new members, and to resettle exiles.
The group's fundraising in South Africa will probably fall far short of
its needs, and Mandela undoubtedly hopes Washington will help rally
overseas support.te-NR�
The Mandela itinerary is being used to show appreciation to longtime
allies, and the ANC has scheduled his visits to reward nations,
cities, or groups that have long supported its call for sanctions and
disinvestment from South Africa. He has delayed meeting with Prime
_Minister Thatcher, who has campaigned against South African
sanctions, even though he visited the UK and spoke at well-attended
events organized by British antiapartheid groups. Mandela
undoubtedly recognizes US sensitivities on some ANC ties but has
nonetheless expressed symbolic support for the PLO, Havana, and
Tripoli, regarding them as past or potential supporters of the ANC
cause.-G41.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
15
(b)(3) NatSecAct
�Tep-Setrut-
23 June 1990
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C05301377