STATEMENT TO VICE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OFTHE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 07101928
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2024
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2024
• Case Number: F-2021-02293

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Mr. Vice President embers of the Presidents Commission:
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to
clarify the activities conducted by the Central Intelligence
Agency within the United States. I would like to assure
you at the outset that the Agency has not conducted a
"massive illegal domestic intelligence operation" as alleged
in The New York Times of December 22, 1974.
The Agency and I shall be entirely forthcoming with
this Commission's work in full confidence that a thorough
understanding of the intelligence apparatus of the United
States and the role of CIA will:
1) demonstrate the high value and great
importance of the intelligence work of
the Agency,
(2) reassure you as to the legality and
general propriety of the Agency's activities
over the years, and
(3) lead you to constructive recommendations
to improve the procedures and arrangements
that govern Agency activities.
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In short, we welcome the opportunity this inquiry brings
to increase public confidence in the Agency and to make its
work more effective in the future.
I shall start with a brief description of the CIA--
its authority under the law, its mission, and the intelligence
process itself.
This will include two Agency activities of special
relevance to this inquiry--security and counterintelligence.
I shall then describe those activities of the Agency that
take place within the United States to demonstrate the relation-
ship between them and the collection of foreign intelligence.
I shall follow this with a discussion of the allegations
raised in The New York Times of 22 December and several
subsequent publications.
I shall conclude with some ideas which might be useful
to the Commission in formulating its recommendations.
Mr. Vice President, in addition to this statement, I am
submitting for the record a set of detailed appendixes
discussing in greater depth some topics germane to the Com-
mission's work. Most of these documents are classified and
in their present form should remain so. We would, however,
be glad to work with the Commission to make parts of them
appropriate for public release if the Commission desires.
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In addition, of course, I am prepared to answer your questions
in any detail you request, as will other current Agency
employees you may wish to question, but on these matters also
I respectfully request that you consult with the Agency to
delete sensitive material prior to release.
THE CIA, AUTHORITY AND BACKGROUND
CIA's existence and authority rests upon the National
Security Act of 1947. The Act provides that the Agency will.
"correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence within the Government...."
The Act calls for the Agency to perform certain services
f "common concern as the National Security Council determines
can be more efficiently accomplished centrally" and "to perform
such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting
the national security as the National Security Council may from
tilme to time direct."
The Act provides that "the Agency shall have no police,
subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions."
I emphasize the latter phrase. The law is explicit that the
Agency shall have no internal security functions--those are
the responsibility of the FBI and other law-enforcement
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authorities. In its use of,the term "intelligence" in
connection with CIA activities, thus, the Act implicitly
restricts CIA to the field of foreign intelligence.
Another proviso is that "the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;...."
Incidentally, the Director is the only Government official
specifically charged by statute to protect intelligence
sources and methods.
The CIA Act of 1949 provides that, in order to implement
the above proviso and in the interests of the security of the
foreign intelligence activities of the United States, the
Agency is exempted from the provisions of any "law which
requires the publication or disclosure of the organization,
functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the Agency -
In the intervening years since 1947, as the international
role and responsibilities of the United States have grown, so
has the importance of intelligence to its decision-making
processes. The duties of the Director of Central Intelligence
have also grown, and particularly his role as coordinator of
all the intelligence efforts of the US Government.
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Intelligence today is no simple, single-dimensional
activity. It is primarily an intellectual process involving:
(1) the collection and processing of raw information,
(2) analysis of the information and development of
reasoned judgments about its significance, and
(3) the dissemination and presentation of these
findings to those needing them.
The process involves a number of different Departments
and Agencies, which, together, we call the Intelligence
Community.
Our overt collection .includes, for example, monitoring
public foreign radio broadcasts, press, and other publications,
excerpts of which are produced by CIA as a service of common
concern for the other members of the Community.
Other overt collection is done by State Department
Foreign Service Officers, Treasury Department representatives,
and Defense Attaches abroad.
Great technological advances have revolutionized
intelligence over these years. The advent of sophisticated
technical collection systems has enabled us to know with
certainty many things which a decade ago we were debating
on the basis of bits of circumstantial evidence.
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This technology has been introduced at high cost.
Collection systems being employed today have required
hundreds of millions of dollars and substantial numbers of
people to analyze and make sense of the information they
deliver.
But overt and technical collection cannot collect
the plans and intentions of a hostile general staff, sense
the political dynamics of closed authoritarian societies, or
enable us to anticipate new weapons systems during the
research phase before they are completed and visible. For
this, clandestine collection is needed, especially by human
sources.
The immense flow of data from these collection systems
must be correlated, evaluated, and analyzed to understand
its true significance. Since the responsibilities of our
policy-makers cover such a wide range of international
subjects these days, intelligence must employ the analytical
services of professionals with specialized backgrounds in
politics, economics, the sciences, military strategy, geography,
and other disciplines. CIA alone, for example, employs enough
expertise in these fields to staff the faculty of a university.
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Other Agencies play essential roles in intelligence work,
but CIA is the only statutory Agency of the US Government with
responsibilities exclusively in the field of intelligence.
It has three major functions:
(1) to produce intelligence judgments,
based on information from all sources, for
the benefit of policy-makers. The product
is in the form of publications and bulletins
on current developments, estimates of future
international situations, and in-depth studies on
various topics--for example, a study of the
origins and growth--over time--of the Soviet
strategic weapons program.
(2) to develop advanced technical equipment
to improve the collection and processing of
US intelligence; and
(3) to conduct clandestine operations to
collect foreign intelligence, carry out
counterintelligence responsibilities abroad,
and undertake--when directed--covert foreign
political or paramilitary operations.
This chart depicts the CIA organization to accomplish
these activities.
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The production of intelligence judgments and analysis
concerning foreign affairs is vested in the Directorate for
Intelligence (DDI). Offices below the Deputy Director level
specialize in economic, political, and military topics. DDI
analysts often confer with a range of experts in the United
States outside the Intelligence Community to benefit from
the views of recognized authorities on topics of interest.
The Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T) is the
unit responsible for research, development, and operation,of
advanced collection systems. These range from small technical
devices concealed by agents abroad to complex and costly
"black-box" collection systems involving electronics,
photography, and the like. In the DDS&T also, our analysts
keep under study scientific and technical developments abroad,
including weapons and space systems.
The Directorate for Operations (DDO) is the unit responsible
for covert collection, primarily through clandestine collection
by human sources. The Directorate is organized along geographic
lines. It has some special staffs which focus on problems
that cut across regional boundaries (for example, international
terrorism).
The Directorate for Administration (DDA) provides support
to other Agency components. It is responsible for personnel
programs, security, administration, training, logistics,
communications, medical services, and the like.
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SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
I have already mentioned my responsibility for pro-
tecting intelligence sources and methods. It is out of this
responsibility, and because of the need to protect the
nation's vital intelligence secrets, that CIA has built over
the years a capability, using security and counterintelligence
techniques, to protect those secrets and guard against
penetration of our intelligence activities.
A degree of secrecy, and an ability to protect some
secrets, is essential to our work. This literally can be a
matter of life and death for agents operating abroad,
whether they be our own employees whose identification with
CIA would make them obvious targets for terrorists, or
citizens of totalitarian regimes who have agreed to report
to us on their own governments. Many of the American
businessmen and professors who voluntarily share their
foreign experiences with us want the relationship to remain
confidential, and we must protect their proprietary information
which sometimes comes our way in the course of such exchanges.
Disclosure of the details of sophisticated (and costly)
technical collection operations would tell a target country,
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for instance, Just how to change its procedures in order to
deny us reliable assessments of its military threat. Finally,
no foreign government can be expected to continue intelligence
cooperation and exchange with us unless it is confident that
we can keep its secrets.
There is an obvious potential conflict here With the
right of citizens in a democracy to know what their govern-
ment is doing in their name (and with their money). I am
trying to reconcile this dilemma by making as much as possible
of the substantive product of intelligence activities available
to the general public as well as to government officials.
I am also trying to make public as many as possible of the
general categories of intelligence activities conducted by
the US government: But I cannot relax, and indeed am
intensifying, efforts to preserve the secrecy of operational
details. Our efforts on these lines concentrate on assuring
us of the integrity of those we employ or work With, providing
.indoctrination in and monitoring our procedures to keep our.
secrets, and investigating weaknesses or leaks In 'our security
machinery. We have requested some improvements in our
legislative tools for this purpose, and during the course of
this Investigation, I shall be asking your support for some
of these efforts.
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Counterintelligence Ls an essential element of the
Intelligence process, assigned to CIA by the National SeCuritT
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The counterintelligence function was the subject of
scrutiny back in 1954 by a special committee established by
President Eisenhower and headed by General James Doolittle
to examine the covert activities of CIA.
In his report, General Doolittle wrote:
"We cannot emphasize too stongly the importance of
the continuation and intensification of CIA's counter-
intelligence efforts to prevent or detect and eliminate
penetrations of CIA."
Findings such as this served to underscore the importance
of our counterintelligence work.
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ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
It is, of course, a fact that the CIA has a presence
in and carries out certain activities within the United
States. About three-fourths of its employees live and work
in this country. Most are in the Metropolitan Washington
Headquarters Area, performing analysis, staff direction, or
administrative support. About 10 percent of CIA's employees
work in the United States outside the Headquarters Area. These
perform functions supporting our organization which must be
done here, such as personnel recruitment and screening or
contracting for technical intelligence devices, and they
collect foreign intelligence here. Clearly much information
on the world is available here from private American citizens
and from foreigners, and it would be foolish indeed to spend
large sums and take great risks abroad to obtain what could
be acquired cheaply and safely here.
CIA's Domestic Collection Division (DOD) has representa-
tives in 36 American cities. These representatives contact
residents of the United States who are willing to share with
their Government information they possess on foreign areas
and developments. These American sources provide their
Information voluntarily, in full awareness they are contribut-
ing information to the Government.
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The DCD assures them their relationship with CIA will
be kept confidential and that proprietary interests (say, on'
the part of a businessman) will not be compromised.
Since 1947, the DCD has contacted many thousands of
individuals and organizations representing American business,
industry, and the scientific and academic communities. DCD
of course maintains records on its relationships with the
individuals and organizations it has contacted.
The information obtained by DCD is made available to
other agencies in the Intelligence Community as a service of
common concern. Army, Navy, and Air Force officers are
assigned to some DCD offices to assist CIA personnel so that
there is one coordinated program, rather than separate dup-
licating efforts.
I want to emphasize that this collection program
focuses exclusively on the collection of information about
foreign areas and developments.
In addition to their information collection responsibil-
ities, DCD offices also assist in other CIA activities in
the United States, such as the identification of individuals
who might be of assistance to Agency intelligence operations
abroad. DCD is also responsible for the resettlement of v/
foreign defectors who take up residence in the United States.
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Information is sometimes received by DCD representatives
which more properly falls within the jurisdiction of other
US Government agencies. Such information is always passed
to the appropriate agency. When possible, the possessors of
the information are referred to the appropriate local
agency. In a few cases, Domestic Collection Division V
offices have accepted and passed to CIA Headquarters
forwarding to the appropriate agency, information about
foreign involvement in US narcotics traffic, dissident
activities, and terrorism which they learned while conducting
their normal collection activity.
The Foreign Resources Division was known until 1972 as
the Domestic Operations Division. The principal mission of
this Division is to develop relationships with foreigners in
the United States who might be of assistance in the clandestine
collection of intelligence abroad. In this process, it also vi
collects foreign intelligence from foreigners in the United
States. It has offices in eight US cities which operate
under some cover other than CIA.
The work of this Division is closely coordinated with
the FBI which has the responsibility for identifying and
countering foreign intelligence officers working within the
US against our internal security.
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The Cover and Commercial Staff exercises both staff and
operating responsibilities in the conduct of the Agency
cover program, in commercial activities and funding necessary,
to support our other operations, and in arranging the cooper-
ation of US business firms for cover purposes. It conducts
negotiations with other US Government Departments and Agencies
on official cover arrangements and with cooperating US
business firms on non-official cover arrangements for Agency
personnel, installations, and activities. It develops and
maintains a variety of proprietary commercial mechanisms to
provide non-official cover and operational support to Agency
operations against foreign targets. An example of the work
of this Staff in the commercial area is the arrangement with
a corporation, either an independent firm or a wholly-owned
proprietary, to provide the ostensible source of income and
rationale for a CIA officer to reside and work in a foreign
country.
The Agency's Office of Security has eight field offices
in the United States primarily engaged in conducting security
investigations of Americans with whom the CIA anticipates
some relationship--employment, contractual, informational,
or operational. The investigators do not normally identify
themselves as CIA.
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The Office of Security investigates all applicants for
employment with the Agency, actual or potential contacts of
,the Agency, and consultants and independent contractors to
determine their reliability prior to their exposure to
sensitive matters in dealings with the Agency. We also
conduct investigations of individuals employed by contractors
to the Agency, such as the employees of Lockheed who worked
on the U-2.program. Numerous files are, of course, built up
in this activity, but are kept segregated from the Agency's
operational and counterintelligence files.
Another responsibility of the Office of Security is the
investigation of unauthorized disclosures of classified
_intelligence. This function stems from the Director's
statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and
methods. Thus, the CIA__Office of Security would prepare a
damage assessment and endeavor to determine the source of a
leak so that we could take corrective action. The National
Security Act of 1947 gives the birec'tor authority to
terminate the employment of an individual when he deems it
"necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
states. . ."
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Research and development are necessary activities if we
are to have the technical intelligence capabilities I
discussed earlier. Nearly all such work is done for the CIA
through contracts with US industrial firms or research
institutes. In many such contracts, CIA sponsorship of the
project is not concealed. But in some cases, the fact that
the work is being done for the CIA--or even for the Government--
must be hidden from many of the individuals working on the
program. This was the case in the development of the U-2
aircraft, for example.
In such cases, a separate organization athin an existing
company may be established by the company to conduct the
necessary R&D under a cover story of commercial justification.
Management of the entire program is organized in a fashion
which isolates it from any association with the CIA or the
Government. In order that such operations can take place,
special cover mechanisms must be established to handle such
problems as funding and security investigations of personnel
being assigned to the job. Because of the Agency's ability
to operate with greater flexibility than most other agencies
of Government and because of its experience, in such activities,
it has also Undertaken such activities on the basis of
funding made available from the Department of Defense from
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appropriations for for the purpose. Indeed, though the CIA's
own R&D program is a vigorous one, it is very small when
compared with the several large programs conducted in con-
junction with the Department of Defense. All such activity
is subject to regular and systematic review and audit. This
activity represents another category of our domestic activities,
bringing the Agency into contact directly or indirectly with
large numbers of US citizens and requiring it to keep a
large number of records involving US citizens and organiza-
tions.
The complexity of modern intelligence analysis requires
the development and application of increasingly sophisticated
methodology for treating the enormous quantity of data
collected by the Intelligence Community. Although the
Agency has actively pursued such development using its own
highly qualified staff, it has increasingly been forced to
call on the capabilities of the American scientific and
technical community for assistance.
This assistance is provided via a contractual arrangement.
It may be for the purpose of defining and developing the
methodology, e.g., how to process poor quality foreign radar
signal intercepts in order to be able to evaluate the emitting
radar. Alternatively, it may require a continuous effort to
apply a methodology, e.g., to provide assessments of foreign
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missile performance frOm intercepted signals. In either
case, it both supplements and complements analogous efforts
in the Agency itself. Such programs have been a standard
means of carrying out the Agency's role for many years.
These sorts of research projects or studies can be
misunderstood, as recently occurred with respect to one on
foreign transportation technology. One critic has confused
CIA's solicitation of bids for a study with a program to
spy. This confusion stems from a lack of appreciation of
the modern intelligence process in which "spying" plays only
a small role. In fact, however, this project, and others
similar to it, are purely analytical in character and expect
no espionage or active intelligence collection by the contractor
beyond research among open sources. Some such contracts do
include analysis of information provided by CIA from its
secret technical or clandestine sources, but only when the
information is not available otherwise.
The Agency's Office of Personnel has a Recruitment
Division to hire Americans with the required skills and
expertise for Agency employment.
Agency recruiters identify themselves as CIA Personnel
Representatives and carry CIA credentials. We maintain 12
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domestic field offices (whose telephone numbers can be
obtained from the public telephone directory). In addition,
Agency representatives enter into confidential arrangements
with some US residents who agree to assist us abroad in the
conduct of our foreign intelligence responsibilities.
Here in the Headquarters area, we have an office in
Rosslyn, Virginia, open to the general public. Since most
of, our professional applicants come from college campuses,
primarily at the graduate level, our recruiters maintain
close contact with college placement officials and faculty
advisors. To round out our recruitment effort they also
maintain contact with personnel representatives of private
industry, professional and scientific associations, minority
organizations, and the like. Our recruiters are authorized
to place advertisements in newspapers, periodicals, and
college publications for recruitment purposes.
The Agency must look to itself to provide training of
its employees in those disciplines which are unique to its
mission, ranging from clandestine operations and agent
handling to intelligence analysis and technical skills. We
also offer an extensive program in language training, commun-
ications, and the normal administrative and management
courses associated with Government operations. To this
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end we operate several training sites and occasionally take
advantage of a large US city 'environment to expose a trainee
to the difficulties of foot surveillance. In such instances,
of course, the subject would be another Agency employee
participating in the training exercise.
The four units I have just described carry out the
major programs of the Agency which call for the operation of
field offices in the United States. They all are proper
under the Act which governs us. A detailed list of the
facilities involved and various other specific facilities
outside the Washington area (e.g., logistics) is Appendix H,
'1CIA Domestic Real Property."
Mr. Vice President, the foregoing provides you with a
view of the extent of CIA activities in the United States.
The classified appendixes I have submitted to the Commission
provide additional detail.
Now, let me turn to the recent press allegations.
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ALLEGATIONS AND SOME DETAILS
The article of December 22, 1974, charged that CIA has
engaged in a "massive illegal domestic intelligence operation.
The article referred in particular to files concerning
American dissident groups.
The facts are these (as outlined in my report to Presi-
dent Ford, a copy of which you have):
In mid-1967, the US Government was concerned about
domestic dissidence. The obvious question was raised as to
whether foreign stimulation or support was being provided to
this dissident activity.
On August 15, 1967, the Director established within the
CIA Counterintelligence Office a unit to look into the
po8sibility of foreign links to American dissident elements.
And then, you will recall that President Johnson on
July 27, 1967, appointed a National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders. Mr. David Ginsburg, the Executive Director
of that Commission, wrote to the Director on August 29,
1967, asking what the Agency might do to assist in that
inquiry with "information, personnel, or resources."
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The Director responded on September 1, offering to be
helpful, but pointing out that the Agency had no involvement
in domestic security. Some limited material from abroad,
the Director wrote, might be of interest.
Later the same year, the CIA activity became part of an
Interagency program, in support of the National Commission,
among others.
In October 1967, a report issued by the new CIA unit
concluded that, although information was limited,
"There is no evidence that anti-war demonstrations
and related activities in the United States are con-
trolled by Communist forces abroad. There are indica-
tions, however, that anti-war activity is partially
responsive to North Vietnamese inspiration."
Periodically thereafter, various reports were drawn up
on the international aspects of the anti-war, youth and
similar movements, and their possible links to American
counterparts. Specific information was also disseminated to
responsible US agencies.
In September 1969, the Director reviewed this Agency
program and stated his belief that it was proper "while
strictly observing the statutory and de facto proscriptions
on Agency domestic involvement."
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In 1970, in the so-called Huston Plan, the Directors of
the FBI, DIA, NSA, and CIA recommended to the President an
integrated approach to the coverage of domestic unrest.
While not explicit in the plan, CIA's role therein was to
contribute foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to
the joint effort.
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The Huston Plan was not implemented, but an Interagency
Evaluation Committee, coordinated by Mr. John Dean, the
Counsel to the President, was established. The Committee
was chaired by a representative of the Department of Justice
and included representatives from CIA, FBI, DoD, State,
Treasury, and NSA. Its purpose was to provide coordinated
intelligence estimates and evaluations of civil disorders
with CIA supplying information on the foreign aspects thereof.
Pursuant to this, CIA continued its counterintelligence
interest in possible foreign links with American dissidents.
The program was conducted on a highly compartmented basis.
As is necessary in counterintelligence work, the details
were known to few in the Agency.
We often queried our overseas stations for information
on foreign connections with Americans in response to FBI
requests or as a result of our own analyses. Most of these /
requests were for information from friendly foreign services,
although there were instances where CIA collection was
directed. In most cases the product of these queries was
passed to the FBI.
In the course of this program, the Agency worked
closely with the FBI. For example, the FBI asked the Agency
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about possible foreign links with domestic organizations or
requested coverage of foreign travel of FBI suspects. The
Agency passed to the FBI information about Americans it
learned from its intelligence or counterintelligence work
abroad. The FBI turned over to the Agency certain of its
sources or informants who could travel abroad, for handling
while there. In order to obtain access to foreign circles,,
the Agency also recruited or inserted about a dozen .individuals
into American dissident circles in order to establish their
credentials for operations abroad. In the course of the
preparatory work or on completion of a foreign mission, some
of these individuals submitted reports on the activities of
the American dissidents with whom they were in contact.
Information thereby derived was reported to the FBI, and in
the process the information was also placed in CIA files.
In 1973 this program was reviewed and specific direction
given limiting it to collection abroad, emphasizing that its
targets were the foreign links to American dissidents
rather than the dissidents themselves and that the results
would be provided to the FBI.
In March 1974, the Director terminated the program and
issued specific guidance that any collection of counter-
intelligence information on Americans would only take place
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abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests i/C)
from the FBI or in coordination with the FBI, and that any
such information obtained as a by-product Of foreign intelli-
gence activities would be reported to the FBI.
In the course of this program, files were established on 4)
about 10,000 American citizens in the counterintelligence unit.
About two-thirds of these were originated because of
specific requests from the FBI for information on the activities
of Americans abroad, or by the filing of reports received
from the FBI.
The remaining third was opened on the basis of CIA
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information
known to be of interest to the FBI.
For the past several months, we have been eliminating
material from these files not justified by CIA's counter-
intelligence responsibilities, and about 1,000 such files
have been removed from the active index but not destroyed.
In May 1970, the Department of Justice provided us with0
a machine-tape listing of about 10,000 Americans. The
listing could not be integrated in CIA's files and was
destroyed in March 1974.
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Mr. Vice President
me digress here for a moment to
comment on this word "files which has been bandied about
widely and can mean many different things to different
people.
The backbone of an intelligence operation, particularly
a counterintelligence case, is detailed information - through
which one can begin to discern patterns, associations, and
connections.
In this sphere, therefore, any professional Intelligence
organization tries to systematically record all scraps of
Information on people who may be of interest to it or may
provide avenues to persons of interest. Thus whenever a
name - anyone's name - a date, a place, a physical description
appears anywhere in any operational report it is usually
put into a cross-referenced master index..
Whenever there are one or more pieces of paper dealing
primarily with a single individual - for whatever reason -
there is probably, somewhere, a "file" on that Individual;
whether he is an applicant an employee, a contractor, a
consultant a reporting source, a foreign target of intelli-
gence Interest, a foreign intelligence officer, or simply a
person on whom someone else (such as the FBI) has asked us
to obtain information overseas.
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The fact that there is a "file'Lsomewhere in one of our
various record systems with a person's name on it does not
mean that that "file" is the type of dossier that police
would use in the course of monitoring that person's activities.
In this context, it is clear that CIA does have listings
of large numbers of Americans, as applicants, current and
ex-employees, sources and other contacts, contractors,
Government and contractor personnel cleared for access to
sensitive categories of intelligence, individuals corresponding
with us, etc. I am sure you will find that most of these
are unexceptional and necessary to run an institution of the
size and complexity of CIA, and that these records are
maintained in ways which do not suggest that the names are
in any way suspect.
Our operational files also include people who were
originally foreign intelligence targets but who later became
US citizens, such as Cuban or other emigree groups.
There have been lists developed at various times in the
past, however, which did appear questionable; for example,
caused by an excessive effort to identify possible "threats"
to the Agency's security from dissident elements, or from a
belief that such lists could identify later applicants or
contacts which might be dangerous to the Agency's security.
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They did not result from CIA collection efforts, but were
compilations of names passed to us from other Government
agencies such as the FBI, some police forces, or the House( -------
Un-American Activities Committee. A number of these clubiot;-""-------
listings have been eliminated in the past three
the Agency's current directives clearly require
listings be kept.
The New York Times article of December 22,
certain other charges:
that at least one member of Congress had been under CIA
surveillance and that other Congressmen were in our
"dossier" on dissident Americans, and
that break-ins, wire-taps, and surreptitious inspection
of mail were features of CIA activities.
Let me provide background on these allegations.
On May 9, 1973, the Director issued a notice to all CIA
employees requesting them to report any indication of any
Agency activity any of them might feel to be questionable or
beyond the Agency's authority.
The responses led to an internal review of the counter-
intelligence program and other Agency activity - a review,
Mr. Vice President, that is continuing.
years, and
that
no Such
1974, made
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The initial responses and our review of them culminated
in fresh policy determinations and guidance issued in August
1973. This guidance is a matter of detail in the classified
appendixes I will provide to this Commission. k
As I have said, Mr. Vice President, this review continues
in order to insure that our activities remain proper.
Let me discuss our findings with respect to the press
allegations.
(1) The New York Times article of December 22, 1974,
declafed:
"At least one avowedly anti-war member of Congress was
among those placed under surveillance by the CIA, the
sources said."
Mr. Vice President, our findings are that there is
no -- and to my knowledge never has been -- surveillance,
technical or otherwise, directed against any sitting member
of Congress.
The New York Times article also indicated that "Other
members of Congress were said to be included in the
CIA's dossier on dissident Americans."
No current Congressmen are included in the files of the
counterintelligence program described above, although we do
have lists and files of current Congressmen.
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Some (about 14) were opened prior to the Congressmen's
election as a step toward possible operational cooperation with
the Agency. Some (about 2) because the names arose in the course
of coverage of foreign targets. Some are files on ex-employees
(2) or applicants. Some (about 17) are on contacts or sources of
our Domestic Collection Division. Some were included in the
coverage of dissidents maintained by our Security Office mentioned
above. And, of course, our Congressional liaison staff keeps
working files on its contacts with Congressmen.
(2) The New York Times article also referred to "break-ins,"
and said no "specific information about domestic CIA
break-ins" could be obtained.
Our investigations to date have turned up a total of three
instances, which could have been the basis for these allegations.
Each of the three involved premises related to Agency employees
or ex-employees.
In 1966, a new Agency employee, inspecting a Washington
apartment he was thinking of renting, saw classified documents
in the apartment, which was the residence of an ex-employee. The
new employee advised CIA security officers who promptly went to
the apartment, were admitted without stating their intentions,
and removed the documents.
The second instance occurred in 1969. A junior Agency
employee with sensitive clearances caused security concern by
appearing to be living well beyond his means. Surreptitious entry
was made into his apartment in the Washington area. No grounds
for special .concern were found.
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The third instance occurred in 1971 in the Washington
area. An ex-employee became involved with a person believed
to be a Cuban intelligence agent. Security suspicions were
that the two were engaged in trying to elicit information
from Agency employees. A surreptitious entry was made into
the place of business of the suspect Cuban agent. Results
were negative. An attempt to enter the suspect agent's
apartment was unsuccessful.
(3) The New York Times article also referred to wire-
taps and said no specific information could be obtained.
Our findings show that there were telephone taps directed
against twenty-one residents of the United States between
1951 and 1965, and none thereafter. In each case the purpose
was to check on leaks of classified information. Nineteen
of the individuals concerned were Agency employees or former
Agency employees, including three defector contract agents
(not US citizens) and one contract employee who was the wife
of a staff agent. The two private citizens whose phones
were tapped in 1963 were thought to be receiving sensitive
intelligence information, and the effort was aimed at determining
their sources. Our records show that these two taps were
approved by the Attorney General.
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In 1965, President Johnson issued an order that there
be no wire-taps in national security cases without approval
by the Attorney General. Only one of the operations mentioned
above took place in 1965, against a CIA employee suspected
of foreign connections. This operation was approved by the
Attorney General.
Since World War II, successive Presidents have authorized
the Attorney General to approve electronic surveillance in
national security situations. The Omnibus Crime Act of 1968
prohibits interception and disclosure of wire or oral communi-
cations but further provides that nothing in such law
...shall limit the constitutional power of the President
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the Nation against actual or potential attack ,or other
hostile acts ,of a foreign power, to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States, or to protect national
security information against foreign'intelligence
activities." (Emphasis supplied.)
While this statute does not purport to convey a new power to
the President, it is a recognition by the Congress that such
measures are within the constitutional power of the President.
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(4) The New York Times article also.alleges physical
surveillance of American citizens.
The Agency has conducted physical surveillance on our
employees when there was reason to believe that they might
be passing information to hostile intelligence services.
This was done on rare occasions, and in recent years only
three times -- in' 1968, 1971 and 1972. In 1971 and 1972,
physical surveillance was also employed against five Americans,
who were not CIA employees. We had clear indications that
they were receiving classified information without authoriza-
tion, and the surveillance effort was designed to identify
the sources of the leaks.
Also, in 1971 and 1972, a long-standing CIA source
a foreigner visitng in the U8 -- told us of a Plot to kill
the Vice President and kidnap the CIA Director. We alerted
the Secret Service and the FBI and we carried out physical
surveillance in two American cities. The surveillance came
to involve Americans who were thought to be part of the
plot -- and the mail of one suspect was opened and read.
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(5) The New York Times article also refers to "surrepti-
tious inspection of mail."
As part of its foreign intelligence program, CIA has
conducted at various places in the world a survey of mail to
and from certain Communist countries. This provides technical
information on Communist mail procedures and censorship. It
provides addresses that might be used for various intelligence
programs and, in those instances in which selected mail is
opened, it sometimes provides information on conditions in
the country as well as operational leads for agent recruit-
ment.
From 1953 until February 1973, CIA conducted programs
at three sites in the United States to survey mail between
the United States and two Communist countries. Some of this
mail was opened to determine Communist censorship techniques
or to report the contents of the messages. The main product
of this activity was material of an internal security nature,
which was disseminated to the FBI.
The activities discussed above were reported as a
result of the Director's 9 May 1973 notice and were reported
to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Com-
mittees -- the 'Congressional bodies responsible for oversight
of CIA -- on 21 May 1973.
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CIA RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
In August 1973 in connection with the review of all
activities of the Agency which might be considered questionable
under the terms of its charter, I ordered a review of assistance
to other Federal, state, and local government components. Each
of the Agency's Deputy Directors Was required to terminate all
activities he considered inappropriate.
Based upon this review, I asked the CIA Inspector
General and General Counsel to review and make recommendations
On all activities not terminated by the Deputy Directors.
On this basis, I made an individual determination to continue,
modify, or terminate each such activity. Most assistance to
other agencies was continued, but a substantial number of
such activities were modified or terminated.
Assistance to agencies with foreign operations and not
involved in domestic law enforcement was generally continued,
while assistance which could involve the Agency even indirectly
in law enforcement activities was appropriately modified or
terminated.
In addition, some assistance activities not warranted
on the basis of economy or necessity were discovered and
terminated. This program of review of assistance to other
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Government agencies has been made permanent and each new
proposal for this kind of assistance must be reviewed and
approved by the Deputy Director concerned, the Inspector
General, and the General Counsel before it may be instituted.
In case any one of them disagrees, I personally make the
decision.
I believe this continuing program will assure that all,
assistance is carefully considered and kept within the
bounds of legality, propriety, and economy.
In discussing allegations of improper CIA domestic
activity, I wish to comment on "the Watergate affair." This
topic has been the subject of extensive hearings by the
Ervin Committee and the four CIA Subcommittees of the 'Congress
as well as by other investigations by the Grand Jury, the
Department of Justice, and the Special Prosecutor. So I
will comment only briefly on it. The allegation Was that
CIA had prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in and was
somehow otherwise knowingly involved. While I have admitted
the CIA made mistakes in providing certain equipment to
Howard Hunt and in preparing a psychological assessment on
Daniel Ellsberg, both in response to directives from the
White House, we have no evidence, and none was developed in
any of the hearings or inquiries I have just mentioned, to
support the other allegations concerning CIA. Aside from
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these two instances, the main CIA role in Watergate was to
refuse to be used in the coverup, and to avoid being misunder-
stood as involved. Most recent evidence clearly demonstrates
CIA's non-involvement rather than involvement in Watergate.
While Senator Baker's minority report suggests that the
Agency was involved in domestic activities beyond its charter,
the testimony of 24 Agency witnesses covering 2,000 pages,
along ilith the production of some 700 sensitive Agency
documents, failed to result in any concrete evidence to
support these allegations.
Although we entered into that investigation in the
spirit of cooperation and in the interest of providing
information relevant to the investigation, eventually extremely
broad requests, which would have exposed sensitive intelli-
gence sources and methods having no relationship to the
Inquiry, forced me to request a more precise bill of particulars,
and to suggest that they might be handled more appropriately
through our normal oversight procedures with the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
I think it is interesting in this connection that
despite the fact that the profile and the provisioning were
requested by the White House, questions as to the propriety
of these actions were brought to the attention of senior
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officials of the Agency by Agency employees at the working
level.
For the Commission's background, I would also like to
mention the Agency's relationships with American student and
other associations and foundations, revealed in 1967 by
Ramparts magazine. The Agency had developed confidential
relationships wifh some officials of these groups to assist
their activities abroad in exposing and counteracting
Communist-controlled efforts to subvert international student
and labor groups.
State Department Under Secretary Katzenbach chaired an
interagency group which investigated this matter. The
group's recommendations resulted in a ban on CIA covert
assistance to American educational or voluntary organizations,
and these restrictions are reflected in internal Agency
regulations ansi policy.
The activities I have described to you in this statement
related to The New York Times allegations and were among
those, as I have said, that were reported to the Director by
our officials and employees in 1973 in response to his
notice to all employees asking them to report any and all
activities that they or others might deem questionable.
These were reported to the Chairmen of the Senate and House
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Armed Services Committees - the Congressional bodies responsible
for oversight of CIA - in May 1973.
These briefings were accompanied by my assurances that
the Agency's activities would be conducted strictly within
its proper charter, and specific instructions were issued
within the Agency along these lines. Recently, I was advised
by the Acting Attorney 'General that I was obliged to call
pertain of these to his attention for review, and I have
done so, although it is my opinion that none would properly
be the subject of adverse action against men who performed
their duties in good faith.
The Commission will be interested in some of the CIA's
internal checks and balances - its safeguards designed to
ensure that its activities remain within proper bounds.
In the first place, strength is to be found in the
simplicity of CIA's organization. The command line runs
from the Director to four Deputies and thence to Office or
Division Chiefs. The arrangement provides the Director with
an uncomplicated and direct access to action officers within
the separate components, whether they be Deputies, Office
Chiefs, analysts, or operators.
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The Agency relies on certain functions, as well as
organization, to provide safeguards. The Inspector General,
who reports directly to me, is vested with an independent
authority to review the activities of all elements of the
Agency.
The CIA General Counsel reports to the Director and
oversees the legal aspects of Agency activity.
' The CIA Comptroller, who reports directly to the Director,
reviews programs and the allocation of resources independent
of the Deputies and makes his advice known to the Director
and the Deputies.
The CIA Audit Staff is responsible for checking the use
of funds by Agency components and for assuring that the
funds are properly used and are consistent with appropriate
internal approvals and the law.
The Office of Finance watches the integrity of the
Agency's accounting structure, supervises internal financial
audits, and assures compliance with the fiscal requirements
of the Agency and the Government.
In addition to my dealings with each Deputy Director and
Independent Office Chief, they together comprise the CIA
Management Committee. As such, they meet regularly to
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advise me on a wide range of policy decisions. This practice
also ensures communication among the leadership of all
components of the Agency and provides for cross-
fertilization of ideas and opinions.
One characteristic of the Agency is the need for
compartmentation to enhance security and protect particularly
sensitive sources and methods. This does not diminish my
responsibility to know of and approve all sensitive operations,
but it does limit the awareness of employees not directly
involved in the operation and leads to limits on written
records to which substantial numbers of people have access.
As a result the written records immediately available
to describe the background of some Agency activities conducted
in earlier years are less complete than I - and I am sure
the Commission - would like. There is no implication here
of improper destruction of records, but the intelligence
profession does limit the detail in which they exist and the
degree to which they are circulated.
Finally, every year Agency employees are instructed to
bring either to my attention or to that of the Inspector
General any activity which they think may be beyond our
charter.
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Mr. Vice President, in this presentation I have endeavored
to provide the Commission with a frank description of our
intelligence activities. That description is intended to
demonstrate the importance of the CIA and the rest of the
Intelligence Community in assisting the Government in developing
and implementing its foreign policy and alerting it to
potential crisis or war. I would now like to summarize the
situation and present some thoughts as to possible Com-
mission recommendations.
First, as I said at the outset, I flatly deny the press
allegation that CIA has been engaged in a "massive illegal
domestic intelligence operation."
Whether we strayed over the edge of our authority on a
few occasions over the past 25 years is a question for you
gentlemen, and whatever investigative bodies Congress may
designate, to judge.
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Mr. Vice President, any institution--in or out of
Government--that tias been functioning for 25 years finds it
hard put to avoid some missteps, but I submit that any such
missteps in the CIA's history were few and far between, and
unconnected with the thrust of the Agency's important and
primary mission-the collection and production of intelligence
pertaining to foreign areas and developments.
Certainly at this time it is my firm belief that no
activity of the Agency exceeds the limits of its authority
under law.
Mr. Vice President, the President's charge to this
Commission requests that your review lead to recommendations,
some to be made to me as well as to the President. I look
forward to those recommendations, including any you may make
with regard to internal CIA safeguards and organization.
I would like to offer for the Commission's consideration
certain suggestions which the Commission may deem to be appro-
priate subjects for eventual recommendations.
There are several bills now in Congress recommending certain
amendments to the National Security Act so as to clarify the extent
of CIA's activities within the United States.
One of these is to add the word "foreign" before the word
"intelligence" wherever it appears in the Act, to make crystal
clear that the Agency's purpose and authority lie in the field
of foreign intelligence.
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Another amendment proposes that within the United
States the Agency will not engage
"in any police or police-type operation or activity,
any law enforcement operation or activity, any internal
security operation or activity, or any domestic intelligence
operation or activity."
The Agency fully accepts these amendments as a clear
statement of prohibited activity and as a way to reassure
any concerned that CIA has any such function. Last September,
I wrote to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
assuring him that the Agency will abide by the letter and
the spirit of this proposed amendment.
The prohibition in this amendment is supplemented by
the following additional proviso:
"Provided, however", that nothing in this Act shall be
construed to prohibit CIA from prctecting its installa-
tions or conducting personnel investigations of Agency
employees and applicants or other individuals granted -
access to sensitive Agency information; nor from carry-
ing on within the United States activities in support
of its foreign intelligence responsibilities; nor from
providing information resulting from foreign intelligence
activities to those agencies responsible for the matters.
involved."
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Again, we welcome this text as a dear statement of
what the Agency properly does in the United States in support
of its foreign intelligence mission. As I described to you
earlier and explained in my confirmation hearings these
include:
(1) Recruiting,screening training, and investigating
employees, applicants, and others granted access to
sensitive Agency information;
(2) Contracting for supplies;
(3) Interviewing US citizens who voluntarily share
with the Government their information on foreign topics;
(4) Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in
the United States;
(5) Establishing and maintaining support structures
essential to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and
(6) Processing evaluating and disseminating foreign
intelligence information to appropriate recipients
within the United States.
I respectfully suggest that the Commission might indicate
its support of these legislative amendments in its recommenda-
tions.
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A separate matter of concern deals with the question of
appropriate oversight of the Agency. Within the Executive
Department, the Director is appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate and serves "during the
pleasure of the President of the United States and for the
time being."
The President has appointed a Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board to assist him in supervising the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States.
This Board has a long and excellent record of reviewing
the foreign intelligence activities of the United States--
those in CIA as well as the other departments and agencies.
The Board has made a number of very important recommenda-
tions to the President and has stimulated and supported
major advances in our intelligence systems.
The activities of the CIA and the Intelligence Community
are also reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget, to
which the Agency reports fully and through whom the Director's
recommendations for the total foreign intelligence program
are routed to the President.
General guidance of the CIA and the Intelligence Community
is provided by the National Security Council through the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and
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the National National Security Council staff. The National Security
Council is assisted by the National Security Council Intelli-
gence Committee and by several other National Security
Council committees, such as the Washington Special Action
Group for crisis situations, the 40 Committee for covert
actions, and others.
Pursuant to a Presidential directive of 5 November
1971, reaffirmed by President Ford on 9 October 1974, the
Director of Central Intelligence is also assigned a special
role with respect to the Intelligence Community as well as
the Central Intelligence Agency. He is required to exercise
positive leadership of the entire Community and to recommend
to the President annually the appropriate composition of the
entire intelligence budget of the United States. He is
directed to accomplish these with the advice of and through
the United States Intelligence Board and the Intelligence
Resources Advisory Committee, which include the intelligence
elements of the State, Defense, and Treasury Departments,
and other agencies concerned with intelligence.
The National Security Council exerts.its direction over
the Intelligence Community through a series of National
Security Council Intelligence Directives assigning responsi-
bilities and providing authorization for actions. These
Directives are in the process of consolidation and updating
and are supplemented by Directives issued by the Director of
Central Intelligence under the general authority provided by
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the National Security Council Intelligence Directives. One
of particular relevance to this Commission's work specifically
outlines how CIA will operate within the United States. It
is in its final stages of coordination and is essentially
agreed between the FBI and CIA.
In my view, Mr. Vice President, the arrangements for
administrative supervision of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Intelligence Community by the Executive
Branch appear sufficient at this time, but you will certainly
want to reassure yourselves on this in detail.
Congressional oversight of CIA has long been handled
with full recognition by Congressional leaders of the necessary
secrecy of the Agency's activities. As a result, from its
earliest days, small subcommittees were established in the
Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate
and the House to which the Agency reported its activities,
but outside of which no information was made available con-
cerning its sensitive operations. There are no secrets from
these oversight committees, and between our meetings with
the Committees, we are in continuing contact with the Staffs.
The Agency has reported publicly to other Committees
about matters which can be disclosed publicly, and it has
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reported extensively in Executive Session to other Committees,
providing classified and substantive intelligence appre-
ciations of world situations. Over the years, a number of
suggestions have been made within the Congress to revise the
oversight responsibility, but to date none has been agreed.
The Agency's position has always been that it will work with
the Congress in any way the Congress chooses to organize
itself to exercise its responsibilities for oversight and
for appropriations.
Whatever arrangements the Congress adopts, we trust
there will be a continuation of Congressional protection of
the secrecy of our intelligence activities.
This raises the final subject to which I invite the
Commission's attention--the need for improvement in our
legislation to strengthen our ability to protect those
secrets necessary to successful intelligence operations.
It is plain that a number of damaging disclosures of
our intelligence activities have occurred in recent years.
One effect of this has been to raise questions among some of
our foreign official and individual collaborators as to our
ability to retain the secrecy on which their continued
collaboration with us must rest.
We certainly are not so insensitive as to argue that
our secrets are so deep and pervasive that we in CIA are
beyond scrutiny and accountability.
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We of course must provide sufficient information about
ourselves and our activities to permit constructive oversight
and direction.
I firmly believe we can be forthcoming for this purpose,
but there are certain secrets that must be preserved.
We must protect the identities of people who work with
us abroad.
We must protect the advanced and sophisticated technology
that brings us such high-quality information today.
To disclose our sources and methods is to invite
foreign states (including potential enemies) to thwart our
collection.
The problem is that current legislation does not adequately
protect these secrets that are so essential to us.
Current legislation provides criminal penalties, in
event of disclosure of intelligence sources or methods, only
if the disclosure is made to a foreigner or is made with an
intent to injure the United States. The irony is that
criminal penalties exist for the unauthorized disclosure of
an income tax return, patent information, or crop statistics
To improve this situation, we have recommended changes
in legislation, and I invite this Commission to support the
strengthening of controls over intelligence secrets. These
can be fully compatible with the Constitution, with the
lawful rights of intelligence employees and ex-employees,
_
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and with the independence of our judicial authorities.
I believe this matter to be as important as possible
improvements in our oversight by the Executive and Legislative
Departments. For effective supervision of intelligence
activities and the need for effective secrecy must go hand
in hand.
Mr. Vice President, I mentioned at the outset that I
have submitted for the record classified appendixes to this
statement. I trust they will be useful to the Commission in
its examination.
I am prepared to respond to any questions the Commission
may have and to make available appropriate employees of the
Agency for questioning.
As for ex-employees, I respectfully request--should the
Commission seek them as witnesses--that they be contacted
directly by the Commission. The Agency no longer has authority
over them, and I have directed that they not be contacted by
the Agency at this time in order to avoid any possibility of
misunderstanding of such contacts.
In the event of testimony by ex-employees or others, I
respectfully request an opportunity to review with the
Commission the details of testimony before a decision is
made to publish them and perhaps reveal sensitive intelligence
sources and methods.
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In conclusion, Mr. Vice President I sincerely believe
that this Commission will find with me that the Agency did
not conduct a massive illegal domestic intelligence activity,
that those cases over its history in which the Agency may
have overstepped its bounds are few and far between and
exceptions to the thrust of its activities and that the
personnel of the Agency, and in particular my predecessors
In this post served the nation well and effectively in
developing the best intelligence product and service in the
world. Lastly, I hope that this Commission may help us to
resolve the question of how, and consequently whether, we
are to conduct an intelligence service in our free society,
and recognize its needs for some secrecy so that it can help
protect our freedoms and contribute to the maintenance of
peace in the world.
Approved for Release: 2024/02/29 C07101928