PORTUGUESE GUINEA MEMO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06954146
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2022
• Case Number: F-2018-01460

Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
I UNCLASSIFIED 1 I CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Mr. Harold Horan, NSC Staff
2
Executive Office Bldg.
3
Room 301
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Attached is the memo you requested on
Portugal in Africa, prepared jointly by
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
1 UNCLASSIFIED I I CONFIDENTIAL I
SECRET
FORM NO. er27 Use previous editions
1-67 c. t
(40)
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
-701:r-SETRET-
Portugal and Africa
Page
Introduction 1
Portuguese Guinea 3
Mozambique 8
Angola 12
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
TOP SECRET
Portuguese Guinea
After a long period of stalemate, the guerrillas of the
African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape
Verde Islands (PAIGC) have improved their military position
in Portuguese Guinea, largely through a new capability to
counter Portuguese air power. From late March to early
June the guerrillas used Soviet-supplied SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles to down several aircraft, forcing an abrupt curtail-
ment of Portuguese air support activity. In May and June
the rebels sustained ground operations with increasing bold-
ness along both the Guinean and Senegalese borders, and be-
cause of the decline in air support there was a decline in
morale among European troops. The PAIGC leadership, dis-
rupted by the death of Amilcar Cabral, seems to have pulled
itself together in part because of the military progress, and
the leaders are now talking of a declaration of independence
by the end of the year.
3
Tor SECRET
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
luP SEC
Prospects 'for' the War
PAIGC forces appear to
remain at about 6,000-8,000, where they have been for the
past few years, but the rebels may attempt to follow up
their recent successes by undertaking sustained operations
The PAIGC may
even turn to somewhat more conventional tactics in this sec-
tor, making use of roads no longer as well covered by Portu-
guese air power. The PAIGC is believed to have a number of
armed trucks and armored vehicles available, which it may
already have used to some extent in the southern zone.
The Portuguese have contended in the past that the
PAIGC will acquire an air capability. Amilcar Cabral once
said that late 1972 was a target date for the return of
pilot trainees and the delivery of aircraft from the Soviet
Union, but there has been nothing to substantiate his claim.
There has been speculation that PAIGC pilots, with training
and technical assistance from Cuban instructors in Guinea,
might fly combat missions out of northern Guinea. This
seems doubtful, however. As high OAU officials have noted
recently, air activity by any African liberation movement
would involve neighboring host states in an unwanted wider
war. It almost certainly would result in increased Portu-
guese retaliatory action against Guinea. If PAIGC pilots
do make an appearance, they would probably be limited by
Guinean President Sekou Toure to protecting PAIGC instal-
lations inside Guinea and might even be controlled by inte-
grating them into Guinea's air defense system.
Portuguese manpower remains at about 30,000, of which
some 25 percent is believed to be black African commandos
and marines. There are an additional 13,000 militia and
village self-defence forces, some with limited training.
In contrast to the Europeans, Portuguese African units
seem to have acquitted themselves well in recent combat.
Although Lisbon is reluctant to rely on armed Africans,
the programs for recruiting African troops probably will be
maintained.
Should the Portuguese re-establish their air cover, the
war could become stalemated again. The recently named new
commander Bettencourt Rodrigues, appears to be a hard-nosed
4
-112eF-9�BeRTT-
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
TOP SECRET
fighter who combines rigorous military initiative with eco-
nomic and social enticements for the uncommitted populace,
an approach that served the present commander General Spinola
reasonably well until the developments of the last few months.
Lisbon has been searching for ways to counter the SA-7
missile, which is vulnerable to decoy and evasion techniques.
The financial burden of the war and moral opposition from
potential Western suppliers would seem to preclude the ac-
quisition of more sophisticated aircraft, as one way of
dealing with the SA-7. The Portuguese appear to be trying
new tactics as an alternative. The PAIGC recently denounced
indiscriminate high-altitude bombing and napalm attacks on
civilians, an indication that Lisbon may be introducing dif-
ferent bombing techniques.
Foreign Assistance for the PAIGC
The USSR and Cuba are the PAIGC's major sources of
assistance. The Soviets have provided arms, ammunition,
artillery, medical and quartermaster supplies, motor torpedo
boats, military vehicles, and, more recently, the SA-7.
They appear willing to continue their aid indefinitely.
Guinea cannot provide much financial or material sup-
port of its own, but President Toure permits the use of
Guinean territory and transport facilities as a conduit for
outside aid to the PAIGC and he will continue to do so.
Toure also provides training and staging areas and has even
backed rebel thrusts across the border with direct artillery
support.
Elsewhere, support for the insurgents is erratic at
best. The OAU and individual African states offer moral,
financial, and material support, but deliver little of the
latter. After years of equivocation President Senghor of
Senegal has promised to increase financial and material
assistance once the PAIGC declares independence. Libya has
sent arms shipments, and rebel artillery trainees are now
5
TO
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
�TOP�S"BeRELE-
in Tripoli. Zaire recently donated $40,000. In Europe,
Scandinavian and other governments are increasing their
non-military aid to all of the anti-Portuguese movements
and are beginning to put more political pressure on Lisbon.
The PAIGC Leadership
The election of new party leaders in July seems to have
resolved two problems that had surfaced about the time
Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in January 1973. Differ-
ences had been building between the party's political leaders
and military field commanders, with the latter pushing for
a greater voice in political decisions and expressing their
dislike of being held back by the politicians from under-
taking more aggressive military actions. A second problem
resulted from the almost total control of the party leader-
ship by Cape Verdean mulattoes. Black Portuguese Guineans
made up the bulk of the fighting forces and resented the
fact that the mulattoes did not share combat duties equally
with them. Although specific details are still unclear,
these differences apparently played a part in the assassina-
tions of Cabral by PAIGC dissidents. A more representative
leadership has now been established with the election--inside
Portuguese Guinea according to the PAIGC--of a four-man Per-
manent Secretariat, consisting of three Cape Verdeans and
one black Guinean. Two Cape Verdeans with political back-
grounds--Aristides Pereira and Luiz Cabral--still hold the
two top party posts, but the other positions are held by
men who have served as major military commanders.
Pereira was a long-time deputy of Cabral, but has not
been considered a strong leader. He apparently was chosen
acting secretary general after Cabral 's death as a compro-
mise until the internal disputes could be resolved. His
election as permanent leader may be attributable to the re-
cent military successes as well as to his own good judgement
on delicate internal issues.
Whether Pereira can maintain his leadership is open to
question. On the one hand, continued military success and
steady movement toward independence could enhance his posi-
tion. On the other, these gains could well lift a black
military commander to rival prominence, and in a future
political crisis the far more numerous blacks could seize
the top leadership in the movement.
6
Tor SECRET
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146
TOP SECRET
(b)(3)
Independence
The PAIGC has talked about declaring Portuguese Guinea
independent for several years, and it appears now that a
declaration may come this year. The PAIGC announced in May
that it would attend the nonaligned conference in Algiers
as an independent state rather than a liberation movement
Little time remains before the Algiers meeting (W(1)
a declaration might now be timed to coin- (b)(3)
cide with the upcoming UN General Assembly.
PAIGC representatives have recently been traveling through-
out Africa to gain assurance of support when independence
is declared.
A declaration of independence would almost certainly
receive the support not only of African states but of com-
munist countries, and most "non-aligned" states. Some
Scandinavian countries and perhaps even the Dutch could
also jump on the bandwagon. The PAIGC hopes this momentum
will put pressure on major Western countries such as the US
to follow suit. The PAIGC also hopes to be sponsored for
UN membership.
The PAIGC expects �that once they have gained recogni-
tion, other countries will brand the Portuguese as aggressors,
thus opening the door to increased aid and perhaps �even ac-
tive intervention by the OAU or African military forces if
this were necessary to permit the new state to survive. The
PAIGC wants to avoid a post-independence reliance on commu-
nist backing and wants as much outside aid as possible to
maintain a non-aligned image.
7
TOP SECRET
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/09/21 C06954146