PREPARED STATEMENT ON H.R. 15845 BY WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 07101926
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2024
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2024
• Case Number: F-2021-02293
• Publication Date: July 22, 1974

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PREPARED STATEMENT ON H.R. 15845
BY
WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
22 July 1974
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on H.R. 15845
introduced by you and Mr. Bray. The amendments proposed in this bill would
be the first changes in the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency, found in
the National Security Act of 1947. In conformity with our American constitutional
structure, the existence of the Central Intelligence Agency stems from an Act of
Congress. This is a unique contrast to the tradition and practice of most intelligence
services, but it is a necessary reflection of our free society. The result, I believe,
makes us a stronger nation, whose citizens live in a freedom envied by most of
the world.
The amendments would add the word "foreign" before the word "intelligence"
whenever it refers to the activities authorized to be undertaken by the Central
Intelligence Agency. I fully support this change. While I believe the word
"intelligence" alone in the original Act was generally understood to refer only
to foreign intelligence, I concur that this limitation' of the Agency's role to foreign
intelligence should be made crystal clear to its own employees and to the public.
I hope this amendment will reassure any of our fellow citizens as to the Agency's
true and only purpose.
Section (3) of the bill reenforces the charge in the original Act ,that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The amendment states that,
pursuant to this responsibility, the Director shall develop appropriate plans, policies,
and regulations but such responsibility shall not be construed to authorize the Agency
to engage in any pollee, subpoena, law enforcement, or internal activities, and that
any information indicating a violation of the Director's plans, policies, and
regulations should be reported to the Attorney General for appropriate action.
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This amendment conforms to my own understanding of the meaning of the
original statutory language., As I said in my confirmation hearing, I believe that
the original Act gives the Director a charge but does not give him commensurate
authority. Under existing law, the Director is responsible for developing such
internal administrative controls as are possible and appropriate to protect against
unauthorized disclosure, but if such a disclosure is identified, his only recourse
beyond internal disciplinary action, including termination of an employee, would
be to report the matter to appropriate authorities for examination of possible legal
action. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the Government did take legal action
with respect to one of our ex-employees who declined to abide by the agreement
he made when he joined CIA to protect the confidential information to which
he would be exposed.
Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with this clarification of the precise nature of
the charge on the Director to protect intelligence sources and methods against
unauthorized disclosure. As you know, I am of the personal opionion that additional
legislation is required on this subject to improve our ability to protect intelligence
sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure. The contract theory on which
the previously mentioned litigation is based is indeed a very slender reed upon
which to rely in all cases. My views on this subject became known publicly as
a result of that case and the specifics of my recommendations on this subject
are still under active consideration within the Executive Branch, so that an
appropriate Executive Branch recommendation can be made to the Congress.
The bill would also require that the Agency report to the Congress "in
accordance with such procedures as the Congress may establish" on those "other
functions and duties related to [foreign] intelligence affecting the national security
as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The National
Security Act authorized the National Security Council to direct the Agency to
conduct a number of foreign intelligence activities which by their nature must
remain secret. The Act made clear, however, that these functions and duties could
only stem from a specific direction by the National Security Council rather than
being determined by the Agency itself. The amendments do not change this
situation but add the requirement of reporting to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, at present the Agency reports to the Congress about its activities
in a number of ways. On certain matters the Agency reports publicly, such as
in this hearing and in my own confirmation hearings. The Agency further identifies
for public release a number of matters affecting it or resulting from its efforts.
A recent example was the publication of testimony on the economies of the Soviet
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Union and China provided to the Joint Economic Committee and published on
19 July with only a few deletions which related to intelligence sources and
methods.
The second area in which the Agency reports to Congress is in its assessments
of foreign situations. The Agency briefs appropriate committees of the Congress
in executive session, using the most sensitive material available, thus providing the
Congress the fruits of the intelligence investment made by the United States. I
believe this type of reporting is particularly important, as I hope to make our
intelligence of maximum service to the nation as a whole, and this can only take
place if it can assist those in the Congress who share in the American
decision-making process under our Constitution. The Appropriations Committees,
the Armed Services Committees, the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations
Committees, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and others have been the
recipients of this kind of material. Again, to the extent possible, information
provided and discussed in these executive sessions is later screened for publication.
In many cases the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved does not permit
such publication, but the classified transcript of the briefing can be made available
to the members of Congress.
The third area in which the Agency reports to Congress concerns its operations.
Pursuant to long-established procedures of the Congress, reports on these matters,
including the most sensitive details, are provided only to the Intelligence
Subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of each
House. Mr. Chairman, there are literally no secrets withheld from these
Subcommittees. In fact, I believe I have more than a duty to respond to them;
I must undertake the positive obligation to volunteer to these Subcommittees all
matters of possible interest to the Congress. As you know, these reports cover
our annual budget, the details of our activities, and problems which may have
arisen in some regard or other.
The procedures established by the Congress for this reporting have worked
well. Large numbers of highly sensitive matters have been revealed to these
Subcommittees over the years, and their classification has been respected. I am
also aware of the sense of responsibility of the members of the Congress as a
whole with respect to matters which must remain highly classified because of their
sensitivity. Thus, I am confident that congressional procedures in the future will
be as effective as those of the past and I welcome the codification of this
relationship in the proposed amendment which requires the Agency to report to
the Congress.
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Mr. Chairman, the bill also reenforces the proscription in the original Act
against police, subpoena, law enforcement' powers, or internal security functions.
I wish I could say that this clarification was not necessary but as you know,
Mr. Chairman, I have frankly admitted that the Agency did make some mistakes
in recent years in this area. Your own report of the investigations of this
Subcommittee dealt with those incidents. The Congress has, in Public Law 93-83
of 6 August 1973, made clear that the CIA may not provide help to the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration in assisting local policy and law
enforcement agencies of the states and municipalities. The language of the, bill
would go further in this regard and prohibit the Agency from engaging directly
or indirectly in the above type of activities within the United States either on
its own or in cooperation or conjunction with any other department, agency,
ort nization, or individual. This would restrict our collaboration with the FBI. to
the, field of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. It may also limit the degree
of assistance the Agency could provide to the Secret Service, under the Secret
Service Act, which authorizes it to call upon the assistance of any other agency
of the Government to assist it in its mission (Public Law 90-331). While this
amendment might restrict certain of our activities of the past which were not in
any way reprehensible, I believe that its enactment at this time would be an
appropriate way of clarifying the purpose of the, Agency as related only to foreign
I do note that the bill contains a proviso in this area which I believe is both
appropriate and essential to the proper functioning of the Agency. This makes
it clear that nothing in the Act shall be construed to prohibit the Agency from
conducting certain necessary and appropriate activities in the United States directly
related to its foreign intelligence responsibilities. I welcome this priviso not only
for its content but also for its clarification of the, propriety of some of the
long-standing activities of the Agency which are essential to its foreign intelligence
mission. These include:
a. recruiting, screening, training, and investigating employees�
applicants, and others granted access to sensitive Agency information;
b. contracting for supplies;
c. interviewing US citizens who voluntarily share with their -
Government their knowledge of foreign subjects;
d. collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in the United States;
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e. establishing and maintaining support structures essential to CIA's
foreign intelligence operations; and
f. processing, evaluating, and disseminating foreign intelligence
information to appropriate recipients within the United States.
These matters were publicly reported by me in my confirmation hearing last
summer, and I believe that there is general understanding of their necessity and
propriety. The proviso in the amendment, however, would make this explicit.
The bill also adds a new subsection to the Act to prohibit transactions between
the Agency and former employees except for purely official matters. I fully
subscribe to the purpose of this provision, to assure that former employees not
take advantage of their prior associations to utilize the Agency's assistance or
resources or to have an undue influence on the Agency's activities. This is
particularly directed at the possible use of the Agency's assets for "nonofficial"
assistance outside the Agency's charter. I. would like to say that such a provision
is not necessary, but again I must admit that errors have been made. While I do
not believe there were any instances of major import, I accept the desirability
of making the limitations on the Agency's unique authorities quite clear.
The normal legal proscriptions against improper influence on Federal
employees apply, of course, to the Agency. In addition, a regulation has been
developed within the Agency, which is brought to the attention of each employee
each year, that any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions
which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter will inform
the Director immediately. I might point out that in those cases which presented
questions concerning the Agency overstepping its bounds, the propriety and
dedication to American traditions of our own employees caused them to object
to possible Agency activities outside its charter. In my confirmation hearing I stated
that I am quite prepared to leave my post if I should receive an order which
appeared to be illegal and if my objections were not respected.
Thus, we in the Agency are fully in accord with the purpose of this
amendment. At the same time, I confess concern over some possible interpretations
of the language of this subsection. I assume that "purely official matters" would
include our normal relationships with our retirees or others who left the Agency.
I would assume it would also enable us to maintain normal offical relationships
with individuals who left the Agency to go on to other Government activities as
long as the "official matters" fall within the scope of CIA's legitimate charter
and there is no undue influence involved. I do wonder, however, whether certain
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activities might be included under this provision as official which neither the
Congress nor the Agency would want to countenance, and on the other hand
whether the phrase might interfere with a contact with an ex-employee volunteering
important information to the Agency.
' Since the Agency has certain unique authorities under the National Security
Act and the CIA Act of 1949 and since much of its work does involve highly
classified activity, I would think it appropriate that .the Congress add to the
Agency's legislative charter some special recogniti6n of the high degree of
responsibility imposed on the Agency and its employees as a result of the grant
of these unique authorities. This could require the Director to develop and
promulgate a code of conduct for CIA employees at a higher standard than that
expected of Federal employees generally. Thereby, the intelligence profession would
become one of those with special standards such as the medical or legal professions.
The Director's unique authority to terminate employees in his discretion when
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, pursuant to the National
Security Act of 1947, would provide a sanction for the application of such high
standards. Regular congressional review would provide an assurance that such a
code of conduct was adequate and that it was being promulgated, applied, and
adhered to.
Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity to comment
on H.R. 15845. With the few reservations I have noted above, I fully support
� the bill. Most of all, I fully support the purpose of the legislation in clarifying
the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency only to conduct foreign intelligence
activities. At the same time, I am pleased that the modifications proposed to the
CIA charter would not adversely affect its authority or capability to carry out
the challenging task of collecting, processing, and disseminating foreign intelligence
in the world today. I believe these amendments would mark an important milestone
in eliminating any apparent conflict between our ideal of an open American society
and the minimum requirements of secrecy in the intelligence apparatus necessary
to protect this free nation.
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