CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: PROSPECTS FOR PORTUGUESE GUINEA,

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06954147
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2022
• Case Number: F-2018-01460
• Publication Date: March 15, 1973

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
15 March 1973
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 10-73 (Revised)
SUBJECT: Prospects for Portuguese Guinea
NOTE
The plan for independence has been seriously disrupted by
Cabral's death. An orderly march to independence would take some
months, perhaps a year or more. But Cabral's successors might see
some advantages in a speedy, if less organized, move towards that
goal. This memorandum discusses the background and current status
of the insurgent movement, and speculates on possible developments
in Portuguese Guinea. As such it may be useful in lieu of an estimate.
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A. The The Portuguese and the PAIGC
. Portuguese Guinea
is
important because the African liberation movement there has been the
bell-wether of all other insurgent efforts directed against white
rule in Africa. Under the able leadership of Amilcar Cabral, the
African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) fared
reasonably well in the field, and represented the hopes of black
Africans. For their part the portuguese believe that the loss of
Portuguese Guinea would have a domino effect on the more important
provinces of Angola and Miozambique. They have, therefore, chosen
to defend their position in Portuguese Guinea with as much determina-
tion as in the larger provinces.
2. The Portuguese have had some contact with Portuguese Guinea
for over 500 years, but only in the twentieth century have they
established any semblance of control over the interior. Only 2,000
or so of the half-million inhabitants are Portuguese, and nearly all
are government functionaries living in a few towns. There are some
30,000 Portuguese troops, mostly in garrisons sprinkled around a
central core area. They protect a few trade routes and tribes loyal
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to Lisbon, and occasionally venture out to seek battle against
the guerrilla bands of the PANG.
3. The insurgency has dragged on for 10 years, but with
a greater measure of success than similar movements in Angola
and Mozambique. The guerrilla forces -- believed to number
some 6,000-8,000 -- hold perhaps a third of the territory, and
are contesting another third. The swampy terrain, the effec-
tive leadership of Amilcar Cabral, and material support from
the Republic of Guinea, the USSR, and others have contributed
to the relative success of the insurgency.
4. In the last couple of years the military situation has
reached a stalemate. General Spinola, the Portuguese governor
and military commander, has conducted the war more effectively
and with more troops than his predecessors, and has persuaded
Lisbon to pay greater attention to economic and social needs in
the territory. Meanwhile Cabral restrained his more bellicose ,
field commanders, who yearned for more rocket and artillery attacks
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on Portuguese positions, a tactic tried briefly but with good
effect in mid-1971. Cabral for several years had been publicizing
his cause in Africa, Europe, and North America, and lining up
foreign support for his planned declaration of independence. In
the latter half of 1972 PAIGC officials in the "liberated" areas
of Portuguese Guinea conducted elections for a national assembly.
The plan was for the assembly to meet within Portuguese Guinea,
declare independence as the Republic of Bissau (or some name to
be determined later), and appeal for international recognition.
Presumably this would have included application for membership in
the OAU and the UN. The murder of Cabral in January 1973 has
thrown all of this into limbo.*
The murder of Cabral still has some unresolved loose ends. A
suspected murderer and some accomplices, all members of the
guerrilla movement, are under arrest in Conakry, Guinea. Guinean
authorities blame the Portuguese, partly because it fits their
preconceptions of imperialist conspiracies, and partly because
the suspects attempted to flee by boat in the direction of
Portuguese Guinea. (They were intercepted by a Soviet naval
vessel and returned to Conakru.)
case can be made that Cabral was the victim of a long simmering
racial conflict within the guerrilla movement. Cabral, as a
Cape Verdian mulatto, was resented by mainland blacks; and as
an advocate of a coordinated military and political policy,
he was opposed by the more hawkish field commanders. The
unity and discipline which for long distinguished CabraZ's
movement from other African liberation organizations broke
down in the early weeks of 1973.
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B. Sekou Toure and the PAIGC
5. In the 1960s when the insurgency in Portuguese Guinea
was new and promising, Sekou Toure gloried in his role of host
and sponsor. By providing PAIGC with a headquarters in his awn
capital, propaganda assistance and training facilities there and
in camps close to Portuguese Guinea, Toure enhanced his own revo-
lutionary anti-imperialist credentials. But tensions built up
over the years between Toure and the PAIGC. Relations between
Toure and Cabral were fairly cordial, but never warm. Both were
heavily influenced by Mhrxist concepts, but differed in interpreta-
tion. When the Portuguese staged a raid on PAIGC facilities in
Conakry in 1970, Toure publicly reaffirmed his attachment to the
liberation cause and struck a martyr-like pose. Privately, he
was somewhat shaken by the event, enough at any rate to call for
Soviet naval protection and to instigate a massive purge of his
awn party in a search for traitors. For over a year there were
trials of "fifth columnists" and numerous warnings of imperialist
attacks, coupled with appeals for national unity.
6. Small wonder, then, that Toure over-reacted to the murder
of Cabral. At toure's moment of decision his awn fear and insecurity
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won out over revolutionary attachments. He quickly disarmed all
PAIGC guerrillas in Conakry, 'sealed off the barracks, and incited
his security forces to deal with stray PAIGC personnel as they
would with Guinean citizens,
7. For several weeks after the murder Toure took virtual
command of the PAIGC, and played a central role in selecting a
temporary leader of the movement.
Toure's speeches on the undying solidarity of Guinea
and the PAIGC failed to assuage the bitter feeling of the guerrillas
about Guinean mistreatment. A token group remained in Conakry to
handle the continued flow of Soviet arms, and occasional arrival of
Cuban advisors, and to sustain what remained of the relationship with
the Guinea government. Toure is not holding back on supplies and aid
to the insurgents; indeed, he hopes that they all go off to the front
and win the war. If they are not able to do this, he expects them tq
confine their internal feuding to their own camps, far from Conakry.
C. Prospects for the PAIGC
8, At the moment and for the immediate future, the PAIGC faces
two major interrelated problems: finding a leader, and restoring
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internal discipline and cohesion. The temporary leader, Aristides
Pereira, was selected by the PAIGC Central Committee and Toure, in
full awareness of his known deficiencies. The blacks in PAIGC were
opposed to all Cape Verdians but, lacking an agreed upon candidate
of their own, accepted the weakest of the top rank of mulattoes --
Pereira -- until a more formal election under calmer circumstances,
perhaps in a few months' time. So long as Pereira is in charge,
the field commanders are likely to operate independently, long on
� bravado but short on coordination.
If
action in the field fails to produce either tangible results (in
terms of territory gained, weapons or prisoners captured) or a
new hero, then the PAIGC is likely to pass into a phase of racial
bickering, defections, desertions, and perhaps a split into rival
factions. This situation may, indeed, not be far off.
9. If, on the other hand, one or another military commander
appears to be making headway against the Portuguese, or displays
some heroic or charismatic qualities, the movement would probably
gravitate in his direction. If the new hero were a black mainlander
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from one of the larger tribes, rather than a Cape Verdian, the
path to the top would be easier. It would be more difficult
though not impossible for a Cape Verdian with either political
or military credentials to attain the top spot. If the leader-
ship issue can be resolved before the current internal disputes
tear the movement apart, then there would be a chance to resolve
or paper over the racial conflict, restore the confidence of
foreign backers, and step up recruitment. The Portuguese would
then be in for some difficult times.
10.
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11. A, transfer of PAIGC operations to a base in Senegal
would not be easy to arrange, even though Senegal's southern-
most province, the Casamance, borders on Portuguese Guinea and
much of its population is tribally related to groups in the
Portuguese colony. The Casamance has long been at odds with
the Dakar government and from time to time indulges in separatist
agitation. Central control over the Casamance has always been
tenuous. Senegal's president, Leopold Senghor
refuses to permit opera-
tional activity from Senegal soil. He is not sympathetic with
the PAIGC's leftist leanings, and he regards their military
activity near his borders as a threat to Senegalese internal
security. He would like to see a compromise solution to the
conflict, and to that end keeps a line open to Lisbon. It is
unlikely, therefore, that Senghor would be receptive to a PAIGC
request to move into Senegal. Moreover, in light of the Portuguese
practice of the hot pursuit of guerrillas into Senegal, some of
the PAIGC leadership would have serious reservations about even
requesting help from Senghor.
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12. It is more likely that the PAIGC will swallow its re-
sentment of Sekau Toure and try to patch up the quarrel. Toure
will allow the PAIGC to use bases in the northern part of Guinea,
and will continue to funnel supplies to them. It is in his nature
to want to advise the guerrillas, and if possible to dominate them.
Hence, relations between host and guests are not likely to be pleasant
or easy, but a workable arrangement is possible. In any case, the
PAIGC will be forced to rely much more than before on support and
sustenance from the locals inside the "liberated territories".
13. The uncertainties surrounding the PAIGC and its future
are so great that it is hardly possible to estimate its prospects.
In the broadest terms, the insurgents are not likely to gain
spectacular victories against the Portuguese, nor will they
exert enough pressure to force a Portuguese withdrawal. On the
other hand, the Portuguese will probably not be able to defeat the
insurgents in the field. Therefore, some variation of the present
stalemate is likely to persist for a long time.
D. Independence
14. As for independence, the chances are still good that at
some point the PAIGC will declare itself a government in place and
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seek recognition. There is really nothing to prevent Pereira
and his colleagues from picking out some hamlet in a secure area
of Portuguese Guinea, calling it a capital and launching a drive
for recognition. If they were to tackle this in an orderly way,
it would take some months, perhaps a year or more, primarily be-
cause of the confusion in the leadership and the preoccupation
of most top officials with simply establishing their awn positions.
Also the external relations with capitals around the world, which
Cabral had cultivated so assiduously, would have to be revived.
All of this would take time.
15. Yet, from the PAIGC standpoint there is a strong case
to be made for instant independence. Considering the unsettled
problems of leadership and the frayed discipline in the ranks, a
political move towards independence might seem a useful unifying act
to give some aura of authority to the leadership and boost the
morale of the troops. Indeed, if the internal divisions are actually
greater than we think they are, then the harried leaders may seek
a very early declaration of independence. However the matter is
resolved, we are not likely to get much advance warning.
16. Until the independence issue is advanced to the level of
a UN membership proposal, PAIGC activities are not likely to cause
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much concern for US policy makers. At the UN the Africans, the
Communist states, some Asian and Caribbean countries, and a few
Western Europeans would support membership for an independent
"Bissau". There would be considerable pressure an France, the
UK, and the US from both the Portuguese and the Africans.
If the US were to vote against the PAIGC, there
would be considerable clamour at the UN, some demonstrations in
African capitals, but probably no lasting damage in relations
with most of the African states. Portugal and the Portuguese
settlers and troops in Africa would suffer some psychological
damage from a PAIGC move towards independence. Conversely the
move would boost the morale of African liberation movements
elsewhere and would inspire one or more of them to consider
a similar course of action.
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